CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 17, 2006
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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
'INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 66
OCI NO. 4443/60
8 September 1960
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
pNfIDENTIAL
4OCUMENTN0_
NO CHANGE IN CLASS
(:! DECLASSIFIED
C. _ASS. CHANGED T
O: TS
XT REVIEW DATE:j
UTH: HR 70.2
25X1 AATE:- _REVIEWER.
State Dept. review completed
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"r'
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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8 September 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Despite Khrushchev's decision to attend the UN General
Assembly and his appeal in Finland to all heads of govern-
ment to lead their delegations, it is doubtful that the
Soviet premier seriously expects to have meetings with
Western leaders at this time. He apparently intends to
use the United Nations primarily as a forum for attacking
American policy and enlisting support for Soviet posi-
tions. Khrushchev, in his recent visit to Finland, gained
President Kekkonen's endorsement of the USSR's stand on
disarmament and the need for peaceful coexistence. In
return, Moscow agreed to open negotiations for safeguard-
ing Soviet trade interests "in case" Finland becomes
associated with the European Free Trade Area.
EAST GERMANY INTENSIFIES PRESSURE ON WEST BERLIN . . . Page 3
The Ulbricht regime--using the pretext of West German
"revanchist" meetings in Berlin--demonstrated from 30
August to 4 September its ability to determine what West
Germans would travel to the city by land and strongly
asserted its claim to control of civilian access by air.
This move was accompanied by further steps to tie East
Berlin more closely to East Germany. One reason for
the intensified pressure appears to be a desire to cut
the flow of refugees, which is running far in excess
of 1959 figures.
. Page 6
Fidel Castro in effect withdrew his country from the
inter-American system in a 2 September speech in which
he reiterated his acceptance of Soviet support and an-
nounced his intention to establish relations with Commu-
nist China. Cuba's recognition of Peiping, the first
by a western hemisphere nation, is a major diplomatic
breakthrough for Communist China. Peiping's embassy in
Havana will likely be used as a center for spreading
Chinese influence elsewhere in Latin America. Meanwhile,
the Castro regime continues to provoke other Latin
American governments, and several are considering
breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba, a step taken
by Nicaragua and Guatemala earlier this year.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
PART I (continued)
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The power struggle between President Kasavubu and
Premier Lumumba remains unresolved, Premier Lumumba ap-
parently retains the initiative and has police and army
support, although the arrival of troops favorable to
Kasavubu and the moderates has raised the threat of con-
siderable violence in Leopoldville. Hammarskjold has
asked the UN Security Council to reconvene in an effort
to stop unilateral aid efforts from the outside and to
give authority to disarm the Congolese troops. Meanwhile,
the Lumumba government is continuing its efforts to sub-
due secessionists in Kasai Province before attempting to
gain control over Katanga.
The USSR has given Lumumba strong propaganda support
in the wake of Kasavubu?s attempted coup and has criti-
cized UN authorities, portending new Soviet-supported
moves by Lumumba aimed at modifying the role of the UN
in the Congo. Soviet bloc countries have been increas-
ing their direct aid to the Lumumba regime.
The new government of Premier Souvanna Phouma is
,slowly beginning to function, but Interior Minister
General Phoumi remains at his headquarters in Savannakhet.
He has ignored repeated summons by Souvanna to join the
cabinet in Vientiane on the grounds that Captain Kong Le
is still in de facto control of the capital and that it
is therefore unsafe for him to return. He also appears
to be having second thoughts about the compromise he
reached with Souvanna and may be planning some form of
armed opposition to the Vientiane regime. The Communist
Pathet Lao has responded to Souvanna?s appeal for im-
mediate peace talks with a set of stiff preconditions
for negotiations, including Phoumi's removal from the
cabinet, indicating that the Pathet Lao representatives
will be hard bargainers when and if they sit down at a
conference table with Souvanna.
CloNFiDENrIaL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1860
NOTES AND COMMENTS
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Trujillo dictatorship is seeking to counter its
growing diplomatic and economic isolation in the western
hemisphere by increasing contacts in Western Europe and
making new contacts with Near Eastern and Soviet bloc coun-
8
t
on
tries. However, the UN Security Council will mee
September to consider Moscow's request that the council
endorse the recent action by the Organization of American
States against Trujillo. This move is an evident effort
to embarrass the United States by again asserting the
USSR's claim to have a legitimate interest in the affairs
of the western hemisphere.
THREATENED POLITICAL CRISIS IN VENEZUELA OVER POLICY
TOWARD CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Venezuelan President Betancourt's coalition is facing
a split over policy toward the Castro regime as a result
of controversy about Venezuela's role at the San Jose meet-
ing of OAS foreign ministers. Foreign Minister Arcaya's
refusal to sign the final OAS resolution against extra-
continental intervention in the hemisphere, although
Betancourt subscribed to it unconditionally, emphasized
the sharp division in Venezuela between pro- and anti-
Castro elements and touched off a series of pro-Castro
demonstrations. Arcaya resigned from the cabinet on
6 September, but his party is still a member of the
government coalition.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS .
Page 3
. . . . . . . . . .
Chinese Communist journals have continued to a irm
their all-out campaign. The Soviet party has moved to
protect itself against Chinese charges of "revisionism"
by attacking a long Yugoslav critique of Chinese posi-
tions, although the Soviet review leaves unrefuted the
larger part of the Yugoslav case. The high-ranking
Eastern European representation accompanying Khrushchev
positions offensive to Moscow but have not resumed
to the UN appears designed to demonstrate satellite
party support for Moscow. Khrushchev has
sent further letters to the nonbioc Communist parties
seeking their support in a meeting scheduled for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
PART II (continued)
DE GAULLE'S RECENT STATEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The line taken on the world situation by De Gaulle in
his 5 September press conference and at the start of his
speaking tour of Brittany probably indicates his feeling
that this is a propitious time to press his bid for a
greater leadership role in the Western alliance. His
dismissal of the UN as a forum for serious discussion of
international problems is probably anticipatory of ad-
verse UN action on the Algerian problem. De Gaulle's
remarks seem intended to encourage a resumption of cease-
fire talks with the rebels.
EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION PLAN . . . . . . s . . . . . , , . Page 5
De Gaulle's proposals for a European confederation,
which he brought before the public in his 5 September
press conference, continue to provoke misgivings among
the Common Market countries, which would most likely be
its constituent members. Many see the plan as a direct
threat to the federalist-inclined Common Market and as
a device for extending French influence in NATO. Never-
theless,'these countries are not likely to risk offending
De Gaulle by rejecting his plan out of hand, and they may
hope in the next few months to extract concessions which
would preserve the prospect of real political integration.
MOROCCO PRESSES CLAIM TO MAURITANIA . .
. . . o . . . Page 7
The Moroccan Government is seeking international sup-
port for its claims to Mauritania, which becomes independ-
ent'on 28 November. These claims seem certain to cause
new difficulties in Morocco's relations with France. which
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . , S . 9 . . . . . . . , . . . Page 8
Vitriolic propaganda exchanges between Jordan and,the
UAR are continuing in the wake of the assassination of
Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli. In Iran, the Shah is
continuing to try to regain the prestige lost over the
rigged parliamentary elections. Opposition elements,
however, are exploiting the situation, which is develop-
ing in their favor. New pressures against the policies
of Western oil companies may result from a meeting of
government oil officials from several Arab states, Iran,
and Venezuela beginning on 10 September in Baghdad.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
PART II (continued)
POLITICAL DETERIORATION IN BURMA . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Burmese Army leaders, increasingly dissatisfied with
Prime Minister Nu, are urging General Ne Win to intervene
with Nu for stronger leadership and administrative disci-
pline. Ne Win probably opposes direct army action at this
time, but ultimately may be unable to restrain his col-
leagues. U Nu has little control over his party and may
face a political revolt if he attempts to tighten
administrative control to satisfy army demands.
INDONESIA AND THE KAREL DOORMAN CONTROVERSY . . . . . . . Page 10
The return to West New Guinea of the Dutch aircraft
carrier Karel Doorman, following cancellation of a visit
to Yokohama, will undoubtedly be exploited by President
Sukarno and the Indonesian Communist party to stimulate
further anti-Dutch feeling and demands for the "libera-
tion" of the area. Sukarno is also expected to use the
issue in an effort to obscure a domestic crisis precipi-
tated by the army's ban on Communist activities in
several areas.
SWEDEN'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS . . . . . .
. . . . . . Page 11
Sweden's governing Social Democratic party is ex-
pected to lose some voting strength in the parliamentary
elections on 18 September, but it is uncertain whether
these losses will be sufficient to cause Prime Minister
Erlander to resign or drastically reshuffle his govern-
ment, The campaign is being fought largely on social
welfare and other domestic matters. The question of
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability has not become
an election issue in view of government plans to post-
pone a decision on it until 1963.
