CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002900110001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 9, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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crr-~-~- CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO
OCI NO. 488/60
9 November 1960
0OCUM 'E IN CLASS. ^
NO CHANG
p DECLASSfFtED
CLASS. AN ED TO: TS
ATE IOIl~1
NyEXT REVIEW D
R TO-2
ACTH. H REVIEWER
DATE- - --
I1) 15 MAY 1980
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE,UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMA
9 November 1960
A I
ONFIDENTIAL
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE SOVIET ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Bloc leaders now gathered in Moscow for the anniver-
sary celebrations of the Bolshevik Revolution are expect-
ed to concentrate on the Sino-Soviet problem in meetings
which may continue until 19 November. Despite the heavy
emphasis on Communist unity contained in both Soviet and
Chinese comment on the anniversary, Moscow and Peiping
have so far held firmly to their positions on the major
points of conflict. The public celebrations have followed
closely the pattern of recent years: a keynote declaration
which advances claims to a series of foreign and domestic
achievements and a brief military display.
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Observances in Havana of the anniversary of the
Bolshevik Revolution included a special reception by
the government-controlled labor confederation for the
Soviet ambassador, who again pledged Soviet "aid and
support" for the Cuban revolution. An increasing number
of Cuban delegations are traveling in the Sino-Soviet
bloc. There is some reason to believe that Che Guevara's
visit to East Germany around 1 December will provide the
occasion for Cuba's expected announcement of diplomatic
recognition. The Castro regime continues its active
support to Communist and other revolutionary groups
in many Latin American countries; it likewise continues
to strengthen Cuba's civilian militia.
SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The situation in Laos continues to drift. Premier
Souvanna Phouma is off on another fence-mending tour of
the northern provinces; while in Luang Prabang he will
have an opportunity to consult with former Premier
Phoui, who seems about to try his hand at bringing
about a reconciliation of non-Communist forces. However,
Phoui's fall from power last January was attended by a
great deal of bitterness, the scars of which may limit
his usefulness as a mediator.
SITUATION IN THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The stalemate between Mobutu and Lumumba continues in
Leopoldville. At the UN General Assembly, debate on the
eight-nation Afro-Asian resolution to seat the Lumumba
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKL?N TI L
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PART I (continued)
delegation is likely to become a full-dress debate on
the Congo situation with sharp African and Communist at-
tacks on the role of Belgium and the Western nations.
In contrast to the relative political lull in Leopold-
ville, pro-Lumumba forces are active in Orientale Province.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
FRANCE-ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
De Gaulle's 4 November speech, in which for the first
time he spoke of a future Algerian "republic," has occa-
sioned the resignation of Andrd Jacomet, the second-ranking
French administrator in Algeria. The government evidently
fears that the Jacomet incident may impel proponents of a
French Algeria to defy De Gaulle's stern warning against
obstructing his policy and is reported considering measures
to remove recalcitrant civil and military officials. Mean-
while, the rebel provisional government still rejects De
Gaulle's terms for negotiations and is parading its promises
of Communist bloc assistance in the hope that his bid for
international understanding will not soften t
UN resolution the Afro-Asian bloc is pushing. 25X1
SALVADORAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
The Salvadoran Army is becoming increasingly appre=.--
hensive over the failure of ex-President Osorio, who was
behind the overthrow of the Lemus regime on 26 October,
to head off a strong bid for power by Communists and
other pro-Castro leftists in the new provisional govern-
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SOVIET UN TACTICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Moscow's desire for a close alignment with the Afro-
Asian states has forced some modification in Soviet tac-
tics in the UN. In deference to the wishes of these states,
the Soviet delegation has abandoned pressure for an im-
mediate debate on colonialism, and Afro-Asian introduc-
tion of compromise draft resolutions on disarmament has
made it difficult for the bloc to carry out Khrushchev's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU
1AL
PART II (continued)
threat to walk out of the Political Committee. Widespread
opposition to Khrushchev's plan for reorganizing the
Secretariat has also led the Soviet delegation to postpone
a showdown on this issue. By linking the issue of the en-
largement of the Security Council and the Economic and
Social Council with the seating of Communist China, the
USSR hopes to improve prospects for achieving Peiping's
admission in the next General Assembly.
SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITY IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION . . . Page 5
The Soviet bloc is pushing ahead with its program to
conclude civil air agreements with free-world countries.
Thus far in 1960, bloc members have concluded or revived
about 19 agreements with nonbloc countries, with
Czechoslova'r.ia accounting for almost half of these.
Prague has extended its civil air routes to Indonesia
in the east and Guinea in the south, and apparently is
preparing to operate routes to both North and South
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EAST GERMAN EFFORTS TO SOLVE AGRICULTURE PROBLEMS . . . . Page 7
In an effort to cope with agricultural problems and
passive resistance among the peasants, East Germany has
carried out and is expected to continue widespread shake--
ups throughout district and local party and government
organizations. Such administrative measures are unlikely
to be effective, however, and there may be food shortages
in urban areas during the coming months. 25X1
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
North Vietnam apparently intends to reduce spending
for its military forces this year. Economic considera-
tions have dictated cutbacks in personnel and finances,
but these curtailments are not to affect the basic effort
to create a better equipped and technically competent
army. Significant progress has in fact been made in
modernization of the armed forces over the past several
years, and North Vietnam now has acquired a limited air
transport capability that may foreshadow the development
of some tactical air strength. Much of the army's equip
ment has come from Communist China, in violation of the
Geneva agreements of 1954.
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Moscow has apparently accepted an Iranian proposal
for a "good-will mission" headed by Prime Minister Sharif -
Emami and has invited the Shah's sister to visit the USSR,
probably in the hope that such contacts will eventually
result in Iranian willingness to make concessions on the
issue of foreign military bases on Iranian soil. Both
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
PART II (continued)
the Shah and the new prime minister wish to improve
relations with the USSR; however, they have emphasized.
their determination not to agree to any arrangements
with Moscow at the expense of Tehran's ties with the
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BLOC ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN IRAQ . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Bloc economic activity in Iraq is increasing.
Czechoslovakia late last month extended a $33,000,000
credit--raising total bloc economic aid to $215,000,000--
and additional Soviet technicians have arrived in recent
months to speed up previously established programs. Qasim
apparently is encouraging stepped-up bloc assistance in
the hope of restoring the regime's declining popularity.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Prime Minister Qasim's position appears increasingly
insecure as the struggle between pro- and anti-Communist
elements in Iraq intensifies. Communist-led strikes and
riots in central Baghdad from 5 to 7 November were harshly
suppressed by the Iraqi Army. In Jordan, a number of army
units are being pulled back from the Syrian border area,
although tensions between the UAR and Jordan continue.
SOUTHERN RHODESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
mitted nation" like Thailand. The USSR is capitalizing
on this restivenss, and may purchase more Thai rubber.
Leftists and neutralist elements in Bangkok will be
encouraged to engage in greater political activity and,
if the government's restiveness continues, Thailand could
The Southern Rhodesian Government's latest effort to
crack down on disorders and other political activity by
African nationalists has brought widespread domestic
criticism, the resignation of the chief justice, and
British refusal to conduct constitutional talks with
the Rhodesians in the present tense atmosphere. A pro-
posed security bill which would provide long terms of
imprisonment for minor breaches of the peace has led to
charges in Southern Rhodesia that the colon has become
a "police state."
THAILAND AND SOVIET ECONOMIC AID . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
.Prime Minister Sarit's recent announcement that he is
prepared to accept Soviet economic aid offers is intended
to underscore Bangkok's complaint that neutrals receive
better treatment from the United States than does a "com-
ultimatel. ado t a more neutralist foreign policy.
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PART II (continued)
UPSURGE OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN SOUTH KOREA Page 14
Communist subversion and espionage have increased in
South Korea. The national police, whose actions were a
major cause of discontent leading to the April revolution,
have become almost totally ineffective following succes-
sive purges and a reorganization. Concerned over the
deterioration of internal security, the Chang Myong
government is attempting to revitalize the nation's
security forces.
BRITISH LABOR PARTY DISSENSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The Parliamentary Labor party's election of Hugh
Gaitskell as its leader by a 2-to-l margin resulted
principally from opposition to the left wing's effort to
foster unilateral nuclear disarmament and neutralism in
Britain. Many moderate Labor leaders, however., have
privately expressed doubt that any resolution of the
party's troubles is possible as long as Gaitskell remains
leader. Future party developments will probably depend
in large part on the position taken by George Brown, the
expected winner in present balloting for deputy leader.
Brown, although a right-wing trade unionist and advocate
of a strong British defense policy, has been privately
critical of Gaitskell's leadership. 25X1
POLITICAL AGITATION IN PANAMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Activities of the powerful Arias Madrid family are
causing political stresses in Panama which could threaten
the month-old administration of President Chiari. Influ-
ential ex-Presidents Arnulfo and Harmodio Arias and
Harmodio's son Roberto are actively exploiting Panama's
deep-seated social discontent to arouse students and lower
class elements. They seek in particular the ouster of
the National Guard commandant, who despite his general
unpopularity has been a major force for stability in
Panama in recent years.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
CHURCH AND STATE IN POLAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
After an attempt by Polish Cardinal Wyszynski and
party leader Gomulka to work out a new modus vivendi
early this year, church-state relations in Poland have
deteriorated to their lowest point since the church-state
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
PART III (continued)
agreement was reached in December 1956. The major moves
against the church in the past year have consisted of
confiscatory taxation, attempts to stop the teaching of
religion in schools, seizure of church property--especi-
ally in the "Recovered Territories"--and a drive to
popularize birth control. Recent information suggests
the possibility of a temporary moderation by both
antagonists, at least in part because of the obvious
inability of either to win a complete victory. The
long-term outlook for the church, however, is signif-
ica
tl
n
y worse than it was a year ago.
BACKGROUND TO LAOTIAN POLITICS
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Politics in Laos is primarily a struggle for power
between shifting coalitions of the national elite, which
is composed principally of members of the nation's aristo-
cratic families. The adjustment of this elite to the
concept of national unity and to the constitutional
machinery imported after World War II is so tentative
that the seizure of Vientiane by a single battalion
last August has fragmented the country along traditional
dividing lines. The substance of Laotian politics re-
mains quasi-feudal, centering primarily on issues of
personality, region, and family. Differences over
alternative policy choices exist, but they are frequent-
ly subordinated to, or colored by, the more traditional
political concerns. The Communist-dominated Pathet Lao,
using mass organizational techniques, is challenging
the older political order and in the present crisis is
emerging as the strongest, nationwide political force.
NATO PLANNING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
North Atlantic Council discussions this fall show
an unusual sense of urgency over NATO's need to adjust
to meet the changing conditions in economic as well as
military spheres it will face in the next few years.
Belief that the Sino-Soviet bloc's economic penetration
of underdeveloped areas now constitutes the main threat
to Western security has produced increasing willingness,
even among the Scandinavians, to extend NATO's interest
outside of Europe. Many members believe De Gaulle's
drive to raise the status of France is frustrating
ro
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SOVIET ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION
The celebration of the an-
niversary of the Bolshevik Rev-
olution is being overshadowed
this year by a gathering of the
top leaders of world Communism
for discussions of the Sino-
Soviet dispute. Key statements
by Soviet and Chinese leaders
on the eve of the celebration
indicate that neither side has
retreated from its position.
Presidium member Frol Koz-
lov, in his keynote address on
6 November, reaffirmed. in mod-
erate terms the Soviet stand
on points At issue with China
and claimed that the USSR's po-
sition has been "confirmed by
the course of events." He as-
serted that the Soviet party
had "creatively developed Marx-
ism-Leninism" at both the 20th
and 21st party congresses in
declaring that war is no longer
inevitable even though imperial-
ism still exists. In a state-
ment evidently intended to in-
dicate that the Soviet Union is
determined to maintain its po-
sitions, he declared that the
Soviet party remains "irrecon-
cilable to any revisionist dis-
tortion or dogmatic deadening"
of Communist theory.
Kozlov stressed that bloc
unity is the source of the Com-
munist world's strength, but
noted that this strength depends
on the ability of all parties
to understand and apply doctrine
in the "new historical situa-
tion." This implies that Chi-
nese willingness to drop "dog-
matic" thinking and accept So-
viet changes in doctrine is
vital for preserving unity.
Throughout the dispute the
USSR has claimed that it has
been right, and China wrong,
in "creatively applying" Marx-
ism-Leninism.
