CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO.
OCI NO.4898/60
6 October 1960
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
rl DECLASS8F!ED
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NE,XTREVIEW DATE:
r: ; .A3
25X1 AUTh: HR 70-2
DATE: REMEWE State Dept. review completed
14 MAY 193A
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ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE, UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY Page 1
Khrushchev seems determined to overcome any impres-
sion that the bloc is on the defensive as a result of the
generally adverse reaction to his UN reorganization plan.
Khrushchev probably believed that the President's letter
turning down a meeting and Macmillan's speech at the UN
requited a vigorous reply to dispel any suggestion of re-
treat, His performance indicates that the bloc will pur-
sue an uncompromising line toward the West for the remainder
of the UN session, but in talks with Prime Minister
Macmillan he has indicate a a summit negotiation on
the Berlin question might be possible in a few months.
Hammarskjold will be under increasing pressure from
Asian-African UN members to revamp the senior echelons
of the UN Secretariat to make its composition more repre-
sentative of the present membership.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The government crisis in Leopoldville continues, al-
though Lumumba appears to have lost the support of many
of the deputies from his own stronghold of Stanleyville
and may no longer be able to carry the assembly. The
projected round-table conference of political leaders
now may be shelved by Colonel Mobutu in favor of a
direct appeal to the Congolese assembly. The apparent
erosion of Lumumba's support will make it more difficult
for his African allies--the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea--to
restore him to power. Meanwhile, the UN Command is
turning greater attention to the Congo's grave economic
SITUATION IN LAOS .
Page 6
Premier Souvanna Phouma seems to be gaining the upper
hand in his struggle with General Phoumi's Savannakhet
Revolutionary Group. Souvanna's improved position is re-
flected in his growing reluctance to negotiate with
Savannakhet. Negotiations between Souvanna and the
Communist Pathet Lao are apparently imminent. The
Pathet Lao will be negotiating from a strong position
because of its control of Sam Neua Province.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SING-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow evidently sent a high-level delegation, pos-
sibly including Mikoyan and Suslov, to Peiping in September,
presumably to attempt again to find some way to compose the
dispute between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties
and end the bitter recriminations of recent months. Moscow
may have felt that as a result of its campaign to isolate
the Chinese party in the world Communist movement, Peiping
would be more ready to compromise. Recent Chinese state-
ments, however, suggest that no progress toward reconcilia-
tion has been made, and a further deterioration in rela-
tions appears likely.
PEIPING CELEBRATES. NATIONAL DAY . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The 11th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese
Communist regime was celebrated on 1 October in a more
subdued spirit than in previous years. Peiping had no
outstanding economic achievements to announce; indeed,
the principal speaker this year, Foreign Minister Chen
Yi, dwelt on the effects of natural disasters on this
year's grain harvest. The failure of all bloc coun-
tries, except Albania, to send delegations underlined
the stresses in the Sino-Soviet alliance. A highlight
of the day was the signing of the Sino-Burmese boundary
treaty--an event stressed in holiday propaganda, particu-
larly for neutral countries, as proof of Chinese adher-
ence to peaceful coexistence.
ALBANIA REAFFIRMS SUPPORT OF CHINESE POSITIONS . . . . . . Page 5
Albania, the smallest and least significant of the
satellites, in the last three weeks has firmly aligned it-
self with the Chinese Communist positions in the Sino-
Soviet dispute. China is supporting Albania in the face
of growing Soviet disapproval of the Tirana regime. The
Soviet leaders probably view Albania's continued willing-
ness to defy Moscow as a threat to their campaign to
isolate Ching and to their authority in Eastern Europe,
and can be expected to make further moves to bring
Albania into line. Tirana leaders earlier were reported
to be uneasy and tense, apparently because of Soviet
pressure, and evidently have postponed their party
congress scheduled for November.
ITALIAN COMMUNISTS AND THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE . . . . .
The Sino-Soviet dispute has revived the "hard-soft"
Page 7
controversy that has long plagued Italy's Communist party--
the largest outside the Soviet bloc. Secretary General
i i
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
Togliatti can be expected to keep the party firmly
oriented toward Moscow, but opposition elements may
attempt to use the Sino-Soviet dispute to undercut the
present party leaders. Provincial congresses reportedly
will be held throughout Italy this fall to discuss
"peaceful coexistence between diverse systems and the
noninevitability of war."
TENSIONS OVER BERLIN . . . . . . . .
Bonn?s termination of its 1961 trade agreement with
East Germany--announced on 30 September in retaliation for
Communist harassment of West Berlin--will probably not re.-
suit in an end to interzonal trade, but it puts West
Germany in a legal position to take further action to
restrict trade. Bonn and West Berlin authorities are
considering a plan to strengthen West Berlin's position
by routing all interzonal shipments through West Berlin,
thereby making it difficult for the East Germans to
tamper with Berlin access routes without blocking their
own imports. Party boss Ulbricht on 4 October strongly
asserted East German "sovereignty" over East Berlin. and
demanded establishment of a demilitarized "free city" of
West Berlin, but gave no indication of what counter-
measures his regime intends to take. His cautious atti-
tude may mean that any decision on countermeasures must
await Khrushchev's return from New York.
Fidel Castro's experience at the UN General Assembly
has apparently strengthened his view of himself as a
leader of the peoples of all underdeveloped countries
"against imperialism," and there are indications that he
may return to the UN later this month. Castro has an-
nounced that Nkrumah and Nasir may visit Cuba, and his
regime is increasing its propaganda support of the
Algerian rebels. Meanwhile, the government is further
strengthening its ties to the Sino-Soviet bloc in various
ways.
Page 8
Page 10
NEW PARTY STRUCTURE IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES . . . . . . Page 12
A plan set forth in May to expand the regular party
structure in the Soviet armed services now is being im-
plemented as a result of a new decree of the Soviet central
committee. Battalion.--level party organizations are being
given powers formerly exercised at the regimental level.
Further steps toward replacing the political departments
in military units with the type of party organizational
forms found in civilian life will probably depend on the
success the new organizations have in safeguarding party
interests in the military
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
PART II (continued)
USSR INTENSIFIES CAMPAIGN AGAINST IDLERS . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Moscow has stepped up its drive against "parasites"
and idlers, and greater efforts are being made to generate
widespread public indignation against all forms of unde-
sirable behavior. The campaign has spread into all social
levels, even the upper levels of the bureaucracy, and in-
cludes particularly vehement attacks on the tendency to
acquire private property. Parasitism in all its varieties
is characterized as the most serious vice of present-day
Soviet society.
. . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Representatives of the Algerian rebels are intensify-
ing their efforts both in New York and in Western capitals
to secure backing for a UN-conducted referendum to settle
Algeria's political future. Rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas'
trip to Peiping was probably undertaken to demonstrate to
Western governments that the rebels were in earnest when
they stated they would accept aid "wherever it can be
found." Meanwhile, Morocco and Tunisia are engaged in
maneuvers designed to enlist UN intervention in Algeria
on the pattern of UN operations in the Congo.
. . . . . . . . . Page 15
The situation along the Syrian-Jordanian border has
eased somewhat, but efforts to arrange a meeting between
Husayn and Nasir have been unsuccessful, and the tensions
between the two countries persist. Jordan's recognition
of the Qasim regime in Iraq stems from the antipathy of
both governments toward the UAR; the two countries now may
cooperate to support secessionist tendencies in the UAR's
Syrian region. On a neighboring border, Israel's resump-
tion of dredging work in the Jordan River is causing new
friction with the UAR,
In Iraq, the regime's crackdown on extremism in the
press appears to be damaging the Communists more than the
nationalists. Relations between the Qasim government and.
the Iraq Petroleum Company are worsening. New efforts are
under way in Sudan to form a coalition among the various
influential elements seeking to oust the Abboud regime.
AFGHAN-PAKISTANI BORDER TROUBLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Fighting among the Pushtoon tribes living along the
Afghan-Pakistani border north of the Khyber Pass now ap-
pears to be slackening. Despite the continuing build-up
of military forces in the area and the exchange of re-
criminations, both Kabul and Rawalpindi seem to be trying
to keep the disturbance localized.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
PART II (continued)
SINO-BURMESE BORDER TREATY . . . . ?
Page 20
The Burmese consider the border treaty signed on 1
October in Peiping their most significant diplomatic
achievement since independence. The exactitude of the
language and completeness of detail in the treaty appear
to be products of the Burmese chief negotiator's deter-
mined effort to make it difficult for Peiping to find any
basis for future disputes over the treaty's interpretation.
