CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002900010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 17, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. - ./ .
OCI NO. 4338/60
1 September 1960
State Dept. review completed DIA review(s)
completed.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
DOCUMENT NO. ,
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
13
C7 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
TS
f : HR 7 DATE:
AufH:
AU HR 70-2
01
DATE: - REVIEW
13 MAY 1980
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
BERLIN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . o , . . . . . Page 1
The East German Government's declaration of 30 August
and the Interior Ministry's decree limiting travel by West
Germans to East Berlin apparently were designed to emphasize
the sovereignty of the Ulbricht regime and its right to
impose sudden and arbitrary controls over civilian travel
to and within the city. The East Germans seized on the
planned meetings of two West German expellee groups in
West Berlin as a pretext to assert their authority in an
area'where the Western position on Berlin is weakest--access
to the city by West Germans. West Berliners still move
freely into all parts of the city, but controls have been
tightened on travel by West Germans to West Berlin, East
German police, in addition have prevented West Germans
from going into East Berlin. Soviet propaganda has
stressed the increasing use of Berlin by the West for pro-
vocative activities and welcomed the timeliness of the
East German warnings. Moscow has also emphasized that
West Berlin is a "permanent source of tension" and that
Bonn has no rights in the city.
SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
There is increasing evidence of strong Soviet pres-
sure on the Chinese party in recent months. In a long
letter to the other participants on the eve of the
Bucharest meeting of Communist parties last June, the
Soviet party sharply criticized Chinese Communist posi-
tions on world Communist strategy and tactics, as well
as Chinese actions in seeking the support of other
parties. Khrushchev may have threatened to reduce or
withdraw Soviet aid to China. There have been several
authoritative Soviet attacks on Chinese policies in July
and August, concurrently with the departure from China
of a substantial number of Soviet technicians, and the bloc
press for the first time has warned that China would be
ruined by separation from the bloc. Khrushchev presumably
wishes to avoid a complete break with Peiping, but his
actions seem designed to convince the Chinese that he is
willing to risk a break if the Chinese do not back down.
Peiping is continuing, however, to defend positions of-
fensive to the Russians.
CONFIDENTIAL
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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? CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
PART I (continued)
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Cuba's walkout from the OAS foreign ministers' meet-
ing on 28 August further isolates the Castro regime from
other hemisphere nations and emphasizes Cuba's rejection
of the inter-American system in favor of greater dependence
on the Sino-Soviet bloc. Havana spokesmen reiterate their
concept of Cuba as the vanguard of the "anti-imperialist"
revolution that will eventually sweep throughout Latin
America. Cuban ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc continue
to be strengthened, as evidenced by the announcement
that diplomatic relations will be established with North
Korea--possibly foreshadowing early recognition of
Communist China--and by expanded contacts by the press
and organized labor with the bloc.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . .
Trujillo apparently is preparing to take over the
presidency of the Dominican Republic, having ruled through
puppets since 1952.
He now is expected to try to liquidate the lead-
ers of the moderate opposition, a move which would open
the way to eventual control by anti-US elements already
favored by recent pro-Communist policies his government
has adopted.
SITUATION IN THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The threat of civil war is mounting following Premier
Lumumba's military action against the secessionist Mining
State of Kasai Province, his preparations against Katanga,
and Katanga's strengthening of the its defenses. In Leopold-
ville, Lumumba's friction with the UN forces has lost him
considerable support among African countries; this was re-
flected in the final resolution of the African States
Conference which called for loyal cooperation with the
UN. The influence of the Soviet bloc, however, continues
to grow in Congolese Government circles and may be further
increased by the arrival of 10 IL-14 aircraft engaged in
a foodlift from the USSR.
SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . .
. Page 10
. Page 14
Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi have put together
a compromise government which appears to have the ac-
ceptance of all the major figures in the conflict generat-
ed by Captain Kong Le's takeover of Vientiane on 9 August.
Kong be raised last-minute objections to the inclusion
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CONF1DFNTIA1
CU
RRENT INTELLKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
PART I (continued)
of Phoumi and one of Phoumi?s close associates in the
cabinet, but was apparently induced by Souvanna to drop
his opposition to the government. Souvanna can be ex-
pected to attempt to carry out his pledges of strict
neutrality and an accommodation with the Pathet Lao,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CHINA'S ECONOMIC DEPENDENCE ON THE USSR . , o , , , , , , Page 1
The departure of substantial numbers of Soviet techni-
cians from China this summer raises the question of a pos-
sible corollary reduction in trade and Soviet material and
technical assistance to China?s industrialization effort.
Approximately half of the 291 Soviet aid projects in
China, which constitute the core of Peiping?s industriali-
zation program, are not yet in operation, and termination
of Soviet aid would seriously disrupt Peiping's program,
AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN CHINA. . . . . . . , , , , . Page 4
The food situation in Communist China continues to be
tight, with little prospect for improvement in the near
future. The tone and emphasis of recent press articles
appear to confirm signs that Peiping has decided to give
agriculture first consideration in the allocation of man-
power, materials, and money, but there is no indication
of what specific measures may be undertaken to supplement
existing agricultural programs.
