CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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W`ONFIDENTIA ;
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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.9 U
OCI NO. 2273/60
5 May 1960
DOCUMENT NO.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
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TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
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The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
B R I 4 FI E. D"T_
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
In his speech to the Supreme Soviet on 5 May, Khru-
shchev resorted to a time-honored Soviet device on the eve
of important East-West negotiations which is designed to
place the Western powers, particularly the United States,
on the defensive and to demonstrate that the USSR's peace-
ful coexistence line does not result from any weakness the
West could exploit in summit talks. In general he sharply
criticized the West's attitude toward the summit, and,
specifically, he:charged violations of Soviet air space by
American aircraft. The speech probably was also intended
to warn against any exaggerated expectations in the Com-
munist world regarding the outcome of the Paris meeting
and to prepare the ground for blaming American "insincerity"
should the talks break down. Khrushchev's reaffirmation
at the end of his speech of his desire for a "mutually
acceptable agreement" apparently was designed to reassure
Western leaders and to forestall speculation that he has
lost interest in summit negotiations.
KHRUSHCHEV SHAKES UP TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP .
shchev's designated successor has been strengthened.
. . . . . . . Page 4
The Soviet leadership shake-up on 4 May is the most
extensive since the defeat of the Malenkov-Molotov "anti-
party" group in 1957. The evidence indicates that the
changes were made at Khrushchev's direction. The net re-
sult is that the Khrushchev-Mikoyan-Kozlov team appears to
be stronger than ever, and Frol Kozlov's position as Khru-
cratic party.
TURKISH DEMONSTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The demonstrations in Turkey against the government
of Premier Menderes have subsided, but students are still
determined to carry on the struggle and new outbreaks are
possible. The government appears determined to crush the
opposition Republican People's party and, now that the NATO
meeting in Istanbul has ended, may use the rioting as an
excuse for proscribing the party and arresting its leaders.
Premier Menderes and President Bayar are reported also
apprehensive over possible defections from their Demo-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
PART I (continued)
SOUTH KOREA UNDER HUH CHUNG . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The South Korean public appears to desire a return to
peaceful conditions, but students have renewed demonstra-
tions, demanding that a new National Assembly be elected
before changes are made in the constitution. Should pro-
longed political bickering appear to preclude a clean
sweep of the old regime, the general public might again
join the students in agitating against the government.
Acting Chief of State Huh Chung, a political independent,
apparently sees himself as more than a caretaker. His
early moves have been intended to gain popular support,
. Page 6
and he may emerge as a new political power in South Korea.
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The Castro regime, which is steadily strengthening
its ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc, is becoming further
isolated from other Latin American governments. Vene-
zuela's Betancourt is now included among the democratic
Latin American presidents being attacked by Cuban Govern-
ment media. Betancourt says he is completely disenchanted
with Castro and would be happy to play a leading role in
focusing hemisphere attention on the Cuban problem, pro-
vided Dominican dictator Trujillo were ousted first. In the
Dominican Republic, the church-state conflict is intensi-
fying,
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MAY DAY IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
May Day was observed throughout the bloc with the
usual massive parades and Communist-style hoopla. In Mos-
cow, rockets and missiles were displayed for the first
time since November 1957, but no important new equipment
was shown. Crowds were notably apathetic in Eastern Europe.
The traditional tremendous parade in Peiping was given up
this year in favor of smaller, dispersed celebrations
throughout the country. This, says Peiping, will be the
pattern for future May Days in order to allow the greatest
number of people to participate.
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5 May 1960
PART II (continued)
. Page 2
Collective farms in the USSR, primarily those near
major urban centers and on marginal land, are rapidly being
converted to state farms. The regime expects by this means
to promote greater specialization of production and to re-
duce costs. The process is also consistent with the re-
gime's long-range goal of eliminating the differences be-
tween state and collective farms.
. Page 3
Articles in Yugoslav journals in recent months indi-
cate more unrest among party intellectuals than at any
time since the Djilas affair in 1954. The basic issue is
how far Yugoslavia can evolve toward Western concepts in
its political program. Tito, who over the years has bor-
rowed heavily from the West in developing his economic pro-
gram, is apparently having difficulty limiting the influ-
ence of Western thought.
. . . . . . . . Page 5
Some 15,500 East German refugees--farmers, small
businessmen, and youths--fled to West Berlin in April,
despite the regime's intensified efforts to stop the flow.
A new element is the large number of youths escaping from
the regime's drive to place them on collective farms.
The regime blames the Evangelical clergy for the flights,
hoping thereby to counteract the effects of that church's
criticism of the oppressive methods used to collectivize
the farmers.
MOSCOW SHIFTS TACTICS TOWARD SOVIET EMIGRES . . . . . . . Page 7
Soviet propaganda toward emigrds no longer urges re-
patriation but rather tries to instill a feeling of patri-
otism and to. encourage spiritual and cultural ties with
the homeland. Moscow probably believes that most emigrds
who would return have already done so in response to the
vigorous "return to the homeland" campaign of recent years
and that the problem now is to organize and make more ef-
fective use of those remaining abroad.
SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The USSR, as part of its extensive effort to exploit
contacts between Khrushchev and free world leaders, has
sounded out the Ayub government on several recent occasions
to determine whether such visits have produced any change
in Pakistan's cool attitude toward bloc countries. Since
Moscow continues to support Afghanistan and to censure
Pakistan for participating in Western military alliances,
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5LURIL
5 May 1960
PART II (continued)
Soviet diplomatic feelers seem designed primarily to
arouse fears among Pakistan's allies of revision of
Rawalpindi's strongly anti-Communist policies.
ADDITIONAL PAKISTANI CABINET CHANGES . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
President Ayub apparently intends to relieve ambi-
tious Lieutenant General Sheikh of his duties as minister
of interior within a few weeks and appoint him permanently
to the less powerful Ministry of Food and Agriculture.
The departure of Lieutenant General Azam Khan from the
cabinet to assume the governorship of East Pakistan has
already stimulated extensive rumors about rivalries within
the government. 25X1
PREMIER NU CONSOLIDATES HIS CONTROL IN BURMA . . . . . . . Page 10
Premier Nu's return to effective control of the
Burmese Government has been assisted by General Ne Win's
determination to withdraw the army from open participa-
tion in political affairs. The new government's programs
are designed to produce a rapid return to pre-1958 condi-
tions of party politics and appear intended to eliminate,
as far as possible, all reminders of the army regime. Al-
though government efficiency and integrity may decline,
the army will continue its behind-the-scenes watchdog role.
INDONESIAN ARMY INTENTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The Indonesian Army is encouraging the anti-Communist
Democratic League and the league's anti-Sukarno press cam-
paign, with the immediate objective of preventing installa-
tion of President Sukarno's appointed parliament. Sukarno,
who is still abroad, reportedly has been extremely irritated
by these activities and may even dismiss army chief Nasution.
Dutch plans to send naval units on a six-month flag-showing
cruise to Far.Eastern waters could be exploited by Sukarno
to drum up an anti-Dutch propaganda drive which could unite
all Indonesian factions.
Page 12
Political activity in the Congo, centered about the
legislative elections scheduled for 11 to 25 May, has been
marked by the Communists' efforts-to increase their in-
fluence in the Belgian colony. Although no single party
is expected to control the legislature, the group led by
Patrice Lumumba--one of several enjoying Communist support--
is expected to make a strong show ing. The imminence of
African rule on 30 June has increased restiveness among the
Europeans in the Congo.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
PART II (continued)
NATIONALIST AGITATION OVER PORTUGUESE AFRICA . . . . . . . Page 13
Portugal's African possessions are likely to come
under increasing attack from nationalist and exile move-
ments supported by independent African states
Agitators in the Belgian Congo are attempting to arouse
nationalist sentiment in Angola. Although the internal
situation in the Portuguese territories remains calm,
Lisbon's rule will be subjected to growing pressure as a
ditional areas come under African control.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The Arab boycott of US shipping which began at mid-
night 29 April has gained momentum, with dockworkers'
unions or governments in almost all Arab states having ex-
pressed their determination to implement it. Most Ameri-
can-flag ships have been diverted from Arab ports. In
Lebanon, despite this week's violent Christian-Moslem in-
cidents, President Shihab has scheduled parliamentary
elections beginning 12 June. The political influence of
the Iraqi Army will be increased as a result of Qasim's
reshuffle of the cabinet following the resignation of
competent, conservative Finance Minister Hadid. In this
week's Afro-Asian Economic Conference in Cairo, the UAR
took the lead in thwarting attempts by representatives
from Sino-Soviet bloc states to increase their influence
in the organization. 25X1
BRITISH LABOR PARTY RECONSIDERING ITS NUCLEAR DEFENSE
POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. Page 18
The British public's demands for unilateral British
nuclear disarmament have become markedly stronger in recent
weeks, and there is growing pressure on the Labor party
leaders.to abandon their support of an independent nuclear
'deterrent. As suggested in part by the recent parliamen-
tary debate on the government's abandonment of the Blue
Streak missile project, Labor leadersappear to be
preparing for a new compromise to accommodate their, critics.
This situation adds to the pressures on the Macmillan gov-
ernment to show some tangible progress on disarmament.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY . . . . . Page 19
A low-keyed effort to resume direct progress toward
European political integration by instituting popular
election of the European Parliamentary Assembly is expected
to attract increasing attention within the European
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5 May 1960
PART II (continued)
Economic Community (EEC) in the next few months. Plans
for sach?an election--provided for in general terms in both
the EEC and EURATOM treaties--will probably be approved
soon by the assembly, but ratification by the member gov-
ernments will be difficult to obtain. Proposals by European
federalists that the limited powers of the assembly be in-
creased have virtually no prospect of adoption at this time.
US BASE IN TRINIDAD FACES HARASSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . Page 20
Trinidad's termination on 30 April of the use by US
military planes of the island's only operational airport
may presage other moves which would limit effective use
of the Chaguaramas naval base and missile-tracking station.
Premier Williams, who has strong anti-US prejudices, has
long campaigned for full participation in the planned re-
vision of the 1941 US-UK agreement on West Indies bases
and for obtaining at least part of Chaguaramas for the
federal capital. Other harassments he has hinted at in-
clude cutting the base's power supply, fomenting labor
troubles, delaying movements in and out, and elaborating
his charges that the base is a source of radiation hazards.
PARAGUAYAN EXILES LAUNCH NEW INVASION . . . . . . . . . . Page 22
The Stroessner regime in Paraguay, increasingly in
the spotlight as the last dictatorship in South America,
has encountered another exile invasion attempt. The
Argentina-based effort, which began on 29 April, now ap-
pears to have faltered, but on 3 May a new small-scale
thrust occurred in the northeast along the Brazilian bor-
der. The armed forces, loyal to the Stroessner regime,
are said to be confident they can control the situation.
THE TAMBRONI GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 23
The all - Christian Democratic minority government of
Fernando Tambroni has won investiture in the Italian Sen-
ate after pledging itself to a six-month tenure limited to
caretaker functions. The opposition parties of the left
may still renew their efforts to overthrow Tambroni in the
lower house, but with no prospect of success barring an un-
likely breach of party discipline by Christian Democratic
left-wingers.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Khrushchev probably views the summit meeting which
opens in Paris on 16 May not as a decisive confrontation
with the West but as a new and important stage in a pro-
tracted period of high-level negotiations. This view-
point and the opportunity for further bilateral discussions
during President Eisenhower's visit to the USSR in June
probably preclude any move to force a showdown at the sum-
mit itself or in the period immediately after. Khrushchev's
principal efforts probably will be focused on obtaining a
general statement on Berlin which the USSR could then rep-
resent as marking Western acceptance of the principle that
the Berlin situation is "abnormal" and should be modified
in the direction of ending the "occupation regime" in West
WEST GERMANY'S PRE-SUMMIT MOOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
West Germany is more apprehensive than usual about
the impending East-West negotiations. Although official
statements express confidence and the mass of the popula-
tion appears to be busy enjoying Germany's continuing
economic prosperity, the politically minded minority seems
suspicious, uncertain, and generally pessimistic about the
outlook. There is a strong tendency to regard the meeting
JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES . . . . . . . . Page 8
Since 1953 Japan has had the greatest foreign trade
growth of any major nation, and its standard of living is
now 25 percent above the prewar period. The emphasis of
Japanese trade has shifted from Asia to the United States,
but loss of control over many of its former markets and
sources of supply has raised new problems which are compli-
cated by growing international pressures on Japan to liber-
alize its import program and restrict exports. The popular
belief that Japan is prepared to engage in a substantial
capital export program to assist underdeveloped countries
1960--BANNER YEAR FOR NORTH VIETNAM .
. . Page 15
North Vietnam observes several important milestones
this year, including President Ho Chi Minh's 70th birthday,
the 30th anniversary of the founding of its Communist
party, and the 15th year of "national independence." Party
membership has been expanded, the first party congress
since 1953 and the first elections for the National Assembly
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5 May 1960
PART III (continued)
since 1946 are to be held, and a new constitution is to
be promulgated this year. Modernization of the 270,000-
man army, the strongest in Southeast Asia, continues.
Although Hanoi's Three-Year Plan, which ends this year,
will fall considerably short of its original goals, the
nation has achieved self-sufficiency in food at an auster-
ity level.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S RY
5 May 1960
Off' IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Khrushchev climaxed his
pre-summit maneuvers with a
speech to the Supreme Soviet
on 5 May in which he resorted
to a time-honored Soviet device
--used frequently on the eve
of important negotiations--
which is designed to place the
Western powers on the defen-
sive and to demonstrate that
the USSR's peaceful coexistence
policy does not result from any
weakness the West could exploit
at the negotiating table,
The Soviet premier gave a
pessimistic assessment of pros-
pects for agreement at the sum-
mit, citing recent Western pol-
icy statements and actions as
providing little ground for
hope that the Western leaders
"are really looking for con-
crete solutions." He charged
that "aggressive forces" in the
United States recently have in-
tensified their efforts to
"wreck the summit conference,
or at least prevent it from
reaching agreements."
Although Khrushchev's ref-
erences to President Eisenhower
were couched in moderate terms,
he went further in criticizing
the President than at any time
since his visit to the United
States. He remarked that re-
cent speeches by American
spokesmen were an "ill omen"
for a "favorable outcome" at
the summit and said this situa-
tion has been "aggravated" by
the "unfortunate fact that even
the American President approved
these speeches." He expressed
regret that President Eisen-
hower intended to limit his
presence at the summit to only
seven days and observed that
this shows that questions to be
discussed in Paris "do not en-
joy due attention on the part
of the United States Government."
Khrushchev apparently in-
tends to build up his charges of
recent violations of Soviet
air space by US aircraft into a
major international issue. He de-
nounced these flights as a "di-
rect provocation" and announced
that the USSR would bring these
incidents before the UN Security
Council. He charged that the
incidents were timed to coincide
with the summit meeting and that
the United States is seeking to
weaken the USSR's "determina-
tion to fight for a relaxation
of international tension and an
end to the cold war and arms
race."
In an effort to portray
American policy as irresponsible
and provocative and to generate
widespread public alarm-over
its possible consequences, Khru-
shchev warned that the USSR re-
serves the right to reply to
"such aggressive actions" in
the future "with measures which
we shall find necessary to ensure
the safety of our country." With-
out committing the USSR to such
a course, he attempted to convey
the notion that it would employ
missile retaliation.
Khrushchev's threat to
bring the issue before the
Security Council closely
parallels a Soviet move call-
ing an emergency session of
the council in April 1958
to condemn flights of US
Strategic Air Command nuclear-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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armed bombers over the Arctic
"in the direction of the fron-
tiers of the USSR." This move
coincided with the beginning
of the abortive preparatory
talks in Moscow to arrange a
pre-summit foreign ministers'
conference. The 1958 maneuver
culminated in ' a veto 'bSr-,the
'8oviet Union of an' Amer-
ican r6solut ion ` calling `for an
Arctic inspection system to re-
duce the danger of surprise at-
tack.
In addition to the primary
effort to discredit the United
States on the eve of the summit
meeting, Khrushchev's speech
probably was calculated to warn
against any exaggerated expecta-
tions in the Communist world
regarding the outcome of the
Paris talks, which he has been
careful to portray as only
the first of a series of such
negotiations. Khrushchev's
harsh criticism of the United
.States may also be intended to
prepare a case for blaming
American "insincerity" should
the talks break down.