The Burmese still view the Chinese as a dangerous neigh-
bor and have placed the frontier areas under special
PHILIPPINE CONCERN OVER POSSIBLE RESURGENCE OF HUK
ACTIVITY . . . . . . . . . Page 20
A recent wave of killings in Luzon provinces, possibly
politically motivated, has caused speculation in the
Philippines concerning a possible resurgence of the Commu-
nist-led Huk rebellion. The Auks apparently have no more
than a nuisance capability, however, and the Philippine
Communists are not believed to be abandoning their
primary reliance on tactics of subversion and on efforts
to exploit the country's growing nationalist sentiment.
SOUTH KOREAN UNREST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 21
Increasing South Korean student unrest, agitation
among lower ranking officers in the armed forces, and
press criticism suggest growing popular dissatisfaction
with the Chang Myon government. The situation is aggra-
vated by the political stalemate resulting from factional-
ism in the ruling party which prevents the government from
t
k
a
ing a firm lead in shaping public opinion.
THE COMMON MARKET'S FARM PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
The Common Market is encountering strong opposition
to its program for gradually equalizing agricultural
prices among the member states, supporting prices with
variable import duties, and replacing national marketing
bodies with community agencies. The program, which had
been recently revised by the Common Market Commission
in an effort to satisfy both internal and external criti-
cism, is still criticized as either insufficiently pro-
tectionist or not liberal enough. An agreed farm policy,
however, is probably prerequisite to full implementation
of last May' decision to accelerate the Common Market's
development.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
PART II (continued)
POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN EL SALVADOR . . . . . . . . . Page 23
The Salvadoran Government has emerged from its recent
political crisis in a dangerously weakened condition and
on 3 October extended the state of siege for an additional
30 days. Communist and pro-Castro elements are actively
exploiting growing popular pressure for socio-economic
reforms, and President Lemus has been unable to provide
the leadership required to carry out his electoral prom-
ises of moderate progress in this field. A new political
crisis could arise at any time and might result in a
military seizure of power and the subsequent transfer of
the presidency to the still popular ex-President Osorio.
PROSPECTIVE CHANGES IN FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND
NYASALAND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 24
The publication on 11 October of the Monckton Com-
mission report on possible structural changes in the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will revive controver-
sy as London tries to reach an accommodation between white-
settler and African-nationalist interests. While now
tending to concede to African aspirations, London will
be unwilling to "sell out" the white settlers at a con-
stitutional conference which may follow as early as
December. Britain's recent moves to promote harmonious
relations with African nationalists will probably not
prove wholly successful, and the federations' white-
settler prime minister already opposes the reported
recommendation that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia be
free to secede after five years.
REPUBLIC REFERENDUM IN SOUTH AFRICA . .
. . Page 26
The victory of Prime Minister Verwoerd's Nationalist
party in the referendum on 5 October gives Verwoerd a
mandate to press for the early reconstitution of South
Africa as a republic. The strong showing of the opposi-
tion indicates that the deep split between the Afrikaans-.
and English-speaking communities has not been lessened.
Verwoerd may call for new elections to increase his com-
manding lead in parliament. His announced intention to
proceed with the establishment of a republic regardless
of Commonwealth disapproval could lead to the republic's
denial of membership--the first such action in Common-
wealth history.
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN TURKEY . . . , .
Page 1
As the military regime in Turkey enters its fifth
month in power, the restoration of civil authority, which
the regime still professes as its goal, appears more
distant than ever. The ruling Committee of National Union
(CNU), having consolidated its position, has launched a
widespread program of reform. Despite outward signs of
stability, however, there are growing indications of
cleavage and tension within the ruling group and of
possible adverse public reaction to the forthcoming
trials of officials of the ousted Menderes government.
In developing its foreign policy, the CNU may in effect
promote "positive neutrality" and accept Soviet aid offers.
FRENCH LABOR AND THE FIFTH REPUBLIC . . . . . .
French labor unions have been in a relatively un-
favorable position under the De Gaulle regime, and until
well into 1959 were hesitant to press demands on the
government. Since then strike activity has increased,
but the government has ignored most union demands and
is unlikely to change its basic policy of tight wage
controls. The Communist leaders of the General Labor
Confederation are confident that they have laid a firm
basis for broad joint action with the non-Communist
unions at some future date.
BOLIVIA UNDER THE NEW PAZ ADMINISTRATION . . . . .
In its first two months in office the leftist Paz
Estenssoro administration has initiated a drive for
foreign aid in improving Bolivia's economy, which is
nearly bankrupt despite continuing US help. Paz
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. . Page 13
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III (continued)
apparently hopes for substantial investment in the tin
mines from Germany or France; in addition the USSR has
suggested the possibility of aid. Paz may hope that
demonstrable economic progress will free him from his
considerable political dependence on the Communist
infiltrated labor forces linked with Vice President
Juan Lechin. These forces have been strengthened in
the past year or two by Bolivia?s continued failure to
achieve the economic growth promised in the sweeping
revolution of 1952.
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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV AT THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Khrushchev's actions and
statements at the UN are in-
tended to make it clear that the
USSR will not retreat from its
demands in face of the generally
adverse reaction to his UN reor-
ganization plan and attacks on
Secretary General Hammarskjold.
After a few attempts to play
down this question and re-empha-
size disarmament as the key is-
sue facing the assembly, Khru-
shchev reacted to continuing
strong support for Hammarskjold
and criticism of the Soviet plan
by renewing his attacks on the
secretary general.
In his address on 3 October
he warned that Hammarskjold's
failure to resign would lead
the Soviet Union to draw the
"necessary conclusions," and he
threatened to withhold Soviet
cooperation with future UN de-
cisions. In his previous speech
on the Chinese representation
question, Khrushchev hinted the
bloc might withdraw from the UN
and form a separate internation-
al organization.
Khrushchev's tactics in re-
newing his campaign suggest.. that
he sees a sustained attack backed
by occasional threats as the only
means of achieving some results
which could be represented as an
acknowledgment of the validity
of Soviet demands for a redis-
tribution of power in the UN ex-
ecutive organs. The Soviet Un-
ion may feel that continuing
attacks on Hammarskjold's posi-
tion will gradually erode sup-
port for him among the Afro-
Asian powers.
Eisenhower-Khrushchev Meeting
Khrushchev's strategy in
handling the question of a meet-
ing with President Eisenhower,
as proposed by five neutralist
leaders, appears to have back-
fired and forced a switch in
tactics.
After Nasir's original
call for a meeting, bloc dele- 25X1
gates encouraged expectations of
a favorable reply from Khrushchev.
25X1
ru-
shchev had obtained "permission"
from Moscow for the meeting. It
is likely that Khrushchev ex-
pected that the United States
would have difficulty rejecting
the neutral powers' initiative
out of hand, and that an equiv-
ocal reply would provide a wide
field for maneuvers designed to
discredit American sincerity
and contrast the President's
expected insistence on release
of the RB-47 crew with Khru-
shchev's own willingness to dis-
regard previous American "prov-
ocations."
The President's letter re-
jecting the neutralists' move
and calling for "Soviet action
in the UN and elsewhere" to pave
the way for future talks created
a new and apparently unexpected
situation. Khrushchev probably
believed that, in light of
Macmillan's rebuttal, of his
views and the President's re-
jection of a meeting, even an
ambiguous response from him
would have implied a. retreat
under pressure from the position
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
he took in Paris and would have
been interpreted as a sign of
weakness.
In his 3 October speech,
therefore, Khrushchev dismissed
any hope for agreement in a
bilateral meeting as "naive"
and made no attempt to align
himself with the neutralists'
position. In his formal reply
to the five leaders, he avoided
an outright rejection of a meet-
ing but reverted to his patently
unacceptable demands for con-
demnation of the U-2 and RB-47
flights as a precondition to a
meeting.
The Soviet leader apparent-
ly chose to regard the Presi-
dent's position as an affront
to his own prestige and that of
the USSR, and felt it required
a vigorous reply. Khrushchev
probably also concluded that
any acknowledgment of the pos-
sibility of resuming negotia-
tions now would have blunted his
efforts to use this UN session
to indict the West on the issues
of anticoloniajism, the Congo
situation, and the U-2 affair.