KHRUSHCHEV?S VISIT TO FINLAND e 4 0 o v e e n o 0 0 0
Page 5
Khrushchev is expected to use his visit to Helsinki
from 2 to 4 September to exploit Soviet claims of Scandi-
navian involvement in the U-2 incident, and press his
campaign against US overseas bases. Soviet initiative
in arranging the visit and the absence of any pressing
bilateral problems suggest Khrushchev is seeking a
propaganda forum outside the bloc to announce his in-
tention of attending the UN General Assembly meeting
and urging world leaders to follow suite Soviet com-
mentary on the visit also suggests that Khrushchev may
set the stage for a UN appearance by reaffirming his
peaceful coexistence policy and his continuing interest
in high-level exchanges, citing Soviet-Finhish relations
as an example of the successful application of these
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? LOIVFIDENTJAJWCUR
RENT INTELLIGEN EEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
PART II (continued)
SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Several important internal political questions have
remained unanswered throughout the protracted Moscow vaca-
tion season. These questions include the personal
of Khrushchev since the May party plenum,
ranking of his immediate subordinates, and the possibility
that new divisions of responsibilities have been created in
the top echelons of both party and government. Khrushchev
returned to Moscow on 28 August after a month's leave, his
fourth vacation this year. Some clarification of these
ir
th
e
problems is likely after all the leaders resume
regular activities.
MOSCOW'S BOUNDARIES EXPANDED . . .
. Page 8
Moscow's boundaries were officially extended on 1S
August, withthe result that the city's area has,more than
doubled. The expansion, which incorporates five smaller
cities and several settlements, raises Moscow's population
by about 500,000 to a new total of 5,600,000. The bound-
aries:,, encompassing the belt highway being built around
Moscow, are the outgrowth of a study now being made on
the long-term development of the city. When complete, the
study will replace a plan adopted in 1935 which provided.
for an ultimate population of 5,000 000 to be distributed
over a city area of 154,000 acres.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS .
The assassination of Jordanian Prime Minister Majalli
on 29 August has caused a new crisis in Jordanian-UAR re-
lations. King Husayn has charged the UAR with "direct
complicity" in the crime. The meeting of Arab League for-
eign ministers in Lebanon ended the day before the as-
sassination with agreement on very little except policies
which the individual member.: states had already been pur-
suing. The USSR has concluded agreements for additional
i id to both the UAR and Iraq. UAR propaganda
a
econom c
is continuing its friendly treatment of the USSR and its
harsh criticism of the United States.
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CONFIDENTIAL
1 September 1960
PART II (continued)
SHAH OF IRAN SEEKS TO AVOID BLAME FOR RIGGED ELECTIONS . . Page 13
The Shah, in an attempt to appease the public and
shift the blame from himself for the openly rigged parlia-
mentary elections in progress since early August, has
forced the resignation of Premier Eqbal and called on
the newly elected Majlis representatives to resign. The
maneuver may appear to the public as forced on the Shah
by the protests of his many domestic enemies, and prob-
ably will not significantly strengthen his regime.
GREEK COMMUNISTS SEEK COMMON FRONT WITH OTHER OPPOSITION
PARTIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Repeated efforts have been made without success during
the past few weeks to unify the Greek non-Communist op-
position parties. The Communist-front United Democratic
Left (EDA), the major opposition party in parliament, hopes
to profit from the feeling that some form of opposition
unity is needed, and has proposed that the nationalist
opposition parties join with it in coordinating their
activities on certain basic issues. Although EDA's ini-
tial overtures have been rejected, some non-Communist
opposition leaders may consent to common action with
the Communists.'
ALGERIA . .
The Algerian rebels, anticipating discussion of the
Algerian issue in the forthcoming UN General Assembly,
are seeking to line up support for their 22 August pro-
posals for a UN-controlled referendum in Algeria. While
hopeful of further overtures from De Gaulle, they are
seeking help from the Arab states to maintain their
guerrilla operations inside Algeria.
ELECTIONS IN THE MALAGASY REPUBLIC . . . . .
Parliamentary elections to be held in the Malagasy
Republic (Madagascar) on 4 September will provide an im-
portant test of strength between President Tsiranana's
pro-Western coalition and the Congress party for the
Independence of Madagascar (AKFM), an extremist opposi-
tion party dominated by hard-core Communists. Tribal
rivalry, the coalition's continued appeal in rural
areas, and the euphoria created by the republic's
attainment last June of independence within the French
community are factors favoring Tsiranana's forces.
However, the AKFM has attracted growing support since
its strong showing in municipal elections last fall.
