CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002800040001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 50
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 13, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 7, 1960
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CC/
COPY NO. 71
DIA review(s) OCI NO.3334/60
completed.
7 July 1960
'CURRENT State Dept. review
completed
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
I DE:1_.._
CLAS.
NE. T T 4':E E-.
AU H:,.OWri 1 V
DATE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
STAT
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev has used his visit to Austria to affirm
once again that the main lines of his policies will remain
unchanged at least until a new administration takes office
in the United States. His reception has been notably cool,
and his attacks on West Germany and the United States have
drawn sharp criticism from the Austrian press. Moscow con-
tinues to move toward a position in the nuclear test ban
talks from which it could break off the discussions at any
time and charge the West with responsibility for the lack
of progress.
CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Cuba will probably suffer shortages in petroleum prod-
ucts for about a month, after which the Soviet bloc can,
if it wishes, satisfy all Cuban petroleum requirements.
The Castro regime's reactions to the reduction of its
sugar quota have been angry, as predicted, and the expro-
priation of more American-owned firms appears certain.
There are indications that Communists will soon increase
their influence in the Cuban Foreign Ministry.
VENEZUELA'S EFFORT TO FORCE TRUJILLO'S OVERTHROW . . . . . Page 4
Venezuela has launched an all-out effort in the Organ-
ization of American States to force the downfall of Domin-
ican dictator Trujillo, who was involved in the 24 June
attempt to assassinate President Betancourt. Venezuelan
armed forces are on an alert status and may act unilater-
ally in the event the OAS fails to take prompt and effec-
tive measures or Trujillo engages in any further interven-
tlonlst ac;LLVLLLW=.
ALGERIA-FRANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The announcement by the Algerian rebels on 4 July
that substantive negotiations on an Algerian cease-fire
are "not opportune" at present stemmed from dissatisfac-
tion at the treatment accorded a rebel delegation in pre-
liminary contacts with French representatives at Melun. The reb-
el communiqud was conciliatory in tone, and the rebels are
probably prepared to resume negotiations if the French
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
PART I (continued)
make certain procedural concessions. European settlers
in Algeria view the stalemate in the talks without ela-
tion, and continue to fear a French "sellout" to the
rebels.
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Public order in the Republic of the Congo has been
seriously threatened by a mutiny among units of the
24,000-man Force Publique which began on 6 July. Even
if the mutiny is brought under control, concessions made
to the mutineers--which include across-the-board promo-
tions for enlisted personnel and the removal of the Force
Publique's Belgian commander--may nullify its effective-
ness as the major force for internal stability in the new
state.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
STRUGGLE OVER LEADERSHIP OF JAPANESE CONSERVATIVES . . . . Page 1
Leaders of Japan's ruling Liberal-Democratic party
(LDP), still unable to resolve their bitter factional
struggle to name a successor to Prime Minister Kishi, may
be forced to submit the issue to a floor vote at a part
convention on 13 Jul .
Japanese leftists plan a series of rallies
and demonstrations between 10 and 15 July, beginning at
the US naval air station at Atsugi, near Tokyo. UNCODED
SHAKE-UP IN AGRICULTURAL LEADERSHIP IN THE RUSSIAN
REPUBLIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Several agricultural leaders in the Russian Republic
of the Soviet Union have been fired or reassigned during
the past month amid complaints of serious deficiencies in
agricultural administration--primarily failures to correct
errors which last year were blamed for the mediocre har-
vest. The timing and pattern of the shifts, however, sug-
gest that they may reflect political maneuvering among
the top Kremlin leaders, p ly involving differences
over agricultural policy. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
PART II (continued)
POLAND REVISES 1961-65 ECONOMIC PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Revisions of Poland's Second Five-Year Plan (1961-65)
made at the recent plenum of the party central committee
reflect a shift in economic priorities which seems to be
at least a partial victory for the more orthodox faction
of the party that has pressed for more rapid'expansion of
heavy industry, even if it means slowing the growth of
personal consumption. The Polish plan now bears a closer
resemblance than before to those of other Soviet bloc
countries.
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE NEW TURKISH REGIME . . . . . . . Page 4
Moscow has made several overtures to the provisional
Turkish Government for improving relations
has offered Ankara economic assistance in an effort to
take advantage of Turkey's financial plight. Soviet lead-
ers, while disappointed with the provisional government's
decision to maintain close ties with the West, may hope
their overtures will strengthen any elements in the new
CYPRUS SETTLEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Agreements reached by British, Turkish- and Greek-
Cypriot negotiators appear to have removed the last ob-
stacles to independence, now expected to be proclaimed in
August. Despite general relief by the majority of Cypriots,
Archbishop Makarios'can expect continued sniping from the
die-hard supporters of union with Greece and possibly also
from the Communists. Among the Turkish Cypriots, opposi-
tion to Kuchuk's moderate leadership has increased in re-
cent weep w .
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Rumors of internal troubles are increasing in Iraq as
the 14 July anniversary of the 1958 revolution approaches,
but there is no firm evidence that an uprising is being
planned. The Lebanese elections have ended in a compara-
tively peaceful atmosphere, and a new cabinet is expected
soon. Nasir's perennial propaganda war with Jordan's King
Husayn has warmed up again. Israeli patrolling in the de-
militarized zone between Israel and Syria has been resumed
and has increased border tension there. The Yemeni inter-
nal situation remains shaky as the Soviet bloc continues
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
PART II (continued)
UNREST REPORTED IN MOZAMBIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
African unrest has been reported in remote areas of
northern Mozambique, where natives have apparently come
under the influence of nationalist agitators from Tangan-
yika. Some arms may have been smuggled in, and Portuguese
troops have been flown into the disturbed area.
ternal pressure on Mozambique will probably increase
Tanganyika and Nyasaland move toward self-government
NEPAL AND COMMUNIST CHINA AT ODDS OVER BORDER INCIDENT . . Page 9
Relations between Nepal and Communist China received
a sharp jolt as a result of the clash in late June in the
isolated Mustang border area. Peiping's formal apology
has eased tension somewhat, but each government still dis-
putes the other's claim that its territory was violated.
Both Katmandu and Peiping apparently still wish to pro-
ceed with the arrangements for border demarcation agreed
on in March, but the Napalese Government's ability to ne-
gotiate a final settlement may be limited by the growing
had a similar impact in India. 25X1
CAMBODIA THREATENS TO ACCEPT BLOC ARMS . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Prince Sihanouk has warned that he will accept prof-
fered Communist bloc arms unless the United States moves
promptly to satisfy his complaint that it is giving more
and better arms to South Vietnam, Thailand, and Laos than
to Cambodia. Sihanouk's attitude is conditioned not only
by concern over his neighbors' armaments, but also appar-
ently by a belief munist China is the "wave of the
future" in Asia.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
PART II (continued)
BRITAIN, SPAIN, AND NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella's official visit
to London from 11 to 13 July follows a gradual increase in
economic and military contacts between Britain and Spain.
While Britain itself now favors Spain's admission to NATO,
it does not vet appear ready to try to overcome Norwegian,
Lanisn, De.L .L 1, a11N "W l.vla vt.j.vv+.r-..
WEST GERMAN CRACKDOWN ON NAZIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
The Eichmann dispute between Argentina and Israel has
stimulated the West German Government to arrest a number
of former Nazis suspected of war crimes. In moves against
neo-Nazi groups, the Hesse state government has seized
periodical subscription lists and other records, while
Bonn has adopted a law banning the wearing of Nazi emblems
and stiffening the punishments for racial and neo-Nazi _-
agitatlull .
PARAGUAYAN REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The several Paraguayan revolutionary groups seeking
to oust the Stroessner dictatorship are planning to expand
their military operations. Their as-yet-uncoordinated
activities have hitherto seemed mainly designed to promote
a revolutionary atmosphere of heightened tensions, to in-
filtrate rebels, and to elicit material support outside
Paraguay. The military at present appears to be loyal to
Stroessner.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN SOVIET POLITICS . . . . . . . Page 1
The presence of Marshal Malinovsky at the abortive
summit meeting in Paris in May led to considerable specu-
lation about the role of the military in Soviet political
life. The key questions which arise are: Is "the mili-
tary" a cohesive element in the leadership? Are the mili-
tary leaders in a position where they could exert pressure
on Khrushchev? Are there indications that they have wanted
to exert such pressure? These questions are discussed in
the first portion of this article; the last half covers
the effects and implications of recent events--including
the Soviet demobilization program, the U-2 incident, and
the summit conference--on the military-political relation-
ship. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
PART III (continued)
SOVIET TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The Soviet Union, which launched an ambitious indus-
trial modernization program in June 1959, has scheduled a
central committee plenum for 13 July to review progress
and give additional guidance for promoting technological
advances. The meeting will probably praise the satisfac-
tory production record of Soviet industry, the general
overfulfillment to date of the Seven-Year Plan industrial
and productivity goals, and the determination to complete
the plan ahead of schedule. There will probably be severe
criticism of accomplishments to date, however, as few of
the specific tasks assigned a year ago appear to have been
fulfilled. The USSR is more advanced in some cases than
the West in theoretical knowledge of automation, but lags
appreciably behind in the application of automatic con-
trols to industry. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS
Khrushchev has used his
visit to Austria--his first
trip outside the bloc since the
summit collapse--to affirm once
again that the main lines of
his policies will remain un-
changed, at least until a new
American administration takes
office. In a major speech on
1 July in Vienna, the Soviet
premier listed the main goals
of his post-summit policy as
disarmament, a peace treaty with
Germany, and a solution of in-
ternational issues by negotia-
tion. Following this broad
declaration, he concentrated
his other speeches on the dan-
gers of "revanchism" in West
Germany and warned that the
Soviet Union cannot remain in-
different to statements by Ade-
nauer which resemble some of
Hitler's.
In the private talks with
Austrian officials, Khrushchev
apparently reaffirmed his pub-
lic commitment to uphold until
after a change in administra-
tion in Washington the status
quo in Berlin, provided there
were no "provocations." Austrian
Foreign Minister Kreisky con-
firmed this to the press fol-
lowing the private discussions
on 1 July. In an attempt to
utilize the close relations
among Vienna,, Bonn, and Berlin,
Khrushchev told Austrian offi-
cials that if Bonn attempted
to hold a Bundestag meeting in
Berlin, Moscow "just might" con-
sider that as the occasion for
signing a separate peace treaty
with East Germany, and then
Adenauer and the West German
Bundestag would have to request
"exit permits" from Ulbricht.
Khrushchev's departure
for Austria and the West Ger-
man foreign policy debate pro-
vided the occasion for drawing
increased attention to the
German and Berlin questions.
On 30 June Moscow protested
formally to the three Western
powers against alleged West
German recruitment of West
Berliners for the German armed
forces. The Soviet notes
charged that Bonn was pursuing
such activities with the inten-
tion of bringing the situation
in Berlin and Germany to "dan-
gerous conflicts."
In his public statements
in Austria, Khrushchev resorted
to his familiar attempts to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
differentiate between the US
Government and the American peo-
ple.
Austrian Reactions
The Austrian press has
criticized the government for
allowing Khrushchev to abuse
Austrian hospitality with his
hostile remarks about countries
friendly to Austria, and news-
papers have specifically criti-
cized Chancellor Raab, partic-
ularly for his "uncalled-for"
attendance at the 2 July rally
of the Austro-Soviet Society.
The press has noted the general-
ly cool public reaction to the
whole visit, commenting that
"enthusiastic crowds" claimed
by the Soviet delegation were
either tourists or, in one case,
Austrians dressed for church.
Bonn, especially irked that
the speeches attacking Adenauer
were made in the presence of
Raab, has sent a sharp protest
to the Austrian Government.
Kreisky and other top Austrian
officials have welcomed this
move as supporting their view
that Raab should not have ac-
companied Khrushchev on his
tour of the country.
Moscow is apparently mov-
ing toward a position in the nu-
clear test ban talks from which
it could break off the discus-
sions at any time and charge the
West with responsibility for the
lack of progress. Both Foreign
Minister Gromyko and chief So-
viet delegate Tsarapkin have pub-
licly indicated that the USSR's
continued participation is de-
FTsarapkin in an in-
terview with the East German
news service, pointed
out that the talks closely par-
alleled the disarmament negotia-
tions in that the West was plac-
ing obstacles in the way of
progress, but was careful to
make a distinction between the
two negotiations. He implied
that Moscow would await Western
proposals on the outstanding
issues listed by him.
In the conference sessions,
the Soviet delegation has at-
tempted to build a record of
willingness to continue negotia-
tions in a serious vein. On 1
July Tsarapkin formally intro-
duced draft-treaty language on
the composition of the control
commission, without altering
the substance of the Soviet posi-
tion. In addition, he accepted
Western proposals on secondary
issues and accepted a British
compromise proposal on the method
of selecting deputies for the con-
trol commission's administrator.
