CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002900100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 53
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 12, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 3, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO.. 68
OCI NO. 5487/60
3 November 1960
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
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AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY Dt/VTI
/AL
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
posing views.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Recently concluded meetings in Moscow between Soviet
and Chinese spokesmen apparently failed to bring their
parties closer together and may even have exacerbated their
differences. The latest issue of the Chinese party's major
theoretical journal, Red Flag, alluding to "fuzzy-minded"
and "preposterous" Soviet v ewpoints, strongly insists on
the necessity of violence in seizing state power and im-
plicitly criticizes Khrushchev's gradualist strategy.
This issue of Red Flag, delayed since mid-October while
the negotiations with Moscow were under way, probably re-
flects decisions reached at recent politburo discussions
in Peiping. The apparent failure of the preliminary
negotiations makes it unlikely that the scheduled Novem-
ber meeting of world Communist parties in Moscow will
succeed in achieving any meaningful compromise of op-
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Che Guevara arrived in Moscow on 29 October after
having negotiated in Prague for the doubling of Czecho-
slovakia's earlier $20,000,000 line of credit for Cuba.
He is to go on to Peiping and North Korea. On the
domestic scene, the government has placed the country
on a virtual war footing in anticipation of an '
minent invasion by imperialist-backed forces."
Page 3
LEFTIST BID FOR POWER IN EL SALVADOR . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
civilians stirred up by Communist agitation.
26 October coup and sought the leftists' support by in-
cluding them in the provisional government, now is reported
to be no longer in full control, and the situation seems
to be moving toward open clashes between the military and
A week after the armed forces ousted the Lemus ad-
ministration, Salvadoran leftists and Communists launched
a bid for full power by demanding early national elections
and the immediate elimination of the military from the
government. Ex-President Osorio, who masterminded the
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMENT
~~R
3 November 1960
PART I (continued)
SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The formation on 31 October of a Committee for Neu-
trality and National Unity in Vientiane introduces a
potentially dangerous new element into the confused politi-
cal situation in Laos. The committee is heavily weighted
with leftists, including pro-Communist Neo Lao Hak Sat
leaders, and its establishment is likely to harden the
attitudes of leaders in Luang Prabang and Savannakhet
toward any rapprochement with the Souvanna Phouma govern-
ment. General Phoumi in Savannakhet had already given
signs of increased resistance to a compromise with
SITUATION IN THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Forces favoring Lumumba are actively strengthening
their position in northeastern Congo while the ousted
premier plays a waiting game in Leopoldville, The 15-
nation UN conciliatory committee is expected soon in the
Congo, but its chances of working effectively to bring
opposing Congolese leaders together are slim. UN repre-
sentative Dayal, meanwhile, is exerting pressure on
President Tshombd of secessionist Katanga to try to in-
duce him to cooperate with UN efforts to resolve the
crisis.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ALGERIAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The leaders of the 11 former French territories in
Africa, who met on 24-26 October in Abidjan, have under-
taken to seek a negotiated settlement of the Algerian war..
While pressure for peace is increasing in France, such
rightist opponents of any compromise as Soustelle's
Vincennes group may take advantage of the current trial
of leaders of the January settlers' uprising in Algiers
to intensify their attacks on De Gaulle, who is to address
the nation on 4 November. Meanwhile, rebel Premier Ferhat
Abbas' firm rejection of cease!-'-'fire negotiations, which
highlighted his radio address marking the sixth anniver-
sary of the rebellion, reflects the Provisional Algerian
Government's markedly improving international position.
ii
THE WEEK IN BRIEF C?NFIDENTIA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
INDICATIONS OF SINO-SOVIET BORDER FRICTION . . . . . . . . Page 2
Within the past few months both Soviet and Chinese
newspapers have made oblique, unusual references to mili-
tary and security developments along widely separated
sections of the Sino-Soviet border. In a recent discus-
sion of his differences with Peiping, Khrushchev is re-
ported to have said that the Chinese have "invaded"
Soviet territory and started construction of "forti-
fications" there. Apparently the Chinese have begun
activity to renew their ancient border claims against
the USSR.
ALBANIA MAINTAINS SUPPORT FOR COMMUNIST CHINA .
Albanian Premier Mehmet Shehu on 25 October con-
demned two Soviet-sanctioned disarmament proposals of
European satellite leaders and reiterated Tirana's es-
sentially pro-Chinese interpretations of world affairs.
Albania's public alignment with Peiping and Peiping's
success in gaining support and influence in a country
hitherto considered exclusively a Soviet preserve may
encourage opposition to Khrushchev's policies in other
European satellite parties and may pose problems for
Moscow throughout the Communist movement.
. Page 5
SOVIET LEADERS MAY DELAY PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . Page 6
. The Soviet 22nd party congress, rumored previously to
be planned for the first quarter of next year, may be de-
layed until late 1961. Although a congress could be
called on as short as six weeks' notice, the signs which
have usually preceded the convening of a party congress
are lacking at this time.. The deterioration in relations
between the Soviet Union and Communist China this year
is undoubtedly a major consideration in any plans for
a congress.
USSR TO INTRODUCE NEW AIRCRAFT INTO CIVIL AIR FLEET . . . Page 8
The development of two new aircraft, the AN-24
twin turboprop and the TU-124 jet light transport, indi-
cates that the USSR is making progress in its announced
program of modernizing the Civil Air Fleet (Aeroflot).
Both planes are designed for domestic feeder routes and
thus will complement the larger transports being intro-
duced on the long domestic and international flights.
The new aircraft will also increase the USSR's military
airlift potential in times of emergency.
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THE WEEK TN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
SOVIET OVERTURES TO TURKEY . . . . . . . .
. . . . Page 10
The USSR is continuing its efforts to encourage
closer relations with Turkey and to stimulate neutralist
sentiments in the Gursel regime through offers of economic
aid and proposals for restrictive military arrangements.
There are signs that Soviet-Turkish relations have im-
proved to some extent, but Turkish officials emphasize
that Ankara's policy toward the bloc has undergone no
basic change.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS .
Acute tensions between the UAR and Jordan persist,
with each government attempting to prevent new clandestine
operations by the other. King Husayn has indicated his
willingness to tone down Jordan's anti-UAR propaganda, but
the UAR propaganda barrage continues unabated. The sudden
return to Baghdad last week of two prominent Iraqi offi-
cials who were on trips abroad is a further sign that the
Qasim regime is in trouble.
MOROCCAN LEFTIST OPPOSITION GROWING STRONGER . . . . . . . Page 15
The opposition of left-wing Moroccans to the govern-
ment of King Mohamed V is growing stronger as the regime
attempts to stop leftist criticism by curtailing civil
liberties. Most leftist leaders probably would still
support a constitutional monarchy with the ruler reduced
to a figurehead. Considering the constitutional issue
too complicated for popular understanding, the leftists
have concentrated on anticolonialism, greater support
for the Algerian rebellion, and evacuation of foreign
. . . Page 12
troops, including both French and American.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
25X1
BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE . . . . . . . . Page 16
President Paz Estenssoro is facing strong economic
pressures seriously endangering Bolivia's US-backed
economic stabilization program, which since its initia-
tion in December 1956. has succeeded in curbing the
country's runaway inflation. Paz fears possible anarchy
and chaos and feels that governmental austerity at this
time might result in violent outbreaks which would under-
cut longer term plans for economic progress. Anti-US
sentiment--which last erupted violently in March 1959--
is reflected in a recent statement of the finance
minister that the United States will be to blame if
the Bolivian Government cannot pay its November wages.
MALI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
During the Mali Republic's first month as a separate
state, its Marxist-influenced leaders have been concerned
chiefly with demonstrating their independence from
Western--especially French--domination. Steps have been
taken toward early diplomatic and economic ties with Sino-
Soviet bloc countries, and Mali's representatives at the
UN have attacked France and consistently voted with the
Soviet 'bloc on East-West issues. Western influence seems
certain to decline further if extremist elements now re-
portedly challenging Mali's relatively moderate top
leaders should become dominant.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
NONBLOC COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE . . Page 1
As Moscow prepares for the conclave of world Commu-
nist leaders scheduled to begin during the 7 November
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
Khrushchev retains his hold over the initiation of all
major policies, and the cult of the leader continues.
THE KHRUSHCAEV LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Stalin, shortly after World War II and at about the
age of 67, began to divest himself of many of the day-to--
day problems attending the administration of the Soviet
state. Khrushchev, at the same age, is apparently doing
the same, as his rest and vacation periods grow longer
and more frequent. New methods of operation are being
developed in the Kremlin to allow the Soviet leader to
devote himself almost exclusively to matters of high
policy, particularly in external affairs. Kozlov,
Suslov, and Kosygin accordingly are assuming the bulk
of administrative responsibilities. Nonetheless,
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vi
PART III (continued)
celebrations of the Bolshevik revolution, the disruptive
effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the "unity" of the
Communist world has spread to nonbloc Communist parties.
Rising out of, and compounding, the problem posed by
Chinese deviation, this situation must be a source of
deep concern to the Kremlin. Although the leadership
of almost all major nonbloc parties has voted in Moscow's
favor as a result of the Soviet Union's stepped-up drive
to get these leaders commited to its side, support with-
in even these parties appears far from complete. In
addition, some parties, in which loyalties are more in
balance, are trying to substitute neutrality for commit-
ment in the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Page 7
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Meetings held in Moscow in
October have apparently failed
to bring the Chinese Communist
and Soviet parties closer to-
gether and may even have ex-
acerbated the situation.
Continuing the polemic, the
latest issue of the Chinese par-
ty's major theoretical journal,
Red Flag, published on 31 Octo-
ber, strongly insists on the
necessity of violence in seizing
state power and implicitly crit-
icizes Khrushchev's gradualist
strategy. It devotes two edito-
rials to the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute, one keyed to the Soviet
fol-
success in seizing power by
lowing Marxist-Leninist concepts
of armed revolution and the oth-
er to the Chinese success in cor-
rectly adhering to these concepts.
The editorials were appar-
ently conceived as refutation
of a recent article in the So-
viet party's theoretical jour-
nal, Kommunist. The Soviet
article ccr i ized the "dog-
matist" (Chinese) approach to
Lenin's theory of revolution,
accusing the dogmatists of
ignoring the changes in the
world since Lenin's time and
consequently Of rejecting the
"new propositions. . .and tac-
tics" of the world Communist
movement.
The first Red Flag edito-
rial in effect attac s the So-
viet contention that in the
"new epoch," in which the forces
of socialism are superior to the
forces of imperialism, peace-
ful accession to power by the
Communists is increasingly pos-
sible. Red Flag declares that
this "new epocz' of Communist
superiority is "unprecedentedly
favorable" not for a gradualist
strategy but for "proletarian
revolution" in various countries
of the world, especially in the
underdeveloped countries.
The second editorial--in
addition to the same stress
on force--broadens the argu-
ment to include other points
of disagreement with the
USSR. Citing Chinese experi-
ence in seizing power from
the Kuomintang, the editorial
reiterates basic Chinese con-
tentions that the US is a
"paper tiger" and that nego-
tiations with the imperialists
are fruitless. In a clear at-
tack on Khrushchev's views,
the editorial labels; "ab-
solutely preposterous" and
fundamentally anti-Marxist the
belief of modern revisionists
and some "fuzzy-minded" peo-
ple that armed revolutionary
struggle is a threat to world
peace.
Delayed since mid-October,
this issue of Red Flag probably
reflects decis ons reached at
recent politburo discussions
in Peiping. In addition to
the Chinese officials who par-
ticipated in talks in Mos-
cow, most members of the polit-
buro--including regional mem-
bers who seldom leave the
provinces--have recently been
identified in Peiping. The
gathering of these leaders
strongly suggests that a high-
level party conference has taken
place.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY.
The celebrations of the
anniversary of the Bolshevik
Revolution invariably open on
6 November with a wide-ranging
speech on international and
domestic affairs by a member of
the party presidium, although
not necessarily the first secre-
tary. In view of the importance
of the occasion this year, how-
ever, Khrushchev himself might
choose to speak. In any event,
the speech can be expected to
set the tone for the Soviet
positions to be taken in the
conferences that follow, as
Khrushchev's speech to the Bu-
charest conference in June
signaled the tough line taken
later in the closed meeting.