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cOP4HQEI\lTIAL
CU RRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
PART II (continued)
INDONESIA >. 0 0 0 0 0 0 o a o o g a s o 0 0 0 0 0. Page 18
President Sukarno, the army and the Indonesian
Communist party have begun a new round of maneuvering
precipitated by Sukarno's dissolution of the anti-
Communist Masjumi and Socialist parties which was
followed by the army's ban on Communist party activities
in South Borneo and South Sumatra. The army so far is
taking a stronger position against Sukarno than it has
heretofore attempted; its moves have heightened ten-
sions and could lead to a definitive change in Indonesia's
internal power structure,
CHINESE COMMUNIST FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS AFGHANISTAN < , Page 19
Peiping appears generally gratified with the results
of Foreign Minister Chen Yi?s trip to Afghanistan, even
though not all the Chinese objectives were accomplished.
Chinese propaganda,is exploiting the trip and the sign-
ing of a nonaggression treaty as a new example of
China's "peaceful coexistence" in Asia. Chen proposed
to the Turkish and Iranian ambassadors in Kabul that
visits by private individuals be encouraged as a
steppingstone,:: toward official exchanges between their
countries and China,
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET UNEASINESS ABOUT CHINESE POPULATION PRESSURE , o a Page 1
Soviet leaders publicly dismiss as provocative any
suggestion that Chinese population pressures pose a long-
range threat to the USSR. There is, nevertheless, anxiety
in certain official quarters over the population disparity
between China and the Siberian "vacant lot." In addi-
tion, there is some concern that the increasing ratio of
Chinese to Russians--already more than 3 to 1--may eventu-
ally affect the balance of forces as the Chinese'improve
C-UlVt1U~ jV t i iL.
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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co ^ f I DAWL INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
PART III (continued)
in modern technology. Moscow's uneasiness has not been
allayed by Mao's statements implying that China's large
population would be of decisive importance in a nuclear
war, assuring enough survivors to make Peiping the domi-
nant power after other combatants were left prostrate.
USSR TO EMPHASIZE AIR OPERATIONS IN SIXTH ANTARCTIC
SEASON . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The USSR's plans for its sixth season in the Antarctic
(1960-61) include continuation of its ambitious scientific
program, with the prospect for a significant increase in
coverage with the introduction of a turboprop aircraft.
A strip to accommodate heavy aircraft may be built at the
Soviet station, Lazaryev, which will probably be moved
inland to a more permanent site, and plans for an even-
tual increase in the station's winter staff suggest an
indefinite stay. The research and supply vessel Ob will
leave the Soviet Union earlier than usual this year.
The Soviet planned activities will increase the con-
cern of Argentina, Chile, and Australia, and could hamper
ratification of the Antarctic Treaty.
AFGHAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,.,,, .., .
. . . . . . Page 8
Afghan Prime Minister Daud is relying on rapid econom-
ic development to strengthen his regime and reinforce
Afghanistan's independence. This policy has been fairly
successful; the Afghan economy is making progress,
particularly in the transportation field, and Daud is
being given the credit. As he approaches the Second
Five-Year Plan (1961-66), however, Daud seems ready to
accept more than in the past from the USSR in the way
of advice and support.
THE BRAZILIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION .
Janio Quadros, the opposition's
. . . . . . . . . . Page 11
candidate in Brazil's presidential election on 3 October,
has gained strength steadily in the past three months and
now is challenging the 15-year dominance of the moderate
Social Democratic machine. A number of qualified ob-
servers believe
his election would lead to political instability and
possibly dictatorship. Quadros has stated that if
elected, he will renew diplomatic relations with the
USSR and recognize Communist China. President Kubitschek,
who is ineligible to succeed himself, could probably turn
the tide in favor of the Social Democratic candidate,
former War Minister Lott. So far, however, the President
has not taken an active part in the campaign.
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TRR. WEEK TN RRTPF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
BERLIN SITUATION
The'threat to Berlin access
posed by the East German Govern-
ment's declaration on 30 August
and the Interior Ministry's de-
cree apparently was aimed at
emphasizing the ability of the
Ulbricht regime to impose sud-
den and arbitrary controls over
travel to and within the city
rather than to create a major
East-West incident that would
entail a serious risk of a mili-
tary engagement. The East Ger-
man moves do not appear to bear
the earmarks of a sharp change
in Khrushchev's public commit-
ment to maintain the status quo
in Berlin until an attempt is
made at a further round of nego-
tiations.
The Communists probably
hope to create a state of anxie-
ty and uncertainty among the
Western Allies, as well as in
West Berlin, that would under-
mine their unity in the face of
East German or Soviet threats.
Moscow probably considers
that probing actions and har-
assments of the type begun by
the East Germans are necessary
to focus. public attention
on the Berlin question and
maintain pressure on the West
to negotiate.
There are no indications
thus far that the East German
Government intends during the
31 August - 4 September period
covered by the announcement to
block either West German civil-
ian travel or Allied :military
traffic between West Germany and
West Berlin. Nevertheless,
harassment of Allied ground
military traffic and commercial
air traffic remains a possibility.