Chinese comments on the
anniversary praised Soviet ac-
complishments and stressed
Peiping's commitment to bloc
unity. In a speech on 6 No-
vember,Foreign Minister Chen
Yi noted that Moscow is the
proper "center" of the world
Communist movement--a formula-
tion used by Mao in the more
cordial days of November 1957
but one which has since been
used only rarely.
Otherwise, Chen Yi held
fast to the lines staked out by
the Chinese in the dispute. He
observed that the struggle
against modern revisionism--
Khrushchev's "creative" Marxism-
Leninism--"must be carried
through to the end." Chen
added bite to the insult by
citing as examples of Mao Tse-
tung-',s "creativity" Chinese
innovations--the "great leap
forward!' and the communes--
which Khrushchev has found so
objectionable.
Chen referred to Soviet
experience during the Bolshevik
Revolution to buttress argu-
ments for the use of force in
the present epoch. He charac-
terized as the "most important
universal truth of Marxism-
Leninism" the assertion that
Communism can come to power only
through "revolutionary means."
Professions of high re-
gard for Soviet achievements
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and bloc solidarity came also
from Madame Sun Yat-sen in a
6 November article, but like
Chen she did not retreat on sub-
stantive issues. She reiterated
the Chinese belief that the
Communist movement must "mainly
rely" on struggle to "compel"
the West to reach agreements.
In the opening round of
what may prove to be an arduous
series of interparty talks, both
parties have offered courteous
gestures, but a definite cool-
ness remains.
Liu Shao-chi, who heads
the Chinese delegation to Mos-
cow, was given the place of
honor at the 6 November rally
and the 7 November parade, but
Khrushchev has maintained a
generally unsmiling and reserved
attitude toward him. According
to several diplomats present
at the airport arrival cere-
monies, both men were markedly
undemonstrative in greeting, and
the group of local residents
assembled for the occasion was
composed entirely of Chinese.
At the rally, Khrushchev placed
Liu on his right but, despite
the presence of a Chinese in-
terpreter behind them, spent
most of the evening conversing
with Poland's Gomulka on his
left.
In Peiping,: MIao, in a rare
public appearance, attended a
Soviet Embassy reception in
honor of the anniversary, He
apparently considered the situ-
ation serious enough to lend
his prestige to the Chinese ef-
fort to manifest cordiality with
the Russians. This display of
fellowship may reflect a fairly
recent decision, however,
eiping did not
decide to send a delegation to
Moscow until 31 October,
The composition of the Chi-
nese delegation suggests that
Peiping is prepared for a ma-
jor struggle to exclude all
phrases objectionable to the
Chinese from any document that
might be issued at the conclu-
sion of the interparty conclave.
Aside from Liu Shao-chi second-
ranking Chinese leader, it in-
cludes five other politburo
members responsible for party
affairs--three of whom have
already been involved in nego-
tiations with the Russians in
the present dispute--and some
of the regime's leading theo-
retical writers.
Delegations from other Com-
munist countries show the same
complexion. Headed by the par-
ty first secretary in, every
case except North Korea, the
delegations are composed of
politburo members who deal with
ideological matters and writers
on theoretical problems.
There is some evidence that
the party discussions will last
until at least 19 November,
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C,,RR.EN'F? ITITELIJGE.NCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
The Chinese will apparently
attemj-yt to avoid a break in par-
ty,or state relations with the
Soviet Union--probably by ex-
pressing willingness to sign a
communique such as that issued
at the Bucharest conference of
party leaders last June, which
deferred both a showdown and
a resolution of the dispute.
Military Display
The military parade in Mos-
cow on 7 November lasted only
eight minutes and generally fol-
lowed the pattern of recent
years. Aside from the usual
display of armor and heavy ar-
tillery, a,number of guided
missiles were shown, including
one surface-to-surface type re-
ported to be slightly larger
than those previously paraded,
and several surface-to-air mis-
siles reportedly of a type not
seen before. Information from
eye witnesses indicates that the
latter represented a modifica-
tion of the familiar SA-2 "guide-
line," rather than a new model.
The military marchers were
led by the newly appointed com-
mander of the Moscow Military
District, General of the Army
Krylov. Defense Minister Mali-
novsky's speech to the troops
stressed economic and scientific
progress rather than military
might. He emphasized that the
Soviet Union had no plans to at-
tack anybody, but that the
threatening attitude of the im-
perialists forced it further to
strengthen its defensive power.
Keynote Speech
Presidium member Frol
Kozlov's 6 November keynote ad-
dress presented the usual claims
of achievements both at home and
abroad, with no new departures
from standard Soviet policy po-
sitions. Stressing the validity
of the peaceful coexistence line,
he singled out Khrushchev's UN
performance for praise, and as-
serted that Soviet foreign policy
had proved effective and pro-
duced substantial results. He
concluded a general review of
the international situation and
East-West problems by declaring,
"We propose to the Western powers
that they undertake honest talks
between states on outstanding is-
sues in international relations."
The speech revealed no new
economic programs and reiterated
the familiar themes of preful-
filling the Seven-Year Plan and
catching up with the West. Koz-
lov's optimism concerning in-
dustrial achievements-.-an over
fulfillment of 1960 targets and
a 23-percent increase in gross
industrial production in the
last two years--was not dupli-
cated in his agricultural proi-
nouncements, which were more
noncommittal than on any similar
occasion in several years. He
cited only the Russian and
Belorussian republics for ful-
fillment of agricultural goals.
Kozlov admitted that the
weather was "extremely capri-
cious" this year and felt called
upon to reassure Soviet citizens
that bad weather no longer seri-
ously affects food supplies to
the population as it once did.
His agricultural statistics
failed to shed any light on the
extent of agricultural failures
this year but the total grain
harvest is expected to be about
the same as last year's mediocre
showing, and livestock production
as a whole will probably not show
much, if any, improvement. No
mention was made of the cotton
crop, which probably is less than
last year's record harvest. 25X1
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Observances in Havana of
the anniversary of the Bolshevik
Revolution included a special
reception for the Soviet ambas-
sador given by the government-
controlled labor confederation
and attended by high Cuban of-
ficials. Ambassador Kudryavtsev
again pledged Soviet "aid and
support" for the Cuban revolu-
tion."
Che Guevara, on the Moscow
leg of his five-nation Sino-So-
viet bloc economic mission, is-
sued a statement for the 7 No-
vember ;festivities .in which :he
implied a similarity between
the early post-revolutionary
struggles of the Soviet people,
"the first in the world to take
power in their own hands," and
Cuba's current experiences. He
added that the Soviet people
"supported us by your warnings
to the imperialists, thus de-
stroying their machinations
against Cuba." Moscow press
reporting of a recent speech by
President Dorticos suggests a
Cuban-Soviet decision to claim
that Cuban mobilization and the
Soviet rocket threat have so
far averted the "imperialist
aggression" that a week ago was
declared imminent.
month or early next. Cuban
journalists visiting East Ger-
many on 4 November signed an
agreement with "East German
journalists" for cooperation in
the "anti-imperialist struggle,"
according to the East German
news agency.
An increasing number of
Cuban delegations are now
traveling in the Sino-Soviet
bloc: a ballet troupe and a
"peace" movement delegation are
in the USSR; journalist delega-
tions are visiting East Germany
and USSR; and a "health" mission
has been visiting Communist
China.
Meanwhile, Cuba is appar-
ently seeking to circumvent US
export controls by expanding its
trade relations with Canadian
and Western European firms which
could provide equipment unavail-
able in the bloc at this time.
The press has reported the nego-
tiation of a deal under which a
"pool" of Canadian and British
firms would sell Cuba equipment
and buy Cuban sugar and gasoline
--the latter presumably refined
from Soviet crude. The sponsors
of the "pool" would reportedly
invite West European firms to
join..
East German Communist lead-
er Paul Verner, who attended the
Cuban Communist party congress
last August, said late last
month that Cuba will probably
announce its recognition of
East Germany in December!
Verner added that the possibil-
ity of closer Cuban - East Ger-
man economic cooperation will be
thoroughly explored in the near
future. He was, probably refer-
ring to the scheduled arrival
of Che Guevara's economic mis-
sion,in East Germany later this
A Canadian Embassy officer
in Havana told the US Embassy
on 4 November that the press
stories were presumably based
on the activities in Cuba of a
Canadian promoter who is known
to have discussed such a scheme
with Cuban..economic officials.
The Canadian expressed an un-
favorable opinion of the pro,
moter and doubted that any "re-
sponsible" Canadian interest
would join in the scheme. How-
ever, he could not discount the
possibility that some independ-
ent distributor in Canada may
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
be interested in handling Cuban
gasoline.
The Castro regime continues
its active propaganda support
for leftist-revolutionary groups
in other Latin American coun-
tries and is reportedly aiding
some of them materially. Former
Guatemalan President Arbenz and
Guatemalan Communist leaders
Fortuny and Pellecer now are in
Cuba: and probably are receiv-
ing Cuban aid for revolutionary
schemes in their country.
The sudden resurgence of
leftist influence in El Salvador
after the 26 October coup could
lead to a situation easily ex-
ploited by the Cubans and could
become a serious threat to the
Guatemalan and other Central
American governments.
Cuban propaganda media con-
tinue to attack Venezuelan Pres-
ident Betancourt, and to support
the strong extreme leftist and
Communist opposition to his gov-
ernment. Cbmmui1tst and Communist-
infiltrated parties and groups
in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and
other countries have publicly
declared their support for Castro
in recent weeks
Havana continues' to
strengthen its military poten-
tial, particularly through the
civilian militia, on the pre-
text of preparing for an attack
by "imperialist-backed co -
revolutionaries."
25X1
25X1
Selected
militiamen are being formed in-
to units to handle some of the
more complex weapons such as
antiaircraft artillery received
from the Soviet bloc. 25X1
SITUATION IN LAOS
The situation in Laos con-
tinues to drift, with no solu-
tion to the crisis yet in sight.
There has been little 4pecent
political activity because of
a Buddhist festival during the
first six days of November. With
the holiday out of the way, the
main participants in the crisis
presumably are free to resume
their efforts to resolve the
impasse which has paralyzed
Laos and threatened its dissolu-
tion as a national entity.
Premier Souvanna Phouma is
off on another fence-mending
trip to the northern provinces.
PART I
His main purpose is probably to
reinforce the seemingly growing
disinclination of the First
Military Region and General
Ouane, the armed forces com-
mander, to break away from
Vientiane. While there, he
will have an opportunity to
talk things over with former
Premier Phoui Sananikone, who
after several months' absence
from the country appears about
to re-enter the political fray.
Phoui is in Luang Prabang "tak-
ing soundings" with a view to-
ward bringing about a reconcilia-
tion among non-Communist ele-
ments in Luang Prabang, Vientiane,
and Savannakhet.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
Such an effort might suc-
ceed, as Phoui is uncommitted
to any of the factions which
sprang up in the wake of Cap-
tain Kong Le's August coup.
However, his usefulness may be
impaired by residual bitterness
from the conflict which led to
his fall from power last Jan-
uary. One of Phoui's prelimi-
nary conclusions is that it
will be important to encourage
opposition to the Pathet Lao
in Vientiane, rather than to re-
ly solely on strengthening
anti-Pathet forces in Luang
Prabang and Savannakhet.
The Fifth Military Region
commander in Vientiane claims
some progress in his efforts to
limit further Pathet Lao gains
in the province and to wean
Kong Le's Second Paratroop Bat-
talion away from its seemingly
close working relationship with
the Pathet Lao. Kong Le is no
longer commander of the battal-
ion and now is in Sam Neua on
what seems to be a political
junket which has little rela-
tion to his nominal position as
an aide to Souvanna in the lat-
ter's capacity as minister of
defense.
Some of the methods used
by the Fifth Military Region
commander to control the Pathet
Lao seem open to serious ques-
tion, particularly his arrange-
ment dividing the province into
zones of responsibility for the
government forces and Pathet
Lao elements scattered through
the province. He claims that
this device will serve to freeze
the Pathet Lao where they are;
however, the arrangement tends
to legitimatize their present
enclaves.
PART I
The newly created Commit-
tee for Neutrality and Nation-
al Unity, a front group rang-
ing from Supporters of Souvanna
to the pro-Communist Neo Lao
Hak Sat (NLHS), has issued no
statements since the fanfare
attending its creation. The
circumstances surrounding its
establishment remain obscure,
with officials in Vientiane
seemingly reluctant to discuss
the matter. There are indica-
tions that Souvanna may still
go ahead with plans to form a
moderate political party which
would be distinct from the new
committee.
