CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002800110001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 10, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
C7ATE -ViEa`d
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NEXT RFWE-W G =, ;
4J
COPY NO. 71
OCR NO. 3820/60
CLASS.
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
i r" r,,r!s.t
State Dept. review completed
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'-3
25 August 1960
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow promptly moved to keep alive the issues de-
veloped in the Powers trial by requesting on 20 August that
the UN General Assembly session this fall consider the US
"threat to peace" created by the U-2 and RB-47 incidents.
Soviet propaganda is using the trial to renew charges and
warnings against the use of American overseas bases, and
further diplomatic action on this question will probably
be forthcoming. Moscow is also attempting to give the
impression of correct and legitimate trial procedures to
support the authenticity of its claims that the U-2 was
brought down by a rocket at 68,000 feet. Khrushchev's
appearance at the UN discussion on disarmament continues
to be a strong possibility, and other bloc leaders may
also attend.
CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Cuban leaders have been vitriolic in their condemna-
tion of the United States and its "lackeys" at the OAS
meetings in Costa Rica. In Cuba the proceedings of the
Cuban Communists' eighth national congress have vied with
OAS developments in the press and other propaganda media.
The congress featured the expected violent attacks on US
"imperialism," praise for Fidel Castro and his conduct
of the Cuban revolution, and a call for unity of all
forces backing the Cuban revolution. Representatives of
at least 31 foreign Communist parties, including most
Sino-Soviet bloc parties, were present to express their
solidarity with the Cuban revolution. No Soviet repre-
sentatives have been reported. On the domestic front, there
there are some signs of open, although still sporadic
and uncoordinated, opposition to the Castro regime.
REACTION TO OAS SANCTIONS AGAINST TRUJILLO REGIME . . . . Page 4
The Dominican radio El Caribe announced on 23 August
that it is attempting to open negotiations for the serv-
ices of TASS in order to help counter "imperialist in-
terests opposing the Dominican people." Although
Trujillo apparently is attempting primarily to convince
the United States that any alternative to his control
would be a pro-Castro government, he is believed capable
of attempting an alignment of his regime with Castro or
the Soviet bloc out of spite against t4j~.-United States
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
PART I (continued)
and against his domestic opposition, which is prepon-
derantly anti-Castro. Moscow is likely to be cautious
in responding to such overtures, especially in view of
the unanimity of Latin American opinion against the
Dominican Republic as expressed in the OAS.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Following Congo Premier Lumumba's abrupt withdrawal
of his more extreme charges against Secretary General
Hammarskjold and the UN Command in the Congo, he has
turned his attention to domestic security matters.
Lumumba probably realized his growing isolation from
other African nations and.the USSR's unwillingness to
extend all-out diplomatic support in the face of Afro-
Asian opposition. Brussels' insistence that the final
status of its bases should be bilaterally negotiated
with the Congo Government may provide Lumumba with his
next international issue. Lumumba, in moving troops to
Kasai Province, may be mounting military moves against
Katanga,,even _while he remains wary of his opposition
SITUATION IN LAOS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Premier-designate Souvanna Phouma and General Phoumi,
leader of the countercoup forces, have reached a tentative
agreement looking to a negotiated settlement of the crisis
arising from Captain Kong Le's 9 August coup. The "agree-
ment" could break down over any of a number of points.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
tance to some 28 additional projects.
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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow has informed a number of bloc and nonbloc
Communist parties of the gravity of the Sino-Soviet dis-
pute and presumably its own local party cadres as well.
Radio Moscow's blackout of news commentaries on Chinese
affairs to the Soviet home audience continues for the
sixth consecutive week. Despite the intensification
of the dispute, some cultural exchanges between the two
countries continue, however, Peiping in the past two
weeks has muted its criticism of Soviet positions.
Possibly in reaction to Western press reports that
there has been a withdrawal of Soviet technicians from
China as a result of Sino-Soviet differences, Izvestia 25X1
on 20 August reported that a Soviet-equipped power
plant in China has been completed and cited Soviet assis-
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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25 August 1960
PART II (continued)
ASIAN COMMUNIST LEADERS VISIT MOSCOW . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Two of Asia's top Communists--North Vietnam's Presi-
dent Ho Chi Minh and Mongolia's Premier Tsedenbal--have
made unannounced trips to the Soviet Union within the past
few weeks. The position of the Asian satellites in the
Sino-Soviet dispute would be high on the agenda for dis-
cussions with Soviet leaders, who may find Ho Chi Minh
making some effort at mediation. Ho's trip coincides
with the crisis in Laos and he probably has talked about
Communist strategy in Indochina. North Korea's Premier
Kim I1-sung, who was recently absent from Pyongyang
for six weeks, will have an opportunity to exchange views
with Khrushchev when he plays host to the Soviet premier
in early October. 25X1
EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES AT MIDYEAR . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Midyear economic reports issued by the European
satellites reveal that industry continues to perform
well, but that problems in agriculture persist. Hungary
and Poland have also encountered further difficulties
with foreign trade. Living standards in the satellites
improved slightly. There were numerous minor food short-
ages during the first part of the year, but in East Germany,
poor distribution and the demoralization of recently
collectivized farmers combined with unfavorable weather
to produce shortages which continue to plague the regime.
SOVIET PLANS TO AVOID TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT . .
suiting from the wider use of new technology.
Page 5
Several recent statements by Soviet officials have
discussed the problem of labor displaced by the intro-
duction of new technology in Soviet industry. In addition
to anticipating the need for redistributing labor as the
automation program progresses, the statements seem intended
to reassure workers that there will be no unemployment re-
SOVIET PETROLEUM DELIVERIES TO CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
and will exceed 300,000 tons for the month.
tons of petroleum. Deliveries are up sharply in August
The Soviet Union is supplying sufficient petroleum
to meet Cuba's normal requirements, although certain prod-
ucts--chiefly fuel oil and lubricants--are in short supply
and refineries are operating at less than capacity. Soviet
and Western tankers have made 42 voyages between the Black
Sea and Cuban ports since April, delivering about 550,000
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
PART II (continued)
SITUATION IN MALI FEDERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The breakup of the Mali Federation arising from
Senegal's secession on 20 August raises the possibility
of serious disorders and a realignment of West African
governments. The action confronts France and the UN with
another question of whether to intervene to preserve the
unity of a recently internationally recognized African
state.
AFRICA AND THE COMMON MARKET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Ties between the Common Market (EEC) and the African
territories formally associated with At in 1957 have been
strained by the African independence movement, even though
EEC association is advantageous economically to the emerg-
ing states. The EEC is attempting to retain these ties,
and allocations for African projects from the EEC's
$581,250,000 Overseas Development Fund are continuing.
However, many Africans are suspicious of the Common Market
as a "colonial front," and before 1962, when the present
association convention expires, the EEC itself will have
to decide whether an attempt to continue the "Eurafrican
experiment" on the present basis would be realistic.
TURKEY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The "transitory" military regime in Turkey appears to
be taking on an air of permanence, and the influence of
the military ruling clique is spreading through the lower
echelons of the government. Neutralist sentiments are
making themselves felt both within and outside the govern-
ment, and could lead to a review of Turkey's foreign
policies.
INDIAN AND PAKISTANI LEADERS TO MEET . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
prochement both leaders desire.
Nehru will visit Pakistan on 19 September to sign the
long-delayed Indus waters treaty and hold talks with
Pakistani President Ayub. Ayub is eager to make some
progress toward a solution of the Kashmir problem, but
feels it now is New Delhi's turn to make a conciliatory
gesture. Nehru has indicated a willingness to "discuss"
any matter that is raised, but apparently is still not
ready to engage in substantive negotiations on either
the Kashmir dispute or Ayub's joint defense proposals.
Their meeting could, however, pave the way for general
exploratory talks at a lower level to further the rap-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
PART II (continued)
NEW SOUTH KOREAN GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The new South Korean cabinet of Prime Minister Chang
Myon has been drawn largely from his immediate Democratic
party supporters, who comprise less than half the party's
two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives. His
party opponents, having rejected his offer for a broadly
based cabinet representative of all Democratic elements,
appear bent on forcing the new government from power.
Continued factional conflict between the politicians could
undermine confidence in the post-revolution leadership.
PEIPING SOFTENS ATTITUDE TOWARD INDONESIA . . . . . . . . Page 14
Peiping is following up its recent accommodation with
Burma and Nepal on boundary questions with moves to calm
its dispute with Djakarta over Indonesia's treatment of
Overseas Chinese. Communist China has halted its hostile
propaganda, and Chou En-lai has expressed the belief that
the Overseas Chinese dispute can be resolved amicably.
THE FINNISH POLITICAL SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The most important problems facing the Finnish parlia-
ment which reconvenes in mid-September are the questions
of reconstituting the 20-month-old minority Agrarian
government and the government's seeming unwillingness to
associate Finland with the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA). Decisions to proceed on these problems rest large-
ly with President Kekkonen, who is hesitant to take any
action which might risk Soviet displeasure. Official
procrastination on the EFTA question has aroused increas-
ing impatience among industry spokesmen as well as much
of the press.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The nuclear test ban negotiations recessed on 22
August for five weeks without having resolved the principal
outstanding issues: the number of inspections of sites
where violations are suspected to have occurred, the dura-
tion of a temporary moratorium on small underground tests,
the details of a research program to improve methods of
detecting these tests, and the composition of the control
commission and the various components of the control
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
PART III (continued)
system. Although Moscow appears satisfied with prolong-
ing the talks and thereby continuing the de facto test
moratorium, which has existed nearly two years, its
course of action in the immediate future will be largely
dependent on the US decision whether or not to conduct
unilateral research tests employing nuclear devices.
Khrushchev was warned that the USSR would regard such a
move as freeing it to resume nuclear weapons tests.
STATUS OF SOVIET DOMESTIC TRANSPORT . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Soviet domestic transportation has undergone steady
expansion and modernization in recent years. Since 1950
the total annual ton-miles of freight handled by all modes
of transport has more than doubled. The present transport
system is still hampered, however, by low-quality service,
uneconomical use of labor and equipment, and ineffective
application of modern technology.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS
The memorandum and the
propaganda exploitation of the
trial suggest that Moscow will
take some new diplomatic action
along the lines of its original
protests and warnings. Soviet
propagandists have developed
the idea that the trial should
serve as a lesson to countries
with American bases. The in
dictment and Powers' testimony
involved Sweden, Finland, and
for the first time, West Germany.
While Moscow has continued
to highlight the theme that Amer-
ican policy was indicted and
found guilty for its provocative
and aggressive nature, a major
purpose of the trial has been to
establish the correctness and
legitimacy of the Soviet legal
proceedings. Moscow has taken
pains to avoid any impression
of a staged affair, and both
The objective of this effort
has been to establish the re-
liability of Powers' testimony
as a means of lending credibility
to Soviet claims that the U-2
was brought down by a rocket at
an altitude of 68,000 feet. As
one Soviet commentator noted:
"One can no longer minimize So-
viet antiaircraft defense."
Press reports quote the
Soviet defense attorney as prom-
ising a quick reply from Khru-
shchev to the letter from
Mrs. Powers asking for a chance
to plead for dlemency. The West-
ern press also reports that the
American attorneys accompanying
Mrs. Powers have been invited
to a meeting with Soviet offi-
cials to arrange a possible meet-
ing with Soviet President Brezh-
nev. Although this opens the
way for a grand gesture, Soviet
propaganda has stressed that
the sentence was "just and hu-
mane."
