CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
State Dept. review completed
COPY NO.
OCI NO. 4444/60
15 September 1960
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev's sharp denunciation of US plans to re-
strict his movements during his stay in New York sug-
gests he is seeking to exploit this issue as a deliberate
effort on the part of the United States to create a hos-
tile atmosphere. He has also used this issue to renew
charges that the US is not interested in settling major
international issues at the General Assembly. Moscow's
extensive propaganda build-up for this UN session im-
plies that Khrushchev will advance ostensibly new pro-
posals on disarmament. Along with Eastern European
party leaders, Khrushchev can be expected to underline
the urgent need for disarmament by citing alleged
Western provocations in Berlin and the rearmament of
West Germany as major factors in the deterioration
of East-West relations.
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The first large shipment of arms from the USSR ar-
rived in Cuba on 8 September. Communist China is moving
rapidly to establish its diplomatic mission in Havana,
and Khrushchev is expected in Cuba after taking part
in the opening meetings of the UN General Assembly.
Fidel Castro is to head Cuba's UN delegation, which
is likely to support the Soviet position on all major
issues. In the Dominican Republic, the Trujillo re-
gime has reacted to mounting international pressures
by calling a mass meeting for 24 September to demon-
strate its "popular support" and by threatening re-
taliation against US businessmen. Continuing tension
is evident in Venezuela despite President Betancourt's
success in maintaining his three-party coalition fol-
lowing the forced resignation of pro-Cuban Foreign
Minister Arcaya.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The struggle for power between Premier Lumumba,
President Kasavubu, and Colonel Mobutu in the Congo re-
mains unresolved. UN initiatives aimed at combating
Lumumba's extremism have been hampered by the
concern of African states--exploited by the USSR
--that the UN is infringing on the Congo's
sovereignty. Meanwhile, Soviet involvement in
the Congo situation continues to increase. In
VUNFIDLIlIihL
Page 5
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
PART I (continued)
addition to expanding the scope of its direct aid to
Lumumba
the USSR has affirmed its in en-
tion of bypassing UN channels in supplying aid, and
Khrushchev on 13 September strongly attacked Hammar-
skjold for ,consciously working in the interests of
the imperialists" in the Congo.
SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . Page 8
The proclamation of a rival government by General
Phoumi and Prince Boun Oum in opposition to the Souvanna
Phouma government has brought the situation in Laos
into a new and more critical phase. Souvanna has re-
acted moderately to this new threat and has sought
to keep the door open for a new compromise by refrain-
ing from branding Phoumi and Boun Oum as rebels. The
refusal of the King to take sides, in effect a repudia-
tion of Souvanna, has dimmed prospects for a recon-
ciliation between Souvanna and Phoumi, however, and
may lead to Souvanna's early resignation. Captain
Kong Le is still in military control of Vientiane.
The Communist Pathet Lao continues to exploit the
division in Laos' non-Communist ranks, exerting mili-
tary pressure in regions ostensibly loyal to Phoumi
and waging a vigorous propaganda campaign calling
on all Laotians to get behind the Souvanna government
and Kong Le in their struggle against the "traitorous"
Phoumi clique.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ELECTIONS AT THE 15TH UN GENEEAL ASSEMBLY . . . . . . . . Page 1
A contest between the Soviet bloc and the West
over the election of the president of the 15th UN
General Assembly is in prospect when the assembly
opens on 20 September. The competition between two
rival Western candidates--Frederick Boland of Ire-
land and Thor Thors of Iceland--improves the chances
of Jiri Nosek of Czechoslovakia. Cuba's intention
to seek the Security Council seat relinquished by
Argentina--in opposition to Chile, the choice of the
Latin American caucus--may induce delegates from
other areas, particularly Africa, to seek this seat.
C'ONFIDEIV I,ji ,
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4VIUI IUL11 I U1L
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
PART II (continued)
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONFERENCE . . . . . Page 2
The fourth general conference of the UN's Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency, convening in Vienna on
the same day the General Assembly opens in New York,
will probably be marked by East-West conflicts on
several issues, including the perennial one of Chinese
representation.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS .
At the North Vietnamese party congress--the first
important bloc forum since the Bucharest meeting in June
--Soviet and Chinese spokesmen reaffirmed their posi-
tions in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Chinese, who
were again criticized for lobbying among other parties
and for disrupting international organizations, have in
fact continued to press their opposition to Soviet
policies in other Communist-controlled international
bodies. As to governmental relations, the USSR con-
tinues to schedule the delivery of military and other
aid to China, but there are several indications of a
worsening relationship.
BERLIN SITUATION .
The East German Government continues to extend
its restrictions on travel of West German citizens in
East Berlin and East Germany. The Bonn government
is reluctant to apply strong countermeasures, such
as an embargo on interzonal trade, lest they lead to
worse East German retaliation, particularly against
West Berlin's large trade with West Germany. East
German party boss Ulbricht has disclosed in a mem-
orandum to the UN a plan for the phased disarmament
of Germany, including provisions for signing a peace
treaty with the "two German states," Western troop
withdrawal from West Berlin, and a "free city" of
West Berlin.
Page 3
. Page 5
EAST GERMAN REFUGEE FLOW CONTINUES DESPITE CONTROL
MEASURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Despite intensified East German security measures,
the refugee flow to West Berlin and West Germany is
continuing at a high rate. More than 3,000 refugees
reached West Berlin during the week ending 6 September,
although this period included the five-day near-
blockade of the East Berlin "escape hatch" to the
Western sectors. Some 126,500 East Germans have
crossed over in the first eight months of the year--
far above last year's rate--and the 1960 total is
likely to be well above last year's total of 143,000.
There has also been a decrease in the number of
persons going from West to East.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
PART II (continued)
POSSIBLE MISSILE RING AROUND BERLIN . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Berlin by early 1961 will probably be ringed with
surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. The ring may
eventually contain eight or more launch sites, each
with local support facilities. In addition there may
be two central support facilities. All of the support
facilities were reported under construction this
summer, and could be completed, with launch sites
installed, in early 1961. The two existing operational
SAM sites in East Germany--not a part of the Berlin
complex--are manned by Soviet personnel, but there
is evidence that the East Germans may eventually
MOSCOW-TO-HELSINKI COMMUNICATIONS CABLE
A high-capacity underground coaxial cable is
being installed between Finland and the USSR. Since
the cable will provide a circuit capacity greatly in
excess of civil requirements, it could be used for trans-
mitting air-defense information into the USSR, under
terms of the Finnish-Soviet mutual assistance pact
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ALBANIAN PARTY SHUFFLE SETS STAGE FOR GREATER SUPPORT
OF MOSCOW o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The ouster from the Albanian party politburo of
a leading ideologist and the elevation to the party
secretariat of an agitprop specialist suggest that
Tirana is preparing to revamp its equivocal propaganda
line on basic issues in the Sino-Soviet controversy.
The ideologist will probably be a scapegoat in this
instance for the regime's "collective error" in past
support of the Chinese on such matters as the in-
evitability of war and the nature of the imperialist
threat. Her ouster, probably a direct result of
Soviet pressure, will serve to deter others in the
Albanian party and elsewhere who tend to favor the
NORTH VIETNAM HOLDS THIRD PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Two themes dominated the sessions of North Viet-
nam's third party congress, which met in Hanoi from
5 to 10 September--how best to modernize and in-
dustrialize the country in accordance with Communist
principles and how to reunify Vietnam. Hanoi, hoping
for the overthrow of President Diem, plans to solve
the latter problem by forming a coalition government
with a "democratic" successor government. The long
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
PART II (continued)
continuity of leadership within the Lao Dong party was
again underscored by the continuation of the politburo
without changes in membership. It became clear at the
congress that Le Duan, an individual closely associated
with the direction of subversive-activities against
South Vietnam, is second in power to President Ho Chi
Minh.
GUINEA STRENGTHENS COMMUNIST BLOC TIES . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Guinea.'s economic ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc
have been strengthened further as a result of President
Tourd's current visit to several Communist bloc countries.
In Moscow.Tourd secured a Soviet commitment to partici-
pate in the proposed Konkourb hydroelectric project--
Guinea's priority development scheme--while Peiping
extended a $25,000,000 interest-free credit, its first
large-scale economic aid to any Black African country.
In addition, Tourd endorsed a number of Moscow's policy
positions and appears to have moved toward closer
alignment with the Communist world.
USSR AND IRAN MAKING NEW EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS . . . Page 16
Both Moscow and Tehran are making new moves to
relieve the long-standing tension in their relations.
Following the ouster on 28 August of the stanchly anti-
Communist Eqbal as Iranian prime minister, Soviet Am-
bassador Pegov returned to Tehran, and the Soviet
Government diminished its propaganda attacks on the
Shah. Sharif Emami, Iran's new prime minister, feels
that the immediate task of his government is to im-
prove relations with Moscow, but not at the expense
of its ties to the West. Iran has halted its counter-
propaganda and has begun to display greater coopera-
tion in minor matters toward Soviet officials in
Tehran.
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
The confrontation of President Sukarno and the
Indonesian Army over the Communist issue appears to
have been once more postponed by Sukarno's ban issued
on 13 September on the activities of all political
parties. The ban frees Sukarno from the necessity
of making a direct choice between the army and the
Communists; it also obviates an army decision on
whether to oppose Sukarno further by extending to
other areas the proscription of Communist activity
announced last month in three military commands.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
PART II (continued)
SOUTH KOREAN CABINET RESHUFFLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
South Korean Prime Minister Chang Myon and his op-
ponents within his party agreed on 12 September to a
compromise cabinet designed to give Chang a working
majority in the National Assembly. Although the new
cabinet appears to strengthen Chang's position for the
time being by drawing his opponents into sharing re-
sponsibility for government policy, the terms of the
compromise will make it easy for the anti-Chang fac-
tionists to function as a de facto opposition bloc in
future 'tests of strength.
CONGO REPERCUSSIONS ON THE BELGIAN DOMESTIC SCENE . . . . Page 19
The new Belgian coalition cabinet, recently an-
nounced by Premier Eyskens in response to public
criticism of the government's Congo policy, contains
no new influential figures, and may not last through
the winter. No-major changes in defense and foreign
policies are likely; Eyskens' austerity economic pro-
gram, however, involves defense cuts ranging between
7 and 13 percent, and the drift away from active par-
ticipation in NATO will Probably continue.