The Soviet leaders may pre-
fer to withhold any move to break
off the talks until after the
United States begins the first
l
of its series of conventiona
and nuclear explosions to im-
prove the capabilities of
detecting underground tests.
Moscow may seek to distort
the purposes of a chemical
,explosion, scheduled for 12
July as part of the US pro-
gram for peaceful uses of
nuclear energy, as indicat-
ing: an American intention
to proceed with nuclear
pendent on evidence of the West's weapons development, and as
willingness to clarify its posi- justifying Soviet refusal
tion on the main issues under to negotiate under such
debate. Both left the impres- conditions.
sion, however, that the Soviet (Concurred in by 031)
delegation would probably not
break off the talks immediately. I.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
The Castro regime will
probably be faced with petroleum
shortages during the next month.
By then, the Soviet bloc can,
if it wishes, satisfy all Cuban
petroleum requirements. Soviet
petroleum products already con-
tracted for amount to only about
a quarter of Cuba's annual
needs.
The Soviet Union has been
chartering free-world tankers
to carry Soviet oil on runs to
Western Europe and the Far East
in order to free more of its
own tankers for service to
Cuba.
The regime's reactions to
the cut in its sugar quota were
bitter and provocative, as pre-
dicted. Late on 5 July the
cabinet authorized the seizure
of all American-owned properties
in Cuba, "when deemed necessary
in the national interest." This
is consistent with Castro's
earlier threat to take every-
thing "down to the nails in
their shoes" from Americans in
Cuba if Cuba's sugar quota in
the US market were cut. In his
6 July speech,. Castro called
the cut in Cuba's sugar quota
a "stupid and decadent" act
and said the US is taking
advantage of Cuba's backward-
ness, "for which it is responsi-
ble."
The Communist-controlled
Cuban Labor Confederation has
called for a rally of "a mil-
lion and a half" on 10 July to
protest the "aggression of the
imperialist and pro-Nazi US
Government." Castro may well
use a scheduled speech on 8
July or the rally to announce
the seizure of further Ameri-
=-n properties. Conrado Becquer,
leader of the powerful sugar
workers' federation, has ordered
union members to prepare to
seize the 31 sugar mills owned
by Americans. Anti-US fervor
is being whipped up to such a
pitch that there is danger of
violence against Americans and
their properties.
Raul Castro told the Czech
press that it no longer would
be a disaster for Cuba if the
United States stops buying Cuban
sugar, since now "we have the
help of the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries. We
have learned who our real friends
are." He has been in Czechoslo-
vakia since 26 June on a mission
that probably involves efforts
to obtain military equipment.
The regime's moves to obtain
arms in Western Europe also con-
tinue.
Foreign
Minister Raul Roa may shortly
be replaced by pro-Communist
Carlos Olivares. Roa has re-
mained out of the limelight in
recent weeks,while Olivares, ap-
pointed under secretary on 17
June, has been assuming an in-
creasing share of responsibility
in the ministry.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Olivares, a member of Raul
Castro's clique, has been a lead-
ing organizer for the Castro-
sponsored Latin American Youth
Congress which is scheduled to
open in Havana on 26 July and
which appears certain to be
dominated by the Communists.
Olivares' appointment as foreign
minister would mean increased
Communist influence over Cuba's
foreign policy.
VENEZUELA'S EFFORT TO FORCE TRUJILLO'S OVERTHROW
Venezuela has launched an
all-out effort in the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS)
to force the downfall of Domini-
can dictator Trujillo, who was
involved in the attempted as-
sassination of President Betan-
court on 24 June. At a meeting
of the OAS Council on 6 July,
the Venezuelan representative
demanded an early meeting of
American foreign ministers to
consider Trujillo's aggressive
action and apply sanctions against
his regime. The Venezuelan Gov-
ernment, whose armed forces are
on alert status, may act uni-
laterally against the Dominican
Republic in the event the OAS
fails to take prompt and effec-
tive measures or Trujillo en-
gages in any further interven-
tionist activities.
Betancourt, who has long
insisted that the OAS give prior-
ity to the problem of Trujillo
over that of Castro, apparently
intends to assist in a hemis-
phefe solution for the Cuban
situation after Trujillo's elim-
ination. Colombian President
Lleras strongly supports Betan-
court's position on Trujillo,
although he recognizes that
Castro is a greater threat to
peace in the hemisphere. He
would probably cooperate in Betan-
court's approach to the two
Caribbean problems.
Trujillo's stability, which
is already threatened by grow-
ing internal opposition and dip-
lomatic isolation, will be further
eroded by Venezuela's charges
in the OAS.
Trujillo also apparently 25X1
ears that the US will play an
important role in possible OAS
action against him. Article 8
of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance, which
Venezuela plans to invoke, pro-
vides for sanctions ranging from
recall of ambassadors to armed
action.
In the present tension, Vene-
zuela's public and its armed
forces would probably approve a
direct attack on the Dominican
Republic. Any rash act--or pos-
sibly even an erroneous report
that such a step was being pre-
pared by either country--might
touch off military hostilities.
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7 July 1960
The announcement by the
Algerian rebels on 4 July that
substantive negotiations con-
cerning an Algerian cease-fire
are "not opportune" at present
stemmed from dissatisfaction at
the treatment accorded a rebel
delegation in preliminary con-
tacts with French representatives
at Melun, outside Paris. While
their communique was conciliatory
in tone, the Algerians are un-
likely to resume negotiations
in the absence of procedural
concessions by the French. The
rebels reportedly did not expect
France to recognize their pro-
visional government as repre-
sentative of the Algerian people,
but expected a voice in deter-
mining the conditions under
which substantive negotiations
would be held.
According to the communique,
French officials indicated they
would not permit rebel negotia-
tors to travel freely in France,
or to contact Algerian ministers
--such as Mohamed Ben Bella--
presently held prisoner in
France. The rebels' statement,
in an attempt to blame France
for the stalemate, made no
mention of their pre-conditions
In Algeria, the suspension
of the talks has been received
without elation by European
rightists, who generally expect
them to be resumed and who still
fear a "sellout" to the rebels.
They are continuing their efforts
to create a broadly based organ-
ization, the Front for a French
Algeria (FAF).
The rebels' suspension of
cease-fire talks has been warmly
endorsed by the Tunisian Gov-
ernment and editorially sup-
ported elsewhere in the Arab
world. The Algerians, however,
can be expected to maintain
communications channels to Paris
through the use of intermedi-
aries or possibly through French
embassies. Meanwhile, they will
make every effort to sustain
and to step up terrorism within
Algeria.
ress reports
from Cairo that the Algerians
will shortly open a diplomatic
mission in Peiping
designed to encourage 25X1
Western intercession with France
on behalf of the rebels. Com-
munist China agreed in May to
the establishment of a rebel
mission in Peiping at some
future data.
In a series of talks in
Normandy on 6 July, De Gaulle
spoke in his usual vein about
moving toward an Algeria linked
to France, with its future to
be decided by the Algerians them-
selves. Appealing to the rebels
to end the war, he said they were
wrong in imposing delays "for
reasons which are theirs and
not ours."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
Public order in the Repub-
lic of the Congo has been seri-
ously threatened by a mutiny
among units of the 24,000-man
Force Publique which began on
6 July. Even if the mutiny is
brought under control, conces-
sions made to the mutineers
may nullify. the force's effectiveness
as the major agencyfor internal
stability in the new state.
Since its independence on
30 June, the Congo has been the
scene of renewed tribal out-
breaks in Leopoldville and
Kasai provinces. Although the
Force Publique--still under the
command of Belgian officers--
was instrumental in containing
the disturbances in Leopold-
ville, its discipline appears
to have been undermined by
contact with tribesmen who re-
gard "independence" as synony-
mous with the removal of all
restraints.
The mutiny of 6 July began
in Force Publique barracks on
the outskirts of Leopoldville
and in the town of Thysville,
80 miles south. The mutineers'
immediate demands were for more
pay and for the "Africanization"
of the officer corps--that is,
the removal of Belgian officers.
Premier Lumumba, after appealing
for order, dismissed General
Emile Janssens, the Belgian
commander of the Force Publique,
and stated that all enlisted
personnel would be promoted one
grade. By nightfall, mutineers
who had demonstrated in front of
the assembly building in Leopold-
ville had returned to their
barracks. In Thysville, however,
the mutineers remain in control,
and continue to hold their offi-
cers in confinement.
Although the mutiny has thus
far been confined to Leopold-
ville Province, it appears likely
to have ramifications in units
elsewhere. Lumumba's concessions
to the mutineers probably fore-
shadow the accelerated Africaniza-
tion of the Force Publique at
the further expense of its effec-
tiveness as a security force.
Any such weakening, in turn, is
likely to be reflected in re-
newed tribal outbreaks, partic-
ularly in Kasai Province, where
the Force Publique has been a
major factor in maintaining order
during the past year.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
STRUGGLE OVER LEADERSHIP OF JAPANESE CONSERVATIVES
Leaders of Japan's ruling
Liberal-Democratic party (LDP),
still unable to resolve their
bitter factional struggle to
name a successor to Prime Min-
ister Kishi, may be forced to
submit the issue to a floor vote
at a party convention scheduled
for 13 July. Hayato Ikeda re-
mains the leading contender, but
his candidacy has been set back
by a tactical coalition between
Mitsujiro Ishii and Bamboku Ono,
the other major candidates, and
by a threat on the part of anti-
Ikeda die-hards to form a new
conservative party.
Thus far, the only course
apparently acceptable to Kishi
and his hard-core LDP support-
ers--Ikeda, Finance Minister
Sato, and former Prime Minister
Shigeru Yoshida--is a simple
transfer of leadership to Ikeda.
Ishii and Ono, both of whom may
see the present changeover as
their last opportunity to become
prime minister, are insisting
that an interim successor be
chosen to serve at least through
general elections, which are
expected in the fall.
A third group is led by
party dissidents Kenzo Matsumura,
Ichiro Kono, and Tanzan Ishibashi.
The Kishi team wants to disci-
pline these dissidents for party
disloyalty add for encouraging
leftist efforts to block rati-
fication of the US-Japanese 25X6
security treaty and bring about
Kishi's downfall. The dissidents
are threatening to withdraw from
the LDP and, with Socialist sup-
port, to elect Matsumura prime
minister unless they are granted
a strong voice in party leader-
ship.
The three leading candi-
dates have agreed to allow a
six-man committee of government
and party officials, headed by
Kishi, to attempt to resolve
the succession question. The
LDP rivalry may be settled be-
fore 13 July, in which case the
party convention wil merel en-
dorse the decision.
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7 July 1960
now is directing v
other conservatives, In Sai-
tama, the new Democratic Social- 25X6
ist party, which campaigned for
the first time, took support
away from the Socialist party
but not from the LDP.
perative criticism at the con-
servative wrangling on the suc-
cession issue. Asahi Shimbun,
the country's largest and prob-
ably most influential daily,
has likened the LDP deadlock
over Kishi's successor to "three
vultures dividing rotten meat
among themselves."
Meanwhile, incumbent con-
servative governors have scored
victories in gubernatorial con-
tests in Aomori and Saitama pre-
fectures in early July. Although
the Socialist campaign in both
areas concentrated on the secu-
rity treaty issue, local issues
and the popularity of the in-
cumbents were of greater im-
portance. The voting--especially
that in Saitama Prefecture,
which is near Tokyo--did indi-
cate, however, that widespread
antipathy toward Kishi is not
necessarily directed toward
Japanese leftists are at-
tempting to reinvigorate their
campaign against the security
treaty. They have scheduled a
series of demonstrations and
rallies throughout Japan from
10 to 15 July. As part of their
effort to make it difficult for
the US to maintain bases in
Japan, they have scheduled a
demonstration for 10 July at the
US naval air station at Atsu i
near Tokyo
25X6
25X6
Several agricultural lead-
ers in the Russian Republic
(RSFSR) of the Soviet Union
have been fired or reassigned
during the past month amid com-
plaints of serious deficiencies
in agricultural administration--
primarily failure to correct
,errors which last year were
blamed for the mediocre harvest.
On 9 June, Dmitry Matyushkin,
party first secretary in Kras-
nodar Kray, an agriculturally
important province in the Rus-
sian Republic, was fired for
alleged deficiencies in his
administration of agriculture.
He was succeeded by Georgy
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7 July 1960
Vorobyev, who had been head of
the agriculture department for
the RSFSR in the party's cen-
tral staff.
Four days later Stepan
Kalchenko, the RSFSR minister
of agriculture, was "transferred
to other work" and replaced by
Grigory Smirnov, deputy head of
the party's RSFSR agriculture
department until January 1960,
when he became RSFSR deputy
premier. Kalchenko's new job
is not known,but he has not
been publicly criticized.