Recent Soviet commentary
suggests that a similarly tough
line will be taken when the
world Communist leaders convene
in Moscow. In along review of
the necessity for unity of eco-
nomic thinking in "socialist"
countries, an article in the
latest issue of Problems of
Philosophy asserts that 'it is
impossible in contemporary his-
torical. conditions to build so-
cialism in an individual coun-
try, cut off from the world
system of socialism." The
article appears to be warning
the Chinese again that their
obstinacy may lead to their
economic isolation from the
USSR and the rest of the
bloc.
Peiping has not yet an-
nounced whether or not it will
send senior party officials to
the;: Bolshevik Revolution cele-
brations. The North Vietnamese
are sending Ho Chi Minh, who
arrived in Peiping on 2 November
en route to Moscow. Ho earlier
tried to bridge the gap be-
tween Khrushchev and Mao and
undoubtedly intends to try
again. His stopover in Pei-
ping will give him an op-
portunity to discuss the latest
developments in the Sino-Soviet
feud with Mao, with whom he
had a "cordial talk" on 2 No-
vember.
Satellite Delegations
Among the European satel-
lites, the Albanian, Bulgarian,
Hungarian, and Rumanian parties
have each held central commit-
tee meetings in the last few
days which were addressed by
their party first secretaries,
and at which delegates to at-
tend the Moscow celebrations
were selected.
Only the Bulgarians, how-
ever, have announced the composi-
tion of their delegation, which
is to be led by party First
Secretary Zhivkov and includes
politburo member and Premier
Yugov. At least two members
of the delegation, former party
boss Chervenkov and agitprop
specialist Avramov, can be con-
sidered pro-Chinese.
The Other satellite dele-
gations will probably be
equally high level, although
they may not all include
pro-Chinese elements. The
unusual announcement that
the central committees chose
the delegations to an off-
year anniversary celebration was
probably to demonstrate the soli-
darity of each party behind its
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delegation, and indicates that
after the anniversary celebra-
tions there will be a high-level
meeting to discuss the Sino-
Soviet dispute.
Although the Poles, Czechs,
and East Germans have yet to
announce recent central commit-
tee meetings on their delegates
to Moscow, it is probable that
they will send similar high-
level representatives.
Andrzej Werblan, chief of the
propaganda section of the Polish
party's central committee and
considered to be Gomulka's top
ideological adviser, was in
Moscow in mid-October. He was
probably there, as were other
important satellite officials,
to be briefed on the status of
the Sino-Soviet dispute. In
any event, Gomulka, in a care-
fully worded speech on 21 Octo-
ber to the Polish parliament,
reaffirmed his support for So-
viet policies.
Hermann Axen, editor of
the East German party daily,
Neues Deutschland; flew to Mos-
cow fro' m Bum aria on or about
12 October
He was
joined there by Werner Eberlein,
Ulbricht's personal assistant,
who acted as interpreter. Pre-
sumably these men were also
briefed on the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute and have returned to East
Berlin, although there has been
no report to this effect.
Albania, even at this late
date, continues to reaffirm its
support for Communist China and
its policies. In a major speech
to the Albanian National Assem-
bly on 25 October, Premier Shehu
directed a large portion of his
remarks to Khrushchev's proposals
at the UN General Assembly and,
in contrast to leaders in the
other satellites, strongly im-
plied these proposals were im-
practical. His remarks again
reflected a view of the world
situation similar to that held
by the Chinese Communists.
Despite the wide gap that
continues to separate Moscow
and Peiping, both sides reiterate
the standard formulations of
commitment to bloc solidarity
and friendship. These cliches,
nevertheless, do not obscure the
controversy. The seriousness of
the basic disagreement, as well
as the apparent lack of success
of the preliminary negotiations,
makes it extremely unlikely that
the November meeting in Moscow
will succeed in achieving any
meaningful compromise of oppos- 25X1
ing views. The outlook for even
a nominal compromise at these
meetings appears bleak.
Che Guevara, pro-Communist
head of Cuba's banking system
who is probably the chief
architect of the country's ex-
treme economic policies, ar-
rived on 29 October in Moscow,
the second stop on his mission
to five Sino-Soviet bloc countries.
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In Prague, he signed an
agreement increasing Czech-
oslovakia's original $20,000,-
000 credit to Cuba to $40,000,-
000 and negotiated details for
the coming year of a general
trade agreement signed last June.
The expanded Czech credit
is reported in the Cuban press
to be for the purpose of "re-
activating" Cuba's automotive
industry and is to be used to
assemble _n Cuba Czech tractors,
motorcycles, and stationary en-
gines, and eventually trucks and
automobiles. Guevara may also
have made arrangements to pay
the Czechs for the military
equipment Cuba has received.
In Moscow, Guevara is re-
ported to be negotiating with
Mikoyan, presumably on the de-
tails of Cuban-Soviet trade
for 1961, and he may attempt
to increase the $100,000,000
Soviet credit negotiated last
February. Thus far there is
no indication that Cuba has se-
cured promises in the bloc for
the purchase of more than the
approximately 40 percent of
Cuba's sugar exports which the
bloc is already committed to
buy.
Guevara is scheduled to
go next to Peiping, presumably
for negotiations similar to
those in Moscow. Cuba's trade
and technical assistance agree-
ments with Communist China were
signed last July. Guevara is
to travel from Peiping to North
Korea, where trade and coopera-
tion agreements are expected
to be concluded. Guevara's
last stop is to be in East
Germany; he signed a one-year
agreement last March with the
East German State Bank and
will probably seek an exten-
sion during the visit.
There is no indication
that Guevara intends at this
time to travel to the other
bloc countries--Poland, Hun-
gary, Rumania, and Bulgaria--
that have concluded trade
agreements with the Castro re-
gime.
The American naval attache
has received a report that 25
Czech technicians are in Cuba
assisting the Cuban military
on the weapons already delivered
from the Soviet bloc. The to-
tal number of such technicians
probably will eventually reach
a much higher figure, and more
military equipment probably
will be sent to Cuba. Further
units of the Cuban civilian
militia are believed to have
been issued Soviet bloc arms
during the week of 30 October.
Meanwhile, in his inter-
view with Cuban journalists
on 22 October--not released by
TASS until the 28th, when Cuban
charges of an imminent inva-
sion were reaching a peak--Khru-
shchev again showed his reluc-
tance to be drawn into too
precise a reiteration or elab-
oration of his 9 July rocket
threat. In a reply to a re-
quest to comment on,statements
that the warning was purely
symbolic, he said he "would
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like such statements to be
really symbolic." For this,
he added, it is essential that
""imperialists' threat of in-
tervention" not materialize.
"Then there will bo no need to
test the reality of our state-
ment ....
Although the Soviet
press has maintained a large
volume of comment on alleged
US plans for an invasion of
Cuba, it has relied heavily
on citations from foreign
press accounts and avoided
official commentary. The US
Embassy in Moscow suggests this
may reflect a wish not to a-
rouse the Soviet "public un-
duly,
.On the domestic scene, the
Castro regime has put the coun-
try on a virtual war footing in
anticipation of what the gov-
ernment repeatedly charges are
plans for an imminent invasion
of Cuba by US-supported "coun-
terrevolutionary" elements. On
30 October, the national direc-
torate of the Cuban militia
called on all male militiamen
in the Havana area to assemble
at designated points as part of
a national mobilization" to
meet the invaders. Some mil-
itia units were sent from the
Havana area to other points in
the country, and assemblies of
militiamen took place in many
parts of the island. On 1 No-
vember, radio stations in the
capital urged Cubans to donate
blood for "the casualties of
a possible imperialist inva-
sjon.""
A possible indication of
future Cuban tactics with re-
spect to the US Naval Base at
Guantanamo Bay came in an inter-
view given by Fidel Castro to
a UAR newsman. He is quoted
as saying that Cubans are not
such "idiots" as to try to
seize the base by force.. In-
stead, Cuba will demand through
the United Nations that the
base be evacuated
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
LEFTIST BID FC_?, POWER IN EL SALVADOR
A week after the armed
forces ousted the Lemus admin-
istration, Salvadoran C-mmunists
have joined in a strong bid for
power by leftist elements, Man-
ifestoes circulated by the Com-
munist-dominated labor confed-
eration and by other Communist-
influenced groups demand the
immediate elimination of the
military from the government
and early national elections.
These demands, coupled with
vicious attacks against the
United States, are also voiced
on a daily radio program pre-
pared by Communists and broad-
cast under instructions from
the head of the new government's
press office. The leftist de-
mands, which are also supported
by non-Communist politicians
who had long been in the oppo-
sition, bitterly attack ex-Pres-
ident Oscar Osorio, whom they
call responsible for "all the
political, moral, and adminis-
trative ills" of the country.
Osorio, whose 1950-1956
term in the presidency immedi-
ately preceded' Lemus', master-
minded the 26 O:;tober coup. He
retains wide popularity among
lower income groups for his
moderate reforms designed to
alleviate the country's deep-
seated socio-economic programs,
but earned the hatred of the
Communists for his strong meas-
ures against them. After the
26 October coup, Osorio sought
to win leftist backing for the
junta by having leftists in-
cluded in the new government,
and apparently intended to play
a dominant role from behind the
scenes until elections scheduled
for 1962 returned him to the
presidency.
Osorio, a retired lieuten-
ant colonel, is probably the
country's most influential mili-
tary figure. The three military
members of the six-man junta are
his supporters, as are the mili-
tary members of the cabinet--
who head the key ministries of
defense, interior, and public
security. If these individuals
leave the government under pres-
ent circumstances, it would mean
turning the regime over to the
highly articulate leftists, many
of whom appear influenced by the
Salvadoran Communist party,
which, although small, is endowed
with well-trained and capable
leaders.
Osorio is reported to be
very uneasy and worried by de-
velopments following the coup,
and some of his friends fear he
may lose control, Although the
military still holds the key to
the situation,
American Embassy claim that the
army is seriously weakened by
internal dissension. Even be-
fore the leftists launched their
attacks, there were reports of
a possible countercoup led by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
officers such as General Cordova
who had lost their posts in the
coup.
The situation seems to be
moving toward open clashes be-
tween the military and civilians
stirred up by Communist agita-
tion. Unless Osorio or another
able military figure is willing
to show decisive leadership in
meeting the leftist challenge,
the government could become
dominated by pro-Communist ele-
ments. Such an eventuality
would have very serious implica-
tions for the stability of
other Central American govern-
ments, particularly in Guatemala
and Nicaragua.
SITUATION IN LAOS
The formation in Vietiane
on 31 October of a Committee
for Neutrality and National
Unity has introduced a poten-
tially dangerous new element
into the confused political
scene in Laos. The committee's
membership, although including
some moderate supporters of
Premier Souvanna Phouma, is
heavily weighted with various
shadings of leftists. In ad-
dition to Kong Le and several
of his lieutenants, the com-
mittee includes Quinim Pholsena,
the leftist head of the gov-
ernment's team now negotiating
with the Pathet Lao, and Nouhak
Phoumsavan, a luminary of the
Pathet Lao political front, the
Neo Lao Ilak Sat (NLIiS). Sou-
vanna and his half brother,
Prince Souphannouvong, head of
the NLIiS, have been named
honorary chairmen.
The aims of the new group,
as detailed by the chairman,
Pheng Phongsavan, a former
president of the National As-
sembly and close associate of
Souvanna, include harmoniza-
tion of various political
groups looking to the forma-
tion of a coalition government,
and establishment of a neutral,
demilitarized Laos willing to
accept aid from all countries
as long as such aid is without
strings. Although the Souvanna
group, Kong Le, and the Pathet
Lao have all subscribed to these
same aims with varying degrees
of emphasis, the language in
which Pheng couched his state-
ment is reminiscent of recent
Pathet Lao/NLHS propaganda; the
NLHS may even have drafted the
statement.
The circumstances attend-
ing formation of the committee
are still obscure, but the
initiative probably came from
Quinim, the Kong Le group, or
the NLHS. Although Souvanna
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE: WEEKLY SUMMARY
had been reported planning to
form a new party, it had been
understood that what he envi-
sioned was a centrist group--
clearly distinguishable from
the NLHS--whose purpose would be
to compete with the NLHS while
using the same slogans of peace
and neutrality which the Kong
Le coup revealed had
struck a responsive
chord among the people.
Souvanna may thus have
been outmaneuvered.
It will be difficult
for him to disavow
the committee, and it
is problematical
whether he will now go
ahead with his plans
to form his own party.