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL LEADERSHIP IN FLUX . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Top-level party and government direction of Soviet
agriculture remains in the state of flux apparent more
than a year ago. The latest round of personnel changes,
in part a result of last year's disappointing harvest,
may also be symptomatic of indecisiveness ors contention
within the Kremlin hierarchy over questions of agri-
cultural organization. With Khrushchev set to embark
on a new series of international junkets and no central
committee meeting scheduled for the immediate future,
decisions may be further postponed, but some action to
give direction to Soviet agriculture seems likely before
the next party congress late this year or early in 1961.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
PART II (continued)
PROPOSED CHANGES IN SOVIET ECONOMIC PLANNING . . . e , , , Page 13
Details of a proposal to create 14 economic coordina-
tion and planning councils to cover most of the USSR were
xpounded in a recent issue of the official journal of the
Soviet State Planning Committee. These and other recent
refinements in economic administration and planning are
part of the regime's continuing efforts to obtain the
benefits of both central control--for effective planning
.and the promotion of nationwide objectives--and operational
flexibility at'the local level to spur initiative and pro-
mote efficiency,
POLISH PEASANTS BLAMED FOR FIVE-YEAR PLAN FAILURE , o < , Page 15
Gomulka, in a speech on 4 September, laid on the
Polish peasants responsibility for achieving only a 19-
percent increase in agricultural production in the Five-
Year Plan (1956-60) instead of the planned 25 percent,
In an apparent effort to combat hoarding, he asserted
that this year's grain crop, although damaged by drought
and heavy rains, would nearly equal last year's record
output, He also called for laws which would permit
strong action against the many peasants who have not
heeded his admonitions to join government-sponsored
organizations--"agricultural circles"--for the purchase
and cooperative use of machinery.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
BRITAIN ADVANCES INDEPENDENCE SCHEDULE FOR COLONIES , . . Page 1
Britain is markedly hastening its pace in granting
independence to its colonies and protectorates. Within
a few years, according to present plans, the colonial
empire will dwindle to a small number of territories
with strategic bases and a'few scattered islands where
nationalism has not yet developed. By readily conced-
ing to nationalism and continuing to provide economic
aid, London hopes to retain some defense facilities
as well as considerable good will and trades The
inclusion of numerous small states in the COMMOnWe2l
may compel a modification in its structure.
THE USSR'S USE OF EDUCATION AT HOME AND ABROAD Page 5
Close control of education has enabled the Soviet
Union to train, in proportion to its total manpower, a
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8 September 1960
PART III (continued)
greater number of technicians and scientists than the
United States, The Institute of International Relations,
with a six-year course emphasizing language and speciali-
zation on principal areas of the world, provides inten-
sive training for service abroad. Education has been
used increasingly as an important element in foreign
policy, Scholarship offers, particularly to students
of underdeveloped countries, have been generous, and
acceptances have increased steadily, A University of
People's Friendship for foreign students is to be opened
in Moscow this year but probably will not entirely
liminate the problem of students' disillusionment
with a close view of Soviet life,
PART IV
OTHER INTELLIGENCE ISSUANCES
Published during the week of 31 August - 6 September 1960
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS
Khrushchev has followed up
the announcement of his UN ap-
pearance with an effort to per-
suade free-world leaders to at-
tend the opening of the General
Assembly. He has sent private
letters to Nehru, Sukarno, and
probably other neutralist lead-
ers, urging them to attend.
During his short visit to
Finland, Khrushchev renewed his
appeal for all the heads of
government to lead their dele-
gations. Prior to the announce-
ment, Deputy Foreign Minister
Kuznetsov on three separate oc-
casions had requested Secretary
General Hammarskjold to invite
President Eisenhower, Prime
Minister Macmillan, and Presi-
dent de Gaulle, as well as Khru-
shchev, to attend the meeting.
Khrushchev's remarks in
Finland and Soviet propaganda
treatment of his UN trip sug-
gest that he does not expect
the Western powers to follow
his suggestion and is pressing
the proposal as a means of doc-
umenting his claim that the
Western leaders are indifferent
to a solution of the disarma-
ment problem. In his speech
in Helsinki on 3 September he
was apparently setting the
stage for such a charge when
he questioned, "Who can argue
that of all the pressing prob-
lems which require the attention
of the heads of government," the
disarmament question is not the
most important and vital.
Soviet propaganda has also
developed the theme that the
United States has been thrown
into a state of "confusion and
panic" at the thought that the
heads of government would dis-
cuss its "provocative" ;policy.
This line of attack appears
designed to ensure against
attendance by the Western lead-
ers.
Khrushchev probably hopes
that the attendance of a few
Afro-Asian leaders will serve
as a demonstration of support
for Soviet charges against
the United States. On the
basis of his performance in
Finland, Khrushchev can be
expected to rely heavily on
the U-2 incident in reviewing
the international developments
since his last UN appearance
and in defending his actions
in wrecking the summit and
withdrawing from the disarmament
talks. Moscow still intends
to press for debate on both the
U-2 and RB-47 incidents before
the General Assembly, and Khru-
shchev will probably attempt
to convince neutral delegations
that support for an indictment
of the United States as a
"menace to peace" is a neces-
sary prerequisite'to an.improve-
ment of the international cli-
mate.
As in his last visit to
the UN, Khrushchev's main theme
will be disarmament and peaceful
coexistence. Soviet propaganda
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
has hinted that Khrushchev will
present a new or modified dis-
armament plan to the General
Assembly. The intense campaign
against foreign bases may indi4:
cate that Khrushchev will modify
the first stage of the Soviet
disarmament proposal so as to
present a new package covering
elimination of foreign bases
and nuclear weapons delivery
systems as a first step to be
taken within some specific time
limit.
Khrushchev to Cuba
Khrushchev will arrive by
ship in New York on 19 Septem-
ber, and he may visit Cuba after
an appearance before the Gen-
eral Assembly.. TASS broadcast
a statement claiming that the
Cuban people were eagerly await-
ing Khrushchev's appearance,
and the Havana radio cited UN
diplomats as the source of ru-
mors that Khrushchev would come
to Havana after his visit to
the General Assembly. Continued
attacks against the United
States would'almost certainly
be a feature of such 'a trip.
Soviet-Finnish Relations
Although Khrushchev char-
acterized Soviet-Finnish rela-
tions as an outstanding example
of the application of the prin-
ciples of peaceful coexistence,
he indicated during his visit
that Finland should pursue a
policy of more active neutral-
ity. The joint communique is-
sued at the completion of Khru-
shchev's visit on 4 September
shows that in return for nego-
tiations which may clear the
way for Finland's association
with the European Free Trade
Association, President Kekkonen
endorsed Soviet proposals for
complete disarmament and pledged
Finland to strive for expanded
trade and cultural contacts with
the USSR.
Both men expressed their
"firm intention to do their ut-j
most to keep the region of north-
ern Europe outside the sphere
of tension and friction between
states." This would suggest that
Kekkonen may have been enlisted
in the Soviet effort to neu-
tralize Scandinavia. The So-
viet Union has long complained
that the Finnish Government has
followed too passive a foreign
policy and had not sought to
influence Norway and Denmark to
leave NATO and adopt an offi-
cial policy of neutrality. The
Soviet Union will have a fur-
ther opportunity to seek to
identify Finland more closely
with Soviet foreign policy ob-
jectives during Kekkonen's visit
to Moscow in November to nego-
tiate trade arrangements prior
to Finland's entry into EFTA.
Germany
Khrushchev also used his
Finnish visit to continue his
attacks on German militarism,
which he warned was being under-
estimated in Scandinavia. He
quoted a memorandum of the
West German armed forces opera-
tional staff as an "ominous"
confirmation of the threat of
German militarism. This gen-
eral line was reflected in So-
viet notes to Bonn and London.
The note to Bonn added the
standard warnings that the USSR
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
would not remain indifferent
if West German forces are sup-
plied with nuclear weapons. It
also contained a renewed threat
to sign a separate peace treaty 25X1
with the East Germans and solve
the Berlin problem "in the near
future,"
EAST GERMANY INTENSIFIES PRESSURE ON WEST BERLIN
The Ulbricht regime--using
the pretext of West German "re-
vanchist" meetings in the city--
demonstrated from 30 August to
4 September its ability to de-
termine what West Germans would
travel to West Berlin by land,
and strongly reiterated its
claim to control of civilian
access by air. This move was
accompanied by further steps
to tie East Berlin more closely
to East Germany.
One important reason for
the intensified pressure appears
to be a desire to cut the flow
of refugees, through the city,
which for the month of August
reached 18,000. Total flights
to West Berlin and West Germany
last month totaled more than
21,400--the highest monthly
figure since the mass flights
of August 1958. So far this
year, more than 100,000 refugees
have fled through West Berlin,
and total flights to the West
exceed 126,000 for the first
eight months, compared with
some 143,000 during all of
19 59 .
In a television interview
marking his return from a six-
week vacation in the USSR, East
German party boss Walter Ul-
bricht asserted on 3 September
that the Western powers have
"liquidated" the four-power
agreements relating to Berlin,
that East Germany and "its
capital, Berlin," are no longer
subject to occupation, and that
West Berlin "is and remains
part of the territory of the
German; Democratic-Republic,
and is not and will not be a
state of the Federal Republic."