On 25 June, Fedor
Kulakov, RSFSR minister of
grain products, was named party
first secretary of the Stavro-
pol Kray, another important
agricultural area. He replaced
Nikolay Belyayev, the former
party boss in Kazakhstan who
was expelled from the party
presidium on 4 May. Belyayev
had earlier been blamed for
the poor harvest in Kazakhstan
and was transferred in disgrace
to the Stavropol Kray in Janu-
ary of this year.
Although these changes
may be designed primarily to
improve direction of agricul-
ture in the field by shifting
managerial experts from Moscow,
there is an apparent connection
between the nearly simultaneous
shift of the RSFSR's three top
agricultural officials and the
fortunes of party presidium
member Nikolay Ignatov. All
three had been appointed to
their former jobs in April
1959, the same month in which
Ignatov, who had been central
party secretary in charge of
agriculture since December 1957,
was mysteriously shunted into
the largely ceremonial post of
chairman of the RSFSR Supreme
Soviet Presidium. In November,
Ignatov returned to his former
work in the party secretariat,
regaining the status he had ap-
parently lost in April.
There is some evidence that
Ignatov was relieved of his ag-
SECRET
ricultural responsibilities
shortly after the bloc agricul-
tural conference in early Feb-
ruary 1960, inasmuch as he
did not participate in an im-
portant inter-republic party
conference on agriculture
held in Moscow in mid-March,
although he was apparently in
Moscow at the same time. On 4
May he lost his job as party
secretary and was appointed
deputy premier of the USSR,
ranking below First Deputy Pre-
miers Kosygin and Mikoyan.
Ignatov was probably deep-
ly involved in the disputes over
agricultural policy which have
taken place since the abolition
of the Machine Tractor Stations
(MTS) in early 1958. Although
the issues were debated in the
press and appeared to be ripe
for solution by the fall of 1959,
the party central committee in
December temporized on most of
the major issues and referred
them to the party presidium
for further study. So far there
is no evidence that final de-
cisions have been made, but
the twists and turns in Ignatov's
career during the past year
and a half may be a reflection
of those policy disputes.
The suggestion that the
shift of the RSFSR agricultural
leaders is related to Ignatov's
transfer from the party secre-
tariat and may reflect a new
stage in the policy controversy
is buttressed by the fact that
Georgy Denisov, head of the
agriculture department "for
the union republics"--counter-
part to the agriculture depart-
ment for the RSFSR--was also
transferred recently. On 21
May he was appointed Soviet
ambassador to Sofia.
The names of new heads of
the two party agriculture de-
partments have not been made
public. Their identities may
clarify the issues involved
in the recent shifts.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
Extensive revisions of Po-
land's Second Five-Year Plan
(1961-65)made by the party cen-
tral committee on 21 and 22
June reflect a significant
shift in economic priorities.
Production of producer goods
and increased investments are
emphasized at the expense of
consumer goods and housing.
As a result of these changes,
the Polish plan bears a closer
resemblance to those of other
Soviet bloc countries, although
it still favors the consumer
to a greater extent.
Under the new version of
the plan, the share of national
income for capital investments
is higher and that for personal
consumption lower than in the
preliminary version adopted in
April 1959. Capital invest-
ments now are scheduled to in-
crease by 51 percent over the
previous five-year level. Ag-
riculture and some sectors of
heavy industry have been al-
located considerably larger
shares of investment funds,
largely at the expense of in-
vestments for housing.
The rate of growth for
over-all industrial production
has been raised slightly. The
production of producer goods is
to expand at a considerably
faster rate. Per capita per-
sonal consumption during 1961-
65 now is planned to increase
only 20-23 percent, as com-
pared with the originally pro-
posed 23-25 percent.
Some of these revisions
were necessitated by the pro-
gram for accelerated mechani-
zation of agriculture, which
was adopted several months after
the preliminary version of the
plan had been approved. Re-
visions also take into account
the interim performance of the
economy: the negative devel-
opments in agriculture and
foreign trade, and the positive
ones which have improved pros-
pects for industrial production.
However, the revisions as
a whole reflect a general shift
in economic priorities which
probably is at least a partial
victory for the more orthodox
faction of the party which has
been pressing for more, rapid
growth of heavy industry, even
if it entails a cut in the con-
sumption program. This change
in economic policy should add
to the anxiety and discontent
of the Polish eo le .
SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE NEW TURKISH REGIME
The USSR has made a number
of overtures and offers of
economic aid through diplomatic
channels to the provisional
Turkish Government in a bid
to promote friendlier relations.
Moscow is disappointed with
the new regime's decision to
maintain close political and
military ties with the West,
but may hope that Ankara's
economic plight will open the
door to Soviet aid and that
its overtures will strengthen
any elements in the new gov-
ernment inclined toward neu-
tralism.
Immediately after the coup
in late May, Khrushchev on
several occasions publicly ex-
pressed hope that the new
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.SECRET.
' 7 July 1960
government would "make the nec-
essary efforts" to improve re-
lations, and that Turkey would
return to the neutralist pol-
icies of the Ataturk government
during the 1920s. However, the
Soviet press and radio, while
affirming this line, have re-
peated Moscow's standard warn-
ing of the "dangers" to Turkey
from Western bases on its ter-
ritory and were especially
critical of Foreign Minister
Sarper's statement in early
June in which he confirmed An-
kara's continued adherence to
NATO and CENTO.
Soviet officials in An-
kara have also voiced concern
over recent Turkish events.
One Soviet diplomat in mid-June
said that the new regime is
more "nationalistically in-
clined" than its predecessor,
but that Moscow would find it
more difficult to deal with.
Soviet Ambassador Ryzhov, ex-
plaining that military inter-
vention in Turkish politics is
"not a favorable omen" for bet-
ter relations with the USSR,
expressed strong disappointment
that the "revolution" in Turkey
had been brought about by the
army.
At the same time, Moscow
has continued efforts to en-
courage the provisional govern-
ment to establish closer rela-
tions.
Moscow's latest move isr
off er ng o prow e
Turkey with economic aid. The
offer--described by Foreign
Minister Sarper as "you say how
much"--probably repeats in
large part an aid offer made
through Ryzhov in mid-June to
extend funds, technical assist-
ance, and industrial plants to
Turkey.
Sarper informed American
Ambassador Warren that the Na-
tional Unity Committee (NUC),
General Gursel, and the cabinet
all wish to refuse Khrushchev's
latest overture as Turkey did
the earlier offer. However,
Sarper asserted that Ankara's
financial situation is desperate,
and claimed that there is "heavy
pressure" from Moscow to accept
the Soviet offer.
Ambassador Warren has warned
that, because the general phi-
losophy of the NUC remains rel-
atively unknown, these "pressures"
should not be underestimated.
25X1
The last obstacles appear
to have been removed, and
Cypriot independence now is
expected to be proclaimed in
August. British and Cypriot
officials who resumed negotia-
tions on 23 June made rapid
progress in resolving differ-
ences, and announced on 1 July
that "full agreement" had been
reached.
Three days later, Arch-
bishop Makarios and Fazil Kuchuk,
leaders of the Greek and Turkish
communities on Cyprus, announced
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMM Ry
7 July 1960
settlement of the
long dispute over im-
plementation of con-
stitutional provi-
sions specifying the
percentage of Greek
and Turkish Cypriots,
70 and 30 percent
respectively, in the
future civil serv-
ice. The British
Parliament is ex-
pected to pass ena-
bling legislation prior
to its summer recess.
Elections for the
Cypriot House of Rep-
resentatives are
scheduled for 31
July and elections for the Com-
munal Chambers will follow a
week later.
The agreement with Britain
followed 16 months of efforts
to draft the documents neces-
sary to implement the Cyprus ac-
cords drawn up in February 1959
by representatives of Britain,
Greece, Turkey, and the two
communities on Cyprus. London
and the Cypriots--primarily the
Greek Cypriots--were in dis-
pute over the future and size
of the two military bases to
be retained by Britain and the
extent of future British finan-
cial aid to Cyprus.
A six-week deadlock was
broken in May when the Greek
and Turkish governments proposed
a compromise formula. Under
the terms of the final settle-
ment, agreement was reached on
the size (99 square miles),
exact boundaries, and extent of
Cypriot civil administration of
the two bases retained by Brit-
ain. London gave assurance'
that the bases will be turned
over to the Cypriot Government
if they are ever abandoned.
Britain will grant the new gov-
ernment nearly $40,000,000 in
financial aid during the next
five years.
The settlement has prob-
ably been received with consid-
erable relief by the majority
of Cypriots, many of whom feared
continuing economic deteriora-
tion and a possible recurrence
of violence between the Greek
and Turkish communities if the
deadlock had continued. Makarios,
however, can expect continued
sniping from the die-hard sup-
porters of "enosis" on"Cyprus,
from ex-EOKA leader George
Grivas in Athens, and probably
from the Communists, who have
begun agitating for complete
demilitarization of the island.
Among the Turkish Cypriots,
there may be considerable criti-
cism of Kuchuk for agreeing to
the compromise regarding the
civil service. Opposition to
his moderate leadership has
increased in recent weeks, and
anti-Kuchuk leaflets have ap-
peared in Nicosia. His long
identification with the ousted
Menderes regime in Turkey has
been used against him by his
more nationalistic critics.
Should Kuchuk lose his position
as head of the Turkish Cypriots,
he would probably be replaced by
his more demagogic subordinate,
Rauf Denktash. This would complicate
relations between Greek and Turkish
Cypriots at a time when Cyprus faces
serious problems as a new state.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
Iraq
On the eve of the 14 July
celebration of the second an-
niversary of the Iraqi revolu-
tion, rumors of troubles are
increasing as they did last
year. There is no firm evidence,
however, that incidents are be-
ing planned by either the Com-
munists or nationalist elements.
Many of the rumors appear to
stem from memories of last July's
Kirkuk massacres by Communist-
instigated Kurds.
Premier Qasim's prestige
is low at present, and increas-
ing numbers of senior military
officers and civilian officials
criticize him openly.
It would appear untimely
for the Communists to attempt
an all-out struggle with Iraqi
nationalists when Communists in
the provinces and the army are
being continually rebuffed;
they have lost control of the
trade unions and peasant asso-
ciations and seem to face dis-
lodgment from high positions
in the government. Several
Communists in the Education
Ministry, a Communist strong-
hold, were ousted last week.
While there is much dis-
satisfaction with the present
situation, all elements prob-
ably fear the consequences of
an upheaval.
The fourth and last round
of Lebanese parliamentary elec-
tions was marked by surprises.
The heavy cross--voting indicates
that a minor revolt was staged
against the traditional feudal
leaders of the Biqa Valley, and
a number of their candidates
lost out to local aspirants.
Prices: for votes dropped to a
new low with the introduction
of the secret ballot, and many
vote buyers were arrested by
the security forces.
Pro-UAR extremists seem
to have suffered further re-
buffs, and the election of
Kazim Sulh, former ambassador
to Iraq, raises the possibility
that Beirut Moslem leader Saib
Salam, who has had the edge up
to now, may be passed over for
the premiership in favor of
either former Prime Minister
Rashid Karami or possibly Sulh.
The new parliament is sched-
uled to meet in mid-July.
The propaganda warfare be-
tween the UAR and Jordan flared
up again during the last two
weeks. Nasir, in a speech on
24 June in Alexandria, attacked
King Husayn, implying, without
mentioning him by name, that
the Jordanian monarch would
''meet the same fate as Nuri
Said." Husayn's rebuttal was
followed on 27 June by a barrage
of invective in Cairo papers
which referred to the King as
"traitor," ";Judas," and "shame-
less slave to imperialists" and
to Jordanian Prime Minister
Majalli as "chief eunuch of the
traitorous King."
Husayn, in his speeches,
has called Nasir a dictator
and has accused him of leniency
toward Communism. Amman radio
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
July 1960
has called on the Syrian people
"not to despair" and has assured
them that the day will come
when the "sufferings" they have
endured under Nasir's yoke will
be ended. On 4 July Amman broad-
cast a recorded interview with
a defected Iraqi pilot who af-
firmed that, while in the Syrian
region, he discovered a new
plot by Nasir to inspire "in-
ternal revolt" in Iraq. The
UAR has warned Jordan that
"serious consequences" would
follow continued Jordanian at-
tacks against the UAR.
The propaganda battle is .a
not unusual prelude to the forth--
coming Arab League meeting in
August, when Arab foreign min-
isters are scheduled to make
new attempts to reconcile an-
tra-Arab differences. Majalli
has indicated Jordan will bring
up for consideration the UAR's
"aggression."