Having .nvoked the threat
of a new and dangerous crisis,
Khrushchev concluded his speech
by reaffirming his commitment
to the "Leninist policy" of
peaceful coexistence and by
pledging himself to "spare no
effort at Paris to achieve a
mutually acceptable agreement.."
This pledge was intended to
reassure Western leaders and
forestall speculation that he
has lost interest in summit
talks.
Prior to Khrushchev's
speech, Soviet and bloc officials
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portrayed the Paris summit meet-
ing as a general discussion to
narrow differences rather than
to negotiate specific settle-
ments, The Polish foreign min-
ister privately expressed doubt
that the Berlin problem could
be solved now. A Soviet official
in Geneva said that the one
thing the West could be assured
of was that Khrushchev would
come to Paris "with a smile"
and a willingness to discuss
issues seriously.
In Vienna, a Soviet Em-
bassy official expressed the
view that some progress could
be achieved on disarmament and
nuclear testing. British press
reports quote a "top Commu-
nist diplomat" to the effect
that Khrushchev will mark time
until the US elections and
will seek only broad general
agreements in. Paris, leaving
the details to be worked out
later.
Bloc. spokesmen, including
the Polish foreign minister,
sought privately last week to
de-emphasize any suggestion
of a.crisis on Berlin at the
summit. The Soviet military
attache in Prague, apparently
acting on instructions, went
out of his way to stress to the
American attache that Khru-
shchev's 25 April speech in
Baku was not intended as a
threat to use force on the Ber-
lin issue. The Hungarian and
Rumanian attaches also took
the same approach in private
conversations, and the Soviet
ambassador in London publicly
denied that Khrushchev's re-
marks could be interpreted as
a threat.
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'Woo
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Disarmament Talks
In the last sessions be-
fore the recess on 29 April of
the disarmament talks at Geneva,
the Soviet delegation used the
problem of a final communiqu6
to further its efforts in blam-
ing the West for rejecting "com-
plete and general disarmament"
and obstructing progress in the
conference. Soviet chief dele-
gate Zorin introduced a draft
communique designed to commit
the West to agreement on having
achieved a "certain rapproche-
ment of views" and to continue
work on the basic principles of
a general treaty after the re-
cess.Zorn sought to induce
the West to accept by indicating
that when the negotiations re-
sumed, the USSR would consider
some provisions in the Western
list of principles in develop-
ing an agreed program for com-
plete disarmament.
Following Western presen-
tation of amendments eliminat-
ing the items on a rapprochement
and the future work, the bloc
delegations took the line that
the West's position demonstrated
its opposition to the UN resolu-
tion and its desire to "strain
the atmosphere." As a result,
the communique merely noted
the recess and date for resump-
tion. Zorin's tactics in at-
tempting to create the impres-
sion'that the West opposes gen-
eral disarmament provide further
evidence that Moscow is prepar-
ing the ground for shifting the
talks to a discussion of partial
measures after the summit.
Nuclear Test Talks
Moscow's acceptance of the
Eisenhower-Macmillan proposal
of 29 March for establishing a
moratorium on small underground
tests through unilateral declara-
tions appears designed to focus
the summit discussions on the
duration of the moratorium.
After stressing earlier that a
moratorium should be formally
incorporated into the treaty,
either as an annex or protocol,
the chief Soviet delegate on
3 May presented a Soviet Gov-
ernment declaration accepting,
in effect, the US-British pro-
posal; provided the three pow-
ers reached agreement on a,
"mutually acceptable duration
for the moratorium."
Although the declaration
again proposes four to five
years as a suitable period, it
implies that this is subject
to negotiation, on condition
that the moratorium be con-
terminous with the research
program for improving detection
techniques. Soviet agreement to
begin working out this program
also included acceptance of the
American proposal for conduct-
ing experimental nuclear explo-
sions during the course of re-
search.
The Soviet delegate, how-
ever, indicated that the re-
search program and experimental
tests should be "joint," rather
than coordinated national pro-
grams as proposed by the West-
ern powers. This approach may
indicate the USSR plans to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
debate the concept of "joint"
as opposed to "coordinated" in
the preliminary meeting of ex-
perts beginning on 11 May to
establish the framework for the
research program.
The Soviet move appears
timed to demonstrate Khrushchev's
intentions to conduct serious
negotiations on the nuclear
test issue at the summit. The
Soviet premier will probably
call for a long-term Western
commitment on a moratorium and
may propose a two-'to three-
year period as a compromise
solution. In return he will
probably press for Western con-
cession on the number of on- 25X1
site inspections as the only
other major issue blocking con-
clusion of a treaty.
KHRUSHCHEV SHAKES UP TOP SOVIET LEADERSHIP
The Soviet leadership
shake-up on 4 May is the most
extensive since the defeat of
the Malenkov-Molotov "antipar-
ty" group in 1957. The evi-
dence indicates that the changes
were made at Khrushchev's direc-
tion. The net result is that
the Khrushchev-Mikoyan-Kozlov
team appears to be stronger
than ever, and Frol Kozlov's po-
sition as Khrushchev's desig-
nated successor has been
strengthened.
The transfer of Kozlov
from first deputy premier to
the party secretariat will give
him an opportunity to establish
influence over the hard core
of party professionals. Their
support will be necessary if
he is eventually to take over
control and maintain his posi-
tion against other contenders.
In addition, the secretar-
iat has been reduced from a
10-man body to a tight group
of six, a size reminiscent of
the Stalin era.' Other than
Khrushchev, Suslov appears to
be the only remaining party
secretary who might have the
semblance of an independent
voice.
The promotion of Aleksey
Kosygin, Nikolay Podgorny, and
Dmitry Polyansky from candi-
date status to full membership
on the party presidium is a
logical move. Kosygin and
Polyansky particularly have
been mentioned frequently as
rising stars on Khrushchev's
team, and Podgorny, party chief
in the Ukraine, replaces Aleksey
Kirichenko as representative
of the Ukrainian Republic in
the top leadership.
The removal of Kirichenko
and Belyayev from their top
party positions simply formal-
izes the demotion they received
earlier this year when they
were assigned to remote pro-
vincial posts.
The promotion of Kosygin
from deputy premier and USSR
economic planning chief to
first deputy premier and his
replacement by Vladimir Novi-
kov, who worked for a time in
Leningrad, Kozlov's old baili-
wick, were the principal shifts
in the government. For the 25X1
past year, Novikov has been
chief economic planner in the
Russian Republic (RSFSR).
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
.5 May 1960
TURKISH DEMONSTRATIONS
The demonstrations in Tur-
key against the government of
President Bayar and Premier
Menderes have subsided follow-
ing the conclusion of the NATO
Ministerial Council meeting in
Istanbul on 4 May. Before they
did so, however,s,erious rioting
occurred in Istanbul and An-
kara, and minor demonstrations
took place in Izmir, Malayta,
Bursa, and possibly other Turk-
ish cities. Many student lead-
ers were arrested and some were
reportedly beaten during inter-
rogation. The students appear
determined to continue their
struggle against the government,
and new demonstrations are a
distinct possibility.
The riots, which began on
28 April, appear to have been
sparked solely by recent re-
pressive acts of the govern-
ment against the political op-
position in Turkey, although
they may have been prolonged
by the students in hopes of
attracting the attention of
the NATO delegates. Menderes
was the special target of
the demonstrators, and there
were repeated indications that
the police also were the ob-
jects of student hatred. While
the students were unsuccessful
in winning support of the
troops sent to suppress the
demonstrations, the army gen-
erally was cautious in han-
dling the crowds, and the stu-
dents displayed respect fore
the army's strength.
Many intellectuals have
long opposed the increasingly
authoritarian posture of the
Turkish Gowernment,and lawyers
and university faculty members
were particularly active in
supporting the student demon-
strations. The general public,
however, remained largely
apathetic. Student leaders
have denied that the opposi-
tion Republican People's.,patty
(RPP) was behind the rioting
and have denied government
charges that Turkey's small
underground Communist party
was involved. Observers have
noted that there was no indi-
cation of anti-Americanism in
the demonstrations.
The Menderes regime has
reacted to the demonstrations
with new charges that the RPP
is fomenting open rebellion.
The regime may use the riots
as an additional excuse for
further limiting--if not elimi-
nating--the RPP. Several local
RPP leaders reportedly have
been arrested, and there is
speculation that the government
will move against the top lead-
ership of the party after the
NATO meetings. If the govern-
ment proscribes the party, the
RPP plans to operate underground.
If reprisals against the opposi-
tion become severe, RPP leaders
may seek political asylum in for-
eign embassies in Ankara.
The administration is al-
so worried that dissidents in
the governing Democratic party
(DP)--possibly as many as 150
of more than 400 DP deputies in
the legislature--may resign and
eventually join.*ith the RPP to
topple the government. Apparent-
ly in anticipation of such moves25X1
President Bayar reportedly has
threatened to arrest any DP dep-
uty who resigns.
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5 May- 1960
Continued student restive-
ness in South Korea confronts
the provisional government of
Acting Chief of State Huh Chung
with the problem of how to main-
tain law and order while deci-
sions on a new form of govern-
ment and elections are being
made. The general public appears
to desire a return to peaceful
conditions, but students have
renewed demonstrations, demand-
ing that elections be held for
a new National Assembly before
changes are made in the consti-
tution. Should prolonged fac-
tional maneuvering A,hd political
bickering in the legislature
appear- to preclude a clean
sweep of the old regime, the
general public might again join
with the students in agitating
against the government.
On 2 May some 20,000 stu-
dents at Pusan and Taegu defied
martial law to hold peaceful
demonstrations demanding the
speedy election of a new assem-
bly before the existing Ameri-
can-styge presidential system
of government is changed for
one with a prime minister and
cabinet responsible to the
legislature. In Seoul, some 500
students who staged a sitdown
strike before the National As-
sembly building had to be dis-
persed with tear gas.
American Ambassador Mc-
Conaughy has noted that these
demonstrations showed more plan-
ing than was evident in the
largely spontaneous movements
of 19-26 April. Seoul students
have organized an executive
committee representing all of
the city's 27 colleges and uni-
versities. Outside political
groups may also be attempting
to manipulate the students.
The army seems intent on adopt-
ing stiffer measures than here-
tofore to cope with demonstra-
tions.
Such activity emphasizes
the uncertainty of whether the
public is willing to accept
amendment of the constitution
by a discredited incumbent Na-
tional Assembly. Ignoring de-
mands that it quit, however,
the assembly has continued its
preparations to change the
structure of the government be-
fore a new legislature is elect-
ed,. The committee charged with
drafting the amendments to es-
tablish a parliamentary form
of government published on 4 May
its proposals for making the
president a titular head of
state and providing for his in-
direct election by the legisla-
ture.
It is questionable, how-
ever, whether this measure will
have the two-thirds support of
assembly members needed to pass
a constitutional amendment.
Former President Rhee's Liberal
party, after virtually abdicat-
ing its leadership of the legis-
lature following the overthrow
of the regime, now may be mov-
ing to reassert its majority
position in the present highly
fluid political situation. There
are also indications that a
minority among the Liberals may
be maneuvering for a return of
Rhee, possibly as president un-
der the new parliamentary system.
While the assembly appears united
in its support for a cabinet sys-
tem of government, it is not
agreed on the method of select-
ing the president. A legisla-
tive fight may develop over how
he is to be chosen.
Outside the legislature,
preparations are under way for
the formation or revival of a
number of minor parties, from
the Progressive party on the
left to the militant National
Youth Corps on the right. An
unstable, multiparty situation
may develop.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Meanwhile, Huh Chung, while
apparently favoring amendment
of the constitution prior to
holding elections for a new as-
sembly, appears to have kept
clear of the dispute. His ad-
ministration has begun to reform
the police, revise legislation
to make local governments more
responsible to the people, and
clean up graft and corruption
among officials and in the econ-
omy. Despite such popular ac-
tions, Huh as yet has not
emerged as a popular leader.
On 28 April, Huh gave Am-
bassador McConaughy the impres-
sion he would lean heavily on
the United States for support and
particularly requested
American assistance in
overhauling the police
system. Huh assured
the ambassador he hoped
to promote the closest
possible relations with
the United States and
requested a public
statement of support
to "aid in calming
down the situation."
Huh has indicated
that he recognizes the
need to normalize re-
lations with Japan. He
feels, however, that
he must move cautious-
ly to avoid any im-
pression of making ex-
cessive concessions. For this
reason, he has stated publicly
that any over-all settlement is
dependent on Tokyo's ending the
repatriation of Koreans in Japan
to North Korea. In the mean-
time, he appears willing to
revise Rhee'S hostage diplomacy
toward Japan, relax enforcement
of the "Rhee fishing line," and
permit Japanese newsmen to en-
ter South Korea.
Pyongyang continues heavy
commentary on events in South
Korea, and now characterizes
the outcome as a victory for the
'Corean people, but only "an ini-
tial victory." To free them-
selves fully, Pyongyang urges,
the southerners must continue
their demonstrations and "com-
pel the American imperialists
to withdraw." North Korean
leaders have again called for
a joint North-South political
conference, the establishment
of a joint economic commission,
and general all-Korean elections
to set up.a unified government.
There is no indication that
North Korea intends to initiate
hostilities, but Pyongyang may
attempt to infiltrate additional
agents during the present con-
fused situation. The naval in-
cident on 4 May off the east
coast near the demilitarized
zone, between a South Korean pa-
trol boat and North
Korean torpedo boats,
was probably acciden-
tal. The South Ko-
reans reported heavy
fog in the area, and
both sides may be
somewhat nervous con-
cerning the other's
intentions. The
South Korean vessel
reportedly was not
damaged.
Acting President
u Chung
Huh Chung, now
62, has a reputation
for directness, in-
tegrity, and personal
courage. He is a political in-
dependent who apparently sees
himself as more than a caretaker,
and he may emerge as a new po-
liticdl power in South Korea.
Educated at Columbia University
in the 1920s, Huh speaks English
and Japanese fluently and has
a fair command of French. He
met Rhee, a fellow Methodist,
in.the United States and there
became active in the i:orean po-
litical independence movement.
Following the establishment of
the South Korean Republic in
1948, he was appointed trans-
portation minister and elected
to the National Assembly..Subse-
quently he served as social affairs
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
minister and was acting prime
minister for five months in
1951-52.
Despite his close associa-
tion with Rhee, Huh opposed his
strong-arm methods and often us,,,d
tndeperident' judgment in the cabinet.
Dismissed from office in 1952
and defeated for re-election
to the National Assembly in
1954, Huh retired from politi-
cal life, bitterly resentful
of Rhee.
In December 1957, Rhee ap-
pointed Huh mayor of Seoul, al-
legedly at the urging of the
late vice president - elect, Yi
Ki-pung, with whom Huh had been
associated as a political moder-
ate. Yi apparently believed that
Huh, as a political independent
with Liberal party leanings, was
better able to deliver the Seoul
urban vote to Rhee in the 1960
elections than any proadmini-
stration mayor. As mayor, he
conducted an able; largely non-
political administration, and
gained significant popularity.
During an official trip to
several major US cities in 1959,
Huh criticized the Rhee admini-
stration's abolition of the
elective system for local offi-
ces. This, coupled with pres-
sure from those Liberal party
leaders who were angered by his
failure to cooperate in repres-
sive measures for the election,
caused his ouster the day after
he returned to Korea in June
1959. In the fall of 1959, he
served briefly as chief dele-
gate to the South Korean - Jap-
anese negotiations for normal-
izing relations.
Huh's appointment as for-
eign minister on 25 April was one 25X1
of several desperate, last-minute
attempts by Rhee to popularize
his regime.
CUBA AND THE CARIBBEAN
The Castro regime, which
continues to strengthen its
ties with the Sino-Soviet bloc,
is becoming further isolated
from other Latin American gov-
ernments. The estrangement be-
tween Fidel Castro and Vene-
zuelan President Betancourt ap-
pears virtually complete; Cuban
Government propaganda media have
begun to attack Betancourt as
they have other democratic pres-
idents--Frondizi of Argentina,
Lopez Mateos of Mexico, Lleras
Camargo of Colombia, and Alles-
sandri of Chile.
In his May Day speech, Cas-
tro derided Betancourt indirect-
ly but unmistakably. The next
day an editorial in the Castro-
controlled daily Revolucion at-
tempted to promote a brea be-
tween Venezuelan civilian groups
and the military, intimating
that Betancourt is subservient
to the army and to American oil
companies.
A political crisis in Vene-
zuela could develop as a result
of an open rift with Castro. Dis-
agreement over policy toward him
is increasing, particularly with-
in the government coalition.