Prior to the trial the So-
viet defense attorney appeared
to be inviting a petition for
clemency from the Powers family,
with the implication that it
might be favorable received.
He explained privately that the
matter would involve two stages,
the first being the trial and
sentence and the second a petition
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Moscow's intention to keep
alive the issues developed in
the Powers trial was under-
scored by its prompt action on
20 August in requesting the UN
General Assembly to consider a
"threat to peace created by US
aggressive acts." Gromyko's
accompanying memorandum to the
UN reviewed the Soviet version
of the U-2 and RB-47 incidents
and renewed charges against
other countries which Moscow
claims have been accomplices of
the United States in these af-
fairs. The memorandum also re-
ferred for the first time to the
interrogation of the crew of the
RB-47 and claimed they stated
that their aircraft belonged to
a unit which "carried out spe-
cial tasks of the nature of mil-
itary intelligence."
the Soviet press and radio have
displayed sensitivity to any
suggestion of pretrial condi-
tioning. Soviet propaganda has
relied heavily on quotes from
nonbloc sources to substantiate
claims of an objective trial
and to refute the idea that
Powers did not testify freely.
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PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
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25 August 1960
to the Presidium of the Supreme
Soviet.
UN General Assembly
Moscow is likely to make
a major propaganda effort in
the UN General Assembly session
that opens on 20 September.F_
Soviet reports and commen-
tary on the proceedings of
the UN Disarmament Commission
stress that Moscow's proposal.
for the heads of government to
attend the General. Assembly was
viewed favorably by commission
members. An indication of new So-
viet willingness to engage in rough-
er treatment of the West was re-
f lected in a report of plans to a-
dopt a "sharper and firmer" bloc at-
tude on the Algerian question in
the UN. 25X1
Cuban leaders have been
vitriolic in their condemnation
of the United States and its
"lackeys" at the OAS foreign
ministers' meetings in Costa
Rica, but inside Cuba the pro-
ceedings of the eighth national
congress of the Communists'
Popular Socialist party (PSP)
have vied with OAS developments
in the press and other propa-
ganda media.
pleas for unity among the forces
backing the Cuban revolution.
PSP Secretary General Bias Roca,
in a 12-hour report to the con-
gress, stressed the "unity" theme
in his call for the "coordina-
tion, cooperation, and fusion
of all the conscious and radical
Cuban revolutionary forces into
a single revolutionary movement
under the leadership of Fidel
Castro."
The PSP congress, which
opened on 16 August and ended
on 22 August, featured the ex-
pected violent attacks on US
"imperialism," almost unreserved
praise for Fidel Castro and his
conduct of the revolution, and
In the report to the con-
gress on the PSP program, it
was emphasized that much remains
to be done, including the "in-
tervention" of remaining US
property, ouster of the United
States from the Guantanamo Naval
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25 August 1960
Base, and completion of the re-
modeling of the government on
the Communist pattern, eliminat-
ing separate judicial, admin-
istrative, and legislative
branches.
The PSP congress was at-
tended by at least 65 "fraternal"
delegates from 31 Communist
parties. Many Latin American
parties were represented, as
well as most Sino-Soviet bloc
parties, who sent relatively
high-level officials. The So-
viet party, however, was ap-
parently not represented by a
central committee member and no
mention has been made of a So-
viet delegate. The French Com-
munist party was represented by
Jacques Duclos, second-ranking
party leader, and the Italian
party by a member of the party
central committee.
Chinese Communist party
central committee member General
Wu E'siu-chuan addressed the con-
gress on 20 August, praising
Cuba for giving Latin Americans
a "brilliant example" in the
struggle for "emancipation from
US domination." Other speakers
criticized Cuba's continued lack
of diplomatic relations with
Communist China.
On the domestic front,
there are some signs of open,
although still uncoordinated
and sporadic, opposition to
the regime. A thorough purge
of the Cuban Navy is now ap-
parently under way, following
the reported discovery of a
plot among naval personnel on
17 August. Although the govern-
ment is maintaining tight se-
crecy on naval developments,
there appears no doubt that the
purge is eliminating the last
stronghold of moderate elements
in the Cuban bureaucracy.
Anti-Castro guerrilla
groups have stepped up their
activity in the mountains and
foothills of Las Villas and
Camaguey provinces. Small guer-
rilla bands have attacked
militia units and in some cases
small army garrisons, seizing
their weapons. The government's
concern is evident ih its ef-
forts to eliminate the guerrilla
bands.
The militia, which all
Cubans are regularly being urged
to join, now may have reached a
total strength of 200,000. Cas-
tro addressed 2,000 newly grad-
uated militiamen in Pinar del
Rio Province on 21 August, de-
claring that a "people armed
to the teeth" is Cuba's answer
to "the intrigues and ma-
neuvers of imperialism"
against Cuba.
Church-state friction is
rising, and church officials
are convinced that the regime
is inspiring and directing the
frequent demonstrations against
churchgoers. The wounding and
arrest of a Jesuit priest by
Cuban G-2 agents on 19 August
may lead to new violence as news
of the incident spreads.
Fidel Castro's remarks in
a long speech before a meeting
of Cuban women on 23 August
probably forecast Cuba's posi-
tion-,of support for the Soviet
Union on all issues at the UN
General Assembly session which
opens on 20 September, including
support for the admission of
Communist China. He said,
"The imperialists must know...
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
that Cuba will no longer vote
in the UN at the bidding of
their index finger. We shall
be the friends of the USSR and
of the Chinese People's Republic
because they have proved to be
our friends, while the imperi-
alists attack us and want to
destroy us." Last year Cuba
was the first Latin American
nation to abstain on the issue
of Chinese Communist represen-
tation in the UN.
REACTION OF TRUJILLO REGIME TO OAS SANCTIONS
Generalissimo Rafael Tru-
jillo has reacted with character-
istic vindictiveness to the OAS
foreign ministers' vote of 20
August to apply diplomatic and
economic sanctions against his
regime. His controlled press
and radio are attacking the
United States, which he blames
for the OAS action. Some of
this propaganda is clearly pro-
Castro and pro-USSR.
There are also indications
that Trujillo may be seriously
considering an attempt to align
his regime with the Soviet bloc
out of spite. Moscow would prob-
ably respond to any Dominican
overtures with caution, especial-
ly in view of the unanimous
Latin American condemnation of
the Trujillo regime. A leading
Dominican dissident told the
American Embassy on 22 August
that the dictator's son, now in
Europe, wants to visit Moscow,
and a Dominican consul in Europe
expects Trujillo to ally him-
self with Castro.
The Dominican radio El
Caribe announced on 23 August
that it is attempting to open
negotiations for the services
of TA SS in order to help counter
"imperialist interests opposing
the Dominican people." El
Caribe, which in recent weeks
has broadcast pro-Castro and
and pro-Soviet propaganda, re-
sponded to the OAS decision by
declaring, "We clearly see how
futile it is for us to be anti-
Communist." There is no indica-
tion, however, that this line is
anything but an expression of
Trujillo's own vindictiveness.
The regime's leading station,
La Voz Dominicana, which is also
attacking the United States,
continues to style the Dominican
Republic as "the most anti-Com-
munist country in America," and
vows to continue its "noble strug-
gle against Communism."
Although Trujillo appears
to be attempting primarily to
convince the United States that
any alternative to his control
would be a pro-Castro regime, he
also seems determined that if he
falls, he will have revenge on the
United States by leaving a herit-
age of anti-US, pro-Castro
strength in.-the country. His
toleration of a small pro-Castro
opposition party, which has been
very active in recent weeks,
suggests that he may expect that
group to be the only functioning
party in the country if he should
be forced out. Middle-class pro-
fessional groups, strongly anti-
Castro, have borne the brunt of
opposition to Trujillo but have
been ruthlessly suppressed.
Elsewhere in Latin America,
initial reaction to the OAS
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25 August 1960
decision on the Trujillo regime
has been to consider it a major
triumph for the OAS. After the
vote, a gathering of chiefs of
diplomatic missions in Honduras
lavished praise on the US and
key Latin American delegates.
Honduran President Villeda ex-
pressed general jubilance in
commenting, "I was a boy again.
I could hardly resist cheering
before the radio."
The leftist as'well as the
Communist press--at least in
Cuba, Venezuela, and Chile--saw
the resolution as a victory not
only over Trujillo but also over
the United States.
Mexico and Chile responded
immediately to the OAS resolu-
tion by breaking diplomatic
relations with the Dominican
Republic, although prior to
the San Jose meeting both
countries had been reported
reluctant to follow such an
OAS directive. Nicaragua,
Panama, and Guatemala fol-
lowed suit on 23 August.
Prior to the meeting, nine
Latin American countries--
Venezuela, Cuba, Colombia,
Eucador, Peru, Bolivia, Hon-
duras, Uruguay, and Costa
Rica--did not maintain normal
relations with the Trujillo
regime. Other Latin American
governments may be waiting
until the OAS notification of
its call for sanctions is
presented at the United Nations.
Congo Premier Lumumba's
abrupt withdrawal of his more
extreme charges against Sec-
retary General Hammarskjold
and the UN Command in the Con-
go has forestalled an interna-
tional crisis for the time being.
Lumumba had threatened to de-
mand complete withdrawal of the
UN force.
Lumumba's about-face fol-
lowed a Security Council dis-
cussion in which the majority
voiced support for Hammarskjold's
policy of noninterference in
the Katanga dispute. His action
probably stemmed from realiza-
tion of his government's growing
isolation from other African
nations. The USSR withdrew an
anti-Hammarskjold resolution at
the 21 August session when it
failed to gain Asian-African
support. Soviet officials who
are working closely with the
Congo Government will probably
encourage Lumumba in further anti-
UN and anti-Western:moves which
might receive African backing.
The USSR had strongly sup-
ported Lumumba immediately
prior to the 21 August UN Secu-
rity Council meeting. In the
forth official Soviet statement,
issued on 20 August, Moscow con-
gratulated the Congolese on their
success so far, and again went
on record with its standard am-
biguous warning that "peace-lov-
ing countries" would have to
take "other steps" if Belgian
forces were not withdrawn and
alleged plans to "dismember"
the Congo were not abandoned.
The statement contained
Moscow's first reference to
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25 August 1960
SUDAN
Lake A//:,P,111'1
UGANDA
-URUNDI
Lake ~~~~ r~fANGANYIKA
Tangany;kal
Albertville
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
"volunteers," a "flood" of
which could come from among
"loyal friends" on other con-
tinents as well as from African
countries if additioal NATO
units are sent to the Congo.
The Congo on 23 August rejected
Soviet military help, however,
stating it does not need such
volunteers from foreign coun-
tries. The USSR's belated
reference to the possibility
of volunteers is reminiscent
of its similar threat during
Elisabethville
.
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA
AND NYASALAND
the Suez crisis--issued four
days after the Anglo-French
cease -fire was announced.
Soviet delegate Kuznetsov
on 20 August officially demanded
the withdrawal of Canadian troops
from the Congo, and delivered a
statement to Hammarskjold pro-
testing as "completely inadmis-
sible" his plan for a civilian
UN administration to give tech-
nical and administrative as-
sistance to the Congo Government.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
Moscow, alleging that the
US and its allies would occupy
posts which have a "key signifi-
cance" for the economy and all
vital activities of the country,
objected to the exclusion of
Eastern European experts from
among the 65 envisaged in the
plan and to the alleged rele-
gation of African personnel to
"second-rate posts," and charged
such a plan would subordinate
the future development of the
Congo to American interests and
could become a "dangerous
precedent."