Both Hanoi and
Peiping were quick to
report formation of
the new committee and
its political objec-
tives; Communist
China has again ac-
cused Thailand of
fostering civil strife
in Laos by supporting
Phoumi and blockading
Vientiane. With its
customary freewheel
ing approach, Commu-
nist China charged
that resumption of US
aid to Laos was an
effort to "interfere";
a few days earlier,
Peiping had levied an
identical charge
against the US for
"withholdings' aid,
Hanoi on 30 October de-
nied South Vietnamese claims
that North Vietnamese troops
had crossed Laos to attack the
town of Kontum in South Vietnam,
This "Western fabrication,"
Hanoi said, was intended as a
pretext for South Vietnamese
intervention in Laos. While
bloc propaganda seems anxious
to head off outside, pro-Western
intervention in Laos, it is
not :threatening retaliatory ac-
tion.
Formation of the committee
for neutrality and national
unity will almost certainly
harden the attitudes of Laotian
,_'Nluong Peun
9RARAw, : _ , e-
leaders in Luang Prabang and
General Phoumi's Savan.nakhet
Revolutionary Committee. The
Luang Prabang group, which in-
cludes Souvanna's armed forces
commander, General Oua.ne, may
construe its existence as suf-
ficient justification to carry
out previous threats to break
away from Vientiane, Phoumi
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%no _MW
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meanwhile can be expected to
use the existence of the com-
mittee as vindication for his
frequent assertions that Vien-
tiane is in effect under Pathet
control.
Phoumi was already showing
signs of increased resistance
to compromise with Souvanna. He
adamantly refuses to send pay-
masters to Vientiane,since this
would constitute "recognition"
of the Souvanna government, and
his group insists that Souvanna
must resign to allow the King
to designate a new premier.
Savannakhet and Luang Pra-
bang, while maintaining some
contact, continue to view each
other with suspicion, thus im-
peding joint efforts to achieve
their seemingly commonly held
purposes of limiting further
Pathet Lao gains.
Former Premier Phoui.
Sananikone now is in Bangkok,
where he is assessing the situa-
tion pending a possible return
to the Laotian political scene.
Although Phoui's long absence
from the country would seem to
place him in a good position to
mediate the present crisis, the
circumstances of his fall from
power nearly a year ago left a
residue of bad feeling with the
King and Phoumi, among others,
which may limit his usefulness.
Soviet Ambassador Abramov
returned to Phnom Penh on 28
October, completing a 15-day
stay in Laos. During his visit,
an offer of Soviet economic
assistance was accepted "in
principle" by the Souvanna gov-
ernment, The aid offer was
not spelled out and will prob-
ably be the subject of pro-
tracted negotiations at a
later date. Abramov, prior to
his departure, told US Ambas-
sador Brown that he would re-
turn to Laos in a few weeks.
The Soviet press has not
as yet mentioned the aid offer
to Laos but has focused atten-
tion on what it charges are
American plans to establish
a new government in Laos, thus
plunging the country into re-
newed civil war. Moscow radio
has significantly shifted its
endorsement of the Laotian
Government from that of "sym-
pathy" for the Laotian peo-
ple, as expressed in an of-
ficial government statement
of 21 September,to "full sup-
port" for the neutralist policy
of the Souvanna regime.
Soviet Propaganda on Thailand
The Laotian situation has
also precipitated a virulent
Soviet propaganda attack on
Thailand. Repeated charges of
Thai interference in Laotian
internal affairs have been a
standard theme in Soviet broad-
casts to Southeast Asia. A
20 October article in Sovet-
skaya Rossiya accuses Marshal
gar-it of equipping the Thai
Army with American rockets as
part of a "military build-up"
which is related to alleged
SEATO plans to intervene in
Laos. The article concludes that
such "war preparations" under-
mine Thailand's diplomatic re-
lations with its neighbors and
urges Sarit to r 11 the "re-
cent provocations" 25X1
and the consequent danger to
all nations with US bases.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Forces favoring Lumumba
are actively strengthening their
position in Orientale Province
while the ousted pre-
mier plays a waiting
game in Leopoldville.
Army chief Mobutu's
government has not
been recognized by UN
officials, although
they continue to work
with department heads
among the Mobutu-ap-
pointed commissioners
in an effort to handle
day-to-day activities.
Officials of the UN
Command are putting
pressure on all fac-
tions--especially
Mobutu, Foreign Min-
ister Bomboko, and
Katangan. President
Tshombd--to get them
to cooperate in a
working agreement.
In furtherance
of the UN objective,
a committee was formed
on 27 October in
New York by the na-
to make it unmanageable and less
subject to influence by Lumumba's
strong supporters. Likewise,
THE CONGO
Part-FranZ'qui
P' t
Thvsvil e
tions represented in the Congo
operation to work out a rec-
onciliati6n' among opposing
Congolese politicians. Such
a body had been authorized
by the resolution of the
special UN session on the. Congo
in mid-September, and the
idea has been strongly backed
by such pro-Lumumba states
as Ghana, Guinea, and the
UAR.
The'large size of the com-
mittee, which includes 15 Afri-
can and Asian nations, will tend
RUANDf
-URUNDI
11 4 Lil uabourg .)3akwanga- Albertville
il_ a Luputa'
Elisabethville
L. A%.
the membership of at least six
moderate nations--Ethiopia, Li-
beria, Nigeria, Malaya, Pakistan,
and Tunisia--should serve to neu-
tralize the efforts of those
friendly to Lumumba. Kasavubu and
Mobutu on 1 November warned, how-
ever, they would not cooperate in
such efforts to patch up their
dispute with Lumumba.
Lumumba partisans have been
increasingly active in parts of
the Congo remote from Leopold-
ville, particularly his political
stronghold of Stanleyv:ille and the
rest of Orientale Province.
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WAV,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
The Katangan situation
threatens to become increasingly
serious, and it may be aggravated
by the efforts of Dayal to under-
cut Tshombe's position. Dayal
is providing a UN escort for
Tshomb6's rival, Jason Senwe,
to tour Baluba tribal areas in
northern Katanga despite Tshom-
be's threat to use force to
prevent the tour. Dayal is also
likely to take other measures,
such as pressing for an early
withdrawal of Belgians from Ka-
tanga's military and administra-
tive services and increasing re-
strictions on the activities of
Tshombo's security forces in
dissident Baluba tribal areas.
Meanwhile, the presence of
a growing number of Belgians in
influential positions within
both Mobutu's administration
and that of Katanga has provoked
increasing bitterness on the
part of the UN Command in Leo-
poldville and several African
states.
Some believe Tshombe
derives almost his entire
support for a secessionist
Katanga from the presence of
several thousand Belgian
military and technical ad-
visers, and that without
their aid he would soon
have to yield to Leopold-
ville's authority.
The reported capture of
four white officers--includ-
ing three Belgians-.-by UN
troops attempting to curb
Baluba depredations in Kasai
Province has been followed
by a new Soviet demand that
Hammarskjold suppress "the
subversive activities of
Belgian agents" in the Congo.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
The leaders of the 11 for-
mer French territories in Africa,
who met from 24 to 26 October in
Abidjan, have undertaken to seek
a negotiated settlement of the
Algerian war. While pressure for
peace is increasing in France,
such rightist opponents of any
compromise as Jacques Soustelle's
Vincennes group may take advan-
tage of the current trial of lead-
ers of the January settlers' up-
rising in Algiers to intensify
their attacks on De Gaulle.
The African leaders met on
the initiative of Ivory Coast
Premier Felix Houphouet-Boigny.
They agreed to try to bring
France and the rebels together
in new direct talks in the hope
of heading off a "strong" Al-
gerian resolution at this year's
UN General Assembly. According
to Houphouet-Boigny, the confer-
ence named a delegation to Paris
and appointed another to approach
the rebels if the first one finds
some "flexibility" on the part
of the French President.
De Gaulle responded to the
Africans' initial gesture by say-
ing he would be pleased to dis-
cuss "general problems between
France and the African countries"
anytime after 4 November, the
date set for his radio-televi-
sion address. Houphouet indi-
cated he would go only to dis-
cuss Algeria.
A continuing series of
manifestoes and demonstrations
show, the wide public appeal
negotiations have in France.
Two more important groups have
spoken out--the Young Catholic
Workers on 21 October about the
"crisis of conscience" among
youths called up to serve in
Algeria, and the Protestant
Federation of France on 1 No-
vember urging all French reli-
gious groups to press for a ne-
gotiated peace.
Tension and uncertainty
are building up among "French
Algeria" elements in both Al-
geria and France. New violence
may be sparked as a result of
stepped-up slogan; painting by
the large French Algeria Front,
deliberations at the :3 November
meeting of the Vincennes group,
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and the trial in Paris of Pierre
Lagaillarde, leader of the Jan-
uary revolt in Algiers. In view
of the excitement stirred up by
the September trial of the left-
ist Jeanson network for aiding
the rebels, the Lagaillarde case
may become a new emotional focus
of the extremists.
Meanwhile, rebel Premier
Ferhat Abbas' firm rejection
of cease-fire negotiations,
which highlighted his radio
address marking the sixth an-
niversary of the rebellion,
reflects the Provisional Al-
gerian Government's markedly
improving international posi-
tion. This is seen in its
de facto recognition and prop-
aganda support by the USSR,
promises of massive aid from
Peiping, and new public dem-
onstrations of support from
Tunisia and Morocco.
Within the past few months
both the Soviet'and Chinese
press have made oblique, un-
usual references to military
and security developments along
widely separated sections of
the Sino-Soviet border. In a
recent discussion of his differ-
ak,
Irkutsk l ikal
1' Boundary shown on recent Chinese Communist maps
SECRET
rences with Peiping, Khrushchev
is reported to have said that
the Chinese have "invaded"
Soviet territory and started
construction of "fortifications"
there. Apparently the Chinese have
begun actively to renew their an-
cient border claims agair~st the. USSR.
KOREA
KOREA
#. SOUTH'
KOREA
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A Peiping pictorial dated
1 May reported that border de-
fense troops of the People's
Liberation (Chinese Communist)
Army were building barracks and
"homes" at an unspecified loca-
tion "on the Pamir plateau."
While the article could have
been referring to developments
in a region adjacent to Kashmir,
it is more likely that the area
in question is farther to,the
north.:Pa,rt of the Pamir Plateau
is in western China, but most
of it is in the USSR's Tad-
zhik Republic. The commentary
noted that to be protected, the
border region "must be built
up," and observed that the troops
engaged in target practice at
an elevation of 14,000 feet
were "happily defending the
border region of the homeland."
Earlier Chinese maps of
this area, both Nationalist and
that enemies have al-
ways tried and will
try to hamper Commu-
nist construction."
Its this context he
observed that "even
now imperialists at-
tempt to send spies
and saboteurs into
our country"--pre-
sumably Lacross these
rivers.
In view of the
extreme unlikelihood
that "imperialist"
spies are operating
in this area, the of-
ficial may well have
been using his refer-
ence to them to cloak
a ntpre realistic ob-
ject of concern--
Chinese border crossers.
The speech also
carried the implica-
tion that it would
be necessary to main-
tain a strong border
Chinese "border defense troops (in the Pamirs) have built barracks guard force along at
and settled down on a mountain covered by snow all year." least this part of the
--Liberation Pictorial, 1 May 1960
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NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 19
Communist, claimed territory
well to the west of the line
drawn on Soviet maps. Newer
Chinese Communist maps have
the same boundary as that on
Soviet maps, but--unlike the
Soviet maps, which show the
border as clearly demarcated--
indicate the frontier as "in-
definite." Chinese claims
within the Tadzhik Republic
thus appear not to have been
entirely abandoned.
In a speech on Soviet "Bor-
der Guard Day"--28 May--a high-
ranking Far East Border Gtkard
official, Boris A. Ivanov,
stressed the need for border
guard vigilance. In a peculiar
juxtaposition of thoughts, he
said that the frontiers of the
Amur and Ussuri .givers "now
link two great brotherly nations
forever, but Soviet Far Eastern
border wards will never forget
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SttIMMARY
Sino-Soviet frontier. This is
rather striking, since the broad-
cast occurred at a time when the
USSR had been widely publicizing
the demobilization of servicemen,
including border guards, in con-
nection with Khrushchev's troop
reduction program.
In mid-July Vladivostok
radio claimed the USSR had
reached an agreement with Com-
munist China, allegedly for
"mutual fire protection." Ex-
tensive work to create a "black
antifire zone" was alleged to
have been started along the
Primorskiy Kray's border with
northeast China Forest areas
were being plowed, "swamps
drained," and rocky hills "over-
come." The draining of swamps
and the "overcoming" of rocky
hills would not seem to be pro-
tective measures against fire,
and the program might actually
have as its purpose the creation
of a surveillance zone of the
border.