Venezuelan leftists staged a
Latin American "congress of sup-
port for the Cuban revolution"
in Havana on 29-30 April, and a
Venezuelan civilian "militia"
group marched in the Cuban May
Day parade.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Cuba has maintained close
contacts with dissatisfied ele-
ments in Venezuela's government
coalition and with Communists
there, and it may be giving them
financial aid and guidance.
Betancourt told Ambassador
Sparks on 26 April that he was
completely disencharjted with
Castro; he said he would be
happy to play a leading role in
focusing Latin American atten-
tion on the Cuban problem if
Dominican dictator Trujillo were
ousted first.
Dominican Situation
The church-state conflict
is intensifying in the Dominican
Republic, and a break in rela-
tions between the Trujillo dic-
tatorship and the church may be
imminent. The American Embassy
reported on 3 May that Trujillo
has launched a strong antichurch
program in the country.
One of the top anti-Tru-
jillo dissident leaders told
the American Embassy in Ciudad
Trujillo that any expression
of US disapproval of Trujillo
would trigger a coup attempt now
being organized with the help of
military elements and would
salvage US prestige among the
dissidents "at the eleventh
hour."
Sino-Soviet Ties With Cuba
Sino-Soviet ties with Cuba
continue to be evident.
Small shipments of Soviet
crude and refined petroleum,
wheat, and pig iron are arriving
in Cuba under the trade agree-
ment concluded in February.
Marta Frayde--a charter
member of the 26th of'July move-
ment and close confidante of Cas-
tro--told the press during her
recent visit to East Germany that
she favored closer relations be-
tween both countries. Peiping ra-
dio continues its extensive report-
ing on events in Cuba, and the
secretary general of the Cuban
Communist party, Bias Roca, was
received by Mao Tse-tung while in
Peiping for the May Day celebrations,
Expansion of Propaganda Media
The Castro regime is
steadily expanding its substan-
tial propaganda efforts abroad.
Plans have been announced for
a powerful short-wave radio
station for which the Ministry
of Communications claims to have
appropriated $1,700,000 "to
bring the truth of the Cuban
revolution to all Latin America."
This probably would be closely 25X1
tied in with the Castro-subsi-
dized Prensa Latina news agency
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May -.1960 .
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MAY DAY IN THE COMMUNIST BLOC
In Moscow's May Day cele-
bration'this year, a military
parade featured, for the first
time since November 1957, a
massive display of rockets and
missiles. Four 700-nautical-
mile and eight 100-n.m. surface-
to-surface missiles were shown,
as well as eight surface-to-
air missiles. The only new
piece of equipment seen, how-
ever, was a single-round rocket
launcher mounted on aft amphib-
ious tank chassis. Two versions
were shown, one of which had a
new-type conical warhead. This
rocket appeared to be one with
two stages.
Superheavy artillery
pieces, probably designed to
fire ram-jet,-assisted shells
with atomic capabilities, were
also shown for the first time
since 7 November 1957. Unlike
the rockets and missiles, how-
ever, these special artillery
weapons are not believed to be
in the hands of troops. It is
possible that the weapons shown
are prototypes which have never
been produced in quantity.
The attention given ad-
vanced weaponry in this year's
parade served both as a remind-
er of Soviet military power on
the eve of the summit and as an
assurance to the Soviet people
that their military strength
has not been impaired by man-
power cuts,
All European satellites
except Poland celebrated May
Day with parades, but only in
East Berlin were military units
featured; an estimated 4,000
to 5,000 East German troops
marched through the city. This
action was in defiance of quad-
ripartite agreements banning
all troops but those of the oc-
cupation powers. As in previous
years, certain unarmed paramil-
itary delegations, including the
workers' militia (Kampfgruppen),
marched in the parade alongside
about 100,000 "workers" and
sympathizers. The East German
demonstration of strength and
"sovereignty" in defiance of
the West was greeted by a crowd
of 25,000, smaller than expected,
in Marx-Engels Platz. This is
in sharp contrast with the 750,-
000 person's who attended cele-
brations in West Berlin.
In the other satellites,
there was little popular enthus-
iasm for the demonstrations. In
Czechoslovakia, the people par-
ticipated in the parade because
they felt their jobs depended
on their participation, while
in Poland hundreds left carry-
ing "furled banners" before
Gomulka had finished speaking.
Most satellite spokesmen
commemorating May Day emphasized
the peace theme and Khrushchev's
call for peaceful coexistence.
This soft tone--abetted by the
deletion of scurrilous advance
propaganda and provocative
floats--was marred somewhat,
however, by East German and
Czech attacks on the Bonn gov-
ernment, by a generally hostile
tone and specific condemnation
of Yugoslavia by Albania, and
by calls for "vigilance" and
caution by certain other satel-
lites, including Rumania.
Peiping announced on 24
April that, beginning this year,
the traditional method of ob-
serving May Day with a tremendous
parade in the capital would-be
abandoned in favor of smaller
celebrations throughout the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
-5 May '1960
cities and countryside of Com-
munist China. The change was
in order "to enable the great-
est possible number of people
to celebrate their own holiday
enthusiastically and to give
them a chance to be happy and
joyful and to relax." A joint
notice of the party central
committee and State Council
called on everyone to celebrate
May Day "more extensively and
more enthusiastically" than
ever before.
Chinese Communist press
reports claimed that 3,000,000
people took part in the cele-
brations in Peiping alone as,a
result of the new policy. Chu
Te was the senior member of the
top leadership present in Pei-
ping; other leaders observed the
decentralization theme with Mao
in Tientsin, Liu Shao-chi in
Chengtu, Chou En-lai in Kweiyang,
and Chen Yi in Kunming. Peiping
declared a one-day cease-fire
for the Chinmens on 1 May in
order to enable "compatriots"
to celebrate the occasion.
North Korea and North Viet-
nam celebrated May Day in the
customary fashion with huge
demonstrations, parades, and
speeches in the capitals.
STATE FARM MOVEMENT
Collective farms in the
USSR, primarily those near ma-
jor urban centers and on margi-
nal land, are rapidly being con-
verted to state farms. Partic-
ipants at.an academic meeting
on agriculture in March com-
mented that all but about 200
collective farms in Moscow Ob-
last would become state farms
by the end of the year. There
Emu 0
.
j
._._
11211R4010 91,2 76,500
have been several Soviet press
accounts in the past month of
conversions of collectives to
state farms, notably in the New
Lands area and the Soviet Far
East.
The immediate motivation
is apparently economic. The
changes taking place around ma-
jor cities comply with decrees
issued late in 1958 calling for
IN THE SOVIET UNION
the creation of specialized
truck farms near major urban
centers. The regime apparently
hopes that the specialization
resulting from such change-overs
will reduce production costs,
improve supplies in state re-
tail outlets, and erode the com-
petitive position of the collec-
tive farm free market; conver-
sion may also alleviate local
shortages in agricul-
tural labor.
Many collective
farmers living near
urban centers reside
at the farm but work
in industry in the
city. The change to
state farms could help stabilize
labor and make it possible to
create more rapidly conditions
comparable to those in industry.
By conversions on marginal
land, the state can take a more
direct hand in solving the prob-
lems of the economically back-
ward collectives.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY !SUMMARY
5 ;Maya i19.60_
The state -farm system has
generally been favored by the
regime as a more efficient form
of agricultural organization
which allows tighter state con-
trol. The form is also more
consistent with the eventual
goal of making both living con-
USSR: DISTRIBUTION OF SOWN ACREAGE
II*PRIVATE PLOTS OSTATE FARMS COLLECTIVE FARMS
375.7
ditions and wage systems of the
urban and rural worker similar.
The changes, however, apparent-
ly do not portend the elimina-
tion of the collective system.
Soviet leaders have indicated
that for the present the col-
lective system is to continue
along with the state-farm sys-
tem. A principal reason for
the state's present position is
unwillingness to guarantee a
normal wage to all agricultural
workers--an obligation that
could be a major burden in a
poor crop year.
Conversion will not be re-
ceived favorably by all collec-
tive farmers. In marginal agri-
cultural areas, where the col-
lective farmer's income is very
small, the security offered by
the state farm might be welcome;
on the other hand, the change-
over means that collective farm
capital, nominally owned by the
farmers themselves, is trans-
ferred to the state and the
farmers become state employees
with fixed wages. Furthermore,
the regime is discouraging
state workers from owning cattle
and cultivating private plots--
valuable sources of revenue for
the farm workers. Collective
farmers in the more prosperous
areas will resent any tampering
with their favored situation.
The extent of recent changes
is indicated by an official So-
viet year-end report which dis-
closed that 500 state farms were
created during 1959, as compared
with fewer.. than: ,100 in 1958.
In January 1959 there were 850
collectives in Moscow Oblast.
During the past decade the num-
ber of collective farms has de-
creased from over 250,000 to
55,000 at the end of 1959--
mostly through amalgamations
but partly through conversion
to state farms. The number of
state farms has increased each
year since 1953, although at
an uneven rate, and now totals
approximately 6,500.
On an average throughout
the USSR, a state farm has from
four to five times more sown
acreage than a collective farm;
the over-all share of state
farms in the sown acreage has
increased from about one tenth
in 1953 to more than one fourth
in 1958, and the amount of pro-
duce sold by state farms to the
state has also increased sharply
in recent years. 25X1
(Prepared by ORR)
Articles in Yugoslav jour- I bates between liberal intellec-
nals over the last nine months
indicate more ferment among
party intellectuals than at
any time since the Djilas af-
fair in 1954. Although de -
tuals and some conservative re-
gime ideologists on such ques-
tions as the function of the
state, the meaning of real and
formal democracy,and the class
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.5 May 1960
structure of modern society
are conducted in Marxist termi-
nology, the basic issue is
how far Yugoslavia can evolve
toward Western concepts in
its political program.
The regime's leading
ideologist, Edvard Kardelj,
in late February attempted
to minimize the conflict, but
Milhailo Markovic, a professor
at the University of Belgrade,
assured an American diplomat
that the debate will go on
"in one form or another.,,
In addition to Markovic,
more outspoken members of the
liberal group include offi-
cials in the International In-
stitute for Politics and Eco-
nomics and a number of writers
and intellectuals, including
Gavro Altman, an editor of the
party's monthly, Komunist. The
debate has been carried on
primarily in two journals,
Nasa Stvarnost, a nonparty in-
eI'aec ua monthly, and Komu-
nist.
Typical of the liberal,
and in fact non-Marxist, po-
sitions which have appeared
in these journals is Markovic's
contention that, since the West
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has progressed in the social
science and philosophy fields
as well as in technology,Marx-
ists must accept those parts
of Western thought which rep-
resent a real contribution.
A tactic commonly followed
by the liberals is to criticize
those Soviet ideological posi-
tions which are also held by
conservative Yugoslav ideol-
ogists. Najdan Pasic, editor
of Nasa Stvarnost,for example,
ha d denie the Soviet theory
that the sole role of the West-
ern state is to oppress the work-
ing class. Rather, he argues,
every state is performing a
series of functions which are
indispensable to the society
as a whole.
The primary spokesman for
the more doctrinally conserva-
tive elements has been Boris
Ziherl, central committee mem-
ber and leading regime educator.
He accuses the liberals of for-
getting Lenin's view that a
Communist state must be better
in every respect. Claiming
that the liberals learned their
Marxism "from the works of
Marx's bourgeois critics," he
also condemns the liberals for
being so pro-Western that they
are incapable of separating
Marxism from Stalinism.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
In his attempt to resolve
the debate, Kardelj assumed a
middle position, but one which
seemed somewhat to favor the
liberals. Milentije Popovic,
another important party lead-
er, followed Kardelj's lead.
In essence, they are appealing
for continued free development
of "science and scientific
thought," with the qualifica-
tion that it must not degener-
ate into "futile speculations
and verbalisms." Although
Kardelj did not advocate an
end to the debate, Komunist
apparently felt a cog-o-dff
period was called for and has
ceased allotting space to it.
The existence of these
rumblings among the intellec-
tuals has important implications
for Yugoslavia's future orienta-
tion, since the dissidents are
by and large from the new genera-
tion of party ideologists. More-
over, they are sympathetic to
Djilas--who advocated a modified
type of Western political democ-
racy for Yugoslavia--although
they believe his tactics were
wrong. Apparently the regime,
which over the years has bor-
rowed heavily from Western prac-
tices in developing its economic
program, is having difficulty 25X1
limiting the influence of West-
litical program.
ern thought on its evolving po-
In the week ending 26
April, 4,911 East German refu-
gees--farmers, small business-
men, and youths--registered in
West Berlin, bringing to 7,675
the number of escapees for the
two-week period beginning on
15 April. A new element among
the refugees is the large number
of youths evading the regime's
drive to place them on collec-
tive farms. Some 5,435 refugees
reached West Berlin in the com-
parable two-week period last
year, almost one third less, al-
though the regime's security
precautions were then less
drastic. Some 15,500 refugees
fled to West Berlin in April,
compared with only 8,612 in
March and 9,162 in April 1959.
This is the highest monthly
total since the mass flights
of professional workers in Au-
gust.1958.
6,000
5600
5200
4800
4400
4000
3600
3200
2800
2400
2000
1600
1200
800
400
30 DEC-5 JAN 13-19JAN 27 JAN-2 FEB 10-16 FEB 24 FEB-1 MAR 9 MAR 23-29 MAR 6-12 APR 20-26APR
6-12 JAN 20-26JAN 3-9 FEB 17-23 FEB 2- B MAR 16-22 MAR 30 MAR-5APR 13.19 APR
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
The high refugee flow is
particularly embarrassing to
the Communists on the eve of
the summit, but the Ulbricht
regime probably considers that
the drastic measures which
would be necessary to close
the Berlin escape routes would
be even more embarrassing. The
regime has clamped severe
controls on the East-West Ger-
man border, however; only 1,-
681 East Germans eluded the
border police in April, bring-
ing the total refugees figure
for the month to 17,183.
The flight of experienced
farmers--said by West German
officials to constitute about
16 percent of the April totals
--will add greatly to the re-
gime's difficulties arising
from the speed and extent of
its collectivization campaign.
handles agricultural matters,
has reportedly demanded that
farm production for 1960 reach
that of 1959--a poor year--
despite the disorganization
in newly formed collectives.
He has threatened to purge of-
ficials who do not meet or
surpass this goal, and a shake- 25X1
up is imminent in one district.
East German ambas- 25X1
sadors to bloc countries have
been ordered to exert pressure
on these governments to provide
East Germany with farm machin-
ery. This presumably would
be in accordance with a 1958
directive of the bloc's Coun-
cil for Mutual Economic As-
sistance, which ordered support
for East Germany's drive to over-
take the West German standard
of living.
regime fears that many remain-
ing farmers joined collectives
merely to gain time until they
can collect enough money to
flee.
Officials view with con-
cern the low morale of remain-
ing farmers, as well as the
serious shortage of adequate
farm machinery, the lack of
properly trained administra-
tors and organizers, and the
serious shortages of farm
buildings to shelter livestock
on collectives. Officials re-
portedly believe that, as a re-
sult of these shortages, it
will be five years before the
regime achieves its goal of
raising all livestock on large
collective farms and two or
three years before the newly
collectivized farmers are
organized into large-scale en-
terprises.
SED central committee sec-
retary Gerhard Grueneberg, who
The regime also is worried
about the relatively large sums
farmers have taken with them to
the West, despite action to
block the savings accounts of
suspected defectors. The flow
of currency to West Berlin
forced the quotation on the East
mark down from 3.93 in com-
parison with the West German
mark in mid-March to 4.71 on
20 April; it probably now is
down even further.
The regime is seeking to
pin the onus for the flights
on the Evangelical Church. The
move is designed to counteract
the effects of the sharp public
criticism by leading East Ger-
man churchmen of the coercive
methods used in the collectivi-
zation campaign. Party boss 25X1
Ulbricht has sought to explain
away the criticism by charg-
ing that it comes from a small
number of "West German mil-
itarist clergy."
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5 May 1960
MOSCOW SHIFTS TACTICS TOWARD EMIGRES
A notable shift in Soviet
tactics in the treatment of
emigres has taken place this
year. Current propaganda no
longer urges repatriation, but
rather aims at promoting a
feeling of patriotism, admira-
tion for Soviet accomplish-
ments, and a strengthening of
spiritual and cultural ties
with the homeland.
