CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002700030001-0
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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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7E
COPY NO. x
OCR NO. 1672/60
14 April 1960
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
I I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEWDA7 E: < f
AUTFl: i
DATF~~~ REVIEWER: 25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
x
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14' April 1960
During Prime Minister Ver-
woerd's recuperation from the
9 April attack on his life,the
South African Government is
being led by Minister of Lands
Paul Sauer, a member of the
relatively moderate wing of
the ruling Nationalist party.
Sauer and other government
spokesmen have indicated that
Verwoerd's policies will be
continued. In fact, the Na-
tionalist drive for total ra-
cial separation may be inten-
sified in an effort to reduce
South Africa's overwhelming
dependence on African labor.
Police raids and arrests in
African areas are continuing.
With the outlawing of the
two main African nationalist
organizations--the African Na-
tional-Congress and the Pan-Af-
ricanist Congress --and'_the ar-
rest of most of their leaders,
Africans have lost most bf their
ability to organize effective
protests.
The continuing crisis may
have aggravated the splits with-
in the European population. Al-
though the English community,
represented in Parliament by
the United party, has supported
the government's efforts to sup-
press the Africans, United par-
ty leaders have called for an
investigation of the causes of
the disturbances once the ten-
sion abates. Moreover, the
English population, which domi-
nates South African industry
and wishes to retain a large
urban African labor pool, will
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14 April 1960
probably increase its opposi-
tion to the Afrikaners if the
latter follow through with
their apparent aim of intensi-
fying the implementation of
apartheid.
Afrikahe' l" } di etrii st ;'b f ,the
English community may be height-
ened +by the fact that Verwoerd's
CUBA
The Castro regime con-
tinues to expand relations
with the bloc. It seems to be
preparing its first exchange
of ambassadors with a Sino-
Soviet bloc country--Czecho-
slovakia. On 7 April, the
secretary general of the Cuban
Communist party, in Prague en
route to Moscow, told Czech
newsmen that he hoped "the
Cuban ambassador would soon
arrive in Prague on the basis
of an agreement to establish
diplomatic relations." Czecho-
slovakia was the first Commu-
nist country to establish per-
would-be assassin is of English
descent. In addition, Afri-
kaners are no longer united
among themselves; influential
Nationalists in the Cape Town
area have recently begun to
criticize fundamental aspects
of their. party's policies,
South Africa's representa-
tion at the London conference
of Commonwealth prime ministers
in May has not been determined.
Sauer or some other senior cab-
inet members may attend in place
of Verwoerd; otherwise, South
Africa will be represented only
by External Affairs Minister.
Eric Louw a Nationalist ex-
tremist
Even
if a more moderate representative
should accompany Louw, the out-
look is for growing tension be-
tween South Africa and the
other members of the Com-
monwealth.
manent trade representation with
the. Castro regime, and there _
have been increasing cultural,
tilitary, and economic contacts
but no formal trade agreement
like those with the USSR, East
Germany, and Poland.
Polish officials have in-
sisted that on'y sport and ag-
ricultural planes and heli-
copters will be sold to Cuba
under a trade and payments
agreement signed recently in
Havana by the Polish deputy
minister of commerce.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
Exchanges of visits by
cultural, labor, and agricul-
tural missions between Cuba
and the Soviet Union and Com-
munist China are increasingly
reported, and Castro plans to
establish diplomatic relations
with these regimes and other
Communist countries. However,
there is no evidence that the
USSR has yet taken action on
the expressed agreement of
Mikoyan and Castro in February
to resume diplomatic relations
"at a convenient time." Mos-
cow may wish to assess reac-
tion to the Czech move and to
wait until after the summit
conference in May.
antigovernment guerrilla bands
cou provide the nucleus for
an eventually much larger and
more serious challenge to
Castro's position.
The growing number of defec-
tions from the regime has
caused widespread comment in
other Latin American countries
adverse to the Castro regime.
The Cuban air attache in Mexico
defected on 11 April, declaring
his conviction that Castro has
betrayed the Cuban revolution.
He said the only road now open
for him is again to take up
arms, this time to fight Castro.
The resignation on 7 April of
the Cuban ambassador to UN of-
fices in Geneva, Andres Vargas
Gomez, is perhaps even more
significant, since he is widely
respected and capable and is
representative of professional
and business elements who have
become thoroughly disillusioned
with Castro..
In its plans for the "hun-
gry nations" conference in Ha-
vana in September, Cuba now seems
resigned to accept unofficial
delegations to an obviously non-
governmental conference. This is
indicated by the recent Cuban in-
vitation to ten Honduran students
and pro-Castro members of the Hon-
duran congress. The conference
will thus be a far cry from Cas-
tro's original plan for a meeting
of ,official delegations headed by
prominent personages, but his con-
trol of the conference is assured
and extensive propaganda exploita-
tion can be expected.
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
As the Western foreign min-
isters began meeting in Wash-
ington, Moscow reverted to its
standard propaganda line that
influential circles in:the West
still oppose negotiating with
the USSR and that this continues
to divide the alliance. Moscow
seized on Secretary Herter's 4
April speech to contrast West-
ern skepticism over the prospects
for agreement at the summit
with Khrushchev's public expres-
sion of optimism following his
talks with De Gaulle.
The Soviet press criti-
cized the speech as a demon-
stration of how the "weight of
the past" still drags US policy
along the "inglorious cold-war
road." Izvestia on 9 April
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April
claimed that Herter used the
"threadbare" thesis of the
threat of aggression from the
East to urge Western European
countries, particularly Bonn,
to "arm and rearm."