On 4 September a Soviet
broadcast to servicemen in the
Far East again described the
efforts of the Soviet Far East
Border Guard to combat "espio
nage." The announcer related
several examples of how "vio-
lators"--otherwise.: unidentified
--had been apprehended, and
stated that an "enemy spy" had
been caught crossing the Amur
River from the USSR to China.
These statements suggest that
some sort of Chinese-Soviet
incidents had occurred along
the river and other sectors of
the border which it was found
necessary to explain away as
having been caused by "imperi-
alist' spies." The commentator
also noted, in the first such
known reference in Soviet
broadcasts, that Chinese border.
guards patrol the south bank of
the Amur.
In July the Soviet publi-
cation Problems of History
carried a review of a Soviet
book entitled "The Amur Question"
which outlined the historical
development of the Amur River
boundary between China and what
is now the USSR. The review
described as "unfair" the
Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), under
which Russian-settled territory
north of the Amur and east of
the Ussuri was ceded to China,
and recounted Chinese attacks
of this period on undefended
Russian settlements in the area.
The review concluded that the
boundary was justly rectified
in the 19th century because of
Russian cultural and economic
superiority over China.
An article by Engels was
cited in support of the conten-
tion that Russia was at the
time the "f irst..power in Asia;"
while China was "weak and de-
caying." This attempt to justify
Russian rights to territory
north of the Amur and to remind
readers of Chinese intrusions
in the area may indicate that
Chinese claims for territory
north of the Amur have been
renewed, perhaps on the basis
of the Treaty of Nerchinsk.
The Khabarovsk area of
the Amur frontier may be par-
ticularly significant in any
dispute over borders in view
of the direct conflict of
claims between Chinese and
Soviet maps concerning a large
island in the Ussuri-Amur
river network.
There is also evidence
that the USSR is seriously
concerned about Chinese inten-
tions toward Mongolia, where
there is also a conflict over
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
Khrushchev was said to have
feared that Mongolia would "go
the way of Tibet"--presumably
meaning that he felt the Chinese
intended to occupy the country.
Nehru is said also to believe
that Khrushchev is concerned
over Chinese designs on the
Mongol areas of the USSR.
Soviet troop dispositions
lend support to the belief
that the USSR continues to be
concerned with the protection
of its border with China de-
spite the advent of the Chinese
Communist regime in 1949. Of
the 38 line divisions in the
Far East and Transbaikal
military districts, at least
18 are within 200 miles of the
Chinese and Mongolian borders.
Major groupings are three
divisions near Zabaykalsk, four
in the Blagoveshchensk area,
and seven in the Primorskiy Kray.
This is approximately the same
deployment which has been in
effect since the end of World
War II and seems inordinately
large, in view of the decline of
Japan as a military power and
the withdrawal of US ground
forces from the Far East since
the Korean war.
Lending support to the
conclusion that Soviet troops
have remained deployed in this
manner in part to discourage
the possibility of Chinese in-
cursions into the USSR is the
statement of a refugee who
served in 1957 in an artillery
regiment attached to a division
at Blagoveshchensk. He asserted
that the division's mission 25X1
was to intervene in possible
"emergencies on the Sino-Soviet
border."
ALBANIA MAINTAINS SUPPORT FOR COMMUNIST CHINA
Only four days before the
bloc meeting in Moscow sched-
uled for 7 November, the Al-
banian regime continues its
support of Chinese Communist
positions. In an address to the
Albanian National Assembly on
25 October, Premier Mehmet Shehu
condemned two Soviet-sanctioned
disarmament proposals of Euro-
pean satellite leaders and re-
iterated Tirana's essentially
pro-Chinese interpretations of
world affairs.
Albania's public alignment
with Peiping and Peiping's suc-
cess in gaining support and in-
fluence in a country hitherto
considered exclusively a Soviet
preserve may encourage opposi-
tion to Khrushchev's policies
in other European satellite
parties and may pose problems
for Moscow throughout the Com-
munist movement.
In a reflection of Albania's
extreme concern about bloc pol-
icies toward Yugoslavia and the
Balkans, Shehu in his speech im-
plicitly criticized Khrushchev's
meetings in New York with Tito.
He also condemned the idea of
total disarmament in the Balkans
--proposed by Gheorgh:iu-Dej of
Rumania and Zhivkov of Bulgaria
--as "absurd and dangerous"
while "imperialism" surrounds
the bloc, and he scored Gomul-
ka's proposal that a first step
toward disarmament could be the
acceptance of existing military
bases on foreign soi 1 as long as
new bases are prohibited.
Shehu's speech came at a
time of continuing signs of
Sino-Albanian amity and of fur-
ther Soviet-Albanian friction.
The Chinese and Albanians have
continued to congratulate each
other on their "devoted struggle"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to preserve the "purity" of
Marxism-Leninism. In a 24 Octo-
ber cable of 'thanks for Al-
bania's greetings on China's na-
tional holiday, Chinese leaders
said their friendship for Al-
bania is based on Marxist prin-
ciples. On 27 October, Deputy
Premier Kellezi, recently re-
turned from a three-week visit
to China, hailed China's com-
munes and "leap forward" as
"extremely correct."
As a sign of their mutual
opposition to any form of bloc
cooperation with Yugoslavia--
a factor which always conditions
Albania's response to initia-
tives in the Balkans--both the
Chinese and Albanian delegates
walked out of a Rumanian trade
union congress on 28 October
when the Yugoslav delegate was
speaking. Another sign of
Chinese moral support for Al-
bania was the previously un-
heralded arrival in Tirana on
24 October of a Chinese military
delegation which had made an
extended visit to the UAR. The
group returned to Peiping on 30
October and evidently did not
visit any other European satel-
lite.
An official of the French
Foreign Ministry has reported--
presumably on information re-
ceived from its legation in Ti-
rana--that the Soviet ambassador
to Albania recently was out of 25X1
the country for five weeks,-
ostensibly because of illness.
The Soviet charg6 allegedly has
been denied access to the Al-
banian Foreign Ministry, while
the Chinese ambassador has daily
been received there as well as
at the party politburo and
central committee headquarters.
The French also assert that
Moscow has withdrawn Soviet
technicians from Albania,--
a move which would complicate
the functioning of the Al-
banian economy.
A remark by Shehu in his
speech indicates, however, that
the Albanian party is not united
behind the regime's pro-Chinese
policy. He stated that "revi-
sionists and opportunists" who
claim that the Chinese party
is dogmatic and in favor of
war--an implicit reference to
the Soviet position--can be
found in Tirana as well as
elsewhere. In this way Shehu
may have been warning other
Albanain leaders--presumably
those favoring a more pro-Soviet
orientation--to support the
pro-Chinese policy or face de-
motion or ouster from the party.
SOVIET LEADERS MAY DELAY PARTY CONGRESS
It is beginning to look as
though the Soviet leaders have
no plans at the present time
to hold the 22nd party congress
until possibly late next year.
There have been rumors in Mos-
cow that it might be held dur-
ing the first three months of
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1961, but it has not yet been
officially convoked--the "irreg-
ular" 21st,.part:y congress in
early 1959 specified only that
the next congress be held some-
time in 1961--and the Soviet
press and radio have been si-
lent on the subject. There is,
moreover, no mention of the
next congress in the party slo-
gans for the anniversary cele-
bration of the Bolshevik Revo-
lution on 7 November. Slogans
preceding the 20th party con-
gress in 1956 and the 21st party
congress in 1959 both referred
to those forthcoming congresses.
In addition, the election
and accountancy meetings of
primary party organizations
began in mid-September without
any reference to a forthcoming
congress. These meetings,
which taker place once a year
whether a national congress is
in the offing or not, are the
first stage in the hierar-
chical system of party meetings,
rayon and oblast conferences,
and republic congresses which
precede a national congress
when one is to be held. When
these election and accountancy
meetings are to lead to a
national congress, a Pravda
editorial announces that act.
For example, the meetings in
late 1955 preceding the party
congress in February 1956 were
described as "the most important
stage in the preparation for the
20th party congress."
The deterioration this sum-
mer and fall in relations be-
tween the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China has undoubtedly
been a major factor affecting
Soviet plans for the holding of
the next congress. According
to a statement by Khrushchev in
November 1959, the new party
program called for by the 20th
party congress in 1956 would be
considered by the 22nd congress
in 1961.. Since the program is
thought of as a guide! for the
entire international Communist
movement, it must be difficult,
if not impossible, to formulate
in view of the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute.
Decisions to draw up a new
program to replace the one
adopted in 1919 and long out-
dated have been made by every
regular congress beginning with
the 18th party congress in 1939,
but have never been implemented.
There were indications early
this year that the program was
being actively worked on at
last, but for several months
there has been no sign of prog-
ress. If the instructions of
the 20th party congress are
followed, a draft program will
be published in time for "ex-
tensive discussion" before the
next congress.
Khrushchev, however, re-
cently told a group of Cuban
journalists that it was diffi-
cult for him to set a time for
a visit to their country be-
cause of a party congress "sched-
uled for 1961," thus indicating
that the question of a congress
in early 1961 was still open.
If the congress were to be held
before fall, the Soviet leaders
would probably prefer to get
it out of the way before April.
In the spring and summer months
a congress would disrupt agri-
cultural work so severely as
probably to constitute an over-
riding consideration.
No congress within the past
30 years has been held during
those months. There is still
time for the necessary prepara-
tions if consideration of a new,
program is put off to a later
congress. Party rules require
only one and one half months'
notice, and the experience of
the 19th congress in 1952
shows that this is adequate.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
USSR TO INTRODUCE NEW AIRCRAFT INTO CIVIL AIR FLEET
As part of its long-term
program to improve the Civil
Air Fleet (Aeroflot), the
Soviet Union has announced the
development of two new light
transports, the AN-24 (Coke),
a turboprop transport, and
the TU-124 (Cookpot), a jet
transport. Series-produced
units of these aircraft are
scheduled to enter service
on domestic feeder routes
sometime it 1961.
The AN-24 twin
turboprop feeder-
line aircraft was
designed to operate
from semi-improved
fields for flights
of 800 to 1,000
miles and to carry
from 32 to 42 pas-
sengers or equiva-
lent freight. The
AN-24's high-wing,
low-slung fuselage
and large, high tail-
fin suggest that it
is designed to fill
a role in the USSR
similar to the one
already filled to
some extent in the
free world by the
Fokker-Fairchild F-27
twin turboprop trans-
port. The power
plants each develop
about 2,000 eshp--
equivalent shaft
horsepower--and en-
able the AN-24 to fly at a speed
of over 300 knots at 20,000
feet. Aeroflot claims that the
operating economy of the AN-24
will reduce ton-mile costs
about 25 percent from 'those of
the IL-14 piston transport.
The TU-124, believed to be
produced at Khar-
kov, is a twin-engine, low-wing
transport which resembles the
TU-104 but is smaller. The 44-
SECRET
68 passenger TU-124 was designed
to use economical turbofan jet
engines which should enable it
to fly at a speed of better
than 500 knots. The turbofan
engine used by the TU-124 is
more economical than a con-
ventional jet because it uses
an extra turbine stage to com-
press bypass air to augment
thrust without raising fuel
consumption.
Two additional versions
of the TU-124 have been mentioned
in the Aeroflot publication
Civil Aviation. These consist
of a tour- st-class and an econ-
omy-class configuration, seat-
ing 55-60 and 68 passengers
respectively. This information
suggests that the USSR is fol-
lowing the lead of Western air-
lines in using a basic aircraft
in which the internal seating
arrangement may be easily con-
verted to accommodate various
loading factors on different
routes.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
These new transports prob-
ably will replace many of the
approximately 1,500 LI-2, IL-
12, and IL-14 piston-engine air-
craft which now constitute about
four fifths of Aeroflot, other
than small types of aircraft and
helicopters. A large amount of
the USSR's civil air activity
consists of short flights within
the country, and the introduction
of these new aircraft, from the
standpoint of increased operat-
ing efficiency, will be a major
step forward in the over-all
moderation of Aeroflot.
The appearance of these new
light transports has been expect
ed for some time. Delays may
have been occasioned by higher
priorities accorded the develop-
ment program for larger civil
transports--such as the TU-104,
TU-114, IL-18, and AN-10. The
longer range planes are more
important in terms of prestige
and propaganda and are essential
for the expansion of Aeroflot's
international routes;, as well as
for providing faster schedules.
Soviet aircraft-capabili-
ties for the military forces
would be significantly increased
by the introduction of sizable
numbers of the new transports
into Aeroflot, inasmuch as civil
aircraft could readily be used
to augment Military Transport
Aviation in times of emergency.