Despite his setback in
the UN, Lumumba probably will
return to the offensive. Al-
though Brussels has announced
that its remaining troops in
the Congo will be withdrawn by
30 August, the Belgians reported-
ly plan to leave behind a token
force of "technicians." Brussels'
insistence that the final status
of its bases should be the sub-
ject of bilateral negotiations
with the Congo Government may
provide Lumumba with his next
issue.
Meanwhile, Lumumba prob-
ably hopes to develop a Congo-
lese Army, both as an internal
security force and as a means
by which to force his way into
Katanga. On 23 and 24 August
he airlifted between 600 and
1,000 Congolese soldiers to Kasai
Province, ostensibly to curb
the tribal warfare which once
again has flared between the
Lulua and Baluba tribes. Lu-
mumba probably hopes, however,
that by establishing a pres-
ence in Kasai he can prevent
the establishment by anti-Lu-
mumba Congolese of a separate
province in southern Kasai.
There is also a possibility that
this is the opening move for
military action against
Katanga.
Lumumba's most recent step
to restore the once-effective
Force Publique has been to ap-
point Moroccan General Kettani,
deputy commander of the UN Com-
mand, as his "adviser" in organ-
izing an army. Kettani appears
to have been made available by
Hammarskjold as a means of
bringing the UN Command and
the Congolese Army into closer
coordination. There are press
reports that the over-all UN
force commander, General von
Horn, may be replaced by a
Finnish officer, General A.E.
Martola, who played an im-
portant role in organizing the
UNEF during the Suez crisis.
Lumumba continues to
mainifest uneasiness in his
handling of internal affairs.
A meeting in Elisabethville of
anti-Lumumba Congolese from
several provinces was followed
by new arrests of Belgian "spies"
in Leopoldville and by the
closing down of ferry service
between Leopoldville and Brazza-
ville. Lumumba's fears of
collusion between Tshombe and
President Youlou of the former
French Congo were intensified
when a Belgian airliner which
made a forced landing at Lulua-
bourg on 21 August was found
to be carrying Abako officials
from Brazzaville to Tshombe's
council of war in Elisabethville.
Opposition to Lumumba in
the Leopoldville area remains
sporad-ic and ill defined. The
Congo Senate continues to be a
focal point for criticism of
the regime,but in a governmental
crisis it would probably be
closed down by Lumumba. The
Secessionist Abako has resumed
its criticism of Lumumba, but
appears hamstrung by the con-
tinued support of Lumumba by
Abako and Congo President
Joseph Kasavubu.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2.5 August 1960
A Canadian engineer in
Leopoldville has indicated to
the American Embassy his con-
cern over the presence of an
estimated 60 Soviet and satel-
lite technical personnel in
Leopoldville, which would prob-
ably include doctors, medical
technicians, and aircrew mem-
bers. The number of such per-
sonnel increased following
the arrival
at Matadi on
22
Au-
gust of the
Soviet vessel
Arkhangelsk
with 100 trucks
and
an undisclosed number of tech-
nicians aboard. According to
a Congolese official, Lumumba
is expected to ask for and re- 25X1
ceive in the immediate future
Czech teachers for Congolese
Laotian Premier-designate
Souvanna Phouma and General Phou-
mi, leaders of the countercoup
forces, met in Savannakhet on
23 August and reached a tenta-
tive agreement looking toward a
negotiated settlement of the
crisis set off by Captain Kong
Le 's take-over of Vientiane on 9
August. Souvanna's exposition
of the agreement indicates that
the prime immediate objectives
of both sides are to bring units
in the Vientiane area back un-
der the control of senior com-
manders and to insulate the capi-
tal against any military pres-
sure by the Communist PathetLao
insurgents.
General Ouane, recently re-
installed as armed forces com-
mander, is handling the arrange-
ments for securing the capital,
including the collection of arms
distributed by Kong Le to civil-
ian partisans and possibly to
the Pathet Lao in anticipation
last week of an attack by the
Phoumi forces. Kong Le's Second
Parachute Battalion is said to
be collecting these arms, after
which it is supposed to return
to its barracks about ten miles
outside Vientiane. Meanwhile,
Phoumi will retain elements of
his forces at Paksane, about
100 miles east of Vientiane,
pending notification from Ouane
that the agreed-on security ar-
rangements have been completed.
Souvanna expects this phase
of the agreement to be carried
out by the week end, but he may
be oversanguine in this as in
other aspects of the situation.
Although Souvanna
claims that
arrangements for
of Vientiane have
the
the
securing
full.ap-
25X1
proval of Kong Le, there is no
confirmation from Kong Le him-
self.
Once the military situation
is stabilized, the National As-
sembly will be called on to arbi-
trate the differences between
the two groups. Both Souvanna
and Phoumi apparently agreed that
neither of their groups was the
legal government of Laos. These
deliberations will take place in
Vientiane if the King decides to
come there or in Luang Prabang
if he does not. Souvanna ex-
pects a "national union" govern-
ment, excluding the Pathet Lao,
to emerge.
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25 August 1960
C H I N A
ARA`JAHE I,.
Pakse r
CHAMP ASSAK Attope
The Souvanna-
Phoumi accord came
amid rising tension
in Vientiane caused
by overdrawn reports
that Phoumi's forces
were converging on the
capital. Kong Le had
begun establishing a
defense perimeter.a-
round the capital and
had passed an undis-
closed number of arms
to civilians and ir-
regular military ele-
ments recruited to
participate in defense
of the town. There
were also indications
that he planned to in-
corporate Pathet Lao ele-
ments in his defense
plans and that he pro-
vided new arms to un-
specified Pathet Lao
units.
Souvanna, Ouane,
and perhaps even Kong
Le himself may have de-
liberately overstated
the degree of pro-
spective Pathet Lao in-
volvement in their de-
fense plans in order
to incline Phoumi to-
Although he is not sure he
will be the premier, he is pre-
pared to recommend to the new
government that it offer to re-
integrate the Pathet Lao into
the national community, provided
its members lay down their arms.
He claims Phoumi has agreed to
this tactic, which Souvanna be-
lieves will place the onus on
the Pathet Lao for any continu-
ation of the civil war. Souvan-
na presumably thinks he can in-
duce the Communists to stop
fighting without further con-
cessions, a supposition which
is in all probability unfounded.
ward a settlement. However, if
the situation had been permitted
to drift much longer, or if the
present efforts to resolve the
crisis fall through, Pathet Lao
involvement might be unavoidable.
In Savannakhet, Phoumi had
been making substantial progress,
prior to his meeting with Sou-
vanna, toward - developing a rival
government which could plausibly
claim to enjoy the support of
much of the country outside
Vientiane. Enough National As-
sembly deputies have left Vien-
tiane to put into serious question
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SAY
25 August 1960
the ability of the main body to
have a quorum at the capital.
Phoumi also received an impor-
tacit boost when Prince Boun Qum,
inspector general of the king-
don and a former pretender to
the Laotian throne, joined him
in Savannakhet.
Phoumi had also been gradu-
ally getting his forces organ-
ized for his planned encircle-
ment of Vientiane. However, re-
ports that the road from Pak-
sane to Vientiane was impassable
because of heavy rains, his lack
of air transport, and indications
that Kong Le was establishing
what might be a formidable de-
fense perimeter around Vientiane
probably combined to incline him
toward a compromise with Souvan-
na.
Implementation of the Sou-
vanna-Phoumi accord will be dif-
ficult and could break down over
any of a number of points. Aside
from Kong Le's necessary coopera-
tion, the agreement may founder
over varying interpretations of
its details and methods of im-
plementation, even though Phoumi
has corroborated the broad out-
lines of Souvanna's version of 25X1
the agreement and appears to be
working to carry out its pro-
visions.
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25 August 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Moscow has informed a num-
ber of satellite and nonbioc
Communist parties, and'.presum-
ably ite~`own?:'ocal party?.:aadrss
as Well," :of 'the..-gravity of the
dispute with Communist China
about both domestic and foreign
policies.
These developments suggest
that the Soviet :.hierarchy, in
addition to bringing further
pressure on Peiping through the
international Communist movement,
is taking steps prior to the
projected November meeting of
Communist representatives in
Moscow to offset tthe impact of
a possible open party split
with Peiping.
The US Embassy in Moscow
has reported rumors that during
the discussion of the Sino-
Soviet question at the July
plenum, Suslov said that in the
future the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China would have only
governmental relations and not
party-to-party relations.
Moscow radio continues its
blackout of commentaries on
Chinese affairs to the Soviet
home audience for the sixth con-
secutive week. Moscow continues
to broadcast short news items
on events in China, however.
Possibly in reaction to
Western press reports that there
has been a withdrawal of Soviet
technicians from China as a re-
sult of Sino-Soviet differences,
Izvestia on 20 August reported
that a Soviet-equipped; power
plant in China has been completed
and cited Soviet assistance to
some 28 additional projects. Re-
ports of a large-scale exodus
of Soviet technicians from China
remain unconfirmed.
Since the conclusion of Chi-
na's First Five-Year Plan in
1957, the number of Soviet ad-
visers in China has declined, and
Peiping has appeared eager to op-
erate independently of outside
aid in technical fields. Accord-
ing to foreign diplomats in Pei-
ping, Chinese Communist officials
have stated in response to que-
ries kbout departures of Soviet
personnel that their services
were no longer necessary and
have implied that Chinese na-
tional pride is involved.
The announcement on 23 Au-
gust that Molotov is being trans-
ferred as ambassador to
Mongolia to become the USSR's
representative at the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna appears to be related to
other recent Soviet moves in the
Sino-Soviet dispute. Molotov is
not believed to have been person-
ally involved.'in the dispute or
to have kiven support and encour-
agement to the Chinese leaders.
It seems likely that Moscow is
again using Molotov, long identi-
fled with foreign policy views
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25 August 1960
close to those of the Chinese,
as a symbol in the contest with
Peiping. His removal from Ulan
Bator, a post that has become
more sensitive with the growing
Sino-Soviet tensions, probably
is tended as a further sign of
Moscow's determination to defend
its ideological and political
primacy in the Communist world
against Peiping's challenge.
Despite the intensification
of the dispute between Peiping
and Moscow, cultural exchanges
between the two leading Commu-
nist powers are apparently con-
tinuing. On 14 August a Soviet
dance troupe--the fourth such
group from the USSR this year--
arrived in Peiping. In welcoming
the dancers to China, the Chi-
nese minister of culture on 19
August cited the "indestructible"
unity between Peiping and Moscow.
The meeting in Tashkent on 21
August between Chinese Vice.
Premier Chen Yi, then en route
to Kabul, and Soviet Deputy For-
eign Minister Pushkin--which
protocol-would normally have de- 25X1
manded in any case--may have been
largely concerned with Afghan
problems.
Two of Asia's top Commu-
nists have made unannounced
trips to the Soviet Union with-
in the past few weeks. Both
North Vietnam's President Ho
Chi Minh and Mongolia's Premier
Tsedenbal probably are deeply
concerned about the effects of
the Sino-Soviet feud and may
have discussed this subject and
other Far Eastern issues with
Soviet leaders.
offending either side. While
this strategy seems predicated
on North'-Vietnam's status as a
"poor relation," there may be
some feeling in Hanoi that an
uncommitted Ho Chi Minh could
work with both Soviet and Chi-
nese leaders in an effort to
cool tempers.
