CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Release Date: December 28, 2005
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• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
111 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
C Lti~J.
State Department review completed
COPY NO. t;(;
OCR NO. 2700/60
23 June 1960
e n.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent the
immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
Khrushchev used his speech
to the Rumanian party congress
on 21 June for a vigorous re-
statement of the USSR's inten-
tion to maintain its detente
policy despite Peiping's increas-
ingly open criticism and al-
leged American efforts to "re-
turn to the worst times of the
cold war." His hard-hitting
attack on Peiping's interpreta-
tion of Marxism-Leninism indi-
cates no intention to compro-
mise but a determination to de-
fend Moscow's ideological pri-
macy and hegemony in the Commu-
nist world against Peiping's
challenge.
This is the second time in
six months that Khrushchev has
chosen a satellite party con-
gress, attended by leaders of
all bloc nations and free world
Communist parties, as the forum
for directing strong criticism
against the Chinese regime. At
the Hungarian party congress
last December, he warned that
"if the leadership of this or
that country becomes conceited,
this can only play into the
hands of the enemy." In a pre-
view of the main points in Khru-
shchev's speech in Bucharest, a
Pravda editorial on 20 June re-
called this earlier warning and
Khrushchev's stress at that
time on the need for bloc lead-
ers "to synchronize our watches:'
The sharper tone of Khru-
shchev's latest attack on Chi-
ne.3e views probably reflects
his growing irritation with
Peiping's increasingly open
criticism of his policies in
major articles in the leading
Chinese theoretical journal,
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DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET FOREIGN RELATIONS
Red Flag, in April and June, in
7eople 's Daily editorials, and
in by Chinese leaders
at the recent World Federation
of Trade Unions (WFTU) meeting
in Peiping. Khrushchev dissected
the Chinese approach to Marxism-
Leninism with heavy sarcasm.
However, he stopped short of open-
ly branding the Chinese leaders
as heretics.
Emphasizing that "Communists
who are realists" know that un-
der present conditions war must
be excluded from society, Khru-
shchev asserted that only "mad-
men and maniacs can speak of a
new world war." Rebutting the
Chinese view that local wars are
still likely even if there is a
possibility of excluding global
war, Khrushchev insisted that
even local wars must be pre-
vented because they can grow
into a general conflict whose
consequences would be disastrous.
He implicitly condemned the Chi-
nese for not sharing the USSR's
confidence that the growing
strength of the Communist bloc
will turn the world Communist
without resort to war.
Khrushchev, in a condescend-
ing tone, reproved those Commu-
nists who "mechanically" repeat
what Lenin said "in quite dif-
ferent historical conditions"
regarding the inevitability of
imperialist wars until socialism
triumphs throughout the world.
"One must not only be able to
read but also correctly under-
stand what one has read and ap-
ply it in specific conditions,"
he said, adding that "if-we act
like children who in studying
the alphabet compile words from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
letters, we shall not go very
far."
Khrushchev has been care-
ful to marshal all the East
European satellites in support
of his positions. Four satel-
lites have so far reprinted the
highly critical Pravda article
of 12 June on the front pages
of their newspapers.. Fuma.nian
party First Secretary Gneorghiu-
Dej, in his opening speech to
the congress, fully supported
Khrushchev's views on the cur-
rent international situation
and the role Communist countries
should play. After Khrushchev
spoke, the heads of the East
German, Czech, Bulgarian, Polish,
and Hungarian delegations mounted
the podium in rapid fire order
to give them full endorsement
of his speech.
East German party boss U1-
bricht apparently felt it nec-
essary to demonstrate earlier
that his regime has no special
sympathy for Chinese practices.
Neues Deutschland on 17 June
courteouslybut firmly rejected
the Chinese contention that the
path of development from collec-
tives to communes holds good
for other bloc countries. This
pronouncement apparently was in
response to a remark by the Chi-
nese representative at a recent
East German agricultural show
that "in Communist China, too,
we have taken the road from land
reform through collective farms
to people's communes."
The major Chinese address
at Bucharest was given the day
after Khrushchev's speech by
politburo member Peng Chen, head
of the high-level Peiping dele-
gation. The speech made no con-
cessions on major issues in the
current Sino-Soviet dispute, al-
though Peng's words were care-
fully chosen to avoid antagoniz-
ing the congress, which was pub-
licly lining up behind Khru-
shchev. Peng gave credit for
China's economic success to the
regime's "leap forward" and com-
mune programs--the Chinese do-
mestic developments most dis-
liked by Moscow. He blurred
the question of the inevitabil-
ity of war by quoting contradic-
tory statements from the 1957
Moscow Declaration and failed
to mention "peaceful coexistence."
His only endorsement was, for
Khrushchev's attack on the United
States at Paris.
While Peng was judiciously
attempting to avoid exacerbating
the situation in Bucharest,
propaganda emanating directly
from Peiping continued to voice
sharp criticism of Khrushchev's
policies. An article in the
official party paper, People's
Daily, on 21 June made many of
Peng's points, but in much
stronger language.
Reflecting the Chinese view
that. the bloc is in a position
to deal from strength, the ar-
ticle rejected Khrushchev's pol-
icies of "active coexistence"
and "friendly cooperation" with
the West, calling instead for
a "resolute struggle" against
imperialism as the only assurance
for peace. By implication, the
article names Khrushchev a "ren-
egade" for branding the Chinese
interpretation of Leninism as
"stiff dogmatism" and takes the
Soviet leader to task for laud-
ing "shameful actions of be-
trayal" as creative Marxism-
Leninism.
The Chinese refusal to re-
treat from their position, which
amounts to a rejection of the
ideological basis of Khrushchev's
foreign policy, tends to widen
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the rift between the two powers
and makes prospects for a com-
promise more remote.
Anti-US Campaign
Khrushchev used his Bucha-
rest speech to carry forward his
post-summit effort to destroy
the favorable image in the bloc
of President Eisenhower and
American policy which he had
done so much to create in the
months following his visit to
the United States. He repeated
his charge that the US had tor-
pedoed the summit meeting "by
its insolent, provocative ac-
tions," stated that American
leaders are "incapable of under-
standing the conditions which
have been created in the world,"
and asserted that they are "not
in a condition to build correct
relations among states with
different social structures."
He said the Soviet people hope
to see a president elected who
will "understand and correct
the mistakes committed by the
present US Government."
This harsh indictment of
American leaders, which gener-
ally repeated the line he had
taken in his 28 May speech in
Moscow, apparently was intended
as a further indication that
Khrushchev has, in effect,
severed relations with the pres-
ent administration in Washington.
Khrushchev, however, again
made it clear that he has no in-
tention of abandoning his detente
line under pressures from Pei-
ping and Washington. He an-
nounced that the U3SR will not
"give in to provocation and
deviate from the general line
of our foreign policy" as de-
fined by the Soviet 20th party
congress and "confirmed" by the
Moscow conference of bloc lead-
ers in November 1957.
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The Soviet premier's speech
also revealed Moscow's continued
sensitivity to the effects of
the U-2 flights in exposing
weaknesses in Soviet air de-
fenses. He took considerable
pains to assure his audience
that the flights 'had in no way
compromised the USSR's military
posture. He asserted sarcastical-
ly that the "data obtained by
the spy flights are of no im-
bortance to the defense of the
US" and claimed that the flights
"two or three years ago" had
photographed only "experimental
rocket launching grounds" but
not rocket bases "of military
and strategic importance."
Khrushchev also felt com-
pelled to repeat the explanation
he had previously given to jus-
tify his performance in Paris.
In response to questions he said
he had received as to why he
did not consent to begin the
summit talks after President
Eisenhower had announced can-
cellation of the U-2 flights,
Khrushchev contended that the
President's statement was a
"subterfuge, a half-measure" and
insisted that the Presfdent could
still "cancel the cancellation
of the flights."
Geneva Negotiations
In both the disarmament and
nuclear test ban talks, the Com-
munist delegations have stepped
up their efforts to establish a
record of Western obstructionism.
Following the lead given in Khru-
shchev's letter to the chairman
of the British "Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament," the five
bloc delegations at the disarma-
ment talks issued a statement
on 22 June asserting that "one
gets the impression" that the
US and its allies have no inter-
est in achieving progress.
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The statement echoed Khru-
shchev's claim that the US is
attempting to scuttle the nego-
tiations or have them mark time
interminably. Although a Soviet
spokesman hinted to the press
that the bloc delegations were
considering breaking off the
talks, an Izvestia correspond-
ent's report on the status of
the conference included a state-
ment that the USSR was prepared
to wait until the return of the
American and French delegates.
The Communist delegations
also increased their efforts
to demonstrate an open split
between France and the US prior
to the French delegate's return
to Paris for consultations. In
the 20 June session, Soviet
delegate Zorin attempted to
maneuver French delegate Moch
into either admitting that
France had reversed its position
or that it differed with the
other Western delegations. Zorin
compared Moch's earlier state-
ments with his remarks on 15
June and implied that France
had abandoned its position on
the priority of eliminating
delivery systems rather than
merely controlling them.
Zorin also implied that
the French delegation was in-
hibited from carrying out De
Gaulle's alleged position link-
ing elimination of delivery sys-
tems to liquidation of bases
for these systems. Zorin claimed
that De Gaulle took this posi-
tion in his 11 June letter to
Khrushchev.
The nuclear test ban nego-
tiations lkst week did not re-
duce the differences over the
seismic research program, and
the Soviet delegation, in re-
sponse to Western prodding,
furnished revisions of its pro-
posals on other treaty issues.
Khrushchev's Bucharest speech
and recent soundings by Soviet
officials concerning a long re-
cess suggest that Moscow does
not expect serious negotiations
to be conducted until after the
U3 elections, but wishes to
avoid any implication that the
talks will be broken off.