He added that the use of West
German passports by West Ber-
liners is "completely illegal."
These assertions suggest
that the regime may soon at-
tempt to force West Berliners
to use some different type of
documentation in order to cross
East Germany, and that in any
event, further East German ef-
forts to interfere with access
to West Berlin can be expected,
Earlier, Deputy Foreign
Minister Otto Winzer challenged
Western use of the three air
corridors linking West Berlin
with West Germany for any pur-
pose other than supplying the
Western garrisons in Berlin,
Ulbricht questioned the validity
of the four-power basic agree-
ments of 1949 assuring free ac-
cess to Berlin and protested
use of the corridors "by Ameri-
can aircraft" to transport West
Germans who had been turned
back at road and rail crossing
points by East German border
guards. East Germany made no
effort last week, however, to
interfere with traffic in the
corridors.
Ulbricht said conclusion
of a peace treaty with Germany
is "necessary and inevitable,"
but set no deadlines. The East
Germans have not yet, however,
attempted to interfere with
Western military access to the
city and have confined their
harassment strictly to West
German traffic, already under
their exclusive control during
past years.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
East German Foreign Trade
Minister Rau on 6 September
reasserted the regime's "right"
to impose controls and warned
Bonn against attempting to take
any steps, such as cutting off
trade with East Germany, to
retaliate against the intensi-
fied restrictions on West German
travel to Berlin. Moreover,
he categorically
rejected the West
German contention
that East - West Ger-
man trade is contin
gent on maintaining
of West Berlin's
free communications
with the West.
The Ulbricht re-
gime appears to have
taken two further
steps to tie East
Berlin more closely
to East Germany. The
East German Ministry
of Interior decree
barring West Germans
from the city with-
out residence permits
appears to have been
applied directly in
the Soviet sector,
without any inter-
mediate legislation
by East Berlin munic-
ipal authorities.
Moreover, West Ger-
mans were subjected
to the same type of
controls as those
imposed at the East
West German border,
although no effort
was made to halt
a crisis atmosphere in connec-
tion with East German moves.
While providing full propaganda
support, Soviet commentaries
seem designed to stress the
provocative nature of West
German policy and play
down the restrictive meas-
ures adopted by the East
Germans.
COMMUNICATION ROUTES BETWEEN
Prenzlau
E A S T
Liebenwede
ST
IERLIN
I R 11 A ?,-V
ho
Control Points for Allied! Traffic:
A Soviet - A Allied
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
Last A West
visits by West Berliners to
East Berlin.
Soviet propaganda treat-
ment of the Berlin situation
and the lack of high-level com-
ments suggest that Moscow has
been concerned not to create
Khrushchev's failure to
comment on the situation during
his public remarks in Finland
also suggests that Moscow de-
sired to allow the five-day
travel prohibition to 'run its
course without injecting itself
into the dispute. Such a tactic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
would serve to underscore the
East German claims to sover-
eignty over access to Berlin
within the context of the So-
viet - East German agreement
reserving controls over Allied
traffic to the USSR.
East Germany is intensi-
fying its efforts to undermine
the links between West Berlin
and Bonn and has charged that
the 10 September visit of Vice
Chancellor Erhard to confer
with West Berlin's Mayor Willy
Brandt is a "provocation." The
East German press is also en-
deavoring to capitalize on al-
leged differences among the
Western powers concerning West
Berlin's relations with Bonn,
in an effort to create dissen-
sion and undercut effective ac-
tion against East Germany.
Some 17 barges en route
to West Berlin from West Ger-
many were forced by East German
officials to return to the
frontier crossing point at
Schnackenburg on grounds that
their draft exceeded the legal
limit and were subjected to
long delays. In contrast to
past usage, the barges were
not permitted, for legalistic
reasons, to take an alternate
route. It is not yet clear
whether this arbitrary action
forms part of the regime's har-
assing measures against Berlin.
West Berlin Mayor Brandt
and other Berlin officials have
taken a very serious view of
East Germany's temporary inter-
ference with free access, called
for a high-level protest by the
Western allies to the USSR, and
stated that without firmness
by the Western powers there
will be future harassments of
this type. Brandt further ex-
pressed concern over the ef-
fects of East German harassment
on West Berlin's economy, par-
ticularly in regard to the level
of West German industrial orders
and new investment in Berlin.
Nevertheless, he and the
Berlin city council recommended
against any retaliatory measures,
such as slowing down or halting
interzonal trade, on the grounds
that this would only aggravate
the situation. The sole coun-
termeasure was the provision
of free air transportation into
the city for nearly 700 out of a
a thousand West Germans pre-
vented by East German border
guards from making the trip by
land.
West Berlin Deputy Mayor
Amrehn on 6 September expressed
fears that new harassments may
be attempted on 10 September in
connection with the West Berlin
Industrial Fair and the visit
of Erhard. Erhard is to dis-
cuss possible economic reprisals
with Brandt, who has threatened
the East Germans with a "moral
boycott" including economic
measures if there is any further
interruption of access to the
city.
Western Positions
The British Foreign Office
has explained to Bonn that the
Times editorial critical of West
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Germany's Berlin policy--which
has been liberally quoted by
the East Germans--does not re-
flect British policy. The
Times article had concluded
TE West Germany is spoiling
a good case by overplaying its
hand and warned that continuance
of this practice would cause
the opinion to spread among the
Western allies that their ob-
ligation to defend West Berlin
was being exploited.
A working-level Foreign
Office official on 2 September
was receptive to the idea of a
study of countermeasures against
East German interference with
travel to Berlin, mentioning
the possibility of selectively
withholding the issuance of
temporary travel documents.
The French Embassy in Lon-
don has proposed a high-level
approach to Bonn urging it and
Berlin authorities to hold full
consultations with the three
Western powers before taking
any future decisions likely to
lead to East German or Soviet
reaction. The British Foreign
Office believes that the French
approach is a result of the
strong East German response to
refugee meetings in Berlin.
London is cool to the idea but 25X1
is willing to allow the Western
ambassadors in Bonn to discuss
the matter.
Fidel Castro in effect
withdrew Cuba from the inter-
American system in a 2 Septem-
ber speech that featured the
announcement of his intention
to establish diplomatic rela-
tions with Communist China and
to accept Chinese Communist,
as well as Soviet, military aid
"if we are attacked."
Cuba's recognition of the
Peiping regime, the first by a
western hemisphere nation, is
a major diplomatic breakthrough
for Communist China. Peiping
has intensified its propaganda
toward Latin America in recent
years and has expressed special
admiration for the Cuban revolu-
tion, which it holds up as a
model for other Latin American
countries in their "struggle
against American imperialism."
hou 25X1
En-lai on 15 August pledge "every
possible aid, with no strings
attached" to "the Cuban people."
Cuba, with a Chinese com-
munity of about 30,000--the
largest in Latin America--will
be a particularly valuable base
for the Chinese Communists in
promoting their influence in
Latin America. The Chinese Com-
munists have for some time been
using the Havana office of the
New China News Agency as a prop-
aganda outlet and will probably
use their embassy facilities
as a channel for covert guid-
ance and financial assistance to
Communist movements throughout
Latin America.
On 29 August, Cuba became
the first nonbloc nation to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
recognize North Korea, and an
exchange of ambassadors is ex-
pected soon. A Hungarian trade
mission arrived in Cuba on 3
September, and trade and cul-
tural agreements will probably
be signed.
At the 2 September rally
of some 300,000 persons staged
by the government to give the
answer of "the Cuban people"
to the OAS warning against
accepting Sino-Soviet bloc
support, Castro reiterated
Cuba's acceptance of Soviet
military aid in the "Declara-
tion of Havana," a ten-point
manifesto read to, and duti-
fully approved by, the crowd.
Castro said the manifesto,
which also bitterly attacked
the "open and criminal inter-
vention which the US has ex-
ercised over Latin America
for 199 years," would be sub-
mitted to "all revolutionary
groups and men in America" for
support. On 6 September, a
Cuban spokesman said the regime
had requested support for the
dedlaration from labor, agrarian,
student, women's, and profes-
sional groups all over the
world.
In the same speech Castro
denounced the US-Cuban mutual
defense assistance treaty of
1952 and threatened to reply
to new US "economic aggression"
by nationalizing all remaining
American-owned property. He
repeated 'ear? lier i statemonts. ;that
Cuba will never attack the US
naval base at Guantanamo Bay,
but added that if "aggression"
against Cuba continues, a new
"assembly of the Cuban people"
will be called to demand that
the United States withdraw from
the base.
Cuba's relations with most
other Latin American nations
have been further strained by
its accusations of a "'shameful
surrender" to US pressure at
the San Jose foreign ministers'
meeting and by the invective
employed by Cuban Foreign Min-
ister Roa toward them. Roa
rejected Argentine and Brazil-
ian protests in sharp notes to
the ambassadors on 5 September,
This' has raised the possibility
of an Argentine break in dip-
lomatic relations with Cuba.