EL SALVADOR'S GOVERNMENT SHAKEN BY LEFTIST ATTACKS . . . . Page 20
The moderately progressive regime of Salvadoran
President Lemus has been seriously shaken by persist-
ent attacks from leftist student and labor elements,
many of whom are pro-Communist and pro-Castro. Ten-
sions have subsided somewhat recently as a result
of mediating efforts by businessmen and civic leaders;
but the state of siege declared on 5 September still
continues, and the outlook for government stability
PATTERNS AND,. PERSPECTIVES
CHINESE REPRESENTATION 114 THE tMITED NATIONS . . . . . . . Page 1
Although 'ationalist China is expected to retain
China's seat in the UN through the procedural device
of the moratorium at this year's General Assembly,
the prospect for maintaining the moratorium beyond
1961 is increasingly uncertain. Taipei, despite its
association in African minds with '}colonial powers,"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
PART III (continued)
may even pick up additional support from newly sover-
eign states if they are admitted to the UN before the
vote. Many UN members, even among those which have
consistently supported the moratorium, have long be-
lieved that UN membership with its attendant obliga-
tions offers a way of bringing Peiping under some
form of international restraint. A strong appeal
to this body of opinion may be made in Khrushchev's
forthcoming speech to the assembly in which he is
expected to call for Communist China's admission
while developing his theme of peaceful coexistence
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
KHRUSHCHEV AND THE 15TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Khhrushchev has seized on
the question of US security
precautions during his stay in
New York as head of the USSR's
delegation to the UN General
Assembly as a pretext for de-
nouncing the American Govern-
ment's attitude toward the UN.
In a telegram answering ques-
tions of the London Daily Ex-
press on 13 September, tHe__79o-
viet premier charged that the
restrictions on his activitdes
indicate that the United States
"doesinot sympathize with the
effort to resolve the major is-
sues"to be considered by the
UN. Moscow's formal protest
note to the US took a similar
line, alleging that the purpose
of the restrictions was to
"worsen in advance the interna-
tional climate" when the heads
of government meet at the Gen-
eral Assembly.
The sharp reaction by Khru-
shchev, who will arrive on 19
September, suggests that he
anticipates a cool public recep-
tion and is seeking an issue to
charge the US with intentionally
creating a hostile atmosphere.
Propaganda allegations that
Khrushchev has received numer-
ous invitations from Americans
for visits and public appear-
ances also fit into the pattern
of creating an impression that
Washington is attempting to
block Khrushchev's contacts
with the American public.
The Soviet campaign to
persuade free-world leaders to
attend the meeting has met with
moderate success. Among the
heads of government who plan
to attend the initial debates
during the first weeks of the
General Assembly are Nasir,
Sukarno, Tito, Sihanouk of
Cambodia, Moulay Hassan of
Morocco, and Koirala of Nepal.
Nehru, U Nu, Sekou Tour6, and
Nkrumah are apparently planning
to attend, but probably not un-
til early October. Prime Min-
isters Daud of Afghanistan and
Abboud of Sudan are apparently
still undecided. Prior to
Eisenhower's announcement that
he intends to address the UN
on 22 September, no heads of
government ox prime ministers
of Western states were planning
to come, except Cuba's Castro,
who will fully support the So-
viet line.
Soviet propaganda has rep-
resented this turnout as a suc-
cess for Soviet diplomacy and
a defeat for the West. Moscow's
initial reaction to the announce-
ment that President Eisenhower
would address the UN was to dis-
miss it as a "forced concession"
to world opinion which TASS
claimed strongly supported the
initiative of the USSR.
Disarmament
The extensive Soviet prop-
aganda build-up on the UN meet-
ing has emphasized disarmament.
A Pravda editorial of 10 Sep-
tember cited Khrushchev's visit
as "new proof" of the USSR's de-
termination to break the dead-
lock on that issue. Moscow has
also suggested that Khrushchev
will expand his most recent
disarmament proposals. Propa-
ganda implies that he will un-
veil a new scheme; while staying
within the context of complete
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15 September 1960
and general disarmament, it will
probably be designed to appeal
to Afro-Asian neutral states.
Such a bid for this sup-
port may involve a revised ver-
sion of proposals presented on
2 June, with additional emphasis
on the economic benefits of
disarmament in terms of making
funds available for underdevel-
oped areas. Previous Soviet
plans have stopped short of
proposing the establishment of
a joint fund which would func-
tion as a channel for "savings"
from disarmament to be used in
aid programs. Moscow may feel,
however, that a specific pro-
posal at this time will gain
widespread Afro-Asian support
for its over-all disarmament
plan. This approach is re-
flected in Khrushchev's joint
communique with Guinea Presi-
dent Toure on 8 September,
which listed disarmament, and
economic security as principal
topics for UN discussions.
Polish Deputy Foreign Min-
ister Naszkowski told American
Embassy representatives that
Khrushchev would propose an
enlargement of the disarmament
talks to include some neutrals
but not the Chinese Communists.
Khrushchev's immediate aim
on disarmament will be to elic-
it support in the UN General
Assembly for a subsequent reso-
lution endorsing "complete and
general disarmament" as the
prime objective in any future
East-West negotiations. In his
Pravda interview on 9 August,
KK is chev foreshadowed such a
position by claiming that "the
Soviet Union wants the General.
Assembly to recognize universal
and complete disarmament as the
crucial question." He added,
"It is essential that the Gen-
eral Assembly rule that disarm-
ament must be complete."
Colonialism
The reference in the Khru-
shchev-Toure communique to the
"national independence of peo-
ples" as a cardinal issue to
be taken up by the General As-
sembly also indicates that in
his address to the assembly the
Soviet premier will stress at-
tacks on "colonialism"' and West-
ern attempts to use the UN ac-
tion in the Congo crisis as a
"cover for imperialism." Khru-
shchev probably anticipates that
with the admission of new Af-
rican members to the UN and the
attendance of some leaders of
other Afro-Asian countries,
such attacks will garner con-
siderable support.
Germany and Berlin
The Polish deputy foreign
minister indicated that Berlin
would be raised in connection
with disarmament. East German
party leader Ulbricht's new
plan for phased disarmament
for Germany could provide
the cue for Khrushchev to stress
that the rearmament of Germany
and the situation in Berlin are
major obstacles to a relaxation
of tensions. He can also be ex-
pected to use these problems
to underline the urgency of dis-
armament.
It does not seem likely,
however, that Khrushchev will
advance any new proposals on
Berlin, such as presenting an
ultimatum to the West demand-
ing acceptance of Soviet posi-
tions on disarmament, Germany,
and Berlin. Although a Soviet
diplomat in Vienna told a New
York Times reporter that this
wou die Khrushchev's position,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
precipitation of a showdown on
these issues would not be in
keeping with the general em-
phasis on creating an image of
the peace-loving Soviet Union
in the presence of high-level
Afro-Asian delegations.
Nevertheless, Khrushchev
may clarify his position on
Berlin in his informal remarks
to the press, while leaving
CUBA AND THE
The Soviet ship Ilya Mech-
nikov arrived at Havana with a
large cargo on 8 September,
the first major bloc arms ship-
ment to the Castro regime. The
cargo apparently included
armored vehicles, artillery, and
a variety of other weapons and
equipment. Jet aircraft also
may have been delivered. In
July, four or five Soviet MI-4
helicopters and at least 10,000
Czech rifles and submachine
guns had been delivered to
Havana.
Following Castro's 2
September anouncement that
Cuba will establish relations
with Peiping, the head of the
Havana off ice of the New Chi-
na News Agency has notified
the Cuban Foreign Ministry
that he had been designated
by Peiping to negotiate the
exhange of diplomatic tis-
sions.
Khrushchev is expected to
pay his long-promised visit to
formal presentations of bloc
charges against Bonn to be
made by the satellite leaders,
Gomulka declared recently that
the Polish delegation would
use the UN rostrum to "warn
the nations against the dan-
ger of German militarism."
He added that Czechoslovakia
was also entitled to make
a similar warning.
CARIBBEAN
Cuba after his trip to New York
for the opening of the UN Gen-
eral Assembly. The Cuban Gov-
ernment has announced that Fidel
Castro himself is to head Cuba's
UN General Assembly delegation,
which will also include Foreign
Minister Roa and Nunez Jimenez,
the head of Cuba's Communist-
.dominated Agrarian Reform In-
stitute. Castro will use the
world forum for further attacks
on the United States and to
hold up his revolution as an ex-
ample for all underdeveloped
nations and colonial areas. The
Cuban delegation is expected
to support the Soviet position
on all important issues.
Meanwhile, open opposi-
tion to Castro inside Cuba is
still uncoordinated and lacks
effective leadership. The
Castro forces apparently have
had no success in routing the
guerrilla bands that have been
forming in the Escambray Moun-
tains of central Cuba for some
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
months. Castro publicly mini-
mized the importance of the
guerrillas on 9 September, but
the regime actually appears to
be taking the threat of A guer-
rilla build-up seriousl .
The Cuban consul in Hong
Kong broke with the Castro re-
gime on 12 September and wants
to come to the United States.
Dominican Republic
Trujillo has reacted to
mounting international pres-
sures by announcing a mass
meeting for 24 September to
demonstrate his regime's "pop-
ular support." Calling a care-
fully organized rally for this
purpose is a device the regime
has used before; in this in-
stance it may also provide an
occasion for Trujillo to an-
nounce his resumption of the
presidency in response to "pop-
ular demand."
The government-controlled
Radio Caribe has warned US
businessmen to begin defending
Trujillo against US attacks if
they want to continue doing
business in his country. The
US Consulate sees the future
of US interests there as "in-
creasingly bleak" as long as
Trujillo retains control.
Radio Caribe's propaganda
favorable to Castro and the
Soviet bloc showed a marked
drop following the USSR's un-
successful demand that the UN
Security Council endorse the
OAS sanctions against the Do-
minican Government, Attacks'
on "US imperialism" continue,
however, and on 13 September
Radio Caribe lashed out at the
United States in a vicious at-
tack, calling the US Government
"the strongest dictatorship on
earth," dominated by "Wall
Street and eight capitalists."
While Trujillo now is at-
tempting to give the impression
that he is not personally re-
sponsible for the viciously
anti-US line of his propaganda
outlets, he undoubtedly could
control them if he wished. At
the same time, his propagandists
are active in the United States,
where they are attempting to
portray the dictator as a stalwart
defender against Communism who
has been grievously wronged by
his great friend, the United
States. He is reportedly spend-
ing considerable money in the
United States to this end.