Predicting that the con-
ference would "obviously". extend
into 1961, a Soviet official
privately suggested to the US
delegation a substantial recess
because of the 'US inability to
reach policy decisions during
an election period.' The West-
ern press had previously quoted
a Soviet spokesman to the same
effect.
France, Britain, Canada,
and Italy have pressed strongly
for a new Western approach in
the light of the 2 June Soviet
proposal. French chief delegate
Moch has been in the forefront
of this drive, and on 20 June
his deputy submitted a paper at
a Western five-power meeting
proposing new Western tactics.
The French paper ruled out stand-
ing pat on the present Western
plan or simple rejection of the
Soviet plan, and proposed four
alternatives--each of which
would bring the Western disarma-
ment position closer to that set
forth by the USSR on 2 June.
Despite Moch's emphasis on
Western solidarity in his 13
June speech at Geneva, he care-
fully noted that the new Soviet
plan had adopted the French pro-
posal for the elimination of
the means of delivery of nuclear
weapons, a move he considered
an important change. He re-
jected the Soviet demand that
the West commit itself in ad-
vance to a program of total
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
disarmament, but he also made
clear that France's position
was not so flatly in opposition
to the new Soviet proposal as
that of some of its allies.
This attitude had been es-
tablished more explicitly in
his 31 May address to the Assem-
bly of the Western European Un-
ion, where he presented the
French position as midway be-
tween two extremes. He said
his American allies preferred
to discuss immediate measures
rather than distant principles,
whereas France insisted on both.
Moch also feels that if
the West offers no positive re-
sponse at Geneva, its position
would be extremely weak should
the USSR return the matter to
the UN. Moch's thinking on dis-
armament probably is close to
De Gaulle's. The French Presi-
dent has reiterated publicly his
view that a real detente can
have a beginning only in dis-
armament, and that control and
elimination of delivery systems
is a practical appraoch.
The British also seek some
movement in the Western posi-
tion, in keeping with the Mac-
millan government's concern with
public opinion considerations
both in Britain and abroad. Brit-
ish chief delegate Ormsby-Gore
has suggested the possibility
of adding to the Western plan
in an early stage some kind of
joint study of control over
means of delivery of nuclear
weapons. This seems designed
more to conciliate the French
and consolidate the Western
position than to compromise
differences with the USSR.
The formal exchange of in-
struments ratifying the US-Japa-
nese security treaty on 23 June
marks a new stage in Tokyo's po-
litical crisis. Prime Minister
Kishi, whose methods in obtain-
ing ratification of the treaty
have made him the scapegoat for
recent disorders, announced after
the ratification ceremony that
he will resign soon but has set
no date.
Leftist opponents of Kishi's
government and ratification, ex-
pecting an early general elec-
tion, are broadening their at-
tacks by calling for repeal of
PART I
the treaty and opposition to US
military installations. Some
observers feel that the useful-
ness of the treaty as a basis
for future US operations has
already been seriously impaired.
Kishi's expected resigna-
tion as prime minister and party
president has intensified nego-
tiations among Liberal-Democratic
party (LDP) faction leaders to
agree on a successor. A strug-
gle over the succession, or even
an interim compromise, might
temporarily weaken the government
at a time when resolute leader-
ship is needed to restore public
order.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
The LDP appears to have two
courses of action,. It could call a con-
vention to elect a new party
president, presumably for a two-
year term, whom the Diet would
then install as prime minister.
Under these conditions, observ-
ers feel that the most likely
candidate would be Hayato Ikeda,
minister of international trade
and industry,
On the other hand, a party
caucus could agree on a com-
promise interim party president
and prime minister in order to
put off a major intraparty strug-
gle for the posts, in which case
Bamboku Ono and Mitsujiro Ishii
appear to be more likely possi-
bilities. Former Prime Minis-
ter Yoshida, who has supported
Kishi but now recognizes the
need for new leadership, is
pressing leaders of the pro-
Kishi factions to unite the
party in the face of continued
leftist opposition and an al-
most certain general election,
The Japan Socialist party
(JSP) considers the security
pact "legally invalid" and has
vowed continued opposition dem-
onstrations like those of 22
June, which were markedly less
violent and smaller than dis-
turbances before upper-house
ratification of the treaty. The
J3P is reportedly planning to
keep its "Council Against Rati-
fication of the Security Treaty,"
responsible for organizing dem-
onstrations, in operation as an
instrument for marshaling sup-
port in the election campaign.
The Communists, backed by
propaganda and presumably'finan--
cial support from the Sino-So-
viet bloc, have penetrated the
organizations opposing the
treaty sufficiently to exercise
virtual control of the demon-
strations. They hailed post-
ponement of the President's
visit as a "great victory for
the Japanese people" and have
called for redoubled efforts
against Japan's alliance with
the United States. They have
succeeded in blurring in the
Japanese public's mind the dis-
tinctions between a wide number
of issues ranging from personal
dislike of Kishi and government
methods in ratifying the treaty
to neutralist antipatby toward
a military arrangement which
might involve Japan in a future
war.
The Communist efforts have
been aided by the willingness of
a large part of the Japanese
public to accept the disturb-
ances by opponents of'the treaty
as justifiable responses to
Kishi's "highhanded" methods in
ratifying the treaty. Japanese
university authorities have con-
tributed to this apathy toward
maintenance of public order by
refusing to discipline students
participating in violence and
by joining the press in blaming
the government for the disorders.
Japanese police have been
unwilling to use harsh measures 25X1
in quelling disturbances because 25X1
of fear of a reaction similar to
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The'widespread demonstra-
tions and occasional violence
have, however, generated some
concern over the threat to law
and order. The business com-
munity, fearing that the recent
turmoil will hurt the vital ex-.
port trade, has moved to re-
store foreign confidence. Ja-
pan's four major business or-
ganizations issued a joint state-
ment on 17 June regretting post-
ponement of the President's
visit and promising that vio-
lence will be eliminated and
normal parliamentary govern-
mental processes restored.
Continued government in-
effectiveness in controlling the
leftist extremists is almost
certain to encourage ultraright-
ist elements to attack the left-
ist groups.
ALGERIAN CEASE-FIRE PROSPECTS
The decision of the rebel
Algerian Provisional Government
to send a delegation to Paris
for cease-fire negotiations
has revived hopes for a settle-
ment of the rebellion--now in
its sixth year--even though
prospects for an early settle-
ment are slight. The statement
by rebel Premier Ferhat Abbas
on 20 June characterized De
Gaulle's invitation as repre-
senting "some progress" but
still "far removed" from meet-
ing rebel demands. Abbas is
expected to go to Paris during
the week of 27 June. Ahmed
Boumendjel is reported en route
to Paris to make preparations
for Abbas.
The rebels continue to as-
sert that:a free referendum would
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result in an overwhelming vote
for independence, and only with
difficulty could they accept a
status short of independence.
Some rebel officials might be
willing, however, to accept some
form of "association" with
France, provided it includes a
high degree of local autonomy.
Advocates of such an expedient
include persons skeptical of De
Gaulle's ability to guarantee
a free referendum as well as
moderates willing to discuss a
status for Algeria short of full
independence in return for an
end to the fighting.
In any negotiations, the
rebels will be handicapped by
the need to placate their more
intransigent military commanders,
while De Gaulle's freedom of
maneuver will continue to be
limited by the far right and the
army. In Algeria, news of the
rebels' acceptance of De Gaulle's
invitation was received with
dismay by rightist groups. There
have been no major disorders,
however, and extremist leaders
are said to be reluctant to in-
itiate disorders unless there
should be a concerted effort
by French rightists to overthrow
the De Gaulle government. The
"French Algeria" faction in
France, headed by former Deputy
Premier Soustelle, issued a pro-
test manifesto at an orderly
rally on 20 June.
In view of the wide gulf
which separates the two sides,
any negotiations are likely to
be difficult and protracted.
French officials have reiterated
that any discussion would "con-
cern only a cease-fire, the dis-
position of weapons, and the
fate of the fighters." More-
over, De Gaulle is unlikely to
recognize the rebels as the sole
political spokesmen for Algeria's
Moslems. The rebels, on their
part, will insist that the con-
duct of a referendum be discussed
and satisfactory assurances
provided. Both sides, however,
view the negotiations as a first
step toward a possible settle-
ment, and each will probably
strive to avoid any early break-
down in the talks
The inability of Abako
leader Joseph Kasavubu to form
a broadly based coalition in
the Congo forced the Belgians
on 21 June to call once again
on the radical leader of the
National Congo Movement, Patrice
Lumumba, to form a government.
In contrast to his first effort
--when Brussels insisted that
he secure the concurrence of
all major groups--Lumumba now
appears to have a mandate to
attempt to form a government on
his own terms.
In their anxiety to devel-
op a degree of stability in the
Congo prior to its independence
on 30 June, the Belgians may
urge Lumumba's rivals not to
oppose his efforts to form a
government. Spokesmen for the
Abako and other groups had
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indicated previously that they
would tolerate Lumumba as pre-
mier only under Brussels' orig-
inal condition that he form a
national coalition. Lumumba's
prestige increased following a
test vote in the newly consti-
tuted Chamber of Deputies on 21
June in which his candidate for
presiding officer defeated
Kasavubu's choice by a vote of
ammunition for charges
of a Lumumba "dic-
tatorship."
74 to 58. The near-stalemate
continued the following day,
however, when Kasavubu's fol-
lowers proved able to organize
the Senate.
The power struggle between
Lumumba and Kasavubu centers on
the posts of premier and chief
of state. Although Kasavubu
appears resigned to Lumumba as
premier, he probably aspires to
the post of chief of state, a
position which the Belgians
envisage as largely ceremonial
but which in a new nation
might be developed into a po-
sition of power. Lumumba has
said he wants to occupy both
posts, but he may be reluctant
at this time to hand Kasavubu
On the provin-
cial level, the threat
of political fragmen-
tation continues.