Tighter controls have been im-
posed on travel by West Germans
to West Berlin, and some travelers
have been turned back at the
zonal border. East German po-
lice have prevented West Germans
from going into East Berlin. West
Berliners still move freely into
East Berlin, although some East
Berliners reportedly have not
been permitted to go into the
Western sectors.
The regime is anxious to
curb the rising refugee flow to
Berlin and to condition the pop-
ulation to tighter controls on
movement to the city. It is
the meeting of the influential
Federation of Expellees--a un-
ion of 31 expellee groups in
West Germany--and the smaller
Union of Returnees, POWs, and
Relatives of Missing Soldiers
that served as the pretext for
the East German threats and strict-
r; ton$rols o i Meetings -Of this 'kind
have been held previously in
West. Berlin.
While Communist propaganda
regularly denounces these or-
ganizations as "revanchist,"
the major barrage has been con-
centrated against plans to hold
a session of the West German
Bundestag in West Berlin this
fall, as has been done for the
CONFIn~~-T~QI
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
past five years. Since the
Bundestag meeting may not be
held in West Berlin this year,
the East Germans may have
seized on the meetings of the
private West German expellee
groups as a pretext to assert
their authority in an area
where the Western po-
sition on Berlin is
weakest--West German
access to the city.
East Germany
probably will warn
the West that even
more drastic restric-
tions will be im-
posed if the Bundes-
tag should meet in
West Berlin. In a
statement issued on
31 August, Bonn
called East German
charges of revanchist
motives in permitting
the expellees' ral-
lies to be held "ab-
surd" and stressed
the right of all
Germans to free ac-
cess to West Berlin.
Bonn gave no indi.ca-
tion that it would
exert pressures on
the expellees to can-
cel the meetings.
West 'Berlin
Mayor Willy Brandt's
visit to East Ber-
lin last week and
the rousing welcome
and applause he re-
-WEST GERMANY AND BERLIN
visit as a "provocation" and im-
plied that any recurrences of
the visit would be met with
rigorous counteraction.
Ulbricht recently returned
from the USSR, where he had
talks with Khrushchev. The
COMMUNICATION ROUTES BETWEEN
ceived from East Berliners ob-
viously stung the Communists.
The Ulbricht propaganda machine
immediately characterized the
Railroad Autobahn --- Road
Canal Air Corridor
Control Points for Allied Traffic:
A Soviet 1 1 A& Allied
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
'n, Last Z1. West
Soviet leader reportedly re-
fused to commit himself to a
specific timetable on Berlin
or to a definite date for a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
separate peace treaty. The
two leaders are said to have
agreed that a stepped-up cam-
paign was necessary to document
the Communist claim that the
Berlin situation could lead to
a grave crisis in international
affairs. East German propagan-
da has long played on the theme
that West Berlin is a center
for provocations and subver-
sion by the "Bonn militarists."
Moscow radio's European serv-
ice on 31 August approved of
East Germany's move against
the "revahchist meetings in
West Berlin."
The East German Government
statement contains a vaguely
worded warning against "misuse"
of the air coridors. While
the statement warns the Allies
that they must bear the conse-
quences for "misusing" the air
corridors, it does not commit
the East Germans to any spe-
cific type of action--or to
any action at all--in imple-
menting the threat to harass
civilian air transportation
between West Germany and Ber-
lin. Since the East Germans
have no physical controls over
the airfields or access to pas-
senger lists, harassment of
civilian aircraft probably
would take the form of buzzing
by fighters in the corridors.
Thus far, there has been
no interference with com-
mercial or military air traf-
fic to Berlin, even though
a number of West German ex-
pellees have flown to Berlin
for the meetings.
The language of the East
German threats appears to have
been deliberately ambiguous
in order to leave the regime
maximum flexibility in choos-
ing measures to implement
its warnings. A more in-
tensive period of probing
actions and political war-
fare may be in the offing
designed to test the deter-
mination of the West to
maintain its rights in Ber-
lin.
The East Germans probably
also hope to demonstrate anew
to the West Berliners that
they occupy an exposed po-
sition and that the Western
powers have a limited capa-
bility to assist them in
the face of determined Com-
munist action. There is also
a possibility that the Ul-
bricht regime will attempt to
interfere with the return to
West Germans to West Germany
at the close of the meetings
of the expellee groups on
the grounds that they were
involved in "provocative"
activities of "revanchist"
organizations in West Ber-
lin.
East German Deputy Foreign
Minister Otto Winzer stated
on 1 September that his
government considered the
four-power agreements on
free access to Berlin
to be null 'and' void. East
Germany is a sovereign state,
he asserted, and is not bound
by any legal obligations con-
tracted by the Soviet Union.
Winzer's statement suggests the
possibility that the ;regime may
attempt to extend its curbs on
West German travel to Berlin
after 4 September.