Moscow also used the speech
as "evidence" of divisions with-
in the West. Izvestia said
Herter's defense of the "new"
West Germany as a stabilizing
factor in Europe was shown to
be "elementary hypocrisy" by
a London Times report that in
his talks with Macmillan the
secretary did not deny Germany
could become a danger to Europe.
Pravda claimed that the speech
clashed with Premier Debre's
statement on the same day
calling for a speedy solution
of disarmament problems, and
was generally at odds with the
tone set at Camp David and at
Rambouillet, where Khrushchev
and De Gaulle met.
As part of the general
propaganda build-up to place
the West on the defensive be-
fore the summit conference on
16 May, Moscow has intensified
its efforts to discredit the
Adenauer government with a
series of critical notes, an-
nouncements. and press con-
ferences
Adenauer still favors a
pre-summit plebiscite in West
Berlin, but the West Berlin
city council agreed to hold
the plebiscite if requested by
both the Bonn government and
the Allies. Consequently,
Adenauer apparently decided to
reserve the plebiscite idea
for possible use at a later
date.
Disarmament
The bloc delegates at the
Geneva disarmament conference
have stepped up pressure to
commit the West to a set of
general principles which could
be referred to the summit for
endorsement. Following formal
rejection of each other's plans,
Soviet delegate Zorin suggested
that this line of debate be
abandoned in favor of returning
to the United Nations resolu-
tion as the commonly agreed
point of departure. He intro-
duced a slightly refurbished
version of the Soviet proposal,
under the heading "Fundamental
Principles of Complete and Gen-
eral Disarmament." He stressed
that the discussions had re-
vealed certain points of mutual
agreement which should be re-
corded before proceeding to
draft 'specific :measures for..
a treaty.
The bloc delegates prompt-
ly moved to establish this docu-
ment as the basis for further
debate by. inviting the Western
powers to offer amendments and
suggestions. Zorin argued
that areas for possible agree-
ment were larger than the West
admitted and cited the preamble,
measures constituting complete
disarmament, and the concepts
of stages and effective controls
contained in his list of prin-
ciples.
These tactics, plus the
Soviet agreement to a long re-
cess in the conference from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY -
14 April 1960
29 April until 7 June, reflect
Moscow's apparent belief that
the West will make no basic.
shift in its disarmament posi-
tion prior to the summit con-
ference. The bloc delegates
hope to obtain some agreed gen-
eral statement, even though
limited perhaps only to a
treaty preamble which restates
in effect the UN resolution.
Test Ban Talks
A member of the Soviet
delegation to the test-ban talks
has privately told a US official
in Geneva that his delegation
has forwarded to Moscow its
recommendations.on the Eisen-
hower-Macmillan statement of
29 March which called for uni-
lateral pledges not to test
small underground nuclear weap-
ons. He added that it will
take "some time" before a de-
cision is reached.
In contrast to his usual
approach to any new Western
move at the talks, the Soviet
delegate has refrained from
attacking the Western proposal.
He has instead confined him-
self to posing questions about
the duration and nature of the
proposed moratorium and on the
details of the research and de-
velopment program, and to re-
stating the Soviet position
that any moratorium obligation
should be incorporated in the";
test-cessation treaty and that
the moratorium and research
program should be conterminous.
This cautious approach reflects
Khrushdhev's apparent desire
to have the main elements
of a test-ban' treaty ready
for decision at the May
summit meeting.
In discussing the is-
sues to be taken up by the,
heads of government, Soviet
spokesmen continue to point
to a test-ban treaty as of-
fering the best possibility
for agreement.
(Concurred in by E:=-
(Concurred
EAST HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq 1
The Iraqi scene this past
week has been dominated. by the
visit of Soviet First Deputy
Premier Mikoyan, who arrived on
8 April. He has talked with
Qasim several times, but no of-
ficial pronouncements have been
made. Mikoyan is being given
the usual tour--the hanging
gardens of Babylon, model vil-
lages, and the US-built Daura
oil refinery near Baghdad. He
is scheduled to hold a press
conference before returning to
Moscow on 16 April.
Mikoyan has been greeted
by large crowds, and the Com-
munist press has marked the
visit,_by praising Soviet eco-
nomic assistance. One nation-
alist paper, however, published
an "open letter to Comrade Miko-
yan" declaring that the "im-
perialists" could not have de-
famed "your reputation one
tenth as much" as the Iraqi
Communists have. Soviet pub-
licity has been confined large-
ly to accounts of Mikoyan's
statements of friendship for
the Iraqi people and to descrip-
tions of his activities.
There have been no signif-
icant clashes or disturbances
during the visit. However,
Qasim chose the day before
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
,.1 April 1960
Mikoyan's arrival to chastise
the leftist-run Iraqi press
association and the Communist
press for creating divisive
influences in the country.
His comments were particularly
aimed at articles criticizing
the government.
On 10 April the president
of the Baghdad Military Court
struck out at the Communist
press for describing 66 indi-
viduals being tried as "honest
fighters," stating, "No one can
dall.these accused honest."
Those referred to are Commu-
nists who set up a "workers'
court" and executed 17 anti-
Communists after the Mosul re-
volt in March 1959. A recent
issue of Ittihad al-Shaab, the
Communist mouthpiece, was de-
voted entirely to charges that
the regime has shown partial-
ity toward anti-Communist par-
ties, has closed down Commu-
nist-dominated unions and im-
prisoned their leaders, and
has failed to license peasant
associations. At the same
time, three previously sup-
pressed nationalist papers
have been allowed to resume
publication.
The proceedings of pro-
Communist Col. Mahdawi's Peo-
ple's Court now are being edit-
ed' before being broadcast by
Baghdad radio and television.