The AN-24, especially, would ap-
pear to be easily adaptable to
military operating conditions.
Apart from modernizing
Aeroflot, the USSR may hope to
penetrate free-world markets.
In the past the USSR could of-
fer in the light transport class
only the relatively obsolete IL- 25X1
14, which did not prove attrac-
tive in nonbloc countries even
at low prices.
(Concurred in by ORR
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET OVERTURES TO TURKEY
The USSR is continuing its
efforts to encourage closer re-
lations with Turkey and to stim-
ulate neutralist sentiments in
the Gursel regime.
Since the Turkish coup in
May, Soviet officials on a num-
ber of occasions have offered
economic aid, including credits
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
Odessa
~qq
?,
Istanbul
T U R K E Y
Poti pi,
Batumi s
Ankara
Naval Base
O STATUTE MILES 300
KILOMETERS 300
8 NOVEMBER 1960
of up to $500,000,000. Khru-
shchev, in a talk in New York
on 11 October with Turkish
Foreign Minister Sarper, reiter-
ated offers of such assistance
and, asserting that Turkish mem-
bership in NATO and CENTO is not
a major obstacle to better rela-
tions, suggested that the USSR
and Turkey agree to establish
a demilitarized zone along their
common frontier by withdrawing
their military forces a distance
of up to "several hundred kilo-
meters." The Soviet premier al-
so observed that the Black Sea
should be turned into a "sea of
peace" and recalled that the
Soviet Government in 1953 had
denounced Stalin's policy of
maintaining pressure on Turkey.
Soviet policymakers are
probably aware that the Gursel
government is reluctant to be-
come involved in any restrictive
military arrangements with the
USSR. By seeking to allay
Turkish concern that the USSR
may again resort to pressure
tactics'and demands involving
territorial claims, Moscow is
probably hoping to encourage
Ankara to accept Soviet aid
and demonstrate greater inde-
pendence of the Western powers
in political as well as mili-
tary matters.
The USSR has also taken a
more friendly public attitude
toward the Gursel government.
In an article on 29 October
marking the founding of the
Turkish :Republic, for example,
Pravda cited the exchange of
messages in June and July be-
tween Khrushchev and Gursel as
an example of improved relations.
However, the clandestine radio
station, "Our Radio," which
broadcasts in Turkish from East
Germany, has criticized the
Gursel regime for persisting in
many of the policies of the
Menderes period and for continu-
ing to suppress Turkish Commu-
nists.
There are signs that Soviet-
Turkish relations have improved
to some extent, particularly in
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Feodosiyd 4
Sevastopol qq'~ W
W~,
.e- ovorossiysk
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the field of cultural exchanges,
A professor from Istanbul Uni-
versity lectured in Moscow in
late September, after which the
Turkish ambassador referred
favorably to Soviet achievements
in science and culture and ex-
pressed the hope that cultural
relations would be strengthened.
On 30 October a ten-man Turkish
commercial delegation arrived
in the USSR for talks with So-
viet foreign trade officials.
Turkish officials continue
to emphasize, nevertheless, that
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
King Husayn is reported
satisfied with the effect of his
anti-Nasir speeches in the UN
and in Amman and now is willing
to allow Jordan's anti-UAR propa-
ganda offensive to taper off.
His strong anti-Nasir stand is
said to have mollified the
Bedouin and Majalli tribal ele-
ments in the military who were
demanding some satisfaction for
the assassination of Prime Min-
ister Majalli in late Auguste
Husayn has recalled the Royal
Guard Brigade to Amman from the
Syrian-Jordanian border area,
but the bulk of the Jordanian
forces deployed near the fron-
tier in early September still
remain in that area.
Lebanon has complied with
UAR demands to curb the activi-
ties of anti-UAR elements within
its borders by announcing new,
strict rules controlling the
movements of political refugees.
Ankara's policy toward the Com-
munist bloc has undergone no
basic change. While'there is
apparently a minority in the
CNU which favors accepting
economic aid from any source,
the Gursel regime has thus
far displayed reluctance to
undertake any new financial
obligations or to respond
to any Soviet initiatives 25X1
which might weaken Turkey's
ties with the West.
There is no firm evidence
that the UAR has taken positive'
steps to retaliate in kind for
Jordanian acts of terrorism in
Syria. No significant change
in the readiness posture of
Syrian military units near the
Jordanian border has been
noted. Meanwhile, Cairo and
Damascus continue intensive
propaganda attacks on Jordan,
and have announced the, uncover-
ing of an alleged Israeli-Jor-
danian espionage and sabotage
ring in Damascus.
Iraq
The growing lack of confi-
dence in Prime Minister Qasim's
leadership is reflected by re-
ports that he may be faced with
wholesale cabinet resignations.
Politicians and military per-
sonnel in the Iraqi Government
have become increasingly reluc-
tant to continue their associa-
tion with what they are coming
to believe is a failing regime.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Two prominent Iraqi offi-
cials on trips abroad, apparently
having received disturbing in-
formation about the situation
at home, returned suddenly to
Baghdad last week. Foreign
Minister Jawad, who had planned
a leisurely journey through
Europe on his way back from the
United Nations meeting in New
York, cut short his trip and
flaw directly from London to
Baghdad.
Pro--Communist Colonel Mah-
dawi, head of the notorious
People's Court, who had been on
a "red-carpet tour" of Communist
bloc countries, suddenly arrived
back in the Iraqi capital on 27
October. His speech at the air-
port significantly omitted any
mention of Qasim. This could
hardly have been an oversight,
for in the past Mahdawi has in-
variably made a point of identi-
fying himself with Qasim, the
"sole leader," as closely as
possible.
Sudan
The Abboud military regime,
which in its less than two years
of power has survived a variety
of political machinations and
several coup attempts, is again
in serious trouble. The immedi-
ate cause was the government's
decision on the resettlement of
some 50,000 residents of the
Wadi Halfa area, which will be
flooded when the UAR's Aswan
High Dam reaches advanced stages
of construction.
Riots in Wadi Halfa last
week have been followed by demon-
strations and disturbances in
Khartoum and five other Sudanese
cities; these had the backing of
a number of religious and politi-
cal elements, including the Su-
danese Communist party
Prime Minister Abboud is
not, however, permitting inter-
nal difficulties to interfere
with his external plans. Having
instituted additional security
precautions, he and several of
his ministers departed on 29
October for a week-long state
visit to Ethiopia. He has also
been insistent that Nasir's
ten-day state visit to the
Sudan take place as scheduled
beginning on 15 November.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
MOROCCAN LEFTIST OPPOSITION GROWING STRONGER
The opposition of left-wing
Moroccans to the government of
King Mohamed V, long the univer-
sal symbol of Moroccan national-
ism, is strengthening as the re-
gime attempts to suppress left-
ist criticism by curtailing
civil liberties. Organized
leftist activity is centered in
the 14-month-old National Union
of Popular Forces (UNFP) and
its labor wing, the Moroccan
Union of Labor (UMT), The basic
issue in dispute is the con-
st itution,which the King has
promised to promulgate before
the end of 1962.
tion of the country, is suspected
by the left of scheming to in-
stall an authoritarian govern-
ment.
The constitutional issue
being far too complicated for
popular understanding, the UNFP
has turned to other issues to
arouse popular sentiment for it-
self and against the King's
government. Its focus has been
on anticolonialism, greater sup-
port for the Algerian rebellion,
and the evacuation of foreign
troops, including both French
and American.
UNFP spokesmen insist that
the constitution be drafted by
"the people" and not imposed by
the King. They are agitating
for the election of a national
assembly to draw one up, and
they refuse to sit on the com-
mission appointed late in the
summer to prepare a draft. The
King apparently hoped to parry
leftist attacks by submitting
the-constitution to a popular
referendum, a farcical gesture
in a country where at least 85
Countering such activities,
the government has become more
aggressive in explaining its
policies. It also has retali-
ated against leftist propaganda
by seizing whole issues of left-
ist newpapers containing offen-
sive articles. The government's
recent action in rescinding
legislation requiring govern-
mental approval of the formation
of labor unions is widely inter-
preted as giving a boost to the
right-wing labor federation,
percent of the people are illit- which seeks to destroy its power-
erate,and the vast majority ful rival, the UMT, by attract-
failed to comprehend the sig- ing the UMT's grass-roots
nificance of the municipal and following.
rural council elections held
last May.
Two prominent UNFP chiefs
intimated recently to American
officials that the removal of
the monarchy will eventually be
necessary. Most leftist leaders
probably would still support a
parliamentary monarchy with
sharply reduced royal powers.
The King, on the other hand,
while pledged to establish a
constitutional monarchy, wants
a strong executive. Crown Prince
Moulay Hassan, who is being
groomed by his father as the heir
to the throne and is in fact
responsible for the administra-
The administration's un-
easiness over the strength
the left is demonstrating
was shown on 1 November,
when all leftist gatherings
were dispersed by police and
the UNFP president of the Casa-
blanca municipal council, who
served as minister of labor
under leftist premier Ibrahim,
was arrested. The government
had, however, declared the
day a--national holiday in
support of the Algerian
rebels after the left had
prepared a one-day strike and
mass meetings in major cities..
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
BOLIVIAN PRESIDENT UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE
Strong pressure on President
Paz Estenssoro for a new round
of wage increases is seriously
endangering the US-backed eco-
nomic stabilization program which
has enabled Bolivia to maintain
a stable foreign exchange rate
for almost two years after a
long period in which the rate
deteriorated steadily. Paz fears
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
that anarchy and chaos lie barely
beneath the surface of the pres-
ent scene and that governmental
austerity at this time might
result in violent outbreaks which
would undercut the possibility
of new foreign investment es-
sential to long-term: economic
progress.
The government's cash short-
age is preventing the payment
of social security benefits and
of salaries in many government
operations, and family allow-
ances for the army are more
than two years in arrears. Re-
cent strikes of construction,
telephone, newspaper, printer,
and railway workers unions were
suspended only after "friendly"
consideration of wage demands
was guaranteed despite the gov-
ernment's cash position and its
fear of a new wage-price spiral.
New strikes in key unions were
announced on 28 October, and
government officials expect
additional labor halts. Paz
does not believe he can declare
the strikes illegal, since most
of them involve demands for
wages legally due.
The Bolivian Government
now is particularly interested
in possible German and Brazilian
investments. Negotiations are
under way for a German invest-
ment and management contract in
the nationalized tin mines.
Several key Bolivian officials
hope that Brazilian interests
will build a modern electrolytic
smelter like that constructed
several years ago in Rio de
Janeiro State. This type of
smelter is able to process any
kind of ore, even if ' it is com-
plex and of low grade like most
of that in Bolivia. Labor and
congressional groups continue
to press strongly for the gov-
ernment to follow up the USSR's
offer of a tin smelter. The
cabinet met to discuss the
question on 29 October but
President Paz does not--at
least at present--appear to be
giving serious consideration
to such a step.
n i-US feeling has
previously been strong in pe-
riods of financial stringency,
apparently because leading
Bolivians feel that the extent
of US aid is the major factor
in Bolivia's economic position.
Bolivian factory workers
recently expressed irritation
at US exclusion of manufactur-
ing in Bolivia from the help
which the US extends indirectly
to the Bolivian Mining Corpora-
tion through budgetary support.
The finance minister recently
said that the United States
would be to blame if the Boliv-
ian Government did not have
,funds to ay its November wages.
During the Mali Republic's
first month as a separate state,
its Marxist-influenced leaders
have been concerned chiefly with
demonstrating their independence
from Western--especially French
--domination. This ha s provided
Sino-Soviet bloc countries with
new opportunities, which they
are moving rapidly to exploit,
to extend their presence in
Black Africa.
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vow 14W
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Already Mali
has established, or
clearly indicated its
readiness to estab-
lish, diplomatic re-
lations with the USSR,
Czechoslovakia, Com-
munist China, and
North Vietnam. In
addition, the Mali
Government is active-
ly engaged in work-
ing out barter-trade
and other economic
and technical assist-
ance arrangements
with at least some of
the seven Communist
countries...'includ-
ing East Germany, Hun-
gary, and Yugoslavia
--which sent special
missions to Bamako
last month.