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,Ja.a,aecr a
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
The Sino-Soviet dispute
over world Communist strategy
and tactics, developing since
1957, has moved into a new and
critical phase since June. The
relationship is now similar in
several respects to the Soviet-
Yugoslav relationship in the
spring of 1948--the period in
which Moscow put pressure on
the Yugoslav party to force a
change in policy or a change in
leadership, the period ending
with the public denunciation
of Yugoslavia by the Cominform.
It was apparent in June
that Peiping was not satisfied
simply by the wrecking of the
summit talks. The Chinese had
long been calling for a funda-
mental change in Soviet policy
and even after the summit they
saw no signs of such a change.
At the meeting of the World
Federation of Trade Unions in
Peiping in early June, the Chi-
nese summoned various other Com-
munist members of the WFTU and
stated their opposition to So-
viet policies throughout the
world. In the public sessions,
the Chinese delegates spoke
strongly against Soviet posi-
tions.
This active Chinese lobby-
ing against Soviet policy in one
of the important arms of the
world Communist movement seems
to have broken Khrushchev's
patience. Immediately after the
WFTU meeting, the Soviet party
took pre-emptive action. Some
of the WFTU delegates were re-
portedly told in Moscow on their
way home that the Sino-Soviet
dispute was very serious, and
that their parties should dis-
cuss the issues and produce a
resolution accusing the Chinese
of violating the November 1957
declaration of the Communist
parties then meeting in Moscow.
Bucharest Meeting
The Bucharest conference
of Communist parties--including
the major European parties--was
used by the Russians to launch
their offensive against the Chi-
nese party within the ranks of
the world Communist movement. 25X1
on t o eve o t e uc ares
meetingi the Soviet party dis-
seminated an 80-page letter
strongly criticizing Chinese
Communist positions and Chinese
actions in support of those po-
sitions.
several of the reported Soviet
charges are credible. For ex-
ample, the Soviet letter is
said to have charged the Chinese
with failure to adhere to the
November 1957 dedlaration, of
failing to understand that "peace-
ful coexistence" was necessary,
of opposing the Soviet gradual-
ist policy toward nationalist
movements and government in
the colonial areas, and of re-
fusing to recognize that dis-
armament was a feasible goal.
Khrushchev is also said to have
criticized the Chinese--whether
in the letter or in the Bucharest
meetings is not clear--of lobby-
ing against Soviet positions
in communications to other Com-
munist parties and of attempt-
ing to form pro-Chinese "fac-
tions" in them.
Khrushchev is said also,
at the Bucharest meeting, to
have cited a Chinese refusal
to permit the Russians to con-
struct certain installations
in China for Soviet military
purposes, and to have made deri-
sive remarks about the Chinese
"!Leap forward" and commune pro-
grams. Judging from subsequent
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
developments--the departure of
unusually large numbers of So-
viet technicians in China, some
strong assertions of Chinese
economic independence in the
Chinese party press--and un-
precedented warnings in the
bloc press--Khrushchev may also
have threatened to reduce or
withdraw Soviet material aid to
China if the Chinese did not
back down.
As the Soviet paper Soviet
Latvia recently put it, naming
Communist China for the first
time in the dispute: "Could
one imagine the successful de-
velopment of socialism.. .in
such a big country as, let us
say, China, if this country
were to be isolated,...? Such
a country would be subjected
to an economic blockade by the
capitalist countries and ex-
posed to military blows...."
indicative of an effort to pre-
pare the Russian people psycho-
logically for the possibility
of a break, is similar to the
boycott placed on commentary
about Yugoslavia in the spring
of 1948.
Concurrently with the sud-
den withdrawal of some part of
the Soviet technical force in
China, and just after a secret
meeting of Chinese party lead-
ers in Shanghai, a Shanghai
journal published a bristling
article which has since been
reprinted in the party's offi-
cial People's Daily. The arti-
cle emphasized the advisability
of relying on "one's own ef-
forts." It also accused un-
named "reactionaries in various
countries" of being "unwilling
for us to accelerate socialist
construction and rapidly pre-
pare the conditions for advanc-
ing to Communism."
July Plenum
At the mid-July plenum of
the Soviet central committee
following the Bucharest confer-
ence, there was evidently a
lengthy discussion of the Sino-
Soviet relationship. The plenum
resolution contained the most
serious--if still implicit--
formal charges against the Chi-
nese that have yet been made by
the Russians, charges of "left-
wing deviation" and "narrow na-
tionalism." These charges were
similar to--although not as
strong as--the Cominform resolu-
tion of June 1948 which expelled
the Yugoslav party.
Shortly after the plenum,
withdrawals of some Soviet ad-
visers evidently began. Also
in early or mid-July, Moscow
radio began to boycott China
in commentary to the Russian
audience--a boycott that has
now lasted for the unprecedent-
edly long period of almost two
months. This boycott, perhaps
There were similar emotion-
al passages in the mid-August
article in Red Flag by Li Fu-
chun, a politburo member re-
sponsible for long-range econom-
ic planning. Li cited the
hatred of China by imperialists,
reactionaries, modern. revision-
ists and "those who echo them,"
and declared that their "anti-
Chinese activity" simply proved
that "we' are real Marxist-Len-
inists and...are not doing badly."