A recent central committee
communique pledged the North
Ho Chi Minh appeared in
Moscow on 15 August. His re-
gime normally has shown some
affinity for Peiping's views,
but,since the Bucharest con-
ference in late June, has moved
toward neutral ground in what
appears to be an effort to avoid
Vietnamese party to work for
bloc solidarity. It is unlike-
ly that anyone either in Peiping
or Moscow asked Ho to act as
mediator, but as an Asian Com-
munist with long experience in
the European movement, he may
have set himself this task.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
In any event, it is un-
likely that Ho went to Moscow
solely to talk about Laos,
although this subject and gen-
eral bloc strategy in Indo-
china naturally would arise.
Ho presumably would want to be
back in North Vietnam for the
celebration of "national day"
on 2 September and the party
congress which convenes on 5
September.
Tsedenbal was received at
the Kremlin on 29 July. Of the
three Asian satellites, Mongolia
has been Moscow's most consist-
ent echo throughout the Sino-
Soviet dispute. There is no
evidence of Chinese pressure on
Tsedenbal, yet he must regret
the necessity for choosing
sides between two large neigh-
bors, each of which provides
Mongolia with essential economic
aid. Having faced severe party
factionalism before, Tsedenbal
also may be concerned lest con-
tinued Moscow-Peiping dissension
provide the pretext for a strug-
gle within the Mongolian party.
Tsedenbal does not have Ho
Chi Minh's personal prestige,
EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES AT MIDYEAR
In the first half of 1960,
industry in the European satel-
lites continued to perform well,
but problems in agriculture per-
sisted. Hungary and Poland
have encountered further diffi-
culties with foreign trade, and
living standards, nowhere marked-
ly improved, have stagnated in
Poland. Food shortages were fre-
quent but generally minor except
in East Germany. There, poor
distribution and the demorali-
however, and it is unlikely that
he has any aspiration to serve
as a mediator. In discussions
with Soviet leaders, Tsedenbal
might suggest a greater effort
to re-establish Sino-Soviet rap-
port, but he probably would be
most interested in assessing
the depth of antagonism between
the bloc's two major powers and
its future effect on Mongolia.
North Korea's Premier Kim
Il-sung reappeared in Pyongyang
in early August after an unex-
plained six-week absence. There
is no evidence that Kim had been
to Moscow. Sino-Soviet matters
are sure to be a topic for dis-
cussion when Khrushchev visits
North Korea in early October.
Pyongyang has vacillated during
most of the year-long Peiping-
Moscow disagreement over tactics
to be used against the West,
although its sympathy most often
seems to have been with the Chi-
nese. Since the Bucharest meet-
ing, however, the North Koreans
progressively have adopted a
more orthodox position, parrot- 25X1
ing most of the major ele-
ments of the Soviet line.
zation of recently collecti-
vized farmers combined with un-
favorable weather to produce
shortages which continue to
plague the regime. East Germany
has had to increase food imports,
and several other satellites
probably will have to do so be-
fore the end of the year.
Poland, Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Bulgaria have an-
nounced industrial growth rates
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
of from 9 to 15 percent, which
exceed plan goals, although
the Bulgarian rate was consid-
erably below the previous
year's. A 10-percent rise in
industrial output in East
Germany was smaller than that
recorded in 1959, but may be
larger than had been planned.
The machine-building, chemical,
and electric power industries
registered the largest gains
in most countries.
As in 1959, the three north-
ern satellites showed the most
impressive gains in labor pro-
ductivity, and Poland even re-
duced industrial employment
slightly. Bulgaria, on the
other hand, failed to better its
EASTERN EUROPE: ANNOUNCED PERCENTAGE INCREASES
IN SELECTED ECONOMIC SECTORS
FIRST SIX MONTHS OF 1940 OVER FIRST HALF 19$4
its construction plan, and sev-
eral other satellites failed to
meet schedules for certain proj-
ects, including some important
industrial ones.
Although midyear announce-
ments attempt to give an impres-
sion of important progress in
agriculture, there will be
little change this year from the
1959 level of production for the
area as a whole. Unfavorable
weather and the continued drive
to socialize agriculture in
several satellites are contrib-
utiug factors to the lack of
improvement.
Smaller grain harvests are
in prospect for Poland, Hungary,
and Czechoslovakia,
but increased produc-
tion in Bulgaria, Ru-
mania, and possibly
East Germany may pre-
vent total satellite
grain production from
dropping much below
the 1959 level, which
was above the 1955-59
average. In East Ger-
many and Hungary, the
procurement and supply
systems were disrupted
by the effects of last
winter's collectiviza-
tion. The reorganiza-
tion of wholesale trade
also caused difficul-
ties in East Germany.
Less severe disorgani-
zation of supply and
procurement channels
BULGARIA
SLOVAKIA EAST
SLOVAGERMANY
HUNGARY
POLAND
INDUSTRIAL T1A~11
is
12
1?
1S
9
RETAIL TRADE
TURNOVER
11
7
14
EXPORTS
NA
14
14
NA
IMPORTS
22
12
N A
NA
(RUMANIA RELEASE{? NO SIX-MONTH REPORT)
poor 1959 record in labor pro-
ductivity; the number of indus-
trial workers increased almost
as fast as production. In all
satellites, the quality and
assortment of industrial goods
remained poor.
The investment drive of
1959 slowed somewhat during the
first six months of 1960, ex-
cept in Czechoslovakia. Bul-
garia, as usual, did not meet
has occurred in Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and possibly Bulgaria.
Some gain in consumer wel-
fare during the first half of
1960 is suggested for most satel-
lites by announced retail trade
figures. In Poland, however,
growing emphasis on investment
permitted no improvement in
living conditions. In at least
four satellites--Bulgaria,;Czech-
oslovakia, East Germany, and
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25 August 1960
Poland--a portion of the indus-
trial labor force is having to
meet higher work norms. Morale
was also adversely affected in
East Germany add Hungary by the
intemperate collectivization
policies.
Foreign trade turnover in
the satellites continued to ex-
pand rapidly, but the rate of
growth for 1960 as a whole prob-
ably will not reach that of last
year. Imports increased more
rapidly than exports in Czech-
oslovakia and Poland and twice
as fast as exports in Hungary.
Poland and Hungary will incur
still larger trade deficits this
year than last, unless these 25X1
trends are reversed. during
the remainder of the year.
SOVIET PLANS TO AVOID TECHNOLOGICAL UNEMPLOYMENT
Several recent statements
by Soviet officials have dis-
cussed the problem of labor
displaced by the introduction
of new technology in Soviet in-
dustry. In addition to antic-
ipating the need for redistrib-
uting labor as the automation
program progresses and the pres-
ent labor shortage is alleviated,
the statements seem intended to
reassure workers that there will
be no unemployment resulting
from the wider use of new tech-
nology.
At a Soviet party central
committee plenum in July, Trade
Union Chief V. V. Grishin called
on Gosplan and other agencies
to work out measures for im-
proving the use of labor re-
sources as progress is made in
the appliation of new tech-
nology. A Soviet economist writ-
ing in the journal Novy Mir re-
cently noted that some Soviet
factories did not know what to
do with surplus workers, and G.
Zelenko, head of Soviet . vocation-
al ,education, called for a program
for. the retraining. of. such workers.
During the present rela-
tively short supply of labor--
a result of the low birth rates
during World War II--any workers
displaced by new technology will
be needed in other areas of the
economy. This situation will
prevail for the next sever&l
years. There may be isolated
instances of immobility and
temporary labor surpluses, but
existing means for encouraging
workers to go where they are
needed will probably continue
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
to prove adequate, and, as in
the past, workers will be placed
in new jobs in a relatively
short period of time.
atively small costs of transfer-
ring workers and otherwise ad-
justing the growth of the labor
force.
Among the means available
for doing this are the legal
requirement that a Soviet man-
ager seek employment elsewhere
for workers he intends to lay
off, the payment of transport
and other costs for workers mov-
ing to remote areas, and the
system of organized recruitment
and resettlement--ORGNABOR--
which since 1931 has been re-
cruiting workers, including de-
mobilized servicemen, and ar-
ranging for their employment on
a long-term contract basis.
Although no major techno-
logical unemployment is expected
in the next few years, the sit-
uation will begin to change by
1964 as the effect of wartime
birth rates passes and the im
pact of the automation and mech-
anization programs is more fully
felt. The gradual reduction to
a 35-hour workweek, scheduled
for 1964-68, will help. In ad-
dition, other measures, such as
earlier retirement and increas-
ing educational requirement's for
young people, may be taken. The
large gains which are possible
through a major improvement in
technology will outweigh the rel-
The problem of surplus labor
on the farms was discussed re-
cently by Soviet Academician
S. Strumilin, who pointed out
that 12,000,000 farm workers
could be transferred to other
employment by 1965 if output
and productivity goals are met.
These are unrealistic assump-
tions, however, as both output
and productivity are expected
to be well below plan. Although
the use of employed persons in
an inefficient manner exists
in the agricultural areas to a
much' greater extent than it
does in urban areas, and will
become more important as produc-
tivity improves, it will not
reach by 1965 the proportions
ascribed to it by Strumilin.
The construction of new
enterprises in rural areas and
the use of redundant agricultur-
al labor--on a full- or part-
time basis--in nearby plants is
a possible soluticon,and workers 25X1
from various collective farms are
already being used on an intermit-
tent basis to build roads, construct
irrigation canals, and work
in local industry.
The Soviet Union is sup-
plying Cuba with sufficient pe-
troleum to meet Havana's normal
requirements. Although certain
products--chiefly fuel oil and
lubricants--are in short supply
and the refineries are operating
at less than capacity, there is
no sign of an imminent petroleum
crisis.
From April to 25 August,
36 Soviet and Western tankers
have made 42 voyages between the
Black Sea and Cuban ports,
delivering about 550,000 tons
of petroleum. Cuba's imports
of petroleum prior to the
seizure of the three Western
refineries in July ranged be-
tween 3,000,000 and 3,600,000
tons a year, most of it crude
oil. As the refineries exported
limited amounts of petroleum
products, a rate of 3,000,000
tons annually probably is suf-
ficient to fill present demands.
Soviet POL deliveries are
up sharply in August and will
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25 August 1960
exceed 300,000 tons--an annual
rate in excess of'Cuba 's minimum
needs. In July a total of 165,-
000 tons was delivered as Mos-
cow sought to adjust to its new
Cuban commitments. Precautionary
measures taken in Cuba since the
seizure of the three refineries
apparently have been successful
in averting all but temporary,
local petroleum shortages.
Cuban ports, 27 have been Soviet-
flag vessels, five British,
two Greek, one Danish, and one
Norwegian. Tankers now en
route include Italian, Dutch,
British, and Norwegian, as
well as'Soviet vessels. In
addition, three Polish tankers
have been pulled from their
normal runs in European waters
to be used in the Cuban trade.
There are, however, shortages
of lubricants and of catalysts
used in the refining process, and
fuel oil has not been delivered
or produced in sufficient quan-
tities to meet the demand fully.
Cuba may be able to procure
these products elsewhere; if not,
it can and presumably will be
supplied by the Soviet Union.
The supply of spare parts for
the refineries could become a
major problem.
Some difficulties are aris-
ing in Cuba from the shift to
Soviet petroleum. The embassy
has been reliably informed that
the country's principal iron
and steel company is having
great difficulties in attempt-
ing to operate with Soviet fuel
oil. Its high sulfur content
makes it difficult to obtain a
good surface quality in rolled
steel ingots. The company has
had to shut down pending an
attempt to get fuel oil from
Mexico and Venezuela.