While no commit-
ments have yet been
announced, the Czechs
reportedly have
agreed to construct
certain industrial
SIA,TUTE MILES 600
31435
'SPANISH
SAHARA
low-interest credit. An ini-
tial group of eight Soviet
technicians already has arrived
in Mali, presumably to survey
possible aid projects.
enterprises, to supply 350
trucks, and to send several
geologists to conduct mineral
surveys. Prague is also said
to have offered a long-term,
A number of the
projects being pre-
sented by Mali for
the consideration of
the bloc delegations
are designed to im-
prove transport routes
between landlocked
Mali and Conakry,
Guinea's capital and
port. This presumably
reflects a belief that
the bloc will show
particular interest
in schemes that would
foster ties between
Mali and Guinea--a
belief which appears
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY $U RY
3 November 196,0
well founded in view of the in-
creased emphasis apparently be-
ing placed by the USSR and
Guinea on the early reconstruc-
tion of the Conakry-Kankan
rail line in Guinea.
Since August, when Senegal
dissolved its federation with
Mali, the Malians have adamant-
ly refused to use the direct
rail link with Dakar. Instead,
they have arranged to ship the
bulk of Mali's commercial
traffic via the more costly,
road and rail route through
Abidjan, capital of the West-
ern-oriented Ivory Coast,
While Mali's leaders have
not yet demanded the evacuation
of the four French military and
air bases,which constitute
France's most important single
interest in Mali, steps have
been taken in the domestic field
to undercut the position of
private French economic inter-
ests. Moreover, many of the
statements and actions of Mali
officials since late September
have reflected the generally
held conviction that France was
responsible for the breakup of
the federation and have indi-
cated a desire for complete
dissociation from the French
Community. This impression
has been created particularly
by Mali's representatives at
the UN, who have denounced
France at every opportunity
while voting with the bloc on
nearly all East-West issues.
Mali's drift away from the
West and toward the bloc--simi-
lar in many ways to the course
adopted by Guinea when it be-
came independent in 1958--may
well be accelerated in the near
future.
ou a ex rem s s, w o pre-
viously had been held in check
by relatively moderate President
Modibo Keita, succeed in gaining
predominant influence, Mali would
probably move rapidly toward a
close alignment with Guinea and,
like that state, welcome bloc
assistance on a large scale.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
NONBLOC COMMUNIST PARTIES
The conclave of world Com-
munist leaders scheduled to be
held in Moscow in conjunction
with the 7 November celebration
of the Bolshevik revolution
bids fair to be the most impor-
tant meeting of its type ever
held. The "strains" in the
Sino-Soviet alliance, increas-
ingly apparent since 1956, be-
came a "rift" by April 1960,
and now threaten to develop
into a permanent schism. -'
Throughout the evolution of
the dispute on world Communist
tactics, and particularly in
its later stages, both the So-
viet and Chinese parties have
lobbied energetically for sup-
port from other Communist par-
ties.
Since the failure of the
Bucharest meeting in June 1960
to bring even a temporary easing
of the situation, the Soviet
Union has stepped up its drive
to get the Communist parties of
the world to commit themselves
to Moscow's side. In large
measure it has succeeded. The
European satellites, with the
exception of Albania, are firm-
ly on record with the Soviet
party; the major European Com-
munist parties are also behind
Moscow. Even the Dutch Commu-
nist leader, Paul De Groot, who
is notorious for his preference
for Chinese views, pressed his
central committee for a resolu-
tion supporting the Soviet Un-
ion after a recent visit to
Moscow.
AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
although the Japanese party
seems to prefer to remain neu-
tral. On the American conti-
nents, no party has shown
enough sympathy for the Chi-
nese positions to argue for
them, and most of the major
parties are aligned with the
Soviet Union.
On the surface, then, Mos-
cow will enter the discussions
in November with impressive
world wide support. Beneath
this encouraging surface, how-
ever, pockets of dissent re-
main, uneasiness over Moscow's
course survives, and dedidated
revolutionists are still in
fundamental agreement with Pei-
ping's fiery slogans. Thus
support for Moscow even in those
POSITIONS OF NONBLOC COMMUNIST PARTIES
IN SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE
Parties unequivocally supporting Soviet position:
us
Canadian
British
West German
French
Italian
Swiss
Finnish (People's Democratic: League)
Lebanese
Chilean
Parties whose leaders, at least, favor Soviet position:
Austrian
Costa Rican (Popular Vanguard party)
Ecuadorean
Peruvian
Parties declaring support of Soviet position
but with significant dissenting minorities:
Dutch
Belgian
Indian
Indonesian
Of the Asian satellites,
North Vietnam and North Korea
have shown a reluctance to be-
come embroiled in the argument.
Among the important nonbloc
Asian parties, most of the In-
dian and Indonesian leaders
have voted for Moscow's views,
Iraqi
Japanese
Cuban (Popular Socialist party)
Panamanian (People's party)
Brazilian
Argentine
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IYO
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
parties which have
declared themselves
does not appear com-
plete, and this must
be a cause of con-
siderable disquietude
in Moscow.
Western Europe
--Paul DeGroot, secretary general, Dutch Communist party.
The Cosvnunist who thinks that a war must be unleashed ,to reach so-
Although Peiping cialist objectives cannot be regarded as a normal human betng.... Those
has tried ';t o swing a t who are dreaming of war... have not the fate of the peoples at heart, but
are merely basing themselves on fantastic and philosophic ideologies.
least some of the:.old-
er, more-mature-.par-
What appears most serious, at least to me, is the fact that the
number of those who think that hanging on tables is not an adequate
substitute for dropping A-bombsis steadily increasing., these forces
are certainly making headway,since it is very difficult to find the
proper eounterargwnents to what they are saying.
ties of West Europe unjust criticism of the Soviet Communist party cannot flat be
to its.. side ,', it has had harmful and is not in the interest of the `workers' movement,,.. he
l i t t l e :s uc c e s s . In interventions and certain of the writings of the Chinese are dangerous,
and cannot but cause certain parties to deviate....
countries where par- --Georges Glineur, Belgian Cononuntst party representative at
liamentary democracy Bucharest Conference.
is strong, economies
are healthy, and the
people fervently desire peace
and disarmament, Chinese pro-
grams hold little appeal... In
addition, leaders of the major
parties have loyally followed
the lead of the Soviet Union
through many Sharp twists and
turns of policy, even when this
has meant increasing unpopular-
ity for the parties involved
and heavy losses in party mem-
bership.
Since its 30 June - 1 July
central committee meeting, the
French Communist party, lack-
ing a "Chinese faction," has
been unequivocally aligned with
Moscow against "dogmatists and
left-wing deviationists." The
Italian party is so firmly com-
mitted to the Soviet view that
the Chinese reportedly told its
leaders that the usual Italian
delegation to the celebrations
of China's National Day would
not be welcome in Peiping this
year.
The Swiss Communist party,
solidly behind the Soviet Union,
has refused to distribute liter-
ature received from the Chinese
party in support of Chinese
views. While the British Com-
munist party has made no for-
mal statement on the dispute,
the material which has been ap-
pearing in the Daily Worker in-
dicates that it favors Moscow's
views. Leaders of the Austrian
Communist party agree that the
conflict has reached a stage
which must be described as dan-
gerous, but apparently have de-
cided that it should not be dis-
cussed within the party, since
this could only lead to discord.
The situation in the Dutch
Communist party illustrates how
the realities of the European
scene, combined with pressures 25X1
from Moscow, overcome the sym-
pathy which life-long revolu-
tionists feel for Chinese views.
De Groot, who had been re-
garded as a consistent; Stalinist
and was believed to favor Pei-
ping's positions, stated that
the Dutch party must support
Moscow on peaceful coexistence
whether sympathetic with its
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
views or not. In a revealing
statement, De Groot told his
central committee that "while
we respect the opinions of our
Chinese comrades, the Chinese
have forgotten one important
thing: We, not they, will be
the victims of an atomic war."
The Belgian Communist par-
ty appears to find itself in
somewhat the same situation as
the Dutch. While generally sup-
porting Moscow, it still eyes
the Chinese line with some fa-
vor, and many militants in the
party appear to hope that this
line will triumph. On the ques-
tion of the "national libera-
tion movements," the Belgians
appear to prefer the more ag-
gressive, revolutionary views
which Peiping advocates. The
party recently advised Congo-
lese correspondents to collab-
orate with China as "a country
capable of providing important
aid."
Southeast Asia and the Far
East show the obverse side of
the coin. Here, close to the
Chinese colossus, in countries
where parliamentary democracy
is not deeply rooted, economies
are weak, and extreme solutions
to problems seem to offer prom-
ise, Soviet success in enlist-.-
ing support is tinged with some
failure.
Indian Communist party
leaders on 7 September formally
reaffirmed their policy of
achieving power through "peace-
ful" means, thus in effect back-
ing Moscow's views. The resolu-
tion passed by the Indian par-
ty's central executive committee
temporarily ended a bitter debate
that had raged for some time be-
tween pro-Moscow moderates and
an extremist "left-sectarian"
group which had supported Pei-
ping's views on various questions.
The Indian Communist lead-
ers remain deeply divided, but
the position of the moderate fac-
tion has reportedly been bol-
stered by indications that even
some "left sectarians" now deem
it expedient to show some sup-
port for the Moscow line. Other
of these leftist leaders, how-
ever, continue to support the
concepts advanced by the Chinese,
and the potential of a shift
within the party remains.
In Indonesia, like India,
dissension and uneasiness re-
main a problem. Although Chair-
man D. N. Aidit of the Indonesian
Communist party, long the dom-
inant figure in the party, is re-
ported to have declared Moscow
"right" and Peiping "wrong" and
to have gained acceptance of
this position, support for Mos-
cow from this party must be bon-
sidered fragile. Four of the
seven politburo members have re-
cently been reported leaning
d i i d
t
P
I'm not quite sure whether talking like this with you will be cor-
rect according to the party. But I think I an right as jar as I have
gone because you have read it all in the newspapers. What bad luck for
the party: I wish you hadn't known it.'
--S. A. Dange, Indian Cormunist party leader, talking to
provincial party members.
Xhrushchev is doing harm. to the international Com.a+ntst movement,
as he did when he attacked Stalin.
The Chinese are wrong and Moscow right and,aocoriing to Lenin,
who improved on and perfected !jarcr, each country must follow those
tactics suitable to the situation of that country.
D. X. Atdtt, chairman of the Indonesian Cosvsw%ist party.
SECRET
owar
e p ng, an
there was considerable
argument before Aidit's
views were accepted.
Aidit's support
for Moscow continues
the ambiguous policies
of all previous lead-
ers of the party in
Indonesia--they have
looked to Moscow for
guidance, but' ha.ve
tended to view the
Chinese Communist rev-
olutionary tactics as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
better suited to Indonesian
conditions.
The Japanese party has not
gone on-record in support of
either side in the dispute. Pri-
or to the Bucharest meeting in
June, the Japanese Communist
newspaper had urged its readers
to study the text of three state-
ments--of Chinese views which
had been reprinted on 5 June in
the party's semimonthly journal..
Since the meeting, the Japanese
Communist press has been pub-
lishing only those Chinese
statements that support the
Bucharest communiqud.
ly to support the USSR. The
leaders and the rank and file
of the Communist party in the
United States are united in
their view that Chinese concepts
can only do harm to the interna-
tional Communist movement and
the US party. The leader of
the Canadian Communist party,
Tim Buck, has not condemned Chi-
nese views to the evident satis-
faction of his followers, but
has refused an invitation from
the Chinese to visit Communist
China. Buck also wrote an ar-
ticle which appeared in the Marx-
ist Review, September-October
T 0,_wTich was highly critical
of Chinese positions, and the
Canadian party drafted a letter
of criticism which was sent to
the Chinese party.
In Latin America, the Com-
Any ideological differences will be settled shortly, and a defint-
tive Stno-Soviet break is a capitalist daydream. 1 11
--Cusafael 'cheverrta, an Ecuadorean Com,nurdst party leader.
The imperialists have speculated much about a dtision between
China and the Soviet Union. They have not hidden their Joy and their
crtminal.hopes of such a possibility? But_thetr joy is in vain. Their
criminal hopes will be disappointed. The Soviet Union, China, and all
socialtst,gountrteswtl2 not,be diuJ by any cause; on the con-
trnary, they mill become more united and litter coord nateo eery day.
--Ettttorialor 1 October in Hok, newspaper of the
American offi-
cials in Tokyo be-
lieve the party is reluctant
to become publicly involved in
the dispute because of close
ties with both Peiping and Mos-
cow. If forced to choose now,
the Japanese party would prob-
ably declare in favor of Mos-
cow's present interpretation of
Communist theory and doctrine.
Over the longer range, however,
the orientation of the Japanese
Communists will be influenced
by their party's long and sym-
pathetic association with the
Chinese party and the special
attraction which the mainland
exerts on Japanese society.