Libya
On 11 April a minority
bloc in the Libyan Chamber of
Deputies launched virulent at-
tacks on the operation of Wheel-
us Air Base, on the "lack of re-
spect shown by Americans for
Libyan sovereignty and honor,",
and on American "indifference"
to Libya's economic needs. One
of the group's spokesmen de-
manded that the chamber take
matters into its own hands
and "annul this evil American
treaty."
While the Libyan Government
still controls the majority of
the chamber's membership, the
strength of this opposition
bloc was considerably increased
in last January's elections.
Earlier meetings of the newly
elected membership were organi-
zational; this is the first
chance the minority group has
had to use parliamentary debate
to air its anti-American views.
As "rent" for continued
American use of the air base,
the prime minister and other
leading governmental officials
are insisting on a substantial
level of American aid and a
commitment of funds for several
years which would be completely
at the disposal of the Libyan
Government. The government's
handling of the minority par-
liamentary group on this issue
will depend largely on the spe-
cific size and nature of pend-
ing new American aid proposals.
Arab League
The Arab League Political
Affairs Committee, which two
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
weeks ago found the hotly dis-
puted Palestinian "state" ques-
tion too delicate to handle,
(see Part III, page 6), tried
to tackle another controversial
matter in Cairo last week. This
was the UAR-sponsored proposal
for an Arab boycott of French
goods and the freezing of French
assets in Arab states in protest
against nuclear testsa in the
Sahara. In mid-March, Cairo
quietly stopped issuing further
import permits for French goods,
Disagreement in the ,Arab
League committee showed that
few, if any, of the other Arab
governments intend to follow
the UAR's lead, and Cairo prob-
ably is not pressing the issue.
A Lebanese official publicly
announced ':that his country
would "refuse to abide by any
Arab League recommendation for
the boycott of France."
While there has been a
strong adverse reaction in"all
the Arab states to the French
nuclear tests, economic rela-
tions with France are important
to many of them. Their goTern-
ments prefer to express their
opposition in. ways which db not
entail disruption of trade or
possible financial loss. Thus,
most of the Arab states will
probably continue to concen-
trate on protesting through
propaganda, public demonstra-
tions, and diplomatic notes.
Working with the. African states,
they will also sustain their
pressure in the United Nations
for a special General Assembly
session on the issue.
Turkey-USSR
Ankara and Moscow issued
simultaneous announcements on
12 April that Premier Menderes
would visit Moscow in July and
Premier Khrushchev would make
a return visit to Turkey at a
later date. The USSR since
early 1960 had been pressing
for such an exchange, but offi-
cials in Ankara were reluctant
to agree to the visits, fear-
ing their,',,effect on some of
Turkey's allies--particularly
Iran. The Turks apparently ac-
quiesced to keep pace with some
of their NATO allies in current
efforts to improve East-West
relations.
Officials.in Greece have
already indicated fear that
the announcement will cause
internal difficulties for the
Karamanlis government, which
has consistently rejected simi-
lar Soviet overtures. Iran,
.whose relations with the USSR
have been severely strained
during the past year, will also
be under increased pressure to
improve relations with Moscow.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Fighting in Algeria may
soon intensify, especially in
the Tunisian border area. The
rebels have indicated their
desire to step up military op-
erations as a means of improv-
ing their international stand-
ing. The build-up by both
sides near the Tunisian border
increases the possibility of
French incursions into Tuni-
sian territory in pursuit of
rebel units.
French Defense Minister
Messmer reported to the Senate
Defense Committee on 6 April
his concern over Tunisian "com-
plicity" in allowing the in-
stallation of rebel training
camps "within binocular range"
of the Algerian frontier. He
added that French military
forces are not authorized to
remedy this situation "for the
time being."
Meanwhile, French Army
headquarters in Algeria has
declared the end of the eight-
month campaign in the Kabylia
Mountains, in which the French
claim to have inflicted 5,000
rebel casualties, and announced
the imminent transfer of the
seasoned Tenth Paratroop Divi-
sion, probably to the Tunisian
border.
French military authori-
ties state that they expect a
rebel attack in force at an
early date, and the press is
giving anticipatory play to
the "right of pursuit." The
French have crossed the Tuni-
sian border occasionally in
the past, and the bombing of
Sakiet-Sidi-Youssef in Febru-
rary 1958 resulted in a formal
Tunisian complaint to the UN
Security, Council.
The rebels, who held a
council of war in Tripoli from
4 to 6 April, plan to step up
both military and political
activity. Spokesmen of the
provisional government have
hinted that newly arrived arms
will permit the launching of a
spring offensive. The rebels,
reportedly disappointed at
Khrushchev's failure to plead
their cause.with De Gaulle, may
send a delegation to`Communist
China to obtain arms and to
demonstrate their willingness
to accept aid from any friend-
ly source. The rebels' moves
to gain international accept-
ance as belligerents have in-
cluded "ratification" of the
Geneva convention at the Trip-
oli meeting, as well as efforts
to inaugurate a "foreign
legion," presumably made up of
Arab volunteers, for Algeria.
Premier Debra's visit to
Algeria from 11 to 13 April
concentrated on preparations
for the 29 May cantonal
elections which his government,
in spite of the skepticism of
of most political groups in
France, apparently hopes will
bring forward a new group of
Moslems with whom Paris can
discuss Algeria's future. While
his public statements dealt
mostly with problems related
to economic and social
progress, he said in a 12 April
broadcast that a vote favoring
independence in any referendum
following ;paeificition would
be disastrous and would lead
to partition of the area. The
rebels have said they will
boycott the French-sponsored
elections in Algeria, and prob-
ably plan a campaign of terror-
ism to inhibit Moslem partici-
pation.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
A Belgian-Congolese eco-
nomic conference will open in
Brussels on 25 April against a
backdrop of growing alarm in
Belgium over the Conga's eco-
nomic future after it becomes
independent on 30 June. The
conference is thus likely to
be much concerned with imme-
diate financial problems, but
Belgium still hopes that it
will also settle such impor-
tant questions as the Congo's
future ties with the Common
Market, the formation of a
Belgo-Congolese Development
Corporation, future relations
between the Congolese and Bel-
gian central banks, and various
other financial and budgetary
management problems.