Israel-Syria
Several Israeli newspapers
have attempted to link the Jor-
danian-UAR dispute with recent
incidents along the Israeli-
Syrian border; one paper said
Nasir's speech at Alexandria
"marked the resumption of the
UAR campaign of incitement."
However, General Von Horn, chief
of staff on the U( Truce Super-
visory Organizati n (UNTSO),
blames Israeli patrolling in
the sensitive Tawafiq area of
the demilitarized zone for the
increased border tension. Von
Horn said such patrolling was
suspended on his urging after
the clash at Tawafiq last Jan-
uary and he considers its re-
newal provocative.
The Syrians had stated
their intention to open fire
if Israelis entered this area,
and on 28 June a member of an
Israeli armored patrol which
did enter it was killed. Von
Horn believes recurring inci-
dents are likely unless the
Israelis are disposed to co-
operate with UNTSO in the de-
militarized zone. A ten-minute
exchange of fire occurred on 3
July.
Numerous reports of native
unrest in northern Mozambique
have reached the American Con-
sulate General in Lourenco
Marques. African tribesmen in
the Mocimboa da Praia and Porto
Amelia areas, probably influ-
enced by agitators from neigh-
boring Tanganyika, reportedly
have created disturbances at
local administrative posts.
Some natives have apparently
been killed, and wounded Af-
ricans have crossed the border
into Tanganyika. Portuguese
officials in Lisbon and Lourenco
Marques have played down the
significance of the outbreaks;
elements of the Portuguese
garrison have been flown to
the area, however, and the
northern Mozambique border
is':being patrolled by air-
craft.
IN MOZAMBIQUE
The security situation is
complicated by evidence of arms
smuggling. Some of the natives
in the disturbed area apparent-
ly are armed,
The reports of unrest con-
cern a relatively remote part
of Mozambique, where poor com-
munications and the sparseness
of the European population have
hampered Portuguese control.
More than half the natives in
the area are Moslems and have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SRy
7 July 1960
close ties with their
co-religionists to the
north. As Tanganyika
becomes self-govern-
ing, radical Tangan-
yikan nationalists
are likely to exploit
these ties to an even
greater extent. Mo-
zambique is likely to
be exposed to further
agitation as the na-
tives of the Nyasa-
land protectorate
gain greater control
over their own affairs.
Portuguese offi-
cials are becoming
alarmed over develop-
ments in territories
which adjoin their
African overseas prov-
inces. To date their
prime concern has
been Angola and its
relations with newly
independent Congo,
REPUBLIC
OF THE
CONGO
I.LAGA Y
EPUB G
NEPAL AND COMMUNIST CHINA AT ODDS OVER BORDER INCIDENT
Previously cordial rela-
tions between Nepal and Commu-
nist China received a sharp, jolt
as a result of the border inci-
dent in central Nepal in late
June in the isolated Mustang
area, a semiautonomous salient
into Tibet. Peiping"s formal
apology for the incident, in
which a Nepalese checkpost of-
ficer was killed and 10 Nepa-
lese nationals detained, has
eased the tension somewhat, but
reaction in Nepal to the Chi-
nese "attack" will hamper fur-
ther progress toward a final
Sino-Nepalese border agreement.
Katmandu protested the
Chinese action as a violation
of the agreement reached last
March demilitarizing the frontier
zone and setting up procedures
for border demarcation. Prime
Minister Koirala had sought this
to clarify the actual boundary
and to forestall incidents simi-
lar to those last fall along
the Sino-Indian border. Arrange-
ments for joint commissions to
survey areas in dispute and to
demarcate the boundary on the
basis of "actual jurisdiction"
were agreed on during Koirala's
visit to Peiping and ratified
when Chou En-lai went to Katmandu
in late April.
Nepal, stressing its neu-
trality, has generally minimized
its own disagreement with Peipin':
over border demarcation and taken
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PART II NOTES AND COkIENTS
7 JULY 1060
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
Demarcated boundary
-*-x- Undemarcated bcundary
--- Indefinite boundary
Nevi
Delhi
Backha
a detached view toward India's
dispute. Katmandu, like New
Delhi, now has been placed in
the position of an injured
party.
Railroad
Road
- - - Trail
R? ., .. P ~ , v rno~e
.Frog, zed by rte U.S G-er-ear
Although Koirala on 4
July expressed his "satisfac-
tion" with Peiping's reply
and probably will proceed with
the border negotiations, his
ability to reach a final settle-
ment with Peiping will be
limited by the hostile reac-
tion within Nepal against the
Chinese. Rightist opposition
groups are demanding a stronger
policy, and the ruling Nepali
Congress party itself apparent-
ly is exploiting popular indig-
nation to bolster the govern-
ment's position. Various de-
fensive measures, including
army reinforcements for the
border posts, are being widely
publicized, and six prominent
Communists have been arrested
on security grounds.
The incident has had con-
siderable impact in India,
where it has heightened anti-
Chinese sentiment and strengthened
the hand of those demanding a
more aggressive Indian border
policy. Pressure on Nehru's
government to help bolster Ne-
pal's defenses is likely to
increase in view of the Indian
Dxong
alam .Dzon
Katmandu *Nam e
L B it Sik
phkhganj e. y
1Biju1pura ~Daneehng lr1
prime minister's previous
statements that any attack on
Nepal would be regarded as
an attack on India.
Speedy Chinese action ac-
knowledging responsibility for
the clash indicates that Peiping
hopes to minimize the unfavorable
impact and head off a new series
of Asian charges of Chinese ag-
gression such as followed Pei-
ping's refusal to accept blame
for the Sino-Indian border
clashes of 1959. In his 2 July
letter apologizing for the in-
cident, Chou avoided stating
that Chinese forces had trans-
gressed on Nepalese territory
and, contrary to assertions by
Katmandu, placed the locale of
the incident north of the Kore
Pass in Chinese territory.
Koirala, however, continues to
assert that the clash occurred
inside Nepal.
In an effort to lessen the
possibility of further incidents,
Chou stated in a subsequent
letter that Chinese troops had
been ordered to withdraw six
miles to the north of the Nep-
alese-Tibetan border. Peiping
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
thus was probably attempting
to reduce the seriousness of
its 27 June admission to Kat-
mandu that Chinese troops were
operating within the demili-
mission.
tarized zone. Peiping also
notified Katmandu on 5 July
that it had appointed five Chi-
nese representatives to the
joint boundary demarcation com-
CAMBODIA THREATENS TO ACCEPT BLOC ARMS
Cambodian Chief of State
Sihanouk has warned that he
will accept Communist bloc mili-
tary aid unless the United
States moves promptly to satis-
fy his complaint that it is
giving more and better arms to
South Vietnam, Thailand, and
Laos than to Cambodia. In
recent editorials and inter-
views Sihanouk has stressed
that Cambodia urgently needs
means to stand up to its "over-
armed" neighbors, which he
accuses of having aggressive
designs and acting in league
with dissident Cambodian ele-
ments. Sihanouk would prefer
to accomplish this through an
increase in American military
aid to Cambodia combined with
a cutback in such aid to the
neighboring states; he has also
suggested regional disarmament
through international action.
Sihanouk's threats to turn
to the Communist bloc if these
other approaches prove unpro-
ductive are probably not all
bluff, even though such a step
would virtually end Cambodia's
ever-dwindling area for maneuver-
ing as a neutral. Sihanouk's
thinking is heavily conditioned
by his apparent conviction that
Communist China is the "wave of
the future."
Sihanouk may have in
mind a stand-by arrangement with
Czechoslovakia, pending Ameri-
can reaction to Cambodia's
request for more and newer arms
for the Cambodian armed forces.
The Cambodian Government
is believed to have a contin-
gency plan under which the armed
forces and police would turn
over their American-supplied
arms to Cambodian irregular
forces and would be resupplied
with Communist bloc arms.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
BRITAIN, SPAIN, AND NATO
The official visit to Lon-
don of Spanish Foreign Minister
Castiella from 11 to 13 July--
the first high-level Spanish
mission to Britain since Franco
attained power--marks a major
improvement in Spanish-British
relations. Until now, the grad-
ual improvement in Anglo-Spanish
relations has been mainly non-
political, marked by increased
commercial ties. In early June
a British carrier, a cruiser,
and lesser ships stopped in Bar-
celona on "British Day" at the
city's trade fair. Some informal
discussions on military collab-
oration may have occurred in the
past year to two
Regarding political prob-
lems, Spain's claims to Gibral-
tar and restrictions on the move-
ment of workers into the naval
base have irked London. Madrid's
relaxation of these was a pre-
condition for Castiella's visit.
More basic are the authoritarian
character of the Franco regime
and lingering wartime and prewar
animosities still voiced by the
British Labor party. The Mac- likely soon, a more favorable
London's attitude on pos-
sible Spanish admission to NATO
seems also to be shifting since
a year ago, when the government
side-stepped inquiries on the
question. Castiella's visit
will provide the British Govern-
ment with an opportunity to in-
dicate that it has no objection
to discussion of this controver-
sial topic.
This would set the stage
for a further British shift to
open support of Spain's entry.
The gradual change may be part
of Macmillan's effort to culti-
vate President de Gaulle, who
is on record as advocating Spain:'s
admission. London,i also would
like to see Spain affiliate with
the European Free Trade Associaz
tion.
British officials are never-
theless aware that strong oppo-
sition in Norway, Denmark, Bel-
gium, and the Netherlands must
be overcome before the required
unanimous approval for NATO ad-
mission is in sight. Although
active persuasive efforts are not
millan government apparently now British attitude may contribute 25X1
feels strong enough, however, to the gradual erosion of active
to afford some criticism on this hostility in those countries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM ARY
7 July 1960
The recent capture in Ar-
gentina of former SS General
Adolf Eichmann has stimulated
the West German Government to
arrest a number of former Nazis
suspected of war crimes on the
assumption that additional evi-
dence necessary for convictions
may become available during the
trial of Eichmann in Israel.
Those arrested include former
SS General Wilhelm Koppe, charged
with complicity in the death of
some 300,000 inmates of the Chel-
mo concentration camp in Poland;
Hermann Krumey, an Eichmann as-
sistant; and Adolf Heinz Beckerle,
Hitler's wartime representative
in Sofia.
but are firmly supported by the
major political parties and the
press.
In recent moves against neo-
Nazi groups, the Socialist-con-
trolled state government of Hesse
has seized records, including
membership and periodical sub-
scription lists, from a major
neo-Nazi center in Germany, the
publishing house of the late
extreme-rightist organizer,
Karl Heinz Priester. The Hes-
sian Interior Ministry prevented
a meeting of the "Congress of
West German and European Fas-
cists," planned for 5 June in
Wiesbaden, at which the numerous
extreme rightist splinter groups
reportedly planned to
merge.
In another move,
the federal Bundestag
in early June approved
a law banning the wear-
ing of Nazi emblems
and stiffening punish-
.ments for racial and
neo-Nazi agitation.
Wearing Nazi emblems,
showing Nazi flags,
or using Nazi slogans
in public now can bring
a sentence of up to
three years, and racial
or neo-Nazi agitation
can be punished by
Bonn inherited,. from the-
Allies responsibility for the
prosecution of war criminals
with the assumption of sovereign-
ty in 1955. In 1958 the West
German states set up a central
office for tracking down war
criminals, mainly through an
examination of Nazi records.
Approximately 1,200 persons are
under investigation or have been
arrested. The process has been
speeded up since 1958 because
the statute of limitations runs
out during 1960 for all crimes
except murder. The arrests have
evoked bitter protests in na-
tionalist and neo-Nazi quarters
three months to five
years in prison.
Bonn is probably motivated
by a desire to counter criticism
abroad of laxity toward former
Nazis, as well as by a sincere
desire to bring serious offenders
to justice. West Germans have
generally viewed Eichmann's cap-
ture as evidence that "crime
doesn't pay," and the press has
welcomed the opportunity as an-
other object lesson for German
youths to learn of the horrors
of the Nazi era.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
The several Paraguayan
revolutionary groups seeking to
oust the Stroessner military
dictatorship plan to expand
their operations beyond the
guerrilla activities and small
invasions of the past few
months. Their as-yet-uncoordi-
nated activities have hitherto
seemed mainly designed to pro-
mote a revolutionary atmosphere
of heightened tensions, to in-
filtrate rebels, and to elicit
material support outside Para-
guay.
The most active of the
four revolutionary groups has
been the 14th of May Movement,
which carried out the revolu-
tionary attacks last December
and the more recent series of
raids beginning on
29 April. It has
no formal tie with
any political party
but is composed
mainly of Febreris-
tas, Liberals, some
Communists, and a
few foreign advisers.
The 14th of May
group may be gaining
strength as a result
of its harassing
activity. Until now
it has been considered
third' in impor-
tance to the Popular
Colorado Movement--
dissidents from
Stroessner's Colorado party--
and to the National Para-
guayan Union (UNP), led by
exiles of the major opposition
Liberal and Febrerista parties.