In his letter to the neu-
tralists, Khrushchev did not
repeat his characterization of
the idea of a meeting as "naive,"
but instead sought to place the
onus on the President for fail-
ure of the initiative. He
strongly rejected "any attempts
to advance some preliminary con-
ditions" for a meeting by the
"side which has embarked on the
road of perfidy..." and contended
that the President's letter
proves that the United States
"has no serious intention of
seeking ways to Settle oiat9tand-
ing issues." Nehru withdrew
the five-power resolution on 5
October, explaining that amend-
ments had made it meaningless.
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East-West Issues
Although Khrushchev's per-
formance indicates that the
bloc is determined to pursue an
uncompromising line toward the
West for the remainder of the
UN session, in his talks 25X1
with Prime Minister Macmillan
and in his remarks to the press,
Khrushchev attempted to keep
alive the possibility of a sum-
mit conference on the Berlin and
German questions. In his first
meeting with Macmillan on 29
September, Khrushchev proposed
that a summit conference could
be convened in January, provided
there were no "provocations" by
Bonn. He stressed the standard
Soviet position that the West
must recognize the existence
of two German states, sign a
peace treaty on that basis,
and "liquidate" the occupation
of Berlin.
These statements were ac-
companied by the warning that
the West's failure to agree
would result in a German peace
conference and the conclusion
of a separate peace treaty.
Khrushchev, as well as
Foreign Minister Gromyko in his
discussions with Foreign
Secretary Home, defended the
recent East German actions in
Berlin as justified countermoves,
but indicated that Moscow was
not seeking a new crisis. Gro-
myko warned, however, that fu-
ture developments would depend
on the West.
The second round of Khru-
shchev-Macmillan discussions
apparently covered the same
ground. According to press re-
ports quoting Soviet diplomats,
Khrushchev refused to agree that
disarmament discussions could
be resumed in the ten-nation
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
committee, and stressed that Mos-
cow is not prepared to nego-
tiate with the United States un-
til a new administration takes
office.
UN Afro-Asian Bloc
Both East and West are com-
peting for the support of the
UN's 45-member Afro-Asian bloc,
which includes countries allied
to the United States by treaties
as well as those seemingly fol-
lowing the Soviet line. There
is also a rivalry among members
of the bloc itself for recogni-
tion as its principal spokesman
and leader. President Tito of
Yugoslavia probably still hopes
to recruit members of this loose-
ly knit group into his "third
-force." Nehru, Sukarno, Nasir,
and Nkrumab of Gana also have
presented themselves as poten-
tial leaders of the group. Dele-
gates from most of the Asian,
African, and Arab members have
stressed their bloc's potential
for mediation between the major
rival camps.
The addition of 16 new
states--15 from Africa plus
Cyprus--has made the Afro-Asian
bloc potentially the largest
voting group in the General As-
sembly. Even if a strong lead-
er should emerge, dissensions
within the group and the wide
disparity of culture and polit-
ical maturity among its members
will probably continue to prevent
a great degree of cohesiveness.
The Asian-African bloc ex-
hibits considerable unanimity
on the subject of anticolonial-
ism, and Khrushchev's emphasis
on this issue has probably had
strong emotional appeal to the
group as a whole.
At a 29 September meeting
of the bloc, Krishna Menon of
India led an attack against
Portugal's candidacy for the
Western European seat on the
Security Council which is to
be vacated by Italy at the end
of the year. While recognizing
the dangers of throwing the con-
ventional system of allocating
elective seats on the Security
Council into "disequilibrium"
by not supporting the Western
European choice for the seat,
several Asian-African members
insist that Portugal, the major
remaining "symbol of colonial-
ism," cannot be allowed to rule
on international issues, par-
ticularly as related to Africa,
by virtue of a seat on the UN
Security Council.
Portugal has been under
attack ever since it joined the
UN in 1955 for its refusal to
be bound by the UN Charter pro-
vision requiring members to
submit yearly reports on their
non-self-governing territories.
The Portuguese maintain they
have no such territories, that
all their possessions are in-
tegral parts of Portugal itself.
Since the'balloting for the of-
fice is secret, and strong op-
position from the Afro-Asians
is developing rapidly, Lisbon's
claim to have commitments from
62 nations is doubtful, and the
Salazar regime itself has re-
cently been showing consider-
able apprehension about its
chances.
Opposition to Portugal
might result in the emergence
of another candidate for the
seat; Yugoslavia, Iceland,
Austria, and Finland have been
suggested. With the UAR ex-
pected to get the Middle East
seat, the possibility that the
Western European seat might be
occupied by a member not closely
allied to the West will make it
difficult to ensure the West
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the seven affirmative votes nec-
essary to pass a council resolu-
tion.
UN Secretariat
Hammarskjold, in order to
keep the support of the smaller
nations in his fight with the
Soviet bloc, will be under in-
creasing pressure to revamp the
upper echelons of the UN Secre-
tariat. The preponderance of
American. and Western European
nationals in the Secretariat?
although a direct result of the
unavailability of qualified ap-
plicants from other areas at
the time of the founding of the
UN--has long been a grievance
to members of the Afro-Asian
bloc,
Nkrumah's proposal of 30
September urging the creation
of an advisory group of under
secretaries representing the
various power groupings probably
would have the support of many
Afro-Asians. Most seem to agree
that the USSR's suggestion to
create a triumvirate to replace
the secretary general is unreal-
istic since it would require an
amendment to the UN Charter.
Prime Minister Nehru, in reject-
ing the Soviet recommendation,
nevertheless agreed that the
policy-making level of the Sec-
retariat should take account
of the various UN groupings.
The British UN delegation
believes that the Afro--Asians
would be susceptible to the argu-
ment that the USSR must be given
some concession to its point of
view and would regard Nkrumah's
proposal as the obvious solu-
tion. The British delegation
views Nkrumah's proposal with
the alarm because it would per-
mit the Russians to gain either
positive direction of or at
least negative control over the
Secretariat's operations and because
it would introduce political
considerations on a level
just under the secretary gen-
eral.
The government crisis in
Leopoldville continues. Lumumba
is still at the premier's offi-
cial residence guarded by UN
troops and has ventured outside
on only two occasions recently.
President Kasavubu has made few
public appearances, and Colonel
Mobutu has remained mostly in
Camp Leopold. The recently in-
stalled Commission of Tebhnicians
is functioning but has yet to
come to grips with the Congo's
administrative problems.
Lumumba's position in his
political stronghold of Orien-
tale Province appears to be
cracking. On 5 October, Mobutu
arrested two leading Lumumba
supporters there without op-
position. the ex- 25X1
premier's hold over the local
political and military organiza-
tion is weakening because of
poor leadership and lack of
funds.
In addition, Lumumba ap-
pears to have lost the support
of many members of the delega-
tion to the National Assembly
from Orientale Province--a loss
which may make it impossible for
him to obtain an assembly ma-
jority. The defections fol-
lowed Colonel Mobutu's revela-
tion of Lumumba's appeal for
Chinese Communist aid as well
as his attacks on the United
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Nations. Peiping
law~
SECRET
The apparent erosion of
support for Lumumba will make
it more difficult for his Afri-
was willing to furnish consider-
able financial support--perhaps
as high as $2,500,000
--but considered it
inappropriate 1 (,)to,,..
send military vol-
unteers.
CONGO
REPUBLIC
Lumumba's appar-
ent loss of legisla-
tive support may in-
fluence Colonel Mobu-
tu 4,:o shelve the pro-
jected round-table
conference of polit-
ical leaders in favor
of a direct appeal to
Parliament to clarify
the political situa-
tion. Mobutu, char-
acterized recently by
the American ambassa-
dor as extremely nerv-
ous and fearful of
assassination, has been
putting considerable
faith in the round-
table as a way of iso-
lating. Lumumba. Mo-
butu_________ is
ready to mpose his
will" on the conferees if neces-
sary. However, in view of Lu-
mumba's reported loss of legis-
lative influence and Mobutu's
disgust with the present impasse,
he may open Parliament and let the
politicians fight it out themselves.
The major Congo factions
have hedged their attendance with
such conditions that a meaning-
ful conference has become un-
likely. Lumumba is willing to
attend only if he is recognized
as premier, a demand unaccept-
able to Kasavubu and Ileo. Kasai
secessionist leader Kalonji wants
the conference held in a neutral
locale--such as Pointe Noire in
the neighboring Republic of Congo.
Katanga leader Tshombd would
probably not attend under any
condition'. On 5 October, he
refused to receive a delegation
from Colonel Mobutu.
Loke
LopOId H
Cogu,ilhatville
Lu uabourg
l~Lupule
sabethville
- ft.