A vigorous redefection
campaign was 'launched in 1954
to bring as many emigres as pos-
sible back under Soviet con-
trol and to demoralize the rest.
In early 1955 a Committee for
Return to the Homeland was
formed in East Berlin to handle
the drive, and a political am-
nesty was issued within the So-
viet Union. The campaign had
only limited success; fewer
than 10,000 returned, includ-
&ing many social misfits and
persons who had never lived in
the Soviet Union. The amnesty,
furthermore, did not prove an
effective safeguard for return-
ees. Emigre".circles have~l6arned
that some of those who returned
to the USSR were sent to prison
for earlier transgressions, or
were not allowed to settle in
their native areas.
The committee probably
feels that most defectors like-
ly to return have done so by
now, and that it is time to
concentrate on the "compatriots"
who have settled abroad. In
line with the recent shift in
tactics, the name of the com-
mittee's newspaper has been
changed from For Return to the
Homeland to The Voice of the
Homeland. Clubs are being or-
ganized in foreign countries
to serve as local chapters of
the "Union of Soviet Patriots."
The committee has increased
its mailing of cultural and
educational literature and has
stepped up its broadcasts.
Emigres are urged to prop-
agandize Soviet achievements
and establish closer contacts
with friends and relatives liv-
ing in the homeland. Soviet
emigres are being offered the
opportunity to visit friends
and relatives in the USSR with
the guarantee that they will
be permitted to return to their
adopted countries. In the past,
many emigres have feared to
visit the Soviet Union, as some
earlier visitors had not been
allowed to leave.
Judging from its present
propaganda line, the committee
apparently feels that ris-
ing Soviet prestige and lessen-
ing tensions may bring at least
some waverers back into the
fold. in a letter to an emigre
in West Germany, the committee
says: "Today we are not call-
ing you to the homeland, be-
cause we do not know what rea-
sons have been holding you away
for so many years. But we also
do not admit the thought that
after all these years you have
become hopelessly callous and
that our appeal to think once
more about your ties to the
homeland will not find a re-
sponse in your heart."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
SOVIET-PAKISTANI RELATIONS
The USSR, as part of its
extensive effort to exploit
contacts between Khrushchev
and free world leaders, has
sounded out the Ayub government
in Pakistan on several recent
occasions to determine whether
such visits have produced any
change in Pakistan's cool atti-
tude toward bloc countries,
Since Moscow continues to sup-
port Afghanistan and to censure
Pakistan for participating in
Western military alliances, So-
viet diplomatic feelers seem
designed primarily to arouse
fears among Pakistan's allies
of a revision of Rawalpindi's
strongly anti-Communist poli-
cies.
Soviet diplomats, in deal-
ing with Pakistani officials,
have exuded confidence that
Pakistan eventually will take
steps toward improving rela-
Following the SEATO meet-
ing in Lahore last February,
the USSR made several provoca-
tive moves against Paki
start, The joint communique is-
sued during Khrushchev's visit
to Kabul in March endorsed the
Afghan position in the dis-
pute with Pakistan over Push-
toonistan--the first explicit
Soviet statement on the issue.
In a speech on his return to
Moscow, Khrushchev declared,
"Our sympathies on the ques-
tion are on the side of Afghan-
istan.
Arriving in Pakistana few
days later, Ambassador $apitsa
told the press that the USSR
did not recognize the Durand
line--the present boundary be-
tween Afghanistan and Paki-
stan--and he called Pakistan's
proposal for a plebiscite
among Pushtoons a joke. When
reprimanded by Qadir, Kapitsa 25X1
,became extremely arrogant and
sarcaptidally:: thanked him for
his "lecture."
As part of the bloc cam-
paign to exploit the Khrushchev-
Menderes exchange, Moscow is
planting hints that a similar
meeting is being worked out
with Pakistan.
discussions are
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5 May 1960
being held concerning a KhrU-
shchev-Ayub meeting.
Pakistani officials are
con-
cerned that their government's
pro-Western posture may be un-
suited to the East-West "thaw,"
but they plan to make no deci-
sion as to a revision until af-
ter the Commonwealth conference,
which opened in London on 3 May.
Pakistan is unlikely to make
any major changes in its for-
eign policy, and recent hostile
Soviet Statements make diffi-
cult even pro forma changes by
the Ayub government to bring
Pakistan more in line with the
current East-West detente.
ADDITIONAL PAKISTANI CABINET CHANGES
Pakistani President Ayub
apparently intends to relieve
ambitious Lieutenant General
Sheikh of his duties as minister
of interior within a few weeks
and appoint him permanently to
the less powerful Food
and Agriculture post, which he
assumed on an apparently tempo-
rary basis on 20 April. Lieutenant
General Azam Khan,generally re-
garded as Ayub's right-hand man,
vacated the top post in the Min-
istry of Food when Ayub appoint-
ed him governor of East Pakistan
on 11 April. In addition,Akhtar
Hussain and Zakir Hussain, who
were recently replaced as gov-
ernors of West and East Pakistan
respectively,have been named to
the cabinet and are to be as-
signed posts soon.
Ayub has sought to main-
tain the appearance of govern-
mental stability. These are
the first changes in cabinet
membership since the army take -
over of October 1958, although
several shifts in cabinet as-
signments were made last Jan-
uary. The new assignments
for Sheikh and Azam reflect
the continuing high priority
being given to increasing food
production and to economic
development in East Pakistan,
but it is not clear why Ayub
now has decided to accept the
disadvantages of a second
reshuffle.
Ayub's action has stimu-
lated extensive rumors and
speculation concerning rival-
ries and the balance of
power within the govern-
ment. The crash program to
increase food production is
almost certain to suffer as
a result of Azam's trans-
fer, since this has obliged
Ayub to appoint his third
food minister in three months,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Sheikh has already indicated
he does not share Azam's eager-
ness to push the program. Ghulam
Faruque, chairman of Pakistan's
Water and Power Development Au-
thority and one of the country's
most capable administrators,
believes that Azam, although
highly capable, is likely to
offend East Pakistani sensi-
tivities in his drive for great-
er efficiency and harder work.
The simultaneous reduction
of the influence of Sheikh and
Azam, who have been Ayub's two
strongest lieutenants in the
cabinet, suggests that Ayub is
at least partly interested in
and political center of power.
consolidating his paramount
position in the government.
Sheikh says he protested against
his intended transfer. He has
frequently been mentioned in
rumors circulated by opponents
of the regime as ambitious to
increase his own power, and he
may feel keenly the loss of the
powerful Ministry of Interior,
which controls the police.
Azam reportedly tried to de-
cline the governorship, prob-
ably partly because he had
just taken hold of the food
problem and partly because his
departure from Rawalpindi re-
moves him from both the military
Premier Nu's first month
back in office has been marked
by a smooth transition from mil-
itary to civilian rule and a
rapid reversion to the pre-1958
practices of Burmese government.
In keeping with General Ne Win's
decision to avoid responsibility
for the programs of the new
government, all but,five of the
75 military administrators of
the interim regime have returned
to military assignments. There
has been no protest from the
army, although many of its re-
form programs have been can-
celed-or suspended. It appears
that U Nu is attempting to
eliminate,as fare as is expe-
dient, all reminders of the pre-
vious regime.
Immediately on taking of-
fice on 5 April, U Nu announced
abrupt changes in government
programs. For his Buddhist sup-
porters, he reimposed a ban,
lifted by General Ne Win in
1959, on the sale and slaughter
of beef, and he appointed a com-
mission to advise on adoption
of Buddhism as a state religion.
For urban voters, he suspended
the army's squatter resettle-
ment program and, to meet stu-
dent demands, announced plans
to re-establish tuition-free
middle schools. For his own
political followers, his gov-
ernment is reviewing the cases
of government officials--main-
ly political appointees from
his previous regime--sacked by
the army for incompetence.
Despite the 18-month inter-
lude of army rule, U Nu's views
on party affairs are remarkably
unchanged from the past. U Nu
is the idealistic advocate of
unity, democracy, and magnanimity.
However, he allows his lieuten-
ants to carry out a vindictive
campaign against the opposition
Stable Anti-Fascist People's
Freedom League (AFPFL) As Nu
publicly calls for the devel-
opment of an effective two-party
system, his subordinates are
preparing cases for the legal
ouster of 11 opposition members
from Parliament. Within the
governing Union party, he has
reappointed as secretary general
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Kyaw Dun, who is under indict-
ment for a political kidnaping.
Meanwhile, infighting of the
type which split the AFPFL has
erupted between the party's
"educated" and "peasant" fac-
tions.
. Despite the prospective
decline in government integrity
ficient provocation.
and efficiency resulting from
the return of party government,
at least some of the reforms
instituted by Ne Win are likely
to be continued. Furthermore,
despite Nu's overwhelming na-
tionwide popularity, the army,
united by Ne Win, intends to
keep a check on government pot- 25X1
ides. It will intervene openly
if the government provides suf -
The Indonesian Army is
encouraging the anti-Communist
Democratic League and the
league's anti-Sukarno press
campaign, with the immediate
objective of preventing the
installation of President Su-
karno's appointed parliament.
Despite continuing rumors of a
coup, the army leadership ap-
pears at this time to be in-
terested mainly in the parlia-
mentary objective and in pre-
venting the inclusion of Com-
munists in a reorganized cabi-
net.
Army support and instiga-
tion of. league activities, al-
though covert, are no longer
secret. Should army and league
pressures prove insufficient
to force Sukarno's political
retreat, the army may find its
political role further reduced
by him, and Army Chief of Staff
General Nasution may even be
.dismissed.
League criticism of the
261-member parliament, which
was appointed by President Su-
karno in late March to replace
the body he dissolved earlier
the same month, has apparently
created sufficient confusion
to prompt Acting President
Djuanda to advise Sukarno, now
midway on a world tour, to re-
consider:his plan to install the
parliament in June.
the President remains determined
to install and maintain the new
parliament until elections are
held in 1962.
Sukarno reportedly sent
back orders that "no princi-
pal measure" be taken before his
return and that the newspapers
which were criticizing his pol-
icies be banned. The dailies
have not been banned, and they
continue to print antiparlia-
mentary articles, but General
Nasution has ordered them to
stop criticizing Sukarno.
League and army strategy
appears directed toward persuad-
ing appointed members of parlia-
ment not to accept their seats
in the new body. The principal
target is the Nahdatul Ulama
(NU), Indonesia's second largest
Moslem party, which accounts
for 14 percent of the parliamen-
tary membership. Should all NU
appointees join representatives
of the Democratic League, the
army, and the navy in refusing
their seats, their combined num-
bers would account for only 32
percent of parliament. The re-
mainder are chiefly air force
and police representatives and
adherents of the National and
Communist parties.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUGARY
5 May 1960
A new element, however,
which is likely to benefit Su-
karno and dissipate much of the
criticism directed toward him
is a Dutch plan to reinforce
troops in Netherlands New Guinea
and send naval units on a six-
month flag-showing cruise to
Far Eastern waters from early
June to mid-December. Indonesian
officials have already reacted
vehemently to Dutch plans, and
President Sukarno could easily
exploit them to drum up a propa- 25X1
ganda drive for the "liberation"
of "West Irian" which could unite
all Indonesian factions.
Political activity in the
Congo, centered about the legis-
lative elections scheduled for
11 to 25 May, has been marked
by the Communists' efforts to
increase their influence in the
Belgian colony. Although no
single party is expected to con-
trol the legislature, the Nation-
al Congo Movement faction led
by Patrice Lumumba--one of
several groups enjoying Commu-
nist financial support--is ex-
pected to make a strong showing.
The imminence of African rule
has increased restiveness among
Europeans in mineral-rich Katanga
Province, and outbound aircraft
are heavily booked.
Belgian Communist efforts
to establish a foothold in the
Congo have emphasized the culti-
vation of leading African poli-
ticians through financial aid,
together with promises of bloc
economic aid for the Congo after
independence on 30 June. Belgian
Communist leaders reportedly be-
lieve that Congolese anticipa-
tion of rapid economic advance
following independence will lead
to a disillusionment susceptible
to Communist exploitation. The
bloc will probably offer some
technical and economic aid after
independence, and it might offer
large-scale economic support if
pro-Communist elements become
influential in the new govern-
ment.
SECRET
Meanwhile, delegates to the
economic round-table conference
in Brussels are studying Belgian
proposals for continuing economic
links with the Congo after inde-
pendence, Communist efforts to
disrupt the conference appear
to have had little effect, A
number of delegates remain con-
cerned about the Congo's finan-
cial plight, however, and are
dissatisfied with. steps taken
by Brussels to bolster its
economy.
Despite periodic reassur-
ances from Congolese spokesmen,
an increasing number of Euro-
peans appear to be planning to
leave the Congo prior to inde-
pendence. Renewed tribal war-
fare in the Congo interior has
been viewed as an ominous por-
tent by Europeans already de-
pressed by the prospect of Afri-
can rule. The imposition of
currency controls to slow the
flow of European.capital from
the Congo has further shaken
the morale of Europeans.
The 3 May disorders in
the Congo interior at Stanley-
ville--in which European cars
were stoned--are the first major
anti-European outbreak during
the election period. The prospect
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
of further outbreaks will add
to the problems of Belgian se-
curity forces already hard
pressed to keep the peace be-
tween warring tribes in Kasai
Province.
Organized opposition to
the prospect of Congolese in-
dependence is centered in
southernmost Katanga Province,
where many Africans as well as
the large European contingent
are distrustful of any Congo-
lese central government:.. Moise
Tshombe, leader of one of the
province's two major political
groups, has said he intends to
proclaim Katanga An independent
state on 30 June unless the
other five provinces agree to
his plan for a federal union
in whibh each province would
be fully self-governing except
for whatever powers it might
voluntarily delegate to a cen-
tral authority.
NATIONALIST AGITATION OVER PORTUGUESE AFRICA
With independence attained
or imminent in most African
countries, nationalists are
directing their attention in-
creasingly toward Portugal's
African possessions. Nation-
alist groups. exiled from Portu-
guese territory have recently
shown new vigor; they apparent-
ly have acquired the support of
prominent African leaders as
well as aid from the Communist
bloc.
The principal vehicle for
Communist activity against
Portuguese Africa is the Con-
akry-based Revolutionary Front
for the Independence of the
Portuguese Colonies (FRAIN)
The first
goal of FRAIN's leaders, most
of whom have long records of
Communist affiliation, report-
edly is the "liberation by vio-
lent means" of Portuguese Guin-
ea, a propaganda target of the
Guinean Government as well.
FRAIN has also conducted a
propaganda campaign against the
present conspiracy trials in
Angola.
FRAIN's operations apparent-
ly are supervised by Guinean Min-
ister of Public Works Ismael
Toure
A second group, the
L' eration Movement of Terri-
tories Under Portuguese Domina-
tion, also claims to have Guin-
ean support.
Another center of exile
activity is the Belgian Congo,
which has a tradition of rela-
tively easy native passage over
its long common border with Por-
tuguese-held Angola. The Alli-
ance of the Bakongo (Abako), a
Congolese tribal group which domi-
nates western Leopoldville Prov-
ince, reportedly has been attempt-
ing to extend its influence to
related tribes in Angola and
the enclave of Cabinda. Congo-
lese interest in the Portuguese
territories is also revealed in
the recent private statement of
Patrice Lumumba, a member of
the Congo's governing council,
that the situation in Portuguese
Africa is the most pressing
African problem.
The anti-Communist Union
of the Peoples of Angola (UPA)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May
~AMBI~ FEDERATION
PORT. GUINEA
PORTUGUESE AFRICA 11
has become the spokesman for
Angolan exiles in the Congo
The UPA
has been represented at several
African political conferences.
One of its leaders, Jose Gilmore,
is a member of the steering com-
mittee of the All-African Peo-
ples' Conference (AAPC)., although
FRAIN has recently deprived
him of some of his support in
West Africa.