The most immediate problem
confronting the Belgians is the
serious flight of capital from
the Congo since the independence
accord was reached. Capital
outflow in 1959 exceeded the
1958 level by $130,000,000,
reflecting the persistent fear
of disturbances and possible
expropriation. The capital
repatriation in January 1960
was $20,000,000 above last year's
monthly average. Although ex-
change controls have recently
been initiated, the Congo cen-
tral bank's reserves have been
seriously depleted, and there
are apparently insufficient
funds to meet treasury require-
ments between now and 30 June.
The longer term problem,
and probably the more important
one, is the lack of financing
for essential public investments.
At a meeting with American Em-
bassy officials in Brussels on
5 April, Congo Minister de
Schrijver and his economic
counselor estimated the 1960
requirement at $120,000,000
to $135,000,000. This sum is
ON THE BELGIAN CONGO
over and above minor sources
Brussels still hopes to tap and
the $54,000,000 contribution
Belgium will make to the Congo
budget this year.
Brussels says it has unsuc-
cessfully sought Belgian-guaran-
teed loans for this purpose from
various European countries, as
well as the European Common Mar-
ket's investment bank, and now
sees no alternative to American
aid. Without immediate and sub-
stantial foreign aid, Belgian
officials predict there will be
"economic and political turmoil,"
economic stagnation, and aggrava-
tion of the already serious un-
employment problem, and a conse-
quent loss of Belgian--and West-
ern--prestige.
The Belgians seem to have
been slow to appreciate the eco-
nomic implications of the Congo's
independence and are probably
ill prepared to cope with them.
The $1,000,000 technical assist-
ance program Belgium intends to
offer, for example, seems small.
Also illustrative of overoptimism
is the hope expressed by Belgian
officials that the Congolese will
agree to permit Belgian nationals
to continue to handle the budget,
the banking system, and the gov-
ernment controller's office.
Some Congolese appreciate
the extent to which they are
still dependent on Belgium, but
they will be alert to any at-
tempt by Brussels to retrieve
at the economic conference what
it gave up at the political talks
in January. One powerful Congo-
lese leader has indicated that
in his view the conference should
concentrate on such matters as
the present financial crisis and
Belgian budgetar assistance to
the new state.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
SOMALI AGITATION FOR INDEPENDENCE
Agitation by Somali nation-
alists for early independence
and political unification has
increased tension in the Horn
of Africa, particularly between
Ethiopia and the Somalilands.
Local legislatures in the pro-
tectorate of British Somaliland
and in the Italian-administered
trust territory of Somalia re-
cently passed resolutions di-
rected toward unifying the two
territories by 1 July, when the
trust territory is to achieve
independence.
To guide its protectorate
toward independence within two
or three years, London has re-
formed the territory-wide legis-
lative council so that elected
members are in the majority.
Elections were held last Feb-
ruary, and London appointed four
Somalis to ministerial positions
in the seven-member executive
council. The nationalist lead-
ers, however, at the opening ses-
sion of the legislature in Har-
geisa, introduced a motion on 6
April calling for independence
and unity with neighboring
Somalia by 1 July.
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N
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BURY
14 April 1960
Protectorate nationalists,
taking advantage of an apparent
change in the position of the
trust territory government in
favor of Somali unity, have by-
passed official channels in
London and Rome and have ar-
ranged a meeting of representa-
tives of the two Somali terri-
tories in Mogadiscio--Somalia's
capital--to discuss a unifica-
tion agreement.
Somalia's legislature, ap-
parently anticipating the res-
olution made at Hargeisa, re-
quested the Italian administra-
tor to advise the UN of the
"unanimous desire of all Somali
people to be united under the
same flag" and to permit them
to "freely express" their "own
wish to be united" in an early
UN-conducted plebiscite. While
Walter Ulbricht's all-out
campaign to convert East Ger-
many rapidly into a "social-
ist" stronghold has sharply in-
creased refugee flights to the
West. The number was some 13,-
400 in March, compared with
less than 10,000 per month in
January and February. During
the week ending 12 April, more
than 2,391 refugees
fled to West Berlin
alone--598 more than
during the compara-
ble week in 1959. Of
the March total, al-
most 11 percent were
farmers--compared
with a normal figure
of about 5 percent;
craftsmen, intellec-
tuals, and "middle
class" persons. are
also fleeing in
greater numbers. The
increased flow is
this action may indicate that
Mogadiscio now intends to sup-
port actively a pro-union atti-
tude, the Somalia Government
probably continues to favor a
loose association with the pro-
tectorate. Such an association
would preserve the dominant po-
sition of the governing tribal
group in Somalia.
Addis Ababa, concerne ?;
that the nomadic Somalis who
predominate in Ethiopia's south-
eastern Ogaden Province might
be attracted to an enlarged So-
mali state, has sought to im-
prove its relations with and
control over these nomads. In
addition, Addis Ababa has claimed
that Britain and Italy inspired
the Hargeisa and Mogadiscio mo-
tions, accusing them of fomenting
of Africa.
"neo-imperialism" in the Horn
likely to continue in com-
ing weeks.