Peruvian President Prado
has agreed, under pressure from
the military, to break. relations
with Cuba at a propitious time.
Venezuelan President Betancourt
has become increasingly hostile
toward Castro, while Colombia,in-
censed by a recent outburst by
the Cuban ambassador,is expected
at least to declare the ambassa-
dor persona non grata. Nicaragua
and Guatemala broke diplomatic
relations with the Castro regime
earlier this year.
Cuba's poor relations with
other hemisphere governments are
accompanied by frank appeals for
support from the Latin American
people over the heads of their
governments. While Cuban leaders
publicly deny charges that they
are trying to export their revolu-
tion, they publicly welcome all
Latin Americans who want to come
"to drink at the pure clear
spring" of revolution in Cuba,
and Roa claims that he was speak-
ing for "the peoples of Latin
America" at the San Jose meeting.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
Meanwhile, there is con-
tinuing evidence of increasing
antigovernment guerrilla ac-
tivity in the mountains of cen-
tral Cuba. Embassy sources
reported on 2 September that
at least one shipment of arms
and ammunition had been sent
to the guerrillas during the
previous week. More recruits
are reported to be joining the
guerrillas, and new "fronts"
may be opened elsewhere in the
country.
The power struggle between
President Kasavubu and Premier
Lumumba remains unresolved and
the situation continues fluid.
Lumumba, who has maintained his
popular support and influence
over the police and most army
units, retains the initiative.
Kasavubu at present appears to
have been rebuffed in his bid
to oust Lumumba, and several of
his closest supporters are in
the protective custody of the
UN Command in the Congo. How-
ever, the President may be gain-
ing significant military support.
On 5 September, Kasavubu an-
nounced the removal of Lumumba
from office after the.Presi-
dent's political organization--
the Abako--had put increasing
pressure on him to use his con-
stitutional powers to get rid
of Lumumba. Several other po-
litical groups, generally rep-
resentative of regional inter-
ests opposed to Lumumba's strong
central government, joined in
this pressure. However, UN
troops guarding the radio sta-
tion failed to prevent Lumumba
from broadcasting several ap-
peals for popular support during
which he announced Kasavubu?s
ouster from the presidency.
The UN took over control of
Leopoldville's radio station and
two airports to prevent the-out-
break of disorders. Officially,
the UN Command was pursuing a
policy of neutrality between
rival factions, but to many ob-
servers its actions appeared
to favor Kasavubu. Lumumba
quickly summoned the cabinet
and received its support. The
cabinet accused Kasavubu of
treason for trying to dismiss
the premier and took over his
functions until the National
Assembly could discuss the situ-
ation. At the meeting of the
Chamber of Deputies--the Senate
refused to meet--on 7 September,
Lumumba was in control after
making a fiery attack on the UN
for preventing an armed attack
on Katanga. The chamber's reso-
lution decreed that the dis-
missals of Lumumba and Kasavubu
were invalid, and Lumumba re-
mained in the political saddle.
Lumumba's control over the
Leopoldville police was indi-
cated by their attack on a pro-
Kasavubu demonstration on 6
September during which several
of the mob were killed by gun-
fire. His control over the Con-
golese National Army---the former
Force Publique--is less clear-
cut. On 6 September partisans
of moderate Jean Bolikango--the
Bangala tribal leader from the
northwest region of the Congo--
among some troops brought in by
Lumumba from Thysville liberated
him from jail. Lumumba had
arrested him on 1 September for
allegedly plotting against the
government. These troops may
strengthen the military position
of Kasavubu, who is in alliance
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
with Bolikango, Ka
lonji of the Kasai,
and Tshombd of Katan-
ga. Support of the
Bangalese is vital to
the President because,
along with Kasavubu's
Bakongo people, they
dominate the popu-
lation of Leopoldville
and have for years
comprised about 40
percent of the former
Force Publique.
Many of Kasavu-
bu's supporters with-
in Lumumba's govern-
ment have sought UN
protection against
the premier's retali-
ation, Foreign Minis-
ter Bomboko, tipped
off by the Congolese
chief of staff con-
cerning his impending
arrest, appealed to
Stanleyville~_
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Kindu -URUNDI t~,f
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B SEPTEMBER 1960
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UNCLASSIFIED
31341
the American ambassador for
asylum and then joined Presi-
dent Kasavubu, Senate President
Ileo--Kasavubu's candidate for
premier--and two other minis-
ters at the President's home
under UN protection. This re-
liance on UN protection, particu-
larly if followed by other Lu-
mumba opponents, will provoke
the premier to try drastic meas-
ures; against UN operations in
the Congo. On 8 September he
demanded the withdrawal of all
UN troops from the Congo.
Soviet and East European
propagandists have given strong
support to Lumumba in the wake
of the attempted coup. Radio
Moscow on 7 September criti-
cized UN authorities for "open
interference" in the Congo's in-
ternal affairs and for "hamper-
ing the establishment of law
and order," instead of support-
ing the country's "lawful gov-
ernment." Another Soviet com-
mentary claims that the situa-
tion would "undoubtedly right
itself quite quickly" if the
:Belgians, Americans, and other
NATO elements would stop their
"'evil maneuvers."
Such criticisms raise the
prospect that the USSR will en-
courage and support new moves
by the Lumumba regime aimed at
modifying the role of the UN
forces in the Congo. Previously,
Soviet officials had suggested
to Lumumba that he call for the
creation of an observer group
comprised of representatives of
various African countries which
would ensure compliance with
the UN Security Council. reso-
lutions, but did not press the
proposal because of lack of sup-
port from African and Asian
governments.
Hammarskjold has called for
an early meeting of the Security
Council in an effort to stop uni-
lateral aid from the outside.
He was presumably referring both
to Soviet and Belgian actions.
He also hopes to secure approval
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8 September 1960
for the disarming of the Congo-
lese troops.
The Soviet bloc has been
expanding the scope and size of
its activities in direct support
of the Lumumba regime. There
now are well over 200 bloc per-
sonnel in the Congo, including
high-level economic delegations
from the USSR and Czechoslovakia
which reportedly are discussing
the possibilities of economic
aid with Congolese officials.
As a result, agreements pro-
viding for large-scale bloc eco-
nomic and technical assistance
to the Lumumba government may
be announced shortly.
Meanwhile, the central gov-
ernment is continuing its efforts
to regain control of secessionist
areas in southeastern Congo.
Savage but indecisive fighting is
occurring between the Congolese
Army and forces of the tribal
"Mining State" of southeastern
Kasai Province centered in the
town of Bakwanga. Battles have
taken place in several villages,
and hundreds of persons--mostly
Baluba tribesmen--have been
killed. Ten Soviet IL-14 air-
craft have airlifted Congolese
troops to strengthen Lumumba's
force in Kasai. Moscow is, how-
ever, unlikely to allow these
aircraft, which now bear Congo-
lese markings but have retained
The new government of Pre-
mier Souvanna Phouma is slowly
beginning to function, but the
their Soviet crews, to become
involved in actual fighting.
Other Congolese troop move-
ments indicate that the Lumumba
government is planning to move
against Katanga secessionists at
an early date. Lumumba's forces are
reportedly moving toward the
northern Katanga border through
Kivu Province, but an invasion
attempt must await the outcome
of the fighting in Kasai.
In Katanga, the government
of President Tshombe has had
little success in broadening its
international base of support.
Tshombd's mission to Western
Europe received no promises of
aid, but nine tons of arms ar-
rived in Elisabethville on 7
September by plane from Belgium.
The Belgian commander of the
Katanga Air Force hopes that by
November he will be able to pur-
chase six armed aircraft and
five C47s suitable for para-
troop operations. He also plans
to add ten pilots to the present
total of 15.
Tshombd.
der control of forces opposing
Tshombe may be troubled by
dissension among the tribes in
northern Katanga. Missionaries
who recently returned from the
area report that there is wide-
spread support for Lumumba, and 25X1
most of the urban centers are un-
situation in Laos remains far
from stabilized. General Phoumi,
deputy premier and interior
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
PHONG
SALY
Dien Bien Phu.
LUANG PRABANG 1
Luang Praban
MALAYA
APOR
INDONESIA
XIENG
KHOUANG
VIENTIANE
JNANE_
NORTH
VIETNAM
.Hanoi
minister, remains in Savanna-
khet, claiming that with Cap-
tain Kong Le still in de facto
control of Vientiane, it would
be unsafe for him to return to
the capital. Phoumi also ap-
pears to be having second
thoughts about his agreement to
participate in a coalition gov-
ernment committed to neutralism
and an accommodation with the
Pathet Lao insurgents.
Phoumi apparently has con-
sidered opposing the Vientiane
regime openly, either by reviv-
ing his plans to retake Vien-
ATTOPE
tiane by military
force or by establish-
ing a separate state
in southern Laos, a
move for which there
is historical prec-
edent Phoumi r e-
sponded On 7 September
to Souvanna's repeated
requests that he re-
turn to Vientiane by
writing the premier
that while he was
loyal to the new gov-
ernment, he would pre-
fer to function as
interior minister at
his headquarters in
Savannakhet,,
Souvanna insists
that Phoumi would run
no personal risk by
coming to Vientiane,
but, the premier is
vague regarding the
arrangements made to
neutralize Kong Le.