The Portuguese. Government,
recognizing the growing threat
to its control, has increased
the size of the security forces
in its African territories. At
present, the Africans are under
government control. Neverthe-
less, Portuguese rule will be
subjected to growing pressure
as Africans gain power in ad-
ditional areas of the continent.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Boycott of US Shipping
The boycott of American-
flag vessels in Arab ports of-
ficially went into effect at
midnight, 29 April in retalia-
tion for the picketing and boy-
cott in New York of the UAR
freighter Cleopatra since 13
April. Although the immediate
practical effect on American
trade in the Middle East has
been slight, the boycott is
picking up momentum. The Arabs
believe the action against the
Cleopatra is part of a "Zionist
conspiracy" to obtain passage
for Israeli ships through the
Suez Canal, and this has given
the dispute a highly emotional
character which, for most Arabs
Rome'
I TA L Y
GREECE
t Bengasi
#',Athens''
Only a few ships have ac-
tually been refused service
thus far--at Port Said, Suez,
Latakia, Baniyas, Aden, and
Tripoli in Libya--but a con-
siderable number of vessels
have been diverted to non-Arab
ports to avoid incidents. The
UAR Government has rerouted at
least six ships with American
agricultural surplus cargo to
Greece and Italy for transship-
ment to the UAR on non-US ships,
and the Lebanese; Iraqi, and
Libyan foreign ministers have
requested the diversion of
American ships from ports in
their countries. Arab merchants
Ankara *
T U R K E Y
UAR
(EGYPT)
K E IJ'II
Port Sudan
Jidda
S E A
SECRET
MIDDLE EAST
CORSICA
Tripoli
NOTES AND COMMENTS
transcends economic considera-
tions.
Caspian
Sea
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
are said to be asking their
agents in New York to send Amer-
ican goods on non-US ships.
Despite the UAR's differ-
ences with Iraq and Jordan, the
General Federation of Iraqi
Trade Unions and Jordanian dock-
workers have declared their in-
tentions of boycotting American
ships, although none are ex-
pected soon at Basra or Aqaba.
The boycott in fact has received
wide Arab support, and Ameri-
can-flag freighters probably
will not be serviced in Arab
countries,with the exception
of Tunisia and Morocco.
They have not, however,
been barred from the Suez Canal,
and,according to the under sec-
retary of the UAR Foreign Min-
istry, American-owned ships
under flags of convenience will
not be boycotted. Tankers are
included in a general ban or-
dered by the Saudi Arabian Gov-
ernment, and workers at the Iraq
Petroleum Company's facilities
in Lebanon have said they will
not load American-flag tankers.
On the other hand, on 4 May
the government of Bahrein, pre-
sumably out of consideration
for oil revenues, reversed
its'. initial decision to boy-
cott both US-flag and US-owned
tankers, and an American-flag
tanker has since been loaded.
The first two American-owned
foreign-flag tankers to visit
Sidon and Baniyas, in Syria,
were loaded on 1 and 2 May.
The secretary general of
the UAR-dominated Internation-
al Confederation of Arab Trade
Unions, which organized the
boycott, earlier told American
Embassy officials that a boy-
cott of American aircraft would
be a later step if the boycott
continues. The UAR also is
known to be considering a pos-
sible ban on American goods.
American embassies and con-
sulates have recommended that
American passengers on American
ships stopping at UAR and Leb-
anese ports not disembark be-
cause of'the possibility of in-
volvement in incidents. The
assault in New York on a UAR
seaman from the Cleopatra re-
portedly has aroused talk of
reprisals along UAR waterfronts.
Even before the-official
start of the boycott, dock-
workers in Alexandria and Ku-
wait worked American ships only
following police or government
persuasion. Lebanese longshore-
men, according to Foreign Min-
ister Uwayni, have made it
clear they will not work on
American vessels even if it
means defying Lebanese troops.
Although Arab government offi-
cials publicly support the boy-
cott, they privately have ex-
pressed deep concern over the
adverse effect a prolonged dis-
pute could have on Arab-American
relations. The US Senate's
passage of an amendment to the
foreign aid bill, empowering
the President to withhold aid
from countries (the UAR) en-
gaging in economic warfare
against other aid recipients
(Israel), has aggravated Arab
resentment.
Moscow has seized these
new opportunities to try to
convince the Arabs that the So-
viet Union is their big-power
protector against a Western-
supported Israel. In broadcasts
to Arab audiences on 3 May,
Radio Moscow declared that
Zionist influence in the United
States is behind the refusal
to unload the Cleopatra. Cen-
suring the Senate's action
amending the US foreign aid
bill, the commentator asserted
that the dispute is further
proof of Western "hatred for
the UAR," which he described
as "a long-term political trend."
Despite increased Chris-
tian-Moslem tension resulting
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
from intervention by Moslem-
directed police in a dispute
between two Christian factions
on 1 May, President Shihab has
dissolved parliament and sched-
uled parliamentary elections
beginning 12 June. The elec-
tions will be held on four suc-
cessive Sundays, permitting
movement of security forces
from district to district in
an effort to keep incidents to
a minimum.
The 1 May violence occurred
as crowds gathefed for a pontif-
ical mass planned as a gesture
of national unity and attended
by the papal nuncio, the Maro-
nite patriarch, the Lebanese
cabinet, and members of the dip-
lomatic corps. Supporters of
former President Chamoun and
the Phalange, the political ac-
tion arm of the Maronite Church
led by Minister of Workd Pierre
Jumayyil, staged rival demon-
strations. The pro-Nasir Mos-
lem chief of the emergency po-
lice, a deserter during the
1958 rebellion, threw a hand
grenade into the crowd. This
was followed by firing by the
police. Extremist Christian
elements retaliated on 2 May
by bombing the residence of
the Moslem director of Nation-
al Police. That night Chris-
tians in Beirut clashed with
troops and police.
Although President Shihab
can be expected to take strong
measures to prevent fur-
ther disorders, the incidents
are likely to unite the Chris-
tians against the Shihab re-
gime and possibly against the
patriarch, who has been re-
garded by many Christians as
being soft in defending Chris-
tian
rights.
The setting of the
voting
dates
and apprehension
in
Christian quarters that
any
new parliament would be
domi-
nated by pro-UAR elements bent
on destroying the delicate
balance between Christians and
Moslems are likely to increase
the influence of extremists
among the Christian elements.
Further incidents are prob-
able.
UAR preparations for in-
tervention in the elections
are becoming evident. There
are several reports of UAR
contacts, both in Lebanon and
Syria, with a number of aspir-
ants for Parliament.
Iraq
A reshuffle of the Qasim
cabinet on 3 May has resulted
in the dropping of Finance
Minister Muhammad Hadid, one
of the most influential and
conservative members, and the
appointment of Brig. Gen.
Ismail Arif, former military
attache in Washington, as
minister of education. The
opportunistic Arif, who was
an early Qasim supporter, re-
portedly has criticized the
Qasim regime at social af-
fairs in Baghdad attended by
Americans. He has replaced
Brig. Gen. Muhi al-Din Abd
al-Hamid, a Qasim crony, who
has been made minister of in-
dustry.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Minister of Municipal Af-
fairs Nadia al-Dulaymi, Iraq's
first woman cabinet minister
and a suspected Communist,has
been shelved and made Minister
of state. Another new face is
Minister of Municipalities
Abbas al-Baldawi, a long-time
civil servant who has been gov-
ernor of a number of provinces
under both the royal regime and
the present one. Hard-working
conservative Hashim Jawad, min-
ister of foreign affairs, is
combining Hadid's duties with
his own on a temporary basis.
The replacement of the compe-
tent Hadid is likely to delay
economic recovery, and Arif's
appointment will increase the
army's influence. Military
men now hold nine of the 21
cabinet posts.
Afro-Asian Conference
This week's Afro-Asian
Economic Conference in Cairo
appears to have marked a gain
for Nasir's kind of neutralism.
The USSR, participating as an
observer rather than a member
but backed by representatives
of Communist China and other
Asian Communist states, lost a
fight to include eight Soviet
Asian republics in the conference
membership. Membership remains
limited to countries which par-
ticipated in the 1955 Bandung
conference or to those central
governments located in Africa
or Asia.
Communist China's objection
to the establishment of an Afro-
Asian investment fund, drawn up
by the UAR and labeled an "im-
perialist trap" by the Chinese,
was overruled. The Chinese
delegation also objected with-
out effect to the election of
an Indonesian as a vice presi-
dent of the organization, and
there were loud complaints from
the North Koreans on the inclu-
sion of South Korea as a con-
ference member.
Muhammad Rushdi of the UAR
was elected president, and the
UAR apparently will continue to
lead neutralist opposition to
the Communists, as it has in
the Afro-Asian solidarity move-
ment.
BRITISH LABOR PARTY RECONSIDERING ITS NUCLEAR DEFENSE POLICY
The British public's de-
mands for unilateral British
nuclear disarmament have be-
come" markedly stronger in re-
cent weeks, and there-is grow-
ing, pressure, on -t he labor. par-
ty leaders to abandon their
support of an independent nu-
clear deterrent.
An Easter week-end march
from the nuclear- weapons re-
search center at Aldermaston
to Trafalgar Square in London
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vwoSECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
sponsored by the Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament proved
highly successful in indicat-
ing what the American Embassy
terms a "strong ground swell
of public awareness and disap-
proval of nuclear weapons as
instruments of national policy."
Since Easter, two important
trade unions and the Coopera-
tive party, an affiliate of the
Labor party, have passed reso-
lutions urging unilateral Brit-
ish nuclear disarmament. Other
influential unions will prob-
ably follow suit.
The Transport and General
Workers Union, Britain's larg-
est',; is already on record fa-
voring unilateral disarmament.
These groups have the votes to
repudiate the Labor party's
leadership at the annual fall
conference unless some marked
shift in their direction oc-
curs in the meantime.
Party leader Gaitskell,
who insisted as recently as 1
May that Britain could not dis-
arm unilaterally, has acknowl-
edged that Labor's policy
would have to be reconsidered.
One strong hint of an impending
policy change came in the re-
cent parliamentary debate on
the Blue Streak missile project,
when Labor's shadow defense
minister, George Brown, charged
that in abandoning plans for
a British delivery vehicle to
carry nuclear warheads, the
government had admitted the im-
possibility of providing an in-
dependent deterrent.
The Labor party's present
position, adopted last year to
stem left-wing pressure, calls
for Britain to abandon nuclear
arms only if efforts to form a
nonnuclear "club" of all na-
tions other than the United
States and the USSR succeed. A
possible compromise would call
for an end to production of
nuclear weapons, but retention
of those already on hand.
Public agitation and the
prospect of a Labor party
shift will add to the pressures
on the Macmillan government,
which has long shown extreme
sensitivity to public opinion
on the issue, and will heighten
London's desire for some demon-
strable progress on disarma-
ment at the summit meeting.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
A low-keyed effort to re-
sume direct progress toward the
political integration of Europe
is expected to attract increas-
ing attention in the next few
months in the European Economic
Community (EEC). Geared to im-
plementation of existing pro-
visions of the EEC and EURATOM
treaties, the project seeks the
election of the European Parlia-
mentary Assembly by direct uni-
versal suffrage. This compara-
tively modest achievement has
long been sought by integration-
SECRET
ists, who claim it would give
the average voter an important
sense of participation in the
integration project and would
automatically create a "Euro-
pean body" with real prestige
and authority.
The present 142-seat as-
sembly technically represents
the "peoples" of the member
states, but its members are
drawn from and selected by the
national parliaments. It now
is proposed to replace this
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-~-~ * POLITICAL
COMMERCIAL
CHRISTIAN AGRICULTURAL
DEMOCRATIC SOCIAL
with an assembly three times as
large, only one third of which
would be drawn from the nation-
al parliaments and the remain-
der elected in simultaneous,
community-wide elections. Al-
though certain ground rules
would be established, the elec-
MEMBERS SIT AND CAUCUS
IN SUPRA- NATIONAL
POLITICAL GROUPS
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
142 MEMBERS
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY
(COMMON MARKET, EURATOM,COAL-STEEL COMMUNITY)
THE NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS ELECT THE 142 MEMBERS OF THE ASSEMBLY
36 _~ C6__~
36
MAJOR POWERS OF THE ASSEMBLY
1. May compel the executive commission of each
by two-thirds vote of censure;
sultation with the member gov-
ernments. Electoral procedures,
for example, vary widely within
the community, and some coun-
tries are teluctant to adopt
new ones even for limited pur-
poses. A freely elected .Euro-
pean assembly would almost
INVESTMENT
OVERSEAS AREAS
TRANSPORT
ENERGY
SCIENTIFIC
WELFARE
ADMINISTRATION
LEGAL
2. Reviews and debates annual reports of the three communities;
3. May request reports from the executive commissions and question
their members;
4. May pass resolutions and make recommendations
community institutions;
5. Must be consulted on a large number
EURATOM policies;
6, Must give its consent to amendments
treaty under certain procedures;
7. May recommend changes in the
certainly have Commu-
nist members. No way
has been found, more-
over, to provide par-
liamentary represen-
tation for the asso-
ciated overseas ter-
ritories.
The Dehousse plan
still faces major ob-
tacles. Approved
last March by the po-
litical committee of
the assembly, it may
get plenary endorse-
ment as early as the
session opening on 10
May, but will still
need unanimous approv-
al by the ministerial
council and ratifica-
tion by the six na-
tional parliaments.
Much will depend on
whether the European
federalists will be
content with a small
toral laws of the member states
would apply during a transition-
al period, and the first direct-
ly elected assembly would it-
self draft a community electoral
law.
This plan is largely the
work of a Belgian Socialist,.
Fernand Dehousse, and its cau-
tious tone reflects the prob-
lems he and his committee have
uncovered in 18 months of con-
success. Some among them have
hoped to link the direct elec-
tions proposal with an expan-
sion of the assembly's powers--
a move which would almost cer-
tainly doom the entire project
Despite the widespread support
the Common Market enjoys, few
if any of its member countries
are prepared at this time to
set up a European constituent
assembly.
US BASE IN TRINIDAD FACES HARASSMENT
Trinidad's termination on
30 April of the free use by
US military planes of the
island's only operational air-
port, at Piarco,may presage
other moves which would limit
effective US use of the Chagua-
ramas naval base and missile-
tracking station. Trinidad
has claimed it lost thousands
of dollars in uncollected air-
port charges and extra main-
tenance costs necessitated by
heavy US use of the airfield.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
^\ PUERTO
Rlco
Ai~TIINI~fCAt, . viEUDN
PUBLIC 15LANDs
ChoguarargcGSx.~ fl
Nave X639_.4..
Smubles day +~r` , Port- f--Spain
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sattrva
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CARLSEN AUX.
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TRINIDAD
..Sen Fernando
c . Pri.- Town
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
In line with his frequently
indicated anti-US prejudices,
Premier Williams nevertheless.
refused last summer to discuss
the US offer to pay fees, being
determined to reserve the issue
for bilateral or quadripartite
talks with the US, the UK, and
the government of the West
Indies Federation on the over-
all problem of revision of
the'1941 US-UK base agreement.
Williams' success in elim-
inating a practice arranged
under a ten-year-old US-UK un-
derstanding may encourage him
to press his campaign even more
actively for revision of the
1941 agreement. The British
Colonial Office now is seeking
a formula which would circumvent
his threat that, unless Trini-
dad participates as an equal
delegate in the base-revision
talks, he will repudiate any
agreement.
Williams seeks a promise
that Chaguaramas will be evac-
uated by 1967 at the earliest;
he offers in return another.
site which the US previously
rejected. In the meantime,
he seeks "joint use" of the
base and release of unused
areas. He continues to demand
that the United States give up
Tucker Valley, in the heart of
SECRET.
the Chaguaramas base area, which
he wants as the site of the
federal capital. He asserts that
the 1941 agreement will lapse
in any case when independence
is achieved.
Williams has already begun
preparations for harassment of
the base's operations. He plans
to construct a marine police
launch station at Staubles Bay,
an enclave of British-owned
land within the Chaguaramas
site, and has hinted he might
cut off the base's electricity.
He could also foment labor
troubles among the approximately
500 local employees of the base.
Trinidad Government officials
have indicated they may set up
customs posts outside the base,
following up Williamt.' charges
that extensive smuggling is
carried on.
Williams appears to be
planning to follow up his suc-
cess in arousing alarm over
radiation hazards last summer
by preparing charges that nu-
clear submarines are using the
base and constitute a radiation
danger. While the public does
not echo Williams' vehement
anti-Americanism, his control
over the electorate apparently
remains firm.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
PARAGUAYAN EXILES
The Stroessner regime in
Paraguay, increasingly in the
spotlight as the last dictator-
ship in South America, has en-
countered another exile inva
sion attempt. The Argentina-
based effort, which began on
29 April, now appears to have
faltered,but on 3 May a new
small-scale thrust occurred in
the northeast along the Brazil-
ian border. The armed forces,
loyal to the Stroessner regime,
are said to be confident they
can control the situation even
though isolated skirmishes are
still being reported.