In at least three of
the Congo's six prov-
inces, rival pro-
vincial governments
are in being or im-
minent. Lumumba'
investiture as pre-
mier could trigger
further secessionist
moves, The status of
Leopoldville Province
will remain in doubt
until Kasavubu's status is de-
termined and the Abako assured
a prominent role in provincial
affairs. In Katanga Province,
which is controlled by the anti-
Lumumba Conakat party, separatist
tendencies are likely to remain
strong in the absence of strong
assurances from Lumumba of pro-
vincial autonomy in local af-
fairs.
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23 June 1960
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CUBA
The resignation of two under
secretaries in the Cuban Foreign
i'Iinistry, announced on 17 June,
appears to be the precursor of a
general shakeup that is likely
to end in increased Communist in-
fluence over Cuba's foreign
policy. Foreign Minister Raul
Roa apparently has been held re-
sponsible for various recent
foreign policy failures, includ-
ing the collapse of Cuba's effort
to sponsor a conference of under-
developed nations; he will prob-
ably be removed shortly.
One of the newly appointed
under secretaries--Hector
Rodriguez Llompart--is believed
to be a Communist; the other
recently voiced strong anti-US
sentiments during a tour of Latin
America. Both may have been
selected by Raul Castro, who has
played a key role in Communist
inroads in the military, organ-
ized labor, and other areas.
The Castro regime, with the
support of the Soviet bloc, is
making evident progress in imple-
menting its long-standing goal of
reducing Cuba's traditional eco
nomi dependence on the United
States. Cuba, which used to
conduct as much as 70 percent of
its foreign trade with the United
States, now is turning to the
Soviet bloc for many of the prod-
ucts- formerly bought elsewhere.
Data for the first three months
of this year indicate that 1960
imports from the United States
will probably be half what they
were in 1958, the last full year
before Castro came to power.
The decline results only partly
from an over-all reduction in
imports to conserve foreign ex-
change.
Agreements for trade, tech-
nical assistance, and credits
totaling $120,000,000 have been
signed with the USSR, Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, and East Germany
since last February. The effects
of these agreements will be in-
creasingly felt in the latter
half of the year, but the credits
will not contribute substantially
until 1961. Realization that
Soviet oil shipments to Cuba
will significantly reduce Vene-
zuela's share of the Cuban market
has already led to a sharp reac-
tion from the Venezuelan minister
of mines. He said Cuba could
not count on access to Venezuelan
crude oil in the future if it
reduced imports now.
A Cuban economic mission
headed by agrarian reform di-
rector Nunez Jimenez has reached
a series of agreements in Mos-
cow giving substance to the
Soviet-Cuban trade and aid agree-
ments concluded last February.
It also concluded a cultural ex-
change accord, the details of
which are to be worked out later,
and reached agreement on a
Khrushchev-Castro exchange of
visits.
No formal announcement of
dates has yet been made, but
Soviet Ambassador Bazykin in
Mexico is quoted by a progovern-
ment radio in Cuba as saying
that the Soviet Union will open
its embassy in Havana before
Khrushchev visits Cuba "in
August." The mission arrived
in Warsaw on 19 June, and is
also scheduled to visit Czecho-
slovakia and East Germany to
negotiate for the implementation
of the agreements signed with
those countries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIG Y
The Communists will domi-
nate the Castro-sponsored Latin
American Youth Conference,
scheduled to open in Havana on
26 Jul
national Communist agencies.
Invitations were also sent to
some non-Communist organizations,
probably to camouflage Communist
control of the conference. The
Communists of Latin America will
thus be given another opportu-
nity to coordinate their efforts
to win sympathizers among stu-
dents of the hemisphere with the
guidance and assistance of inter-
Madagascar, under French
rule since the late 19th century
conquest of a native kingdom run
by relatively advanced Merina
tribesmen, gains its sovereignty
on 25 June as the Malagasy Re-
public. Independence celebra-
tions will not be held until late
July, however.
The new state, with a popu-
lation of about 5,100,000, now
is controlled by strongly pro-
French leaders and will for the
time being retain close ties
with France and membership in
De Gaulle's recently "renovated"
Community. The government lead-
ers, who for the most part repre-
sent more backward, non-Merina
coastal tribes, are anxious to
prevent the hinterland Merinas--
the largest and most vigorous
ethnic group in Madagascar--
from regaining their former
dominance.
At present the Malagasy
Government is firmly in the hands
of President Philibert Tsira-
nana, a shrewd politician who
has headed the administration
since May 1957. His directives
have been obediently rubber-
stamped by the provisional legis-
lature--a body hand-picked from
the conservative provincial
assemblies by Tsiranana and his
allies after their successful
campaign in behalf of the De
Gaulle constitution in 1958.
By a unanimous vote the legisla-
ture last January conferred vir-
tually dictatorial powers on
the executive until next October.
Outside the legislature,
however, Tsiranana's moderate
coalition has been faced with
vocal and active opposition,
the most important element of
which is the Congress party for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY NUM ' R Y
the Independence of Madagascar
(AKFM)? This party, launched
in 1958 by anti-Tsiranana
nationalists, is dominated by
hard-core Communists and re-
portedly receives important
financial and organizational
support from the French Commu-
nist party. The AKFM's rank and
file is composed of extreme
anti-French nationalists--
especially Merinas with vivid
memories of their 1947-48 re-
bellion, which the
French suppressed at
the cost of some
80,000 Malagasy lives.
In municipal
elections held last
fall, the AKFM made
a strong showing in
most important urban
centers; it captured
control of the city
governments in
Tananarive, the capi-
tal and a Merina
stronghold, and in
Diego-Suarez, where
a major French naval
base is located. The
party is expected to
win a substantial
number of seats in
the National Assembly
when general elec-
tions are held to re-
place the present
interim body. There
are indications that
Tsiranana will
schedule a vote soon
in the hope of capi-
talizing on the role
he and his followers
have played in
achieving independ-
once
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
present regime is in power.
Close Malagasy-French coopera-
tion, provided for by the bilat-
eral accords negotiated last
winter, depends on continued
French willingness to provide
heavy subsidies--about $22,000,-
000 in 1960.
Nevertheless, any success
Tsiranana may have achieved in
his effort to undercut nation-
alist pressure: by opting for
Both the traditional tribal
rivalry and underdeveloped
Madagascar's need for external
financial assistance and trained
personnel contribute to
Tsiranana's apparent disinclina-
tion to pursue an independent
foreign policy and seem likely
to keep the island firmly in the
French fold as long as the
formal independence will_prob-
ably be short-lived. Opposition
elements, spearheaded by the
AKFM, now can be expected to
focus on demands for the rapid
replacement by Malagasy of French
administrators and technicians
who hold the key positions in
every government department,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
The military regime in Tur-
key appears to be still firmly
in control, but dissent within
the National Unity Committee
(NUC) has led to the dropping of
approximately 25 percent of its
reported membership. The re-
gime's failure to win overwhelm-
ing popular support is increasing
the committee's determination,
in the interest of self-preser-
vation, to destroy the Democrat-
ic party as a political force.
Personality conflicts, as
well as differing political ori-
entation, have apparently emerged
within the NUC. The ultimate ef-
fect of the removal of Col. Ertu-
grul Alatli, the committee's
original spokesman, and 11 other
officers is not yet discernible.
Alatli may soon be assigned a-
broad as a military attachd,
ostensibly to explain the views
of the NUC but more probably to
remove a potential source of
trouble.
Despite public expressions
of support for the revolutionary
regime, many people in Turkey
view the army's intervention in
political life with considerable
apprehension. American observers
in Ankara believe that the re-
action of the peasants and low-
er classes has not yet made it-
self felt. In fact, this seg-
ment of the population is still
regarded as somewhat in a state
of shock as a result of the rap-
id political change.
ere is still widespread popu-
lar sympathy for former Premier
Menderes.
tors to expose themselves and
their past activities to prose-
Municipal and provincial
governments are being hampered
by the army's inexperience with
civil government and by the re-
luctance of civilian administra-
Col. Alparslan Turkes, as-
sistant to interim President-
Premier General Cemal Gursel,
may ultimately emerge as the
real power on the NUC. He has
proved to be an influential
member and is directly super-
vising the group of professors
drafting the new constitution.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Right-wing nationalists in
Istanbul reportedly hope Turkes
will play a Nasir-type role in
Turkish politics. Some RPP mem-
bers, aware of Turkes' opposi-
tion to RPP leader Ismet Inonu's
return to power, believe the
colonel may try to push Gursel
into the political arena to op-
pose Inonu in the next elec-
tions. Turkes probably favors
a more nationalistic and inde-
pendent policy for the new Turk-
ish government.
The fate of the leaders
of the former regime is becoming
more uncettain; all of them ap-
parently have been transferred to
the island of Yassiada in the Sea
of Marmara. One government spokes-
man has stated that they will be
tried under "streamlined" crimi+..
nallaws before a high court chosen
by the NUC from a list prepared
by the government of professors,
judges, and public prosecutors.
Orders of the court are to be
carried out immediately. Accord-
ing to a recent remark attribu-
ted to a cabinet minister, there 25X1
is enough evidence of "horrible
crimes"to convict many members
of the former regime.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
The second round of the
four-phase Lebanese parliamen-
tary elections took place on 19
June in a calm atmosphere and
with a low voter turnout. Nearly
two thirds of parliament now
has been chosen; the rest will
be elected on 26 June and 3 July.
be able to settle on some-
one with a more moderate
record.