Li's article discussed Peiping's
new policy of greater attention
to developing agriculture--a
policy which, while presumably
reflecting official concern over
food shortages in China, may
also indicate an expectation of
reduced Soviet aid to industry.
At the same time, more than
a dozen increasingly severe,
thinly veiled, authoratative
attacks on Chinese Communist
policies and actions have appeared
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1 September 1960
in Soviet media since the Bucha-
rest conference and the July
plenum. These articles charge
the Chinese with "blasphemy,"
with drawing "absurd" concliL,
sions from the current inter-
national situation, and with
departing from or not properly
understanding Marxism.
More important, as an in-
dication of future Soviet tac-
tics, these articles implicitly
accuse the Chinese of "disor-
ganizing" and "disorienting"
other Communist parties, there-
by endangering the unity of the
international Communist movement;
and they implicitly stress the
primacy of the Soviet Communist
party in the interpretation of
Marxist-Leninist dogma. This
may reflect a Soviet intention
to accuse the Chinese at some
future bloc conclave of "-split-
ting" the international move-
ment.
One of the most significant
recent Soviet counterattacks
against Peiping was that by the
Soviet expert on Eastern ques-
tions, Y. Zhukov, writing in
Pravda on 26 August. In re-
sponse to Peiping's criticism
of the gradualist Soviet stra-
tegy toward nationalist move-
ments and governments in the
uncommitted countries, Zhukov
stresses that "the task of
socialist transformation (i.e.,
Communist take-ovej-) cannot be
mechnically placed as the order
of the day in all countries,"
denies that peaceful coexist-
ence retards the national lib-
eration movement, and claims
that many of the new states in
Asia and Africa are making
satisfactory progress away from
"imperialism"--despite the views
of "hopeless dogmatists" (the
Chinese). Peiping wants a
purer and'faster revolutionary
program in these countries.
November Meeting
the Soviet 25X1
party plans an-
ot er confrohtation with the
Chinese in November, at a Mos-
cow meeting in which a commis-
sion of Communist parties is
to "judge" the dispute. The
commission is reportedly to in-
clude, at Chinese insistence,
some nonbloc Communist par-
ties. As of June, Peiping evi-
dently believed that it would
have some support from that
quarter.
The issues between Moscow
and Peiping which may be de-
bated at the Moscow conference
include
1) whether the Soviet pol-
icy of-'low risks, coexistence,
and detente should be replaced
by a more militant revolution-
ary policy thtoughout the globe,
particularly in underdeveloped
and former colonial areas;
2) whether the bloc should
seek to avoid local as well as
general wars on the grounds that
local wars could easily expand
(the Soviet view), or whether
it should support and even in-
cite wars of liberation and
other "just" wars;
3) whether disarmament is
to be seriously negotiated with
the West;
4) whether the Communists
can take power in a large number
of non-Communist countries peace-
fully without resort to armed
uprisings and civil war; and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
5) whether the Communists
in nonbioc countries should
seek to press the "minimum" of
"maximum" program and to what
degree they should ally them-
selves with such non-Communists
as socialists and trade union-
ists.
Khrushchev's Strong Stand
Khrushchev presumably
wishes to avoid a complete
break with the Chinese. His
tactics seem designed to iso-
late and squeeze the Chinese
party and thus to induce it to
retreat. His actions seem al-
so, however, to have made it
pretty clear to Peiping that
he is willing to accept a break.
Judging from their recent
comment, the Chinese have not
decided to retreat, but have
continued to defend positions
offensive to the Russians. In
addition to Li Fu-chun's arti
cle, a People's Daily editorial
of 13 August rejec a the
"blasphemous talk" of "apolo-
gists for imperialism" who
criticized the Chinese posi-
tion on war. In the latest
comment, People's Daily on 30
August--apparently in response
to the 26 August Pravda arti-
cle on strategy for a uncom-
mitted countries--described So-
viet policy as a "violation"
of.Lenin's views and asserted
that Mao's more aggressive line
was "entirely" consonant with
Lenin's views and with the
views of other Communists
"faithful" to Marxism-Leninism.
Satellites' Stands
East European Communist
leaders have continued to echo
Moscow on key foreign policy
and ideological issues. In
addition, in keeping with the
pattern set by Moscow, the
satellite home services have
given little or no commentary
on Chinese internal developments
since the first week in July.
In Sofia, the Bulgarian
Communist party daily Rabotni-
chesko Delo printed an ar is e
on 797ATg-ust supporting the
Soviet position, and on 25 Au-
gust a Bulgarian agricultural
paper warned that any bloc
party which left the bloc would
be "destroyed by imperialism."