The invasions apparently
are a major effort by the small
leftist 14th of May movement,
which led a similar invasion in
December. Some observers be-
lieve the Communist-oriented
National Liberation Front was
also involved. Apparently the
moderate exile groups did not
take part, despite an agreement
in January with leaders of the
14th of May movement. Exiled
SECRET
4,oft Incursions by Pn{uryen Exiles
17. 2r_
LAUNCH NEW INVASION
members of the ruling Colorado
party have remained aloof from
these opposition groups. While
seeking Stroessner's downfall,
they want their party to retain
STROESSNER
contr61 of government' and
have attempted to gain support
within the military for a palace
coup.
President Stroessner's
periodic attempts during the
past two years to liberalize
the political atmosphere have
aroused opposition within his
own Colorado party and have
been received coldly by opposi-
tion leaders, who see reform as
a threat to their plans for
revolt. The December invasion,
despite its quick suppression,
rattled Stroessner supporters
and encouraged opposition exiles,
partly because the rebels
dramatized their efforts through
the use of clandestine radio
transmitters and through arrange-
ments with Cuba's Prensa Latina
news agency, which sent a rep-
resontative to travel with the
insurgents.
Economic difficulties
have contributed to Stroessner's
problems in recent months.
Recent strengthening factors
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BURY
5 May 1960
have included a cordial offi-
cial visit from Brazil's for-
eign minister and an indi-
cation that Argentina now may
be prepared to crack down more
strongly on exile movements
in the border area.
The two-month-old Italian
cabinet crisis has been for-
mally brought to a close by a
governmental formula which is
almost identical to that which
precipitated the crisis. On
24 February the government of
Antonio Segni resigned when
the conservative Liberal party
withdrew its support from
Segni and thereby put the all-
Christian Democratic govern-
ment'in the position of de-
pending for its majority on
the votes of the Monarchists
COMMUNITY MOVEMENT 1-
DEMOCR0p176USOCIALISTS 17
(PS
INDEPENDENT LEFT 1
Christian Democrats of having
immediately to pay the price
at the polls of tacit parlia-
mentary alliance with the neo-
Fascists.
Circumstances at the out-
set of the crisis appeared more
favorable than at any previous
time for a center-left govern-
ment, but conservative forces
were able to block two such at-
tempts. There will, however,
be further skirmishing, if not
a major showdown during the
ITALIAN
PARLIAMENT
and neo-Fascists--a situation
deemed by the Christian Demo-
crats too costly in popular
votes.
Now the Tambroni govern-
ment, with the approval of the
Christian Democratic directo-
rate,has come to power with
the neo-Fascists as itj only
other party support in the
Chamber of Deputies. This sit-
uation was made possible, in
part, by the postponement dur-
ing the course of the crisis of
scheduled local elections, thus
removing the risk for the
next few months over
the issue of the par-
ty's over-all orien-
tation.
The party deci- 25X1
sion on 28 April to
approve the Tambroni
government carried
with it the stipula-
tion that a meeting
of the national coun-
cil, the party's
highest policy-mak-
ing body, would be
held in three weeks,
and the advocates of center-
leftism can be expected to re-
new their campaign to achieve a
formal revision of the party line.
President Gronchi, his
long-standing enthusiasm for an
"opening to the left" presumably
sharpened by recent conciliatory
pronouncements from Socialist
party leader Pietro Nenni, may
press Tambroni to introduce
gradually a legislative program
slanted to the left, thus main-
taining pressure among the
Christian Democrats fora clear-
cut political line.
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SLCRL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 9U1II1iARY
5 May 1960
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KHRUSHCHEV AT THE SUMMIT
Khrushchev probably views
the summit meeting, which opens
in Paris on 16 May, not as a decisive
confrontation with the West
but as a new and important
stage in a protracted period
of high-level negotiations.
This outlook probably precludes
any move to force a showdown at
the summit itself or immediate-
ly after, prior to President
Eisenhower's visit to the USSR
in June. The Soviet leader
summed up this approach during
his trip to France by express
ing "hope that the meeting will
usher in a series of important
negotiations between the lead-
ers of the great powers, with
the object of putting an and to
the cold-war policy."
Moscow's general policy
line during the pre-summit pe-
riod has reflected the more con-
ciliatory posture adopted by
Khrushchev during his visit to
the United States. Moscow has
endeavored to appear responsive
to Western views on the timing
of a summit meeting with no
fixed agenda. Except for ad-
justments in its position on a
nuclear test ban treaty, how-
ever, the Soviet Government's
efforts to create a favorable
pre-summit atmosphere have not
gone so far as to presage So-
viet concessions on major East-
West issues.
Germany and Berlin
Despite Khrushchev's fre-
quent statements assigning top
priority to disarmament and his
intention to negotiate outstand-
ing issues of a nuclear test ban
treaty, he probably regards the
German and Berlin questions as
the focal point of the summit.
Over the past few months, Mos-
cow has increasingly invoked
the threat of a separate East
German peace treaty to soften
Western resistance to a peace
treaty with both German states
converting West Berlin into a
free city. Moscow probably
realizes that, on these issues,
a change in the status quo would
be of little advantage to the
West, and believes that negotia-
tions are unlikely to be fruit-
ful for the USSR unless conducted
under the threat of unilateral
Soviet action.
At the same time, Moscow
does not wish to detract from
the general policy of detente
or appear to be repudiating the
Camp David agreement not to im-
pose a time limit on negotia-
tions. Thus, the threat to sign
a separate treaty has been am-
biguously formulated and calcu-
lated to create uncertainty as
to the timing and circumstances
of such action.
Against this background,
Khrushchev's initial move at the
summit on these issues probably
will be to reintroduce his max-
imum demands for a peace treaty
signed by both German govern-
ments and the establishment of
a free city in West Berlin. Mod-
ifications of this position, as
indicated by authoritative East
German statements reportedly is-
sued at Moscow's direction,
would probably include an offer
to draft two separate documents
containing the same basic provi-
sions, one of which would be
signed by the Western powers
with Bonn and the other by the
bloc with East Germany.
As a part of his peace trea-
ty proposal, Khrushchev will
probably urge that the heads of
government agree on the underly-
ing principles. He will press
for the establishment of a four-
power commission to develop the
details and of an all-German
commission to present a joint
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
proposal to the four powers.
The Soviet leader may accompany
such a proposal with an offer
to hold the Berlin question in
abeyance during peace treaty
talks, but within a strictly
defined time limit. As a fur-
ther variant, Khrushchev may
propose declarations ending the
state of war, which would be
signed by the bloc and Bonn and
the Western powers and East Ger-
many, citing as a precedent the
19 October 1956 Soviet-Japanese
joint declaration.
However, Khrushchev prob-
ably does not expect at this
stage to win Western agreement
to a four-power commission to
draft a peace treaty or to an
all-German committee to discuss
an expansion of contacts and
reunification. Western agree-
ment to these proposals would
imply acceptance of the long-
standing Soviet position that
conclusion of a peace treaty is
the only task remaining for the
four powers and that reunifica-
tion is the exclusive responsi-
bility of the two German states,
Largely for the record,
Khrushchev will advance as a
separate issue the 1 June 1959
proposal to make West Berlin a
free city, garrisoned either by
token contingents of all four
powers or by neutral troops. As
an ostensible concession, Mos-
cow may drop its suggestion
that a Soviet component join
the "symbolic" Western units in
West Berlin,. and instead build
up the UN and neutral role in
guaranteeing the free city.
Finally, Khrushchev may
indicate that the free-city
status can be reached in stages,
provided the final goal is ex-
plicitly spelled out. The first
stage might not go beyond the
severance of all ties between
the Federal Republic and West
Berlin, with troop reductions
at a later date. Agreement to
a limited first stage, however,
would probably be contingent on
a clear commitment to discuss
further stages at an early date.
Interim Berlin Agreement
After the maximum Soviet
demands have been put forward
for the record, Khrushchev prob-
ably will try to move on prompt-
ly to the question of an interim
Berlin solution along the lines
discussed at the Geneva foreign
ministers' conference in 1959.
Gromyko recently hinted this in
a private talk with Ambassadors
Thompson and Bohlen, and Moscow's
sharp propaganda criticism of
alleged Western attempts to can-
cel out the "positive results"
of the foreign ministers' nego-
tiations suggests that the USSR
considers the Western proposal
for an interim solution still..
open to negotiation.
Khrushchev may introduce
certain modifications to make
the Soviet interim-solution pro-
posal more palatable to the
West. He may drop Soviet insist-
ence on formal East German par-
ticipation in such an agreement
and suggest that East Germany
could be associated by means of
separate commitments. He may
offer to extend the time limit
on an interim agreement from 18
months to two or three years,
and he may refrain from insist-
ing on linking an interim agree-
ment to the creation of an all-
German committee. He can be ex-
pected to stress that an interim
solution would not involve any
change in existing Western ac-
cess arrangements.
Khrushchev would probably
insist, in return, on a Western
commitment to reduce troops in
West Berlin, possibly in phases.
On the basic question of the
status of Western rights at the
expiration of such an agreement,
there is no evidence that the
USSR would abandon its opposi-
tion to explicit confirmation
of these rights.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Minimum Aims
It is unlikely that Khru-
shchev expects to reach agree-
ment even on the main elements
of an interim Berlin solution
in the few days available to
the heads of government. He
probably will concentrate his
main efforts on obtaining a
general statement which Moscow
could then represent as marking
Western acceptance of the prin-
ciple that the Berlin situation
is "abnormal" and should there-
fore be modified in the direc-
tion of ending the ,occupation
regime" in West Berlin.
Khrushchev may even be
satisfied with an agreement to
resume high-level negotiations
on Berlin with terms of refer-
ence which the USSR could in-
terpret as a step toward an
eventual change in West Berlin's
status. He will be particularly
vigilant to maintain intact the
provision of his Camp David
agreement with President Eisen-
hower that new negotiations on
Berlin should not be protracted
indefinitely. Therefore, he may
press for setting a specific
date for a subsequent summit
meeting, or at least for another
foreign ministers' conference.
Disarmament
Often' ' in' the past, when
the Soviet leaders have wanted
to impress world opinion with
their peaceful and constructive
purposes, they have turned to
the disarmament problem. Since
Khrushchev's speech to the UN,
Moscow's main effort has been
to focus on disarmament as the
central theme of its peaceful
coexistence campaign and to pre-
sent a convincing case that the
USSR is prepared to move toward
total disarmament.
In six weeks of actual ne-
gotiations at the Geneva disar-
mament conference, however, the
bloc delegations have resisted
Western efforts to discuss the
vital question of effective in-
ternational controls. The So-
viet delegation declined to spell
out its position, beyond the
vague and general proposition
enunciated by Khrushchev that
the extent of control should be
commensurate with the various
stages of the disarmament proc-
ess.
Soviet tactics in the nego-
tiations have been aimed pri-
marily at obtaining a defini-
tion, in Soviet terms, of com-
plete and general disarmament
as the final goal of the con-
ference, and winning Western
agreement to a set of disarma-
ment principles lifted directly
from the Soviet plan. Khru-
shchev's position at the summit
will probably be a continuation
of this effort, with the objec-
tive of gaining a joint state-
ment instructing representatives
in the ten-power committee to
take into account Soviet and
other plans in working out the
framework of a treaty.
The Soviet leaders would
probably seek to represent such
a statement as being tantamount
to acceptance of the main fea-
tures of the Soviet plan and
press the West to agree to pro-
ceed with a discussion of the
first stage, which calls for re-
duction of conventional forces.
Such tactics would also allow
Moscow to place the onus for re-
jecting general disarmament on
the West, before permitting the
talks to shift to specific first
measures or partial plans. As a
secondary position, Khrushchev
may follow the lines of his com-
muniqu6s with Presidents Eisen-
hower and De Gaulle and agree on
a statement reaffirming general
disarmament as the most important
international problem.
Nuclear Test Ban
In contrast to its approach
to disarmament, Moscow has moved
to narrow the differences on the
main issues of a nuclear test
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
ban treaty in preparation for
submitting these problems to
the summit for decision. Since
Khrushchev's visit to the United
States, the USSR has proposed
compromise solutions on a num-
bet of key points, while main-
taining its long-standing posi-
tion that all tests must be
banned at the outset of an
agreement. After resisting the
American position on the diffi-
culty of detecting small under-
ground tests, Moscow in effect
acknowledged this position by
countering a Western proposal
for a limited treaty with a pro-
posal for a moratorium on small
underground explosions.
Following the Eisenhower-
Macmillan communique on 29
March proposing that a morato-
rium be achieved through unilat-
eral and voluntary declarations,
Soviet officials served notice
that the main issues still out-
standing, including the nature
and duration of the moratorium,
were beyond the competence of
the Geneva conference and could
be resolved only at the summit.
They listed as possible summit
topics, besides the moratorium
itself, a quota for on-site in-
spections, the composition and
voting procedures of the con-
trol council, and the staffing
of control organs.
Khrushchev has indicated
that the paramount issue is the
duration of the moratorium. He
implied in a speech at Baku on
25 April that the Soviet sug-
gestion for one of four to five
years could be adjusted down-
ward. The Soviet premier has.
dropped his insistence for formal
incorporation of the moratorium
into the treaty, either as an
annex or protocol,and,accepted:
a voluntary declaration provid-
ing agreement is,reached on the
duration.,.
Since advancing the pro-
posal, based on Prime Minister
Macmillan's suggestion in early
1959 for an annual quota of on-
site inspections of suspected
nuclear explosions, Moscow has
made this a major element of
its position on controls but has
carefully avoided committing it-
self to a precise figure. The
USSR has made it clear that such
a determination should be based
on a high-level political deci-
sion, rather than a scientific
estimate of the annual number of
probably natural disturbances
,which could be mistaken for nu-
clear explosions.
Recently a Soviet official
at the conference privately ex-
pressed doubt that Moscow could
agree to as many as 20 such in-
spections in the USSR. Khru-
shchev is likely to take a sim-
ilar stand, while pressing for
American acceptance "in principle"
of the concept of a quota based
on an arbitrary political determi-
nation.
Other Issues
Under the general category
of East-West relations, Khru-
shchev may attempt to secure an
agreed definition of principles
on which these relations should
be based and set forth his con-
cept of "peaceful coexistence."
He may also be prepared to con-
clude a more generalized agree-
ment along the lines of the Camp
David communique, reaffirming
the four governments' intention
to settle disputes by negotia-
tion rather than by force.
Khrushchev also. plans to
raise the question of outer
space, probably in connection
with UN plans to convene an in-
ternational scientific confer-
ence to exchange information on
peaceful uses. Soviet repre-
sentatives in the UN have pri-
vately urged that the United
Nation's Outer Space Committee
meet before the summit and be-
gin working out plans for the
conference. The USSR, however,
is insisting on a preponderance
in the key conference posts.
Khrushchev will probably make
some gesture to demonstrate
that the summit has yielded
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5 May 1960
results and to create the im-
pression that the USSR is
taking the lead in the field
of peaceful uses of outer space.
Although Khrushchev has
deeply engaged his prestige in
the campaign for a summit con-
ference and has frequently rep-
resented such a meeting as the
most "effective manner" of re-
solving international problems,
he has been extremely cautious
in setting forth any specific
objective for the initial meet-
ing. In his recent remarks in
France, he limited his expecta-
tions to a hope to find a "com-
mon language," and more recent-
ly in Baku he resorted to the
standard expression that the
meeting should produce a fur-
ther relaxation of tensions and
"advance the settlement of the
urgent questions."
Khrushchev has been equal-
ly vague in defining the spe-
West Germany, frequently
the subject of East-West meet-
ings, is more apprehensive
than usual regarding the sum-
mit conference on 16 May. Al-
though expansive economic con-
ditions keep the mass of the
population contented, the po-
litically minded minority seems
suspicious, uncertain, and gen-
erally pessimistic about the
outlook.
Few Germans seriously be-
lieve their country will be re-
unified in the foreseeable fu-
ture; during the past few
months they have felt more and
more isolated from the West and
have been increasingly fearful
that even the status quo may
be sacrificed for the sake of
an East-West detente. Many
Germans accordingly see the
summit conference as a major
test of their allies; should
the West fail to measure up
to German expectations, par-
ticularly with respect to Ber-
lin, Bonn might become a more
nationalistic and less reliable
ally than heretofore.
Chancellor Adenauer re-
marked to a group of fellow
Christian Democrats last
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cific goals to be achieved on
the main issues under discus-
sion and has taken an equivocal
position in acknowledging pub-
licly in France that a solution
of the Berlin problem "evidently
demands some time."