'Pierre Jumayyil, with
Shihab's assistance, appears
to have wrested leadership of
the Christians away from former 25X6
President Chamoun.
The new parliament will
include three pro=UAR extrem-
ists elected last Sunday. Moslem
ranks are already split by a
feud between two former leaders
of the 1958 rebellion: Saib
Salam, who won election in Bei-
rut, and former Premier Abdullah
al-Yafi, who lost in the same
district. The two were allied
against anti-UAR elements, but
now Yafi,charges Salam'with.
"treason." 'Salam, an unsavory
character, apparently now ex-
pects to be named prime minister;
President Shihab'may, however,
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Yemen
Yemen's relations with the
West have become markedly worse
during the past week as the re-
sult of endeavors by anti-West-
ern elements to discredit the
United States and Britain.
Relations between Yemen
and Aden have suddenly deteri-
orated, largely because of in-
creased subversive activities by
antiregime Yemenis whose lead-
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
\SIJLThNATE OF MUSCAT
\ ANT; OMAN
ana o
NAMARAN I', r
fu.",, No Al Hndaydah O
YEMEN
Al Be,dha
~~ (P Qatah R~ v ?` -
?' Adh Dhala
r-9 `I TAI ZZ ?
.11
'Westere Aden Protectorate
~aheioA
\. \ SULT. 4~.
ADEN
4\ "~~' COLONY OF ADEN
1 PERIM i. UK,
FRENCH `D "
:SOMALILAND
.ti
ere allegedly have been given
refuge in the British-controlled
Aden Protectorates. On 12 June
in Taiz the homes of three gov-
ernment officials--including
one of the Imam's fathers-in-
law who is head of internal se-
curity--were bombed. These
bombings followed others in sev-
eral parts of Yemen during the
past two weeks. Leaders of the
Free Yemeni Movement, which aims
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SCARY
at abolishing the Imam's rule
and which has headquarters in
Cairo and Aden, are claiming
:.:edit for these incidents.
Friendly US-Yemeni relations
suffered when anti-Western ele-
ments informed the Imam of the
existence of a radio transmit-
ter belonging to the American
Legation in Taiz. The Imam has
ordered that the embassy's deputy
political officer--in whose home
the transmitter was "discovered"
--be "thrown out of the country
immediately by the police," and
that the American charge not be
received at the Foreign Ministry.
The legation states that Soviet
bloc elements are conducting a
vigorous campaign to organize
and strengthen anti-Western
groups which have the Imam's
ear. Pro-Western Yemeni offi-
cials are alarmed at the Imam's
sudden vehement anti-American
attitude.
The increased Free Yemeni
activities appear to be related
to the general malaise in the
country and to the recently
crushed but long-drawn-out re-
bellion by the Khawlan tribe
east of Sana. The Imam's
despotic methods and the state's
precarious financial situation
are promoting an increased de-
termination among the populace
to seek almost any alternative
to the Imam's rule.
Pro-Western Yemeni offi-
cials fear that the Free Yemeni
activities, combined with the
efforts of Yemeni anti-Western
elements, will jeopardize the
IjS aid program in Yemen unless
American assistance is stepped
up to combat the increased op-
position to the West
The new Moroccan Govern-
ment, over which King Mohamed V
presides as premier, is moving
to resolve a number of problems
with which its predecessor was
too powerless to cope. The crown
prince, as deputy premier, has
assumed direction of routine
government activities efficiently
and with more tact than has been
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his custom. Underlying antip-
athy toward the prince and
frictions between the diverse
personalities within the govern-
ment seem certain, however, to
create early difficulties.
by declaring that Morocco admits
the right of self-determination
for Mauritania and has no in-
terest in administering this
self-governing French Community
state.
The government immediately
undertook an apparently sweep-
ing reorganization of the Minis-
try of the Interior, reportedly
providing for police subordina-
tion to this ministry. It was
an attempt by the leftist Ibra-
him government to shift control
of the police from the palace
to this ministry that was an
immediate cause for the King's
dismissal of Ibrahim on 20 May.
The King also has released
leftist leaders who allegedly
had plotted to assassinate the
crown prince.
The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has opened discussions
regarding evacuation of troops
with France and Spain. France,
long anticipating the fall of
the Ibrahim government and more
amicable arrangements by a con-
servative successor, had been
marking time and urging Spain
not to accede to Moroccan de-
mands for a commitment of even-
tual total evacuation such as
the United States made last
December.
In a press interview di-
rected
more
at metropolitan
France
than
at Morocco, the
crown
prince
for the first time
took a
firm
stand toward the
French but also made statements
intended to reassure and mollify
them. He announced that his
attitude toward problems with
France is no longer "flexible,"
implying that he will press for
the early total evacuation of
French forces in Morocco and a
favorable settlement of the
question of French properties.
He departed significantly, how-
ever, from Morocco's stipulated
policy toward Mauritania, which
both the King and the political
parties claim as part of Morocco,
The prince now
realize that the fat
monarchy is directly
with the success of
seems to
e of the
involved
the King's
assumption
of direct
responsi-
bility.
25X6
25X6
He lays considerable
stress on the military aspects
of his government; the appoint-
ment of an army captain to ad-
minister the remote province
of Tarfaya lends credibility
to rumors that military offi-
cers will replace many civilian
governors.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
The Chinese Communists
fired approximately 175,000
rounds of high-explosive shells
onto the Nationalist-held Chin-
men Islands on 17 and 19 June
during President Eisenhower's
visit to Taiwan. The shelling
AMOY - CHINMEN AREA
and undertake a military display
in order to underscore their
complaints against US "provoca-
tions."
In widely broadcast prop-
aganda, Peiping implied that
--85,000 rounds in 85 minutes
on 17 June and 88,000 rounds
on 19 June--was considerably
more intense than any during
the 1958 crisis. Actual damage
to defensive positions on
Chinmen and adjacent islands
was light.
Peiping announced the
firing beforehand, carefully
characterized it as an anti-US
"demonstration," and adhered
to its alternate-day firing
schedule, probably to avoid a
direct challenge to American
military units in the area.
By this heavy firing, Pei-
ping risked some damage to its
carefully cultivated pose of
reasonableness in dealing with
neighboring Asian countries.
The Chinese leaders apparently
decided, however, to take ad-
vantage of world attention fo-
cused on the President's visit
the bombardment was defensive
in nature, sparked by the in-
creased number of US "provoca-
tions" and attempts to promote
the status quo or a "two Chinas"
solution. Since the U-2 incident,
Peiping has intensified charges
of US "provocations" in the
strait and has coupled this with
a stepped-up series of "serious
warnings" over alleged "intru-
sions" by US naval and air units
into Chinese-claimed coastal
waters. There have been 17 warn-
ings in the last 30 days.
The Communists avoided as-
serting that the artillery fire
was intended as punishment for
hostile Nationalist actions, and
they promoted their long-used line
that the US is likely to desert
the people of Taiwan. In a
broadcast on 18 June, Ho Hsiang-
ning, vice chairman of the Com-
munist-led Kuomintang Revolutionary
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Committee, warned that "lackeys"
who placed themselves at the
disposal of the United States
would eventually become either
sacrifices or scapegoats when
Peiping "liberates" Taiwan.
Despite professed concern
for "compatriots" on the Chin-
mens, the Chinese Communists
probably intended the bombard-
ment as a demonstration to Na-
tionalist officers and men that
the Communists retain the initia-
tive in the Taiwan Strait area.
Chiang Ching-kuo, Nationalist
China's security chief and son
of President Chiang, told Ameri-
can officials that the retalia-
tory firing from Chinmen of
With the assumption by
Prince Sihanouk of the position
of chief of state on 20 June,
at least a temporary easing of
the political turbulence that
has characterized the Cambodian
scene for the past two months
seems likely. Sihanouk has
side-stepped the thorny succes-
sion issud posed by the death
in April of his father, King
Suramarit, and now is expected
to leave shortly for a holiday
of several weeks in France.
Sihanouk and the rest of
,.~e royal family disagreed on
a successor to the late King,
and a hasty amendment of the'
constitution permitting the
creation of a three-man regency
did notresolve the issue. Si-
hanouk did not want to resume
the throne, which he had abdicated
in 1955 in favor of his father
in order to play a more active
political role, nor,,apparently,
could he accept the elevation of
anyone else to this paramount
though largely symbolic role.
He spoke out against the suc-
cession of his mother, Queen
Kossamak, who reportedly was
angling for the throne with
the support of her brother,
Prince Monireth, head of the re-
gency council and a potential
rival of Sihanouk.
Sihanouk's testiness over
this issue was aggravated by
tension with South Vietnam
SECRET
about 5,000 rounds on 19 June
was designed to sustain the
morale of the troops.
Strait drisis.
of urgency or immediacy, and
there is no indication that
the Communists are preparing
the populace for a new Taiwan
Having served notice with
the shelling that it will not
compromise in its long-range de-
termination to take Taiwan,
Peiping announced plans for a
week of films and meetings from
21 to 27 June devoted in large
part to the theme "the resolute
liberation of Taiwan"; however,
there is thus far no suggestion
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
resulting from Saigon's insist-
ent claims to several offshore
islands. His umbrage at what
he regarded as a tightening en-
circlement of Cambodia by "im-
perialist" South Vietnam, Thai-
land, and Laos spilled over to
severe criticism of the United
States for its "lack of under-
standing." Chou En-lai's visit
in early May gave Sihanouk the
occasion to threaten to accept
Chinese Communist military aid
for Cambodia's defense.
To dramatize his solid
public support, Sihanouk ar-
ranged a referendum on 5 June
in which he received 99.98 per-
cent of the nearly two million
votes cast. The referendum was
followed by "spontaneous" demon-
strations calling for his ele-
vation to chief of state. Si-
hanouk withdrew his protege from
the three-man regency council,
thus undermining Monireth's
position and leading to the re-
gency's resignation on 12 June.