Souvanna is reported to
have told the National Assem-
bly on 7 November that the
Pathet Lao was becoming in-
creasingly demanding in the
Vientiane peace talks with
the government. He claimed
the talks could not continue
under present conditions but
did not say they would be
broken off. At the same ses-
sion, the assembly reportedly
decided to begin negotiations
with General Phouiii's Savan-
nakhet group as soon as pos-
sible.
It is questionable whether
Phoumi is in a mood to nego-
tiate, however.
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9 November.1960
The focus of attention of
the Congo problem has shifted
from the capital at Leopoldville,
where ousted premier Lumumba
remains a virtual prisoner in
the official residence, to the
UN General Assembly meeting.
The prospect for a full-dress
UN debate on the Congo, instead
of a limited discussion on the
eight-nation Afro-Asian resolu-
tiOn to seat the delegation
favoring Lumumba, has evoked
action on the part of President
Kasavubu and Katangan President
Tshombe.
Kasavubu has flown to New
York to lead the fight to seat
his delegation. As the only
Congolese political leader whose
position is acknowledged by
everyone, and possess-
ing the ability to
create a good impres-
sion as a quiet, sen-
sible man in contrast
to his demagogic Con-
golese opponents,
Kasavubu may facili-
tate a solution of the
seating issue. On 8
November the issue of
seating a Congolese
delegation headed by
Kasavubu was referred
to the Credentials Com-
mittee by the president
of the General Assem-
bly. However, on 8
November, several lead-
ing Congolese legis-
lators sent a message
through the Ghanaian
delegation charging
that Kasavubu had no
right to speak as a
representative of his
government because
parliament has not
sanctioned his trip.
Atlantic
Ocean
CONGO
REPUBLIC
Thysv
In a 7 November memorandum,
Tshombe expressed the hope that
Congolese and Katangan leaders
would agree on a "new" formula
for a political association
which would be "in conformity
with the regional peculiarities"
of the Congo area, Tshombe?s
statement reiterates his stand
that each province must have
extensive rights of self-gov-
ernment, albeit with stronger
economic ties. On the same day,
Lumumba endorsed the UN role
in the Congo and applauded the
criticism of Brussels and the
Mobutu government contained in
the report of UN representative
Dayal.
In Leopoldville,Mobutu and
several of his technical
ldville
e L D V I LLE
_~.iuabourq
Lobito
9 NOVEMBER 1960
SECRET
O R I E N T A LE.
I oke Alb.
Ka ina?
K A r
Stanleyvilles,__ i-
Loge
\K I V U
\ Bnkavu
Kin u ~---
Manono
A
FEDERATION OF RHOD
AND NYASALAND
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Noiemib?ir ; 11900
commissioners voiced apprehen-
sion lest the UN embark on a
policy of establishing a trus-
teeship over the Congo. Several
commissioners have expressed
contempt for the UN's "one-
sided dealings" with pro-Lu-
mumba elements; on 8 November
Mobutu, who was in a rage over
an alleged UN plot to occupy
parliament and bring Luinumba
back to power, charged that the
Indians running UN affairs in
the Congo were doing everything
possible to restore Lumumba and
turn the Congo into a Soviet
state.
In contrast with the rela-
tive political lull in Leopold-
ville, the struggle in Orientale
Province between pro-:and anti-
Lumumba elements continues un-
abated. Lumumba's deputy pre-
mier, Antoine Gizenga, has been
organizing pro-Lumumba forces
there--reportedly with consider-
able success.
Eleven deputies and senators,
held under arrest by pro-Lu-
mumba forces in Stanleyville
since 15 October, have report-
edly been seriously mistreated.
The American ambassador com-
ments that the UN's inability
to effect their release casts
doubt on the argument that a
Congo parliament can be made
to function in an atmosphere
free from intimidation. Congo-
lese Army elements at Watsa in
northeast Orientale Province re-
portedly threatened on 4 Novem-
ber to march on Stanleyville if
Gizenga's forces did not re-
lease pro-Mobutu officers. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
FRANCE-ALGERIA
De Gaulle's 4 November
speech, in which for the first
time he spoke of a future Al-
gerian "republic," has occa-
sioned the resignation of Andre
Jacomet, the second-ranking
French administrator in Algeria.
The government evidently fears
that the Jacomet incident may
spur proponents of a French
Algeria to defy De Gaulle's
stern warning against obstruct-
ing his policy and is reported
considering measures to remove
recalcitrant civil and military
officials. The rebel provi-
sional government continues to
reject De Gaulle's terms for
negotiations and is parading
its promises of Communist bloc
assistance in the hope that his
bid for international under-
standing will not soften the
forthcoming UN resolution the
Afro-Asian bloc is pushing.
The initial reactions in
French political and press
circles to De Gaulle's speech
ran along established lines,
with rightists bitterly charg-
ing that De Gaulle went too
far and liberals hoping that
his preconditions might be-
come less important. Jacomet's
resignation has reportedly wor-
ried the government because
of its impact on the army. He
is a career civil servant per-
sonally appointed by De Gaulle
two years ago. He was directly
responsible to Delegate General
Delouvrier for supervising and
coordinating the work of all
prefects in the 13 Algerian
departments.
The most immediate reper-
cussions may be felt in the
army among the Special Admin-
istrative Section (SAS) offi-
cers who deal directly with
the Moslem population in organ-
izing, administering, and de-
veloping native communities.
Some SAS officers have com-
plained that ever since De
Gaulle first proposed self-de-
termination for Algeria they
have had difficulty assuring
the Moslems they will not be
abandoned to the rebels by
France. Sharp opposition to
the idea of an Algerian repub-
lic can also be expected from
the "activist" army officers,
particularly at intermediate
levels, who may feel that De
Gaulle let them down by not
coming out firmly in favor of
keeping Algeria French.
There has been increasing
overt disapproval from high-
ranking military personalities,
who include Marshal Juin,
General Salan, and the recently
retired Air Force Chief' of Staff,
General Edmond Jouhaud, who is
a native of the Oran area. Oran
seems to be becoming an. even
greater hotbed of anti-Gaullism
than Algiers. Army dissatis-
faction is being encouraged by
the rightist political leaders,
and both military and civilian
critics will be alert to any
sign De Gaulle is planning a
unilateral cease-fire, as he
has hinted. Rightists are also
aroused over his omission of
any stipulation that Paris
must control the foreign policy
of an Algerian republic.
De Gaulle's failure on
4 November to follow up the
scathing criticism of the United
Nations in his September press
conference suggests that he
wants to encourage nations
friendly to France to water
down whatever resolution the
Afro-Asian bloc may promote
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
later this month in the UN
General Assembly.
The rebel government will
probably persevere in its pres-
ent uncompromising attitude
toward negotiations, and at
least will demand evidence of
French good faith. The rebel
leaders apparently feel that
time is on their side in view
of the support anticipated
during the United Nations de-
bate on Algeria, and the pros-
pects of extensive material
assistance from the Soviet bloc.
"Premier" Ferhat Abbas has
stated in recent press interviews
that there is no question of
Chinese Communist volunteers, or
of bloc aircraft, since the reb-
els do not need men and have no
airfields from which to operate.
He and other rebel spokesmen
have firmly committed their pro-
visional government, however,
to accept Communist arms and
supplies and to continue the
war.
The Salvadoran Army is be- 1 on the present junta have moved
coming increasingly apprehensive
over the failure of ex-President
Osorio, who was behind the
overthrow of the Lemus regime
on 26 October, to head off a
strong bid for power by Commu--
nists and other pro-Castro left-
ists in the new provisional
government.
quickly to appoint numerous pro-
Communists and suspected Commu-
nists to key subordinate posts,
while joining with pro-US and
politically inexperienced mem-
bers of the junta in publicly
stressing the liberal but non-
Communist nature of the new
government.
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members and the three civilians
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A military member of the
junta told a US Embassy officer
on 3 November that most of the
initiative in political matters
had been conceded to the civil-
ians, who probably are not re-
sponsive to Osorio's directions.
Osorio. told the US Embassy
that restrictive measures against
the extreme left--he denies
there are Communists in the gov-
ernment--cannot be considered
at this time, since such action
would disrupt the unity which
the provisional government must
have in order to implement ur-
gently needed social and economic
changes.
The regime already has been
recognized in Latin America by
Mexico, Paraguay, Ecuador, Panama,
Nicaragua, Honduras, and Guate-
mala. Despite their recognition,
however, other Central American
governments are concerned over
the situation, recognizing that
a pro-Communist take-over in
El Salvador would have serious
implications for the stability
of their own re imes.
While the bloc has continued
to press vigorously for the
adoption of the sweeping propos-
als outlined by Khrushchev dur-
ing his stay at the UN, Moscow's
primary objective of promoting
a close bloc alignment with the
Afro-Asian neutrals has forced
some modification in tactics.
Since the beginning of this
assembly session, the Soviet
Union has tried to assume the
leadership of anticolonialist
forces, in order to win favor
with the neutralist nations and,
if possible, to weaken the West-
ern alliance by revealing and
exploiting the differences among
its members regarding policy to-
ward such areas as Algeria and
the Congo..
General Assembly President
Boland told a US official in
late October. he was under strong
pressure from the Soviet dele-
gation to have the Soviet colo-
nial item debated in plenary
session immediately. When Boland
said the Afro-Asian nations would
probably desire more time to de-
velop a resolution of their own,
Soviet delegate Zorin objected
strongly but relented when the
neutrals indicated a desire to
delay debate on this for several
weeks. Several UN officials
speculated that Moscow hoped to
have the colonial item before
the General Assembly prior to
the present gathering of Communist
leaders in Moscow as evidence
of the effectiveness of Soviet
policy. Faced with the choice
of opposing the neutralist bloc
or accepting a delay of the de-
bate, however, the USSR accepted
the delay.
The Soviet delegation has
encountered similar difficult
choices in prosecuting other
portions of its program. In
the disarmament debate in the
UN Political Committee, for
example, efforts by Afro-Asian
neutralist delegations, led by
India, to work out a compromise
disarmament resolution have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
created a situation which now
makes it difficult and embar-
rassing for bloc delegations to
carry out Khrushchev's threat to
walk out of the UN disarmament
debate if the Soviet position
is not accepted as the basis
for discussion. The USSR prob-
ably is not interested in resum-
ing disarmament negotiations, at
least not until after the new
US administration is installed;
its present objective seems to
be to induce the uncommitted
nations to press the West to
accept its proposal.
A member of the Soviet UN
delegation has indicated pri-
vately that the Indian draft
resolution offers the only pos-
sible hope for agreement, and
that the bloc will seek to amend
it to include provisions for
establishing a 15-nation commit-
tee and specific directives for
the committee to work out a
treaty on complete and general
disarmament. He warned that
if these amendments are not
accepted, or if the Indian
resolution with Soviet amendments
fails, the bloc will withdraw
from the debate and wait for a
special session of the General
Assembly to reconsider disarma-
ment next spring.
In an effort to encourage
the neutrals to agree to Soviet
amendments and press for Western
acceptance, Soviet officials are
creating the impression that the I
bloc is greatly "interested" in
the Indian initiative and as a
result has reconsidered its threat
to walk out of the debate.
In a recent talk with Am-
bassador Thompson, First Deputy
Premier Kosygin insisted that
this proposal for a special
session was not a propaganda
maneuver but a serious bid to
"give a push" to disarmament
negotiations.
In the face of generally
adverse reaction, the USSR appar-
ently has decided to defer its
program for reorganizing the UN
executive, but to continue its
attacks on Secretary General
Hammarskjold. The USSR pressed
its campaign in the Budgetary
Committee, where the Soviet
delegate charged Hammarskjold
with "extravagant spending" and
demanded a $50,000,000 ceiling
on the UN budget for 1961. How-
ever, when the question of the
organization and work of the
Secretariat came before the Bud-
getary Committee on 4 November,
the Soviet delegate agreed to
wait until next May for the spe-
cial report on the structure of
the Secretariat by a committee
of experts appointed by Hammar-
skjold.