A UNP leader recently cited the
"growing influence" of the 14th
of May Movement as a reason for
hastening UNP rebel action "at
least by August."
7 JULY 1S 0
& %* M" A
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Carlos Antonio Lopez
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7 July 1960
The Argentine, Brazilian,
and Uruguayan governments re-
cently tightened controls over
border points, but full patrol
of the border is impossible.
The rebels, however, have had
some success in soliciting do-
nations in these countries,
and the indicated step-up in
rebel activities may prompt
more substantial foreign aid.
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7 July 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN SOVIET POLITICS
The presence of Defense
Minister Marshal Malinovsky at
the abortive summit meeting in
Paris in May led to consider-
able speculation about the role
of the military in Soviet polit-
ical life. The key questions
which arise are: Is "the mil-
itary" a cohesive element in
the leadership? Are the mil-
itary leaders in a position
where they could exert pressure
on Khrushchev? Are there indi-
cations that they have wanted
to exert such pressure? These
are discussed in the first por-
tion of this article; the last
half covers the effects and im-
plications of recent events--
including the U-2 incident--on
the military-political relation-
ship.
The Military
Soviet military leaders,
as the directors, planners, and
administrators of the military
establishment, reflect the view-
point and the views of a large
and powerful institution. They
reflect too the career interests
of the officer corps, and rep-
resent the professional judg-
ment of the military arm of gov-
ernment and party on matters of
state policy in which that arm
has a role. In this sense and
in these matters they often have
a relatively unified attitude.
The military leaders at
the same time form a bureauc-
racy made up of individuals of
differing and sometimes con-
flicting views, associations,
and interests. Moreover, these
associations of friendship or
rivalry extend beyond the
bounds of the military insti-
tution into the party and a-
mong political leaders. In this
sense, "the military" does
not speak with one voice, and
sometimes it subordinates com-
mon professional views to per-
sonal differences.
World War II Developments
The "Malinovsky adminis-
tration" came into being pre-
cisely as a result of such a
division among the military
leaders under former Defense
Minister Zhukov, and the sub-
sequent and present situation
cannot be fully understood with-
out due attention to this fact.
Indeed, it is necessary to turn
to the days of World War II in
order to understand it.
The war brought a new re-
lationship between the polit-
ical and military leaders, one
in which the military command-
ers came into unusual intimacy
with senior party officials.
Both between military and polit-
ical leaders and among the mil-
itary leaders themselves, new
and sometimes deep relations of
personal acquaintanceship, and
even lasting friendship or hos-
tility, developed. In a few
cases, whole groups of military
leaders developed ties or antip-
athies to a political figure
with whom they served in the
field or dealt in the capital.
While there was, of course,
a shifting of senior commanders
during the war, two main cat-
egories developed: the army
group and army commanders at
the front, and the Supreme Head-
quarters staff in Moscow, which
sometimes sent one or more of
its members to the field to as-
sume temporary over-all command
of major operations. A prime
example, because of its long-
run effect on personal relation-
ships, was Stalingrad. As will
be seen, this historical case is
relevant to current alignments.
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7 July 1960
In the field,
the Army Group direct-
ly involved in the de-
fense of Stalingrad
was the Stalingrad
Front, under Colonel
General Yeremenko.
Under this command
were four armies,
commanded by Gener-
als Chuykov, Mali-
novsky, Shumilov,
and Moskalenko. Gen-
eral G. Zakharov was
chief of staff of the
Front, General Krylov
was chief of staff of
the 62nd Army under
Chuykov, and General
M. Zakharov was chief
of staff of the 64th
Army under Malinov-
sky. Generals Bag-
ramyan and Popov also
served in this Front.
The senior political
adviser and member of
the Military Council
of the Front was
Lieutenant General
Nikita Khrushchev.
N.S. KHRUSHCHEV
1st Secretary,
Soviet Communist Party.
Premier of the USSR.
M. V. ZAKHAROV
Minister of Defense.
As the battle of Stalin-
grad reached a climax and the
crucial counteroffensive phase
drew near, Stalin sent down not
only the plans for the opera-
tion, but also an echelon of
senior commanders and advisers
to carry it out. Army General
Zhukov, deputy supreme command-
er, and Colonel General Vasi-
levsky, deputy chief of the
General Staff, were given over-
all command. Colonel General of
Aviation Novikov was placed over
all air forces, and Colonel Gen-
eral of Artillery Voronov was
later put in charge of elim-
inating the encirclement.
Moreover, Malenkov was
dispatched as the representa-
tive of the State Defense Com-
mittee to oversee the whole
operation. Not unnaturally, a
certain resentment and rivalry
was felt by the senior field
commanders there. Moreover,
Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Novikov,
and Voronov were all soon
-ref-Deputy
Minister of Defense.
Commander in Chief,
Soviet Ground Forces.
1st Deputy
Minister of Defense.
Commander in Chief,
Warsaw Pact Forces.
Commander, Moscow
Military District.
Chief, Moscow Garrison,
promoted to marshal's rank for
their services at Stalingrad,
while none of the field com-
manders were.
During the following two
years, the generals who formed
the core of the field command
in the Stalingrad battle gen-
erally assumed commands in the
four Ukrainian fronts and their
component armies, which swept
across the southern part of cen-
tral Europe. The Moscow mar-
shals frequently assumed com-
mand of the various northern
Belorussian and Baltic fronts.
Thus was perpetuated, to a con-
siderable extent, a rivalry
which arose in the Stalingrad
campaign. Moreover, it so hap-
pened that a disproportion of
the commanders and the political
figures whose wartime service
was centered in the Ukraine
were themselves by birth or
political career associated
with that region.
During the postwar Stalin
period, some of the "southern"
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7 July 1960
political and military leaders
returned to that area, includ-
ing Khrushchev. The military
district command in Kiev was
first under General Grechko,
and later Chuykov; Popov was
in the Crimea. Moskalenko not
only served with Khrushchev in
the Ukraine from 1945 to 1949
but also made a parallel trans-
fer to Moscow in 1949.
Many other generals from
this clique came to serve in
Siberia: Malinovsky commanded
the Maritime District, and lat-
er a broader Far Eastern area
command; Krylov, the Far East-
ern Military District; and G.
Zakharov and Yeremenko, the
East and West Siberian Military
Districts, respectively. To
be sure, Zhukov was himself for
many years in distant and minor
commands, but the heart of
Stalin's senior military com-
mand was the Supreme Headquar-
ters leadership on which he had
learned to rely during the war
years: Bulganin, Vasilevsky,
Kuznetsov, Antonov, and Shtemen-
ko. Even the field commanders
and staff officers in favor--
Konev and Govorov, Sokolovsky
and Malinin--were men who were
not part of the "southern clique"
which developed from Stalingrad
to the end of the war. ("Clique"
is not intended to indicate
that this group consciously
formed a faction or that it
agreed on all issues.)
Khrushchev-Zhukov Axis
By early 1955, the initial
period of the struggle for the
succession to Stalin had
Premier of the USSR,
Relieved February 1955.
Member, Party Presidium,
Expelled June 1957.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
N. A. BULGANIN
Premier of the USSR,
Relieved March 1958.
Member, Party Presidium,
Expelled September 1958.
1st Deputy Minister of
Defense for General Affairs,
Retired April 1960.
Commander in Chief
Warsaw Pact Forces,
Retired April 1960.
Minister of Defense,
Fired October 1957.
Member, Party Presidium,
Expelled October 1957.
1st Deputy Minister
of Defense,
Retired April 1960.
Chief of the General Staff,
Retired April 1960.
1st Deputy Minister of
Defense for General Affairs,
Relieved June 1956.
1st Deputy Chief of the
General Staff,
Died January 1960.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
closed. The military had, with
all other institutions in the
USSR, increased in importance
on the death of the autocrat.
By 1955 it seemed to have won
its place in the new post-
Stalin order and, with the re-
versal of Malenkov's tentative
programs, to have gained ac-
ceptance of its requirements.
At the,, same time that Mal-
enkov fell and Khrushchev and
Bulganin triumphed, Marshal
Zhukov became minister of de-
fense. A month later, 12 gen-
erals and marshals were pro-
moted, including six to the
highest rank--marshal of the
Soviet Union. Soon after, six
more generals were promoted to
general of the army. Among
those promoted in 1955 were
several former close associates
of Zhukov and of Konev; but al-
so among them were a conspicu-
ously large number of members
of the "southern clique," pos-
sibly included at the instance
of Khrushchev.
Thus, in 1953 and 1955,
Moskalenko was twice raised, to
become a marshal of the Soviet
Union; Grechko--not at Stalin-
grad, but a Ukrainian and long-
time close associate of Khru-
shchev--was also twice promoted;
Chuykov, Yeremenko, and Bargram-
yan became marshals; and Krylov,
Popov, Kazakov, and G. Zakharov
were among the new generals of
the army. Also in 1955 Admiral
Kuznetsov was relieved and re-
placed as naval chief by Admiral
Gorshkov, a "southerner" both
by wartime and postwar service,
and long acquainted with Khru-
shchev.
The period from February
1955 to October 1957 may be de-
scribed as representing an axis
between Khrushchev and Zhukov,
since each found cooperation
with the other useful--until,'
toward the end, Khrushchev con-
cluded that Zhukov was usurping
more than his due role. It was
never, of course, a question of
equal or shared power--Khru-
shchev was always the more pow-
erful--but it was an alliance
of mutual convenience, born in
the early post-Stalin period,
in which each enjoyed the sup-
port of the other in consol-
idating his hold on matters of
his own direct concern.
Khrushchev was building
his personal power within the
party, and the power of the
party within the state; Zhukov
was exercising his authority in
developing Soviet military
thought and training, and in
building a modern military es-
tablishment. Ultimately they
came to clash over the very is-
sue of defining the dividing line
between the party authority of
the one, and the authority with-
in the military sphere of the
other.
When a new central com-
mittee was selected by the 20th
party congress in February 1956,
the number of military members
was reduced--but remarkable fa-
vor was shown in the selection
of officers from the southern
clique. Both Malinovsky and
Moskalenko were raised to full
membership, although the latter
had not even been a candidate
member of the previous (1952)
central committee, which had
included 30 senior military men
as members or candidates.
Bagramyan, Chuykov, and Yeremen-
ko were chosen as candidates.
However, there still prevailed
a three-way balance among the
Moscow headquarters officers,
Zhukov's personal rival Konev,.and
the southern group; Zhukov be-
came the first professional of-
ficer to acquire candidate status
on the presidium of the party.
Both before and after the
party congress, the authority of
the professional commanders, and
of professional military think-
ing, had been largely freed from
political interference. In late
1955 the position of political
officer at company level was
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
abolished. Senior officers
were permitted to meet their
compulsory political education
by what was euphemistically
termed "self-study." The re-
lationship between the party
organizations and the profes-
sional commanders was, however,
in need of clarification.
Accordingly, in April 1957,
by decree of the central com-
mittee, "Instructions to the
Soviet Communist Party Organi-
zations in the Soviet Army and
Navy" were issued, replacing
those issued ten years before.
This decree, and an accompany-
ing order of the minister of
defense, marked a compromise
between conflicting army and
party views on the division of
authority. The compromise did
not, however, settle the issue;
various published articles still
emphasized either the restric-
tions on the political organs
or on the officers, depending
on the point of view of the
author.
At all times, of course,
the four lines of command--the
professional military, the po-
litical administration, the
party organization, and the
secret police counterintelli-
gence--have extended from the
ministry itself into every
battalion of the armed forces.
By 1957 the last three had all
declined in influence both ab-
solutely and in relation to
the professional command cadres.
In June 1957 the various
opponents of Khrushchev among
the party leaders joined in an
effort to depose him. Khru-
shchev has admitted that the
"antiparty group" obtained a
majority in the presidium. Khru-
shchev refused to accept the
decision of this majority, and
insisted on carrying the matter
to the central committee, which
is always heavy with men of the
party machine, and which more-
over he had "packed" with his
supporters at the 20th party
congress.
It was a critical time for
Khrushchev, and although he had
the support of many key party
officials, it was without ques-
tion of great--and conceivably
crucial--importance that he also
found Marshal Zhukov and the
military fully behind him.F_
TZhu-
kov, then a full member of the
presidium, subsequently spoke-
"on behalf of the armed forces"
in pledging continued support
to the party leaders under Khru-
shchev.
The Zhukov Ouster
This was the high point of
the Khrushchev-Zhukov relation-
ship. Indeed, these two ap-
peared to many to be the most
powerful men in the Soviet Un-
ion. For this very reason though,
could the newly successful party
chief permit Zhukov such a posi-
tion? In particular, while Zhu-
kov had on this occasion extra-
legally pledged the army to Khru-
shchev's support, could he not
on some future occasion attempt
to range this power against
him? Could party presidium mem-
ber Zhukov be permitted to make
charged political statements
"on behalf of the armed forces"?