The publication of the article
coincided with the arrival of
Soviet party secretary Kozlov
and Deputy Premier Ignatov in
Sofia. The Soviet leaders, in
talks with top-ranking Bulgarian
party members at the national
and local level, presumably
used the occasion to explain
the Soviet side of the con-
troversy with China and to en-
sure unity of action within the
Bulgarian party.
All three Asian satellites--
North Korean, North Vietnam,
and Mongolia--have shown re-
luctance to choose sides in the
dispute. After some initial
efforts at holding on neutral
ground, however, Mongolia pro-
vided Moscow with its strongest
endorsement by an Asian Communist
regime in a 14 August editorial
supporting Soviet views on peace-
ful coexistence.
Pyongyang, although it has
not gone as far as the Mongolians
--or the Russians--in implicit
criticism of the Chinese, has ac-
cepted the basic tenets of Khru-
shchev's policies in a recent party
resolution. In a mid-August state-
ment on the Bucharest meeting,
Hanoi simply avoided all ideolog-
ical pronouncements which could be
construed as support for either
side and confined itself to plati-
tudes about the need for bloc
unity.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
Cuba's walkout from the
OAS foreign ministers' meeting
on 28 August further isolates
the Castro regime from other
hemisphere nations and emphasizes
to them that the Cuban Govern-
ment has rejected the inter-
American system in favor of
greater dependence on support
from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Cuba
notified the foreign ministers
that it will again charge the US
with economic aggression before
the UN Security Council. For-
eign Minister Roa's speeches at
the OAS meeting and subsequent
comment by Fidel Castro and
Roa and the official Cuban press
clearly state that the Castro
regime regards itself as the
vanguard of the "anti-imperialist"
revolution that will eventually
sweep Latin America.
The Cuban press and radio
have unleashed .a torrent of
abuse against the OAS, which
Radio Mambi, the most virulent,
called "a gang of churls, a con-
clave o-r lackeys under the or-
ders of the powerful and bestial
imperialism." On 30 August,
Fidel Castro condemned the for-
eign ministers as "docile serv-
ants.m of imperialism" who
"betrayed" the people of Latin
America by siding at the OAS
meeting with the "aggressor
nation" rather than with the
"heroic Cuban people." All the
other Latin American governments,
he said, are controlled by mili-
tary and economic oligarchies
linked to "imperialism." "Our
country," he added, "has had the
honor of initiating the American
rebellion against the Yankee
empire."
The OAS meetings have had
serious repercussions on the
domestic; political scenes in
two South American countries.
The Presidents of Venezuela and
Peru may have a showdown with
their foreign ministers for not
following instructions to sup-
port a firm resolution against
Soviet bloc intervention in the
hemisphere.
The resignation.of these
officials, whose actions and
statements at San Jose were
unfavorable to the US and large-
ly sympathetic to the Castro
regime, could stir serious po-
litical reactions in their coun-
tries, where pro-Castro groups
are promoting unrest. The resig-
nation of Venezuelan Foreign
Minister Arcaya, whose party has
allied itself with other left-
ists and Communists, in support
of Castro, would be a potential
threat to President Betancourt's
coalition and a pretext for fur-
ther protest demonstrations.
Moscow signified its inten-
tion of continuing strong sup-
port for Castro by issuing a
statement by Foreign Minister
Gromyko strongly denouncing the
US for its activities at the
OAS meeting. Criticizing Sec-
retary Herter's speech of 25 Aug-
ust, Gromyko claimed that the
US objective at the meeting was
to gain support for "aggressive
policies" toward Cuba by "con-
cocting charges against the
USSR." He challenged the "right"
of the US to regard Latin Ameri-
can affairs as its exclusive con-
cern and defended the right of the
USSR to take an interest in sit-
uations which emerge in other
areas of the world.
Bloc commentators have
generally assessed the OAS meet-
ing as a defeat for US diplo-
macy. A widely broadcast Soviet
commentary picks up the main
point of Gromyko's statement
and concludes that the San Jose
resolution is "not worth the
paper it is written on."
The Castro regime continues
to strengthen its contact with
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NLiL.i\L 4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
the Sino-Soviet bloc. The gov-
ernment announced on 29 August
that Cuba and North Korea had
concluded a cultural exchange
agreement, that the two coun-
tries had agreed to establish
diplomatic relations on the am-
bassadorial level "as soon as
possible," and that a Cuban del-
egation will leave shortly for
Pyongyang to negotiate a trade
treaty. If Cuba grants diplomatic
recognition to the North Korean
regime, it will be the first
nonbloc country to do so.
While the bloc may eventual-
ly render large-scale military
assistance to Cuba., Moscow at the
moment is moving cautiously in
supplying the assistance, probably
in orddr, . to minirA12e, the
SECRET.
Shipments of major
military items, such
as jet aircraft, have
not yet begun. The
delivery of such mil-
itary equipment prob-
ably will be preceded
by training of Cuban
military personnel in
the bloc.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1960
expected reaction in much of
Latin America.