Although the Soviet Union
apparently has thus postponed
any formal action on its reor-
ganization plan until the 1961
session, it will probably main-
tain its campaign against the
structure of the UN and the con-
duct of Hammarskjold in dealing
with the Congo crisis. The USSR
has accused Hammarskjold of acting
on behalf of the Western "colon-
ialists" in the Congo and of fail-
ing to keep members adequately
informed.
To show its displeasure, the
bloc has refused to pay any share
of the expenses in sending UN
troops to the African :republic.
Nearly all the UN members have
rallied to the support of the
secretary general, the neutral-
ists in particular. Despite
this widespread opposition, the
Soviet Union probably still hopes
to force Hammarskjold's resigna-
tion through a campaign of contin-
uous pressure--a tactic employed
successfully in 1952 against the
first secretary general, Trygve
Lie.
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9 November 1960
Another phase of UN reor-
ganization is being considered
in the Special Political Com-
mittee, which is debating Afro-
Latin draft resolutions calling
for enlargement of the Economic
and Social Council by six.-mem-
bers and the Security Council
by two. The USSR has opposed
these resolutions on the
grounds that no attempt could
be made to revise the UN Charter
until Communist China had its
"rightful place" in the Securi-
ty Council. By linking the is-
sue of the enlargement of UN
councils with the admission of
Communist China, the Soviet Un-
ion hopes to increase the pros-
eote;_a for achieving Peiping's
admission in the next regular
General Assembly session.
In the meantime, the bloc
may seek to center the debate on
the question of a realloca-
tion of seats, rather than on
an enlargement of the coun-
cils, in order to support Khru-
shchev's demand for equal rep-
resentation of East, West, and
neutral blocs in all UN organs.
SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITY IN INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
The Soviet bloc is steadily
pushing ahead with its program
to conclude civil air agree-
ments with free-world countries.
Thus far in 1960, bloc members
have concluded or revived about
19 agreements with nonbloc
countries, with Czechoslovakia
accounting for almost half of
these. At least eight other
agreements now are under ne-
gotiation, and still others
have been proposed.
Czechoslovakia this year
has extended its civil air
routes to Indonesia in the east
and Guinea in the south. From
Guinea, Czechoslovakia could
expand its air service to Bra-
zil and other points in Latin
America. In addition, Prague
has revived its 1947 air agree-
ment with Ireland, apparently
as the first step in establish-
ing an air route to North Ameri-
ca. The Czechoslovak Govern-
ment recently submitted a pro-
posed bilateral agreement to
Canada- which now is under con-
sideration in the Canadian cabi-
net. There is, furthermore,
increasing evidence that Prague
is preparing to fly to Cuba--
via either Canada or Bermuda--
and may be planning to operate
a service to Mexico as well.
Moscow recently embarked
on a serious campaign to pro-
mote the sale of one of its high-
performance aircraft--the IL-18
--in the international market,
presumably hoping to supplement
the bloc's program of expanding
its civil air routes. Although
offers of these aircraft to
free-world countries have fre-
quently been reported in the
past, no sales had been made.
This summer, however, Avtoex-
port, a Soviet sales agency,'
was authorized to seek nonbloc
buyers for the four-engine turbo-
prop plane, and the commercial
officers of 23 embassies were
given a ride on the plane..in
Moscow as part of the sales
promotion campaign.
Since then, the USSR has
contracted to sell four IL-18s
to Ghana and may have agreed
to provide two more in 1961.
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Czechoslovak International Civil Air Routes
Rebel
t111\77C .^"R
.. MO
. ()C EA
The sales agreement calls for
Soviet flight and ground
crews to operate the aircraft
until Ghanaian crews can be
trained. Similar IL-18 sales
agreements may be under ne-
gotiatiOn with Guinea and the
UAR as well. Offers to sell
this type of aircraft to Af-
ghanistan and Ceylon also
have been reported in recent
months.
The Soviet Union earlier
this year unveiled two new short-:
range transport aircraft, the
turboprop AN-24 and the turbojet
TU-124. Smaller than the IL-18
or TU-104 jet, these twin-engine
aircraft apparently are compara-
tively rugged and simple, and
their estimated landing and
take-off characteristics sug-
gest they can operate from
relatively short runways. As
these aircraft come to be pro-
duced in quantity, Moscow pre-
sumably will make them avail-
able ':to' the underdeveloped
countries in order to compete
for transport sales with Western
firms.
Scheduled
Governmental agreement, not yet Implemented
Projected (m
Under an agreement calling
for the establishment and opera-
tion of a domestic civil. air-
line by Czech specialists, the
Czech civil airline recently
sold Guinea four Aviat-14 twin-
engine, piston-powered, luxury-
model transports. The first
was delivered in July, with
the others scheduled to be
shipped in August. Czech tech-
nicians presumably have already
begun work on the airline proj-
ect' in Guinea--the first such
arrangement entered into by
a bloc country.
Under the terms of the
agreement, Guinean pilots and
other airline personnel are
scheduled to be trained in
the bloc. The bloc's apparent
willingness to participate
in establishing and operating
airlines, along with its air-
craft sales under generous
credit terms, should greatly
enhance its drive to conclude
air agreements with the less
developed countries of the
free world. (Prepared
by ORR)
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EAST-GERMAN EFFORTS TO SOL
East German party lead-
ers, in a vigorous attempt to
solve agricultural problems
and overcome strong resentment
of efforts to force peasants to
work in collectives, are carry-
ing out a continuing purge of
local party and government of-
ficials. Despite the somewhat
more optimistic agricultural
outlook for 1960, as compared
with the poor harvest of 1959,
party officials have indicated
an unusual concern over report-
ed labor shortages, peasant
indifference or resistance,
lagging livestock procurement,
and lack. of storage facilities
--all problems which have be-
come worse since the completion
of collectivization in mid-April.
Among the districts singled
out for criticism for underful-
fillment of procurement plans
are Frankfurt/Oder, Halle,
Magdeburg, and Neubrandenburg.
Party investigations in these
districts have attributed the
failures to inefficient manage-
ment of collective farms and
peasant resistance to collec-
tivization.
Willi Stoph, party boss
Ulbricht's trouble shooter for
local problems, and Alfred Neu-
mann, party cadre chief, recent-
ly visited Neubrandenburg Dis-
trict--long a special trouble
spot--and carried out a drastic
shake-up of the local party
apparatus. The new district
Socialist Unity party (SED)
leader in Neubrandenburg pre-
viously headed the party appa-
ratus in Ruegen County, where
he appears to have been very
F AGRICULTURAL PROBLEMS
effective, transforming the area
into a model dairy region. He
is the second former subordinate
of Rostock District leader
Karl Mewis to be appointed to
head one of East Germany's
14 districts in the last five
months.
Mewis, a candidate! polit-
buro member, led the regime's
all-out collectivization drive
last spring. The promotion of
his proteges suggests that the
regime may intend to intensify
pressure against the peasants.
The SED now is::screening
its entire membership in con-
nection with the exchange of
party cards for all full and
candidate members. This screen-
ing, due to be completed on 31
January, probably will be used
to eliminate weak officials in
key local party and government
posts.
Such measures may tempo-
arily improve local administra-
tion, but will not eliminate
basic difficulties stemming from
too high production goals, lack
of monetary incentives for
farmers, shortages of manpower
and farm machinery, and serious
shortcomings in coordination be-
tween central and local author-
ities. Under these circum-
stances, both production and
procurement are likely to
continue at depressed levels,
and food shortages may be
more frequent during the
coming months. 25X1
(Prepare , oin . y with
ORR) 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE.WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY
North Vietnam will reduce
spending for its military forces
this year, since it now relies
largely on guerrilla violence
and political agitation to ac-
complish its objectives`. in
South Vietnam. Speaking to the
third party congress:'in early
September, General Vo Nguyen
Giap, Hanoi's minister of de-
fense and chief of staff,
stated that economic consider-
ations had dictated cutbacks in
personnel and finances, but he
made it clear that these curtail-
ments would not affect the
basic effort tb,ocreate' abetter
bgia..tpped., more ,e.#fd.cient,, and
technically competent army.
Three..:yoars,agd)ctGiap anr>t.noiunced :,comprehensive plans for
conscription, a trained reserve,;
standardization of equipment,
improved organization and staff
work, and a fixed pay scale.
Hanoi has made some progress to-
ward all these goals. Although
no reserve units have been
organized--a shortcoming partly
compensated for by the existence
of the militia--an effective
conscription program has been
put into operation.
The structure of tactical
units has been modified to im-
prove fire-power; new combat,
support, and service units have
been activated; and progress is
being made toward standardizing
Soviet-designed equipment. Re-
maining major deficiencies in-
clude a lack of armor and air
support, a serious shortage of
technical skills, and a trans-
portation system inadequate for
effectively sustaining conven-
tional warfare.
One of the most significant
developments during the past
several years has been the ac-
quisition of a limited air
capability with considerable
military potential. Xithough
prohibited by the Geneva agree-
ments of 1954 from acquiring
combat-type aircraft, Hanoi has
continued to renovate former
French airfields and has ac-
quired several new types of light
transports. These developments,
together with the organization
of an air force headquarters
in the Defense Ministry, sug-
gest that the army now has plans
for developing a tactical air arm.
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MW
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Since North Vietnam is al-
most completely dependent on
the Sino-Soviet bloc for mili-
tary support, the :further devel-
opment of its embryonic air force
will be largely determined by
over-all bloc policy toward
Southeast Asia. Whether or not
North Vietnam is able to develop
its own tactical air arm, how-
ever, its air facilities could
be an important adjunct to Com-
munist air power in the Far
East.
North Vietnam--lacking its
own military industry--is almost
certainly re-equipping its 300,-
000-man armed force with modern
weapons imported in violation of
the Geneva agreements, Communist
China appears to be the~main
supplier. The North Vietnamese
have so restricted the activi-
ties of the International Control
Commission (ICC) responsible for
supervising the agreements
that its members have been
unable to detect specific vio-
lations.
General Giap practically
admitted violation of the agree-
ments when he told the party
congress, "Compared with the
backwardness of our equipment in
the past, we have made important
progress." The "past" to which
he referred was the period dur-
ing and just after the war with
the French, when he whipped a
ragtag collection of guerrilla
bands into an army carrying al-
most every form of firearm turned
out by US and European arsenals
over the past 50 years. With
Chinese logistic support and ar-
tillery, this army had defeated
the French at Dien Bien Phu, but
it obviously could not indefinte-
ly function efficiently with its
25X1
diverse equipment. F7 I
SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS
The Soviet Government, which
in the past two months has re-
duced its pressure on Iran, has
apparently accepted an Iranian
proposal for a "good-will mis-
sion," headed by Prime Minister
Sharif-Emami, to be sent to the
USSR. According to Sharif-Emami,
Ambassador Masud-Ansari in Mos-
cow has also been informed by
Soviet officials that the long-
standing invitation to Princess
Shams, sister of the Shah and
head of the Red Lion and Sun
Society-- Iran's counterpart of
the Red Cross--is still valid.
Apparently no date has been set
for the visits.
Starting in late 1958, and
particularly after the breakdown
of Soviet-Iranian negotiations
for a nonaggression pact and the
conclusion of the US-Iranian bi-
lateral defense pact in, early
1959, the USSR began to attack
Iranian participation in defense
arrangements with Western coun
tries. The Shah has offered on
a number of occasions to give
a guarantee to the Soviet Govern-
ment to ban foreign missile bases
from Iranian territory. Khru-
shchev, however, has demanded as
the price of "normal" relations
that the guarantee be extended to
exclude foreign military bases of
all types. This the Shah has re-
fused to do.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
After Shkrif-Emami in late
August replaced the stanchly
anti-Communist Eqbal as prime
minister, Radio Moscow relaxed
its propaganda attacks on the
Shah and Iranian policies. Am-
bassador Pegov also returned to
his Tehran post after a "diplo-
matic" absence of nine months.
Soviet policymakers may
have decided to drop demands
for concessions in the hope that,
by alternating a period of dip-
lomatic and-propaganda pressure
with blandishments, a more fa-
vorable political climate might
be brought about which'would
induce the Shah's regime to make
concessions on the issue of for-
eign military bases.
L
The Shah has stated pub-
licly on a number of occasions
that he wished to improve rela-
tions with Moscow--a task Sharif-
Emami has also said he considers
one of the most important facing
his government. Both have in-
formed Western officials, how-
ever, that any improvement
would not be made at the ex-
pense of Tehran's ties with the
West or through concessions on
the military base issue. The
prime minister, wio has dis-
played reluctance to head the
good-will mission, told an A-
merican official he intends to
refuse to discuss political
matters with Soviet officials
and will try to limit his
talks to commercial rela-
tions.