Khrushchev's wariness of Zhukov's
rising power and popularity was
one facet of the new situation
from June to October 1957. There
were two other facets in addi-
tion which also affected deeply
the civil-military relationship.
The flux in internal power
relations following the death
of Stalin has been alluded to.
The professional party apparatus
under Khrushchev ultimately came
to be dominant, but this was
not the case in 1953 or 1955 or
indeed 1957. The police had
been drastically reduced in
power with the purge of Beria.
The governmental and managerial
bureaucracy was greatly weakened
as ;potential .political force by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
the two defeats of Malenkov and
his associates, and by decen-
tralization. However, the party
leaders were divided. The mil-
itary was affected by these
changes by receiving increased
relative importance.
In particular, under Mar-
shal Zhukov, the military was
also able to acquire a substan-
tial degree of autonomy. The
whole trend of his administra-
tion was, while not antiparty,
nonparty.' "Military science"
itself was redefined in terms
stressing purely professional
military competence. This
tendency clashed with the party
not because it sought to usurp
the political power of the
party, but because it sought
to make of the military a pro-
fessional and self-contained
instrument of the state.
Khrushchev and the party
could not accept this, since
their whole aim was to revital-
ize the party as the driving
force in all activities of
society and the state. Pre-
cisely the growing tendency
toward an autonomous, pro-
fessional governmental and eco-
nomic bureaucracy, a would-be
independent intelligentsia,
and a professionally autonomous
military establishment was con-
sidered by the party a main in-
ternal concern.
The removal of Marshal
Zhukov was accomplished with
no overt signs of difficulty,
although by a devious strate-
gem. Zhukov was sent on a
visit to Yugoslavia in October
1957, and, while he was in Bel-
grade, a previously unplanned
week-long extension of his trip
to Albania was announced. Thus
Zhukov was kept out of Moscow
for a three-week period during
which Khrushchev lined up Mal-
inovsky and others among the
military and political leaders
for his removal. On 26 October
Zhukov arrived back at Moscow
to be met by a military and
political delegation which in-
formed him of his dismissal from
the post of defense minister, a
move immediately made public.
During the next several
days, the public was in the
dark on the meaning of this
measure, while an apparently
extended discussion of the whole
matter of military-political re-
lations took place in the cen-
tral committee. At the end, it
was announced on 2 November
that Zhukov had also been re-
moved from the presidium and
the central committee, and he
was castigated for fostering a
personal cult around himself,
and for attempting to "abolish
the leadership and control of
the party" over the armed forces.
Apparently the initial plan had
been to shift Zhukov quietly to
a post of no real authority, but
when he fought the issue there
could be no compromise short of
his capitulation, disgrace, and
complete retirement.
The Southerners "Arrive"
With the selection of Mar-
shal Malinovsky as minister of
defense in 1957, the southern-
ers "arrived." Khrushchev's
old friend Marshal Grechko be-
came first deputy minister and
commander in chief of ground
forces, with General Popov as
chief of staff of the ground
forces. Marshal (then General)
M. Zakharov was at that time
transferred to replace Grechko
as commander of the Soviet forces
in Germany--the prize field;
command in the Soviet Army.
Marshal Bagramyan was made
deputy minister and chief of the
rear services for the whole mil-
itary establishment, and Marshal
Yeremenko was brought to Moscow
to head the Higher Military
Academy of the General Staff.
Moskalenko and Krylov were in
command of the key Moscow and
Leningrad Military Districts.
Admiral Gorshkov remained naval
chief. Konev, however, was still
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the senior first deputy minis-
ter for general affairs and head
of the Warsaw Pact command, and
Marshal Sokolovsky remained as
first deputy minister and chief
of the general staff of the So-
viet armed forces.
The most recent act of the
drama occurred in April 1960,
in the wake of dissatisfactions
among the military with Khru-
shchev's plan for substantial
reductions in the armed forces
and alterations in force struc-
ture, announced in a speech on
14 January. Although others
too had reservations, the two
leading military men who failed
to speak publicly in support of
this speech by Khrushchev have
developed illnesses leading to
their retirement: the senior
first deputy ministers, Mar-
shals Sokolovsky and Konev. Thus
these two remaining "holdovers"
from the previous adiniliistration
now have been removed.
Today; virtually all of the
key places in the Soviet mil-
itary high command are filled
by members of the southern
clique. Marshal Grechko as-
sumed Konev's post, Marshal M.
Zakharov moved into Sokolovsky's
place, and Marshal Chuykov
moved up from Kiev to Grechko's
old position, fourth in the
hierarchy, as commander in chief
of ground forces.
Based on recent listings
and their positions, the stand-
ing of the top eight military
leaders is approximately as
follows: Malinovsky, Grechko,;
M:. Zakharov, Chuyk ov, Biriu;ov,
Bagramyan, Yeremenko, and Mos-
kalenko--all members of the
southern group. And what of
the Moscow group.?' Zhukov,
Vasilevsky, Sokolovsky, Antonov,
Kuznetsov, Novikov, and Voronov
now are all in retirement. Al-
though various considerations
enter into command appointments,
the contrast between the fate
of these two major groups has
been dramatically and drasti
cally.demonstrated.
Current Relations
The military leaders at
present form a more cohesive
group of men than in any other
recent period, although there
probably are personal and serv-
ice differences which may give
rise to differing attitudes.
However, all owe their present
status largely to Khrushchev's
favor, and presumably he has
reason, based now on more than
his personal association and ac-
quaintanceship, to believe that
they are responsive to his trust.
While the fortunes of in-
dividuals are of interest when
they are as persistent and as
politically relevant as in the
case of Khrushchev's association
with the "southern" clique of
marshals, the main question re-
mains the institutional one.
Malinovsky, after all, is a
marshal much absorbed with mil-
itary interests and charged
with defining, advocating, and
fulfilling military require-
ments. The evolution of the
institutional autonomy of the
military establishment was not,
in fact, basically altered by
Zhukov's fall.
Inasmuch as one of the key
charges against Zhukov was his
attempt, to avoid party-polit-
ical interference in the sphere
of the military--not, of course,
expressed in these terms--the
regime set out to restore party
control at all levels. In what
has seemed to many to be a
paradoxical move, a few months
after Zhukov's ouster- the chief
of the Main Political Adminis-
tration since 1953, Colonel Gen-
eral Zheltov, was replaced by a
professional officer, Colonel
General (now 'Army ..General)
Filip Golikov. In terms of
what the regime has attempted
to do, however, this move is
readily understandable.
In the post-Zhukov era,
considerable stress has been
placed on creating a closer rela-
tionship between professional
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7 July 1960
and party-political interests.
This has been neither easy, nor
altogether successful. Nonethe-
less, an effort is being made
to make professional commanders
and staff officers more inter-
ested in party-political work,
and at the same time to make
the political officers and party
units better grounded in mil-
itary affairs, and their work
thus more responsive to real in-
terests and needs of the pro-
fessionals.
A model, if not a goal, of
interchangeability has been men-
tioned--and indeed personified--
by Golikov, and leading command-
ers at lower levels are being
urged to assume leadership of
local party units. There have
been many indications, even in
Soviet military newspapers, of
a persistent failure to achieve
a real rapport between party-
political work and professional
interests. While the auton-
omous interests of the military
career officers have not been
eliminated, the further prog-
ress of their independent de-
velopment has been arrested
from the strides of early 1955
to late 1957.
The "Instructions of the
Central Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party to Party Organ-
izations in the Soviet Army and
Navy" were revised and supple-
mented in late 1958 to remove
some of the ambiguous allow-
ances made in the compromise
of early 1957. The main and
novel aspect, however, has
been the attempt to create,
rather than merely to promul-
gate, a higher party-political
consciousness throughout the
armed forces.
The higher levels of com-
mand have also been affected by
the pervasive efforts to estab-
lish a closer rapport between
the professional commanders and
the political and party organs.
The institution of the Military
Council, with the senior of-
ficer of the political adminis-
tration in each Military Dis-
trict or Army Group as a member
along with the two or three
senior commanders, has been
resurrected since the fall of
Zhukov. A new tie of the Mil-
itary District to the correspond-
ing regional, republic, or oblast
party organs has recently been
cultivated.
Both these developments tend
to make the officer corps paral-
lel to the local governmental,
agricultural, and managerial bu-
reaucracies, and less of an auton-
omous and self-contained system
apart from the surrounding en-
vironment and tied only to its
own high command in Moscow.
The most recent step in the
never-ending campaign of polit-
ical indoctrination was the "All-
Army Conference of Secretaries of
Basic Party Units" held in Moscow
from 11 to 14 May., Its proceed-
ings reveal that the same prob-
lems remain--most basically, po-
litical apathy in the armed
forces--and also that the gen-
eral course of counteraction fol-
lowed since 1957 continues. In
particular, the emphasis on the
party organizations is used to
bring the professional officers
more into the activities of po-
litical indoctrination.
The present military lead-
ers have shown no inclination to
resume open "Zhukovism" in party-
military relations. The military
is called on for its counsel in
discussion of appropriate major
policy issues, preceding final
decision by the presidium and
submission to the central com-
mittee of the party. Thus its
leaders contribute their advice
as technical specialists--but
not as full-fledged partici-
pants in national and foreign
policy strategy-making.
The military may be given in-
creased public prominence in times
of tension, when the leaders want
to demonstrate military power--
as with Malinovsky's presence at
the abortive summit meeting. Such
moves should not, however, be tak-
en as marking significant fluctua-
tions in the situation of the mil-
itary within Soviet political coun-
cils.
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7 July 1960
Reappraisal of Armed Forces
From the standpoint of
the military leaders, the most
sensitive issue since Zhukov's
ouster is the party and gov-
ernment decision in late 1959
to reduce the size of the
armed forces drastically--at
a time when their strength was
such that only an alteration
of their structure would per-
mit a major reduction. As
since revealed, Khrushchev ob-
tained in December 1959 the ap-
proval of the central committee
of the party--the widest base
of policy consultation and sanc-
tion in the USSR--for this deci-
sion.
This program was announced
by Khrushchev on 14 January
1960, and it clearly had many
internal and external, propa-
ganda, economic, and military
purposes and implications. It
stands out as the first major
issue of political-military
discord in the post-Zhukov
period, and it is significant
that even in a matter of such
central professional concern
to the military leaders, and
indeed to the whole career of-
ficer corps, the preferences
of the political leaders pre-
vailed. In the wake of this
decision some senior military
men, notably Marshals Sokolovsky
and Konev, were retired, but
the military leaders generally
--who must have shared concern
over the measure--accepted,
endorsed, and implemented the
decision.
It is pertinent to note,
in connection with this deci-
sion, that contrary to some
Western commentary, Khrushchev
did not impose a new military
doctrine. The military leaders
still remain masters within
their domain, and they were ap-
parently given the deciding
voice in allocating the military
reductions and changing the
force structure under the polit-
ically imposed manpower ceiling.
The military undoubtedly
did not take the initiative in
proposing a severe slash in
armed strength. Over the last
seven or eight months of 1959,
Khrushchev had hinted, especially
in private talks with prominent
Westerners, that he was planning
a: reorganization and reduction
in the armed forces and greater
emphasis on nuclear-armed mis-
siles. Khrushchev has publicly
and defensively said that his
plan--the military leaders all
publicly note that it is his
plan--was carefully considered
and approved by the General
Staff and the military leaders,
and this is doubtless so.
Still, the terms--an even
one-third cut, to a shade under
the 2,500,000-troop level of
the US armed forces and of cur-
rent Western,.~disarmament pro-
posals--suggest strongly a
politically determined scale
of reduction. Khrushchev him-
self has privately admitted
that there was stiff military
opposition to the program.
Khrushchev probably called
in Malinovsky and his senior
deputies and explained the
reasons, and the necessity,
for a substantial reduction.
He presumably would have argued
in general terms that the nature
of modern weapons, particularly
rockets, made such a reduction
feasible, and he may well
have pointed to the prior US
example.
In addition, he probably
would have argued that war
was quite unlikely in the fore-
seeable future, and that even
granting the premises of cur-
rent Soviet military doctrine
on extended campaigns in a nu-
clear war, the maintenance
of a strengthened reserve sys-
tem would meet future contin-
gencies adequately without the
drain of very large standing
ground armies, especially in
view of the relatively small
size of the Western standing
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
forces directly confronting
them.