Of the 36 tankers which
have made one or more calls at
There is no indication that
these shipping adjustments
have disrupted Soviet deliveries
to other areas. The USSR's em-
ployment of modern Western tank-
ers capable of carrying up to
25,000 tons has been a signifi-
cant factor in easing the Soviet
burden, both on the Cuban run
and to other destinations. Some
Western tanker owners refused to
transport Soviet oil following
the Cuban confiscation of the
refineries, but the attraction
of Soviet charters in the de-
pressed tanker market has over-
come much of this reluctance.
There is still no firm
figure for the total amount
of petroleum the USSR will de-
liver to Cuba this year, but
it probably will reach 1,500,000
tons and provide for nearly all
Havana's oil imports since July.
The Cuban situation has proved
Moscow's ability to adjust quick-
ly to unforeseen circumstances, 25X1
but two such crises at the same
time could cause considerable
difficulty.
The breakup of the Mali
Federation, arising from Sene-
gal's secession on 20 August,
raises the possibility of
serious disorders and a re-
alignment of West African gov-
ernments. The action also con-
fronts France and the UN with
serious new problems.
The decision of Senegal to
withdraw from the two-nation
federation followed a period of
growing tension between Sene-
galese and Soudanese leaders
because of differences over allo-
cation of top administrative
posts and control of foreign
policy, as well as basic differ-
ences in cultural and historic
tradition.
Since the founding of the
federation in January 1959, when
both components were autonomous
republics, the aggressive and
nationalistic Soudanese under
Modibo Keita--premier of Soudan
and president of the Mali Coun-
cil of Ministers--have increased
their influence at the expense
of the Senegalese. Soudan
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25 August 1960
cause, but opposition
extremist groups in
the Casamance area of
southern Senegal may
cause trouble. In
addition, Soudanese
leaders in mid-August
1 (SOUDAN)
St. Louis'.--.,.
Dakai~ghlR-6AL71J~!^+~?r ~r
Conan ry+
SIERRA'
LEONE
LIEF,_RIA f , \TOGO
._ _ Accra
4 CAMEROUN Gulf of Guinea
RIO MFNONGO s REPUBLIC
REP. OF THE
CONGO
GABON ,
appeared on the way to control-
ling the political fortunes of
Mali despite Soudanese depend-
ence on Senegal's economic re-
sources, which include the
modern port of Dakar and Sene-
gal's greater number of trained
personnel.
The Senegalese leaders--
Premier Mamadou Dia and Leopold
Senghor, president of the Mali
Assembly--apparently had decid-
ed by 12 August to secede at an
early date. They had thought
to postpone the final break for
a few weeks, but were stimulated
to action by Modibo Keita's
declaration of a state of emer-
gency on 19 August and his or-
der to the Soudanese chief of
Mali's army staff to deploy
his troops.
The secessionists seem
firmly established at Dakar,
with general popular backing
and control of the local secu-
rity forces. They are revamp-
ing their government insti-
tutions to serve an independent
state and are seeking foreign
recognition. Most Senegalese
leaders have rallied to the
alerted 25X1
Soudanese residents in
Senegal--at St. Louis,
Thies, Diourbel, and
Fatick--to prepare
for possible political
action.
In Soudan, Keita
and his fellow country-
men in the Mali Gov-
ernment received
heros' welcomes on
their arrival from Dakar. Sou-
danese official and radio com-
ment has been bitter about Sene-
gal's action. There is no evi-
dence of any willingness to
accept secession as a fact.
Keita has little military
strength to use against Senegal,
however, because the overwhelm-
ing majority of Mali's forces--
5,000 troops and 2,000 gendarmes
--are Senegalese, and the 7,000
French Community troops in
Dakar have maintained strict
neutrality.
In reply to Keita's call
for France to use Mali security
forces to "protect the integ-
rity" of Mali territory, Paris
declared on 23 August that the
Community army in the territory
has remained neutral and that
the Senegalese and Soudanese
gendarmerie "receive orders only
from the governments to which
they are detailed."
The breakup of the federa-
tion is a blow to the French
Community and confronts Presi-
dent de Gaulle with a problem of
great delicacy. De Gaulle has
offered his good offices to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
resolve the crisis, but his
statement concerning possible
new relationships between Sene-
gal, Soudan, and the Community
has been sharply attacked by
Keita, who claims France is im-
plicitly backing Senegal and
recognizing the announced se-
cession as a fait accompli.
The Sudanese claim secession
is legally impossible under
the Mali constitution. Pre-
mier Dia of Senegal has pre-
sented his interpretation of the
situation to De Gaulle; Keita
has indicated he will probably
visit Paris in the near future.
French sympathies lie with
the more pro-French Senegalese.
In addition, Paris regards the
Dakar naval base as vital for
the protection of its African
interests.
The French probably were
aware of the impending crisis
early in August.
Soviet and Eastern Europe-
an commentaries have attacked
Paris for backing a "Senegalese
puppet" and claimed the situation
resembles Belgium's action in
backing Katanga in the Congo
crisis. The African states op-
pose the partition, and Emperor
Haile Selassie of Ethiopia has
mildly critictied Senegal's at-
tack on African unity. No
nation has accorded Senegal dip-
lomatic recognition.
The United Nations may be-
come involved, because Senegal
immediately asked for admission
as a separate country, while
Keita has asked for a meeting
of the Security Council and the
dispatch of UN troops. Without
such military or diplomatic aid,
Keita has little chance of
forcing Senegal's compliance.
The breakup of the federa-
tion may strengthen the prestige
of Guinean President Tourd, as
landlocked and poverty-ridden
Soudan may be forced into a close
relationship with Guinea. In 25X1
past years, the nationalist 25X1
movement of Soudan had close
ties with that in Guinea.
AFRICA AND THE COMMON MARKET
African nationalism is
raising problems not only for
the colonial powerM individually
but also for the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC or Common
Market), with which a sizable
part of Africa was more or less
happily associated in 1957.
Since that time most of the
colonies have attained varying
degrees of independence of self-
government, giving rise to a
host of political, financial,
and legal issues in the EEC.
In 1962, moreover, the present
association convention expires,
and the six Common Market coun-
tries will have to decide whether
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S Y
25 August 1960
an attempt to continue the "Eur-
african experiment" on the pres-
ent basis would be realistic.
Preservation of the pres-
ent African-Community ties is
due in large part to the zeal
of such EEC officials as Pres-
ident Hallstein and to the fact
that continued association is
economically advantageous to
The European Economic Community and
? ~r
U K DEN MA uJ
ries
ment Fund. Although slow in
beginning operations, the fund--
maintained by members' annual
contributions--is expected to
have allocated $140,000,000 by
the end of this year, mostly
for social and economic devel-
opment projects in Africa.
These operations are con-
tinuing despite legal technical-
1 EAST
OERLi~I A`~~ OLAND
GRE cE
TUNISIA d S,
African areas associated with the
European Economic Community
in 1957
African areas to be associated with
the European Economic Community
SOUTH
WEST
AFRICA
SOMALI
REPUBLIC
RUANDA
IRUNDI
TANGAN
RHODES,
AND (
YASALAN
the emerging states. The prin-
cipal advantages for these states
are preferential access to the
Community's expanding market for
tropical products and raw ma-
terials and access;to the EEC's
$581,250,000 Overseas Develop-
SECRET
MA! AGAEV
R ER ?UI LIC
ities and African
suspicions that the
EEC is a "colonial
front," a view rein-
forced by efforts of
the colonial powers
to retain an "inter-
mediary" role. The
EEC apparently in-
tends, for example,
to overlook the tech-
nicality that the new
Somali Republic, which
desires to retain its
association, is not
coextensive with the
area of the former
Italian trust ter-
ritory which was linked
to the EEC. Some of
the associated terri-
tories are to be al-
lowed to establish
informal diplomatic
representation with
the EEC, rather than
be represented by the
former administrative
power.
Community offi-
cials responsible for
promoting these ar-
rangements believe
the EEC offers the
only long-run hope of
Europe's retaining a
foothold in Africa.
It is apparent, how-
ever, that they have
a major "selling job"
to do. Establishment
of the Oversos Development Fund,
for example, was major conces-
sion to Paris to secure French
ratification of the Common Mar-
ket treaty. Even if such coun-
tries as West Germany and the
Netherlands are prepared to make
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
larger contributions to African
developmental assistance, they
may prefer to contribute in the
future either directly or
through some broader free world
grouping, such as the projected
Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development.
The Dutch recently have
been critical of the EEC's en-
tire concept of associated ter-
ritories, believing that, by
giving preferential treat-
ment to the former colonies
of the EEC countries and ex-
cluding the colonies of Brit-
ain and others, the EEC is
aggravating the economic
problems and disunity of
Africa.
The three-month-old mili-
tary regime headed by General
Gursel and 37 other officers
appears to be assuming an air
of permanence. The government
has announced a program of
sweeping civil and military re-
forms, and the formal estab-
lishment of "revolutionary
courts" appears designed pri-
marily to discourage opposition
to and criticism of the regime.
According to the American Em-
bassy, some members of the rul-
ing National Unity Committee
(NUC) are coming increasingly
to regard themselves as the
initiators of a "new era" in
Turkish history.
The NUC remains uncommitted
concerning the date on which na-
tional elections will be held,
although some members, includ-
ing Gursel, have suggested 27
May 1961--the first anniversary
of the coup. In recent weeks,
however, some members of the NUC
have given the impression that
they regard themselves as less
transitory than during the ear-
ly days of the coup regime.
Moreover, the spread of mili-
tary influence in the govern-
ment and politics suggests that
the revolutionary regime may
perpetuate itself regardless
of elections, although it will
face growing opposition unless
elections are held by next spring.
The regime's general feel-
ing of security is illustrated
by the reported return of all
army units to normal duties,
although scattered checkpoints
are still maintained.
The compulsory retirement
of senior military officers is
proceeding, and estimates of the
total number to be included con-
tinue to rise. In accordance
with NUC "recommendations,"
virtually all colonels, lieu-
tenant colonels, and their naval
counterparts submitted retire-
ment requests, most of which
were accepted. About 30 percent
of the majors will probably be
removed in September. Wide-
spread personnel changes in the
civil government, including a
major cabinet shuffle, will
probably take place in the near
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
future, and many of the vacated
positions filled by retired of-
ficers.
In foreign policy, a clear
drift toward neutralism has not
yet been identified, but there
are suggestions that some mem-
bers of the government favor a
more independent policy. De-
spite official reaffirmation of
Turkey's Western ties, the
American Embassy has concluded
that recent informal foreign
policy discussions inside the
ruling group could lead to a
serious review of Turkey's
foreign policy. There are also
reports of substantial economic
aid offers from the USSR and
rumors that the provisional gov-
ernment will soon ask the United
States to reduce the number of
its military personnel in Turkey.
Influential elements out-
side government may also be re-
assessing Turkey's relationship
with the West. Some Republican
Peoples' party (RPP) officials
in
Istanbul
are of
25X1
the
opinion
that the
United
States is gradually
losing pres-
tige in the world while the
USSR is gaining. They alleged-
ly feel that the new Turkish
Government should seek-a posi-
tion of
neutrality
similar
to that
of the UAR
"by lean-
ing more
toward the
Russians
and less
toward the
Ameri-
cans."