Khrushchev's deliberate
restraint in spelling out his
objectives for the Paris meet-
ing probably reflects his ex-
pectation that a series of
meetings will be held. At
Paris he may attempt to gain
a specific commitment on the
next meeting. Such an approach
is suggested by his speech in
January to the Supreme Soviet
when he asserted that "this
conference will be followed by
a number of summit meetings"
and added that it would be "im-
provident to try to guess be-
forehand the possible re-
sults of the forthcoming
conference." F_ I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
October that the Germans must
yet pay a heavy price for the
"liquidation" of World War II;
more recently he has given his
confidants the impression that
he is fully reconciled to the
indefinite division of Germany.
Such views are in keeping with
a growing recognition in Ger-
many that certain fundamental
goals of the Adenauer era are
becoming increasingly impossible
to achieve with the passage of
time.
Public enthusiasm behind
the European integration move-
ment was particularly strong
in West Germany during the
early postwar years, when it
provided an outlet for nation-
al frustrations and bad con-
science. This now has been
weakened by a growing confusion
over objectives and a genuine
concern in many industrial,com-
mercial, and political circles
over the possibility of a per-
manent split of Western Europe
into two antagonistic economic
groupings.
The Soviet "ultimatum" on
West Berlin of November 1958
struck politically conscious
Germans with unusual impact,
since it posed the danger that
even the present situation in
Germany could not be maintained.
Despite numerous reassurances
of American determination to
stand by Berlin, many govern-
ment officials and leaders of
public opinion remain fearful
that the Allies are basically
unwilling to take any real risks
to defend Berlin, that they will-
gradually accommodate themselves
to the USSR's position on Allied
occupation rights, and that the
city's ties with the Federal Re-
public will, sooner or later,be
weakened.
Adenauer has been especial-
ly troubled by such a prospect,
because he fears this would al-
so pose a serious threat to his
Bonn regime--which must be as-
sured of Western support and
which must maintain the illu-
sion that reunification is at
least an ultimate goal. Ade-
nauer indicated pessimism about
summit prospects when he private-
ly expressed doubt that he could
fully rely on the Western powers
to avoid a dangerous compromise
on Berlin and observed that not
all the participants will have
the game firmness as Khrushchev.
Recent' Resentments
Several developments of
the past few months have caused
Germans to question whether in
fact they are assured of West-
ern support. Many accepted as
justified much of the interna-
tional criticism that followed
the anti-Semitic incidents in
West Germany last winter, but
others were unable to under-
stand why there was concern in
Allied countries over newspaper
stories about German military
bases in Franco Spain.
Germans saw the effort to
obtain supply bases in Spain
as simply a military move es-
sential to the fulfillment of
Bonn's NATO obligations. They
were quick to recall that there
had been no similar controversy
over military cooperation by
other NATO countries with the
Franco regime and frequently
interpreted the criticism as
indicating a fundamental lack
of trust on the part of Bonn's
allies. There were bitter re-
marks about the Federal Repub-
lic having only a second-class
status in NATO".
Many Germans also feel
that their NATO partners have
not supported them strongly
enough in the face of the con-
stant Communist propaganda
barrage picturing the Federal
Republic as "militarist," ""neo-
Nazi," "revenge-hungry," and a
threat to world peace. Bonn
fears that such propaganda has
created an unfavorable public
impression of Germany in free-
world countries, and this fear
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
contributed to a feeling that
the Federal Republic--hated in
the East--may have no real
friends in the West.
the greatest importance that
European Continental powers
have an independent retaliatory
Policy Alternatives
For years past there have
been calls for a new orienta-
tion of West German foreign
policy, geared primarily to
the hope of finding a solution
to the unification issue. The
opposition parties have pro-
posed such schemes as arms
limitation, troop withdrawal
in Central Europe, and the
military and political neutral-
ization of Germany. More recent-
ly, Defense Minister Strauss
has suggested in two or three
little-noticed press interviews
the withdrawal of Allied troops
from Germany, Bonn's withdrawal
from NATO, and international
control of German armed forces
--all in return for free elec-
tions to determine the future
of East Germany, including its
social structure.
There are also voices on
the right, iftdluding some with-
in the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU) itself, calling for
Germany to be more assertive in
Western councils and to stand
up for'its own rights and in-
terests. Many, especially with-
in the CDU, are inclined to seek
greater military strength for
the Federal Republic.
Adenauer welcomed develop-
ment of France's nuclear capa-
bility, feeling that it was of
capability at their disposal.
German Outlook
The American Embassy in
Bonn believes that despite the
mistrust and resentments,
Adenauer and most of Bonn's
military and governmental lead-
ers are still convinced that
the Federal Republic's security
can be assured only by retaining
its close ties with the West.
This conviction springs both
from a positive desire to be
part of the free Western com-
munity and from a belief that
Bonn has no tolerable alterna-
tive. Any rapprochement with
the Soviet Union on the model
of the 1922 Rapallo treaty--in
which the USSR renounced repara-
tions from the Weimar Republic--
is seen as at best extremely
dangerous and at worst utterly
disastrous.
Nevertheless,an Allied com-
promise on Berlin which the Ger-
mans would interpret as a threat
to the city's status,coupled with
a continuing feeling that Germany
is isolated and relegated to an
inferior status, could sooner or
later discredit the solidly pro-
Western elements of the CDU and
encourage West Germany to explore
new means of pursuing its own par-
ticular national interests. Even
though unchanged in basic orienta-
tion,a Federal Republic of this
increasingly nationalistic char- 25X1
acter would be a more difficult
and less dependable ally.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
Since 1953, by which time
the Japanese economy had reached
prewar levels, Japan has had
the greatest foreign trade
growth of any major nation, and
its standard of living now is
25 percent above the prewar
period.
Gross national product, in
real terms, is double the 1934-
36 level--a representative pe-
riod preceding the war build-up.
1936
PATTERNS OF JAPANESE TRADE BY
MAJOR CATEGORIES
(EXPRESSED AS PERCENT OF TOTAL VALUE)
EXPORTS
Machinery
(vessels)
Metals & metal products
(primarily iron & steel)
Clothing
Foodstuffs (primarily fish products)
Synthetic textiles (primarily rayon)
Radio receivers (transistors)
Chemical fertilizers
Plywood
IMPORTS
Petroleum
Raw cotton
Grains (primarily wheat)
Raw wool
Iron & steel scrap
Oilseeds (primarily soybeans)
Iron ore
Timber
Sugar
$0.9 BILLION
6.7%
19.0
6. 5
5.5
2.9
6.6
insig.
Since 1953, exports have in-
creased 171 percent by value,
despite declining export prices;
this rate is considerably great-
er than West Germany's and four
times that of the United States
and United Kingdom.
Japan's exports in 1953
paid for only 61 percent of its
imports; by 1959 a record ex-
port total of $3.46 billion
paid for 96 percent of the coun-
$3.46 BILLION
13.8%
(10.3)
5.5
3.0
2.3
2.2
1.5
0.8
9.5
5.4
5.7
3.7
* Large quantities of rice from Taiwan & Korea not included
00502 C
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try's imports. A
markedly increased
competitiveness has
given Japan strongly
advantageous terms of
trade.
Postwar Japanese
trade patterns reveal
a trend away from
traditional exports
of light manufactured
goods toward metals,
machinery, and other
heavy industrial prod-
ucts. Since 1953,
Japan has increased
its relative share of
total world exports
in several important
categories, but es-
pecially in transport
equipment, electrical
machinery, textiles,
and certain light
manufactures .
The Japanese have
increased their share
of the Western hem-
isphere market--par-
ticularly in the United
States--but suffered
a relative decline in
Europe, the world's
fastest growing mar-
ket, and in China.
Japan was the world's
largest shipbuilder
and ship exporter
5 MAY 1960 from 1956 through
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
1959, although construction now
has declined sharply in view of
the drop in world demand.
Japan faces prob-
lems in trying to re-
solve conflicting
aims in its trade
program--to develop
and expand foreign
markets, assure for-
eign sources of sup-
ply, protect domes-
tic industries, and
accommodate interna-
tional pressures for
a liberalized trade
policy.
1.
7.
the US is a high-cost supplier--
but would also affect adversely
other Japanese international
interests. There is strong op-
position to this and fear that
JAPAN'S MAJOR TRADE PARTNERS 1959
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
EXPORTS
United States
1,043.7
1.
United States
1,
112.5
2.
Australia
291.2
Liberia
3.
Malaya
165.8
Hong Kong
127.7
4.
Canada
153.2
5. Philippines
134
0
Canada
114.0
.
a
6. Kuwait
130.3
Philippines
109.6
7.
Saudi Arabia
127.0
8.
Mexico
122.7
9.
West Germany
103.3
United Kingdom
103.1
10.
United Kingdom
103.2
(TOTAL 3,456)
(TOTAL 3,399)
Tokyo is responding to in-
ternational pressures for lib-
eralized import controls and
foreign exchange regulations on
many commodities. It has a
three-year plan which would
abolish controls on 90 percent
of imports and call for max-
imum purchases from cheapest
suppliers. At present, only
about 40 percent of imports are
free from controls.
JAPANESE TRADE BY GEOGRAPHIC AREAS-1959
EXPRESSED AS PERCENT OF TOTAL VALUE
Free Asial
28.7
Middle East2
4.7
US-Canada
33.1
( US )
(30.1)
Latin America
7.5
Africa3
11.5
Western Europe
10.5
Australia & Oceania
3.4
Communist Bloc
1.1
( USSR )
(0.7)
1 100 1
TOTAL EXPORTS - $3.46 billion
TOTAL IMPORTS - $3.60 billion
21.0
10.4
35.3
(30.8)
9.1
3.0
9. 5
9. 8
1.9
(1. 1)
1 - South Korea, Taiwan, Ryukyus, Philippines, Hong Kong, Macao,
British Borneo, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaya, Laos, Cambodia,
South Vietnam, Burma, India, Goa, Pakistan, Afghanistan.
3 - Egypt excluded
00502 G
Such a program, however,
would not only considerably dis-
rupt Japan's present trading
relationships--in many instances
it would endanger domestic in-
dustries, cause a large payments
deficit, and drain foreign ex-
change. To reduce the impact
of liberalization, the Japanese
Government is considering broad-
ening tariff schedules and rais-
ing its low tariff rates.
Japan's sugar purchases il-
lustrate its problem. Japan
imports annually some 1,200,000
metric tons of sugar. Of this
amount, Cuba in 1959 supplied
42 percent; Taiwan, 26 percent;
Brazil, the Dominican Republic,
Peru, and Ecuador together, 17
percent; and Australia, 12 per-
cent, A smaller amount is pro-
duced domestically by a grow-
ing but high-cost industry
which hopes in ten years to re-
duce present import needs by
half. In Brazil and Taiwan,
Japan pays more than the market
price for sugar in order to pro-
tect export markets or other
interests in those countries.
Cuba has pressed Japan to in-
crease purchases.
IMPORTS
Japan's alignment with the
United States and the free world
is strongly rooted in economic
factors. Its viability, as a
nation with few natural resources
other than manpower, depends on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
access to raw materials and for-
eign markets, considerations
which largely preclude ideolog-
ical alignments. Nevertheless,
the Japanese Government is care-
ful, especially in the case of
the Communist bloc, not to ex-
pose itself to economic vulner-
abilities, such as overconcen-
tration on a single market or
source of supply, which could
be exploited for political pur-
poses.
The most . dramatic. shift in
Japan's postwar trade is the
vast expansion of economic ties
with the US and the relative
contraction of those with Asian
countries. The US is by far
JAPANESE TRADE SHIFT
(IN PERCENT)
TO US
16
30
64
34
FROM US
FROM ASIA
25
31
Japan's largest trading partner,
on both the import and export
side. Japan is the second larg-
est market, after Canada, for
US exports and the principal
foreign purchaser of American
agricultural products. Between
1957 and 1959, Japanese sales
in the US jumped 75 percent and
purchases 30 percent. In 1959,
for the first time, Tokyo vir-
tually balanced its merchandise
trade with the US--at approxi-
mately one billion dollars each
way. Income for US official
and military personnel expendi-
tures in the postwar period us-
ually has given Japan annual
surpluses in its over-all for-
eign exchange account.
The phenomenal growth in,
sales to the TIntte.d,. States::ha.s
occurred despite rising American
pressures for restrictive meas-
ures against imports from Japan.
Low prices on many products, in-
cluding quality items such as
electronics equipment and opti-
cal goods, have stimulated
charges of unfair competition
and led to Japanese Government
enforcement of a schedule of
"check prices" below which items
cannot be exported to the United
States. Even so, prices remain
low. Tokyo has also established
export quotas on items against
which pressures are strongest,
such as stainless steel flat-
ware, cotton and woolen textiles,
plywood, sewing machines, um-
brellas, and umbrella frames.
The major irritant in US-
Japanese trade relations is the
prospective imposition by the
US of an "equalization fee," or
special tariff, against cotton
textile imports from Japan,
which in 1959 totaled $110,000,-
000. Japanese textile inter-
ests are threatening to disre-
gard export quotas, which they
established with the understand-
ing that the US would not raise
tariff rates.
South and Southeast Asia
The relative impor.t.ance.of
South and Southeast Asia in-Jap-
anese trade has declined appre-
ciably in the postwar period
despite Tokyo's reparations pro-
gram, which it hoped would re-
duce animosity toward Japan and
pave the way for close economic
ties.
Japanese trade with the
Philippines has doubled since
1955, despite frequently stormy
economic relations; trade with
Indonesia, the other major repa-
rations recipient, has declined.
Japan hopes, however, that the
recent agreement to extend a
$53,000,000 credit to Indonesia
for development of oil fields
in North Sumatra, in return for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
40 percent of the increased oil
production in the :I-next' ten
years, marks a major break-
through. Japan's failure to
purchase nearly as much as it
sells to Thailand and Burma,
as a resu.lt'. `of ,a sharply reduced
need for imported rice, has
caused severe strains with those
countries.
Japan is participating in
the economic development of In-
dia in a special manner. Tokyo
has extended yen credits to
India in the amount of $70,000,-
000 for purchases of equipment
in Japan; $21,000,000 to devel-
op iron-ore resources and re-
lated rail and port facilities
at Bailadila, to be repaid in
preferentially priced iron-ore
shipments at the rate of 4,-
000,000 tons annually for 15
years beginning in 1966; and
$8,000,000 earmarked for a co-
operative venture with the US
in developing iron-ore mining
and transport facilities at
Orissa.
Until recently Japan has
regarded Latin America, with
its large potential for economic
growth and relative absence of
antagonism toward the Japanese,
as second only to Southeast
Asia in market prospects. More-
over, this area's unusual re-
ceptivity to investments and
participation in management has
attracted one third of Japanese
overseas equity investment. The
principal investments are in a
steel mill and shipyard in
Brazil and a textile plant in
Mexico. Japan is now seeking
to make further copper invest-
ments in Chile, Peru, and Bo-
livia.
In 1959, Japan achieved
virtual balance in its trade
with Latin America, but almost
one third of total exports,
valued at $242,000,000, con-
sisted of ships for Panamanian
registry. In general, trade
JAPANESE TRADE WITH SOUTH
AND SOUTHEAST ASIA
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
EXPORTS IMPORTS
Philippines 109.6 134.0
Hong Kong 128.8 27.0
Indonesia 72.8 56.4
Thailand 103.1 36.7
Malaya 19.3 165.8
Singapore 75.0 9.0
Laos 2.1 0
Cambodia 9.3 3.4
South Vietnam 52.5 2.3
Burma 53.2 9.6
India 75.4 92.0
Pakistan 25.0 32.3
Afghanistan 4.2 0.1
730.3 568.8
5 MAY 1960
relations with this area have
been disappointing to the Jap-
anese.
Japanese officials believe
that exports to Latin America
will amount to less than $200,-
000,000 in 1960, partly because
of an expected cutback in ship
sales and because some Latin
American countries are ex-
periencing foreign exchange
shortages and except for min-
erals and cotton, lack export
commodities needed by Japan.