BLOC ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN IRAQ
The bloc appears to be in-
tensifying its economic activity
in Iraq by extending additional
aid and speeding up previously
established development proj-
ects. Premier Qasim apparently
.is encouraging this stepped-up
assistance in the hope of re-
storing his regime's declining
popularity.
Czechoslovakia in late Oc-
tober extended a $32,600,000
line of credit to be used for
developing oil refineries, with
associated chemical production,
and hydroelectric and thermal
power facilities. This raised
total bloc economic aid to the
Qasim regime to slightly over
$215,000,000.
PART II
In May, Moscow increased
its original $137,500,000 line
of credit--extended early last
year--with an additional $45,-
000,000 for modernization of
the Baghdad-Basra railroad line.
Soviet engineers and technicians
began preliminary work on this
project almost immediately, and
Moscow has announced it, expects
completion by the end of 1962.
The project's auxiliary facili-
ties, including rolling stock
assembly and repair shops, are
to be completed two years later.
The Soviet Union also ap-
pears to be accelerating the
implementation of projects
called for under the original
plan. Additional Soviet
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technicians have arrived in re-
recent months, raising the es-
timated total number of bloc
technicians now in Iraq to well
over 500. In October, Baghdad
announced the formation of a
three-man committee--including
two Soviet economists--to ad-
vise the Qasim government on
economic planning and develop-
ment. Although the recent ar-
rivals and the frequent public
announcements concerning Soviet
aid activity suggest a definite
acceleration in Moscow's as-
sistance program, this increased
activity may be considered at
least partially in keeping with
the implementation schedule
outlined under the 1959 aid
agreement. Prepared
by ORR)
Iraq
Prime Minister Qasim's
position appears increasingly
insecure as the struggle be-
tween pro- and anti-Communist
elements in Iraq intensifies.
Qasim's equivocal actions in
recent weeks have cost him the
confidence of important anti-
Communists.
Iraqi Communist leaders
are concerned at the pressures
being exerted against them by
many government officials, as
well as by nationalist groups.
Pro-Communist Iraqi newspapers
have charged that the government
--though not Qasim directly--is
carrying out a campaign of per-
secution against the country's
"democratic forces"--the Com-
munist-front publications, trade
unions, friendship societies,
and student and youth groups.
The USSR has also shown concern,
PART II
as indicated by recent articles
in Pravda and Trud.
The Iraqi Communists have
been particularly irritated by
their steady losses in recent
trade union elections. After
losing an election among Baghdad
tobacco workers, the Communists
complained of government "rigging"
and engineered large-scale pro-
test demonstrations and a sit-
down strike in two factories in
central Baghdad on 5, 6, and 7
November. The pro-Communist
demonstrators became a :rioting
mob which clashed with army and
police units. Large army rein-
forcements were moved in, the
area was sealed off, and the
troops used extreme methods
to restore control. The se-
verity of the action may have
cost the army the sympathy of
some non-Communist workers and
students.
The new Communist newspaper
which on 6 November ran an edito-
rial supporting the strikers and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
attacking government labor poli-
cies was immediately closed down.
UAR-Jordan
Some of the Jordanian units
sent to the Syrian border area
following the assassination of
Prime Minister Majalli on 29 Au-
gust were reported returning to
their permanent bases on 6 No-
vember. Two key senior offi-
cers of the Jordanian Army were
killed in a vehicle collision
on the same day. There has
been no report of a similar
troop withdrawal on the Syrian
side.
The Jordanian move probably
reflects diminished concern in
Amman that any development re-
quiring large-scale military
action is imminent, but the pos-
sibility remains that terroristic
acts will be undertaken by both
sides.
President Nasir recently
told an American official that
he doubted whether UAR-Jordanian
tensions would subside. He said
that he had had to restrain the
Syrians from retaliating for
Jordanian-sponsored terrorist
activities in Syria and added it
was not in the UAR's interest
to cause a collapse of Jordan
since the consequences could
not be foreseen.
Israeli concern over a
possible UAR effort to overthrow
King Husayn has been voiced by
Foreign Minister Meir in an in-
terview published by the London
Times on 6 November.
Mrs. Meir claimed that
Nasir has clear designs to rule
Jordan and declared Israel can-
not accept Jordan's domination
by any other country. According
to Mrs. Meir, Israel could not
remain "passive" in the event
of a change of the status quo
in Jordan.
The tense situation has also
had its effects in Lebanon, where
the government's recently stated
determination to restrict the
activities of Syrian exiles there
has aroused popular disapproval.
Some Lebanese believe that
Prime Minister Salam abjectly
gave in to UAR pressure and that
Lebanon's role as a sanctuary
for political refugees is being
SOUTHERN RHODESIA
The white-settler govern-
ment of Prime Minister Whitehead
in Southern Rhodesia is cracking
down on native organizations in
a manner reminiscent of the
Verwoerd government's actions in
South Africa. In the face of
a wave of native disorders which
started last July and in which
several persons have been killed,
the government has mobilized
extra security forces, has an-
nounced a strengthening of the
defense establishment, and
has proposed a drastic security
bill which now is before the
colonial legislature.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
The bill gives the govern-
ment greatly increased powers
to deal with violence and pro-
vides severe penalties for
breaches of the peace. Stoning
of vehicles will bring from 5
to 20 years' imprisonment; admin-
istering of subversive oaths,up?
to 20 years; and resisting police,
interrupting essential services
through strikes, or using "op-
probrious epithets," up to 10
years. In addition the police
are given wide powers to disperse
meetings, to make arrests, and
to conduct searches without
warrants.
The government has been
roundly attacked by many sectors
of public opinion. Spokesmen of
both the protestant and Catholic
churches and press and legal
associations, as well as many
influential newspapers, have
criticized the scope and severity
of the bill. Calling it panic
legislation, they say it violates
traditional principles of free-
dom and justice.
The most dramatic reaction
has been on the part of Chief
Justice Sir, Robert Tredgold, who
resigned on 1 November after
alleging that the bill "outraged
almost every basic human right
and was an unwarranted invasion
of the judiciary." Despite
Tredgold's action, the govern-
ment is determined to secure
legislative approval of the bill
with no more than minor modi-
fications.
Both of the leading white
parties in Southern Rhodesia
support the government's posi-
tion. Only relatively uninflu-
ential white liberals have sup-
ported Tredgold's call for a
"national front" of all politi-
cal parties in an effort to gain
the cooperation of all races and
ensure the continuation of the
present constitutional system..
African organizations have ap-
plauded the chief justice's
resignation but have reserved
their position about partici-
pating in a national government.
The flare-up in Southern
Rhodesia has affected the self-
governing colony's relations
with Britain. Constitutional
talks between Rhodesian and
British officials--expected to
concern greater political re-
sponsibilities for thexo?iesian
Government such as relaxation of
London's veto power over legis-
lation affecting native affairs
--have been postponed. They
were to begin in early November,
but Britain has balked at hold-
ing the talks in the present tense
atmosphere and prefers that the
question be. examined next year.
London seems to be taking a hard
line to force Prime Minister
Whitehead to come up with pro-
25X1
posals more liberal. toward Afri-
can interests.
Prime Minister Sarit's re-
cent announcement that Thailand
is prepared to accept Soviet
economic aid was intended to
underscore Bangkok's complaint
that uncommitted Asian nations,
such as Cambodia, have received
preferential treatment over out-
right anti-Communist nations like
Thailand and that the American
PL-480 grain sales in Asia
threaten Thailand's foreign
exchange holdings. Further, he
has sharply criticized SEATO
handling of the Laotian crisis
and fears that, should Thailand
be attacked, he could not count
on SEATO for adequate defense
assistance.
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Moscow's recent overtures
to Bangkok were clearly timed
to take advantage of Thai restive-
ness. Ambassador Nikolayev appears
only to have made general pro-
posals at a meeting with Sarit
on 31 October, and the immediate
prospect is only for efforts to
increase trade relations. No
scheduled meetings have been
announced for discussions of
economic aid projects. At
present, it is only in the area
of rubber sales that a trade in-
crease is likely. According to
Thai reports, there is no need
for special arrangements, as
there are no Thai restrictions
on rubber sales to the Soviet
Union.
Since the outbreak of the
Laotian crisis in early August,
the USSR has attempted to foster
in Thailand a feeling of iso-
lation in neutralist Asia. On
22 September, an official Soviet
Government statement charged the
Thai Government with interven-
tion in the internal affairs of
Laos, and in recent broadcasts
to Southeast Asia Moscow has
also sharply reminded the Thais
of hazards implicit in military
alliances such as SEATO. An
article of 20 October in
Sovetskaya Rossiya charged that
SEATO plans to intervene in Laos
with troops based in Thailand
and urged Sarit to recall the
"recent U-2 and RB-47 provoca-
tions" and the consequent danger
to all nations that accept
American'military assistance.
There is no suggestion in
Sarit's public statements that
a major change in Thai foreign
policy is contemplated, and
domestically Thailand remains
as firmly anti-Communist as
ever. Nevertheless,
his re-
ceptivity to Soviet feelers will
probably encourage leftist and
neutralist elements in Thailand
to greater political activity
and confuse anti-Communist groups.
Earlier this year, Bangkok ap-
proved a Soviet request to re-
open the TASS agency office in
the city.
Should the Thai Qov-
ernment's discontent in its
association with the United
States continue, Thailand
might ultimately move toward
a more neutral position.
UPSURGE OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN SOUTH KOREA
South Korea's defenses
against Communist penetration,
weakened during the latter part
of the Rhee regime, now have
become almost totally ineffec-
tive. That Pyongyang views the
prospects for subversion as
improved in the wake of the
April revolution is shown in
the recent approach to
Vice Minister of Justice Kim
Yon-chung by his younger brother,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
a North Korean agent, whom
Kim immediately turned over to
police.
The kidnaping of South
Korean fishermen is becoming
a standard Pyongyang tactic.
After being questioned for
information of intelligence
value, the captives are put up
in private hotel rooms, treated
to haircuts, baths, and new
clothes, and shown the'sights
of the North Korean capital.
They then are given farewell
gifts and sent home to tell
friends and relatives about
"the good life" in North
Korea and the "advantages" of
unification.
South Korean internal
security became increasingly
clouded under President Rhee
because of the staging of
bogus acts of subversion,
falsification of statistics,
and a propensity to label any
political opposition as Com-
munist. With the national
police and other internal se-
curity forces used more and more
to harass and repress Rhee's
domestic political opponents,
the number of Communist agents
captured or killed in the first
six months of 1960 dropped to
45 compared with over twice as
many in the first half of 1959.
Hated by the people and subjected
to repeated purges and a reor-
ganization coincident with the
April revolution, the National
Police have been reduced to
near impotency.
Alarmed at the breakdown in
internal security, the Chang Myon
government is attempting to
coordinate the nation's often
jealously competitive security
forces and to revitalize the
discredited police. Home
M._nister Hyon Sok-ho, with the
dual purpose of stemming the
infiltration of North Korean
agents and building up the pub-
lic image of the police as the
defenders of the republic, has
ordered special anti-Communist
police units formed and has
called for full public coopera-
tion in detecting North Korean
agents. Hyon, a veteran of his
Democratic party's intelligence
operations against the Rhee
regime, has sought to reassure
demoralized police personnel that
they can do their work without
fear of further purges.
BRITISH LABOR PARTY DISSENSION
The Parliamentary Labor
party's election of Hugh Gait-
skell as its leader by a 2-to-l
margin over "shadow" Chancellor
of the Exchequer Harold Wilson
in no way diminishes the party
split over defense policy and
leadership. The left wingers'
intention to continue to cam-
paign for unilateral British
nuclear disarmament is evident
in their violent attacks on the
Macmillan government's agreement
to provide facilities for US
Polaris-bearing submarines, as
constrasted with Gaitskell's ac-
ceptance of the principle of such
cooperation while seeking a more
explicit statement of detailed
obligations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
Despite Gaitskell's re-
election--which resulted prin-
cipally from the emergence of
opposition to the unilateralists
--many moderate Labor leaders
have privately expressed doubt
that any resolution of the
party's troubles is possible as
long as he remains leader. The
American Embassy in London
anticipates that unless Gaitskell
heals the rift, he will be de-
feated in next year's election
for the party leader.