General Amkha has
been sworn in as mili-
tary commandant of
Vientiane, but Kong
Le's paratroopers are
still in the area and
would probably be
more than a match for
the assortment of service troops
and half-trained infantrymen which
General Ouane, the armed forces
commander, claims he has armed
as a counterbalance to the para-
troopers. In any event, Kong
Le seems to feel that he retains
considerable influence. On 7
September he addressed an as-
semblage of policemen, informing
them that "we" have set a dead-
line of 9 September for Phoumi's
return, after which he would be
considered a "rebel."
The only individual who
really seems to exercise much
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
influence on Kong Le is Souvanna
himself. There is the danger,
however, that in his efforts to
mollify Kong Le, Souvanna may
move faster and farther than he
otherwise might toward carrying
out his promises to come to
terms with the Pathet Lao and to
bring Laos into a more neutral
position in world affairs.
In conversations with Am-
bassador Brown in Vientiane,
Souvanna gave every indication
of planning to carry out these
policy shifts even before his
government is firmly established
and Phoumi's cooperation is
secured. He hinted that he is
considering establishing diplo-
matic relations with the USSR;
however, Souvanna stated that he
would attempt to limit ties with
Peiping and Hanoi to an exchange
of consuls.
Souvanna's eagerness to be-
gin talks with the Pathet Lao
is evident in his several ap-
peals to the insurgents to send
delegates to Vientiane for talks
and his instructions to provin-
cial authorities to provide a
"warm welcome" to any Pathet Lao
representatives presenting them-
selves to the respective pro-
vincial centers. Souvanna has
also announced that the charges
which led to the arrest of
Prince Souphannouvong and other
leaders of the Pathet Lao's
aboveground counterpart, the Neo
Lao Hak Sat party, a year ago
were being dropped on the
ground there was insufficient
evidence.
The Pathet Lao has re-
sponded to Souvanna's peace
appeals with a set of stiff pre-
conditions for formal negotia-
tions. The terms, as broadcast
over the clandestine Pathet Lao
radio, include the immediate re-
moval of the "Phoumi clique"
from the government, a cessation
of fighting, diplomatic recogni-
tion by Laos of all countries
having "different social and
political systems," and the ac-
ceptance of economic assistance
from these countries. In a
subsequent broadcast,, the Pathet
Lao for the first time criticized
Souvanna personally, attacking him
for permitting "imperialist
lackeys" to violate the 1957
integration agreements when he
was premier in 1958, for including
the "Phoumi rebel clique" in his
new government, and for insisting
that the Pathet Lao followers
lay down their arms and surrender
"as though they were criminals."
These statements indicate that
Pathet representatives will be
hard bargainers when and if they
sit down at the conference table
with Souvanna.
There are also indications
that the Pathet Lao is stepping;
up its guerrilla operations in
Sam Neua Province, in Laos' re-
raote frontier area bordering on
North Vietnam.
The Pathet Lao may wish
to take advantage of the present
Political confusion to strengthen
its bargaining position through
military ventures. It may still
have hopes of getting the whole
loaf rather than the half loaf
in prospect if it settles with
Souvanna's government. A re-
surgence of guerrilla warfare,
billed as a holy war against
the "lackeys of American im-
perialism"--the Phoumi group,
might offer some hope to the
Pathet Lao that Kong Le might 25X1
be inspired to overthrow
Souvanna in a repetition of
his 9 August coup.
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8 September 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
The Dominican Government is
seeking to counter the diplomatic
and economic sanctions agreed to
by the OAS foreign ministers'
meeting. Brazil, Paraguay, and
Haiti now are the only OAS mem-
bers that still have not broken
diplomatic ties with the Tru-
jillo regime, and they are ex-
pected to do so soon.
Baez
Diplomatic relations with the
USSR lapsed in 1946, but the
Dominican radio announced on 1
September that Major General 25X1
Arturo Espaillat might be ap-
pointed ambassador to the USSR.
Foreign Minister Herrera
left on 2 September for a visit
to Britain, France, and other
Western European countries, to
seek their support for a possi-
ble Dominican appeal to the UN
Security Council against the OAS
action and possibly to work for
the continuance of European
shipping services to the Domini-
can Republic. Venezuela has al-
ready succeeded in cutting off
oil shipments from the Dutch
West Indies by threatening to
withhold Venezuelan oil from re-
fineries on Curacao and Aruba.
Trujillo has also made
overtures to the Soviet bloc.
There is no indication
that bloc officials have been
receptive to these Dominican
overtures. The UN Security
Council will meet on 8 September
to consider Moscow's request
that the council endorse the
recent OAS action against the
Trujillo regime. Moscow evi-
dently is trying to embarrass
the United States by again as-
serting the USSR's claim to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
have a legitimate interest in
the affairs of the western
hemisphere.
The Soviet move also seems
designed to dissociate the USSR
from Trujillo's efforts to flirt
with the Communist bloc in or-
der to irritate the US. The
move could in addition provide
a precedent for raising UN ob-
jections to any future OAS
punitive action--as,for example,
against Cuba--since in his re-
quest the Soviet delegate cited
Article 53 of the UN Charter,
which provides that "no enforce-
ment action shall be taken...by.
regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security
Council."
Meanwhile the US Consulate
fears Trujillo may discover and
kill the moderate and pro-US
leaders of a coalition of dissi-
dents that includes students on
the left and high-ranking offi-
cers of the armed forces on the
right. Trujillo may 'take over 25X1
the presidency from his puppet,
Joaquin Balaguer, at any time.
THREATENED POLITICAL CRISIS IN VENEZUELA OVER POLICY TOWARD CUBA
Venezuelan President Betan-
court's coalition is facing a
split over policy toward the
Castro regime--long an explosive
political issue and a source of
unrest in Venezuela--as an
aftermath of the San Jose meet-
ing of OAS foreign ministers.
Foreign Minister Arcaya's re-
fusal to sign the final OAS res-
olution against extracontinen-
tal intervention in the hemi-
sphere, to which Betancourt sub-
scribed unconditionally, clearly
emphasized the sharp division
in Venezuela between pro- and
anti-Cuban elements, touched off
a series of pro-Castro demon-
strations, and resulted on 6
September in Arcaya's resigna-
tion from the cabinet.
The supporters of Cuba in
Venezuela are rapidly becoming
synonymous with the militant
opposition to Betancourt.
Arcaya's leftist, pro-Castro
Democratic Republican Union (URD)
party is still a member of the
government coalition.
Pro-Castro elements in
Venezuela are probably stronger
than in any other country in
Latin America outside Cuba. In
addition to the URD, they in-
clude: the Venezuelan Communist
party (PCV) ; the Revolutionary
Leftist Movement (MIR), a re-
cently organized Marxist party
composed of defectors from
Betancourt's own Democratic
Action party (AD) ; probably a
minority fraction of AD; and
the Venezuelan Confederation
of Workers (CTV), the principal
Venezuelan labor organization,
which is controlled by the AD
but penetrated by Communists.
The CTV recently signed a mutual
assistance pact with its counter-
part in Cuba.
Betancourt, most government
officials, the Catholic hier-
archy, the armed forces, and the
Christian Democratic COPEI party
--a member of the coalition
government--have become increas-
ingly alienated by Castro or are
actually hostile toward him.
Venezuela, which has the
largest US investment in any
Latin American country--some
three billion dollars--is a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY '.SUMMARY
8 September 1960
logical target for Castro's
anti-US program. Cuba has main-
tained close liaison with the
URD, Communist, MIR, and leftist
labor leaders in Venezuela.
Cuban aid has probably
been given to otner oppu-
sition leaders for propa-
Banda and other support of
the Castro regime.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
noninevitability of war, play
into the hands of the imperi-
alists. On 1 September Pravda
published a lengthy critique
of a series of articles by the
Yugoslav theoretician Edvard
Kardelj which had appeared dur-
ing August in the Yugoslav party
paper Borba.
Chinese Communist journals
have continued to affirm posi-
tions offensive to Moscow, al-
though Peiping has not resumed its
all-out polemic. Red Flag on 1
September, commentT oon Cuba,
found occasion to reiterate
Peiping's line on the immutable
nature of imperialism. Peo le's
Dail on 4 September print
full text of a July article at-
tacking "revisionism" in cul-
tural affairs.
The Soviet party has made
another public move to protect
itself against the Chinese charge
that .it ...is "revisionist" and
that its current policies, par-
ticularly its championing of
peaceful coexistence and the
The article attempts to
dissociate the Soviet party.from
Kardelj's analysis of the cur-
rent world situation and his
criticism of the Chinese, and
to establish the Soviet posi-
tion as the centrist one be-
tween "left-wing dogmatist"
(Chinese) views and "right-
wing revisionist" (Yugoslav)
views. The USSR finds Kardelj's
views unacceptable because they
do not level the major attack
on the imperialists as the most
likely cause of war, because
they do not "correctly assess
the class nature of war," and
because they admit that it would
be possible for a socialist
state to begin a war--in fact,
accuse the Chinese of wishing
to do just that.