Khrushchev may well have
agreed in principle to the
need for a large army, but may
have argued that if the prin-
ciple were carried to the ex-
treme, there would be no civil-
ian workers to build tanks or
rockets, no young scientists
to discover new weapons, no
economic and scientific advances
to create the necessary politi-
cal and ideological trends
which give the capitalists pause
and give world socialism momen-
tum. He may have asked the
marshals just how great a su-
periority in divisions they
needed over the Western powers.
Whether or not Khrushchev
presented the matter in this
way, the arguments which the
military finally accepted were
presumably (a) that technolog-
ical advances permitted or
would shortly permit a greater
reliance on missiles to perform
the missions formerly served
by manned bombers, manned fight-
ers, fleet heavy-fire-support
units, and certain categories
of artillery, and (b) that other
forces not supplanted by mis-
siles could be reduced because
the missile deterrent made war
less likely and because provi-
sion would be made to maintain
a superiority in standing
forces plus large reserves.
Thus the military leaders were
able reluctantly to reconcile
themselves to support of Khru-
shchev's reductions.
The circumstance of the
retirement of Marshals Sokolov-
sky and Konev, following their
silence on the new military
plan, suggests strongly that
they were reluctant in support,
even perhaps adamant in opposi-
tion, to the Khrushchev program.
It may be that the occasion was
used to dispose quietly of these
remaining exceptions to the
dominant clique. Indeed, the
recognition of the futility of
opposition may well have led
Malinovsky and his close col-
leagues to decide very early
in the game that they should
let Sokolovsky and Konev bear
the brunt of presenting the
military's case, and then move
in to support Khrushchev, thus
prompting him to remove those
who were out of step.
In this manner, Khrushchev
could be induced to do what he
ordinarily might have been re-
luctant to do: destroy an in-
ternal balance and place the
High Command in the hands of
one clique. At the same time,
Khrushchev was probably ready
to permit Malinovsky and his
associates in the military
leadership to determine the
way in which the reductions
would be applied.
There are no indications
that "service rivalries" have
entered the military-political
relationship, although in a
sense they are bound to play
a part in the apportionment of
reductions. Interservice ri-
valries may have existed, and
may now exist, within the Soviet
military establishment on a
wider scale than appears, but
such rivalries cannot be ex-
pected to reach a major scope
and intensity.
One reason is historical
tradition, the land-oriented,
continental horizon of the
Russian military and the long
dominance of the ground soldiers.
A second is political, the
severe limitations on the de-
velopment of any point of view,
almost anywhere in Soviet society,
which has not been sanctioned
by the party leaders,. More-
over, the nature of the politi-
cal system does not encourage
the belief that such an en-
deavor, even in private and
still less in public, would be
in the national interest.
Third is a sociological
and psychological phenomenon--
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
the difficulty of developing
new ideas in the absence of
their expression, debate, and
refinement, and the further
difficulty in the unofficial
adoption of these ideas by some
service minority. Finally, the
ideological-political founda-
tion of Soviet military thought
is based on conviction of the
need and value of a balanced
and varied military capability,
thus not inducing interest in
theories proclaiming the superi-
ority or self-sufficiency of
any service.
In any case, the only "serv-
ice" to have its fortunes ad-
vanced was the long-range rock-
et command. Khrushchev pub-
icly disclosed on 9 May that
Chief Marshal of Artillery
Nedelin had been named com-
mander in chief of the Rocket
Troops, and from a variety of
sources it now is fairly clear
that Nedelin's command is
roughly coequal with the ground,
air, air defense, and naval com-
ponents of the Soviet armed
forces.
While the implication is
that Nedelin's appointment is
recent, this may or may not
be so. In May 1959 he was
promoted to chief marshal of
Artillery, and ever since
1955 he has been a deputy min-
ister of defense with unknown
responsibilities in the missile
field. In the most recent list-
ings of military chiefs, the
changed precedence of names
of deputy ministers suggests
that the rocket force--and the
political administration--have
advanced over, and at the ex-
pense of, the navy and air
forces. The dominance of ground
force generals is, if anything,
strengthened.
Many officers of all major
branches of service are af-
fected directly by their impend-
ing release from service. Malin-
ovsky's indication that in all
a quarter of a million officers
will be released reflects the
scale of the problem and sug-
gests the scope of concern in
the officer corps. The regime
has shown its awareness of the
problem in several ways, chief-
ly by promulgating a series of
laws which will grant those
relieved extended severance pay
and preferential treatment in
education, housing, and employ-
ment.
Still, the prospects are
not encouraging to middle-age,
middle-rank professional of-
ficers too young to retire and
too old to start a new career.
This is without doubt a con-
tributory consideration in the
lack of enthusiasm of the mili-
tary leaders for the new look.
A second measure that the
regime has taken to mute this
dissatisfaction is the publicly
announced promotion on 7 May
of about 300 generals and ad-
mirals. The promotion lists
included 19 new three-star
colonel generalcies, of which
13 were ground force, 4 were
air force, and 2 were political
administration.
As additional compensa-
tion, it is possible that certain
functions of the dissolved
Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD) may have been transferred
to the Ministry of Defense, in
particular general authority
over the local civil defense
organizations and perhaps over
some of the Internal Troops.
Also, while the Border Guards
are under the Committee of State
Security (KGB), they now may
have a close relation to the
armed forces as well.
Finally, the party set out
in a major internal propaganda
campaign, especially within
the military establishment, to
justify the reductions in mili-
tary terms, to show solicitude
for the released veterans, and
above all to remind everyone
of the infallible wisdom and
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7 July 1960
irreversible resolve of the par-
ty in military as in all other
walks of Soviet life. As in
the previous case of a possibly
delicate reaction, after Zhu-
kov's removal, senior party
leaders--Suslov, Brezhnev,
Ignatov, and others--were sent
to address troop meetings called
to demonstrate solidarity in
support of the party's decision.
This brief sketch of devel-
opments suggests that Khru-
shchev proposed a major reduc-
tion in the armed forces, that
the military was generally not
in:favor, but with a few impor-
tant exceptions accepted the new
policy; that a few key personnel
shifts, internal propaganda,
and appropriate material com-
pensations were provided to
deal with lingering dissatisfac-
tions; and that there was no
crisis in military-political
relations.
The U-2 Affair
Into this situation plunged
the ill-fated U-2 reconnaissance
plane on 1 May. It is diffi-
cult in the tangle of assorted
debris left from its crash to
extricate the military influ-
ences on Soviet policy, but
several considerations probably
have played a part, According-
ly, this discussion will at-
tempt to infer the role of the
military in influencing Soviet
policy from 1 May to 15 May,.
the period of the initial sharp
reaction to the U-2 incident
and to its aftermath.
The four days preceding
Khrushchev's public disclosure
of the incident on 5 May doubt-
less saw extended discussion
among both military and polit-
ical leaders on how to treat
the affair.
Regardless of precise events,
the military leaders probably
held a "hard" position, at least
on exploiting the incident it-
self; they may or may not have
spoken on the broader issue of
the general line of foreign
policy. There have been no
hints that, say, Mikoyan, or
indeed anyone, favored any
course of action other than
that adopted.
At this stage, the Soviet
leaders probably did not expect
the United States to acknowledge
the overflights, and in addi-
tion let the world know that
they had been going on for four
years. This disclosure, plus
the boomerang effect of exces-
sive Soviet boasting, doctored
accounts, and an apparently
false photograph of the wreck-
age, instead of boosting the
image of Soviet air defense
capabilities as the Soviet mili-
tary and political' .eaders prob-
ably had expected, on the con-
trary cast widespread doubts
and aspersions on Soviet military
prowess and ability.
One small indication of
possible initial inclinations
of the military in this period
was a Ministry of Defense re-
quest on 2 May to General White
for a postponement of the planned
announcement of Chief Air Marshal
Vershinin's scheduled visit to
the United States. By 3 May it
was back "on" again. Clearly
the authorities had decided
at that stage not to let the U-2
incident disrupt the visit.
On 7 May the composition of
the Vershinin group was given,
and on 9 May Khrushchev told
Ambassador Thompson that Ver-
shinin's trip would proceed as
planned. As late as 11 May word
was sent announcing the new
ranks of three of the men in the
delegation, who had been among
those promoted on 7 May. Sud-
denly, on 13 May, the visit was
canceled. The events from 2 25X1
to 13 May doubtless reflected
the developing political decision
on the summit and general policy
posture.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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It is not known whether
the military exerted any par-
ticular "pressure" for the
adoption of a "hard line" to-
ward the US prior to 11 May,
when the statements of US re-
sponsibility by Secretary Herter
and the President evidently led
to a change in Khrushchev's
own position on current policy
tactics. There are two indi-
cations in Khrushchev's im-
promptu remarks at the Czech
Embassy reception on the eve-
ning of 9 May which suggest
either that such pressure was
being exerted or that Khru-
shchev wanted to head off any
possible pressure before it
arose.
First, he went out of his
way to castigate the military
for failing to shoot down an
intruding airplane on 9 April.
According to Pravda, Khrushchev
said:
"On 9 April the recon-
naissance plane should
have been shot down. But
our military, speaking
softly, let the chance
slip by. And we had, so
to speak, to lecture them
over that."
Second., he gratuitously
raised an issue when he asserted
--as he had on 7 May--that the
American "provocations" had not
and would not make any change
in the Soviet plan for a reduc-
tion in the armed forces, and
that in fact the USSR would
probably make still further re-
ductions in the more distant
future. He noted in a patroniz-
ing public aside that General
of the Army Zhadov--first deputy
commander in chief of the ground
forces--was scratching his head
in wonderment at this indica-
tion of still more reductions.
Pravda reported Khrushchev's
remarks as follows:
"We not only insist
on the necessity for re-
ducing the armed forces,
but. even now--without
waiting for such decisions
by the Western powers--
we are unilaterally re-
ducing the armed forces
of the Soviet Union by
one third. When we have
reduced the armed forces
to 2,400,000 men, after
a bit, we will think it
over and probably will re-
duce our army still fur-
ther. There, Comrade
Zhadov is scratching the
back of his head--'Again,'
he says, 'reductions:' (Gay
animation in the audience)No,
that won't happen yet, Com-
rade General, but later.
(Gay animation, laughter)."
In sum, any pressure the
military may have sought or
been tempted to exert up to 10
May would appear to have been
ineffectual.
Apparently, from 10 to 12
May the Soviet position was
fluid and open, as Moscow
awaited and assessed the unfold-
ing American publicity on the
theme of officially sanctioned
and justified intelligence col-
lection. There is no indication
that the military was even in-
volved, much less instrumental,
in the decision to torpedo the
summit, apparently reached
sometime between 12 and 14 May.
It is likely that Khrushchev
himself--taking account among
other things of the attitudes
of his political and military
colleagues--made the decision.
There is no indication
that the military leaders were
in a position to exert pressure,
beyond such indirect influence
as occurred in the weighing
of their preferences by Khru-
shchev himself. On the other
hand, there is no evidence that
they have not had opportunity
in high councils to lend their
voices to the deliberations of
the political leaders.
The military has not,
however, shown signs of a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
consistently hard position to-
ward the US. On 17 May Marshal
Bagramyan and Marshal of Avia-
tion Rudenko, in talking with
a US Embassy officer at a recep-
tion, were most friendly, re-
laxed, and moderate in comments
on the U-2 incident and Soviet-
American relations. Also, Chief
Air Marshal Vershinin's letter
of 13 May "postponing" his trip
to the US was moderate. At a lat=
4r? reception, on 25 May, the
US air and army attaches were
singled out by Soviet officers
with friendly comments and a
strong hint that Vershinin
might soon be ready to come as
a symbolic step ending the tem-
porary breach caused by the re-
cent incidents.
These and other remarks
indicate a readiness on the
part of the military to avoid
tensions in East-West relations,
but probably are not inconsist-
ent with their opposition to
large force cuts, to real dis-
armament agreements, and to pos-
sible Soviet experiments in al-
tering the status quo of the
military occupation in Eastern
Europe.
The fact that Marshal Mal-
inovsky accompanied Khrushchev
to Paris raises the question of
his role there. Based on infer-
ence and on what is known of
Malinovsky's behavior, it would
appear that his chief function
was as a visible symbol of So-
viet military might, and perhaps
additionally as a witness to
Khrushchev's dealings. If this
latter function was performed,
there is strong reason to as-
sume Khrushchev himself so
wished it. It is possible, al-
though less likely, that a ma-
jority of the political leaders
wanted such a witness. Least
likely of all is the possibility
that the military would have
monitored Khrushchev's behavior
on its own behalf.
Malinovsky's relative prom-
inence in giving several recent
public or published addresses
may indicate some increased
voice in speaking for the So-
viet leaders, but this is also
quite explicable in terms of
the need for creating both in
the West and in the USSR itself
the impression of Soviet mil-
itary strength, ability, and
resolution. Malinovsky has
firmly reiterated support for
the general coexistence line,
and has said nothing which
suggests reservations or re-
versals on such issues as the
reduction in the armed forces.