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
can allies--particularly the
UAR, Ghana, and Guinea--to re-
store him to power.
The Moroccan representa-
tives in L' 0opoldville are re-
ported vigorously championing
Lumumba, and Moroccan General
Kettani, deputy commander of UN
troops in the Congo, has been
under pressure from them to
bring Mobutu over to unqualified
support of Lumumba. Several
other African nations, partic-
ularly Liberia and Ethiopia,
are opposed to the activities
of Ghana, Guinea, and the UAR
in the Congo.
The activities of Soviet
diplomatic personnel suggest
that the USSRis % marking,
time until I. the, ~ Como sit-
uation clarifies.,.-
Diplomat-ic personnel evacuated from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
the Congo in mid-September are
reported to be in Guinea "un-
der wraps," although the for-
mer ambassador to the Congo is
in Accra.
Ambassador Thompson on 4
October reported a rumor cir-
culating in Moscow that both
the chief and deputy chief of
the African Section of the So-
viet Foreign Ministry have been
transferred, presumably for mis-
calculating the Congo situation.
A Pravda article of 30 Septem-
berr ?er(rred to the "acting chief
of the African Section."
On 4 October the UN began
a $500,000 public works pro-
gram to combat the imminent
threat of widespread disorders
arising from growing unemploy-
ment, A $5,000,000 public
works program has been shelved
for weeks because the UN feared
misapplication of relief funds
by Congolese officials. The
Congo's economic rehabilita-
tion, it is estimated, will
cost $100,000,000 during this
calendar year, excluding de-
velopmental projects necessary
to avoid economic stagnation.
Meanwhile the health serv-
ice threatens to break down.
Outbreaks of smallpox and bubonic
plague have already necessitated
emergency UN action. UN offi-
cials fear that Leopoldville's
water supply will become con-
taminated.
Much of the difficulty
arises from the inability of
the Congolese administration to
take necessary actions--even
that of merely signing UN-pre-
pared documents.
THE SITUATION IN LAOS
Premier Souvanna Phouma
appears to be gaining the upper
hand in his struggle with Gen-
eral Phoumi's Savannakhet Rev-
olutionary Committee. His order
dismissing Phoumi and 26 other
officers from the army, his an-
nounced refusal to negotiate
with Phoumi, and his insistence
that Phoumi pledge his loyalty
to the legal government all re-
flect Souvanna's growing confi-
dence. The premier planned to
go to Luang Prabang on 6 Octo-
ber, ostensibly for the first
of several consultations King
Savang will have with various
Laotian leaders with a view to-
ward formation of a new govern-
ment of national unity embracing
both the Vientiane and Savanna-
khet camps.
Souvanna asked his supporters
to organize a popular demonstra-
tion timed to coincide with his
visit to Luang Prabang provides
another indication that he may
now feel strong enough to avoid
a compromise with Savannakhet.
Such a demonstration would tend
to dissuade the King from ask-
ing 'for Souvanna's resigna-
tion.
Phoumi's headquarters in
Savannakhet claims that Captain
Kong Le's paratroopers, alleged-
ly supported by Pathet Lao
guerrilla units, have resumed
their offensive against Phoumi's
forces southeast of Pak Sane in
violation of the verbal cease-
fire agreement reached in Luang
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
C H I N A
A ~?,-0-`5N VANE ^. k San
NE_
Minister of Information
Quinim Pho.lsena. His
= influence may be some-
what offset by Gen-
eral Ouane's member-
INDONESIA
Prabang on 28 September. In-
dependent confirmation of this
allegation is lacking, but Kong
Le on several occasions re-
cently has reiterated his boast
that he could easily take Savan-
nakhet. At a leftist youth
rally in Vientiane on 4 October,
the crowd urged Kong Le to
press on against Phoumi."S' troops.
While General Ouane, the armed
forces commander in Vientiane,
is probably sincere in his prom-
ises to Phoumi to stop fighting,
it is doubtful that he is in a
position to prevent Kong Le
from taking independent action.
The Souvanna
government and the
Communist Pathet Lao
meanwhile appear to
be moving quickly to-
ward negotiations for
settlement of the
year-old conflict
between their military
forces. Both sides
have appointed dele-
gations for at least
preliminary talks, and
formal negotiations
may begin in a few
days. The Pathet
Lao delegation is
composed of three mem-
bers of the Communist
core of the movement,
while the government
delegation is headed
by an extreme leftist,
The Pathet Lao
will be in a strong
bargaining position
if negotiations are
held at this time,
because of its con-
trol of Sam Neua Province. The
1,000-man pro-Phoumi garrison
which abandoned Sam Neua town
on 28 September subsequently
surrendered to the Pathet Lao,
leaving only a few of Kong Le's
paratroopers as a taken of the
government's presence in the
province. Two cabinet ministers
Souvanna sent to Sam Neua to
investigate the situation re-
portedly were turned back by the
local Pathet Lao commanders,
who claimed they had no authori-
ty to negotiate with the royal
government envoys. According
to press reports, the Pathet Lao
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
radio later announced that no
government administrators would
be permitted to come to Sam
Neua until negotiations for an
over-all settlement had been
held.
There are indications that
the Pathet Lao has sent addition-
al personnel into neighboring
Phong Saly Province. Although
little fighting has been reported
there, the insurgents may be try-
ing to create a position of strength
in .that,. area in anticipation of
the forthcoming talks. The Pathet
Lao used Phong Saly and Sam
Neua as their trump cards in the
negotiations which culminated
In the integration agreements of
1957 and the subsequent formation
of a coalition; government.
The King has approved the
proposal for establishing dip-
lomatic relations between Laos
and the USSR, thus completing
the procedures required under
the constitution for entering
into relations with another state.
Under present plans, the Soviet
ambassador to Cambodia will be
accredited'to Laos-and the Lao-
tian ambassador to France will
be accredited to the USSR.
Hanoi has hailed the fall
of Sam Neua as a victory for the
Laotian people. Pathet Lao
operations in northern Laos have
probably been supported by Hanoi,
but there is no evidence to
support rumors that North
Vietnamese troops are in Laos.
While it may be providing Lao-
tian Communists with training
and provisioning depots across
the border in North Vietnam,
Hanoi probably would be reluc-
tant to become more overtly in-
volved at present for fear of
precipitating pro-Western in-
tervention at a time when Hanoi
most likely feels that the Laotian
situation is favorable for the
Pathet Lao.
The Soviet counselor in
Peiping recently told a British
visitor that Peiping did not
intend to intervene in Laos,
but if the Chinese should de-
cide to send troops to counter
a United Nations move into Laos,
the USSR would support Peiping
even to the extent of sending
Soviet troops. The US consul
general in Hong Kong Points out
that the Soviet counselor's
statement is indicative of the
impression Moscow wants conveyed
to the West.
Moscow propaganda continues
to show concern that the UN or
Laos' pro-Western neighbors might
intervene and has stressed the
gravity of the Laotian situation
in an effort to prevent such
intervention. Moscow radio on 30
September called for the United
States to stop its interference
in Laotian internal affairs and 25X1
accused Thailand of planning a
joint attack with the! United
States against Laos.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Less than three months
after the bitter confrontation
of the Soviet and the Chinese
Communist parties last June at
Bucharest, which increased the
already rapid pace of deteri-
oration in their relations, the
Soviet Union evidently sent a
high-level delegation to Pei-
ping for still another attempt
to reach a mutually satisfac-
tory position. The Soviet
party may have felt that its
efforts of the preceding two
months to marshal support for
its own views and thus isolate
the Chinese within the world
Communist movement would induce
the Chinese to adopt positions
closer to those of the Soviet
Union. Recent Chinese state-
ments suggest, however, that
no progress toward reconcilia-
tion has been made.
Ambassador Thompson reported
on 27 September that a rumor
was circulating in Moscow that
Mikoyan and Suslov were visit-
ing China.
A delegation of this stat-
ure, including Suslov, the
Soviet Union's top ideologist,
would be empowered to conduct
authoritative negotiations
with the Chinese--and to make
some adjustment in the Soviet
positions--in an effort to
bring their views closer to-
gether in order that the meeting
of Communist parties in Moscow
in November not result in the
same impasse as the Bucharest
meeting. In addition, the delega-
tion may have been sent to China
to determine if a meeting of
Chinese leaders with Khrushchev
during his planned visit to
North Korea in October would
be possible and fruitful.