Relations between Cuba
and Dr. Cheddi Jagan, leader
of British Guiana's Communist-
dominated majbrJ ty party, have
been developing rapidly, and
Jagan announced in a press con-
ference in Havana on 25 August
that Cuba had agreed to furnish
his government with a $5 000 000
loan and technical aid.
On the domestic front, the
drastic purge of naval personnel
after the alleged discovery of
an antigovernment plot in the
navy has apparently been largely
concluded. The army and militia
units are exercising complete
control of-naval facilities un-
til leftist Lieutenant Commander
Cainas can reorganize the navy
to the satisfaction of Armed
Forces Minister Raul Castro.
The government has renewed
its charges that "pirate" air-
craft are making hostile incur-
sions over Cuban territory.
It is possible, however, that
the flights were engineered by
the Cuban Government itself in
an effort to arouse Cubans
further against the United States.
Fidel Castro on 30 August accused
"agents of Yankee imperialism"
of planning to shoot down For- 25X1
eign Minister Roa's plane on his
return flight from San Jose.
Generalissimo Trujillo
apparently is preparing to take
over the presidency of the
Dominican Republic, havirig:-ruled
through puppets since 1952. The
regime-controlled Radio Caribe
began to criticize President
Balaguer on 27 August and to
urge that Trujillo be appointed
secretary of state for the
armed forces. If Balaguer re-
signs, the secretary of state
for armed forces is constitu-
tionally next in line to be-
come president.
Trujillo continues to be
vindictive over the OAS foreign
ministers' vote on 20 August
to apply diplomatic and economic
sanctions against his regime.
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1 September 1960
The estimated value of private
US investment in the Dominican
Republic is $200,000,000.
The American Embassy, re-
duced to a consulate after re-
lations were broken on 26 August,
stated that it feared Trujillo
would liquidate the leaders of
the moderate and democratically
inclined opposition. Control
might then pass by default to
leftist groups unless the mili-
tary is able to dominate a new
regime. The small pro-Castro
and probably Communist-led op-
position party that Trujillo
has tolerated since June would
be considerably strengthened by
several thousand politically
articulate exiles--many of them
extreme leftists--who are ex-
pected to return as soon as
the regime falls.
The consulate also stated
that "'Trujillo's anti-Communism
has always been a political
device to safeguard his power"
and that he will "play footsie
with the Communists if he can
make momentary gains." Tru-
jillo's official press announced
on 25 August that negotiations
were under way with the New
China News Agency so that "the
impartial information supplied
by the Chinese press organiza-
tion" could keep readers "bet-
ter informed." Since 25 August,
Radio Caribe has been using
items attributed to TASS.
Any successor government
may immediately face severe
economic problems, since Tru-
jillo is expected to convert
the large available stocks of
the country's main exports--
sugar, coffee, cocoa, and beef--
into cash as soon as possible
for his own use.
The former US air attachd
began receiving reports on 26,
August that government troops
supported by tanks are con-
centrating at San Jose de Ocoa--
an interior town where anti-
Trujillo dissidence has been 25X1
hills.
strong--to destroy an insur-
gent force forming in nearby
SITUATION IN THE CONGO
Premier Lumumba's success
in rebuilding some of the units
of the former Force Publique in-
to a Congolese national army and
his deployment of them against
the secessionist "Mining State"
in Kasai Province suggest that
he may in the near future begin
operations against his main ad-
versary, President Tshombd of
Katanga Province.
Although Lumumba's forces
were initially successful in
seizing the "Mining State" cap-
ital of Bakwanga, recent reports,
which are confused and contra-
dictory, allege that his forces
suffered a reversal at the hands
of Baluba tribesmen who rallied
to the secessionist cause and
recaptured Bakwanga, Luputa,
and other points. Nevertheless,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY g;RY
1 September 1960
Lumumba's forces in
Kasai appear to be in
a position to threat-
en Katanga. The
premier may also re-
ceive aid from
Tshombe's tribal op-
ponents in northern
Katanga?
President
Tshombd, who expects
an early invasion at-
tempt by i,umumba' s
forces, is taking de-
fensive measures such
as destroying bridges,
roads, and rail con-
nections with Kasai
to a depth of 12
miles along a 250-
mile frontier. He
has stepped up re-
cruitment and troop
training and plans
to increase his
1,100-man gendarmerie
to 3,000 men within
the next four weeks.
,B~kwanga
RUANDA
URUNDI
~ANGANYIKA
25X1
been a deep-seated problem for
the UN. While Belgium completed
its troop evacuation from the
bases on 30 August--except for
about 1,000 technicians left
to service the bases under agree-
ment with the U' and an addi-
tional 600 personnel discovered
at Kamina on 31 August who
claimed to lack transport for
evacuation--neither Lumumba nor
the USSR is satisfied with the
present arrangement. Soviet UN
delegate.,