Trujillo's statement of 13 Au-
gust declaring that his country
is determined to "remain outside
the orbit of cannibalistic Com-
munism" was undoubtedly made
with a view only to its impact
in the United States.
Despite Foreign Minister
Arcaya's resignation, President
Betancourt is successfully main-
taining the three-party coali-
tion which has backed his gov-
ernment since its inauguration
in February 1959. Nevertheless,
continuing tension in Venezuela
is suggested by rumors of high-
level changes in the armed
forces--including the army com-
mander in chief and the chief
of the joint general staff.
Other indicators are a Communist-
instigated armed battle in a
key petroleum labor union meet-
ing in which one man was killed
and 30 injured, and the brief
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15 September 1960
seizure of a Caracas radio sta-
tion on 12 September by a na-
tional guard officer who report-
edly hoped to inspire co-con-
spirators to fulfill a revo-
lutionary plan originally set
for 10 September.
Arcaya's resignation may
have been regarded by anti-
government elements as creating
a weak point in the united
front of Venezuela's three ma-
jor parties which have made up
the government coalition since
President Betancourt's inaugura-
tion in February 1959. These
left-of-center parties--Betan-
court's Democratic Action (AD)
group, the Christian Democratic
COPEI, and the Republican Demo-
The confusion surrounding
the Congo situation has been
compounded by two coups at-
tempted against Premier Lumumba.
President Kasavubu's effort to
dismiss the premier and appoint
moderate Joseph Ileo, the presi-
dent of the Senate, in his stead
did not receive popular or mil-
itary support, and Ileo chose
the safety of Brazzaville in
President Youlou's Congo Repub-
lic instead of the political
struggle in Leopoldville. In
fact, both Kasavubu and Ileo
have moved so slowly that
American Embassy officials de-
scribe their pace as snail-like,
and report that Kasavubu "acts
more like a vegetable every
day."
On 14 September, Colonel
Mobutu, newly appointed army
commander in chief, announced
that the army was taking charge
and would enforce a truce until
31 December, thus enabling the
cratic Union (URD)--have pre-
sented a united civilian front
against the recurring threat of
a new dictatorship by Vene-
zuela's traditionally political
armed forces.
Little unity has been pos-
sible, however, either within
or among the parties on the
Cuban issue. Betancourt has
indicated that he does not want
the resignation of the pro-
Cuban Arcaya,who is prominent
in the URD, to be the cause for
breaking the coalition. Betan-
court believes that many URD
members are disillusioned with
their party and could, eventu-
ally be convinced to leave it.
rival political factions to
reach an agreement, During the
interim a "collect" of Congolese
students and technicians would
run the Congo in cooperation
with the UN. He proposed to
stop the Congo's drift toward
Communism by closing the Soviet
and Czech embassies and consu-
lates, placing military guards
around the premises, and forcing
the diplomats to leave within
48 hours.
In the absence of disorders
or strong reactions on the part
of leading Congolese politicians,
it appeared that the coup might
be succeeding. However, by mid-
morning of 15 September, forces
loyal to Lumumba seemed to have
regained the initiative. Lumum-
ba's claim that Mobutu had been
arrested was subsequently denied,
however. The situation remains
extremely fluid, with the sympa-
thies of the bulk of the Congo-
lese Army unclear.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
Lumumba, after
beating off Kasavubu's
effort to dismiss
him, called a rump
session of the Na;-'
tional Assembly whici
on 13 September voteQ
him undefined "full
powers," and backed
his attacks on the
UN's role in the Con-
go. The premier ap-
parently hopes to
use this action--
challenged by the
opposition on the
grounds a quorum was
lacking--to justify
the establishment of
a dictatorship.
The premier's
ability to retain
power has made the UN
task vastly more dif-
ficult. Further
trouble for Secretary
General Hammarskjold
dontic
~kPAO
CONGO
REPUBLIC
13 SEPTEMBER 1900
MILES 20
whose fears have been exploited
by the USSR. The council ses-
sion on 12 September was ad-
journed because all contemplated
measures would have aided Lu-
mumba, not Kasavubu; the ses-
sion on 14 September was ad-
journed when Tunisia proposed
a good-offices commission to
mediate between opposing Congo-
lese factions--a step which
would seem to accord equal rec-
ognition to Kasavubu and Lu-
mumba.
has arisen from several of the
African states which sympathize
with Lumumba's proclaimed ef-
forts to preserve the unity of
the Congo and to combat foreign
--notably Belgian and French--
imperialism. Guinea, Ghana,
Sudan, and the UAR have all
threatened'to withdraw troops
from the UN Command and implied
that they would be put at Lu-
mumba's disposal. Within the
last few days, however, as the
UN relaxed its control of the
Leopoldville radio station and
airfields, Ghana and Sudan have
adopted a more conciliatory pol-
icy toward the secretary gen-
eral.
Nevertheless, Hammarskjold
has been handicapped in his ef-
forts in the Security Council
to get backing for a tough pol-
icy in the Congo by the waver-
ing of Afro-Asian governments,
For several days there has
been a lessening of bloodshed
in the Kasai area, although it
is not clear whether this has
resulted from the general cease-
fire which the UN announced on
10 September had been ordered
by the Congolese Army. This
easing of the situation was prob-
ably in part a result of the
UN's prohibition against other
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
air flights in the Congo. This
restriction had grounded the
ten Soviet IL-14s which had been
used to transport some 200 Lu-
mumba troops to the Kasai bat-
tlefront. With the relaxation
of the UN restrictions, Lumumba
will probably give new attention
to the Kasai secessionist prob-
lem in an effort to clean up
the area preparatory to an all-
out Katanga campaign.
Following the small-scale
action at two points along the
Katanga-Kivu frontier last week,
the Katanga border remained
quiet until 15 September, when
reports reached Elisabethville
that 300 Congolese troops loyal
to Lumumba were attempting to
invade Katanga from Kivu, At
the same time, President Tshombe's
Katanga regime was confronted
with an apparently. -serious up-
rising by Baluba tribesmen at
Manono.
Tshomb6 welcomed Ileo's
designation as premier and has
sent two representatives to
meet with Ileo's delegates in
Brazzaville to discuss a fed-
erated Congo. At the same time,
Tshomb6 continues to make state-
ments favoring complete inde-
pendence for Katanga. This ap-
parently is largely a bargaining
tactic, but also designed to
appeal to local advocates of a
separate Katanga.
Communist- Bloc Moves
The Communist bloc is be-
coming more involved in the
Congo situation. Khrushchev,
in the strongest Soviet attack
on Hammarskjold to date, charged
on 13 September that the UN sec-
retary general is "consciously
working in the interests of the
imperialists" in the Congo and
that his actions "dovetail with
the policies of the countries
which have always espoused the
positions of colonialism."
Answering questions aboard
the Baltika, the Soviet premier
denounced Hammarskjold's insist-
ence that all aid to the Congo
Government be channeled through
the UN as a further effort to
uphold colonialist interests,
and indicated that he may press
the Congo issue at the forth-
coming UN General Assembly meet-
ing.
In the fifth Soviet Govern-
ment statement on the subject,
issued on 9 September, the USSR
accused Hammarskjold of failing
to show the "minimum of impar-
tiality" and of "openly working
for the benefit of the colonial-
ists, thereby compromising the
UN." Moscow demanded that UN
forces occupying Congolese air-
fields and radio stations be
dismissed, and called on the
governments whose troops are in
the Congo to carry out the "good,
correct decisions" of the Se-
curity Council, bypassing the
UN Command if necessary.
The USSR's reply on 10 Sep-
tember to a note from Hammar-
skjold regarding direct Soviet
aid to the Congo indicated Mos-
cow's intention to continue its
unilateral support for Lumumba.
The Soviet note stated that the
Security Council resolutions
"do not and cannot restrict"
the right of the Congolese Gov-
ernment to request and receive
assistance directly from gov-
ernments of other countries and
asserted that Soviet aid in the
form of civil aircraft and motor
vehicles was "fully consistent"
with these resolutions. Moscow
expressed surprise that the sec-
retary general was attempting to
control the Congo's relations
with other states, specifically
the USSR.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
The situation in Laos has
taken a new and more critical
turn with the repudiation of the
Souvanna Phouma government by
General Phoumi and Prince Boun
Oum. Their self-styled "Revolu-
tionary Committee" proclaimed
over Radio Savannakhet on 10
September that it had temporar-
ily set aside the Constitution,
"ousted" the Souvanna govern-
ment, and decreed martial law
throughout Laos. All military
commanders, civil servants, and
people were requested to rec-
ognize the authority of com-
mittee Chairman Boun Oum and to
disregard Vientiane's orders.
Boun Oum is the 50-year-
old hereditary ruler of south-
ern Laos who renounced his
claims in 1946 in favor of a
unified Laos under the King of
Luang Prabang. Described as
an earthy, practical man of ac-
tion, Boun Oum is believed to
have chafed in recent years
over the lack of scope offered
for his energies by his sine-
cure position as inspector gen-
eral of the Kingdom. Boun Oum
was an anti-Japanese resistance
leader in World War II, and in
1954 he led commando troops
against the invading Viet Minh.
He was premier in 1949-50. He
favors alignment with the West
and the imposition of authori-
tarian government.
While in effect setting up
a de facto government in Sa-
vannakhet, Boun Oum and Phoumi
apparently do not intend this
to be a separatist' regime, at
least at this time. They have
pledged support to King Savang
and sent emissaries to Luang
Prabang to explain their ac-
tions to the monarch.
The Savannakhet group claims
the loyalty of all four military
region commanders outside of
Vientiane, as well as ten of
the country's 12 provincial gov-
ernors, but their sustained al-
legiance and unity of purpose
is open to question. The first
military region commander, with
headquarters in Luang Prabang,
has reversed himself twice'and
now seems tentatively to be
supporting the Souvanna govern-
ment. The loyalty of lower
echelon military units is even
more difficult to assess. Boun
Oum and Phoumi will require
outside financial and logistic
support if they are to carry
out their plans.
Thus far, Souvanna has
reacted to the Boun Oum - Phoumi
challenge with moderation, ap-
parently still hoping for a
compromise. He has declared a
state of emergency throughout
the country, but has not yet
branded Phoumi and Boun Oum as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
CHIN A
rebels. He has also canceled
pending negotiations with the
Pathet Lao insurgents on the
ground that Phoumi's defection
has dangerously weakened his
bargaining position. The pre-
mier has flown to Luang Prabang
twice, but his failed to get
from the King any denunciation
of the Savannakhet revolution.