Recent Chinese statements
suggest that this latest attempt
at reconciliation failed. Dur-
ing the period when the talks
were presumably under way, Chi-
nese treatment of the issues
in 'dispute was pitched in a
low key. On 29 September, how-
ever, the Chinese party central
committee, in a commentary on
a new volume of Mao Tse-tung's
works, issued its most substan-
tial reaffirmation since the
Bucharest meeting of several
of the most important Chinese
positions in the dispute.
The commentary warns against
"illusions hbout imperialism,"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
cites past Western peace
"tricks," insists that peace
can be achieved only through
struggle, rebukes those who
overestimate the strength of
the enemy and underestimate
the strength of the revolution-
ary forces, and reiterates that
imperialism is a "paper tiger."
The commentary concludes that
the volume is of "tremendous
significance" for the present
situation and will become a
powerful weapon in "intensify-
ing the struggle against im-
perialism and modern revision-
ism"--the latter phrase one
which the Chinese often use to
describe Soviet policy.
In :reaffirming that Mao's
propositions were successful
in the Chinese revolution, the
Chinese party appears to be
asserting that it has been right
all along and that Soviet argu-
ments have not persuaded it to
change its views. The publi-
cation of this commentary ap-
pears to mark the opening of
a new offensive by the Chinese
in support of their views. A
People's Daily editorial on 30
September picked up the same
themes for exploitation. Red
Flag, Communist China's theor-
etical journal, which has been
silent on international ques-
tions since early June, devoted
two articles of its current
issueto demonstrating how Mao's
theses properly fit the present
situation. The American consul
general in Hong Kong concludes
that the editorials in Red
Flag and other publications
indicate that a massive Chinese
campaign is now under way to
show that Mao is the "creative
Marxist" on international ques-
tions and that his opponents
are the ones divorced from
reality.
It seems likely that this
hard line will be the Chinese
party's position in any further
bilateral talks with the Soviet
or other parties prior to the
November conclave, or at the
Moscow meeting itself. Some in-
dication of the strong line
which the Soviet party is now
likely to take in this meeting
came in a public lecture on
ideology in Moscow on 30 Septem-
ber. The speaker said "he had
to admit" that the Chinese were
dogmatists because of their
incorrect assessment of the
world situation and, since their
views definitely represent left-
ist. deviation, they would re-
quire self-criticism and ad-
mission of error.
Dealing with another cen-
tral issue in the dispute, Army
Major General Nikolay A. Talen-
sky, a noted writer on Soviet
military doctrine, has condemned
the idea that war might be jus-
tified if it meant the end of
capitalism. In the magazine
International' Life, Talensky
said that after Ianother war,
which "could not fail" to be a
world war, "the earth's popu-
lation would be cut in half, and
it would be the most active and
most cultured part of mankind
that would disappear." He con-
cluded that a mass surprise
would not bring victory for
the attacker because the re-
taliation could still destroy
all his vital centers.
The article, which has been
given added stature by a review
by TASS, is a direct attack on
the Chinese Communist attitude
that the dangers of nuclear war
have been overrated. Talensky
is also in effect reiterating
to the Chinese--who continue
to clamor for Taiwan--that the
concept of limited war is invalid
because it would risk full-
scale war. This is the most em-
phatic major article on military
theory to appear in the Soviet
press since the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute sharpened at the Bucharest
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
conference, and indicates an
effort to show in practical mil-
itary terms why the coexistence
line must be followed.
The strain in Sino-Soviet
relations was pointed up by the
failure of any Communist coun-
try, except Albania, to send
a delegation to Peiping to take
part in the 1 October anniver-
sary celebrations. All the
communiques of congratulations,
a standard part of any such
celebrations, were unenthusias-
tic and routine, and none--with
the exception of Albania and
the Asian satellites--made a
personal reference to Mao. In
speeches and writings on the
anniversary, the Chinese,.:with
the support of the Albanians on
one side, and the Soviet Union
and the other bloc members on
the other, while all paying con-
ventional tribute to the need
for bloc unity, displayed sharp
contrasts in their assessments
of the international situation.
In addition to the support
given Moscow on this occasion,
the satellites have moved in
other directions as well. In
mid-September, the Polish cen-
tral committee, the last of the
East European central committees
to discuss the results of the
June Bucharest conference, is-
sued a resolution which faith-
fully mirrored the Soviet Un-
ion's own. The Poles--as have
some of the other Communist
parties--sent a letter to Pei-
ping disputing the Chinese po-
sition on the inevitability of
war and reaffirming the Soviet
concept of peaceful coexistence.
A shrill note of irrita-
tion has begun to appear in
the day-to-day contacts between
the Chinese Communists and mem-
bers of the rest of the Soviet
bloc. Earlier reports that
bloc diplomats were increas-
ingly bitter over their treat-
ment by the Chinese in Peiping
has in part been substantiated
by complaints made by the Pol-
ish ambassador in mid-Septem-
ber over restrictions placed by
the Chinese on the movements of
all diplomats. Despite the
fact that the Chinese ambassador
is the dean of the diplomatic
corps in Prague and that rep-
resentatives of all major na-
tions gathered to see Czech
leader Novotny and Polish boss
Gomulka depart from Prague for
the UN session on 18 September,
the Chinese ambassador failed
to appear.
At the International Scien-
tific Film Association meeting
in Prague, which began on 16
September, the Chinese dele-
gates refused to ride in the
same bus with the Soviet dele-
gation. The Soviet chairman of
the meetings publicly condemned
the Chinese when they arrived
late for a meeting and recommend-
ed that they emulate the conduct
of the American delegates. Hong
Kong distributors of Druzhba,
the Sino-Soviet Friendship So-
ciety magazine published in Mos-
cow, learned on 3 October in
answer to their earlier query
that publication of the maga-
zine has ended and that they
would receive a refund for the
unused portion of their subscrip-
tions. A Soviet distributor in
July had indicated that cessa-
tion of the magazine was still
an open question.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
With the present unyield-
ing attitudes evinced by both
major parties, it is difficult
to see how the planned confer-
ence in Moscow can make much
headway.. The Chinese, bolstered
by the expression of support
from the Albanians and the de-
termined effort of Ho Chi Minh
to remain neutral,:. may become
even more adamant in hopes. of
encouraging whatever under-
currents of sympathy may exist
in other parties. The USSR,
faced with the possibility of
additional defections from the
ranks of its supporters, may
feel it necessary to contain
the Chinese by withdrawing some
of the economic and military
benefits it has bestowed on 25X1
them. A further deterioration
in relations appears the most
likely outcome.
PEIPING CELEBRATES NATIONAL DAY
The 11th anniversary of
the founding of the Chinese
Communist regime was celebrated
on 1 October in a more subdued
spirit than in previous years.
Peiping had no outstanding eco-
nomic achievements to announce;
indeed, the principal speaker
this year, Foreign Minister Chen
Yi, dwelt on the effects of nat-
ural disasters on this year's
grain harvest.
Statements on the domestic
economic situation were mostly
generalities to, the effect that
things were going as well as
could be expected, at least in
industry. Chen Yi asserted that
China was continuing its "leap
forward," now in its third year,
and expressed confidence that
the major targets for industri-
al production this year would
be met.
The regime has been unusu-
ally reticent about industry's
performance this year, but Chen
did claim that output of iron
and steel had increased about
40 percent, electric power about
45 percent, and coal about 25
percent by the end of August
as compared with the same peri-
od in 1959. Output of major
industrial products is there-
fore apparently proceeding at
or near scheduled levels.
Despite a massive campaign
to enlist the help of "all the
people," the nation's agriculture
continues to founder. Comments
on agriculture were confined to
references to the "worst" nat-
ural calamities since the re-
gime came to power. People's
Daily said in its National Day
editorial that some 150,000,000
acres--about half the total grain
area--had been affected by ca-
lamities, and that one third
of this area had sustained "seri-
ous" losses. Peiping says
drought has struck wide areas
for the second straight year,
adding that reservoirs through-
out the nation are only about
40 percent full and that only
50 percent of this water can be
used for irrigation.
Independent weather data
through late September reveal
that crop weather, although bad,
was not as bleak as the picture
drawn by the regime. Drought
is continuing in the North China
plain and will hinder the plant-
ing of the winter wheat crop;
the late rice crop is several
weeks behind schedule and could
be damaged by an early frost.
Industry is providing
more in the way of material
support for agriculture than
ever before--120 percent more
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
chemical fertilizer, 82 percent
more insecticides, and 18 per-
cent more. irrigation machinery
were furnished in the first
eight months of 1960 than in the
comparable period last year--
but the gains here have not
dispelled the regime's concern
over crop prospects.