The regime has announced
that all but one of East Ger-
many's 14 districts--Karl-Marx-
Stadt--show -have been fully col-
lectivized, meaning that more
than 90 percent of East Ger-
many's agricultural land is now
REFUGEES ESCAPING TO WEST BERLIN
FIRST QUARTER 1960
30 DEC -5 JAN 131AJAN 29 JAN -2 FEB 10-16 FIB 24 FEB-IMAR 1015 MAR 23 29 MAR
6 12 JAN 2026 IAN 3-9 FEB 17 23 FEB 2.9 MAR 16-22 MAR 30 MAR -5 APR
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14 April 1960
under direct supervision of the
state. Most of the newly col-
lectivized farms are still
loosely organized, but the re-
gime will probably attempt to
consolidate control after the
harvest. This in turn is like-
ly to provoke further resistance
and flights to the West.
The regime will continue
pressure for complete collec-
tivization in the remaining dis-
trict in the hope of being able
to announce, prior to the sum-
mit conference, that East Ger-
many is fully collectivized.
At the same time, great efforts
have been made to halt the flights
by tightening security precau-
tions on the frontier and a-
round Berlin.
Proceedings at the eighth
SED central committee plenum,
held from 30 March to 2 April,
reveal that the regime is at-
tempting to counter serious
manpower shortages and low
morale on farms by ordering
thousands of youths to the
countryside. The State Plan-
ning Commission has ordered
conversion of certain factories
to manufacture farm machinery
essential for the newly formed
collectives. More funds are to
be provided for collectives,
which are usually costly opera-
tions. This reallocation of
funds reportedly will be at the
expense of badly needed hous-
ing and consumer goods for the
general populace. Such meas-
ures suggest that the collecti-
vization campaign went at a
faster pace than originally
planned.
The socialization campaign
--called the "great leap for-
ward"--is being extended to the
"middle class." The economic
importance of the small shop-
keepers, who in August still
accounted for approximately 25
percent of East Germany's re-
tail trade, may be such that
the regime will deal somewhat
more.cautiously with them than
with independent peasants.
CHOU EN-LAPS TRIP THROUGH ASIA
Communist China's Premier
Chou En-lai, accompanied by
Foreign Minister Chen Yi and a
party of 20, has left Peiping
for a tour of South and South-
east Asia. His major effort
will be directed toward attain-
ing some agreement with Indian
Prime Minister Nehru concerning
the countries' boundary dispute.
Extension of his journey to in-
clude Nepal, Burma, and Cambodia
is intended to dramatize Pei-
ping's renewed emphasis on
friendship with its neighbors
and to repair some of the damage
to Communist China's prestige
.resulting from the Sino-Indian
border issue and Peiping's sup-
pression of the Tibetan revolt.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
Since Chou's 1956. trip
through this same area, no top-
level Chinese delegation has
toured Asia. Peiping may feel
that, in addition to demonstrat-
ing its professed allegiance
to the "Bandung spirit," there
is a need to follow up the re-
cent high-level Soviet visits.
The delegations from Moscow
maintained a neutral attitude
M O N G O L I A
For the past several months,
the Chinese have used propaganda
and diplomatic "leaks" to por-
tray themselves as anxious for
a quick and equitable settle-
ment with India. This seems
intended to provide Chou with
a maneuverability denied Nehru,
who must constantly reassure
the Indian public that he is
not appeasing Peiping.
toward China's disputes with
India and Indonesia and gave
Peiping virtually no support
for its pose of "reasonable-
ness."
In Rangoon, Chou pre-
sumably hopes to exchange rat-
ifications of the Sino-Burmese
boundary agreement and the
treaty of friendship and nonag-
gression concluded in January.
The Chinese will portray Chou's
visit there as evidence of
friendship and mutual accord
on outstanding issues--a time-
ly display intended to make it
more difficult for Nehru to
adopt an uncompromising posi-
tion in his talks with Chou:
IT.
CN 1'q. NE - -_-
ar_
To take the initiative
and set a tone of Chinese flexi-
bility, Chou, although realiz-
ing that public pressure would
probably prevent Nehru's early
acceptance, may offer the out-
right exchange of disputed
areas in Assam for those in
Ladakh. Chou probably will
seek to gain agreement in prin-
ciple to the Chinese contentions
that the border is not and never
has been delimited and that the
occupation of territory is a
key point in determining final
ownership.
Chou is expected to press
for a mutual military withdrawal
from present frontier positions
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
but may,as a, conciliatory ges'
ture, offer to pull Chinese
troops further back from Pei-
ping's version of the Lddakh
border than he has before. He
is certain to push for a joint
border commission to keep ne-
gotiations alive.
In Nepal, Chou, who is re-
paying Prime Minister Koirala,'s
recent visit to China, probably
will attempt to include a clause
in a friendship treaty to pro-
hibit new military alignments.
This would be aimed directly
at undercutting India's influ-
ence in Nepal, for Katmandu
has a mutual defense understand-
ing with New Delhi but no formal
agreement as yet. Koirala, who
signed border and economic aid
agreements in Peiping, apparent-
ly is ready to conclude a rou-
tine friendship and nonaggres-
sion pact but probably will re-
sist any clause barring Nepal
from entering into military
defense agreements with other
countries.
King Suramarit's death. In
Phnom Penh, Chou will try to
capitalize on Cambodia's
strained relations with Thai-
Chou is scheduled to ar-
rive in Cambodia in early May,
but his trip may be postponed
for a short time because of
PEIPING NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS CLOSES
The annual meeting of
Communist China's National
People's Congress, which ended
on 10 April, was highlighted
by the announcement of a new
drive for the formation of com-
munes in cities.
Speeches during the lat-
ter days of the congress pro-
vide some details on the form
of the new urban communes. They
are to be organized on one of
three basic patterns: around
large-scale state enterprises
such as factories or mines,
around small "neighborhood"
enterprises, or around govern-
ment organizations and schools.