The Soviet Union would
have considered these concepts
heretical at any time, but it
is particularly important at
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party chiefs, rather than gov-
ernmental figures, as is the
normal practice. There is some
question, however, as to the
position of the Albanian party,
as the party first secretary
has not fully endorsed Khru,-
shchev's program.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SCARY
8 September 1960
this time for the Soviet party
to differentiate its views from
those of the Yugoslav "revision-
ists" rapidly and authoritative-
ly, and it has done so.
That the party is aware of
the force of Chinese arguments
concerning Soviet "revisionism"
on the more leftist elements of
the international Communist
movement was demonstrated in a
section of the long Soviet
statement distributed at
Bucharest in June. In arguing
that the Soviet party had always
upheld the "purity of Marxism--
Leninism," the letter noted
proudly that the USSR was the
first to take "an uncompromising
stand" against Yugoslavia in
1958 and again after the con-
clusion of the fifth congress
of the Yugoslav party in May
1960, Now it can again claim
that it was the first to attack
the latest manifestation of
revisionism. At the same time,
the Soviet comment on Kardelj
leaves unrefuted the greater
part of his charges against
the Chinese.
Khrushchev, as head of the
USSR's delegation to the forth-
coming UN General Assembly,
can be expected while in New
York to underscore his commit-
ment to his own. version of
"peaceful coexistence" and to
high-level negotiations. The
high level of the representation
of the East European countries
and the other Soviet republics
which have membership in the
UN appears designed to demon-
strate satellite party support
for the Soviet Union and to
emphasize Communist China's
isolation on these questions.
The Ukrainian and Belorussian
delegations and the delegations
of all the East European members
of the UN except Albania will
be headed by their respective
The Soviet party recently
took another step to prepare
for the November meeting of
Communist parties--in Moscow--
which will try to resolve the
Sino-Soviet dispute. Moscow
sent another letter-- 25X1
the secon since early July--
to the other parties of the
world in which it admitted
"sharp and strong" differences
with Peiping, reaffirmed all of
the Soviet positions in the dis-
pute, and called for an end to
discord based on "sheer dogma- 25X1
tism. "
As for other Communist
parties, the Indian party, since 25X1
receiving the Soviet party let-
ter, is reported to be lining
up behind Khrushchev
The North
Vietnamese are still apparently
hoping to avoid a firm commitment
to either side. Since mid-
August, neither North Korea nor 25X1
Mongolia has ventured statements
which might be interpreted as
choosing sides.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
The line taken on the world
situation by De Gaulle in his 5
September press conference--as
well as at the start of his 7-
11 September speaking tour of
Brittany--probably indicates
his feeling that this is a pro-
pitious time to press his bid
for a greater leadership role
in the Western alliance. His
chief proposals--already fa-
miliar through earlier sugges-
tions made privately to US and
British officials--were for a
revision of NATO to organize
the major Western powers for
political cooperation in Africa
and the Middle East.
De Gaulle argued that an-
archy and the implicit threat
of Communist domination in the
Congo might have been avoided,
had:the-members of the Western
bloc coordinated their policies
on that area. He ruled out the
UN as an instrument for accom-
plishing this, charging that
its unity is fictitious and many
of its members "irresponsible."
In his proposals for the
European Economic Community as
well as for NATO, De Gaulle main-
tained that individual states
are the only realistic basis for
any multilateral organization.
He particularly insisted that
even in a military alliance,
defense of each country's soil
must have "a national character"
to be effective. His reference
to France's new status as a
nuclear power implies that he
regards all of these changes as
likely to increase France's in-
fluence in world affairs.
On the Algerian question,
De Gaulle adhered to the solu-
tion he had proposed previously..
He declared that France would
ignore any UN resolution on
Algeria and presumably would
ignore as well any move by the
UN to accept the recent rebel
invitation to supervise a ref-
erendum in Algeria. He took
a step to encourage resumption
of truce talks with the FLN,
however, with his assurance
that when the rebels halt ter-
rorism they can expect more
favorable treatment at cease-
fire talks. He also offered
more explicit assurances that
the rebels could ultimately be
reintegrated into the Alge-
i??ia,n community.
De Gaulle insisted that
the Algerian situation is moving
ahead, that progress toward
turning over governmental re-
sponsibility to the Moslems is
steady and irreversible, and
he implied a belief that an "Al-
gerian Algeria" with friendly
ties to France would be the
only logical outcome of eventual
self-determination.
French reaction to De
Gaulle's statements has indi-
cated disappointment that they
did not contain any fundamentally
new ideas. Most press comment
has centered on the absence of
a new formula :for ending
the Algerian war--a subject on
which editorial expectations
continue unrealistically high.
Public hopes for a policy clari- 25X1
fication now will probably focus
on De Gaulle's visit to Algeria
next month.
President de Gaulle's pro-
posals for a European confedera-
tion, which he brought before
the public in his 5 September
press conference, continue to
provoke general misgivings among
the Common Market countries,
which would most likely be its
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
constituent members. Many see
the plan as a direct threat to
the federalist-inclined Common
Market as the main instrument
for achieving European unity,
and beyond that as a device for
extending French influence in
NATO.
Concern on both these points
has been heightened by indica-
tions that the new arrangement
would be permanent and more for-
mal than had been supposed. A
new treaty would be required to
establish the proposed council
of heads of governments and min-
isterial committees for politi-
cal, cultural, and military af-
fairs, and De Gaulle now has pub-
licly stated he wants a European
referendum to bring the.confed-
eration into being.
Although it is uncertain
to what extent existing insti-
tutions would be replaced, the
Common Market would be made sub-
ordinate to the new organization.
The new defense committee would
probably be concerned with joint
weapons production and logistics
problems, but it could drift
into military planning--a func-
tion heretofore largely reserved
to NATO.
The reservations this con-
cept raises in all the Common
Market capitals have been most
forthrightly expressed in The
Hague. Dutch Foreign Minister
Luns--who saw De Gaulle on 31
August--has made it clear on
several occasions that he feels
the confederation approach, would
detract from the trend toward
real European integration and
dilute the significance of NATO.
He, like Adenauer, believes Com-
mon Market President Hallstein
has attempted to advance politi-
cal integration too fast, but
both Luns and Adenauer still hold
that the supranational approach
is essential to any workable
European structure.
Despite these reservations,
there is a ,hesitancy to reject
out of hand the confederation
plan. Dutch officials, aware
of the extent to which De Gaulle
has not obstructed France's
participation in the Common
Market, have warned Luns against
driving the French into "isola-
tion." It is generally recog-
nized that, with the Common
Market developing so fast, there
is growing need for similar
progress in the political field.
Those seeking such progress may
hope that De Gaulle's proposals
are open to compromises which
could add up to a significant
French commitment to political
integration.
These considerations, plus
the special importance to
Adenauer of the Bonn-Paris en-
tente, are probably responsible
for Bonn's ambivalent attitude.
German officials have been
vigorously reasserting Bonn's
strong support of both the Com-
mon Market and NATO and have
taken pains to deny earlier re-
ports of Adenauer's disenchant-
ment with supranational insti-
tutions>
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
"MOROCCO PRESSES CLAIM TO MAURITANIA
The Moroccan Government is
seeking support for its claims
to Mauritania, the West African
autonomous republic which be-
comes independent within the
French Community on 28 November.
The issue is characterized by
a Moroccan Foreign Ministry of-
ficial as a "life and death is-
suet" and seems certain to cause
new difficulties in Morocco's
relations with France. Al-
though no mention is being made
at this time of Spanish Sahara
and the extreme western portion
of the Paris-administered Sahara
Desert-.-both of which lie be-
tween Morocco and Mauritania--
Rabat also aspires to control
these areas.
Rabat claims that Mauritania
has been a part of Morocco since
the 16th century and that the
Moroccan sultan collected taxes
there until 1920, when France
altered the administrative set-
up. Morocco also charges that
France refused to put the ques-
tion before a mixed commission
which was to be established in
1956 to define Morocco's south-
ern boundary. The counselor of
the French Embassy in Rabat
characterizes Morocco's asser-
SPAIN
V GIBRALTAR
Ceu~a-j_(ux.~
/ Me..)
Rabat
MOROCCO
.Tindouf
tions as "fantasy" without legal
or historical basis.
Immediately after Morocco
regained its independence in
1956, right-wing nationalist
leader Allal el-Fassi began a
largely one-man campaign to
"reintegrate" Mauritania and the
intervening areas. A year later,
a group of 254 Mauritanian lead-
ers and tribal chieftains pledged
loyalty to King Mohamed V,
and some of these leaders now
occupy prominent positions with-
in the Moroccan Government. The
King publicly endorsed El-Fassi's
territorial aspirations early
in 1958, and during his tour of
the Middle East early this year
obtained commitments of support
from all Arab governments. These
commitments were honored when
the Arab League last month en-
dorsed Morocco's claims to
Mauritania.