The National Day cele-
brations provided little fresh
insight into the leadership
situation in China. Most of
the regime's top officials were
in attendance in Peiping, and
the absence of several others
could be accounted for by the
press of regional duties. Mao
Tse-tung as head of the party
and Liu Shao-chi as head of the
government and heir apparent to
Mao's party role jointly re-
ceived the accolades of the
more than 500,000 people who
jammed Tienanmen Square, and
the two leaders shared promi-
nence in holiday newspapers,
which featured their pictures.
Chen Yun, at one time the re-
gime's leading economic plan-
ner whose activities now may
be restricted by illness, oc-
cupied a place on the rostrum
among the top party leaders.
Missing, however, were
party Secretary General Teng
Hsiao-ping and politburo member
Peng Chen, the mayor of Peiping
who traditionally opens the
ceremonies. One or both of them
may be involved in discussions
with Soviet party officials.
Former Defense Minister Peng
Te-huai, apparently still in
disgrace for resisting party
leadership in the armed forces
last year, was also absent.
Peiping used its holiday
propaganda, particularly to the
neutralist states, to rebut crit-
icism that China is belligerent
and to make a show of "socialist
unity," but the Chinese pre-
occupation with militant struggle
clearly showed through these
surface themes. The absence of
official delegations from any
bloc countries except Albania
underlined the stresses in the
Sino-Soviet alliance.
The traditional military
parade was eliminated from the
ceremonies, perhaps to help mod-
erate the impression of Chinese
bellicosity. To this end, the
holiday propaganda also made much
of the signing of the Sino-
Burmese boundary treaty and of
the activities of visiting Bur-
mese Premier U Nu and the large
cultural delegation which ac-
companied him. (See article
on page 2Q)
This peace posture is not
intended to suggest any lessen-
ing of Chinese support for the
"anti-imperialist forces." Anx-
ious to demonstrate their support
of the Algerian rebellion, the
Chinese devoted considerable
attention to Algerian rebel
premier Ferhat Abbas, who was
in Peiping for the celebrations.
In the last three weeks,
Albania has extended its sup-
port of Chinese Communist po-
sitions in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute, while China has supported
Albania in the face of growing
Soviet disapproval of the
Tirana regime.
The Albanian leaders have
used the Chinese Communist Octo-
ber anniversary celebrations as
t:e occasion for an explicit re-
affirmation of their support for
Peiping's ideological positions
in the dispute. Recent Albanian
statements are the most
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1960
outspoken of any that this coun-
try--which has been out of step
with Moscow on the Sino-Soviet
dispute for over a year--has
yet made.
Speeches by Deputy Premier
Abdyl Kellezi, the leader of the
Albanian delegation to Peiping--
the only satellite delegation
sent for the anniversary cele-
brations--contain unusual praise
for the Chinese Communist party,
referring to the "correct line
...followed consistently by the
glorious Chinese Communist
party led by Comrade Mao Tse-
tung," and averring that Albania
will study the Chinese "experi-
ence ."
On 4 October, Kellezi stat-
ed that the Chinese "have always
marched forward along the cor-
rect Marxist-Leninist line as
delineated by the party and Com-
rade Mao Tse-tung." The Chinese
reply stated that Albanian-
Chinese friendship was "moot
intimate, eternal, and unbreak-
able." Party First Secretary
Enver Hoxha, speaking at a
Chinese Embassy reception in
Tirana, labeled the Chinese line
a '"correct application in a
creative manner" of Marxism-
Leninisn--a contradiction to
Moscow's position.
Soviet pressure to force
the Albanians to accept Moscow's
line may be responsible for the
"tense" internal situation re-
ported by the Italian Legation
in Tirana. Albanian leaders
reportedly are "nervous" and bloc
diplomats in Tirana unusually
"agitated." The legation noted
that the Soviet ambassador to
Tirana returned to Moscow for
consultations twice in late
August. Moscow's efforts may
have been reflected in the 9
September ouster of politburo
member Liri Belishova and Central
Auditing Commission chief Koco
Tasbko, and the reported removal
of Rrapo Dervishi as head of the
Tirana city party organization.
There have also been an
unusual number of rumors cir-
culating in Tirana about further
personnel changes and about an
abortive coup attempt. Soviet
pressure and Tirana's "nervous-
ness'" may also be behind the
evident postponement of the par-
ty's fourth congress, s lated for
November. Specified precongress
activities--including the pub-
lication of the new economic
plan--havenot been carried out.
Soviet displeasure is clear-
ly visible in the snubs of
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6 October 1960
Albanians in recent weeks.
Pravda failed to mention the
ATGan.zans in its 7 September
listing of Eastern European
delegations to the UN General
Assembly. Premier Shehu, who
headed the Albanian contingent
--Hoxha was the only Eastern
European party leader whose
country has UN membership that
failed to attend--apparently
got a chilly reception from
other Eastern European delega-
tions. TASS failed to mention
him in reporting the reception
on 27 September at the Czech
UN mission headquarters in New
York. According to Western
press accounts, Shehu was
pointedly ignored by Khru-
shchev, who refused to shake
hands ,with him.
The reasons for Albania's
support of China is its ideo-
logical sympathy for the Chinese
position and the similarity in
its concern over the "external
threat"--in the Albanian case,
from Yugoslavia. That Albania
has continued to lend its sup-
port despite Soviet disapproval
may be due to the apparently
high degree of control Hoxha.has
over the party, his receipt of
support from China, and aware-
ness of latent sympathy in other
bloc countries for the Chinese
position.
The Soviet leaders prob-
ably view Albania's continued
defiance as a threat to their
campaign to isolate Peiping and
to their authority over Eastern
Europe: ~ and can be expected to 25X1
make further moves to brin
Albania into line.
ITALIAN COMMUNISTS AND THE SING-SOVIET DISPUTE
The Sino-Soviet dispute has
rovived the' "hard-SOf t't !contro-
versy that has long plagued
Italy's Communist party (PCI)
--the largest outside the So-
viet bloc. Secretary General
Togliatti can be expected to
keep the party firmly orientat-
ed toward Moscow, but oppo-
sition elements may attempt to
use the Sino-Soviet dispute to
undercut the present party
leaders. Provincial congresses
reportedly will be held through
out Italy this fall to discuss
"peaceful coexistence between
diverse systems and the non-
inevitability of war."
The Moscow-Peiping contro-
versy has been having repercus-
sions for over a year in the
PCI. In the early stages of
the dispute the party press
was cautious in commenting
about the ideological rift,
apparently because it was not
sure of the Soviet line. J
At the January 1960 con-
gress of the Italian party, a.
number of the revolutionary-
minded "old guard" were ejected
from the directorate, and the
"revisionists" achieved a
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6 October 1960
majority in the central commit-
tee. Togliatti and Giorgio
Amendola, chief of the PCI's
"organization commission," are
believed to have engineered the
removal of revolutionists di-
recting party committees in
Milan and Bologna, but were less
successful in Turin, Genoa,
and elsewhere. Leadership of
most of the smaller federations
--or local organizations--re-
mained unchanged.
On 25 July an intensive
campaign to clarify "policy
issues" was apparently begun.
Meetings were reportedly held
in all federations to discuss
the main points of Khrushchev's
speech at Bucharest criticizing
the Chinese, and a series of
articles translated from Rus-
sian and Chinese was presented
to illustrate the disagreement.
On 3 August the party daily
L'Unita broadly hinted that the
hh inese Communists fall into
an "extremist" category, and
at about the same time the Com-
munist journal Rinascita sum-
marized the Soviet press with
reference to the "full valid-
ity of the policy of coexist]
ence and of the line of the
20th congress."
Fall. congresses at the
provincial level are said to
have been planned to show up the
Chinese position as anachronistic
and stress the "justice" of the
Soviet stand. Furthermore, the
Italian party is said to have
been destroying thousands of
pamphlets sent by the Chinese
Embassy in Bern setting forth
the Chinese thesis.
The Chinese Communists are
reported to have reacted by ad-
vising the PCI not to send its
usual delegation to this year's
National Day celebration in Pei-
ping. Giuliano Pajetta, head
of the PCI's foreign section,
has hinted that the Chinese may
reduce or even cease their month-
ly subsidy for Rome's Peiping-
inspired "studies center for
economic and cultural relations
with China."