Much will probably
depend on the posi-
tion taken by George
Brown, who is ex-
pected to win the
present balloting for
deputy leader.
Brown, the "shad-
ow" minister of de-
fense, is the leader
of the trade union
group of MPs, and
has long been con-
sidered on Labor's
right. His attitude
toward Gaitskell and
defense has neverthe-
less been ambiguous.
Last spring he was the principal
architect of Labor's new com-
promise defense policy, which
went far to appease the unilat-
eralists. In the weeks before
the party conference in October,
when it appeared likely that
the trade union bloc vote for
uncompromising unilateralism
would upset this policy, he
tried to persuade Gaitskell to
make further efforts to com-
promise.
Once Gaitskell rejected
this advice, however, Brown
went down the line at the con-
ference for the official policy,
and since then has vigorously'
supported Gaitskell's efforts
to reverse the conference's
vote for unilateralism during
the coming year.
At the same time, Brown's
private comments to American
Embassy officials indicate
his low regard for Gaitskell's
ability as a leader. Should
Gaitskell's campaign against
unilateralism make him more
enemies, Brown, who is personal-
ly more popular throughout the
party than Wilson, could
easily keep an eye open to
the left as a possible
"unity" candidate for the
leadership another yearI
POLITICAL AGITATION IN PANAMA
Activities of the powerful
Arias Madrid family are causing
political stresses in Panama
which could split President
Chairi's weak coalition and
threaten his month-old adminis-
tration.
Through Finance Minister
Gilberto Arias, who represents
the family's strong influence
in the coalition, many key gov-
ernment posts have been filled
by known leftists and seditious
elements. For example, certain
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
appointments made in the customs
service can facilitate the
activities of Communists and
Castro agents, and members of
the Panamanian Communist party
were reported recently gloating
over a proposed Arias appoint-
ment in the postal service.
Meanwhile, Gilberto's
brother Roberto Arias has been
ranting of "inevitable social
revolution" to Panama's restless
students and lower classes since
his return from political exile
last month. Although he denied
recently that his speeches ad-
vocated revolutionary overthrow
of the government and has moder-
ated a little his remarks on the
urgency of revolution, Roberto
now is claiming the Canal Zone
as Panama's tenth province, a
propaganda tack he will probably
follow further.
In April and May 1959,
Roberto led an abortive revolt
against former President de la
Guardia--whose ambassador in
London he had been--which co-
incided with a Cuban-sponsored
expedition against Panama. Re-
berto is closely associated
with irresponsible pro-Cuban
revolutionaries, boasts of his
friendship with Fidel Castro,
and is known to be in contact
with the Cuban Embassy in Panama
City.
Behind his sons is the
powerful lawyer, publisher, and
businessmen, Harmodio Arias,
himself a former president who
for 40 years has plotted with
SECRET
and used any group he considers
useful in his determination to
dominate Panama. Also recently
returned to political activity
is Harmodio's half-brother
Arnulfo, who has strong dema-
gogic appeal despite having
twice been ousted from the presi-
dency. 'Although Arnulfo usually
operates alone, he has worked
with Harmodio when it suited
their joint purposes.
The activities of the Arias
group are strengthened by owner-
ship of three newspapers and
some radio stations, which they
use in strident campaigns for
political or economic advantage.
Through its news media, the
family is also trying to obtain
highly favorable coverage from
a US news team now doing a TV
study on Panama.
If President Chiari decides
the Arias' maneuvers jeopardize
his control of the administration,
he may break with them although
such action might bring down the
government. At present the
Arias Madrid press is conducting
a campaign against National
Guard Commandant Bolivar Vallar-
ino, who in recent years has used
his power to maintain political
stability in Panama. Chiari thus
far has resisted the pressure and,
for fear of losing his strongest
support, will probably postpone
his plans to reorganize the
unpopular National Guard into
separate police and military
groups and to oust or transfer
Vallarino.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY . SumMA,RY
After more than two years
of probing for weaknesses, the
Polish regime. this year
stepped up its offensive against
the Roman Catholic Church in Po-
land through the imposition of
confiscatory taxes on church in-
comes and properties, seculari-
zation of schools, seizure of
church property in the "Recovered
Territories," and a public cam-
paign to popularize birth con-
trol. The last is potentially
the most explosive issue, since
only in ':this case is the
church totally committed to
outright opposition and unwill~
ing to negotiate any compromise.
Both church and state hold
strong positions. Cardinal
Wyszynski has retained much of
the popular support evident on
his release from prison in 1956
and has recently shown a read-
iness to fight back. He is
hampered in his relations with
regime officials, however, by
the attitude of some of his
bishops and lower clergy, as
well as a faction of the Curia
in the Vatican which feels that
the church in Poland should en-
gage in a more militant campaign
against Communism and that the
cardinal should be less; in-
clined to compromise.
The faction in the Polish
hierarchy desiring a more mil-
itant posture is particularly
powerful in the countryside,
where the church is strongest
and the party weakest. The
cardinal, nevertheless, ap-
pears to have maintained es-
sential church unity in terms
of basic goals and has been
able to keep open a personal
channel to elements in the
Vatican who at least recognize
the validity of his point of
view.
Attempt at Reconciliation
On 14 January, in an ef-
fort to determine how far the
regime was prepared to go in
its campaign against the church,
as well as to "clear the air"
for the resumption of activi-
ties of the dormant Church-
State Commission, Cardinal
Wyszynski at his own request
met with party chief Gomulka.
The atmosphere was decidedly
better at this meeting than at
their previous one in 1958, .and
both sides were said to be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
pleased with the re-
sults. The only seri-
ous area of disagreeHo
ment reportedly was
the matter of birth
control, which is vig-
orously supported by
the state both as a
weapon against the
church and a means to
curb Poland's rapid
population growth.
Following his
meeting with Gomulka,
the primate made sev-
eral conciliatory ef-
forts to ease the sit-
uation. During Jan-
uary the leading Cath-
olic newspaper urged
Catholics to support
the regime's economic
programs and printed
an endorsement of the
regime-sponsored
"agricultural circles.
In early February,
Bishop Kaczmarek of
Kielce, whose dismis-
sal had been demanded
by the regime in 1959,
was sent on an "ex-
tended vacation."
By the time the
Church-State Commis-
sion resumed function-
ing in March, reports
PART OF THE CROWD, ESTIMATED AT OVER 300, 000, PAR-
TICIPATING IN VESPERS AT THE JASNA GORA MONASTERY,
POLAND 'S NATIONAL SHRINE, DURING THE AUGUST. 1960
MARIAN CONGRESS. PILGRIMS HAD BEEN FORBIDDEN TO
COME IN LARGE GROUPS.
were circulating in Warsaw that
a compromise had been reached
on limited objectives. The
church was said to be willing
to support the state's eco-
nomic programs and ready to aid
the regime's program to curb
the wave of immorality sweep-
ing Poland. Church officials
were reportedly assured that no
attempt would be made to inter-
fere with the teaching of re-
ligion in the public schools.
On 17 March the Episcopate
released a pastoral letter to
Polish clergy exhorting the
faithful to support such gov-
ernment objectives as tem-
perance, industriousness, and
the national economic effort.
When the commission recessed
for Easter, cautious optimism
was expressed in some Warsaw
clerical circles over the sta-
tus of church property and
taxes. Nevertheless, regime
officials continued to harass
the church during this period,
and the long negotiations over
who was to control distribu-
tion of relief packages from
American Catholics were broken
off in early April.
Popular Discontent
Popular uneasiness about
general internal conditions and
continued regime pressures a-
gainst the church eventually
led to a series of disturbances.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
On 27 April a riot involving
an estimated 2,000 persons
erupted in Nowa Huta when
workmen--beginning construc-
tion of a school--began to
dig up a cross on a building
site previously designated for
the construction of a church.
Attempts on the same day
by party workers in the provin-
cial capital of Olsztyn to re-
move banners hung in honor of
the Black Madonna--Poland's
most revered national religious
symbol--and replace them with
banners and slogans for May Day
celebrations resulted in dis-
turbances on 1 May caused by a
group of Catholics. These e-
vents reportedly so enraged
regime functionaries that par-
ty secretary Zenon Kliszko,
chief government representative
on the Church-State Commission,
broke off negotiations on 25
May and accused the church of
antistate activities.
On 30 May a new riot, in-
volving 5,000 persons, flared
up at Zielona Gora, in the
"Recovered Territories." The
disturbance was sparked by a
dispute between local author-
ities and Roman Catholics over
the use of a church building
owned before World War II by
the German Evangelical Church.
Each of these riots was
forcibly broken up by police,
and many persons were injured
and arrested.
Regime Reaction
The regime, alarmed and
infuriated by the deep-seated
religious convictions of the
populace, apparently decided
at this point to step up,
rather than diminish, its at-
tacks against the church.
Every real or imagined anti-
regime action or statement on
the part of the church was
countered with an immediate,
often drastic, reaction.
Hitherto tentative programs
of harassment became harsher,
Prohibitive taxes, which ap-
parently had been imposed on
a selective basis-in the past,
were now levied on virtually
all church properties.
Four seminary preparatory
schools were closed for nonpay-
ment of taxes. Other church in-
stitutions--including an orphan-
age, several church schools, and
a guest house run by a religious
order--reportedly suffered a
similar fate. In Siedice, after
the local bishop attacked the
state-operated Catholic Charities
organization (Caritas), land set
aside for a seminary and build-
ing materials for its construc-
tion were confiscated for "back
taxes."
Virtually every source of
income has been taxed, with im-
posts of up to 60 percent lev-
ied on honoraria received by
priests for such services as
weddings and baptisms. Incomes
of some priests have been so
heavily hit that personal prop-
erty, such as livestock, rectory
equipment, or garden crops, has
been seized and sold for taxes.
Monasteries, convents, seminar-
ies, and retreat houses have
been charged an "extra space
tax" for all floor space over
the national housing allotment
of eight square meters (approx-
imately 10 square yards) per
person. Priests are reportedly
forced to pay a "bachelor tax,"
and the regime is said have re-
cently imposed a tax on all
church-owned loud-speakers.
Concurrent with this cam-
paign, the regime expanded its
drive to remove religious in-
struction from school curricu-
lums. When the fall school
term opened in September, many
catechists found that their li-
censes to teach religion had
not been renewed. In other
areas religion was dropped from
the curriculum because of "class-
room shortages" or "scheduling
problems." Whereas a year ago
the rare parent who did not wish
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CURRENT, INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SLI-12 L
9 November 1960
his child to receive religious
instruction had to petition for
a release, this year parents
found they were forced to peti-
tion to have instruction.
This year public schools
have added new courses in ethics,
logic, and comparative religions,
and increased the Marxist con-
tent of other courses. Special
indoctrination sessions for
teachers have been scheduled
to prepare for these changes.
Candidates for seminaries are
now required to pass entrance
examinations which contain
questions on Marxism-Leninism,
and the study of dialectical
materialism is scheduled to be
a compulsory course in seminar-
ies, as well as in all other
institutions of higher learn-
ing.
The Catholic University at
Lublin--the only institution of
its kind in Eastern Europe--has
come under increasing govern-
ment controls. A special office
has been operating in Lublin
for over a year supervising the
activities of the university,
which was hit with an exorbi-
tant tax bill it was unable to
pay. As a result its bank ac-
counts were frozen, and it now
lacks funds for operating ex-
penses.
Although more students
were allowed to register at the
university this fall than had
been expected, several facul-
ties, particularly in the hu-
manities, have been reduced in
size. Compulsory courses in
Marxism have not yet been
introduced, but academic off 1-
dais have been notified to re-
move from the school's library
shelves all literature which op-
poses Communism and Marxist the-
ory. An inspection of the li-
brary is expected, since several
diocesan libraries recently were
forced to remove anti-Communist
literature or lock their doors.
Rumors have been rife in
Warsaw and Lublin that the clos-
ing of the Catholic, University
has been made a priority target
of the antichurch drive. Al-
though difficult, the universi-
ty's situation is not yet hope-
less, and there is no evidence
that the regime actually in-
tends to close it.
Birth control propaganda
is-increasingly heavy, and the
activities of the semiofficial
Planned Parenthood Society have
been greatly stepped up. As of
August, the society claimed
120 local organizations with a
total membership of 40,000, and
it plans a fivefold expansion.