Urban communes in the Manchurian
industrial city of Harbin were
reported to have an average of
nearly 160,000 members, while
those in Shenyang (Mukden)
average about 30,000 members.
One speaker noted that 20,000,-
000 urban residents had-already
been organized into communes,
largely in the provinces of
Honan,Hopei, and Heilungchiang.
Both People's Daily and
speakers awe congress have
described the formation of
urban communes as a step-by-
step process. The amount of
propaganda attention devoted
to the movement,however,suggests
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
that it will develop into a ma-
jor, high-pressure campaign.
The social and political im-
plications of the urban commune
program are likely to be of
more immediate significance
than the economic effects, and
Peiping presumably hopes it
will result in a higher degree
of regimentation and control in
the cities.
Premier Chou En-lai's
speech at the closing session
of the congress on internation-
al relations and foreign policy.
added nothing to Peiping's pres-
ent lines. He gave only routine
support to Soviet policies, and
his attacks against the United
States contrasted sharply with
Moscow's relatively moderate
tone. He recently told the
Indian ambassador that once
Sino-American issues were "set-
tled," Soviet and Chinese at-
titudes would be "identical."
Chou had originally been
scheduled to present a,"govern-
ment work report," but this was
dropped from the congress'
agenda just before the opening
session. In the light of other
indications that the opening
may have been delayed for sev-
eral days, this suggests that
lines to be taken at the con-
gress were not formulated in
detail until the last minute.
Mao Tse-tung attended the
opening and closing sessions
of the congress, as did Vice
Premier Chen Yun, whose inac-
tivity for almost a year has
given rise to speculation that
he was out of favor. Chen,
described by a Western corre- 25X1
spondent as "lean and haggard,"
was listed in his usual place
as senior vice premier.
CHINA'S LONG-RANGE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM
China's National People's
Congress, which ended on 10 April,
endorsed a long-range "Program
for Agricultural Development
(1956-67)" but called for ef-
forts to complete it two to
three years ahead of schedule.
This program, announced in
early 1956 and revised in the
fall of 1957, is a loosely
drawn outline of measures to
improve agriculture. It lacks
specific provisions for its
realization, but is said nev-
ertheless to have provided the
"impetus" for many of the suc-
cesses achieved in agriculture
in the past few years.
In discussing the program
before the congress, party agri-
cultural spokesman Tan Chen-lin
attempted to show that in the
"leap forward" of the past two
years, certain objectives had
already been surpassed and
others realized to a large ex-
tent. He claimed that the yields
called for by 1967 have already
been achieved on one fourth of
China's grain acreage and on
more than 40 percent of total
cotton acreage.
The country's hog popula-
tion and average per capita farm
income last year reached levels
which the program had set for
1962. Some two thirds of the
program's target for irrigated
acreage has already been met,
Tan said, but he cautioned that
completion of a reservoir does
not automatically confer irriga-
tion benefits on nearby acreage
--as Peiping's statisticians
have sometimes implied.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
Good progress was also re-
ported by Tan toward the pro-
gram's goals of extending the
area sown to improved seed
strains, planting more high-
yield crops (like corn), rais-
ing the multiple-cropping in-
dex, bringing new areas under
cultivation, and initiating
greater research in agronomy.
Mechanization and moderniza-
tion are proceeding more rapid-
ly than had been envisaged in
the original program.
Tan revealed, however, that
the situation in agriculture is
not completely optimistic.
Grain yields set for 1967, one
of the few specific targets
set forth in the program, im-
ply the production of 360,000,-
000-375,000,000 tons. This
would mean an average annual
increase of about 7 percent
over the 1957 harvest--the last
crop before the "leap forward."
While this is a more conserva-
tive figure than the claimed
increase of 21 percent per year
between 1957-1959, it is still
an unrealistic goal. The rel-
ative modesty of the 1967 goal,
together with Tan's emphasis
on the "arduous" task ahead,
suggests that even Peiping may
regard some earlier "leap for-
ward" claims as exaggerated.
Tan takes note of the vast
changes which have taken place
in the Chinese countryside since
the program was first made pub-
lic in early 1956. The regime
has shifted rapidly from lower
level cooperatives through col-
lective farms to the present
communes.
Tan intimates that future
changes will be worked out with-
in the commune framework. He
says the,promised move from the
present system of ownership
mainly at the production-brigade
level to ownership mainly at
the commune level will require
several "conditions"--average
income of commune members must
reach 150-200 yuan (as against
85 yuan last year), "poor"
brigades must reach the income
levels of advanced ones, and
mechanization must reach "cer-
tain proportions"--all of which
indicate that complete rural 25X1
"communization" will not be real-
CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA
Commu-
nist China prove e e Indo-
nesian armed forces with about
$21,000,000 in arms and mili-'
tary equipment during late
1958 and early 1959. All this
materiel except four small
landing craft was delivered
between September 1958 and
May 1958. Approximately half
the arms were supplied to the
air force, and the remainder
was about equally divided be-
tween the army and the navy.
Much of the materiel was
of US origin--presumably cap-
tured in North Korea or from
the Chinese Nationalists. Some
Soviet- and Chinese Communist -
produced arms were also in-
cluded. The Indonesian .,'Air
Force, in addition to receiv-
ing MIG-17 jet fighters, also
acquired obsblete twin-engine
TU-2 light bombers and LA-11
fighters of World War II vin-
tage. The navy procured sev-
eral types of US-produced land-
ing craft and one landing ship.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
The army's purchases consisted
largely of small arms, ammu-
nition, and communications
equipment, mostly of US origin.