He has spoken, most re-
cently and most emphatically
on 29 May, in lyrical terms
of Khrushchev's marvelous qual-
ities as a leader, and crediting
him personally with all major
policies--at the same time he
announced the policy of rocket
retaliation against reconnais-
sance overflight bases.
Future Prospects
There is no reason to be-
lieve that the role of the mil-
itary in Soviet decision-making
has changed, or is likely to
change, in any significant way.
At times of increased tension,
it is not surprising that they
should be given greater prom-
inence, and also that on certain
issues their advice should carry
greater weight. It does not ap-
pear, however, that they are
exerting any significant influ-
ence on the determination of
the general line, or even on
the key current questions most
directly affecting military pol-
icy: a ban on nuclear weapons
tests, and the scheduled unilat-
eral reduction of the armed
forces.
All the reasons which led
Khrushchev and the party, after
evidently extended considera-
tion and coordinated examination
with the military, to decide on
a major unilateral cut still pre-
vail. Even if the general prop-
aganda line is somewhat harder,
there is neither an indication
nor evident reason for a change
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
in plans to stimulate the growth
of the economy, keep down ris-
ing military costs, reduce an
excessively large standing army,
and dispense with obsolescent
air and naval weapons.
It is possible that recent
and future events may affect
some intended reductions (e.g.,
in possible partial withdrawals
from Eastern Europe), but it is
not likely that events to date
have affected even such plans;
reductions are; in fact, `.being'.,
made...
Finally, in the unlikely
event that a major change of
line--which would probably in-
volve the replacement of Khru-
shchev--were to occur, it is
likely that military leaders
would get an increased voice on
issues directly affecting mil-
itary policy. It is most unlike-
ly, however, that they would
be the:: chief motive force in
securing the change of line, or
that they would emerge as the
dominant element in a new re-
gime.
SOVIET TECHNOLOGY
The Soviet Union, which
launched an ambitious industrial
modernization program in June
1959, has scheduled a central
committee plenum for 13 July to
review progress and give addi-
tional guidance for promoting
technological advances. This
year's plenum will probably
Difficulties in introducing advanced machinery as seen by Krokodil.
praise the satisfactory produc-
tion record of Soviet industry,
the general overfulfillment to
date of Seven-Year Plan indus-
trial and productivity goals,
and the determination to com-
plete the plan ahead of schedule.
Fifteen- and 20-year plan goals,
said by Khrushchev last fall to
,be in preparation,
may be discussed in
more detail.
However, the
plenum will probably
criticize accomplish-
ments to date, for
few of the specific
tasks assigned a
year ago appear to
have been fulfilled.
While the USSR is
more advanced in some
cases than the West
in theoretical knowl-
edge of automation,
it lags behind appre-
ciably in the appli-
cation of automatic
controls to industry.
On 31 May, at the Com-
munist Labor Brigade
Conference, Khrushchev
warned, "While we are
solving tasks concern-
ing the growth of pro-
duction... serious
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
problems still exist as regards
quality... including questions
of production costs, cost ac-
counting, and reduction of pro-
duction waste..., and new gains
of science and technology."
This is virtually the same list
of problems which were singled
out by the plenum for remedial
action last year.
Progress in these fields
is especially important if the
ambitious gains in industrial
productivity envisaged during
the Seven-Year Plan period are
to be achieved. Such gains are
necessary to compensate for
smaller additions to the labor
force--a result of the low World
War II and postwar birth rates--
and to permit fulfillment of the
program to reduce the workweek.
Level of Industrial Technology
Soviet industry has demon-
strated a capability to incor-
porate advanced techniques in-
to the rapidly expanding indus-
trial base of the USSR. In many
areas of heavy industry, which
long has been accorded the high-
est priority, technological im-
provements on a par with the
best in the West have been in-
troduced. In some cases, as in
blast furnaces, petroleum ex-
traction, machine building, and
pre-stressed concrete, the Soviet
Union has made notable pioneer-
ing adaptations and developments.
The food-processing, textile,
and other light industries, how-
ever, are far behind. Certain
types of transport, civil tele-
communications, and some aspects
of construction have been ac-
corded only grudging attention,
and many technological practices
in these areas are similar to
those followed in the West 25
years ago.
Within certain industries,
technological development has
also been uneven. In the Donets
coal basin, large sums have been
spent on automating operations
on the surface, but the under-
ground transport of coal is so
poor that one Soviet official
complained that more workers are
needed to extract 1,000 tons of
coal now than in prewar years.
A Soviet economist stated early
this year that Soviet plants em-
ploy 2.8 times as many auxiliary
workers to produce a ton of steel
--in transportation, maintenance,
and inspection--as do their Amer-
ican counterparts. Plants op-
erating the most up-to-date
machinery must frequently fab-
ricate spare parts themselves,
and material often must be
moved from one point in the
production process to the next
by hand or by cart.
Generally speaking, the
USSR has sufficient scientific
knowledge, but its ability to
apply it to industry is dependent
on favorable circumstances. Many
factors peculiar to the Soviet
economic system have led to the
uneven application of technology.
Technological improvements, for
example, are sometimes directed
toward political objectives, and
progress in modernization is
gauged by a scale of values
different from that of the West.
Central directives hereto-
fore have emphasized increased
output rather than increased
quality and efficiency, and thus
they have tended to discourage
the introduction of new tech-
niques which might temporarily
disrupt production. The direc-
tives have also inspired a con-
servatism in plant management
which often has resulted in a
considerable lag between devel-
opment and practical application.
These factors have frequently
led to the retention of existing
capacity and the operation of
technologically outmoded plants
much longer than is the case in
the West. Furthermore, research
planning and experimental work
have often been poorly coordi-
nated with the requirements of
production.
Soviet industry has tradi-
tionally used relatively more
labor and less capital than com-
parable industries in the US.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
In the aggregate, for example,
the USSR's industrial output is
less than half that of the US,
although its industrial labor
force is about 20 percent larg-
er.
Tasks Assigned by 1959,Plenum
To combat these problems,
a plenum of the party central
committee in June 1959 outlined
a comprehensive program to im-
prove the economic and adminis-
trative environment which was
hampering modernization. A
number of tasks were assigned
to various government and party
agencies, and about one third
of these were to be completed
by specified times ranging from
the end of August last year to
1 January 1960.
Gosplan and the minister
of finance were to submit to the
USSR Council of Ministers by
1 September proposals for im-
proving conditions for financ-
ing the introduction of new ma-
chinery--including the improve-
ment of bank credit, the allo-
cation of material resources,
and the establishment of correct
prices--an especially complex
problem in the USSR. Economic
stimuli to encourage enterprises
and construction organizations
to introduce new technology, and
workers to adopt new technology,
were to be drawn up by 1 Novem-
ber.
Branches of industry and
construction were ordered to
draft standardized regulations
for bringing experimental models
USSR AGENCIES CONCERNED WITH INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION AND
TECHNICAL PROGRESS
State Planning Committee
(Gosplan)
State Scientific -
Technical Council
State Scientific -
Economic Council
State Committee on
Problems of Labor
and Wages
Ministry of Higher
and Secondary
Specialized Education
State Committees for...
Machine - building and
Automation
Defense Technology
Radio Electronics
Aviation Technology
Chemistry
Shipbuilding
SECRET
Planning staff of the USSR Council of lsinisters. Responsible for developing state
economic plans--including all investment programs necessary for technical innovation
--and for monitoring their implementation. Rust also provide for shifts in plan
relationships which arise from technical progress and promote such progress through
its planning.
Responsible for developing and administering programs for "basic" scientific re-
search; these may result in practical applications involving technological innovation.
Its institutes are responsible upon request for research and development in direct
support of technical innovation.
Responsible for working out and coordinating programs for developing, storing, and
disseminating scientific and technical information for which it exploits foreign
and domestic literature. Acts as an advisory body to the USSR Council of Ministers
on scientific and technical problems.
Now reported to be handling long-term economic planning. has been responsible for
coordinating economic research, especially for providing theoretical support to
planning organs in technical economic matters. Develops methods for planning to
take account of technical progress and to promote it.
Responsible for developing and coordinating programs of wage incentives which take
adequate account of technical advance and which foster it; works with planning,
administrative, and trade union organs on matters of norms, working conditions,
working hours, and wages.
Responsible for controlling wage payments and authorizations; through operations of
of the State Bank (Cosbank),audits most expenditures for materials, labor, machinery
and equipment, research contracts, etc., in support of technical innovation and in-
vestment programs.
Responsible for training scientific and technical cadres; its network of scientific
research institutes--often adminstered jointly with industrial enterprises--is a
valuable asset promoting Soviet technical progress.
In their respective fields, these state committees are responsible for promoting the
adoption of new techniques, supporting the planning bodies with technical advice On
investment and innovation programs, and coordinating training programs and career
development.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
of new machines into series pro-
duction and to establish the
priorities and time limits for
carrying out work on integrated
automation. Proposals for re-
lating scientific research to
industrial problems--a recur-
ring demand--were to be sub-
mitted by the end of 1959.
Technical Committee reported
that 50 percent more measures
for the introduction of new
technology were carried out in
1959 than in 1958 and that,
throughout the national econ-
omy, series production of more
than 400 new types of machines
had been started.
The deadlines have all
passed with few announcements
of progress, possibly because
many of the deadlines were not
met. Only two specific meas-
ures are known to have been
adopted. One of these was the
passage of new bonus regula-
tions for industrial managers,
supervisors, and technicians in
most branches of heavy industry
and state agriculture which re-
ward those who reduce production
costs and, in certain industries,
improve product quality.
Bonuses for cost reduction
are contingent on simultaneous
fulfillment of the production
plan, the labor productivity
plan, and the plan for deliv-
eries. The new system probably
will succeed in making Soviet
managers and supervisors more
cost-conscious and thereby
should also encourage a more
receptive attitude toward new
production techniques.
A second major step in the
implementation of the decisions
of the June 1959 plenum appears
to have occurred with the pub-
lication on 2 July of a decree
providing for a new system of
bonuses to be paid to managerial
and technical personnel taking
a direct part in the creation
and introduction of new produc-
tion equipment and to the work-
ers operating such equipment.
A less direct influence of
the June 1959 plenum, although
probably of minor significance
with only local application, is
apparent in decrees reportedly
issued by numerous sovnarkhozy
to implement last year's plenum
decisions. In April the chair-
man of the :State Scientific-
Since last year's plenum,
there have also been a number
of conferences devoted to the
tasks set forth at that time.
The Siberian branch of the
USSR Academy of Sciences held
an all-union conference on the
automation of control and meas-
uring technology in industry
last September. Early this
April, the State Scientific-
Technical Committee convened a
meeting to consider the prob-
lems of introducing new tech-
nology and of correcting short-
comings in the application of
technology already adopted.
A conference to consider
wage and bonus legislation to
promote new technology was con-
vened in Moscow the same month,
and in June an All-Union Con-
ference of Agricultural special-
ists considered the problems of
improving the mechanization of
farm operations. At the First
International Congress for Auto-
matic Control which opened in
Moscow on 27 June, Soviet tech-
nologists put on an impressive
show for Western delegates, un-
derscoring the excellence of
their theoretical knowledge,
which in some cases is more ad-
vanced than that of the West.
The main emphasis of the
meeting, however, is on the in-
dustrial applications of auto-
matic controls; in practical
application, the USSR Is appar-
ently appreciably behind the
West. The signs of progress
are accompanied by many de-
ficiencies which troubled the
regime on the eve of the June
1959 plenum and have not been
appreciably reduced.
In March a sovnarkhoz chair-
man complained of extraordinary
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 July 1960
slowness in putting new tech-
nology into practice. "It is
no secret ... that/plant managers7
concerned with fulfillment of
the production plan avoid in-
novations...the introduction
of which entails some loss of
working time and cutting of
production output at the out-
set...." In the May issue of
the Soviet journal Problems of
Economics, an economist noted
that despite last year's admo-
nitions by the plenum "it is a
frequent fact that when an en-
terprise introduces new tech-
nology, payments for labor wor-
sen,. in comparison with work-
ers in enterprises still under
the old technology.."
60.
According to the chairman
of the State Scientific-Techni-
cal Committee at an automation
conference in April, many Union
republics and ministries failed
to fulfill plans for producing
new machines during 1959. It was
pointed out that out of 76 major
technological improvements planned
in
the iron and
steel
industry of
the
RSFSR during
1959,
only some
40 were implemented, and work was
not even begun on 16. At the
same meeting, one delegate com-
plained that it was almost im-
possible to exercise control over
the great number of modernization
projects the RSFSR's sovnarkhozy
had been expected to introduce in
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