He has also been unsuccessful.
in luring Phoumi or Boun Oum
to Luang Prabang for fresh
peace talks under the royal
aegis.
In a talk with
Ambassador Brown on
13 September, the King
said that Souvanna
had "full powers" to
deal with the revolt
and that if he could
not settle it, he
should resign. The
King added that he
would then appoint
a new premier, prob-
ably Boun Oum. The
King made it clear
that he privately fa-
vored the Phoumi group
and hoped Souvanna
would resign. Souvanna
appeared close to do-
ing so on 141 Septem-
ber, but a Radio Vien-
tiane broadcast of
15 September quoting
the premier to the
effect that the King
had "given him a
fresh vote of confi-
dence" indicates he
may try to hold on.
The prospects
for a , compromise solu-
tion in Laos appear
to be diminishing.
Captain Kong Le still,
controls Vientiane,
and he would probably
reject any-resolution of the
crisis in favor of the Savanna-
khe.t', group. For their part,
Phoumi and Boun Oum seem to be
in no mood for any kind of com-
promise. They appear confi-
dent that Souvanna will be
forced to resign and seem pre-
pared to undertake the reduc -
tion of the Vientiane garrison
under Kong Le. Phoumi's re-
ported announcement that he
will "never" negotiate with
Souvanna would appear to close
the door to new peace talks.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
The Pathet Lao insurgents
are exploiting the division of
Laos' non-Communist elements.
They have increased military
pressure in Sam Neua, Phong
Saly, and Xieng Khouang prov-
inces in the north and Cham-
passak Province in the south.
In the propaganda realm,
Phoumils revolt has enabled the
Pathet Lao movement to range
itself on the side of legitimacy
in the current crisis. The
clandestine Pathet Lao radio
has called on all Laotians to
support the legal Souvanna
government and the coup d'etat
group of Kong Le in the strug-
gle against the "traitorous
and rebellious Phoumi clique."
Hanoi and Peiping have not
given events in Laos exceptional
attention in their propaganda.
North Vietnam has rebroadcast
Pathet Lao statements attacking
Phoumi and Boun Oum and voicing
willingness to cooperate with
Souvanna Phouma. Peiping has de-
voted very little space to the
subject, but on 14 September the
Chinese Communist radio did ac-
cuse Thailand of plotting to use
SEATO as a cover to partition
Laos. The paucity of independent
commentary in the Communist cap-
itals may be due to a desire to
picture the matter as purely an
internal Laotian affair and
forestall accusations of Chinese
or Vietnamese inter
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM.
15 September 1960
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ELECTIONS AT THE 15TH
A contest between the So-
viet bloc and the West over the
election of the president of
the 15th UN General Assembly is
in prospect when the assembly
opens on 20 September,
Late starter Thor Thors of
Iceland has campaigned exten-
sively, particularly among Latin
American members, despite strong
Western urging that he withdraw
his candidacy in favor of Fred-
erick Boland of Ireland--the
West's early choice. Although
Thors' chances of election are
slim, he has succeeded in si-
phoning off some support from
Boland, who faces a strong op-
ponent in Jiri Nosek of Czech-
oslovakia.
The Soviet bloc intensi-
fied its drive for high elective
UN offices two years ago with
the announced intention Of get-
ting a bloc delegate elected
as president of this assembly.
Nosek's early campaign, his
personal popularity at the UN,
and the fact that Eastern Europe
has never held the presidency
are strong points favoring his
UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY
candidacy. High-ranking offi-
cials of the UN secretariat,
moreover, believe that granting
a high elective UN office to
the Soviet bloc is a "matter of
equity," Prior, to the Congo
crisis, UN Secretary General
Hammarskjold indicated his pref-
erence for an Eastern European
for the presidency, which, by
common consent, goes to Europe
this year.
The generally capable Boland
has gained a large personal fol-
lowing in the relatively few
years Ireland has been a member
of the United Nations, and his
country's formal neutrality may
increase his potential appeal
among Asian-African bloc mem-
bers. As of 9 September, he
had approximately 35 firm commit-
ments of support--including two
or three Arab states and eight
Latin American--with 55 votes
needed for election.
The elections to fill two
of the three vacant seats on
the Security Council will prob-
ably be more or less routine, with
the UAR replacing Tunisia in the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
Middle East seat and Portugal
replacing Italy as Western
Europe's representative. Ar-
gentina's seat is being sought
by both Cuba and Chile, Chile
being the choice of the Latin
American bloc. The Cuban
candidacy, although unlikely
to gain much support beyond the
12 Communi6t votes, jeopardizes
the "right" to two of the six
elective seats on the council
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY CONFERENCE
The fourth general confer-
ence of the UN's International
Atomic Energy Agency, convening
in Vienna on the same day the
General Assembly opens in New
York, will probably be marked
by East-West conflicts on sev-
eral important issues, includ-
ing the perennial one of Chi-
nese representation.
The first problem confront-
ing the 20 September - 7 Octo-
ber meeting is the election of
a conference president. The
Bulgarian scientist Georgi
Nadzhakov, is expected to be
elected conference president
and a Westerner as chairman of
the Board of Governors. The
Soviet Union will probably make
a new attempt to gain consulta-
tive status for the World Fed-
eration of Trade Unions (WFTU)o
This effort to enhance the
WFTU's prestige was sidetracked
at last year's general confer-
ence, but a number of pro-West-
ern delegations seem cool to
the American view that the is-
sue should not be raised again.
PART II
which Latin America has enjoyed
since 1945. Lack of a single
agreed Latin American candi-
date probably will encourage
others to seek the seat, par-
ticularly Asian and African
members, who believe their
growing numbers are not ade-
quately reflected in Security
Council representation.
The bloc may find opportu-
nities for obstructionism and
propaganda on the nuclear weap-
ons question in the issue of
safeguards against diversion
of nuclear materials from
peaceful purposes to military
uses. A document concerning
safeguards, which Moscow has
stigmatized as a Western de-
vice for preventing underde-
veloped countries from gaining
a nuclear capability of their
own, has been provisionally
approved by the Western-con-
trolled Board of Governors.
The United Statee,,;pritain;
and Canada will press for a
procedural resolution which
simply gives it conference ap-
proval and returns it to the
board for implementation.
The West's problem will
be to keep discussions limited
to the document as a whole and
to forestall any attempts by
bloc or neutral delegates to
debate its seuarate Harts
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
SINO-SOVIET
Neither Moscow nor Peiping
has retreated from its basic
positions in the Sino-Soviet
dispute. At the North Vietnam-
ese party congress that closed
this week--the first important
international Communist forum
since the Bucharest conference
in June--the Soviet and Chinese
spokesmen each reiterated in
strong terms some of his par-
ty's central propositions in
the long controversy,
Li Fu-chun, the Chinese
delegate, emphasized "revision-
ism"--his country's description
of Soviet policy--as the main
danger to Communist unity. He
warned against using the "fight
against dogmatism"--dogmatism
being one of the charges leveled
at Peiping by Khrushchev--as a
"pretext to depart from the
fundamental theoretical stand
on Marxism-Leninism," Li was
the author of the emotional
article in the mid-August Red
Flag which attacked "modern
rev sionists," described the
Chinese as "real Marxist-Len-
inists," and warned that those
attempting to isolate China
would isolate themselves.
Presidium member X. A.
Mukhitdinov, the Soviet dele-
gate, in one speech extolled
Khrushchev as a "great Lenin-
ist" and insisted that his prop-
ositions on the noninevitability
of war are a continuation of
Lenin's policy. In a later
speech, he again struck hard
at the Chinese. After denounc-
ing Yugoslav revisionists, he
said
No less harmful to the
international Communist
movement is the manifesta-L
tion of dogmatism and sec-
tarianism. Parading loud
revolutionary phrases, hid-
ing behind isolated proposi-
tions in the works of the
founders of Marxism-Leninism,
...they try to sell their
erroneous views as Marxist-
Leninist truth and force
them on others..., They at
times oppose their narrow
national interests to the
international tasks of the
world proletariat or even
regard them as superior.
Their sectarian activities
in international organiza-
tions harm the democratic
forces of the world and the
interests of the socialist
camp.
As Mukhitdinov implies, the
Chinese have continued to press
their opposition to Soviet poli-
cies in international organiza-
tions, despite the fact that
such behavior was the immediate
cause of the Soviet denuncia-
tion of the Chinese party at
Bucharest. There now is evi-
dence that at the Third World
Conference of Teachers, held in
Conakry from 27 July to 1 Au-
gust, there were the same direct
clashes and sharp exchanges be-
tween the Soviet and Chinese
delegates that occurred at the
WFTU meeting in Peiping in early
June,
The Russian delegate at
Conakry, in a relatively moder-
ate speech, criticized the West,
including the United States, on
the grounds that Western educa-
tional systems were not as ad-
vanced as the "socialist" one,
but in general he stressed the
need for peaceful coexistence
and avoidance of war in the nu-
clear age. The Chinese, in a
completely political and very
violent speech, attacked the
United States 15 times by name
and much oftener by inference.
The Chinese delegate's speech,
following the Russtan's, was a
direct challenge to the Soviet
position.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
A meeting of theoreticians
from Communist parties of de-
veloped as well as underdevel-
oped countries is reportedly
set for Bucharest this month to
discuss the "national libera-
tion movement and the agrarian
question." Such a forum will
almost certainly consider the
differences between the Soviet
and Chinese views on the pace
and forms of the revolution in
underdeveloped countries. The
Chinese apparently boycotted
the last such meeting in Leipzig
last fall.
While party relations con-
tinue on the downgrade, govern-
mental relations between Moscow
and Peiping give a mixed impres-
sion. The Soviet Union this
year made a formal request that
a motion to seat Peiping in the
United Nations be'put on the
agenda for the forthcoming Gen-
eral Assembly
65-man Chinese song-and-dance
ensemble'left for the Soviet
Union.
Developments in ;Eastern::
Europe contiaue.,to :reflect: the
Sino-Sovd6t _:.dispute :.... The, 4lba-
nian. par.ty,changes 'were ' appar.;-.25x1
equivocation
ently the ' result; of: Soviet ,press
sure on Tirana to.. end
Both sides have also taken
some steps to reduce public
manifestations of the dispute.