Morocco plans to ask the
forthcoming United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly to refer the is-
sue to the International Court
of Justice and, in the meantime,
to refrain from recognizing
Mauritanian independence. Mo-
roccan Crown Prince Moulay
O STATUTE MILES 500
8 SEPTEMBER ;960
UNCLASSIFIED
SECRET
Hassan, who will ini-
tially head Morocco's
UN delegation, may
again suggest--as he
did in June--that a
referendum in Mauri-
tania would be an ac-
ceptable solution.
Nevertheless, territo-
rial aggrandizement
has become a popular
issue with left-wing 25X1
as well as right-wing
Moroccan nationalists.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
Jordan-LIAR
Tensions remain high be-
tween Amman and Cairo in the
wake of the assassination of
Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli
on 29 August. The Jordanian
radio and newspapers continue
to charge LIAR complicity in the
crime, and crowds of demonstra-
tors have milled about the
streets of Amman shouting "Death
to Nasir."
The UAR Government has in-
dicated that it has no intention
of complying with Jordan's re-
quest for extradition of the
two Jordanian nations who
slipped across the border into
Syria after allegedly setting
the time bombs in the prime min-
ister's offices. Radio Cairo
has suggested that King Husayn's
greatest service to his country
would be to resign.
Husayn is concerned about
the possibility of an attempt on
his life and has threatened ex-
treme measures against any
further LIAR-sponsored or UAR-
inspired subversive action
against Jordan. In response, a
Cairo newspaper headlined "His
Majesty Mickey Mouse Threatens
Us With War."
Israel's reaction to the
assassination of Majalli has
been one of concern over the
possible fate of Jordan, which
shares a 330-mile border with
Israel. Israel has long pre-
ferred Husayn's relatively weak
and less hostile regime to the
possibility of a Nasir-controlled
or -influenced government in
Jordan. Israeli armed forces
maintained a careful watch
following the assassination.
Later, when it was apparent that
the Jordanian Government was
still in firm control of the
situation, Israeli Foreign Min-
ister Meir expressed admiration
for the King.
The regime in Iran continues
attempting to regain public
confidence after admitting that
last month's elections were
rigged and canceling those not
yet held. The new premier,
Sharif Emami, has selected his
"nonpolitical" cabinet, which
contains nine new members and
six holdovers from the Eqbal
cabinet. On 3 September, the
Shah convened the committee
which is to amend the electoral
law in preparation for new
elections at some undesignated
future time. The Shah has still
not solved the problem of how
to obtain an obedient; parlia-
ment while giving the appearance
of holding free elections. He
may well believe that if he
fails a second time, he may
have no further opportunities.
The nationalists, suppressed
since the downfall of Premier
Mossadeq in 1953, and other po-
litical opportunists see the
situation as more open to ex-
ploitation than any in the past
several years and are becoming
increasingly active. The secu-
rity forces, while still capable
of strong action, have been cau-
tious in handling initial public
demonstrations promoted by the
opposition.
Middle East Oil Conference
Sheik Abdullah al-Tariki,
Saudi Arabian oil boss, and
Antonio Araujo, Venezuelan am-
bassador to Cairo, Baghdad, and
Jidda, have set up a high-level
meeting in Baghdad on 10 Septem-
ber aimed at adopting a "unified
attitude" against the oil com-
panies for reducing prices
"unilaterally and without con-
sultations." Iraq's Oil Ministry
has invited representatives of
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Iran,
and Venezuela. These countries
produce about 8,000,000 barrels
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
a day--almost half of the free
world's crude oil production-
and account for most of the
crude oil"moving in international
trade.
The UAR, which recently
broke relations with Iran, ap-
parently has not been invited.
This o istion,and the choice of
Baghdad rather than Cairo for
the' conference site, may. be de-
signed to ensure Iranian at-
tendance, The meeting was
probably sparked by the Ruler
of Kuwait, who asked Tariki,
following the early August price
cuts, to call are emergency,pro-
test meeting of Arab states,
Venezuela will be represent-
ed by Juan Perez Alfonzo, Vene-
zuelan minister of mines and
hydrocarbons. He and Tariki'
have long advocated a scheme of
government-controlled world-wide
sharing of markets and price
maintenance, but until. the re-
cant puts they were unable to
wain any important support from
other Persian Gulf countries,
It is not at all certain that
Tariki's scheme'has the sanction
of the Saudi Government, nor is
it clear that Perez would be
able to convince Venezuelan
President Betancourt to commit
his government.
Despite the surface im-
pression of Arab-Venezuelan-
Iranian unity of interest in
the pricing question, there are
deep economic and political
divergencies which would tend
to prevent a world-wide scheme
from operating successfully.
POLITICAL.DETERIORATION IN BURMA
Burma appears headed for a
period of increased political
tension and a possible showdown
between the army and Prime Minis-
tat Nu.
Army leaders, who opposed
Nu's return to office last April,
are increasingly dissatisfied
with the government's adminis-
:trat the : stagnation and Nu' s
conciliation, of leftist opposi-
tion groups. They are plan-
ning to urge General Na Win to
intervene with Nu to obtain'more
forceful leadership and adminis-
trative discipline. They re-
sent the, speed with which Nu has
countermanded many of the reforms
made during the general's 18-
month military regime and fear
that the ruling Union party may
attempt to undermine army in-
fluence and solidarity by creat-
ing party units within the army
or by developing the police as
a counterforcem If the situation
fails to improve, Ne Win's lieu-
tenants may attempt, without Ne
Win, to oust the government,
General Ne Win, who has
just returned from three months
abroad, is also concerned about
the government's deterioration
since he left the premiership
and undoubtedly will warn Nu of
the army's' dissatisfaction with
the government's indecision and
drift. However, No Win is likely
to oppose any direct army action
at this time, both because of
his personal distaste for polit-
ical office and because of the
discontent, and possible civil
strife; which would probably
follow a second military take-
over. The February elections
illustrated both'the army's
unpopularity and Nu's widespread
support.
Ne Win may not be able to
restrain his colleagues indefi-
nitely, however. His command of
the army's loyalty is reported
to have slipped since, he resigned
s prime'. minister, and the
army tends to blame him for his
decision to reinstate Nu as
prime minister.
Prime Minister Nu may re-
spond by attempting to tighten
his administrative disciplines
If he does, however, he faces
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
the prospect of revolt within
his party, which is a loose
coalition of divergent factions.
Despite his popular following,
he has been unable to enforce
discipline even on minor issues
INDONESIA AND THE KAREL DOORMAN CONTROVERSY
Tokyo's decision on 3 Sep-
tember to cancel the good-will
visit of the Dutch aircraft
carrier Karel Doorman to Yoko-
hama, as the result of Indo-
nesian pressures, has provoked
a bitter reaction in The Hague.
Foreign Minister Luns is con-
sidering withdrawing the Dutch
ambassador from Tokyo but not
breaking relations with Japan.
Japan felt compelled to take
action, in view of Indonesia's
threat of commercial and diplo-
matic retaliation if the visit
took place. Tokyo was also in-
fluenced by pressures from Jap-
anese leftist groups and by
warnings from the Japanese am-
bassador in Djakarta that the
Indonesian Communists would
benefit from repercussions of
the visit.
The Karel Doorman, already
en route to Japan when the visit
was canceled, is returning to
West New Guinea before departing
on 17 September for Noumea, New
Caledonia. Its return to New
Guinea will be exploited by
President Sukarno and the Indo-
nesian Communist party to stim-
ulate further anti-Dutch feeling
and demands for the "liberation"
of West New Guinea. Sukarno's
rubber-stamp parliament has
demanded the seizure of remain-
ing Dutch interests in Indonesia
and the possibility has again
been raised of an incident be-
tween the Indonesian Air Force
and the Dutch naval units. If
such should occur, however, it would
probably be the result of a chance
encounter rather than of deliberate
provocation by either side.
of party policy, Any efforts
at effective leadership on his 25X1
part could result in his ouster
through a parliamentary vote of
Sukarno is particularly
eager for a national unifying
issue which he can use to obscure
a domestic crisis precipitated
by the army's ban on Communist
activities in several areas.
He has scheduled a meeting with
national and regional civil and
military officials for 12 Sep-
tember in order to discuss these
bans.
Sukarno also plans. to at-
tend, probably in early October,
the UN General Assembly session
opening on 20 September. He
will deliver an address, report-
edly on world tensions, with
emphasis on colonialism. The
subject of West New Guinea un-
doubtedly will be stressed,
although the Indonesian Govern-
ment has not divulged whether
it will use the occasion to press
its claim to the area. The Dutch,
on the other hand, have indicated
they may advance a proposal out-
side the General Assembly that
they develop New Guinea under
some form of UN supervision.