For propaganda purposes,
the PCI will probably play down
the dispute, continuing; to ad-
here to the line Pajetta took at
a meeting in September at Rome
of Communist provincial secre-
taries when he dismissed the
Moscow-Peiping rift as stemming
from "certain misunderstandings,
rather than an real diver en-
cies." i
TENSIONS OVER BERLIN
Bonn's termination of its
1961 trade agreement with East
Germany--announced on 30 Septem-
ber in retaliation for Communist
harassment of West Berlin--will
probably result in no immediate
stoppage of shipments, but it
puts the Federal Republic in a
legal position to take further
action to restrict trade. Bonn
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6 October 1960
has made no decision on nego-
tiating a new agreement with
East Germany or on making any
definite moves,,, against
interzonal shipments during the
remainder of 1960. At a cabi-
net meeting on 30 September,
the possibility was recognized
that interzonal trade could
continue after 31 December if
the East Germans do nothing
further to aggravate the po-
litical situation,
Bonn and West Berlin au-
thorities are discussing a
plan designed to strengthen
West Berlin's position. Under
this proposal, if a new trade
pact is negotiated, all inter-
zonal shipments would be routed
through West Berlin, thereby
making it difficult for the
East Germans to tamper with
Berlin access routes without
blocking their own imports,
including vital iron and steel
from the Federal Republic.
Bonn has already decided to set
up a central Berlin clearing
house for all interzonal trade
that may continue after 31
December in order to eliminate
individual dealings with East
German firms.
As a further move to bol-
ster West Berlin, Chancellor
Adenauer has asked the Western
Allies to consider increasing
their garrisons in Berlin be-
cause the nearly 50,000 East
Berliners and East Germans now
working in West Berlin are
capable of causing local dis-
turbances. West German offi-
cials have also publicly
hinted that continued Communist
encroachments in Berlin may af-
fect Soviet - West German ne-
gotiations scheduled to begin
on 17 October for the 1961
trade agreement. The 1960
protocol called for trade of
$180,000,000 each way.
West Germany is now seeking
assurance from the Western Allies
that they will not take advantage
of the cancellation of the trade
arrangement to provide the East
Germans with goods that may be em-
bargoed. Representatives of the
Allies have expressed varying
degrees of doubt as to the ap-
propriateness and timing of eco-
nomic countermeasures to East
German travel restrictions and
want a full study made of the
consequences and effectiveness
before imposing any economic
sanctions. However, they have
stated their readiness to co-
operate in implementing any
agreed and fully considered
measures.
Two West Berlin meetings
are likely to draw Communist
propaganda fire. One is the
anniversary celebration on 24
October of the dedication of
the "Freedom Bell" ten years
ago; leading German and Western
dignitaries will attend. The
other meeting, for which no
date has been set, will be held
by the All-German Affairs Com-
mittee of the Bundestag, which
has met many times before in
West Berlin without arousing
Communist attacks.
East German party boss
Ulbyicht's statement before the
People's Chamber on 4 October,
presented in reasonable lan-
guage, strongly asserts his re-
gime's "sovereignty" over East
Berlin, and demands establish-
ment of a demilitarized "free
city" of West Berlin. It gives
no indication, however, of any
countermeasures to Bonn's can-
cellation of the trade agree-
ment. Ulbricht offered to con-
duct trade talks with the West
Germans, but he imposed precon-
ditions which would be unac-
ceptable to Bonn, including re-
pudiation of the "Hallstein
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6 October 1960
doctrine" by which West Germany
breaks diplomatic relations
with any nonbloc country which
accords diplomatic recognition
to East Germany.
Ulbricht`also set the line
for bloc propaganda by charging
that Bonn's action "would sever
the last link between the two
German states" and would indi-
cate that the West Germans are
not interested in working for
German reunification.
Ulbricht's cautious atti-
tude may indicate that any de-
cision on specific counter-
measures must come from Khru-
shchev, who currently seems
preoccupied with the affairs of
the UN General Assembly in New
York.
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS
Fidel Castro's experience
at the United Nations has ap-
parently whetted his appetite
for international politics and
strengthened his view of him-
self as a leader of the people,
not only of Latin America, but
of all underdeveloped countries,
in their "struggle against im-
perialism."' The virtually un-
qualified identification of
Cuba's foreign policy with that
of the USSR, evident in Castro's
UN address, shows signs of be-
ing played down and the theme
of Cuba's association with
world neutralist leaders
stressed. On his return to
Cuba, Castro declared that
Ghana's Nkrumah may visit Cuba
late this Year and Nasir may
visit.next March.
The Castro regime, which
has given increasing propaganda
support to the cause of the
Algerian rebels, is apparently
to act as host later this month
for a conference sponsored by
the "Algerian Aid Committee"
based in Morocco. The committee
member representing the Com-
munists' World Federation of
Trade Unions had urged Havana
as the site of the conference.
On his departure from New
York on 28 September, Castro
declared that he expected to
return to the United Nations in
a few weeks, and New York hotel
managers reported on 3 October
that Cubans had been seeking
reservations for a party headed
by Fidel or Raul Castro begin-
ning 23 October. Castro told
a Cuban television audience on
30 September that "we are think-
ing of presenting a:motion in
the United Nations against
racial segregation in the United
States."
Cuba's withdrawal on 4 Oc-
tober of its candidacy for a UN
Security Council seat;, which it
had little hope of winning, may
have been in return for a promise
by some Latin American delega-
tions for support for a council
seat next year.
Cuban propaganda media con-
tinue their almost hysterical
attacks on the United States,
and some proclaim that the
embassy's advice tp American
citizens to leave Cuba fore-
shadows armed intervention by
the United States. The $100,-
000,000 US Government - owned
Nicaro nickel plant was seized
by the workers' militi^ on 1
October following the delivery
of a US note announcing closure
of the plant because of con-
fiscatory Cuban taxes. Castro
responded publicly, saying,"They
spend a billion dollars on es-
pionage and 40 billion on arms,
but now, after exploiting our
mineral resources for many years,
they object to paying a 25-
percent tax.... Let the
plant be closed."
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Cuban Government agencies
appear fearful of the imposi-
tion of controls on exports to
Cuba. According to rumors prev-
alent in Havana, they are form-
ing companies in the United
States to purchase scarce items
for indirect shipment to Cuba.
A Bulgarian trade delega-
tion, headed by the first dep-
uty foreign trade minister, ar-
rived in Cuba on 30 September.
The expected trade agreement
will be the seventh concluded
by Cuba this year with bloc
countries. The second major
shipment of military equipment
from the Soviet Union recently
arrived, and further shipments
are expected.
Che Guevara is to visit
Moscow in early November for
the anniversary celebrations of
the Soviet revolution, and
Carlos Franqui, pro-Communist
director of the government's
newspaper, and several other
newsmen left on 29 September
to study Soviet journalism.
Numerous other Cubans now are
visiting Moscow, Peiping, and
satellite capitals. At the
same 'time, two East German and
two Czech professors arrived
in Cuba in late September as
guests of the Cuban Government.
Chou En-lai's message to
Castro in late September, on
the occasion of the formal es-
tablishment of diplomatic re-
lations between Havana and Pei-
ping, promised "every possible
support and assistance to the
Cuban people, in case of need."
The "International Volun-
tary Labor Brigade," which came
to Cuba under Communist-front
sponsorship last July to work
on a Cuban school center, left
on 1 October after a send-off
featuring an address by Guevara.
Guevara told the youths, who
were said to have represented
43 countries, that "we of this
generation will see the world
liberated. completely, even if
we have to undergo the greatest
of sufferings."
On the domestic scene,
the armed :forces and militia
are evidently still suffering
casualties in the regime's ef-
forts to suppress guerrilla
activity in the Escambray Moun-
tains, Press sources report
the launching on 4 October of
an all-out government drive to
rout-the guerrillas and the
capture by government forces
of an arms cache destined for
the rebels which had been
dropped by an aircraft from an
unknown destination.
On 2 October the Catholic
archbishop of Santiago, in
Oriente Province, issued a pas-
toral letter constituting the
strongest anti-Communist state-
ment yet made by any church of-
f icial in Cuba. 25X1
although the
church is weak in Cuba, it is in
a psychologically favorable posi-
tion in Oriente to head such a
campaign because many priests
there participated in the fight
against the Batista dictator-
ship, and the archbishop himself
is credited with saving Fidel
Castro's life in 1953 after
he had been captured by the
Batista forces.