The eight-week blackout of Mos-
cow home service commentary on
Chinese affairs was lifted on
5 September with a story of
progress in a Chinese steel
plant. On 1 September two un-
dated issues of Kitai,the Rus-
sian=language edition of the
Chinese pictorial biweekly, were
put on sale in Moscow, follow-
ing an apparent-suspension of
the magazine in July. The Chi-
nese, for their part, gave cov-
erage to Sino-Soviet friendship
meetings in commemoration of the
victory over Japan, including
a meeting held in Moscow on 2
September which the USSR did
not report. On 2 September a
Recent developments in the
Sino-Soviet dispute have led
Ambassador Thompson in Moscow
and the US consul general at
Hong Kong to conclude that
while the Russians and Chinese
may succeed in "plastering over
the cracks" in their relation-
ship, they will probably not
succeed in actually resolving
their differences. Thompson
does not expect a complete
break in relations--i.e., a
break at all levels--but he
does not exclude the possibility
that the two parties will sever
relations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
BERLIN SITUATION
The East German Government
on 8 September announced that
all West German. citizens must
obtain special permits to enter
East Berlin, thereby forcing
them to meet the same require-
ments to go to East Berlin as
to East Germany. The move is
a further step toward incor-
porating the Soviet sector of
the city into East Germany and
gives the sector border the
character of an East German
frontier. By making an East
German law directly appli-
cable to East Berlin, the
East German regime not only by-
passed the normal procedures
under which East Berlin munic-
ipal authorities have re-en
acted any legislation applying
to the Soviet sector of Berlin
but it also clearly violated
four-power agreements guarantee-
ing freedom of movement within
the city.
On the same day, party
boss Ulbricht revealed his plan
for a phased disarmament of
Germany in a memorandum to the
United Nations. This plan is
a rehash of previous proposals
and contains provisions for
signing a peace treaty with
the "two German states," with-
drawal of Western troops from
West Berlin, and the transfor-
mation of West Berlin into
a demilitarized free city at the
expiration of the first phase
in 1961.
Ulbricht warned. that
Khrushchev's pledge not to take
unilateral steps to`change the
status quo in Berlin before
making another attempt at nego-
tiations does not mean that West
Germans and West Berliners
should be permitted to "aggra-
vate the anomalous situation
in West Berlin." He intimated
that his government will con-
tinue attempts to weaken West
Berlin's ties -.with West
Germany.
The regime has sent a
letter to Secretary General
Hammarskjold requesting per-
mission for East German repre-
spntatives--presumably includ-
ing Ulbricht as new head of
state--to present their views
on the German and Berlin ques-
tions.to the General Assembly.
This 'equest is obviously in-
tended to bolster East German
Claims to sovereignty and
equality with West Germany--
vhich, although not a 'UN
member, maintains observers
in New York.
The East German statement
of 13 September that the regime
will refuse to recognize West
German passports issued to West
Berliners who intend to travel
abroad--i.e., to bloc countries
--is designed to emphasize the
East German contention that West
Berlin is not a part of West
Germany but is a separate legal
entity, In practice, the new
regulation probably will cause
few 'difficulties, since the East
Germans are continuing--at least
for the time being--to accept
West Berlin identity documents
issued by West Berlin author-
ities in lieu of passports. The
announcement states that these
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15'September 1960
identity cards will also be ac-
cepted from West Berliners trav-
eling between the city and West
Germany.
The announcement does not
state whether West Berliners will
be required to obtain East German
permits to visit East Berlin, as
they are required to do to visit
East Germany; the regime's an-
nouncement of 9 September impos-
ing restrictions on West German
travel to East Berlin expressly
excepted West Berliners. It
appears that for the time being
there will be no attempt to
force West Berliners to acknowl-
edge. East German "sovereignty"
over East Berlin by accepting
special documentation.
Western Reaction
West German and West Berlin
officials view the East German
harassment as the beginning of
a new series of probing actions
against West Berlin's ties with
West Germany.
The Bonn government--through
Vice Chancellor Erhard--has so
far merely called on German busi-
nessmen not to subject themselves
to the new East German entry re-
quirements and to avoid travel
to East Germany as long as the
restrictions continue. Bonn is
still unwilling to suspend in-
terzonal trade with East Ger-
many.
There are fears in Bonn and
in industrial circles that East
Germany might retaliate against an
embargo of trade with East Ger-
many by cutting off West Berlin's
supply lines to West Germany,
over which more than one and a
half billion dollars" worth of
goods were brought to the city
in 1959. These shipments dwarf
West German exports to East
Germany, which amounted to less
than 2 percent of West Germany's
total exports during the last
three years, reaching a peak
value in 1959 of $256, 800,000: .
American Ambassador Dowling
in Bonn feels that the Western
Allies should urge Bonn to cut
interzonal trade, and fears
that the.'principal Allied
WEST GERMAN TRADE
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
IMPORTSI
EXPORTS
WW WITH EAST GERMANY
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1
W
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
counteraction thus far taken--
the refusal of travel permits to
selected categories of East Ger-
mans--is not likely to have
much effect on the Ulbricht
regime.
Allied officials have ex-
pressed concern over Mayor
Brandt's plans to go ahead with
establishment of a 4,000-man
EAST GERMAN REFUGEE FLOW CONTINUES DESPITE CONTROL MEASURES
The East German populace
continues to "vote with its
feet" against the Ulbricht re-
gime. In the week ending 6
September, more than 3,000 ref-
ugees escaped to West Berlin,
despite a five-day near-blockade
by East German authorities
against travel to Berlin, long
the principal escape hatch from
East Germany. The total for the
previous week had been more than
4,500.
Monthly figures have risen
steadily, both absolutely and
in comparison with last year.
Almost 21,500 refugees escaped
to the West in August of this
year, compared with only 13,610
in August 1959, according to the
West German Ministry of Refu-
gees. Of the 21,500, more than
18,000 fled to West Berlin. This
exceeds the flow of 16,189 in
May in the wake of the forced
collectivization and--is far above
the 10,857 who fled to West Ber-
lin following the uprising in
June 1953.
The total of flights to
West Germany and West Berlin was
almost identical with that of
21,595 in August 1958, when mass
flights of intellectuals were at
their height. During the first
eight months of 1960 more than
126,500 persons applied for refu-
gee status in West Germany and
West Berlin, compared with ap-
proximately 98,000 during the
corresponding period in 1959.
The escapees, more than half
of whom belong to the labor
force, include large numbers of
farmers, technicians, and
WEEK ENDING
5 JAN
12 JAN
19 JAN:
26 JAN
2 FEB
9 FEE
16 FEB
23 FEB
1 MAR
8 MAR
15 MAR
22 MAR
29 MAR
5 APR
12 APR
19 APR
26 APR
3 MAY
10 MAY
17 MAY
24 MAY
31 MAY
7 JUN
14 JUN
21 JUN
21 JUN
5 JUL
12 JUL
19 JUL
26 JUL
2 AUG
9 AUG
76 AUG
23 AUG
30 AUG
6 SEPT
REFUGEES ESCAPING TO WEST BERLIN
1080 2080 3000 4000 5000
1000 2000 3000 9000 5000
15 SEPTEMBER 1960
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auxiliary police force by in-
itiating training of 115 members
of the regular police force to
act as instructors. Although
the new force would be used
primarily for static guard
duties, it would be available to 25X1
support the regular 13,500-man
police force in time of
and civil disturbance.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
NUMBER APPLYING FOR REFUGEE TATUS
TO WEST GERMANY AND WEST BERLIN
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
0 100,000 200,000 300,000 350,000
FIGURES ON APPLICANTS WERE FIRST KEPT BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 1949.
THE FIGURE FOR THE LAST FOUR MONTHS OF 1949 WAS 59,245.
00912 3B 15 SEPTEMBER 1960
professional men, whose services
are badly needed by the Ulbricht
regime. Indications point to a
total considerably in excess of
last year's 144,000, despite in-
tensified East German security
precautions.
Reflecting increased inter-
national tension and unsettled
conditions in East Germany, the
number of persons returning from
West to East Germany or drawn
there by hope of better jobs has
fallen this year in comparison
with 1959. Refugees reaching
West Berlin in July who had pre-
viously resettled from West to
East Germany told British author-
ities in Berlin that there was
a sharp drop in the number of
individuals asking for, admission
this spring and that East German
officials were being much more
careful in their security proc-
essing of such individuals.
Whereas last year the East
Germans frequently boasted of
the high return flow, this year
they have been reticent. Their
claim that 26,000 persons asked
for "asylum" during the first
six months contrasts with the
claimed figure of 62,000 for the
whole of 1959.
The East Germans are likely
to continue their harassment of
West Berlin, with the aim of
reducing its importance as an
escape route, and probably will
also continue to enforce special
controls to limit travel by East
Germans to East Berlin. Secu-
rity precautions on the East -
West German frontier are already
at a high point and are likely
to be maintained at this level.
The strict measures now in
effect, however, may well cause
many East Germans to try to es-
cape at this time if possible,
out of fear that all es-
cape routes may soon be
closed.
ten locations around Berlin, one 25X1
adjacent to a missile launch
site under construction near
Berlin by early 1961 prob- 1 German Army is under way at some
ably will be ringed with sur-
face-to-air missile (SAM) sites.
The complex apparently will con-
tain at least eight launch sites,
each with local logistic support
facilities, and may be connected
to two central support facili-
ties. The local support facili-
ties are located about 25 miles
from the center of the city and
are 16 to 22 miles apart.
construction work or the East
SECRET
25X1
Staunch and two central sup-
port facilities.
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SECRET
15 September 1960
urveying, possibly for a
aunch site, at another of
the ten locations,
Since a o these
projects were reported under
way during the summer of 1960,
completion is possible during
the first quarter of 1961.
All evidence indicates that
the Glau and Jueterbog sites are
manned by Soviet personnel,
There are indications, however,
that the East Germans themselves
with eventually participate in
SAM operations. These include
participation of the East German
Army in the construction of the
SAM launch site at Rauen and in
the survey for another possible
launch site, the extension of
contracts for work on these sites
to civilian concerns by the East
0 Construction project
-- Roilrood
Figures indicate project number
MILES 50
15 SEPTEMBER 1960
31332
SECRET
1
Hamburg
Possible Missile-Associated Construction Projects
v
EAST GERMANY f
dyrHeml Cad!
rfelde
Beets O 1
106
Lodeburg
100
101
BERLIN
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 8UNMRY
15 September 1960
German Army, the reported es-
tablishment at Pinnow--also near
Berlin but outside the SAM com-
plex--of an East German anti-
aircraft artillery unit possibly
equipped with missiles, and re- 25X1
ports of possible SAM training
of East German Army personnel.