The recent improvement in
relations between India and
Pakistan has been given new im-
petus with the an-
nouncement that Prime
Minister Nehru will
visit Pakistan on 19
September to sign the
long-delayed treaty on
the division of waters
in the Indus River
Basin and hold talks
with Pakistani Presi-
dent Ayub. Compromise
on the most important
points still disputed
after years of nego-
tiation was reached
recently as a result
of efforts by offi-
cials of the Inter-
national Bank. While
quibbling over remain-
ing details could cause further
delay, both sides now seem de-
termined to resolve this major
dispute and speed development
programs in the region.
Ayub announced on 17 Au-
gust that Nehru 'would meet him
in Karachi to sign the treaty
and then accompany him to a
northern hill resort for sev-
eral days of private talks. The
Pakistani leader has reiterated
his hope that all questions
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
of mutual interest will be con-
sidered, including the dispute
over Kashmir, which remains the
chief obstacle to Indo-Pakistani
cooperation. In two previous
brief meetings with Nehru since
assuming power in 1958, Ayub has
argued that increasing Communist
pressure in Afghanistan and a-
long the Himalayan frontier
makes such cooperation essential
to the security of the subcon-
tinent.
Popular sentiment in Pakistan
on the Kashmir question,, while
less emotional than several
years ago, still runs strongly
against India.
Nehru, while generally en-
dorsing the rapprochement and
authorizing settlements of sev-
eral JessLimportant questions,
has resisted pressure to nego-
tiate on the majors questions.
Since Ayub has made
obvious his impatience
to reach an over-all
settlement, even at
the cost of yielding
on some points, Nehru
may feel India has
more to gain by sit-
ting tight in the ex-
pectation of further
Pakistani concessions.
He apparently realizes,
however, that some
reciprocal gesture on
his part is necessary
now if the improve-
ment in relations is
to continue.
Nehru's lukewarm response
has nettled Ayub, whose recent
statements stress that the suc-
cess of the coming talks will
depend on the "Indian attitude.fi'
Ayub may also calculate that his
government has gone as far as it
can.-to conciliate India without
risking adverse reaction at home.
When pressed in
Parliament recently,
Nehru said he would
"discuss any matter
that is raised" in
his talks with Ayub,
but he apparently is
still not ready for
substantive negotia-
tions either on Kash-
mir or on jointi,defejise propos-
alr... The-.meeting may, however,
lead to exploratory talks on
such questions at a lower level 25X1
in order to further the rap!+
prochement both leaders desire.
The new South Korean cab-
inet of Prime Minister Chang Myon
has been drawn largely from his
immediate Democratic party sup-
porters, who comprise less than
half the party's two-thirds
majority in the powerful House
of Representatives. His party
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
x~a .e uR~
Madhnpuc,
-Canal controlled by India
Canal controlled by Pakistan
A Darn project
'arike ~"
.1r
drozepur .poi Rupar
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
opponents, having rejected his
offer for a broadly based cabi-
net representative of all Demo-
cratic elements, appear bent on
forcing the new government from
power. However, the prime minis-
ter's constitutional authority
to dissolve the lower house and
call new elections after a vote
of no confidence may have a sta-
bilizing effect on the members,
who presumably are not anxious
to face new elections so soon
after those of 29 July.
Most of the new cabinet mem-
bers named on 23 August are long-
time supporters of Chang and,
like him, are believed to be
friendly toward the United States.
Included in the cabinet are two
independents and one member of
the Democratic faction opposed
to Chang: Minister of Education
0 Chon-sok,Minister of Agri-
culture and Forestry Pak Che-
hwan,, and Minister of Transpor-
tation Chong Hon-chu, respec-
tively. Minister of Defense Hyon
Sok-ho, who presumably will be
responsible for carrying out the
Democratic campaign pledge to
cut back military manpower, has
been criticized for his lack of
experience in military affairs.
Minister of Finance Kim Yong-
son has on occasion been criti-
cal of American policies in
Korea, including the various aid
programs.
The differences between the
two major democratic factions
largely concern personalities
rather than policies. Chang on
20 August announced his intention
to assure the political neutral-
ization of the police; strengthen
and broaden South Korea's rela-
tions with the non-Communist
world, including the neutral
nations; agree to UN-supervised
elections in South as well as
North Korea for the purpose of
unification; and take measures
to strengthen and modernize the
economy, including closer eco-
nomic ties with Japan and West
Germany, to help offset dimin-
ished American aid. Regarding
South Korea's long-standing
dispute with Japan, there is
reason to believe Chang may be
more flexible than his op-
ponents, although both advocate
a settlement of outstanding
differences.
Should prolonged factional
strife between the politicians
for personal power undermine
confidence in the post-revolu-
tion leadership, the disgruntled
public might include the United
States among those it blames
for Korea's difficulties. Many
South Koreans appear to expect
an increase in American aid as
a vote of confidence in their
new government. At the same
time, there has developed a
marked increase in local press
allegations that the United
States is attempting to inter-
fere in South Korean domestic
affairs. Such attitudes, in-
cluding Seoul's long-time desire
for a status-of-forces agree- 25X1
ment with the United States,
may invite exploitation by polk-
PEIPING SOFTENS ATTITUDE TOWARD INDONESIA
To help dispel Asian anxie-
ties about Chinese unreasonable-
ness, Peiping is following up
its accommodation on boundary
questions with Burma and Nepal
with moves to calm its dispute
with Djakarta over Indonesia's
treatment of Overseas Chinese.
Relations deteriorated consider-
ably in early July after two
Chinese resisting resettlement
were killed by Indonesian troops
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
in Tjimahi, West Java. Peiping
demanded an apology and com-
pensation for the victims'
families.
Chinese Communist Foreign
Minister Chen Yi told Indonesian
journalists on 5 August that he
was satisfied with Djakarta's
note of 27 July expressing re-
gret over the Tjimahi incident.
Actually, the note had included
an accusation that the Chinese
Communists had instigated the
incident and an offer to pay
only the repatriation expenses
of the victims' families.
Chen also promised to con-
sider the possibility of ending
Peiping's propaganda attacks
against Indonesia, and there
have been no such attacks since
8 August. The abusive radio
propaganda campaign had greatly
annoyed the Indonesians, and
President Sukarno, to show his
displeasure, refused for over
four weeks to receive the Chi-
nese ambassador, who was. seeking
to present "urgent messages"
from Peiping.
In another move toward
better relations, Peiping in
early August agreed to receive
a new Indonesian ambassador.
After the Tjimahi incident, Pei--
ping had indicated the new am-
bassador would not be welcome.
Peiping's new attitude was
again demonstrated on 17 August
by the appearance of Chou En-lai
and other Chinese leaders at an
Indonesian independence day re-
ception in Peiping. Chou on
that occasion expressed the
belief that the Overseas Chinese
dispute was a temporary question
which could be resolved amicably.
He also pledged full support to
Indonesian efforts to gain con-
trol of West New Guinea from
the Netherlands.
Peiping probably hopes
Sino-Indonesian relations will
improve to the extent that it
can point to them, as well as
to progress toward boundary
settlements with Nepal and Burma,
as proof of its willingness to
settle disputes with Asian na-
tions. Trying to suggest that
Indian rather than Chinese in-
flexibility is responsible for
the lack of progress in Sino-
Indian border negotiations,
Peiping says that progress on
Nepalese and Burmese border
questions was possible only
because both sides were willing
to seek a solution.
THE FINNISH POLITICAL SITUATION
The Finnish parliament
which reconvenes in mid-Septem-
ber faces several unresolved
political and economic issues
likely to affect the future of
Prime Minister Sukselainen's
Agrarian minority government.
One of the most pressing is the
question of broadening the
cabinet which took office in
January 1959 following the
"crisis" in Soviet-Finnish re-
lations. The government has
held on in the face of increasing
criticism of its lack of a parlia-
mentary majority and its apparent
willingness to broaden the cabinet
except on Agrarian terms, which
would exclude Social Democratic
participation.
An issue which now seems
to be directly tied to breaking
the government deadlock concerns
Finland's association with the
European Free Trade Association
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
(EFTA). The government has de-
clined to act on this question,
arguing that negotiations must
first be held with the Soviet
Union on the question of most-
favored-nation treatment for
Soviet exports before the way
can be cleared for association
with EFTA.
Nevertheless, the govern-
ment has sought by a number of
oral and written initiatives to
secure Moscow's agreement to
begin the required ministerial-
level negotiations, but thus
far there has been no response.
Prominent government officials,
however, now are taking the line
that action on EFTA may not be
necessary, in view of what they
believe to be its uncertain
future. While they have doubts
about the long-term viability
of EFTA, the Finns would also
have reservations about joining
the grouping if it appeared that
close links between EFTA and
the Common Market were being
considered.
Official procrastination
on this question has made Finnish
industry spokesmen as well as
much of the press increasingly
impatient and has raised demands
for early action when parliament
reconvenes. A measure of the
seriousness with which industry
regards association with EFTA is
its move to match the 20-percent
EFTA tariff reduction which was
effective on 1 July by a similar
reduction in the export prices of
certain wood and paper products..
Much depends on the attitude
of President Kekkonen, who plays
a key role in both the cabinet
and EFTA questions. Kekkonen
is inclined to avoid any steps
which might risk countermeasures
by Moscow, and he takes a gloomy
view of the long-term prospects
for the West in its struggle with
Communism. In what is probably
an effort to justify the delay
on resolving problems, both
Kekkonen and the Agrarian party
have gone out of their way to
emphasize the gravity of decisions
that involve Finland's touchy
relations with Moscow. The
Agrarians are also probably
anxious to use EFTA to bargain
both for favorable terms in
reorganizing the government and
for support on a new farm-income
law.
Meanwhile, the division
within Finnish labor appears
to have solidified and widened.
The regular Social Democrats,
having recently lost control
of the executive committee of
the central trade union confed-
eration (SAK) to a coalition of
dissident Social Democrats and
Communists, are proceeding with
plans to organize a rival trade
union central organization.
The net result of such a step
may be a demoralization of
democratic elements within Fin-
nish labor and, as the Commu-
nists gain further influence 25X1
over SAK policy, increased
labor unrest.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
The central issue of the
nuclear test ban treaty nego-
tiations, which recessed for
five weeks on 22 August, has
been the problem of agreeing
on an effective control system,
including international inspec-
tions. The West has insisted
on detailed and specific meas-
ures to provide adequate assur-
ance against a violation, and
the USSR had demanded an imme-
diate, permanent, and uncondi-
tional ban on testing, accom-
panied by a minimum of control
features.
The major unresolved is-
sues are the number of inspec-
tions of sites where suspected
violations may have occurred,
the nature and duration of a
temporary moratorium on small
underground tests, the details
of a research program to im-
prove methods of detecting
these tests, and the composi-
tion of the control commission
and the various components of
the control system.
nuclear explosion had taken
place.
Since these conclusions
committed the USSR to allow in-
spections inside its own terri-
tory, one of the Soviet dele-
gation's overriding objectives
has been to circumscribe West-
ern freedom of action in carry-
ing out inspections, which
would constitute an unparal-
leled opening of the Soviet
Union and would provide a strong
precedent for inspections in any
future disarmament negotiations.
The Soviet delegation first met
this problem on 9 December 1959
by resorting to a familiar
move--a demand for a veto over
any directive to dispatch an on-
site inspection team. A way
out of the resulting impasse
grew out of Prime Minister Mac-
millan's suggestion to Khru-
shchev that the USSR could gain
reassurance against arbitrary
and unlimited inspections in-
side the Soviet Union by set-
tling in advance on a specific
number of inspections each year.