The Cambodian parliament there-
after amended the constitution
to provide for entrustment of
the powers and prerogatives of
chief of state to an "uncontest-
ed personality expressly desig-
nated by national suffrage" when
the normal process for designating
a royal successor fails.
As chief of state, Sihanouk
will function as king in all but
name. Despite rumors that he
intends to abolish the monarchy
ih favor of a republic, it is un-
likely at this time that Sihanouk
will remove this pillar of national
unity. He may remain chief of
state indefinitely, or he may
turn the throne over to one of
his sons. Caretaker Premier Pho
Proeung will probably continue
to run the government while Si-
hanouk is abroad.
Cambodia's future orienta-
tion between East and West will
continue to depend largely on
Sihanouk's estimate of the
threat from South Vietnam and
Thailand. Although Sihanouk
is assured of strong public
support, he may eventually en-
counter opposition in high
circles as a result of his pres-
ent maneuvers.
CROP PROSPECTS IN THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
Expanded spring planting
and ample late rainfall in most
of the important grain-produc-
ing areas of the Sino-Soviet
bloc have altered earlier pros-
pects of a poor crop. Prolonged
bad weather could still change
the situation again, but pros-
spects as of mid-June are that
the USSR and Communist China
may reap a grain crop larger than
last :year's. Most of the Euro-
pean satellites can still expect
grain crops somewhat smaller than
last year's, and at least Poland,
East Germany, and Czechoslovakia
will have to step up imports if
they are to avoid shortages and
attendant worker dissatisfac-'
tion.
Despite a late spring which
delayed sowing in.the USSR, the
area planted to spring crops by
collective and state farms in-
creased from 310,000,000 acres
last year to 343,000,000 acres
this year. Almost two thirds of
this increase, however, was in
reseeding of areas in which
winter crops had been damaged
by winter kill and dust storms,
Winter-crop losses could be offset
by the increased area sown to
spring crops.
Late planting over much of
the New Lands area, where most of
the USSR's spring grains are
grown, increases the hazard of
crop losses if there is early
snow in the fall. With normal
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weather for the rest of the
growing season, total grain out-
put in the USSR will probably
exceed last year's estimated
100,000,000 tons. The cotton
crop is likely to be smaller
than in 1959, however.
In Poland and East Germany,
a below-average grain harvest
is indicated. Official Polish
sources are estimating a drop
of 1,500,000 to 2,000,000 tons
in total grain output compared
with 1959 as a result of ad-
verse weather and a decline in
winter-crop acreage. Production
of spring-planted crops in Po-
land is expected to be above
average as a result of expanded
acreage and increased use of
fertilizer. The winter-grain
crop in East Germany may reach
the 1954-58 production average,
but the recent collectivization
drive has sapped peasant in-
centives and led to a drop in
acreage sown to spring crops.
A dry fall and winter in
Czechoslovakia and Hungary will
probably cause winter-grain pro-
duction to dip below last year's
high level. Rain and cool weath-
er during May have retarded the
development of spring crops, but
if normal weather prevails from
now on, above-average yields
may be expected. Reports from
Bulgaria speak of a "rich"
winter-grain harvest; Rumania
also expects an above-average
output of winter grain. Pros-
pects for spring-planted crops
in both countries are good.
Peasant apathy and a late plant-
ing season are expected to re-
duce Albanian production below
the 1954-58 average.
In Communist China, strong
emphasis has been laid on ex-
panding grain acreage after
last year's reduction in sown
area. Although spring planting
has not yet been completed, the
total area sown to grains this
year will probably be some 10
to 15 percent over last,year,
thus equaling: or exceeding the
more normal acreage level of 1958.
Major winter-wheat areas gener-
ally had below-normal precipitation
during the past winter and spring,
but, because of the expanded
acreage, the winter-wheat crop
may exceed that of last year.
The Chinese Communists, usually
quick to publicize any successes,
have not yet made a claim to this
effect.
The dry weather apparently
continues on the important North
China plain. In mid-June the
Chinese Communists stated that
the flow of the Yellow and other
rivers in the area had been re-
duced by two thirds compared
with previous years at this sea-
son., and that "in many areas
half the medium and small res-
ervoirs have dried up." A ty-
phoon in Kwangtung and Fukien
damaged the rice crop there,
but this will have little effect
on national totals.
No estimate can be made as
yet for spring-planted crops in
China, but expanded acreage may
raise total grain production this
year above the 190,000,000 tons
estimated by observers to have
been produced last year. Never-
theless, there is no indication
that the regime intends to ease
the present severe controls on
grain consumption.
The early rice crop in
North Vietnam, described by Hanoi
as a "failure," was certainly
well below last year's early
crop. The authorities are mak-
ing every effort to expand the
acreage of the late-rice crop
and to raise yields in the hope
of overcoming early-crop de-
ficiencies. In North Korea
there is some prospect that the
crop this year will be better
than last a is disappointing
harvests. (Pre-
pared by ORR)
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ECONOMIC COUNCIL ESTABLISHED IN RUSSIAN REPUBLIC
An All-Russian Economic
Council has been set up under
the Council of Ministers of the
Russian Republic (RSFSR) to~over-
see the work of the republic's
70 councils of national economy
(sovnarkhozy). According to a
decree of 18 June, the new count
cil will monitor the fulfillment
of economic plans and enforce
measures to counteract any tend-
ency for the various sovnarkhozy
to place local interests above
USSR-wide priorities. Vasily
Ryabikov, an RSFSR deputy pre-
mier, has been appointed chair-
man of the new council.
The council fills a need
long recognized in the Soviet
press. Earlier suggestions in-
cluded a proposal to establish
on a regional basis within the
RSFSR as many as eight similar
councils with supervisory power
over groups of sovnarkhozy. The
new council is empowered to is-
sue orders in its own right.
The new council thus constitutes
a delegation of authority in
order to overcome some of the
operational problems of coordi-
nation and control coincident
with having 70 disparate and
semiautonomous economic authori-
ties answerable Separately - to
the RSFSR.Council of Ministers.
The Russian Republic's ac-
tion could foreshadow similar
moves in other republics or at
the USSR level. Coordination
problems are far less complex
in the other republics and at
the national level than in the
RSFSR, however.
The new council, which bears
some resemblance to the Supreme
Council of National Economy orig-
inally established in 1917, will
probably assume some of the co-
ordination functions now falling
to the RSFSR State Planning Com-
mittee (RSFSR Gosplan), particu-
larly the duties of those subdi-
visions overseeing the work of
blocs of sovnarkhozy such as the
Department of Far Eastern Sovnar-
khozy. (Prepared by ORR)
Khrushchev's visit to Aus-
tria from 30 June to 8 July will
be purely ceremonial, and he will
engage in no substantive negotia-
tions, according to Soviet of-
ficials in Vienna. The Soviet
premier will certainly attempt
to use the trip to stress such
themes as the benefits of Aus-
trian neutrality and the further
potentialities of Austrian-Soviet
cooperation.
Khrushchev can also be ex-
pected to reiterate his intention
to continue a policy of peace-
ful coexistence, and point to
Austrian-Soviet relations as an
outstanding example. He is like-
ly to seek Austrian support for
Soviet foreign policy positions,
particularly on disarmament and
nuclear testing, and stress the
alleged threat to Austria posed
by NATO bases in West Germany
and Italy.
Soviet officials in Vienna
have shown anxiety that recent
international events will mean
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( * Moscow 30 JIne
inz
L f
a cool reception for Khrushchev.
Although embarrassed by the
timing of the visit, Austrian
authorities plan a cordial
reception, but will keep him
in the provinces for more than
half his visit in order to
minimize his opportunities to
make propaganda.
With the support of Chancel-
lor Raab, the Austro-Soviet
Society--which prominent Austrians
had to join during the occupa-
tion--has obtained Vienna's huge
civic auditorium for a speech
by Khrushchev.
The Ministry of Interior
has evinced some concern for
Khrushchev's safety because of
the large Eastern European pop-
ulation in Austria. No incidents
occurred during Mikoyan's 1957
visit, however, and, according
to press reports, especially
dangerous refugees have been
temporarily "isolated."
Despite the strongly anti-
Communist outlook of nearly all
Austrians, Soviet leaders in
previous meetings have had some
success in eliciting from of-
ficials statements which have
proved useful to Moscow's prop-
aganda. Chancellor Raab, who
has long prided himself on his
alleged ability to "get along
with the Russians," is an es-
pecially easy target in this
respect. Foreign Minister
Kreisky is reportedly worried
about the chancellor's insist-
ence on accompanying Khrushchev
on his tour.
Austrian leaders hope that
any substantive discussions will
concentrate on economic issues;
they seek, for example, a further
reduction of oil reparations
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deliveries. Should Khrushchev
continue the USSR's pressure
on Austria to grant the USSR,
in accordance with the 1955
Austro-Soviet trade agreement,
the same trade benefits Vienna
will grant its free trade area
partners, Austrian officials
have indicated they will re-
assert the position that the
free trade area is excluded
from the 1955 agreement.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BRITISH POLICY IN WESTERN EUROPE
Britain is renewing its
attempts to improve relations
with Western Europe, especially
France, on a bilateral basis.
At the same time, the Macmillan
government is holding to the
long-term goal of reducing
trade barriers between the six-
nation European Economic Com-
munity and the British-insti-
gated, seven-nation European
Free Trade Association.
The summit breakdown and
the failure in early June of
Britain's compaign to ease the
differences between the two
trading groups influenced Lon-
don to revert to its traditional
bilateral approach. The visits
this month of Prime Minister
Macmillan to Oslo and of For-
eign Secretary Lloyd to Vienna
are part of this pattern.