MOSCOW-TO-HELSINKI COMMUNICATIONS CABLE
A high-capacity, under-
ground hardened coaxial cable
is being .".installed between Fin-
land and the USSR. When com-
pleted; the cable will extend
from Moscow via Leningrad and
intermediate points in Finland
to Helsinki and will provide a
circuit capacity double that
needed for envisioned civil re-
Finland has a radar net-
work of rather low technical
level which could, however,
augment the Soviet air-defense
system. According to the
Finnish-Soviet mutual assistance
Coaxial Cable Lines in the USSR and Finland -- 1960
OSLO
ampere I~ Lappee lu'ta
Hameenlinn Lahti
- P`
SWEDEN - I~ hor
a y Turku it oL o
??.y~_? ? ?"~ EL~SINKI 0oo a.r Lenningrad
RAL i'!G
tiF:1
Novgorod
quirements. The installation
of the cable may lead to closer
political, economic, and cul-
tural cooperat o between the
two countries.
in operation
----under construction
........ planned
Tomel
Kiev
~g
pact concluded in
1947, Finland might
be obliged to pass
such data to the So-
viet Union in the
event Moscow consider-
ed itself threatened
with an attack via
Finland.
Three years ago
the Russians made the
first proposal for an
underground cable to
connect Leningrad and
Helsinki, and final
agreement was reached
in early 1960. Com-
pletion of the line
is scheduled for 1962,
with both countries
financing their own
portion of the work
and providing their
own equipment. Finland
has placed orders with
Western firms for 25X1
coaxial cable and
carrier equipment
which reportedly will be used
on their portion of the circuit.
Finland already has two
four-tube coaxial cables on
separate routes from Helsinki
to Kouvala. Beginning in Sep-
tember 1960, one cable with a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
capacity of 1,920 telephone
channels will be extended to
Vyborg in the USSR.
The Finnish section will
probably be laid in a manner
similar to the recently complet-
ed cable out of Moscow to Kiev
and the extension under con-
struction from Moscow to Vyborg.
This type of cable, laid under-
ground about 100 feet from the
edge of the highway, has unique,
underground repeater stations
approximately four miles apart.
This mode of underground con-
struction, also employed in the
US and elsewhere, is more costly
than wire and overhead cable
lines or high-capacity microwave
radio relay lines, but offers
greater protection against
natural and man-made'dlamage,
including bomb blast.
The stated reason for the
new coaxial cable to Helsinki
is to increase telephone service
between'the USSR and Finland.
However, there are no known
plans for increases in either
telephone or television services
which would require such a large
number of channels. Present
plans call for only 960 channels
to be used for civil require-
ments; this would leave a sur-
plus of 960 channels which could
be used for military pur- 25X1
poses, including the trans-
mittal of air-defense data.
ALBANIAN PARTY SHUFFLE, SETS STAGE FOR GREATER SUPPORT OF MOSCOW
The ouster of a leading
Albanian Communist ideologist--
announced on 9 September--and
the elevation to the party sec-
retariat of an agitprop special-
ist suggest that the regime is
preparing to revamp its equivo-
cal propaganda line on the basic
issues in the Sino-Soviet con-
troversy. Politburo member and
party secretary Liri Belishova,
the fifth-ranking party leader,
was removed from her party posi-
tions by a central committee
plenum for committing "grave
errors in the party line.,, A
report on her activities was made
by the politburo and delivered
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU Ry
15 September 1960
to the central committee by
politburo member Rita Marko,
who returned a few months ago
from extensive training in the
USSR, and probably represented
the Soviet interest in the af-
fair.
The central committee also
ousted from party membership
the head of the Central Audit-
ing Commission for "activities
hostile to the party." No elu-
cidation on the charges was
made in the central committee's
communiqud, nor has there been
any further comment by the
regime.
in a plenary session on
13 July,
Albanian propaganda, pre-
sumably in the face of Soviet
pressure, has subsequently made
limited adjustments, subscribed
in general terms to "peaceful
coexistence," and acknowledged
the ,leading role of the USSR,"
but it has not followed the
other East European satellites
in criticizing "dogmatism."
While Belishova was one
of three important regime of-
ficials to visit China this
summer and has, in the past,
made statements favorable to
Long-standing Albanian
preference. for the Chinese
Communist position on certain
issues in the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute was evident at the Rumanian
party congress in June. Party
boss Enver Hoxha was the only
East European party leader who
did not attend, and the chief
Albanian delegate, politburo
member Hysni Kapo, was the only
East European who failed spe-
cifically to endorse Khrushchev's
speech and the only one who
favored the Chinese position on
war and the nature of the im-
perialist 'threat, The Alba-
nian central :committee later
endorsed Kapo'8 statements
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
the Chinese, it is unlikely that
she alone was responsible for
the Albanian positions. It is
true that her main responsibility
was for ideology, but all the
leaders at one time or another
have been committed to a hard-
line, Chinese type of outlook.
Use of her as a scapegoat for
what is presumably a="collective
error" suggests that the regime
leaders are preparing to revamp
the agitprop apparatus and to
move into closer conformity with
Moscow's line.
Ramiz Alija, 34-year-old
politburo candidate member and
propaganda specialist who is
considered to be pro-Soviet,
was elected by the plenum to
the party secretariat, ap-
parently replacing Belisho-
va.
NORTH VIETNAM HOLDS
Two themes dominated the
sessions of North Vietnam's
third party congress, which met
in Hanoi, from 5 to 10 Septem-
ber: how best to modernize and
industrialize the country in
accordance with Communist prin-
ciples and how to reunify Viet-
nam. Hanoi plans to solve the
latter problem by forming a
coalition government with a
"democratic" southern regime
once President Diem has been
overthrown.
Prior to this congress,
the Lao Dong party had never
issued a list of its central
committee members, although 31
individuals had been identified
as members. Eleven of these
also sat on the politburo and
The continued espousal of
pro-Chinese views despite Soviet
1,nst,rii,c:t:i.on,s to 'the contrary h'".
probably given rise to faction-
=al:ism among the party leaders,
and the Belishova ouster may be
the first indication.; that the
position of other tops: leaders
will be challenged in coming
months. While a:purge of Hoxhq~,
who has led the party since 1943,
is not likely, he will probably
be under pressure to "clean up"
his party prior to the scheduled
fourth party congress in November.
The removal of Belishova
will assist other East European
party leaders in keeping dogmatic
elements repressed in their own 25X1
parties. These elements, now in
the background, could weaken satel-
lite support for Moscow at some
future time.
THIRD PARTY CONGRESS
six on the secretariat. The
congress elected 43 persons to
the central committee plus 28
alternates, but all members of
the previous central committee
and politburo retained their
positions, including Minister
of National Defense Vo Nguyen
Giap, who has been out of the
public view much of the last
six months. Two alternates,.
the minister of : public secu;'ity
and the .army chief of:. staf f ,
were added to:::the.:11-man. po4.it-
buro.
Changes were also made in
the party secretariat and the
order of ::rprecedence : ;with the
politburo,,..- Party !Chairman Ho
Chi. Minh relinquished his con-
currentpost of secretary.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
general; the position was re-
titled "first secretary" and
conferred' on Le Duan, who until
1957 was responsible for direct-
ing subversion in South Vietnam
and thus was out of the lime-
light. Two of the new individ-
uals named to the party secre-
tariat served with Le Duan in
South Vietnam: Pham Hung, who
in July was given over-all con-
trol of the government's agri-
cultural programs, and Le Duc
Tho, who now may be in charge
of party organization. They are
the only two to be elevated in
the politburo order of prece-
dence.
Thus, a "southern clique"
may exist within the Lao Dopg
party, which has been increas-
ing its power since early 1958.
The power held by this clique
may do much to explain Hanoi's
"activist" policy toward South
Vietnam--a policy which excludes
overt invasion of the south but
implies that almost every other
tactic to achieve reunification
is legitimate.
Duan, apparently second in
power to Ho, noted that "the
balance of forces, ..is gradually
changing in favor of a revolution"
in South Vietnam. Hanoi has
dropped its customary formulation
that "reunification will be a
long, arduous, and complicated
task" and now states that the
"immediate task" is to overthrow
Diem and for a "democratic coa-
lition government" with- which,
the north can do business.
Hanoi's Five-Year Plan for
1961-65 as outlined by Le Duan
indicates that Hanoi will hence-
forth pursue a long-range eco-
nomic program of industrial-
ization, with emphasis on the
development of heavy industry.
This formulation is more in line
with normal Communist practice
than was Hanoi's past practice
of emphasizing agriculture.
However, the economic realities
of North Vietnam's limited in-
dustrial base, the serious
shortage of technical and mana-
gerial skills, and the basic
importance of agriculture in
the economy will keep the regime
from moving rapidly toward its
goal of industrialization.
No specific plan targets
for individual commodities have
been released, but the scope of
the regime's ambitions is indi-
cated by the general goal of in-
creasing the value of industrial
production by 20 percent a year
and that of agricultural pro-
duction by 10 percent a year
during the plan.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
Another subject with which
the congress dealt at length
was the "peasant problem"--a
euphemism for continued peasant
opposition to cooperativization.
The party has committed itself
to the "basic completion"--i.e.,
75 percent--of agricultural co-
operativization by the end of
the year. At a rural cadres
conference held earlier this
summer it was noted that the
program was lagging behind,
with only 55 percent of peasant
households in cooperatives,
just 10 percent more thafi at
the end of 1959.
Cooperativization remains
the most explosive issue facing
the regime. Concerted opposi-
tion of a stubborn peasantry
forced the regime to back down
on socialization in 1956 when
the "correction of errors" pro-
gram was instituted, and earlier
this year the original Three-
Year Plan (1958-60) goal of
100 percent of peasant house-
holds in cooperatives was re-
vised downward to 75 percent in
the face of peasant opposition.
The new party statutes
approved by the congress incor-
porate more stringent qualifi-
cations for party membership.