Inspections
A key problem throughout
the negotiations has been the
question of inspections. When
the American, British, and So-
viet experts agreed at the
Geneva conference in mid-1958
on the technical feasibility of
establishing a control system
to detect violations of a test
ban, they recommended "timely
inspections of unidentified
events which could be suspected
of being a nuclear explosion."
The experts concluded that when
the control posts detected an
occurrence which could not be
identified as a natural dis-
turbance, the international
control organs should be em-
powered to send an inspection
group to the site in order to
determine whether or not a
To avoid a US proposal to
conclude a treaty by phases,
beginning with tests in the at-
mosphere up to 50 kilometers,
Khrushchev turned to Macmillan's
suggestion. On 23 April 1959
the Soviet premier proposed that
an agreement be reached to car-
ry out annually a previously de-
termined number of inspections
on the territories of the three
powers. These inspections
would be made only if the re-
ports of the control posts in-
dicated the existence of phe-
nomena believed associated with
nuclear explosions. He made it
clear, however, that the num-
ber of such inspections would
be limited.
Subsequently Moscow added
that determination of the number
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25 August 1960
of inspections
should be a polit-
ical decision, made
at a high level and
unrelated to scien-
tific data on the
probable number of
suspicious phenomena
which might be de-
tected but not re-
liably identified.
The USSR has
held to this posi-
tion, as outlined by
Khrushchev, but has
dropped its demand
for a veto over in-
spections. Until
recently, however,
the Soviet delega-
tion refused to
specify the number
of inspections or
enter into negotia-
tions until the
Western powers ac-
cepted the quota
concept "in princi-
ple." In anticipa-
tion of a heads-of-
government meeting,
the Soviet delega-
tion flatly stated
in early 1960 that
the settlement of
the quota issue was
outside the compe-
tence of the confer-
ence.
The collapse of
the summit meeting
in Paris and the im-
probability of an
early resumption of
high-level talks up-
set the Soviet strat-
egy of focusing on a
pasMlbaer: ist proposal for veto ever central orpantsattotsr a
January Jpi9r s..ten powre drop in.tst.w on 2tn0ng test tan
progress on dleariifn.nt.
spoottons of #itta of suspected nuclear testa.
ZS April: r ,tsete (proposal for phased treaty arst proposes prod.
stnaa ..neat quota of on-ruts inspections.
(S publish" data on difftcultt.s in detecting w.dorgrotaid nuclear tests.
.bete: tlchnteal diacue.tote on tmpreving method. of detecting high-ai titafe toots.
lfoaewber: MU ape.*to technical talks on method, of improving detection ad
id.ntifioattot of amtarprosd tests. T.ahioai group fails to reach agree-
ratt on acpabtitita of control system for detect ng and of criteria for
id obeying w derprwnd testa.
1azwoomber: President tts.nho.rer issues atatpent that LS from to twins WON"
teetiarit attar J2 IMr ber, but will not do so without advance OWAKW40WO
li !'4tbtary 2960: ttr propows treaty Lmanintt testa in atnosphsw, ihd.r meter. At
high altttafes as ,par at offsetive controls are apnea, ant
tests a" .a 4.74 setaeatc rmognttude reading ("thre.hald")r ad for so-
tabltahtng fetch r~t~e'e,aarahesd ~aertmottation to tmgbos detection of
moot, Oslo.. thrtahaid.
zp Js : sestet (idea amaepts threshold treaty butmi
rma,st
.n 1
uses.
SO harsh: tt stthrMer-lLait lot a.wemi?rd d.ciar.s if a thrralels treaty is sup sa
sad manta teMdr for Joint ros.arah, a polanitrty, witlsteroilp de
alont'#ertt#oriw,oo,,bdIs iatttated.
o mot Bnoo.t pecan atpewe to p oat d with woMdnp wt of a Joint re "rah
iMnt~r Weald m aide a ".triotly limited, number of molest eapiZMtswl`e-
polesa wsratoriw. of ftiur to tins years.
in ..tam.logli, Ming such nuclear oaatorton. es era neaeeaoy.
Jl 'tap: ,tla5p.rta Meet to dt*aw. research progron. ;Soot.t 4400"" descrtps
twtstt# rational program including teabsr of chemical -plat
2-3 .hse: Scout political delegation repudiates Soviet eaportae progray r-Jaata
(S proposal for safeguards against misuse of research testa for weapons
dewlopaenta, adue cos Soviet demands for safeguards.
26 .Ady: Soviet delegation proposes three wt-mute inspections each year in the
(S15; Soviet titian would have right of three inspscttons each peer in (5
and three in X.
8 August: -Soviet delegation focally rejects (S proposal for common peel of
nuclear desires to be supplied by three pomers sod used in research progrw6
pow Soviet snnntngss that it (S unilaterally conducts research toots agploptng
nuclear devices. the [532 will consider itself tree to resume Weapons tooting.
settlement at the summit, where
Khrushchev had apparently hoped
to use Macmillan's association
with the quota idea to gain US
agreement to a small number of
inspections. After private
hints that the USSR would,
clarify its position on the
number of annual inspections
in return for US clarification
of its position on other is-
sues, the Soviet delegation of-
fered on 26 July to allow three
veto-free inspections each year
inside the USSR, while the USSR
would be allowed three inspec-
tions inside the US and three
inside the UK. The quota would
be subject to revision and re-
view at the end of two years.
At the same time, the So-
viet delegation rejected a US
proposal in which the number of
inspections would be based on
a percentage of the likely num-
ber of unidentified phenomena
above a level of about a 20-
kiloton explosion--in effect
amounting to a proposal for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
some 20 inspections a year.
The Soviet delegation made it
clear that the USSR's quota of
three inspections applied to
all unidentified phenomena, and
not, as the US proposed, only
to the larger ones.
Moratorium on Underground Tests
The differences over the
application of inspections to
all suspected tests, as pro-
posed by the USSR, or only to
the tests larger than 20 kilo-
tons, are a facet of the larger
issue of a comprehensive treaty
permanently banning all tests,
as urged by the USSR, versus a
limited treaty, favored by the
US and Britain, in which some
tests would be temporarily ex-
cluded from a permanent ban.
Since the negotiations opened
in October 1958, the USSR has
insisted that a test ban be not
only permanent but uncondition-
al, and has cited the Geneva
experts' conference as confirm-
ing the technical feasibility
of controlling all types of
testing.
On the basis of new tech-
nical information derived from
nuclear tests in Nevada in the
fall of 1958, the US raised a
serious challenge to the Soviet
demand for an unconditional
ban. The President's Scien-
tific Advisory Committee an-
nounced on 5 January 1959 that
the new data showed that the
Geneva experts had underesti-
mated the difficulty in iden-
tifying and detecting small
underground nuclear explosions.
US scientists also conclude
that an underground test could
probably be concealed by muf-
fling the blast in certain
types of caverns such as salt
domes. From that point forward
the US delegation pressed to
reopen technical talks on the
problem of small underground
tests, but until November 1959
Moscow vigorously defended the
validity of the 1958 findings
of the Geneva experts.
When the conference re-
sumed in October 1959, after a
two-month recess, the US made
it clear that it would intro-
duce the new data into the
record even in the absence of
Soviet agreement. This factor
and the new atmosphere follow-
ing the Camp David talks were
probably the major considera-
tions which led the USSR to re-
vise its position and agree on
3 November to convene a new
technical group to consider
the problem of underground-test
detection.
The refusal of the Soviet
scientists to accept the con-
clusions drawn by the US from
its new data created a new im-
passe which led the US to pro-
pose formally a limited treaty
calling for a permanent ban on
all tests except at very high
altitudes and for small under-
ground tests below a "threshold"
of approximately 20 kilotons.
The "threshold" concept grew
out of the conclusion of US ex-
perts that tests of 20 kilotons
or greater could probably be
detected and identified, but
that below this level great
difficulties would arise.
The US proposal therefore
also included a provision for
a program of joint research and
experimentation by the three
powers to improve methods of
detecting underground tests be-
low the 20-kiloton level so
that this "threshold" could be
lowered and eventually elim-
inated.
In the pre-summit atmos-
phere, the Soviet leaders ap-
parently believed that an out-
right rejection of the limited
treaty idea and insistence on
a scientifically vulnerable
position was no longer feasi-
ble. They accepted the US
proposal but countered by in-
cluding outer space tests in
the permanent ban and tempo-
rarily banning the small un-
derground tests below the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
"threshold" with a voluntary
moratorium. The moratorium
approach, which had originally
been suggested privately by
the British, was accepted by
the US and UK in the Eisenhower-
Macmillan communique of 29
March 1959, with the condition
that agreement be reached for
a coordinated research program.
Shortly before the sum-
mit, the USSR formally accept-
ed a joint, rather than coor-
dinated, research program which
would include a "strictly lim-
ited number" of nuclear tests.
Moscow also agreed that the
moratorium should be unilat-
erally declared by the three
powers, proposed a duration of
from four to five years, but,
in any case, insisted that the
moratorium be conterminous with
the research program.
The main issues in this
area now are the duration of
the moratorium and whether the
three powers would be committed
to extend it automatically on
expiration if the research pro-
gram does not yield the desired
results.
Since the agreement on
placing small underground tests
under a unilaterally declared
moratorium, a new issue has
arisen in connection with the
agreement to institute the re-
search program to improve de-
tection techniques. The US
position on research calls for
coordination of national pro-
grams and includes the detona-
tion of nuclear devices. Prior
to the Paris summit meeting, on
3 May, the USSR accepted the
inclusion of nuclear explosions
and agreed to convene a techni-
cal working group to discuss
the program.
The Soviet experts in the
group outlined a program of
several chemical explosions in
the USSR, declared their inten-
tion not to hold nuclear tests,
but insisted on a joint rather
than a coordinated program. Af-
ter the summit failure, the
Soviet political delegation re-
pudiated the USSR's scientific
experts' program of conventional
explosions and demanded that
the US provide "adequate safe-
guards" against misusing re-
search tests for weapons de-
velopment.
The Soviet delegation re-
jected a US proposal for depos-
iting unopened nuclear devices
in a restricted area under the
control of an international
group. The US then proposed
that the devices be opened on
the basis of reciprocity, pro-
vided that all three powers
contribute a device to a com-
mon "pool" and that each power
could withdraw a device of its
choosing for conducting a re-
search test.
The Soviet delegation
again turned down the US pro-
posal, while noting that the
offer to open nuclear devices
represented a step forward.
Moscow, however, continues to
insist on a four-point proposal
before agreeing to the use of
nuclear tests. According to
the Soviet delegation, adequate
safeguards would include: (1)
access to technical descriptions
and blueprints of nuclear de-
vices, plus superficial and in-
ternal inspection of the de-
vices; (2) presence of all
participants at the place of
assembly and explosion; (3) in-
stallation by all participants
of instruments for measuring
effects; and (4) access to all
data obtained in the program.
Both the Soviet delegate
and Khrushchev have stressed
that Moscow would interpret a
unilateral research test by
the US as a resumption of weap-
ons development which would free
the USSR from its commitment not
to be the first to resume and
which would compel the USSR to
resume weapons tests.
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25 August 1960
An important organ in the
day-to-day working of the con-
trol system is the control com-
mission, which would dispatch
inspection teams and determine
the budget and other fiscal,
economic, and administrative
matters. The composition of
the commission and voting pro-
cedures, therefore, have be-
come significant issues. Early
in the negotiations it was
agreed that the control com-
mission should include sever.
members. The USSR has proposed
that the commission be divided
on a 3-3-1 formula--three rep-
resentatives from the US and
its allies, three from the So-
viet Union and its allies, and
one representative from a neu-
tral country. This proposal
also called for decisions by
a simple majority, except for
a two-thirds vote on the budget
--in effect giving the USSR a
budgetary veto.