The Conservative government
has chosen a moment of unusual
domestic political strength to
invite Spanish Foreign Minister
Castiella for an official visit
to Britain from 11 to 16 July.
This--the first such visit since
Franco came to power in Spain--
follows a gradual improvement
in Anglo-Spanish relations in
the past year or two and the
recent removal by Madrid of
most restrictions on Gibraltar.
Although the British charge in
Madrid has stated that Britain
would no longer oppose Spanish
membership in NATO, the Macmil-
lan government does not appear
ready to go so far as to advo-
cate it, partly in deference to
the Labor party's hostility to
the Franco regime.
Macmillan is making no
moves at this time to improve
Anglo-German relations, but is
continuing his cultivation of
French President de Gaulle as
the key to Britain's broad
European economic objectives and
to any further high-level East-
West negotiations. On disarma-
ment, British officials have re-
peatedly urged adjustment in
the Western position as a ges-
ture to De Gaulle's insistence
on control of nuclear weapons
delivery systems--even while
London sees curtailment of
French nuclear weapons develop-
ment as one of the major advan-
tages of any East-West agreement.
In mid-June, British officials
held bilateral working-level
consultations with France on
Africa, a subject on which there
have been substantial differences
in the past.
Meanwhile, London continues
to probe the European integra-
tionists' attitudes with "pro-
European" statements such as one
recently indicating willingness
to consider any proposal from the 25X1
Coal-Steel Community and Euratom
for British membership.
WEST INDIES FEDERATION DEVELOPMENTS
British Colonial Secretary
Macleod appears to have made
substantial progress in resolv-
ing political deadlocks in the
West Indies Federation during
his 3-18 June visit. He ob-
tained Trinidad Premier Eric
Williams' acceptance of the
British formula for Trinidad's
participation in the US-UK-Fed-
eration conference to be held
later this year regarding the
revision of the 1941 American-
British bases agreement.
London's formula, which the
Federation Government apparently
has also accepted, provides that
at the second--and most substan-
tive--of three. sessions, the
United States and the unit
territories would hold bilateral
talks attended by observers from
both the UK and the Federation
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Government. By not granting
Williams' demand for separate
participation for Trinidad,
London has maintained the pri-
macy of the Federation in ex-
ternal affairs.
On the other hand, London
has in effect acknowledged that
Williams' support is necessary,
inasmuch as the conference will
concern primarily the US naval
base and missile-tracking sta-
tion at Chaguaramas on Trinidad.
To help obtain this support,
the British agreed to establish
a bicameral legislature for
Trinidad and increase the num-
ber of seats in the elective
lower house. This will strengthen
Williams' position and further
weaken the ineffectual opposi-
tion Democratic Labor party
(DLP).
London's formula on con-
ference participation is only
procedural, however. According
to the American consul general
at Port-of-Spain, Macleod did
not discuss the terms of a re-
vised bases agreement with
y~
Williams and hcrc is no indi-
ndi
cation
cation that the Trinidad premier
is prepared to temper his vit-
riolic campaign for the curtailment
of US privileges at Chaguaramas.
Recent events appear to
have strengthened the Federation
against Jamaican secessionist
threats. Sir Alexander Busta-
mente's resignation as leader
of the federal DLP to dramatize
his own anti-Federation stand
led Jamaican Premier Norman
CAICOS ISLANDS
TURKS ISLANDS
CAYMAN
ISLANDS
NICARAGUA
Y S '
Federation of
? The West Indies
23 JUNE 1960
0 MILES 400
I I 1 I 1
}}
u nrTr1 -_
P'J ERTO
RICO VIRGIN Anguilla
Barbuda
`'-"~ ~I~ANDS
St. Christopher---?. _ Antigua
and Nevis--'
_ ~Guadetoupe
Montserrat ~%-',
%Dominica
Cl~ Martinique
? St. Lucia
St. Vincento
Grenada Barbados
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JAMAICA
NOTES AND COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Manley to promise a referendum
in Jamaica on the revised fed-
eral constitution that emerges
from extended negotiations
still going.on.. By, thus point-
ing up Jamaican objections to
increased federal taxing and
financial powers, these develop-
ments may persuade Trinidad and
other Federation members to of-
fer inducements to keep Jamaica,
the strongest single component,
in the grouping. The West
Indians hope to resolve their
constitutional difficulties be-
fore entering the base negotia-
tions.
Brazil plans to launch a dip-
lomatic offensive in Africa with-
in the next few months to further
its campaign for greater interna-
tional influence. The govern-
ment will publicize its effort
as a movement independent of the
colonial powers, but it plans to
seek advice in European capitals
and in Washington.
Brazil's already consider-
able interest in Africa was
heightened in May by hints that
.ashington would welcome a
counterweight to Cuba's influence
in leftist Guinea. Subsequent-
ly, a high Brazilian official
who had visited Africa in May
told American officials he be-
lieves Brazil can be particularly
effective in offsetting the in-
fluence of Communist China. He
said he found African leaders
impressed with China's "miracu-
lous" economic achievement but
also susceptible to the idea
that Brazil is a better model
because it has made great strides
economically without the "polit-
ical and human sacrifices"
exacted by the Chinese.
The Foreign Ministry be-
lieves Brazil's tradition of
racial equality and democracy
will enhance its influence
among the new nations. The
government probably also counts
on gaining good will in Africa
r,,om its sponsorship of motions
the United Nations and the
Organization of American States
condemning racial discrimination,
and, by inference, the Union of
South Africa, Brazil's only dip-
lomatic relations with the new-
ly independent nations are with
Ghana.
In describing the African
project, Brazilian officials in-
dicated they believe Washington
had accepted their thesis, put
forth during President Eisen-
hower's visit in February, that
Latin America can and should be
the West's "bridge to Africa."
In this connection, the govern-
ment will almost certainly continue
to press Washington for greatly
expanded economic aid under Pres-
ident Kubitschek's "Operation Pan
America," arguing that Latin
America should be a showcase for
the capitalist system in its
dealings with Africa.
The International Bank's
recent loan to Kenya for ex-
panded coffee production--which
caused an outburst of anti-
American headlines in Brazil in
early June--will probably in-
tensify the government's drive
for a greater voice in the eco-
nomic and political decisions
of the West and will reinforce
Brazil's interest in winning a
position of influence in Africa.
An exploratory good-will mission
is to begin a tour of Africa
within the next few weeks.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
EUROPEAN SATELLITES SINCE THE SUMMIT
Initial rsactiofi in the
European satellites to the col-
lapse of the summit included
considerable popular apprehen-
sion and uncertainty in party
ranks. While this has lessened
somewhat, Khrushchev, faced with
continued controversy with Pei-
ping, apparently has felt it
necessary to clarify his pol-
icies not only in Pravda but
also at a bloc-wide meeting in
Bucharest. The satellite re-
gimes can be expected to give
their full support to Khru-
shchev's foreign policies.
Regime Reactions
Some European Communist re-
gimes appear to have demonstrat-
ed more initial enthusiasm for
Khrushchev's summit and post-
summit behavior than they did
for his emphasis on detente
last fall. Almost all satel-
lite regimes were to some ex-
tent apprehensive about summitry
and an East-West rapprochement
and viewed with some relief the
collapse at Paris as a return
to traditional forms of the
Communist-capitalist struggle.
Although Satellite commentary
in the immediate post-summit
days was cautious, reflecting
a lack of Soviet guidance,
satellite propaganda drums
beat a loud tattoo in support
of Khrushchev and his personal
policies as soon as the accepted
line became clearer through
speeches by Soviet leaders.
Official statements have
followed the Soviet lead, Seek-
ing to emphasize the continuity
of the bloc policy of detente
and coexistence while castigat-
ing the United States for the
;summit collapse. Several satel-
ites quickly picked up the
2ravda articles of 12 June,
-.vhich supported the principles
of "negotiation" and implicitly
criticized the Chinese Commu-
nists for "left-wing sectari-
anism." No satellite has re-
peated any of the persistent
Chinese dissents to Khrushchev's
foreign policies.
The U-2 incident, treated
as the greatest threat to the
bloc since the Hungarian upris-
ing, served to unite European
Communist leaders--both Stalin-
ist and centrist--behind Khru-
shchev's actions. Nevertheless,
the precipitous manner in which
the talks collapsed and the ap-
parent change in policy caused
confusion and some consternation
in party ranks. In East Germany
this sentiment was compounded by
Khrushchev's speech on 20 May in
Berlin which again postponed
the signing of a separate peace
treaty. East German officials
were openly disappointed--some
party members accused Khrushchev
of "selling out"--and many func-
tionaries have been hard put to
explain Khrushchev's position
to party members. This confu-
sion in the ranks has increased
disciplinary and control prob-
lems in the East German party
apparatus.
Party functionaries in other
satellites were similarly hard
pressed to explain recent devel-
opments. The Czech party ap-
pears delighted, however, with
the increased emphasis on vigi-
lance. It has had less diffi-
culty in explaining changes, be-
cause it had never fully accepted
the virtues of detente and, un-
til Novotny's trip to Moscow in
early May, had hinted at some
reluctance and concern over Khru-
shchev's policy.
In terms of internal satel-
lite politics, the increased em-
phasis on vigilance and security
has presumably met with the par-
ticular approval of hard-line
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CURRENT INTELL ENGE,WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
NOVOTNY
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
elements and should tent. to in-
k i'Y it libera] i in forces , The'
"vindi.Erati '-surn-
pr , m ;t ;p licies', forded by the
events In Paris, however, ,is
unlikely to ,give them real po-
litical advantages, unless Khru-
shchev's policies are reversed
or his leadership seriously
threatened.