Hanoi conducted its first major
party membership campaign since
the 1954 cease-fire early this
year when it increased the mem-
bership 25 percent, bringing the
total to 500,000. In reviewing
the qualifications of its 100,000
new members, the party now may
feel that not enough care was
taken in their selection, and,
by strengthening the qualifi-
cations for membership, it may
hope to avoid similar laxity in
Guinea's economic ties with
the Sino-Soviet bloc have been
strengthened further as a re-
sult of President Sekou Tourd's
current visit to several bloc
countries. In addition, Tourd,
who claims to follow a policy
of "positive neutrality," ap-,
pears to have moved toward clos-
er propaganda and ideological
alignment with the Communist
world.
In Moscow, his first for-
mal stop on a three-week trip
which also included state visits
to Ulan Bator, Peiping, and
Hanoi, Tourd secured a Soviet
commitment to participate in
Guinea's proposed Konkourd hydro-
electric project. As developed
by French planners before Guinea
became independent in 1958,
this scheme envisaged the con-
struction on the Konkourd River
of a dam and power plant capable
of furnishing up to 3.2 billion
kilowatt-hours of cheap elec-
tricity a year.
The energy would be used
primarily to establish an alu-
minum'industry based on Guinea's
large bauxite deposits, some of
which are already being exploited
by private Western interests.
The project, for which the Tourd
regime has been actively solicit-
ing foreign support since last
spring, has highest priority in
the Three-Year Plan for economic
development launched by Guinea
in July.
Although the joint Soviet-
Guinean communiqud of 8 Septem-
ber did not announce the extent
of the Soviet commitment to
"the planned complex of projects
on the Konkourd River," Moscow
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SIMMAARy
15 September 1960
presumably is prepared to make
additional long-term credits
available to Conakry. The USSR'
present economic aid program in
Guinea is covered by a $35,000,-
000 credit extended in August
1959.
For his part, Toure abetted
Soviet policy objectives by com-
mitting himself to a personal
appearance at the forthcoming
UN General Assembly session, as
well as by formally endorsing
the Soviet propaganda line on
the nonpolitical character of
the USSR's African activities
and on the cause--"imperialist
aggression"--of the Congo crisis.
Moreover, the Soviet press quoted
the Guinean leader as having
acknowledged in a Kremlin speech
that "progress" made by the bloc
was "decisive in the liberation
of African peoples"--a point
Moscow has been attempting to
make in its propaganda to under-
developed countries.
Tourd also reportedly called
on newly independent African
countries to carry on "class
warfare," a concept which Toure,
while Marxist-trained, has here-
tofore maintained was not appli-
cable to Africa in its present
stage of development. During a
brief stop at Budapest airport
en route to Moscow, Toure stated
that Guinean-Hungarian relations--
which have not yet been estab-
lished on a formal basis--rested
on an "affinity of political
orientation."
In; Peiping the Chinese
marked the visit of Tourd-=the
first head of an African state
to come to Communist China--by
announcing an agreement provid-
ing for the extension to Guinea
over the next three years of a
$25,000,000 interest-free cre d-
it'... This first large--scale
economic aid arrangement to be
concluded by the Chinese with
any country in Black Africa
points up the importance Peiping
attaches to its intense competi-
tion with Taipei for recognition
in that area. Presumably the
agreement will bring in addi-
tional Chinese personnel to join
the approximately 60 "agricul-
turalists" who have been working
on rice cultivation projects in
Guinea since last spring. In
addition, a friendship treaty
was signed.
Tourd's trip has also pro-
duced new five-year. trade pacts
with both the USSR and Communist
China. The agreement with Pei-
ping--Guinea's first with that
regime--calls for an annual ex-
change of almost $10,000,000
worth of goods, a level which,
if reached, would boost Guinea's
presently negligible trade with
the Chinese to perhaps 10 per-
cent of its total annual foreign
trade. In any event, the new
trade pacts are likely to accel-
erate the diversion from the
West to the bloc of the. bulk of
Guinea's foreign trade. Based
largely on barter arrangements,
this new pattern of trade is
resulting in the mortgaging to
bloc countries of future as well
as current Guinean exports.
USSR AND IRAN MAKING NEW EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS
Goth the USSR and Iran dire
making new moves to relieve the
long-standing tension in their
relations. Soviet Ambassador
Pegov returned to his post in
Tehran on 14 September after a
"diplomatic" absence of about
nine months. His return there
last September, after a similar
extended absence, coincided with
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. CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
Soviet efforts to induce the
Shah, who had offered to ex-
clude foreign missile bases
from Iranian soil, to expand
his proposed guarantee to ex-
clude. foreign military bases of
all types. Despite many sub-
sequent diplomatic exchanges
involving leading figures on
both sides, the Shah continued
to resist the Soviet demands.
The USSR has also modi-
fied its propaganda line on Iran,
as it did during the brief thaw
in Soviet-Iranian relations in
September 1959. Although the
"National Voice of Iran"--a
clandestine station in the''So-
viet Caucasus--and the Tudeh
(Communist) party broadcasts
from East Berlin continue to
criticize the Shah and Iran's
policies, Radio Moscow on 31
August halted its attacks on the
Iranian ruler and began to blame
ousted Prime Minister Egbal--
the Shah's scapegoat for the
election fiasco--for all dif-
ferences with Iran.
Soviet leaders, who have
alternated pressure moves with
blandishments in the hope of
undercutting Iran's close po-
litical cooperation and military
defense ties with Western powers,
probably have been encouraged
by developments in Tehran. The
Shah noted at his 27 August
press conference--in which he
precipitated the resignation of
the stanchly anti-Communist Eqbal
as prime minister by criticizing
the conduct of the elections--
that Iran was ready to have
friendly relations with the
USSR and would give serious con-
sideration to Soviet aid offers.
Although the Iranian ruler
has in the past made similar
statements for the record, the
quick endorsement by most Tehran
newspapers may have been viewed
in Moscow as a sign that the
Shah--who is gravely concerned
over the future of Iran and his
regime--is again read to try
to better relations.
The new prime minister,
Sharif Emami, told Ambassador
Wailes on 4 September that'the
immediate task of his govern-
ment in the foreign policy
field is to improve relations
with Moscow, but he asserted
that this would not be done at
the expense of Iran's ties with
the West. As a step in this
direction, Tehran on 9: September
ceased its counterpropaganda
aimed at blunting the Communist
bloc's radio attacks on the
Shah and Iran's foreign a
domestic policies.
INDONESIA
The confrontation of Pres-
ident Sukarno and the Indonesi-
an Army over the Communist is-
stie appears to have been once
more postponed by President Su-
karno's ban, issued on 13 Sep-
tember, on the activities of
all political parties. He will.
decide before 30 November which
parties may function legally
thereafter.
The ban reportedly was
drafted by the army at Sukarno's
request and serves as a compro-
mise solution to the problem
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
posed by the army last month in
proscribing Communist activity
in three military commands. The
army's move was a direct chal-
lenge to Sukarno, who has per-
sistently conciliated the Com-
munists and who, on 17 August,
had dissolved the anti-Communist
Masjumi and Socialist parties.
The ban frees Sukarno from the
necessity of choosing between
the army and the Communists and
obviates an army decision on
whether to oppose Sukarno fur-
therby extending its anti-Commu-
nist ban to other areas,
The army, however, continues to
be concerned over President Su-
karno's insistence on forging
a united political effort in In-
donesia with considerable reli-
ance on the Communists.
Sukarno's ban will permit him
to proceed more easily with his Na-
tional Front,a mass organization
in which he expects all parties
and groups to cooperate. He in-
stalled the 63-member central board
of the National Front on 8 Sep-
tember; at least 18 of its members
are susceptible to Communist di-
rection. Should the front become
a viable organization, it could
be a considerable asset to the
Communists by providing them a
protected government organization
within which to work.
Colonel Basuki, a high-rank-
ing officer in the office adminis-
tering Indonesia's martial law,
says that among the army's diffi-
culties with Sukarno are the Tat-
ter's closest advisers, These in-
clude Ruslan Abdulgani who, as
vice chairman of the Supreme Ad-
visory Council, is very close to
the President, is antiarmy, and
tries to manipulate government
activities and issues so that they
are detrimental to army interests.
The so-called palace. clique con- 25X1
been unsuccessful.
sists mostly of leftists, and army
efforts to break up this group have
South Korean Prime Minister
Chang Myon and his opponents, the
majority Democratic party, agreed
on 12 September to a compromise
cabinet designed to give Chang
a working majority in the Na-
tional Assembly. The party has
over two thirds of the 233 seats
in the powerful House of Repre-
sentatives, but these are about
evenly divided between support-
ers and opponents of the prime
minister" Although the new cab-
inet appears to strengthen Chang's
position for the time being by
drawing his opponents into shar-
ing responsibility for government
policy, the terms of the compro-
mise will make it easy for the
anti-Chang factionists to func-
tion as a de facto opposition
bloc in future tests of strength.
The balance of power be-
tween the Democratic factions
has rested with about 40 inde-
pendent and minor party legisla-
tors. On 7 September four of
Chang's ministers submitted
their resignations to open the
way for the formation of a cabi-
net based on broader, party
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
representation. After consider-
able negotiation, the anti-Chang
faction agreed to enter the cab-
inet,
opponent for the premiership,
Kim To-yun. None of the four is
among the top ten of the oppb
sition faction.
The new cabinet is made up
of seven Chang supporters, four
adherents of and one defector
from the opposition faction,
and two independents. The Com-
munications Ministry post, as-
signed to the anti-Chang faction,
has not yet been filled. The
four opposition faction ministers
named are Defense Minister Kwon
Chong-ton, Reconstruction Min-
ister Kim U-pyong, Transportation
Minister Pak Hae-cbong, and
Health and Social Affairs Minis-
ter_ Na Yong-kyun. At least
three of these men are believed
to oppose an open party split,
and three of them reportedly
had been selected for possible
cabinet positions under Chang's
The opposition faction ex-
acted--as the price of its partic-
ipation in the cabinet--Chang's
recognition of it as an independ-
ent "negotiating group" in the
legislature with the right to re-
call its men from the cabinet at
any time. However, while the an-
ti-Chang faction retains a strong
bargaining position, it is likely
to be restrained at least for the
time being by current public op-
position to a party split, by its
lack of a working majority in the
legislature, and, most important-
ly, by the likelihood that a no-
confidence vote would lead to 25X1
dissolution of the lower
house and new elections.
CONGO REPERCUSSIONS ON THE BELGIAN DOMESTIC SCENE
The new Belgian coalition
cabinet, recently announced by
Premier Eyskens in response to
public criticism of the govern-
ment's Congo policy, contains
no new influential figures, and
may not last through the winter.