Although an In-
donesian military
purchasing mission,
on its way home from
the Soviet Union,
visited Communist
China in July 1959 and
presumably submitted
additional arms re-
quests to Peiping, ap-
parently no contracts
were concluded at that
time. Subsequent arms
talks, reportedly
scheduled for August
1959, either were
not held or were in-
conclusive. Shortly
thereafter, the dis-
pute over Djakarta's
ban on alien traders
led to a serious de-
terioration of Sino-
Indonesian relations,
which would seem to preclude any
addit a n a l Ch .nese .Co unist - mili-
tary assistance for the time being,
Chinese efforts during
the-past.two years to get an
economic aid program under way
in Indonesia also apparently
foundered during the dispute
over Djakarta's ban on alien
traders. A $30,000,000 credit
offered An mid-1959 for in-
dustrial development reported-
ly has been refused by Indo-
nesia. This offer may be re-
vived later, but it is unlike-
ly that Peiping will renew its
efforts to establish an aid
program until Sino-Indonesian
relations have improved. The
only economic assistance thus
far provided by Communist China
consists of textile and rice
deliveries in 1958-59 under
a credit arrangement amount-
ing to about $11,200.000
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
POLITICAL MANEUVERING IN INDONESIA
Reports of maneuvering and
attitude presumably is influenced
plotting by politicians and
by its appraisal of Sukarno's
military elements in Indonesia
power position, lack of unity
have continued unabated since
in the army itself, and the im-
President Sukarno's appointment
probability that anti-Sukarno
of a controversial new Parlia-
forces would retain their cohe-
ment on 27 March and his de-
sion under stress.
parture on 1 April for a two-
month global tour. Some of
Sukarno himself appears to
these reports arise in part
have been influenced by the pro-
rts of the recently
eff
f
longed spate of rumors; at least
rom
o
formed Democratic League, a
some of them are believed to hav
e
coalition led by the large Mos-
been deliberately planted and
lem Masjumi party, to prevent
stimulated by elements opposing
the installation of the new
the army and favoring the Com-
ent in June
rli
P
munists. When he left Indonesia
.
am
a
on 1 April, Sukarno stated pub-
The league's efforts thus
licly at the airport, "I hope
far appear unsuccessful. The
that when I return I will merely
although lending quiet
army
have to resume the leadership of
,
is awaiting evi-
encouragement
a government that will have been
,
dence of the organization's
functioning without any inter-
strength before making any de-
ruption in the next two months."
cisive move to support it. The
second largest Moslem party,
Since Sukarno's departure,
the Nahdatul Ulama, is nearly
a presidential decree has been
split over the parliamentary
announced removing the leftist
issue, but appears more likely
pro-Sukarno air force from the
to support Sukarno than the
Department of Defense and pro-
league.
viding a separate cabinet port-
folio for the air force chief of
There are also rumors that
staff. The effect will be a fur-
the army, assisted by non-
ther reduction in the army's po-
Communist political groups, will
litical power. Minor inroads
stage a coup. The army leader-
on army power, apparently
ship, however, gives little
made largely at Sukarno's
indication that it plans to
instigation, have been in
attempt a takeover during Su-
progress since late 1959.
karno's absence. The army's
IMPENDING ELECTIONS IN LAOS
The elections for Laos'
59-member National Assembly on
24 April will be of consider-
able importance in terms both
of the quality and political
affiliations of the non-Commu:-+-
nist m, jority expected to gain
office and of the impact of the
voting on future Communist plans
for Laos. Should candidates
of the Communist-front Neo Lao
Hak Sat (NLRS) and allied groups
do well, and should divisive
tendencies among anti-Communist
elements reappear, the Commu-
nists will probably make another
attempt to play the parliamentary
game in Laos. To the extent,
however, that these Communist
hopes are unfulfilled, increasing
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14 April 1960
reliance may be placed on the
underground Pathet Lao insur-
gent movement as the main
means for gaining control of
the country.
The government has been
fairly successful in inducing
the principal anti-Communist
political groupings--former
Premier Phoui's Rally of the
Lao People (RLP) and the. Com-
mittee for Defense of National
Interests (CDNI) --to limit the
number of rival anti-Communist
candidates seeking election.
Government-approved'candidates
will be running unopposed or
opposed only by other RLP or
CDNI candidates in 30 of the
59 electoral districts.
By means of a highly re-
strictive electoral ordinance
and other administrative strat-
agems, the government was able
to limit the number of candi-
dates from the NLHS and the
fellow-traveling Santiphab
party to nine each. Sympathiz-
ers among the "independents"
bring the total number of Com-
munist and Communist-associated
candidates to an estimated 25.
There are indications that the
government may take further
steps to ensure that only a
bare minimum of Communist can-
didates are elected.
The American Embassy in
Vientiane believes that, with-
out rigging by the government,
the NLHS and allied candidates
could win from 5 to 15 seats.
The embassy expects the RLP to
win more seats than the CDNI-
sponsored candidates,but feels
the two groups may be so close
in size as to render the in-
vestiture of a new premier dif-
ficult when the new assembly
convenes on 10 May.
The Communists may foresee
a real possibility of a split
in the anti-Communist ranks in
the new assembly, which would
give the leftist bloc much
greater scope fbr manuever.
This c#lculation is probably
an important factor behind the
Communists' seeming willing-
ness to permit the elections
to be held in relative peace.
Their propaganda has warned,
however, that if the "American
interventionists" and their
"lackeys"--the CDNI--prevent
NLHS and other "progressive"
candidates from winning, the
elections will be null and void
in their view, and there will
.be a recrudescence of guerrilla
warfare by the Pathet Lao.