The US and UK have argued
that this arrangement would
place a great burden on the one
neutral member, who would often
be placed in the position of
having to break a deadlock be-
tween the US and UK on the one
hand and the USSR on the other.
The Western powers have pro-
posed a formula of 3-2-2--one
member each from the US, UK and
another Western state, one mem-
ber each from the USSR and a
Soviet ally, and two members
from neutral countries.
There are also important
differences over the make-up of
the international staff at the
control posts and the composi-
tion of on-site inspection teams
and other staffs. Underlying
all Soviet proposals has been
the demand for strict parity
between the USSR on the one
hand and the US and UK on the
other.
Prospects
The current recess prob-
ably marks an important turning
point in the negotiations, in
view of the fact that the three
powers have narrowed the unre-
solved problems to the crucial
elements which determine the
effectiveness of the control
system. During the recess
Moscow will probably be forced
to reach some decision on its
future course, since its over-
all maneuverability has been
reduced to areas of vital in-
terest to the Soviet position
on controls. Whereas over the
past two years of negotiations
the USSR temporarily side-stepped
an impasse by moving on to oth-
er issues, such freedom of ac-
tion has diminished, and the
general deterioration of East-
West relations will be a strong
factor against any major Soviet
concession to break the stale-
mate.
Moscow's general objective
when the talks resume probably
will be to maintain--without
having to make any substantial
concessions--sufficient flex-
ibility to ensure that the talks
continue. The Soviet delega-
tion's tactics will probably be
aimed at securing a full discus-
sion of the quota and moratori-
um issues before accepting a
debate on the research program.
In such a discussion Moscow may
adjust and amend its current
stand, in line with private
hints that the quota of three-
as as well as the proposed four-
to five-year limit on the mora-
torium, are negotiable.
Moscow's strategy will be
influenced by the Soviet dele-
gation's judgment of the chances
of obtaining Western concessions
on these issues. As an addi-
tional inducement to keep the
talks going, the USSR may offer
a new formula on the composition
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
25 August 1960
of the control commission, pos-
sibly as part of a new package
arrangement on composition,
voting procedures, and staffing
of control posts and inspection
teams. Any arrangement, how-
ever, would probably be closely
tied to the acceptance of a
quota.
Soviet strategy since the
summit breakdown suggests that
Moscow is mainly interested in
prolonging the talks, on the as-
sumption that the US may decide
to proceed unilaterally. with
research tests employing nu-
clear devices. The Kremlin
probably would view unilateral
action by the US as a strong
pretext to break off the talks
on an issue which Moscow could
STATUS OF SOVIET DOMESTIC TRANSPORT
Soviet domestic transpor-
tation has undergone steady ex-
pansion and modernization in
recent years. Since 1950 the
total annual ton-miles of
freight handled by all modes
of transport has more than
doubled. Serious shortcomings
exist, however, in the present
Soviet transport system--short-
comings underscored last month
in the resolution of the plenum
of the Soviet Communist party'
central committee.
STATISTICAL VIEW OF THE
SOVIET TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
While the required tonnage
is being handled with only mi?-
nor localized difficulties, in-
efficient use of capital and
labor results in unwarranted
transport costs, thereby ham-
pering prospects for future
growth. Provisions for new
railroad construction--espe-
cially in the developing areas
of Siberia--have not been ade-
quate. Despite the USSR's
greater size and population, a
third less freight was hauled
DOMESTIC TRAFFIC (billion ton - miles)
1950
1959
1965 (PLAN)
INCREMENT
IN
1959 OVER 1958
AVERAGE ANNUAL
INCREMENT
(SEVEN-YEAR PLAN)
1959 - 65
RAILROAD
412.6
979.2
1267.2
87.3
53.6
HIGHWAY
13.8
60.0
100.0
7.4
6.8
RIVER
31.6
64.1
95.9
5.5
4.5
COASTAL AND INTERCOASTAL
12.9
26.0
34.2
2.0
1.4
PETROLEUM PIPELINE
3.4
28.6
126. 7
5.4
14.8
TOTAL
474.2
1157.9
1624.1
107.7
82.0
NETWORKS
RAILROAD (thous. route miles)
73.1
77.8
82.4
1.0
.8
ROADS (surfaced, thous.route miles)
110.8
156.7
N. A.
9.3
N. A.
RIVERS (thous.miles operated)
81.3
84.4
88.8
N.A.
.6
PIPELINES (thous.miles)
3.4
10. 1
26. 7
1.2
2. 5
SECRET
exploit as part of its efforts
to indict US policy as provoca-
tive. Khrushchev would pre-
sumably follow such a move with
a reaffirmation of Moscow's
pledge not to test if the US
ceased its program, and then
submit the issue to the UN.
Moscow may also feel that
US failure to proceed unilat-
erally would be an indication
that the USSR could extend the
negotiations, and thereby the
current de facto ban, without
any major concessions until a
new US administration takes of-
fice--at which time the issue
could again be employed as part 25X1
of Soviet strategy to bring.;
about a new summit conference.
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25 August 1960
last year than in the United
States, and qualitatively, the
USSR is still a long way from
possessing a modern and diver-
sified transportation system
comparable to that of the United
States.
The equipping of freight
cars with automatic couplers
and automatic brakes--a pro-
gram begun seriously since
World War II--is virtually com-
plete, but the level of applied
technology in classification
yards is low. Loading and un-
loading methods are still back-
ward by Western standards.
The USSR has the second
largest rail network in the
world--77,500 miles compared
to 217,700 miles in the United
States--and railroa.ds~ are still
by far the largest single means
of moving freight in the Soviet
Union. In 1959 nearly 85 per-
cent of all domestic freight
was transported by rail. The
Soviet network, however, has
only fair to poor track and
roadbed, only about one fourth
is double-tracked;, and a still
smaller portion is equipped
with automatic signaling- de-
vices. Over two thirds of the
railroad traffic in 1959 was
still handled by steam power,
and about 30 percent of the
freight cars were old two-axle
types.
An FD20 steam locomotive. Two-thirds of Soviet
rail freight traffic is still moved by steam.
An N8 electric (DC) locomotive -- the most powerful (5, 700 h. p. )
unit on the Soviet railroads. The most heavily traveled rail lines
are being converted to electric traction.
SECRET
Other Forms of Transport
Motor freight transport,
although of considerable impor-
tance in the Soviet Union, con-
sists by and large of short-
haul operations. In 1959 there
were about 2,500,000 trucks in
the civilian inventory, many
of them obsolete and unsuited
for their assigned tasks.
Water transport, operating
on inland seas, coastal waters,
and a river network roughly the
same length as the total rail
network, handled only about 8
percent of the total domestic
ton-miles of freight hauled in
1959. Obsolete vessels and
craft unsuitable for the type
of service predom-
inate in the river-
fleet inventory. In-
efficient utiliza-
tion of ships and
personnel, is in
large part a result
of short navigation
seasons, adverse nav-
igation conditions,
and poor port and
transshipment facil-
ities. Insufficient
productive capacity
for modernization of
equipment, plus the
fact that the river
network in many cases
does not serve impor-
tant industrial cen-
ters, will cause most
of the limited cap-
ital available to
transport to be con-
centrated elsewhere.
The civil air
fleet--Aeroflot--has
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25 August 1960
undergone rapid expansion in
the last decade as part of
Moscow's program to create a
fleet which can compete suc-
cessfully in international com-
mercial aviation and provide
increasingly effective domestic
transportation, primarily for
PASSENGER MILES
(BIWONS)
FREIGHT TON MILES
(MIWONS)
1965
(plan)
29.2
1965
(plan)
1,644
00823 24 AUGUST 1960
passenger traffic. Although
Aeroflot presently handles
less than one percent of total
freight traffic, it provides
an important service by linking
remote areas of the Soviet Un-
ion and, in some cases, cutting
days or weeks off the time re-
quired for shipments over a
comparable land route.
Aeroflot's 1965 target for
passenger-miles is more than
four times the number flown in
1959, and for freight ton-miles,
more than two and a half times.
On the basis of present and an-
ticipated rates of aircraft
production, these goals should
be achieved easily.
Pipeline transport, still
barely developed, carried less
than 3 percent of domestic sur-
face ton-miles of freight in
1959. The average pipeline
haul is still relatively short,
and pumping facilities are gen-
erally inadequate.
Major Shortcomings
Although Soviet transport
can meet present traffic re-
quirements, the limited avail-
ability of certain equipment--
modern ships and barges, suit-
able trucks, pipes, modern
diesel and electric locomo-
tives, electronic and communi-
cations equipment--together
with the transport industries'
relatively low priority for
some materials such as copper
and steel will probably continue
to limit the pace:of moderniza-
tion and expansion.
Statistics on the quantita-
tive aspects of Soviet transport
often give the erroneous im-
pression that the Soviet system
is a very efficient operation.
They do not adequately reflect
the low quality of the service,
the lack of alternative services,
the costly,' ineffective use of
transport equipment and labor,
and the lagging and often poorly
planned application of modern
technology.
Labor-productivity and
cost-reduction targets are fre-
quently exceeded, according to
statistics, which,however,do
not reveal the appallingly waste-
ful use of labor and equipment.
Many workers continue to be
used where one person and a
simple machine could do a given
task. New, powerful locomo-
tives and even many freight cars
are operated well under capacity,
both in terms of speed and ton-
nages, because of siding and
yard limitations on train length
and the relatively poor condi-
tion of roadbed and track.
The relatively heavy traf-
fic on the network forces rail-
road management, mindful of the
importance of the performance
goals and uninterrupted traffic,
to resort to such costly meas-
ures as the provision of sev-
eral kinds of "stand-by" sig-
naling and communications sys-
tems and the utilization of
excessive personnel to ensure
train safety. Trackwalkers are
still employed, primarily for
purposes of train inspection,
and guards are used on all grade
crossings, even those equipped
with automatic devices.
Major emphasis is placed
on achieving performance goals;
cost-reduction and labor-pro-
ductivity goals are secondary.
Allocated capital is used al-
most exclusively for moderniza-
tion and expansion to handle
increasing traffic, and impor-
tant steps for maximum cost
reduction often are not taken.
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 17
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 August 1960
For example, since almost all
switching and yard work on
lines operating under diesel
and electric traction is still
performed by steam power, ex-
pensive steam-maintenance fa-
cilities must be retained.
There is little incentive
for railroad managers to in-
crease the efficiency of these
operations. A stabilized labor
force which is granted only
modest wage and benefit in-
creases keeps total operating
costs from rising as fast as
operating revenues derived
from increased traffic, and it
is an easy matter for managers
under these wasteful conditions
to show increased profits.
Prospects
In the next few years So-
viet domestic freight turnover
will probably continue to in-
crease at a rate considerably
greater than that expected by
the planners. The average in-
crement during the Seven-Year
Plan period (1959-65) was to
have been about 82 billion ton-
miles; in 1959 the increment
was actually 108. The trans-
portation system will be able
to cope with the increases on
a ton-mile basis. Because of
investment and management pol-
icies, however, service will
continue to be generally poor
and limited in certain areas
under expansion.
Many transport problems
and their possible solutions
were reviewed at the recent
plenum. There are, however,
other serious problems--in-
volving both natural factors
and broad policy considera-
tions--about which little will
probably be done in the near
future.
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 17
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