North and Latin America
The Canadian and American
Communist parties appear firm-
munist parties are somewhat
isolated from. the rest of the
movement and ordinarily must
contend with a time lag, in re-
ceiving ideological and policy
guidance from the bloc on
changes in Communist interna-
tional doctrine and issues af-
fecting bloc solidarity.
A degree of hesitancy and
confusion, partially due to a
desire by the leaders to keep
the problem from being widely
considered, has characterized
the apparently limited discus-
sions on the Sino-Soviet rift
within these parties. They
are, however, traditionally
accustomed to looking to Mos-
cow for guidance on interna-
tional Communist policies and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to blindly carrying out Soviet
directives. Although China
has considerably augmented its
influence among Latin American
Communists since 1956, there is
little indication that these
parties will deviate from the
pro-Soviet pattern.
Most of the key parties in
the area--those in Argentina,
Brazil, Venezuela, and Cuba--
have not taken an official posi-
tion on the dispute. In Brazil,
the party secretary general has
effectively gagged discussion
of the question, apparently be-
lieving that it would aggrava.te
his troubles with the small,
but vocal, extreme left party
faction. The Chilean party,
the"fourth largest in Latin
America, has clearly expressed
its support of the Soviet line,
and the Peruvian party has in-
directly expressed its support.
Some leaders of the Panamanian
and Mexican parties have taken
note of the dispute without
adopting a position, while the
top leader of the small Ecua-
dorean party, which has a dissi-
dent faction favoring revolu-
tionary tactics, reportedly
backs the Soviet theses.
The revolutionary tactics
and policies of the Castro re-
gime in Cuba, which is support-
ed by both the USSR and China
and all Latin American Commu-
nists, seem on the surface to
lend support to Chinese theo-
ries. There are rumors of a
split in the Cuban Communist
party between the younger, more
radical members who increasingly
turn to Peiping for guidance
and a somewhat more moderate
group which continues to fol-
low party guide lines originat-
ing in Moscow.
present the Cuban Communist ap-
paratus is oriented more toward
Moscow than toward Peiping. The
progress and fate of the Castro
dictatorship and its experiment
with socialism could become a
test of the validity of the op-
posing Sino-Soviet theories and
hence a battleground for the
loyalties of the parties in the
hemisphere.
Middle East and Africa
The Communists of the Mid-
dle East and Africa, in those
countries in which they are or-
ganized in formal groups, have
generally been too involved
with problems affecting their
own survival in the face of gov-
ernmental pressures to have been
seriously affected by the ram-
ifications of the Sino-Soviet
dispute.
An important exception is
the Iraqi Communist party, which
rapidly expanded its influence
following the 1958 coup and
pushed ahead in a bid for pow-
er under the leadership of a
faction which apparently was
influenced by Chinese views on
the need for immediate armed
struggle. Following a series
of setbacks, however, the Iraqi
Communists adopted a more mod-
erate line involving at least
nominal support for Prime Min-
ister Qasim and conforming with
the views expressed by the So-
viet Union. The party, however,
has never clarified its posi-
tion on the Sino-Soviet dispute.
Another exception is the
Lebanese Communist party, which
is clearly lined up with the
Soviet Union. During the dif-
ficulties in Iraq, after heated
discussions among Lebanese Com-
munists, the party overwhelming-
ly sided with the Soviet-backed
faction in Iraq, with only an
extremely small dissenting mi-
nority. Since then, the local
Communist press has taken its
cue from Moscow, including the
reprinting of Khrushchev's speech
to the Bucharest congress and
an article from Pravda deplor-
ing the "misinterp-r ation,
ideological. fossilization, and
isolationism" of those who
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-. SECRET
maintain that "since the ques-
tion of war and peace depends
on the wishes of the imperial-
ists, the struggle for peace
becomes worthless and without
purpose."
Most of the other Commu-
nist parties of the Arab coun-
tries, as well as in Israel.,
have in the past been closely
identified with Soviet views.
They have also, however, been
subject to intense factional
differences, and there is not
enough information available
to assess their stands on the
dispute.
In the newly independent
countries of Africa, Communist
elements have not developed to
the point of establishing formal
party organizations, Individual
Communists in most of these
poses. Coming after the de-
Stalinization campaign of 1953
and the events in Eastern Europe
of 1.956 which set comrade against
comrade all over the world, the
effects of further factional
strife will be multiplied.
That the Soviet Union real-
izes and fears this development
is shown by the vehemence of its
reaction to the Chinese efforts
in international. Communist front
movements, and in letters and
documents sent to other parties
to gather support for its views.
While the dispute was still in
a bilateral stage, while it re-
mained on the level of argumen-
tation in party journals, the
Soviet party tried hard to keep
it under wraps. When it moved
into the arena of the world
Communist movement, the USSR
struck back hard.
If we were to release to our press the material received daily from
the Chinese Aubassy, unaltered and in its entirety, it would cause serious
ideological conftasion.
-letvan Szirmai, secretary, Hungarian Communist party.
Neither Xhrushchev nor Mao seems to realize the damage their dis-
pate is causing.,
countries are instead concen-
trating on establishing influ-
ence with nationalist leaders
and within the dominant nation-
alist political movements, as
well as in other key groups,
such as trade union movments.
Effects of Dispute
As the men in the Kremlin
survey the present situation
in the world Communist movement,
they can find little to give
them joy and comfort. To be
sure, the Soviet positions are
being echoed all over the world.
But the history of the Commu-
nist movement is full of the
debilitating effects of ideo-
logical squabbles, and today's
Soviet leaders are well aware
of the dangers of polycentrism
which the Chinese deviation
It seems clear
that the dispute now
has reached the stage
where the present lead-
ers of the Soviet Un-
ion and China cannot
arrive
at
a real res-
olution
of
the dis-
pute.
If
the party
meeting
is
held in
Moscow as scheduled and results
in a nominal reconciliation,
leaving both parties free to
carry on as they have, the
traditional. factional struggles
in all. Communist parties will
be intensified. If the meeting
results in some form of Sino-
Soviet break or a vote of censure
against the Chinese, it will be
necessary to follow through
within each party with a purge
of those elements which do
not support the stand of
their leaders. In either
case, the eruption of the
Sino-Soviet controversy in-
to open struggle has af-
fected, and will continue to
seriously undermine, the
unity of the Communist world.
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Stalin, shortly after
World War II and at about the
age of 67, began to divest him-
self of many of the day-to-day
problems attending the admin-
istration of the Soviet state.
Khrushchev, at the same age,
is apparently doing the same,
and his rest and vacation peri-
ods are growing logger and more
numerous. As a result, new
methods of operation are being
developed in order to allow
Khrushchev to devote himself
to matters of high policy, par-
ticularly external affairs.
Nonetheless,,,, Khrushchev re-
tains his hold over the initi-
ation of all major policies,
and the cult of the leader con-
tinues.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE KHRUSHCHEV LEADERSHIP
KHRUSHCHEV'S TRIPS ABROAD AND VACATIONS
(SINCE MID 1959)
14 July - 23 July
6 August - 1 September
5 September - 11 September
15 September - 28 September
30 September - 4 October
19 October - 25 October
16 November - 27 November
29 November - 7 December
1960
19 January - 28 January
10 February - 5 March
12 March - 18 March
23 March - 3 April
8 April - 23 April
14 May - 21 May
4 June - 18 June
18 June - 27 June
30 June - 8 July
30 July - 28 August
1 September - 5 September
9 September - 14 October
26 October
Polish trip
Black Sea
Dacha near Moscow
US trip
Chinese trip
Rumania
Black Sea
Hungarian trip
Place unknown
Southeast Asian trip
Ill with the flu
French visit
Black Sea
Paris Summit
Black Sea
Rumanian trip
Austrian trip
Black Sea
Finnish trip
UN General Assembly
Black Sea
A major shift in Khrushchev's
activities occurred in the
spring of 1958 when he assumed
the premiership from Bulganin.
From March of that year he be-
gan to move gradually away
from the internal scene; during
recent months he has displayed
almost complete preoccupation
with foreign affairs.
In the first years of his
ascendancy, Khrushchev was
deeply involved in two great
problems: first, to retain and
strengthen his position among
the leaders; and second, to re-
organize and revitalize the
domestic economy. By early 1958
he had put his agricultural pro-
gram into effect, the industrial
reorganization and the machine
tractor reform had been adopted,
the antiparty people had been
dealt with, Zhukov had been
sacked, and Bulganin had been
put in his place. It seems un-
likely that the present change
in emphasis toward foreign af-
fairs would be possible if Khru-
shchev were under fire as:he
was in 1957.
1958-1959
During 1958 and 1959 the
composition of the party pre-
sidium remained practically in-
tact, although Bulganin was
removed in September 1958 for
his complicity with Malenkov
and company. By December 1959,
however, it was apparent that
Belyayev, probably in some dis-
favor since 1957, would be
purged for his poor performance
as party chief in Kazakhstan and
that Kirichenko was also on his
way out.
In discussions with Govern-
or Harriman in the spring of
1959, Khrushchev made it clear
that Kirichenko was no longer
a favorite, and during the sec-
ond half of the year Kirichenko's
activities became increasingly
circumscribed and his position
in the hierarchy apparently was
slipping. Several reports in-
dicate that Kirichenko had
crossed the "old man." By Jan-
uary both Belyayev and Kirichenko
were headed for oblivion; the
pattern of their demotions was
almost identical with that given
Bulganin.
The central committee is
known to have met eight times
in 1958 and 1959. Although
speculation is intriguing, evi;
dence is lacking to indicate that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMM&RY
the committee was called on to
intercede in disagreements in-
volving the leaders. If any-
thing, the role of the central
committee became more routine.
With only one exception since
December 1958, central commit-
tee sessions, their agenda, and
even the main speakers were
announced well ih advance. Large
numbers of nonmember special-
ists were "co-opted" to attend
these meetings, and the publi-
cation of stenographic reports
became customary procedure.
Indeed, the years 1958 and
1959 brought the flowering of
the Khrushchev cult--exempli-
fied by his all-pervasive au-
thority at the 21st
party congress in Jan- Every time you [&hruahchev] go abroad, you take with you a part of
ua ry 1959 and i l lu s - each one of us.... Every time [you] return from abroad having success-
fully fulfilled a mission of peace and friendship, [you] not only return
t ra t e d by the great to us "a part of each of us"--[you] enrich for all of us our understand-
propaganda barrage ing of the supreme tasks which are presented before the peoples in the
struggle for peace and progress. Pravda. 21 October 1960
rr
ndi
h i
su
ng
ou
S t r 1
P
to the United States during the
early fall. In addition to
Khrushchev's mounting concern
with foreign affairs and the in-
creasing amount of time spent
outside the country, beginning
in 1959 .it became noticeable
that Khrushchev was away from
Moscow much more frequently for
vacations and rest; there were
strong signs that he was not
well. Khrushchev appeared to
be slowing up.
December Plenum, 1959
In one respect, at least,
the December 1959 party plenum
represented a break with the
past. It apparently was the
first occasion since the 1920s
that individual members of the
central committee had attempted
to win approval for a policy
before the presidium had made
its own decision. The particular
question, concerned changes in
the organization of agriculture,
including the establishment of
collective farm unions--organi-
zations which administer sev-
eral collective farms.
The December plenum, fol-
lowing the pattern of the two
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preceding plenums, was called
well in advance. The agenda--
a progress report on agricul-
ture--and the main speakers were
announced beforehand. There was
speculation prior to the meeting
that in addition to the announced
agenda, the committee would take
some action on organizational
questions, including the col-
lective farm unions.
Two candidate members of
the presidium, Polyansky and
Podgorny, were the chief spokes-
men at the plenum for a hier-
archical system of farm unions;
the minister of agriculture ad-
vocated no expansion 'beyond the
local level. Khrushchev was
aware of the differences before-
hand but is not known to have
committed himself to the pro-
posal. In his speech, the clos-
ing speech to the plenum, Khru-
shchev declared only that the
proposals for expansion deserved
attention, and the resolution
adopted by the plenum mentioned
in passing that the question
would be turned over :to the
presidium for decision.
The lack of a decision at
the plenum is probably attribu-
table to Khrushchev's own res-
ervations at that time. Agricul-
tural results were disappointing
in 1959, and new organizational
schemes which might adversely
affect results for 1960 were un-
likely to be considered prema-
ture.