As a result of a 40-percent
drop in Brazilian exports to
Japan since 1955, principally
because of high pricing and
Japanese purchase commitments
elsewhere, Rio de Janeiro has
incurred a trade debt which
Tokyo is seeking to alleviate--
if only to protect its invest-
ments and the postwar emigra-
tion program, which thus far
has enabled 25,000 Japanese to
resettle in Brazil. On the
other hand, Japan suffers an-
nual deficits in trade with
Mexico and Cuba--a total of
$132,000,000 in 1959. A severe
cutback in exports to Ar-
gentina `since 1955 has -'been
offset,,,' to 'a! certain ex
tent-,:' by 7a growing outlet
in Venezuela.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Middle East and Africa
Following the Middle East
crisis in 1956, Japan sought
closer political and economic
relations with UAR President
Nasir, whom it viewed! as the
dominant influence in the rise
of Arab nationalism. In 1958,
Tokyo established a credit of
$30,000,000 for the UAR to pur-
chase Japanese industrial equip-
ment. Subsequently, however,
Nasir's prestige among the
Japanese dropped, and Tokyo has
shifted to a broader Middle
Eastern policy to encourage
general trade expansion, assure
adequate sources of crude oil,
add facilitate participation in
economic development of the
JAPANESE TRADE WITH SELECTED
MIDDLE EASTERN COUNTRIES 1959
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
IMPORTS
EXPORTS
Saudi Arabia
127.0
11.7
United Arab Republic
21. 8
17. 7
Kuwait
130.3
29.4
Iran
29.8
49.6
Iraq
52.9
21.2
Israel
1.7
1.0
TOTAL IMPORTS - 374.4
TOTAL EXPORTS - 162.6
00502 B 5 MAY 1960
area. Tokyo believes that it
can compete with other nations
of the free world, and it is
also anxious to prevent Soviet
penetrations in the Middle East.
In 1959, 88 percent of
Japanese imports from the Middle
East consisted of crude oil;
purchases other than Oil were
valued at $40,000,000. Iran,
the area's largest importer of
Japanese products, purchased
less than $50,000,000 worth of
commodities during the same year.
Eighty percent of Japan's
oil requirements are filled by
Middle Eastern producers. Crude
oil is Japan's largest single
import item and is consumed al-
most wholly in the domestic
market at a heavy dollar cost
to the Japanese Government. In
order to reduce foreign exchange
expenditures for oil, the Japa= ---
nese have acted in the past two
years to develop nondollar
sources through semibartei+,ar-
rangements with the USSR, an
economic assistance agreement
to develop oil fields in Indo-
nesia, and the exploitation of
an offshore concession in the
Persian Gulf granted by Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait.
Japan made its first oil
strike in its Persian Gulf con-
cession in January 1960, and it
is reliably estimated that in
five years production will amount
to 30 percent of present Japa-
nese crude oil imports. By
1963 the Japanese Government
is expected to invest $180,000,-
000 in this project, a sum
which will limit Tokyo's par-
ticipation in Other internation-
al economic ventures.
Africa is an important
textile market for Japan, but
it thus far offers little at-
traction to Japanese purchasers.
In 1959 the sale of ships to
Liberia exceeded $200,000,000
in value, while the balance of
Afro-Japanese trade approximated
$100,000,000 each way. Tokyo
is showing some interest in pro-
viding technical assistance to
Africa and in developing iron.
ore resources in Rhodesia and
Guinea as new sources of supply.
Europe
European and Japanese eco-
nomic relations are more competi-
tive than complementary, and are
limited almost exclusively to
trade. The sole exception is
Tokyo's extension of a $10,000,-
000 credit to Yugoslavia in
1959 for the purchase of Japa-
nese plants and equipment.
Japan regards as a threat
the development of multination-
al common markets which give
preferential' trade treatment
to member countries. Japan's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
trade with Europe in 1959 was
roughly $350,000,000 each way,
with a slight surplus accruing
to Japan. Its major trading
partners, in order of importance,
were the United Kingdom, West
Germany, the Netherlands, Swit-
zerland, France, Belgium, and
Sweden.
Japan's troublesome trade
relations with Britain illus-
trate its problems with other
European countries. Both coun-
tries seek to protect domestic
industries, and Tokyo claims
that British tariffs and quota
restrictions apply more severe-
ly to Japanese products than
to those of any other nation.
The Japanese have been especial-
ly disturbed by Britain's in-
vocation of Article XXXV of the
General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs, which in effect re-
vokes preferential trade treat-
ment for a member country. Ja-
pan is most concerned about
how to increase exports of cot-
ton textile and optical goods
to the UK.
London claims that Japanese
quota restrictions and foreign
exchange controls discriminate
against British goods, notably
woolens and automobiles. De-
spite these differences, how-
ever, total trade between the
countries in 1959 was valued
at slightly more than $200,000,
000, double the 1955 level, and
the UK has succeeded in bringing
accounts with Japan into balance.
Communist Bloc
Trade with the Sino-Soviet
bloc is negligible. It amounted
in 1959 to $106,000,000--approx-
imately one half of the postwar
peak, which was attained in 1957
--and constituted 1.5 percent of
total Japanese trade. Although
the bulk of present bloc=Japanese-
trade is with the USSR, Japan
depends on North Vietnam for
most of its anthracite coal.
The decline in Japanese
trade with the bloc is due prin-
cipally to Communist China's
suspension of trade in May 1958
for political reasons. Prior
to World War II, mainland China
supplied 13 percent of Japanese
imports and took 24 percent of
its exports. In 1957, Sino-
Japanese trade had reached an
annual total of $141,000,000,
and in early 1958, just prior
to the trade rupture, an agree-
ment had been signed for an ex-
change over a five-year period
of $280,000,000 worth of Chi-
nese coal and iron ore for Jap-
anese iron and steel products.
Many Japanese hope to re-
gain a substantial portion of
prewar trade with China and are
anxious for a political settle-
ment between Tokyo and Peiping.
Others, who realize that res-
toration of large-scale trade
with mainland China is virtually
impossible, are anxious to ex-
ploit whatever possibilities
exist.
The Japanese have been re-
luctant to enter into long-term
economic arrangements with the
USSR or to become dependent on
Moscow for items which cannot
be quickly procured elsewhere.
Recently, however, a new enthu-
siasm has developed for trade
with the USSR. wince its formal
resumption in 1956, Soviet-Japa-
nese trade has grown from $4,000,-
000 to a projected $125,000,000
for 1960.
Japan and the USSR recently
signed a three-year trade agree-
ment under which Tokyo will sup-
ply heavy industrial products,
presumably for Siberian economic
development, and will purchase
increased amounts of timber,
coal, and crude oil. Tokyo also
has agreed in principle to ex-
tend credits to the USSR for
some purchases in Japan, while
Moscow is expected to supply
1,000,000 tons of crude oil to
Japan in 1960. This amount is
a tenfold increase over 1959
and about 5 percent of Japan's
present crude oil imports.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Economic Assistance Program
Reparations programs, ex-
tensions of credit to various
countries, and a-proposal for
a Southeast Asia Development
Fund have created the mislead-
ing impression that Japan is
initiating a substantial capi-
tal-export program to assist
underdeveloped countries. Al-
though the Japanese are in an
excellent position to provide
technological assistance to
such countries--and are doing
so--they prefer to implement
their limited capital-export
program either in bi-
lateral projects
which assure them
large quantities of
vital raw materials
or in connection with
an international con-
sortium, largely fi-
nanced by other coun-
tries, which would
utilize Japanese
equipment and tech-
nical and managerial
skills.
The Japanese
Government and pri-
vate industrialists,
who depend on the
Japanese Government -
sponsored Export-Im-
totaling $564,000,000--most of
them recently incurred--for pur-
chases of US surplus agricultural
products and expansion of domes-
tic electric power, road, rail,
and steel industry facilities.
Japan's program in India
is relatively adventurous, but
elsewhere in Asia the Japanese
have exercised extreme caution
in pursuing their much-publicized
program of economic cooperation.
While South and Southeast Asia,
with large undeveloped resources,
would appear to offer special at-
tractions for Japan., the Japanese
REPARATIONS GRANTS
CREDITS a
PROMISED
DELIVERED
PROMISED
DELIVERED
BURMA
200
88
THAILAND
15
15
INDONESIA
400
204
81
N. A.
PHILIPPINES
550
85.5
47.8b
N. A.
SOUTH VIETNAM
39
0
24.1
0
LAOS
2.8c
0
CAMBODIA
4.2c
0
INDIA
99
14
UAR
30
7
PARAGUAY
3.8
3..8
YUGOSLAVIA
10
0
BRAZIL
104
N. A.
PAKISTAN
36
N. A.
port Bank for most of a-Some Japanese credits are government negotiated, others are negotiated
by private interests; in most cases, however, the Japan Export-Import
their financing, have Bank provides the funds, which are used to. purchase Japanese products.
negotiated long-term b-The Japanese credit to the Philippines ultimately is expected to be de-
ducted from the reparations program.
agreements with for- c-Grants to Laos and Cambodia nominally are in lieu of reparations.
eign countries extend- 00502E 5 MAY 1960
ing Japanese currency,
credits totaling about
$450,000,000. The bulk of these
credits are intended for Brazil,
India, Indonesia, and the Phil-
ippines, but less than 10 per-
cent have been used thus far.
Tokyo also is making rep-
arations. deliveries to South-
east Asia at the rate of $73,-
000,000 annually and is in the
process of establishing an Over-
seas Economic Cooperation Fund
with an initial capital of $14,-
000,000--appropriated two years
ago but still unused.
Meanwhile, Japan has long-
term loans from the World Bank
and the US Export-Import Bank
see too many risks involved as a
result of political instability,
distrust of Japan, frequent in-
ability to gain controlling in-
terest in economic ventures, and
long waiting periods before proj-
ects begin to produce.
Domestic development and wel-
fare programs, shipbuilding sub-
sidies;, modest outlays for defense
purposes, and sizable expenditures
for developmental iron-ore proj-
ects in India and oil projects in
the Persian Gulf and Indonesia
will consume: the major portion 25X1
of available Japanese capital
during the next three to five
years.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
Three milestones are
being observed in North Vietnam
this year. The first, on 6
January, commemorated the 30th
anniversary of the Indochinese
Communist party--now called the
Lao Dong (Workers) party; the
second will be the 70th birth-
day celebration of President
Ho Chi Minh on 19 May; and the
third, on 2 September, will
mark the 15th year of "nation-
al independence."
The regime has expanded
party membership and plans to
hold the first party congress
since 1953 and the first elec-
tions to the National Assembly
since 1946. A new constitution
is to be promulgated and a Three-
Year Plan, which began in 1958
and called for the "basic com-
pletion of the socialization of
agriculture," is tea: be com-
pleted.
The Party
The Lao Dong party in 1956
claimed a membership of 700,000,
a relatively high percentage of
the 13,000,000 population. Very
few new members have been ad-
mitted since the cease-fire in
1954 and party membership was
actually declining, both through
attrition. and as a result of
the expulsion of those members--
particularly in rural areas--
whose loyalty had come under
fire. To halt this drift, the
party late last year held its
first major recruitment drive,
aimed at attracting younger
elements, to commemorate the
party's 30th anniversary. Some
20,000 new members reportedly
were recruited.
Party statutes call for a
national party congress every
three years, but the regime,
ignoring the wartime congress
of 1953, states in its official
histories that the last con-
gress was held in 1951. The
"third party congress'' is sched-
uled. for September and will
probably coincide with "Inde-
pendence Day" celebrations on
2 September. Items on the
agenda include revision of the
party statutes and the election
of a new central committee and
other organs.
The top party and govern-
ment leadership has been marked-
ly stable. This year, however,
there will probably be some ad-
ditions to the central commit-
tee, most likely specialists
and technicians who have made
their mark since the French
were expelled. It also is,quite
possible that Ho Chi Minh is
planning a partial withdrawal
from active politics and will
resign as party secretary gen-
eral but remain as party chair-
man. At any rate, it will not
be long before power devolves
on younger men, and it seems
TRUONG CHINH
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
likely that it will ultimately
fall'into the hands of militant
activists such as Truong Chinh
and Le Duan, who are normally
ranked immediately below Ho in
the party hierarchy.
New Constitution and Elections
The liberal 1946 constitu-
tion, designed to appeal to all
Vietnamese nationalists, was
never put into effect, and the
regime has been operating with-
out any basic statute. Member-
ship in the National Assembly
has dwindled from the original
333 elected in January 1946 to
about 220. High offices, such
as the vice presidency, have
been vacant for years, and the
legal and judicial systems are
extremely primitive and under-
manned.
A committee worked for
over two years to write a new
constitution. The finished
draft, promulgated early this
year, closely resembles the
Chinese Communist constitution.
The regime subsequently an-
nounced that elections for the
National Assembly will be held
on 8 May. This step has been
postponed as long as possible,
because the original elections
had been nationwide in scope,
and to hold separate elections
in the north would weaken Ha-
noi's claim to sovereignty over
the entire country. To circum-
vent this, the election law
calls for all members of the
National Assembly elected from
the southern areas in 1946 to
retain their seats.
Relations With Its Neighbors
North Vietnam recently
scored an important propaganda
victory when Guinea became the
first free world country to
grant it de jure recognition.
Negotiations were concluded last
summer with Bangkok for the re-
patriation of the large majority
--90,000--of the Vietnamese
living in Thailand, who opted
for repatriation. More than
3,500 now have returned from
Thailand, with much fanfare.
In its efforts to pose as
a peace-loving state abiding
by the terms of the cease-fire
settlement negotiated in Geneva
in 1954, the North Vietnamese
regime attempts to dissociate
itself from Communist-inspired
disturbances in both South
Vietnam and Laos. The regime
continues to assure its people
that the reunification of Viet-
nam is only a matter of time,
and pictures subversive activi-
ties against the Saigon authori-
ties as acts of the local popu-
lation revolting against the
"American 'imperialists and
their lackeys."
Although Hanoi supported
the Pathet Lao insurrection
last summer, it has subsequent-
ly allowed the situation to die
down, presumably under bloc
pressure for "peaceful coexist-
ence," On 4 April, Premier Pham
Van Dong sent a mildly worded
note to the Laotian premier
suggesting that they negotiate
their differences. Hanoi's
policy regarding Laos, follow-
ing the recent election there,
will be guided by Moscow's and
Peiping's other international
considerations.
Armed Forces
North Vietnam continues to
work toward a modern, efficient
armed force along the lines of
the Chinese Communist military
establishment, assuring it of
military predominance on the
Indochinese peninsula. The
strong, effective 270,000-man
army is composed of 13 infantry
divisions, an artillery divi-
sion, 13 separate infantry reg-
iments, and security forces.
Troop disposition has been
relatively stable since 1954,
although there have been some
reports of troop movements along
the Laotian border. The general
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1960
pattern of troop deployment is
that of a strategic battle corps
located in the Red River delta,
with additional troops thinly
distributed about the periphery
of the country to strengthen
the frontier guard and perform
missions such as road building.
An embryonic air force and
marine element have come into
being. The air force, although
a separate service, is still
little more than an administra-
tive organization, inasmuch as
North Vietnam has only a few
light training aircraft, two
helicopters, and several trans-
ports. The marine element has
recently received several Swa-
tow-class gunboats from Com-
munist China, thereby increas-
ing its coastal-patrol capa-
bility, Neither, element has an
offensive capability.
The formation of the Peo-
ple's Armed Security Forces was
reported in September 1959. Its
missions were described as "pro-
tection of the frontiers, the
17th parallel, and coastline."
These missions were previously
army responsibilities, and the
Frontier Guard and the Coastal
Security Regiments probably
have been taken into the Peo-
ple's Armed Security Forces.
The appointment of Brig. Gen;
Phan Trong Tue, vice minister
of public security, as command-
er of this new security force
indicates that these forces are
subordinate to the Ministry of
Public Security rather than to
the Defense Ministry.
The Economy
On the economic front, the
regime is also trying to mod-
ernize its facilities. Comple-
tion of the Three-Year Plan in
1960 and preparation of the
first five-year plan are already
being heralded in the press as
tremendous achievements. North
Vietnam has apparently achieved
self-sufficiency in food at an
austerity level, an important
step forward for an area which
was long a net importer of rice.
The Three-Year Plan as a
whole, however, will almost cer-
tainly fall considerably short
of its original goals. In in-
dustry, which at present is
much less important than agri-
culture, the regime has met
with little success, and
there seems to be particular
difficulty in construction and
coal production. The rice
goal for this last year of the
Three-Year Plan, first set for
7,600,000 tons, has been
downgraded to 5,400,000--a
target which the regime
will probably boast of having
attained, It remains to be
seen what effect the complete
socialization of agriculture,
scheduled for the end of 1960,
will have on agricultural pro-
duction,
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