It has strong financial support
from the state and apparently in-
tends to become self-supporting
through the manufacture and dis-
tribution of contraceptives. In
addition to organizing meetings
and lectures for the populace,
the organization publishes books
and pamphlets, has prepared two
movies for showings in urban
areas, and is readying a third
for the countryside.
In the "Recovered Terri-
tories," the Catholic Church
has been using property which
formerly belonged to German
Protestant churches. The re-
gime claims these buildings
are state property, under a
law authorizing confiscation
of former enemy assets. In
this area, where Polish roots
are weak and where there are
fewer close traditional ties
between clergy and populace,
the clergy has undergone mat-
..treatment, including physical
assault, false arrests, and tri-
als on trumped-up morals charges.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
Many priests are of German
origin, and the area's bishops
are at least nominally subject
to t.he'.; uri"sd is t ion of Be'rlin' s
Cardinal Doepfner. This implied
nonrecognition of the Oder-
Neisse frontier by the Vatican
has always been'a sore point
with the regime, which has at-
tacked both the Vatican and
Cardinal Wyszynski on these
grounds. Recent sermons by
Cardinals Wyszynski and Doepf-
ner implying the permanence of
these borders suggest that the
Vatican may be attempting to
mollify strong Polish feelings
on this subject and thereby
bolster Wyszynski's position.
Forthcoming Elections
There are no good signs
that Gomulka will again ask
the church's support in the na-
tional elections next year, as
he did in 1957. Nevertheless,
since Cardinal Doepfner's con-
ciliatory sermon on 16 October--
which was not publicized in
Poland--strident regime prop-
aganda against the church has
ceased. Since the regime has
always asked church support for
its programs--the price for its
toleration--there is some pos-
sibility that it will do so
again for the parliamentary
elections which will probably
be held in April 1961.
There are some sugges-
tions that the state has at-
tempted to lump at least two
of the major Catholic political
groups into one election slate
dominated by the party-spon-
sored PAX organization which
promotes a Polish version of
"peace priests." Cardinal
Wyszynski's nine-man ZNAK
(National Union of Catholic
Activists) parliamentary group
and two other "independent"
Catholic factions allegedly
are to be swallowed up by PAX.
All but the ZNAK representa-
tives apparently receive fi-
nancial support from the state
and have been attacked by Polish
bishops for "attempting to buy
the Polish clergy" with loans to
pay taxes.
Wyszynski's Position
Through the long summer
of attacks, Cardinal Wyszynski
and his advisers maintained a
cautious attitude. By August,
when the seriousness of the re-
gime's actions became clear, the
cardinal, through three leading
lay Catholics, restated his po-
sition on internal affairs, re-
ligious freedom, and interna-
tional matters. The tone was
conciliatory, but he insisted
on recognition of the church and
its place in Polish affairs.
The regime immediately ac-
cused the church of attempting
to create political opposition
to the state and banned the tra-
ditional August processions to
the national shrine at Czesto-
chowa. The primate apparently
decided the time for strong ac-
tion had arrived and struck back
with a public sermon decrying
this insult to the Polish people.
He called a meeting of Polish
bishops on 4 September, at
which a pastoral letter strong-
ly condemning attacks against
the church was drawn up for re-
lease on 21 September.
. At this point state offi-
cials intervened, again threat-
ened to draft seminarians into
the army, and promised limited
cooperation based on the 1956
concordat. The pastoral letter
was officially withdrawn, but
it was leaked to Western jour-
nalists and even read in some
churches.
In a sermon at Malbork on
25 September, the primate turned
to the question of the "Recov-
ered Territories" and intimated
that these areas had been re-
turned to Poland through divine
justice. The primate returned
to the attack in an October ser-
mon which condemned the state's
violations of its agreement with
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November 1960
the church, attacked the seizure
of church property, and blamed
the regime for the riot at Nowa
Huta. At this point, Berlin's
Cardinal Doepfner gave his 16
October sermon hinting at a
possible shift in the Vatican's
stand on Poland's western fron-
tier.
In the meantime, Wyszynski
has been attempting to overcome
the erosive effects of the
state's campaign. Through the
formation of Catholic Intelli-
gentsia Clubs, which are con-
ducted by the laity, the pri-
mate hopes to maintain influ-
ence among restive, often anti-
clerical, Polish youths. To a
certain degree he has been suc-
cessful. Emphasizing his desire
for support from younger Poles,
the cardinal recently arranged
for the addition of four young
editors to the main Catholic
newspaper. Local church so-
cieties have greatly expanded
in scope to fill the vacuum
left by the prohibition against
nationwide church-sponsored
groups. There are some indi-
cations that the regime already
is beginning to attack these
local groups.
The Future?
Events of the past ten
months suggest that the church
is a great deal stronger than
the regime had estimated. Local
disturbances showed that the pop-
ulace is easily aroused by overt
action against the church. Al-
though the regime is not likely
to renounce the gains it has made
during its hard summer campaign
--particularly the seculariza-
tion of schools--the pause in
attacks on the church since 16
October suggests that Gomulka's
return from the UN session sig-
naled a reassessment of the
state's position.
Most recent reports from Po-
land indicate that moderating
forces have begun to operate in
the dispute because of the obvi-
ous inability of either church or
state to win a complete victory,
it is clear that the church in
Poland has been weakened. Al-
though political realities may
force the regime to slow down its of -
forts to destroy its most power-
ful opponent in Poland, recent
experiences have probably con-
vinced the Communists that the
battle eventually can be won.
25X1
BACKGROUND TO LAOTIAN POLITICS
Politics in Laos is pri-
marily a struggle for power
among shifting coalitions of
a narrowly based elite, most
members of which are drawn from
the principal aristocratic fam-
ilies. Although Laos is for-
mally a constitutional monarchy
with a parliament and other
institutional trappings of mod-
ern Western political systems,
the substance of Laotian poli-
tics remains quasi-feudal, cen-
tering primarily on issues of
prestige, personality, family,
and regional interest. There
are differences over alterna-
tive policy choices, but these
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMM&RY
its approximately
2,000,000 population
is i.Lliterate, engaged
in subsistence agricul-
ture, and scattered
throughout more than
10,000 small villages.
Industry is virtually
nonexistent; a ciga-
rette factory and a
soft-drink plant are
the two largest proc-
essing enterprises.
The road systems are,
with minor exceptions,
primitive. Westerni-
zation has been lim-
ited to the urban pop-
ulation of perhaps
100,000 and is strong
only among the even
smaller elite group.
Lao
Tibeto-Burman
0 Sparsley settled
or unpopulated
Phoutheng
Meo
Yao (Man)
issues are frequently subordi-
nated to, or strongly colored
by, traditional political con-
cerns.
The adjustment of the Lao-
tian elite to the concept of
national unity and to the con-
stitutional machinery imported
after World War II is so pre-
carious that the seizure of
Vientiane in August by a single
paratroop battalion commanded by
a young captain, Kong Le, was
sufficient to fragment the coun-
try along traditional dividing
lines.
Laos has few of the sus-
taining features normally asso-
ciated with the stability and
successful functioning of such
a complex parliamentary govern-
ment as is outlined in its con-
stitution. About 90 percent of
The French pro-
tectorate established
in 1893 rested light-
ly on the country. The
French neglected Laos
in favor of Cambodia
and especially Vietnam,
whose denser popula-
tion and more favor-
able geographic posi-
tion made them more
profitable regions
for colonial development. Laos
remains the most underdeveloped
country in Southeast Asia, cul-
turally and economically much
as it was before its exposure
to Western influence.
National Disunity
Laos is ethnically and
linguistically one of the most
complex areas in Asia. It is
this fact together with a ter-
rain of valleys and high moun-
tains that has prevented
the development of national
unity and made Laos highly vul-
nerable to the divisive pres-
sures of the Communist-dominated
Pathet Lao guerrilla movement.
The Lao ethnic group, compris-
ing perhaps 50 percent of the
population, has provided the
"national" religion, history,
and political elite.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The minority groups are
culturally disparate and polit-
ically distinct from both the
Lao and each other. While
members of the minority groups,
especially the aggressive Meos,
hold some local offices as well
as a few national posts, they
are only loosely integrated
into the national administra-
tion. The minorities distrust
the Lao majority, and the Pathet
Lao has exploited traditional
animosities and feelings of cul-
tural inferiority to build its
base in. the non-Lao areas along
the Annamite mountain chain and
in the provinces of Sam Neua,
Phong Saly, Xieng Khouang, Luang
Prabang, Saravane, and Attopeu.
Following the Kong Le coup,
the country has, in effect,
recapitulated its history by
fragmenting along the fault
lines of traditional rival petty
kingdoms. An independent king-
dom of Laos is a novelty created
by administrative decree in 1946.
In its early history Laos had
been united as the Kingdom of
Lan Xang, but from 1711 until
the imposition of French colonial
rule there were as many as
three kings ruling simultaneous-
ly--in Vientiane, in Luang Pra-
bang, and in Champassak.
Laos' internal weakness
made it a prey to its more vig-
orous neighbors: the Vietnamese
exercised paramount influence
over Vientiane, while Luang Pra-
bang and Champassak came under
the aegis of Thailand. It was
probably only the coming of
the French that prevented the
complete absorption of the Lao
kingdoms by their neighbors.
Political Elite
Laos' relative isolation
from the forces of cultural
change introduced by the West,
its difficult terrain, its po-
litical fragmentation during
the 18th and 19th centuries, all
have contributed to the preser-
vation of the traditional social
structure and patterns of polit-
ical participation. The tradi-
tional pattern of political al-
legiance to a regional chief
provides the power base from
which most Laotian politicians
operate. The political elite--
those with the education, con-
tacts, and motivation to engage
in national politics--is largely
drawn from the royalty and key
aristocratic families. Political
orientation is often comprehen-
sible only in terms of family
and regional relationships.
Most of the key figures in
Laotian politics since the war
and many who are playing lead-
ing roles in the present crisis
are members of the few leading
families. Souvanna Phouma, neu-
tralist premier of the 'Vientiane
regime, is a member of the junior
branch of the royal family. He
has been the leader- of a group
that has its regional base in
northern Laos. Tiao Somsanith,
who headed the rightist govern-
ment overthrown by the Kong Le
coup, is a nephew of Souvanna
and a member of the Souvanna
wing in a coalition of ;politi-
cians, the Rally of the Lao Peo-
ple (RLP), which under a variety
of names has played a leading
role in Laotian politics since
1949.
Another member of the
junior branch of the royal fam-
ily is Prince Souphannouvong,
figurehead leader of the Com-
munist-dominated Pathet Lao.
Vientiane's Principal Street
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S t Y'
Members of the Souvannavong
family, which had traditionally
provided the chiefs for Vientiane
Province, played a leading role
in the early days of the Kong Le
coup. Bong Souvannavong, maver-
ick fellow-traveling politician,
and his two extreme leftist sons,
Bousabong and Thammala, served
as advisers to Kong.
Another powerful Vientiane
family, the Sananikones, have
lost ground as a result of the
coup. Ngon Sananikono, a min-
ister in the Somsanith govern-
ment, was not included in the
present cabinet. Colonel Oudone
Sananikone, a ranking army of-
ficer, has been "exiled" to Cam-
bodia as a military attache .
Oudone, after arriving in Phnom
Penh, commented that it was time
for the Sananikones
to bury the hatchet
with General Phoumi,
whom they consider
responsible for engi-
neering the downfall
in December 1959 of a
government headed by
clan chief Phoui
Sananikone--an indi-
cation that clan loyal-
ties would play a
powerful, perhaps de-
termining, role in
aligning the Sanani-
kones.
The Savannakhet
Revolutionary Com-
mittee of Prince Boun
Oum and General Phoumi,
aside from its pro-
fessed anti-Communist
orientation, is a merg-
er of southern re-
gional interests.
Prince Boun Oum had
been the heir to the
southern kingdom of
Champassak until he
renounced his rights
in favor of national
unity. He became dis-
gruntled' over the
secondary role to
which he was relegated,
and there have been
unconfirmed reports that he was
considering a separatist move-
ment.
General Phoumi owes his
meteoric rise in Laotian pol-
itics to his intelligence and
energy, but the base from which
he started was his membership
in the Voravong family, which
has long been the dominant
family in the southern prov-
ince of Savannakhet. He is
also a relative of Premier Sarit
of neighboring Thailand.