In the main, however, no
change in domestic policies is
likely because of the summit
breakup. The over-all drive to
"achieve socialism," under way
since the.Soviet 21st party,
congress, has,had the practical
effect of,generally tightening
internal controls and discipline,
speeding 'industrial development,
and encouraging greater efforts
at economic integration of the
Soviet bloc.
Popular Reactions
The suddenness-of the sum
snit collapse and the saber-
rattling manner in which the
USSR condemned the West gener-
ated a wave of surprise, disap-
pointment, and concern--in some
cases bordering on fear--through-
out Eastern Europe. While few
of the general public had be-
lieved that the Paris talks
would lead to tangible improve-
ments in their personal situa-
tion, many had harbored a hope
that something might happen to
case the tension and relieve
'he tedium of their everyday
lives. The fear that there.
would be an immediate return
to -a modified form of Stalin-
ist terror has not been sub-
stantiated, but on the whole
-people look to the future with
greater apprehension than be-
fore the summit.
In East Germany, where the
people fear bloc actions to
limit their access to West Ger-
many and West Berlin, the imme-
diate reaction was one of shock,
fright, and criticism of Khru-
shchev for wrecking the meeting,
although his 20 May speech amel-
iorated some of the East-German
people's apprehension.
In Poland, considerable
popular uneasiness remains over
the possibility that a stiffen-
ing of Soviet policy will be
reflected locally in a tighten-
ing of the Gomulka regime's
policies. In the days imme-
diately after the summit, some
panic buying occurred in Warsaw
and Budapest, and the American
Embassy in Warsaw reported that
there were bank withdrawals of
gold and dollar currency. Re-
ports from several satellites
indicated that the people were
afraid that contacts with the
West would be sharply curtailed.
In an effort to garner pop-
ular support and underline the
strong backing for Khrushchev
and his policies, "mass demon-
strations" were staged in most
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CURRENT INTELLZGgNCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
satellite capitals. The regimes,
sought to allay popular fears
by reiterating that the summit
collapse.does not mean a return
to the cold war, and that nego-
tiations will continue.
Soviet-Satellite Relations
Since the summit, the sat-
ellite leaders have been judi-
cious in their overt treatment
of foreign policy issues and
have carefully ascertained Mos-
cow's position and supported
this line. Nevertheless, lack
of firm guidance could serve to
stimulate factional activity by
those elements in Eastern Europe
which had registered pre-summit
opposition to Khrushchev's pol-
icies. In an effort to prevent
this, Khrushchev has sought to
clarify his policies in his
post-summit speeches and, most
recently and unambiguously, in
articles published in Pravda on
12 and 13 June.
These articles have, in
turn, formed the background for
Khrushchev's Bucharest meeting
with European satellite party
leaders and Asian Communist par-
ty representatives during the
Rumanian party congress. These
bloc discussions will give Khru-
shchev a chance to lay down
general guidelines for future
developments, to establish prop-
aganda positions to be adopted
GHEORGHIU-DEJ
RUMANIA
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I A`3T I I I PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 11
by the satellites, and to issue
a strong call for full bloc sup-
port for an agreed position. A
clear-cut "directive" from Ithru-
shchev would tend to erase sat-
ellite reservations and, while
differences over policy and ap-
proach will continue, divergent
views would perforce be sub-
merged.
The European satellites
now have clearly identified them-
selves with Soviet rather than
with Chinese policy. Eastern
European statements echoing the
Chinese Communist line have vir-
tually ceased. In East Germany,
the leading party daily, Neues
Deutschland, on 17 June pub-
lished the regime's official re-
jection of the Chinese commune
experiment as an example for
other countries--a notable de-
parture from the lavish praise
which characterized East German
commentary on this subject in 1959.
The East German, Polish,, Bulgarian,
and Hungarian regimes have re-
printed Pravda's implicit at-
tacks on Chinese "leftist sec-
tarianism."
Relations With US
While satellite propaganda
has been increasingly anti-
Western and militant, all sat-
ellites have continued to make
friendly and courteous contacts
with American diplomats. The
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
cordial Czech behavior at a dip-
lomatic reception on 4 June--!
a vivid contrast to the tradi-
tionally cold attitude of Czech
officialdom toward Americans--
presumably demonstrated Soviet
interest in avoiding an increase
in international tension.
Rumanian officials told
American representatives on 5
June that there was no change
in their official attitude to-
ward slightly expanded cultural
relations with the United States,
adding that steps would be taken
in the near future to ensure
that at least part of the ex-
change program--under negotia-
tion before the summit--could
get under way "immediately."
Similar pledges of continued
or increased cultural contacts
have been made by other Eastern
European governments. At least
three of them--Bulgaria, Poland,
and Rumania--have sought to en-
sure that present plans for com-
pleting much-needed foreign trade
arrangements with the West would
not be upset by recent interna-
tional developments.
SOVIET MANPOWER 1960-1970
The Soviet Union's two principal
manpower problems over the next decade
concern the continuing burden of a
farm labor force of more than 50,000,-
000 people, and the small number of
persons reaching working age an-
nually in the next few years as
a consequence of the low birth
rate in the years during and im-
mediately after World War II.
Moscow has already taken steps
to cope with these problems,
however, and should be able to
fulfill manpower goals of the
Seven-Year Plan (1959-65.)
Population Trends
World War II had a rata,
strophic effect on population
trends of the USSR. (Chart I.)
In addition to the enormous
military and civilian losses,
birth rates fell to less than
The reduced birth rates
are being offset by cutbacks in
the armed forces and by control-
ling school enrollments, and the
regime also expects to exploit
more intensively the labor po-
tential of women. In rural
areas, industrial and construc-
tion programs have been initiat-
ed to tap the reservoir of agri-
cultural underemployment.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
half their prewar level. The
1940 population level was not
regained until 1954. With the
low wartime birth rate reflected
in fewer young families in the
1960s, the current rate of
growth of the population will
temporarily decline. For the
decade as a whole, the popula-
tion will increase at an aver-
age annual rate of 1.5. percent--
a little more slowly than dur-
ing the 1950s.
Labor Supply
The civilian labor force
will increase by about 17,009,-
000 during the decade; only
1,000,000 more than the in-
crease during the 1950s.
(Chart II-) Growth will be slow-
er in the first half of the
decade than in the second be-
cause of the low birth rates
during the war and the early
postwar period. The total num-
ber of persons reaching the
normal working age of 15 in
1970, however, will be more than
double that in 1960.
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A4
X05'
-i 2d- ONE 1960
The rapid decline in the
number of 15-year-olds during
the 1950s, particularly in the
latter half of the decade (Chart
III), would have resulted in an
even slower growth in the labor
force than actually occurred if
the regime had not taken steps
to increase the labor supply.
(Chart IV.) Between 1955 and
1060 the armed forces decreased
by about 2,000,000, and Moscow
has announced plans to cut an
additional 1,200,000 during 1960-
61--years when the additions to
the population of working age
will be the lowest. (Chart V.)
In addition, the USSR is
tightening the controls over
school enrollment to provide a
more effective means of manip-
ulating it in accordance with
the need for labor. State au-
thorities will decide whether
graduates from the eighth grade
are to go to work, to high
school, or to a trade school.
Those who go directly to work
will be encouraged to attend
evening classes.
In recent years there has
been a decrease in day school
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
'50 '60 '70'50 '60 '70 '50 '60 '70
AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY and SERVICES
CONSTRUCTION
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE, BY MAJOR ECONOMIC SECTOR, 1439.78
enrollment resulting both from
a decline in the number of per-
sons of high school age and
from a reduction in the pro-
portion enrolled. By such
steps the regime has been able
to keep its civilian labor
force growing at a fairly even
pace.
Agricultural Labor
More than 50,000,000 peo-
ple in the USSR--nearly half of
the total labor force--are en-
gaged in agriculture. (Chart
VI.) This compares with only a
little more than one fourth of
the labor force employed in in-
dustry and construction, and
somewhat less than one fourth
employed in services such as
trade, education, transporta
tion, health, and public ad-
ministration.
While agricultural employ-
ment is expected to resume its
downward trend during the 1960s--
after a temporary interruption
during the mid-1950s, when Khru-
shchev's agricultural program
added several million people to
the farms--farmers will still
make up 40 percent of the civil-
ian labor force in 1970. At
the same time, rural population
will still constitute 43 per-
cent of the total. (Chart VII.)
Soviet agriculture prob-
ably will achieve sizable gains
in productivity during the 1960s,
thus releasing labor for other
purposes, but the integration
of surplus unskilled farm labor
into the urban labor force will
present difficult problems. By
promoting industrial and con-
struction activities in rural
areas, the regime is attempting
to employ surplus agricultural
workers near the farms, thus
keeping rural-to-urban migra-
tion to a minimum and avoiding
the necessity for providing
more housing and public util-
ities in the overcrowded cities.
Women in Labor Force
Women constitute an impor-
tant source-of labor both for
present and future requirements.
Women far outnumber men in the
population and in the key work-
ing areas as a consequence of
the disproportionate losses of
men during World War II and the
collectivization drive of the
1930s. Nearly two thirds of the
women 14 years of age and over
work, constituting more than
half of the civilian labor force.
(Chart VIII, ) Women probably
will continue to participate at
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
in high schools and on evening
enrollment in both high schools
and colleges. The seven-year
elementary schools are to be-
come eight-year schools, and
attendance will be compulsory.
During the 1960s, 3,500,000 to
4,000,000 people will graduate
from college.
The tecbr&cum is a spettienzed Secondary School that trains nurses, dentists.
elementary sekwW teachers. and vari us Kinds of technic{en.. Graduates
have completed k to3 years of aehouing beyond the high school tevet.