First Minister Djuanda claims
to have extracted a promise from
the Indonesian Army that the ban
on the Communists will not be
extended to other areas before
the 12 September meeting. Sukarno
at that time will probably insist
that Indonesia's international
prestige requires united national
support for him while he is at
the UN and the cessation of any 25X1
divisive movement such as the
army's anti-Communist campaign.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
SWEDEN'S PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
Sweden's Social Democratic
party, which has held power
alone or in coalition for al-
most three decades, is expected
to lose some voting strength in
the parliamentary elections on
18 September.
Both the Social Democrats
and the generally more conserva-
tive opposition parties regard
the present parliamentary situa-
tion as unsatisfactory, in view
of the almost equal division of
strength between the two blocs.
This situation gives the seven
Communist deputies in the two
chambers controlling power on
key economic legislation--a
fact embarrassing to the govern-
ment, despite its refusal to
solicit Communist support. The
Communists, who have no more
than a nuisance value in Sweden's
political life, are expected to
hold their own. Their decision
to run candidates in all elec-
tion districts is likely to fur-
ther detract from Social Demo-
cratic voting strength.
In an election campaign
marked by a lack of popular in-
terest, the Social Democrats
have sought to rally their sup-
porters among labor, small farm-
ers, and the white-collar work-
ers by warning that today's ex-
tensive social welfare benefits
will be jeopardized if a non-
Socialist government assumes
power. The Conservative, Lib-
eral, and Center parties are
basing their appeal on public
dissatisfaction with the ever-
increasing cost of government
and certain aspects of the social
welfare program.
Foreign policy has not
been a serious issue in the cam-
paign. All the democratic par-
ties subscribe to Sweden's pol-
icy of nonalignment. Social
Democratic leaders have sought
to portray spokesmen of the op-
position parties, particularly
Conservative party leader
Hjalmarson, as not wholehearted-
ly supporting this policy and
favoring closer ties with the
West. The resulting discussion,
however, has served merely to
underscore the broad measure of
agreement among the parties on
the basic points of Sweden's
foreign policy.
The question of acquiring
a nuclear capability has until
recently been sharply debated.
All parties, however, now ac-
cept the government's plan to
defer until 1963 the decision
as to whether to proceed with
actual weapons research.
The strength of the Social
Democrats may decline somewhat
UNCLASSIFIED
SOCIAL
DEMOCRATS
COMMUNIST
LIBERALS
38
231
SEATS
CENTER
PARTY
(AGRARIANS)
32
CONSERVATIVES
45
in line with the general trend
since World War II, but it is
by no means certain that they
will sustain the loss--'three
or four seats--considered nec-
essary to cause Erlander to end
his 15-year premiership. The
opposition parties are already
speculating about the composi-
tion of a successor government,
but their disparity of views
on domestic problems would
create obstacles in seeking a
basis for agreement. A Con-
servative proposal that the
postelection government com-
prise all four democratic par- 25X1
ties has been turned down
by the Social Democrats.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S_tJ)ARY
8 September 1960
SOVIET AGRICULTURAL LEADERSHIP IN FLUX
Top-level party and gov-
ernment direction of Soviet
agriculture remains in the
state of flux apparent more
than a year ago.
On 5 September Moscow
announced the appointment of
Tikhoh Yurkin as minister of
grain products in the Russian
Republic (RSFSR), a post which
had been vacant since the trans-
fer of the incumbent on 25 June.
Yurkin, a long-time agricultural
specialist, succeeds Fedor
Kulakov, who was appointed
party chief of Stavropol Kray.
Kulakov was not officially
removed from his agriculture.,
post until 4 August, however,
and Yurkin was not named as
his replacement until a month
later--circumstances which
appear symptomatic of some
vacillation in the area of
agricultural assignments.
A number of other impor-
tant agricultural posts have
changed hands in recent months.
Georgy Denisov, who headed the
central committee's Department
of Agriculture for the Union
Republics, was switched to the
lesser position of ambassador
to Bulgaria on 21 May, while
the holder of the equivalent
post for the RSFSR, Georgy
Vorobyev, was appointed party
first secretary in Krasnodar
Kray on 9 June.
Although their replace-
ments have not yet been identi-
fied, the continued existence
of the key centers of party
control of agriculture--the
central committee departments--
was indicated in the Soviet
press on 9 July. It is possi-
ble that one of the two posts
has been filled by Stepan
Kaichenko, who was transferred
on 15 June from his assignment
as RSFSR minister of agricul-
ture to unspecified "other
work."
The latest round of
changes in Soviet agricultural
positions--each of the posts
affected had been newly filled
at about the same time only
a year earlier--is undoubtedly
an aftermath of the disappoint-
ing farm production in 1959.
There are, at the same time,
some signs that the Kremlin
hierarchy, either because of
indecisiveness or contention,
is having difficulty giving
firm direction to the perennial
"soft spot" in the Soviet econ-
omy.
Apart from some "paternal
advice" delivered by Khrushchev
during a recent visit to his
native village, Kalinovka, the
Soviet party chief has had vir-
tually nothing to say since the
central committee plenum last
December on a subject long dear
to his heart. There has as yet
been no indication that his
presumed top agricultural aide,
Nikolay Ignatov, who was trans-
ferred from the party secretariat
to the Council of Ministers last
May, has retained his role in
agricultural supervision,
The December central com-
mittee meeting, which appeared
at first to be on the verge of
enacting significant changes in
agricultural organization,
trailed off into inconclusiveness
and ambiguity. A more recent
conclave of agricultural
specialists, held in the Kremlin
from 14 to 17 June under the
auspices of the Ministry of
Agriculture, concerned itself
mainly with technical prob-
lems. Although the larger
issues of reorganization were
raised, the gathering obviously
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
did not have the authority to
make final decisions on out-
standing matters, some of
which had been consigned to
the party presidium for solu-
tion by the central committee
last December.
With Khrushchev on vaca-
tion and Ignatov merely present
and not heard from, the meet-
ing was dominated by the USSR
minister of agriculture,
Vladimir Matskevich. Although
he is an alumnus of Khrushchev's
old Ukrainian apparatus,
Matskevich has been heavily
buffeted by official criticism
and appears to be more repre-
sentative of the specialist's
point of view than of the
party-political command's.
With Khrushchev set to
embark on a new series of in-
ternational junkets and no
central committee meeting
scheduled for the immediate
future, there is no clear in-
dication as to when new
measures affecting agriculture
will be undertaken. However,
it seems likely that a special
effort will be made to resolve
some of the outstanding issues
before the next party congress
scheduled for late 1960 or
early 1961.
PROPOSED CHANGES IN SOVIET ECONOMIC PLANNING
Details of a proposal to
create 14 economic coordination
and planning councils were ex-
pounded in a recent issue of
Planned Economy, official organ
of the Soviet State Planning
Committee (Gosplan). A planning
official has confirmed that
establishment of some such coun-
cils is "in the offing."
Other recent refinements in
economic administration and
planning have included the es-
tablishment of republic-level
Councils of National Economy
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 September 1960
(sovnarkhozy) in the RSFSR,
Ukraine, and Kazakhstan and the
transfer of some long-term plan-
ning functions from Gosplan to
the State Scientific-Economic
Council (Gosekonomsovet).
These changes are part
of the regime's continuing ef-
forts to obtain the benefits
of both central control--for ef-
fective planning and the promo-
tion of USSR-wide objectives--
and operational flexibility at
the local level to spur initia-
tive and promote efficiency.
This was expressed early this
year by a Soviet economist as
the need for a "properly com-
bined administrative and eco-
nomic independence of enter-
prises and centralized guidance
by the state."
According to the scheme
presented in Planned Economy,
the Soviet Union will be redi-
vided i-
vided for purposes of regional
planning into 16 basic economic
regions instead of the present
13. So-called "Economic Councils
for the Coordination and Plan-
ning of the Work of the Sovnark-
hozy" are to be created in 14
of these regions, 11 of which
are in the RSFSR. The other
three will cover the rest of
the USSR with the exception of
the south region (Ukraine-Mol-
davia) and Kazakhstan, where
coordination and planning prob-
lems are to be handled by
republic councils of ministers,
republic planning agencies, and
republic sovnarkhozy.
The councils would deal
with territorial planning prob-
lems such as the development
of complementary industries in
adjacent sovnarkhozy within
each natural economic region.
They would provide a type of
coordinated regional develop-
ment which neither the republic'
bodies nor the individual sovnar-
khozy,now accomplish.
The councils would work out
for highe.;r! planning organs pro-
posals and recommendations about
the basic direction of development
in their-respective regions, new
technological developments and
their: effective introduction in
production,: the correct distri-
bution of capital investment,
improvements in specialize-
t1on, cooperation, and
combination of enterprises,:
and better utilization of labor
and natural resources. They
would work out balances for
products to be produced and
consumed mainly within the
boundaries of each economic re-
gion.
The relationship of the
councils to the USSR planning
agencies and the republic sov-
narkhozy has not been revealed.
However, an official of Gosekonom-
sovet informed members