No major changes in defense and
foreign policies are likely;
Eyskens' austerity economic
program, however, involves de-
fense cuts ranging between 7
and 13 percent.
Three newly appointed
ministers--two Social Christians
and one Liberal--are to sit as
a kind of supercabinet with the
premier, Foreign Minister Wigny,
and possibly Defense Minister
Gilson to handle major policy
questions--primarily Eyskens'
proposed new program of social
progress through "economic ex-
pansion based on financial ie-
form:.
The austerity program is
basically aimed at offsetting
economic losses as a result of
the Congo situation. The Congo
was estimated last spring to
contribute about 6 percent of
Belgium's gross national prod-
uct of $9.5 billion. The new
program calls for a reduction
of all current expenditures
in the 1961 extraordinary budg-
et and for $120,000,000 in new
taxes. Cuts amounting to
$200,000,000 are to be made in
national defense, education,
and social benefits such as
unemployment and sickness in-
surance and pensions.
Defense cuts, variously
reported as ranging from $30,-
000,000 to $50,000,000--or 7
to 13 percent of the proposed
defense budget for 1961--would
be made by cutting out some
25,000 military and civilian
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'CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
positions in the armed forces
and by economies in maintaining
Belgian troops in West Germany.
The defense minister insists,
however, that Belgium will carry
out contracts for building F-104G
fighter planes, provided the
United States contributes finan-
cial support. The American Em-
bassy in Brussels foresees a
continuation of the drift away
from active participation in
NATO.
Eyskens' program may en-
counter a stormy reception when
presented to Parliament on 27
September. Business interests
are opposed to tax increases,
while the Socialists and Catholic
labor groups are hostile to
measures to reduce social bene-
fits. The government will also
be hard put to convince public
opinion that it intends to give
a "new look" to its African
policy, in view of the appoint-
ment of Count d'Aspremont Lynden
as minister of African affairs.
His choice is attributed to
pressure from the King, and his
public association recently with
Katanga Province as chief of the
Belgian technical mission there
may make it difficult for Belgium
to improve its position with the
independent African states.
EL SALVADOR'S GOVERNMENT SHAKEN BY LEFTIST ATTACKS
The moderately progressive
regime of Salvadoran President
Lemus has been seriously shaken
by persistent attacks from left-
ist student and labor elements,
many of whom are pro-Communist
and pro-Castro. The small and
densely populated country is
particularly vulnerable to left-
ist agitation because of the
unusually wide economic gap
between the peasants and the
few wealthy landowning families
After a student and labor
demonstration on 2 September
in which one youth was killed
and many people were seriously
injured' as a result of police
action, Lemus on 5 September
decreed a 30-day state of siege--
El Salvador's first since 1952.
The President, himself a mili-
tary man, took this action
under pressure from officers
of the armed forces
The state of siege, al-
though removing the immediate
threat to the administration
from the military, did not halt
leftists from exploiting the
strong public indignation over
the security police's indis-
criminate use of force in the
2 September disorders. New dis-
orders were averted when bus-
iness and community leaders,
including the the archbishop of
San Salvador, held separate
conciliatory meetings with
student leaders and the Presi-
dent immediately prior to the
leftist demonstration of 9
.September, which then, was carried
out peacefully. Communists and
pro-Castro elements, however,
will probhbly be quick to en-
courage new demonstrations as
opportunity offers in an attempt
to undermine the government.
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15 September 1960
The US Embassy has ex-
pressed the belief that most
responsible leaders recognize
the necessity to support the
President through the current
crisis. Nevertheless, the gen-
eral popularity Lemus enjoyed
at the time of his election in
1956 has been on the decline
for almost a year, and the Pres-
ident?:s increasingly aloof
manner has even alienated many
of his working associates, His
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hesitance in taking resolute
action to curb Communist and pro-
Castro subversive activity has
prompted many moderate and con-
servative elements to look to
his immediate predecessor, ex
President Osorio, for more ef-
fective leadership. Osorio
probably would be reluctant to
promote a coup against Lemus,
but his less scrupulous follow- 25X1
ers might seek to use future
leftist disorders as an excuse
to seize power themselves.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
CHINESE REPRESENTATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS
Peiping's claim to China's for substantive consideration
;UN:~set.t'is+expeotdd'.to` be=ptit of the issue. New Delhi's bor
off once more through the pro- der troubles with Peipip.g are
cedural device of the annual probably the reason for this de-
moratorium at this year's UN cision. However, on 30 August
General Assembly, which opens on the Indian deputy foreign min-
20 September. The newly sov- ister publicly reaffirmed his
ereign African states, although government's conviction that
assocating Taipei with "colo- Communist China must be admitted
nial powers," may support it to the UN. The USSR early this
if admitted to the UN before month requested inscription of
the expected moratorium vote. the item.
The prospect of maintaining
this device beyond 1961, how- 15th,General Assembly
ever, is increasingly uncertain.
The General As-
sembly at each of its
past nine sessions has
voted a moratorium on
consideration of the
Of the 82 members of the
UN, 31 recognize Peiping--most
MORATORIUM ON CHINESE UN REPRESENTATION
Chinese representation 1951 37
question. This pro- 1952 42
cedural device for de- 1953 44
laying a decision re- 1954 43
quires only a simple 1955 42
majority of votes. Any 1956 47
vote on substance, 1957 48
such as an ouster of 1958 44
Taipei or admittance 1959 44
of Peiping, requires 009122
a two-thirds majori-
ty to pass; neither government
seems to have sufficient support
at this time.
For the first five years,
Nationalist China commanded a
majority of over two thirds in
favor of the moratorium. How-
ever, since the admission of
22 new members, mostly from
Asia and Africa, it has mus-
tered only a simple majority.
This fact has encouraged the
nations which advocate Peiping's
admission to insist on substan-
tive discussion of the Chinese
representation question.
For the first time since
1956, India decided a-ga~ixzs.t in-
troducing an agenda it.eml calling
VOTES OF UN MEMBERS
VOTES NOT TOTAL
AGAINST ABSTENTIONS RECORDED MEMBERSHIP
11 4
7 11
10 2
11 6
12 6
24 8
27 6
28. 9
29 9
60
60
60
60
60
79
82
81
82
15 SEPTEMBER 1960
recently Guinea and Cuba. Forty-
three recognize Taipei, and
five acknowledge neither gov-
ernment; the remaining three
UN members are Nationalist Chi-
na and the two constituent re-
publics of the USSR which have
UN membership.
Partly as a result of good-
will missions to Africa, includ-
ing private trade missions and
technical training offers, Na-
tionalist China has picked up
considerable support from newly
independent African nations.
The Nationalists have estab-
lished diplomatic relations this
year with Cameroun, Togo, and
the Malagasy Republic and are
negotiating with nine other
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU
15 September 1960
Recognition of China by UN Members
and new African states not yet members
CANADA
UNITED
STATES
Recognizes Nationalist China
(Intended recognition announced
cuea R 2September 1960
1VENEZUELA
cCOLOM
PERU BRAZIL
nBO ~~via~
1 -RA1
- EHILE~ ~.~j
rR
'URUGUAY
ARGENTINA
D Recognizes neither
15 SEPTEMBER 1960
former French territories--Mali,
Congo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger, Up-
per Volta, Ivory Coast, Gabon,
and the Central African Repub-
lic. These nations will prob-
ably support Taipei if they are
admitted to the UN before the
vote on the moratorium.
Havana's recognition of
Peiping on 2 September marks
the first definite break in
western hemisphere support for
Taipei. Cuba abstained last
year and is expected to oppose
the moratorium this year. There
is a possibility that the Do-
minican Republic will vote a-
gainst the moratorium in reac-
tion to the condemnation by the
other American republics. Most
other members of the Latin
American bloc probably will
continue to support Nationalist
China.
As in the past, National-
ist China probably will have
the support of the Western and
Asian nations allied with the
United States in defense treat-
ies. Last year Taipei lost the
support of Ethiopia, which ab-
stained; this year it may lose
that of Tunisia, which is re-
portedly considering aligning
itself with the other Afro-
Asians on this issue.
Nationalist China's chief
UN delegate estimates that with-
out the new members,this year's
vote would be close to last
year's, when 44 members sup-
ported the moratorium, 29 voted
against it, and 9 abstained.
Peiping's Attitude
The Chinese Communists do
not expect to become a member
of the UN this year. Their re-
cent propaganda has ignored the
subject, and the regime con-
tinues to depict the UN as a
"tool of American aggressive
policy."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 September 1960
Khrushchev's Appearance
Khrushchev, scheduled to
appear at the opening of this
assembly along with satellite
party chieftains, is expected
to develop his theme of peace-
full coexistence and thereby
underscore Peiping's isolation
within the bloc. At the same
time, he will probably call for
the immediate admission of Com-
munist China to the UN. In
this context his arguments will
probably appeal to many UN
members who, although ready to
vote for the moratorium this
year, have long held the be-
lief that the Obligations of
UN membership offer a way of
bringing Peiping under some form
of international restraint.
Such members as Japan are
particularly desirous of ensur-
ing that Communist China be a
party to any big-power agree-
ment on banning nuclear tests
or on other forms of disarma-
ment. They point out that
since any such agreement will
be accepted by the UN as a
whole, Peiping as a member
would automatically be bound
by the terms of the treaty.
Out look
The present Sino--Soviet
controversy may enlist; support
for Peiping's entry from those
UN members who are eager to see
Peiping exposed to the rough-
and-tumble of UN debates and
voting line-ups. These members,
which include Britain and Pak-
istan, believe that possible
differences between Communist
China and the USSR could be ex-
ploited to the fullest at the
UN.
The prospects for maintain-
ing a favorable UN vote on the
moratorium in future years are
becoming increasingly uncertain.
There is some possibility that
a shift in the voting balance
might result not from a gradual
erosion of Taipei's position but
from a sudden "breakthrough."
If it appeared that the vote
would be close and that in any
event Peiping's admission in
the near future was inevitable,
a bandwagon situation could de-
velop which would result in a
defeat of the moratorium; or
should-Peiping demand-admittance
t'o.the UN as its price for ad-
hering to any disarmament or
nuclear test ban agreement,..-,
Taipei's position might become
even-more ..precarious.. It is
likely:'.that a UN vote against
the moratorium-would be fol
lowed by'a vote in4avor of
admitting Communist. Qhina to 25X1
the UN and giving it a perma-
ment seat on the Security Coun-
cil.
* * *
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