Further, Khrushchev had
been away from Moscow a total
of 99 out of 174 days since 1
July. During intervals at home
he was undoubtedly preoccupied
with such problems as his pro-
posed armed forces reduction,
which had met with strong mili-
tary opposition.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
3 November 1960
Some observers have in-
terpreted the December plenum
as a defeat for Khrushchev.
They argue that Khrushchev was
very much in favor of the col-
lective farm unions but could
not obtain agreement from the
party presidium. As a result,
he utilized the services'of
two deputies in order to try
to push the measure through the
central committee, but other
forces in the presidium took.a
negative stand. As a result of
his "failure," Khrushchev was
then forced to sack Kirichenko.
However, the use of depu-
ties to champion his own pro-
posal is in marked contrast to
Khrushchev's usual procedures.
He neither spoke out for the
collective farm unions himself
nor submitted draft proposals
"for discussion"; indeed, his
advocacy of the plan is diffi-
cult to establish. His chief
spokesmen for the lost cause..
Polyansky and Podgorny, were
promoted to full members in the
presidium a few months later.
Furthermore, ;-:some collective
farm unions above. t:he local
level have recently been created
--probably as an experiment to
test their effectiveness.
that he suffered any kind of de-
feat. If Kirichenko had still
been a Khrushchev favorite at
the time he was ousted, and if
a major program had been defeated
in the central committee during
a time when the military lead-
ers were opposing another major
program, it is difficult to be-
lieve that signs of shakiness
in Khrushchev's position would
not have appeared.
behavior following the plenum 25X1
or Khrushchev's
Finally, there is no indi-
cation from Soviet propaganda,
The major trends noted
earlier--preoccupation with for-
eign affairs and less time in
Moscow--continue in 1960. As a
result of foreign ex-
cursions and increas-
ingly frequent vaca-
tions, Khrushchev has
been outside Moscow
192 days or almost
two thirds of the time
so far this year.
Nonetheless, every
prominent development
in Soviet policy dur-
ing this time has been
associated with him
personally: the armed
forces reduction, the
U-2 and summit affair,
the Burcharest confer-
ence, and the UN Gen-
eral Assembly session.
Painting of Khrushchev published in Ogonyok.
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Personal publici-
ty and accolade for
the man have never been
higher. References to
Khrushchev as "head of
of the central commit-
tee" are commonplace,
and as "head of the
presidium" not unus-
ual. Widely publicized
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
poetry extols his leadership--
and a new honor, the first oil
painting of Khrushchev as lead-
er and teacher, in precisely
the same style in which Lenin
and Stalin were deified--has
been unveiled and reproduced
in Ogonyok, the Soviet counter-
part T Life.
May Plenum - 1960
As the central committee
met in May, Khrushchev appeared
to be approaching the summit
period at the height of his
prestige and power. As party
first secretary, premier, head
of the party bureau for the
Russian Republic (RSFSR), and
recognized "leader of the cen-
tral committee," Khrushchev of
course has assembled a consid-
erable array of power and
prestige, Because of his ab-
sences, however, he needs to
be well assured '.that'. the ma-
chine continues to run smooth-
ly as it does when he is there
to regulate the throttle.
The May session had been
summoned quickly--it was a one-
day affair whose chief purpose
was to brief the central com-
mittee members on the U-2 inci-
dent and the stand Khrushchev
would take the next day at the
Supreme Soviet session. Im-
portant personnel changes were
also announced, but the plenum
clearly was not conceived of as
a battleground in a contest over
the positions of the leaders.
Rumors in Moscow as early as a
month before the session accu-
rately described some of the
details of the personnel shifts
which were to take place. At a
reception on the eve of the
meeting, Khrushchev outlined
roughly what would happen the
next day.
The main effect of the per-
sonnel shifts was to move some
presidium members out of the
secretariat and into jobs either
on the Council of Ministers or
to full-time work in the party
bureau for the RSFSR. Kozlov was
brought into the secretariat,
Kosygin promoted in the Council
of Ministers, and Brezhnev moved
over to take Voroshilov's job
in the presidium of the Supreme
Soviet. If we assume that Khru-
shchev had every intention of
retaining control of the main
positions of power--he said to
Harriman, "As long as I live,
I'll run the party"--and at the
same time had been advised to
slow up, then the changes can
be readily understood.
In accord with the Harriman
conversations, Khrushchev brought
his number-one choice as succes-
sor, Kozlov, into the secretari-
at--a move which certainly had
to be made if Kozlov is to have
a head start in a succession race.
Kosgyin's promotion to a
first deputy. premiership, as
with Kozlov's shift,; pu.t a trusted
man in a top supervisory posi-
tion, Kosygin, for instance,.was
now on a par with Mikoyan,
With the reduction, of the
secretariat from ten members to
five, the responsibilities of
the incumbents--particularly
Suslov and Kozlov--were undoubt-
edly increased. At the same
time, the RSFSR Bureau. (espe-.
cially Aristov.) may have been
given some .independence from
the secretariat in order to
provide better balance and help
ensure that~Khrushchev remains
the final arbiter of major de-
cisions.
There has been some specu-
lation that Khrushchev's col-
leagues in the presidium forced
a reduction in the size of the
secretariat in order to break
its majority in the presidium.
Yet it is difficult to imagine
Khrushchev not carrying the
fight forward; it is equally
difficult to imagine some of
the members of the secretariat
voting to relinquish their seats
in the secretariat in order to
break Khrushchev's hold.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Mikoyan's-Decline
The effect of the U-2 in-
cident on the leadership in the
period immediately following
the May plenum cannot now be
fully measured. The decline of
Mikoyan, however, may well be
related. Mikoyan's ' influence
first appeared to be dropping
when he was absent during most
of May and early June, includ-
ing the week preceding the open-
ing of the summit conference--
certainly a critical period in
the formulation of Soviet policy
on the U-2 incident for the
Paris meeting.
Subsequently, evidence ap-
peared to suggest that Mikoyan
was in some trouble even before
May. Khrushchev told
that
Mikoyan was an opportunist who
would not hesitate to "turn
coat" to keep 'his position.
Shortly before May Day, status
symbols were adjusted to indi-
cate a decline, and subsequent
reports and rumors also alleged
that he was in difficulty. Mi
koyan has not since regained his
old prominence; he was "on va-
cation" from the time Khrushchev
left Moscow for the UN until the
end of October, and there are
recent signs that the status
symbols are again being revised
at his expense.
It is still not clear at
what point Mikoyan began to
slip; there may be some corre-
lation between his decline and
the tougher Soviet line since
May. In any case, Soviet tac-
tics seem to lack the sophisti-
cation they had when Mikoyan
was Khrushchev's chief coun':
Selor,on foreign affairs.
Other Developments
There have been other oc-
currences which were open to in-
terpretation as trouble for
Khrushchev. He did not give a
major speech at the party plenum
in July, and his speech to mem-
bers of the intelligentsia that
same month was not published,
although one by Suslov on the
same occasion was. Speculation
has thus arisen that Khrushchev
can no longer speak out at will.
Such developments as the
December and May plenums, which
have been advanced as evidence
of a decline in Khrushchev's
power, would in fact reflect a
major political crisis in Mos-
cow. Accordingly, if these were
the correct indications of the
situation, they would point to
factionalism, which is consid-
ered "antiparty" activity. Once
the lines were drawn,, there could
be no accommodations. If one
faction gained the advantage,
it would have to go all the way
lest the other eventually win
and order a purge,
This does not appear to fit
the . present. picture. The press
lauds Khrushchev; his associates
in the presidium unhesitatingly
extol him as leader; and he in
turn gives every impression dur-
ing his long absences that the
"farm" is left in good hands.
Propaganda Treatment
An increase in press ref-
erences to collective leadership
this year has also been inter
pretedd by some as symbolic of
Khrushchev's reduced authority.
However, if such references
were in fact meant to convey a
reduction in Khrushchev's au-
thority, they would be inserted
in those publications which
carry the greatest weight, they
would follow some pattern, and
there would be some geographic
consistency. 'T'hus, if newspa-
pers in Tadzhikistan mentioned
collective leadership to reflect
the situation in Moscow, then so
would newspapers in Kirghizia or
Uzbekistan.
Despite some increase in
references to collective lead-
ershin, there has been no
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM"Ry
3 November 1960
authoritative editorial com-
ment on the subject. Pravda
and Izvestia have, for aTl-
meaning u purposes, been
silent; party theoretical jour-
nals have made sporadic ref-
erences--the greatest number
in connection with Lenin's
90th birthday anniversary in
April and the others mostly
referring to elements in the
lower echelons of the party.
Any particular reference to
collective leadership is in-
variably accompanied by others
which underline Khrushchev's
special place among the lead-
ers; finally, geographic con-
sistency in references to col-
lective leadership has not
been established.
Indeed, there need be no
contradiction in Soviet theory
between the principle of col-
lective leadership and stress
on the role of an individual.
The politburo and the central
committee even under Stalin were
described as collective organs,
and their decisions were also
said to have been collective.
Current Methods of Operation
It is not clear whether
Khrushchev's recent preoccupa-
tion with general problems and
his comparative inattention
to day-to-day affairs are dic-
tated by age and health, or
because he now sees himself
primarily as a world states-
man; most likely it is a com-
bination of both. Probably it
also derives from a feeling
that he no longer needs to
demonstrate his authority in
public at every turn. Khru-
shchev may consider it unnec-
essary to attend each and every
agricultural conference or even
address every party plenum; or-
ganizational changes can be
made without his personal pub-
lic endorsement beforehand.
This would mean, however,
greater dependence on subor-
dinate specialists for advice
and consultation. It has al-
ready been noted that in some
internal programs, such as the
educational reform, Khrushchev
has concentrated more on the
over-all course of development
and less on ensuring that each
particular aspect is put into
effect exactly as proposed.
Effective delegation of
authority takes on greater signif-
icance as Khrushchev gets older
and less active, and political
maneuvering in anticipation of
the succession becomes more in-
tense. It has already been
noted that Kozlov has moved
some of his old Leningrad as-
sociates into better positions.
Arist:ov and perhaps Kosygin may
try the same thing. Polyansky,
the RSFSR premier, is being men-
tioned more frequently in the
press. At the same time, the
public activities of Kozlov and
Suslov appear carefully balanced
to give the impression that
neither is receiving favored
treatment at the other's expense.
Iii terms of historical prec-
edent,, the members of the party
secretariat have enjoyed a
strategic advantage in prepar-
ing for the succession.. Kozlov
at this point seems to be the
man most active in utilizing
this advantage, and other lead-
ers are probably pressing to
limit his power if not to get
him shubted aside completely.
As maneuvering intensifies,
it may complicate the political
chain of command. The various
contenders for the succession
will try to build effective
bases of power, and lesser
figures will find it necessary
not only to maintain their loyalty
to the number-one man but also
to preserve the good will of
their respective patrons. In
a crisis, this question of dual
allegiance might weaken Khru-
shchev's direct control.
Present Issues
There are, however, more
immediate problems. There are
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
probably more critical issues
testing Khrushchev's leadership
today than at any time since
1957. He faces his greatest
test in regard to China; he
must muster all his forces for
the bloc meeting in November,
and this means localizing and
curing the Chinese disease.
There is even the possibility
that Moscow has already made
a major effort but failed to
put Albania back into line.
If so, his job is even more
complicated.
Outside the bloc, Khru-
shchev's campaign to negotiate
personally with the Western
leaders in 1960 failed. His
blustering over Berlin has not
yet achieved results, and his
intervention in Africa has not
so far furthered Soviet inter-
ests significantly.
In addition, Khrushchev
may be vulnerable to criticism
for letting internal matters
slide--particularly agriculture.
There is probably considerhble
disgruntlement over his re-
luc;tance to delegate authority
still. further; at least public-
ly, official life in Moscow
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appears to grind to a halt dur-
ing his absences.
TThe possibility that Khru-
shchev has suffered a loss of
power during the past year
should not be dismissed out of
hand, however. The develop-
ments which apply to the leader-
ship situation--such as the
Kirichenko ouster, the May ple-
num decisions, or collective
leadership propaganda--appear
to have had Khrushchev's stamp
of approval. There are, of
course, some loose ends; the
failure to publish Khrushchev's
speech to the intelligentsia
last July is a case in point.
It is difficult, however,
to visualize Khrushchev ac-
quiescing in a situation where
the presidium attempts to'.lim-
it his right to be heard. In
1957 he fought his minority
in the presidium into a majority
in the central committee, and
there is no reason to assume he
would not fight again if he
felt his position being jeop-
frdised.. There is a dearth
of evidence that he has been
fighting for his political life
during the past year.
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