There is no genuine middle
class in ' Laos, but there is a
middle group which usually has
tenuous connections with the
leading families and which has
sufficient education and oppor-
tunities to rise to middle-level
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 ' November 19.60
positions in the civil service
and the army. The peasants re-
main politically passive, making
few demands on the government
and solving..,their problems with-
out reference to the national
political system.
Parties in Laos are little
more than parliamentary group-
ings, typically shifting coali-
tions of politicians oriented
around a prominent figure. Grass-
roots organizations have been
virtually nonexistent. Party
labels have had little meaning
to the villager, who has tended
to vote on the basis of his tra-
ditional allegiance to a member
of the leading family of his re-
gion.
In the parliamentary elec-
tions of 1958, this seignorial
political pattern was success-
fully challenged by a broadly
based political movement--the
Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS)--organ-
ized as the legal front of the
Pathet Lao. The NLHS, in elec-
toral alliance with the small
neutralist and leftist Santi-
phab party, headed by Qui iim
Pholsena, the minister of in-
formation in the present Vien-
tiane government, won almost
two thirds of the seats at
stake in the 1958 election.
The victory of the NLHS re-
flected an actual grass-moots
organization and the appeal of
its promises for peace and so"
cial change, which contrasted
dramatically with the corrup-
tion and weakness of the gov-
ernment. It had apparently
managed to identify itself with
the aspirations of the minor-
ity groups, and in some areas
intimidation and threats may
have played a significant role.
However, the inability of the
non-Communist politicians to
join in a unified electoral
front was responsible for the
magnitude of the opposition
triumph.
Reacting to the election
debacle, a group of younger
civil servants and army officers
organized a reform group--the
Committee for Defense of National
Interests (CDNI)--to purge the
government of corruption and to
mobilize support for a more mil-
itant anti-Communist policy. CDNI
leaders were drawn from the dom-
inant clans, but they soon came
into direct competition with
old-guard politicians. Their
differences were framed in terms
of the means and effort neces-
sary to check the NLHS, but al-
so involved was the emergence of
a new political generation and
the development of a new power
base--the army and the mass po-
litical organization..
While the CDNI never was
broadly based, it did extend its
organization throughout the coun-
try. It rapidly asserted its
power. and, with thinly veiled
threats of a military coup, it
reduced the parliament to an
acclamatory body--in effect,..
carr'ing oiit a "creeping coup."
The Phoui Sananikone government
invested in August 1958 was
pressed by the CDNI into a more
militant anti-Communist posi-
tion and, in January 1960, Phoui
was granted full powers to op-
erate for a year free of any
interference by the National
Assembly.
Finally in December 1959
Phoui and his government were
forced to resign, and a right-
ist government headed by Som-
sanith and dominated by the
CDNI was ultimately invested
in May 1960. It was this gov-
ernment that was overthrown by
the Kong Le coup. The CDNI now
is moribund, its leading mem-
bers scattered. The NLHS re-
mains the best organized polit-
ical party in Laos.
The Army
The 29,000-man Laotian
Army has emerged as a key fac-
tor in the power constellation.
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At the time Laos received its
independence in 1954, the army
was poorly trained and equipped
and lacked a corps of officers
with senior command training or
experience. Until late 1957 the
army was fully occupied in im-
proving its capabilities and
containing Pathet Lao forces
in Phong Saly and Sam Neua
Provinces.
Because of its nationwide
organization and its communica-
tions facilities, the army as-
sumed a progressively greater
role in propagandizing for the
central government. In the
electoral campaign of 1958, the
army played a leading role in
supporting the candidacy of
progovernment candidates and
was ultimately drawn into ac-
tive participation in politics,
with many of its key officers
serving as leaders of the CDNI.
The Kong Le coup appar-
ently had as one of its orig-
inal objectives the restoration
of civilian control over the
government. Its effect, however,
has been to shatter the unity
of the army. Many of the rank-
ing officers and the commanders
of three of the five military
regions are backing General
Phoumi's Revolutionary Committee
in Savannakhet. The commander
of the First Military Region,
with headquarters in Luang Pra-
bang, has maintained a cautious
neutrality between the rival
regimes and now has emerged as
an independent power center.
Vientiane is still under the
shadow of Captain Kong Le and
his paratroopers.
The allegiances of the
junior officers are unknown, and
the loyalty of the troops and
their willingness to fight
either each other or the Pathet
Lao is also a matter of consid-
erable doubt. There is no evi-
dence that there has been any
significant Communist penetra-
tion of the army. There is,
however, a strong predisposi-
tion in Laos toward.' harmohy
and nonvio1:et.ce that probably
extends to the peasant ranks of
the army. In the 1958 election,
several of the military units
which were polled separately
gave a surprisingly strong vote
to the NLHS-Santiphab grouping,
apparently because it had suc-
cessfully portrayed itself as
the party of "peace."
The monarchy remains the
single institution that could
mediate between contending non-
Communist groups, but even it
is a limited solidarity symbol
outside of the old kingdom of
Luang Prabang, and the King, pre-
occupied with maintaining his
position, is clearly reluctant
to take any action entailing
great risks.
In the confusion and dis-
organization of the present
crisis, the Pathet Lao is press-
ing its advantage on several
fronts: in negotiations for a
unification settlement, in ex-
panding its base areas, and in
propaganda and subversion. What-
ever the final balance of forces
achieved among the Laotian elite,
it will face a Pathet Lao move-
ment which has considerably in-
creased its capabilities. I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ;SUMMARY
:'NATO PLANNING
Perplexity over how to deal
with Sino-Soviet economic pene-
tration of the underdeveloped
areas, uncertainty over military
doctrine in the face of rapid
advancements in missile capa-
bilities, and the pressure from
De Gaulle's drive to recast. the
NATO alliance are causing mem-
bers to show an unusual sense
of urgency as they prepare for
the annual December ministerial
meeting of the North Atlantic
Council. A study begun this
fall of NATO's long-term objec-
tives in political, economic,
and military fields is provid-
ing the occasion for some ini-
Spaak to present their own ideas
for progress in NATO's second
decade in advance of formal
government positions. These
await presentation of the United
States' proposals, which are
to be made in time for council
discussion before the foreign,
defense, and finance ministers
convene in Paris from 1.6 to
18 December.
Coping With De Gaulle
In his press conference on
5 September, De Gaulle took to
the public his campaign to raise
France's status in NATO. He
recommended revision of the
North Atlantic Treaty to allow
for organized consultations on
matters outside Europe, "at
least among the world powers,"
and called for retaining nation-
al, as contrasted with integrat-
ed, defense forces. At the same
time, he offered proposals for
greater political coordination
among the six Common,;-:Market
countries. None of these ideas
has yet been offered in the
form of specific proposals to
the North Atlantic Council, how-
ever.
tial discussion on how the al-
liance can adjust to meet
changing conditions, even
without the "fundamental
reorientation" that some
surap+n statesmen :call
for.
Informal North Atlantic
Council meetings have allowed
representatives of member na-
tions and Secretary General
Other NATO members are
united in their opposition to
any formal acknowledgment of a
special position for France be-
yond its seat on the three-mem-
ber military Standing Group.
Britain and other non -?'Common
Market countries continue to
campaign against any institu-
tibnalization of the Common Mar-
ket political consultations as
potentially divisive to the
wider alliance.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9,.November 1960
The other Common Market
countries are notably reluctant
to accept relegation to a
secondary position. While they
consider that they cannot reject
De Gaulle's ideas out of hand,
,no member apparently wants to
get into the business of revising
the treaty, and in early Octo-
ber Premier Debrd is said to
have told Adenauer that revisions
might not be necessary to ac-
complish De Gaulle's ideas.
De Gaulle has nevertheless
found a favorable response in
principle to his wish to extend
NATO members' cooperation on
matters outside of Europe.
Portugal, Belgium, the Nether-
lands, and to a lesser extent
Britain have for some time
shared France's desire to use
NATO to secure more unified
all.ied.support against attacks
in the UN on their colonial po-
sitions. Now, in recognition of
the shift of the Soviet threat
toward the underdeveloped areas,
there are signs of greater will-
ingness even among the Scandi-
navians-and usually cautious
Canada to expand NATO's interest
outside the European area.
Most believe in principle
that tightening present prac-
tices for consultation on world-
wide problems would help, since
in practice such consultation
has often been inadequate or
even omitted. Despite France's
insistence on NATO solidarity
on the Algerian question in the
UN, the Debra government has
so far failed to make an ad-
vance statement in the council
concerning its own planned
,tactics in the UN on this ques-
tion.
Spaak suggests the estab-
lishment of standing regional
committees. and an increase in
contacts with other regional
organizations: CENTO, SEATO,
and OAS. Regional committees,
he holds, would be more likely
to see that area problems are
anticipated and to keep members
moving in step than the present
single committee of political
advisers.
So iet. Egon srnic penetration.
Soviet economic penetration
of the underdeveloped areas has
been described by Spaak as 1175
percent of the threat today,"
and is the main factor influenc-
ing the more cautious members of
the alliance to consider look-
ing beyond Europe. Ideas for
effective counteraction, how-
ever.,, range widely. Spaak, for
example, would have NATO involve
itself more directly in economic
matters, while Britain and Can-
ada prefer no departure from
the present practice of exchang-
ing information on national
policies.
A Dutch idea for NATO's
adoption of an "economic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
directive" to guide members'
own activities has attracted
considerable favor. Nether-
lands permanent representative
Stikker, who formally offered
his proposal in early October
on a personal rather than of-
ficial basis, explained that
the directive could offer
guidlines for common action by
NATO members in other inter-
national organizations, such
as the projected Organization
for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD). Stikker
suggests that even though NATO
would not be the organ to exe-
cute policies, the directive
should deal with political as-
pects of aid to underdeveloped
countries with an eye to com-
bating Soviet penetration.
Military Policy
General recognition of the
need for further integration
of the alliance's military
forces has induced further ef-
fort to find a way around De
Gaulle's hostility to the prin-
ciple. Since De Gaulle's press
conference of 5 September, some
efforts have been made to mini-
mize differences. At their
meeting in early October, both
Premier Debrc and Chancellor
Adenauer spoke in conciliatory
tones, Debre pointing to the
limited agreement on unified
air defense concluded in Septem-
ber. On 1 November, Adenauer
Agalhi_-Lpubl:Edl.*$V"'gpbk~~ ,of, the
pressing need to integrate NATO
forces.
Primary interest focuses
on nuclear weapons: how to
prevent wasteful duplication
of national effort within NATO,
and how to reassure European
members against a feeling of
excessive dependence on the
United States.
Pending presentation of
US military proposals, discus-
sion both within the North At-
lantic Council and in the pub-
lic press has shifted to the
pros and cons of establishing
NATO as a "fourth nuclear power"
--stimulated by speculative
press accounts of the Bowie
advisory report to the State
Department on NATO long-term
planning and by General Nor-
stad's remarks on the subject
in England.
In general, greatest sup-
port of the idea comes from the
atomic "have-nots," led by West
Germany. Defense Minister
Strauss has publicly stated the
Adenauer government's interest
in participating in such a pro-
gram, and the German Social
Democrats may be preparing to
abandon their stand rejecting
nuclear weapons for Germany.
Dutch Liberal papers voice ap-
proval insofar as the ;program
would deter France from going
ahead unilaterally.
Most vociferous opposition
has come from Britain, which
would suffer a further dimi-
nution in its present standing
as one of the two sources of
nuclear military force within
NATO. Commentators fear such
a program would add to West Ger-
man military strength, and
generally doubt that De Gaulle
can be headed off. They further
question whether a NATO program
would in fact increase the
credibility of the deterrence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 November .1960
Last July, Prime Minister
Macmillan spoke disparagingly
in Parliament of the perils of
relying on a weapon which had
"15 fingers on the safety
catch." An article in the pro-
government Daily Telegraph de-
scribed such arrangement as
even more impracticable than
the present "ludicrous";?cEoitbe-
key system for controlling the
use of nuclear weapons. Some
Dutch comment has emphasized
the same control problem.
Some anxiety has also been
shown lest Moscow follow suit
and provide nuclear weapons to
its Warsaw Pact allies.
De Gaulle shows every in-
dication of moving France along
its own path. The determination
with which the Debrd government
rammed its strike force bill
through the National Assembly
indicates that Paris would con-
sider participation in a NATO
program only if it aided France
in its parallel national effort.
I
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