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF TUE !O?ULATION (AeE 13 AND OX#w 1959
4 Wjo i 23 JUNE 1960
this high rate during the 1960s9
Soviet leaders hope that even-
tually nearly all women will be
employed outside the home. Plans
call for more kindergartens,
nurseries, boarding schools,
and public dining facilities
to make this possible.
Educational Level
A fundamental difficulty
wn effectively utilizing labor
resources--both urban and rural--
is the low level of education in
the USSR. In 1959, only 2.6
percent of the population 15
years old and over had graduated
from college; 60.5 percent had
not completed the seven-year
elementary school. (Chart IX,)
Nevertheless, considerable ed-
ucational progress was achieved
during the past decade, and
even greater progress probably
will be made during the 1960s.
The school system is being
reorganized to place more em-
phasis on vocational education
Prospects
The continued rise in the
level of education and skill of
the Soviet labor force, along
with progress in technology,
should permit productivity to
continue its rapid increase.
Labor will be in somewhat short-
er supply until 1963 or 1964,
but the steps already taken by
the regime should assure suffi-
cient labor to meet plans for
the state labor force.
Likewise, the regime would
probably not hesitate to cut
back on educational goals tem-
porarily, or to postpone the
current reduction in the work-
week, should these be deemed
necessary. Women will be en-
couraged to join the work force,
and the regime will continue to
encourage schemes to raise agri-
cultural productivity in order
to release a part of the large
amount of manpower now tied up
on the farms. After 1965 the 25X1
labor problems created by World
War I will be considerably
eased. Pre-
pared by ORR)
EROSION OF ITALIAN DEMOCRACY
The recent cabinet crisis
in Italy, the most severe in
the republic's history, has re-
vived memories of the near-
anarchy which preceded the aban-
donment of parliamentary democ-
racy in the 1920s. The decreas-
ing viability of a center coali-
tion has intensified pressure on
the ruling Christian Democrats
to make a clear-cut choice of
allies from the right or left,
and there has been talk of right-
ist efforts to seize power by
force. Ambitious Premier Tam-
broni, whose caretaker mandate
runs out on 31 October, might
be tempted to take extralegal
measures to block replacement
of his government by one relying
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
.on the Nenni 3acialis.t9' parlia-.
mentary support.
Shaky' Democratic Base
A century of national. unity
has not sufficed to'implant the
democratic process in Italy, and
.the 14-year-old Italian Republic
has never held the choice.of an-
other democratic alternative to
the party, in power. In the
years when they were nationally
allied, the Communists and the
Nenni Socialists in effect re-
duced the size of the Chamber of
Deputies as a democratic body by
over a third, without counting
the further reduction effected
by the parties of the far right,
the neo-Fascists and the Mon-
archists. Even today, 'When the
Nenni Socialists and Monarchists
have acquired at least quasi-
respectability, the Communists
and the neo-Fascists hold over
a quarter of the parliamentary
seats.
The Christian Democrats
had a parliamentary majority
from 1948 to 1953, but have
since been dependent on the
small center partiesfor sup-
port in governing. A;center
coalition has become progressive-
ly more difficult to maintain
because of growing ideological
dissension among the-various
center groups, and Italy's gov-
COMMUNITY MOVEMENT I
(PSDI)
INDEPENDENT LEFT I
ent.government's initial , promise
t6-confine itself-to caretaker
functions and resign-after-six
months.
In the search for a broader
parliamentary base, the faction-
ridden Christian Democratic par-
ty has been unable to decide be-
tween left and.right. Tambroni's
reliance,on neo-Fascist parlia-
mentary-support for a slim work-
ing majority is opposed by left-
wing Christian Democrats, who
accepted it only as a summer so-
lution. Similarly, the party's
powerful rightist minority has
been able to block formation of
a government dependent on Nenni
Socialist abstentions.
ITALIAN
PARLIAMENT
S-INDEPENDT. MONARCHISTS
-NEO-FASCISTS(MSI)
In the Italy of
recent months, there-
fore, ,anarchy and
authoritarianism have
again become serious
threats, and the ed-
itor of a pro - Chris-
tian Democratic daily
in Naples warned on 10
April that unless the
Italian people rouse
themselves from their
contempt for repre-
sentative institutions,
there is danger that
ernments have become increas-
ingly vulnerable to-,the accusa-
tion of "immobilismo." The
political stalemate is,appro-
priately symbolized by the pres-
the country may "in the not-too-
distant future" find itself in.
the grasp of another. totalitarian
regime.
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C(JRRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Nonconstitutional Practices
One specific danger to Ital-
ian democracy in this situation
is that, as the cohesion and par-
liamentary strength of the amor-
phous center has declined, party
leaders have tended to seek so-
lutions outside parliament. This
problem was stressed by Senate
President Cesare Merzagora in
February, when Premier Segni re-
signed rather than rely solely
on Monarchist and neo-Fascist
votes. Merzagora argued that
it was improper for the govern-
ment to quit while it had a par-
liamentary majority.
other felt it had "pinpointed
the malaise afflicting Italian
life." The neo-Fascist press
seized on it as indicating the
crisis within the regime, and
to push for an authoritarian
system. One center-left paper
saw Merzagora as the spokesman
for "conservative and economic"
interests wishing to exploit the
situation to establish a regime
like that in Portugal.
Despite Merzagora's im-
passioned indictment, the
Christian Democratic party has
continued to ignore the spirit
of the constitution in carrying
out its decisions.
Premier Tambroni won
a vote of confidence
in the lower house on
8 April, but his party
disregarded the cham-
ber's approval and pre-
vailed on a reluctant
Tambroni to withdraw
rather than depend on
the neo-Fascists. The
Christian Democratic
directorate then called
on Amintore Fanfani to
form a center-left
government, but the
party's parliamentary
group defied this order
and forced Fanfani to
retire.
Merzagora stressed that
only two postwar cabinets had
been brought down by nonconfi-
dence votes in parliament, and
he denounced the "persistent
and unhealthy" practice of in-
dulging in extraparliamentary
crises in which cabinets were
brought down as the result of
pressures within the Christian
Democratic party. Merzagora
included in his attack on
Italy's multiparty system the
charge that the Constitutional
Court and President Gronchi, as
chief of state, were encroach-
ing on the legislative branch.
Merzagora's speech was
widely commented on in the
Italian press. Of the two
major independent papers, one
considered it ill-advised, the
Tambroni was restored to
office by the Senate's vote of
confidence on 29 April, but no
effort was made to comply with
the constitutional provision
that a premier must be con-
firmed within ten days of in-
veStiture.
Coup Atmosphere
fiambroni's has been called
a "paratroop government," per-
haps in part because the cur-
rent situation presents several
elements propitious for a quick
and violent seizure of power.
The ruling party cannot decide
on its own orientation; although
the electorate has been moving
to the left, the government has
accepted neo-Fascist support,
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23 June 1960
and concern among political and
economic right-wingers and some
members of the clergy over the
possibility of an "opening" to
the 1$enni Socialists might be
sufficient to encourage a mil-
itary move to,prevent it.
A police of-
ficial has called the present
climate the worst he has seen
since 1948 when an attempted
assassination of Communist
leader Togliatti led to nation-
wide Communist disturbances.
For want of a strong lead-
er, the most likely development
if the Christian Democrats fail
to work put a viable democratic
government would seem to be
some form of extralegal polit-
ical odv9nture by Tambroni when 25X6
U18 mandate expires. Tambroni's
personality would lend itself to
-such an effort.
Former Defense Minister
Pacciardi has stated that "a
government opening to the left
will never be created in Italy."
"Little
noses, blocke
the way to br
Riots with anti- 00621
demoeratie overtones occurred
at Pisa and Leghorn during
March; these involved civil-
ians--some Communists--and of--
ficex'-led paratroops singing
fascist songs. Disturbances
were fomented by neo-Fascists
and Monarchists in Home during
the 2 June celebration of the
republic's 14th anniversary.
In early April, before Tam-
broni complied with his party's
order to resign, rumors were
rife that he had met with police
leaders and his defense minis-
ter--right-wing Christian Dem-
ocrat Andreotti--to make plans
to ensure his continuation in
office. There was talk of a
neo-Fascist show of strength in
his support, and the Communist-
dominated General Labor Con-
federation was rumored alerted
for a protest strike.
d a center left government; and this is gust
Democratic Socialist leader
Giuseppe Saragat, 30 March 1960.
23 JUNE 1960
Prospects
Some of this concern seems
to be shared by President Gron-
chi, whose attitude toward Tam-
broni has been ambivalent.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
23 June 1960
Although local elections
have been called for this fall,
he is probably capable of in-
terpreting the results to suit
his own plans at that time. He
might seek to postpone national
elections indefinitely--a pros-
pect with some appeal to the
Christian Democrats, who expect
losses for themselves and gains
for the leftist parties in na-
tional voting. Strikes or up-
risings against Such an assump-
tion of power would give Tam-
broni an excuse to enlist the
aid of the military.
If left-wing Christian
Democrats make another attempt
this fall to form a center-left
government based on Socialist
abstentions, Tambroni will be
tempted to accept the support
of the Group for Defense of the
Republic, which was recently
f o?'n ed to prevent such an
"opening." This group, organ-
ized on 26 May, includes former
fascist activist Pino Romualdi,
right-wing Christian Democrat
and former Premier Giuseppe
Pella, Civic Committees chief
Luigi Gedda, Catholic Action
president Agostino Maltarella,
Paccior-di, and Guglielmo Gian-
nini, former leader of the now
defunct Common Man party, post-
war haven for ex-Fascists.
Gedda, who seems to be the
leader, has announced: "Today
we are united in thought, to-
morrow in action." Tambroni's
espousal of such an extreme right-
ist national front could drive
Socialists, Social Democrats,
Republicans, and left-wing Chris-
tian Democrats into a popular
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