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6 October 1960
NEW PARTY STRUCTURE IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES
A new decree on the struc-
ture of party organizations in
the Soviet military establish-
ment, recently adopted by the
party central committee, is
apparently the first major step
in implementing a program for
expanding the regular party
structure in the army and navy
--a program discussed and ap-
proved at the All-Army Confer-
ence of Secretaries of Primary
Party Organizations held in
Moscow from 11 to 14 May. The
text of the decree has not been
published, but commentary on it
indicates that its provisions
follow closely the proposals
advanced to the conference by
the head of the Army and Navy's
Political Directorate, Army
General Golikov.
No mention has been made
of the proposal to substitute
"elective" party organs for
political departments in the
headquarters of military dis-
tricts, groups of forces,
fleets, and military schools,
nor of the earlier proposal
to replace the battalion dep-
uty commander for-political
affairs with full-time party
secretaries. Instead, the po-
litical departments are charged
with organizing the preparatory
work for the transition to the
new system, with supervising
the new and largely inexperi-
enced party secretaries, and
with "teaching" the battalion
commanders how to work with
the party organization.
Basic party units are to
be established at the battalion
level instead of at the regimen-
tal level as heretofore, and the
staffs of the regimental party
organizations are to be expanded
to enable the regimental unit
to exercise a supervisory role
over the subordinate party units.
In addition, subunits of the
battalion party organizations
can be established in companies
or batteries, operating some-
what like shop subdivisions of
a factory party organization.
The ultimate aim of this
reorganization apparently is to
replace the deputy military
commanders for political affairs
and the political departments
in military units with the type
of party organization found in
civilian life. The decree
creates conditions favorable
for increasing the influence of
the party organizations, but
further steps will probably de-
pend on the success the new or- 25X1
ganizations have in looking
after party interests in the
military.
USSR INTENSIFIES CAMPAIGN AGAINST IDLERS
Moscow has stepped up its
drive against "parasites" and
idlers, and efforts are being
made to generate widespread
public indignation against all
forms of undesirable behavior.
The campaign has spread into
all social levels, even the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
upper levels of the bureaucracy,
and includes particularly vehe-
ment attacks on the tendency to
acquire private property. Par-
asitism in all its varieties
is characterized as the most
serious vice of present-day
Soviet society.
The renewed offensive was
opened in late August at a con-
ference of representatives of
the police, legal officials,
and youth organizations; the
meeting concluded that "a piti-
less fight against parasites and
loafers is a matter of urgency."
The police and courts were said
to be in no position to tackle
the problem unaided. Every
member of the general public
was urged to join the fight.
Khrushchev has lent his per-
sonal influence to the campaign
by invoking Lenin's dictum that
whoever refuses to work does
not eat and by stating on 31
August, "Anybody who thinks he
can live well and work badly
is a parasite."
What constitutes a parasite
was further spelled out last
month at the all-union confer-
ence on ideological problems,
where heavy blows were demanded
against those who display "pri-
vate ownership tendencies, in-
difference to politics .,,na-
tionalism, religious prejudices,
and other forms of bourgeois
ideology,"
In past campaigns of this
sort, the primary target has
been those who refuse to en-
gage in "socially useful work"
and prefer to make a living by
black-marketing, profiteering,
or running unauthorized "serv-
ice" enterprises such as tailor
shops. While miscreants of
this kind are again under heavy
fire, the central themes of
this year's propaganda reflect
the Kremlin's concern over the
markedly increased tendency of
the people to acquire material
wealth. Young people and en-
trenched party and government
bureaucrats are emerging as ma-
jor offenders; the principal
cause seems to be the slowly
growing prosperity of the in-
dividual citizen.
In at least one case, it
had been explicitly stated that
the prosperity of youth can lead
to individualism and "leaving
the collective." Some property-
holding "parasites" have even
been accused of quoting Darwin
to the effect that freedom of
spirit and any kind of creative
activity presuppose the existence
of private property. While such
manifestations are officially
attributed to remnants of bour-
geois ideology, certain press
writers have begun to wonder--
at least rhetorically--how it
happens that a petit-bourgeois
outlook can grow in a socialist
society.
Parasites among Soviet of-
ficials present an entirely dif-
ferent problem. The press has
severely attacked those who seem
intent on "entering Communism
only on condition that they can
take along their summer houses,
cars, pensions, and bank ac-
counts.- At the same time,
there have been hints that it
is difficult to answer the con-
tention of these officials that
they have a right to enjoy the
fruits of their labors on be-
half of the Soviet cause,
In late September the
Georgian Republic passed an
antiparasite law similar to
those adopted in most other
Soviet republics during the
past three years. Under its
provisions, offenders can be
sentenced to exile in remote
areas and to periods of "cor-
rective labor" ranging from six
months to two years. Heavy
press attention to the problem
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
suggests that the way is being
prepared for the adoption of a
similar law in the Russian Re-
public, largest of the Soviet
republics. Otherwise, the cam-
paign has concentrated on
threats of more severe action
against parasites and on ap-
peals for increasing ideolog-
ical indoctrination of the
masses in the proper Communist
outlook.
Despite the bitterness of
the attacks on private property
tendencies, no ready solution
has been found, and the regime
appears unable to overcome the
increasingly bourgeois outlook
of the people.
The Algerian rebels are
intensifying their efforts both
in New York and in various West-
ern capitals to secure backing
for a UN-conducted referendum
to settle Algeria's political
future. At the same time,
Morocco and Tunisia are try-
ing to elicit UN intervention
in Algeria on the pattern of
the UN operation in the Congo.
The rebels apparently are
encouraged by the two-hour
meeting on 2 October of the
rebel delegation in New York
with Khrushchev and by the fan-
fare surrounding the reception
of rebel premier Ferhat Abbas
during his two-day stopover in
Moscow en route to Peiping.
Khrushchev's public statement
that the Algerian government
"exists" and that French-
Algerian talks at Melun last
June were De Gaulle's "tacit
recognition" of the rebel
regime indicates a shift in
Soviet policy from the cautious
neutral position adopted in mid-
1959 to a more open pro-rebel
stand.
Rebel claims that the
Soviet UN delegation offered
official recognition to the
provisional Algerian government
probably are exaggerated, how-
ever. Although Soviet leaders
appear less concerned now than
in the past about avoiding
offense to France, the USSR
and European satellites seem
likely to continue to with-
hold diplomatic recognition at
least until after Khrushchev's
expected call for new East-
West talks on Berlin and Germany
early next year.
Abbas' ostentatious visit
to Peiping probably was designed
primarily to impress Western
governments that the rebels were
in earnest when they stated they
would accept aid "wherever it
can be found." He left there
on 6 October after a week's
stay, with promises of "material
and moral support in the
Algerian war for independence."
Although he may have secured
additional financial assistance,
new arms commitments from
Communist China seem unlikely,
inasmuch as previous armament
commitments apparently have not
been delivered.
Tunisia and Morocco appear
to be vying with each other to
support rebel efforts to
involve the UN more directly in
an Algerian solution, andthey'look
on the UN's operations in the
Congo as a useful precedent.
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Bourguiba has let it be
known that he is weighing the
merits of an Algerian-proposed
Tunisian-Algerian "union" to
which he referred cryptically
on 3 September
e gerza.ns, on ie o er
hand, are said to envisage
implementation of the union as
a means to provoke French
military retaliation against
Tunisia, which could then demand
UN intervention.
Morocco's acting deputy
premier, Abdelkhalek- Torres, has
threatened to order Moroccan
armed forces to retaliate, should
the French.troops based in
Algeria continue to violate
Moroccan territory. Two appar-
ently minor incidents in late
September have been widely ex-
ploited by the Moroccan. press.
Such a counterattack, which is
said to have the approval of the
King, who is 'Vacationing in
Switzerland, would also be de-
signed to justify a call for UN
intervention,
Meanwhile, in France, the
predominantly Moslem study com-
missions, which were apparently
established with an eye to the
forthcoming UN debate, are faith-
fully, but with questionable
utility, studying local Algerian
problems. The government also
has begun to crack down on both
leftist and rightist domestic
criticism of its Algerian policy.
It appears unlikely that
De Gaulle will make any signifi-
cant new move before the UN de-
bate--now expected in mid or
late November--although his Octo-
ber visits to the provinces and
possibly also to Algeria will
provide him opportunities to
speak out on the problem. Re-
cent slighting renarks regard-
ing the UN by De Gaulle and
other top French officials sug-
gest preparation of the public
for an adverse UN resolution on