Late reports indicate the NLHS
and the Santiphab may with-
draw at least some of
their candidates in protest
against alleged government
strong'-arm tactics in connec-
tion with the elections.F____1
The appointment on 11 portfolios were reallocated
April of Food Minister Lt. Gen. within the cabinet in early
Azam Khan as governor of East January, Ayub until now has
Pakistan and the addition of not changed its original per-
the former governors of East sonnel, apparently partly to
and West Pakistan to the Ayub maintain the appearance of sta-
cabinet are the first changes bility lacking under previous
in membership in the Pakistani regimes.
cabinet since the army take-
over in October 1958. Although It is not yet clear whether
Azam can retain his status as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
the number-two man in the Paki-
stani Government and as Ayub's
designated successor. The new
governor may view his assign-
ment to a post 1,200 miles away
from the central government
and army headquarters, both of
which are located in Rawalpindi,
as a demotion, since it removes
him from the center of power.
There has been speculation,
however, that Ayub ha^ under
consideration giving Azam a
special title--"vice president"
has been mentioned--to confirm
him in his number-two position.
Azam's departure may en-
courage the other members to
jockey for positions of greater
influence, with Minister of
Interior Sheikh taking a promi-
nent part in the maneuvering.
Sheikh has been frequently
mentioned in rumors circulated
by opponents of the regime as
eager to increase his own
power, even at the expense of
Ayub. At the same time, the
announced changes will probably
lead regime opponents, particu-
larly the ousted politicians
and their followers, to claim
that the Ayub government is
unstable.
Azam has a reputation for
getting things done, and his
assignment may be intended to
demonstrate that the central
government views economic prog-
ress in East Pakistan as a
priority objective. He will
probably try to bring about
early economic improvement, but,
as a West Pakistani and an out-
sider, he may offend provincial
sensitivities in his drive for
greater efficiency and harder
work. Many East Pakistanis will
probably find cause for com-
plaint in the appointment of
a West Pakistani as governor
and are unlikely to be mollified
by the appointment of East Paki-
stan's former governor to the
central cabinet.
President Ayub has appointed
the Khan of Kalabagh, a prominent
Pushtoon who has been serving
as chairman of the Pakistan In-
dustrial Development Corpora-
tion, as the new governor of
West Pakistan. He probably
hopes this move will strengthen
Pakistan's position in its
propaganda war with Afghan-
istan over the Pushtoonistan
dispute.
CEYLON'S ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES
Prospects for any early
improvement in Ceylon's deteri-
orating economic situation have
been dimmed by the failure of
any party to win a majority in
the national elections in March.
The island's economic decline
under Prime Minister Bandara-
naike during the last three and
one half- years was accelerated
in the series of political
crises which began in mid-1959
and culminated in. the dissolu-
tion of Parliament last December.
The tenuous backing of Dudley
Senanayake's new minority gov-
ernment and the probability that
instability will continue, at
least until new elections can
be held,make it appear likely
that the economic decline will
continue throughout 1960.
Chief among Ceylon's eco-
nomic ills is a record trade
deficit of $52,710,000 during
1959. Before 1957, there was
usually an annual surplus. The
increased volume and higher
costs of imported consumer goods
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
were primarily responsible for
the deficit, as prices for ma-
jor exports were favorable and
total export earnings for 1959
increased over 1958.
The balance-of-payments
position has deteriorated con-
siderably since 1958, and the
deficit last year was $47,250,-
000. External assets fell
during 1959 from $185,000,000
to $145,000,000, enough to pay
for about four months of im-
ports. This small reserve ca-
pacity points up the island's
vulnerability to flood, drought,
or unfavorable shifts in ex-
ternal trade patterns.
The government's cash op-
erating deficit of $86,730,000
for the past fiscal year, Octo-
ber 1958-September 1959, is an
increase of more than 100 per-
cent over the 1957 deficit.
The high rate of government
expenditures has contributed
to expanding the money supply,
which rose sharply during the
last quarter of 1959, keeping
prices high and maintaining
the demand for imports.
The difficulties of fi-
nancing the deficit and lower-
ing the cost of living have
increased considerably. The
total of treasury bills out"
standing reached its legal
limit in mid-January, and the
government recently announced
that it would cost $18,000,000
to reduce the subsidized price
of rice, which other major
parties promised during the
election campaign.
The government has a few
favorable factors on its side.
Production of major export
crops was satisfactory in 1959,
Colombo has contracted for suf-
ficient food imports to cover
1960 requirements, and the ab-
sence of disruptive strikes
since mid-1959 has resulted in
improved operations at Colombo
port, Ceylon's major gateway
to the outside world.
Such advantages are heav-
ily outweighed by adverse po-
litical factors, however.
Even if the Senanayake govern-
ment survives its first par-
liamentary vote on 22 April,
its minority status will severe-
ly curtail its power to im-
plement proposed economic re-
forms.
US INVESTMENT UNDER POLITICAL ATTACK IN PERU
American investments in
Peru, which have risen sharply
in recent years because of
favorable Peruvian laws and
relatively stable political and
economic conditions, are being
attacked with increasing fre-
quency in the Peruvian Congress
and press. Peru is still a
model in South America of suc-
cessful application of conserv-
ative financial principles.
The administration of conserva-
tive President Manuel Prado ap-
pears too weak to control indi-
vidual leaders who exploit na-
tionalist sentiment for their
own advantage. As a consequence,
the climate for foreign invest-
ment is deteriorating and may
in time be reflected in worsen-
ing US-Peruvian relations.
Within the last nine months,
congressional and press criti-
cism directed against two US
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
oil companies has been unusually
bitter. The International Pe-
troleum Company, a Standard Oil
subsidiary and Peru's largest
producer, faces possible an-
nulment of rights to its oil
properties, a threat which
rightist and Communist figures
have exploited politically. A
new financial group, backed by
a politically powerful cousin
of President Prado, is appar-
ently using the possibility of
nationalist agitation to break
into International Petroleum's
distribution monopoly. Another
US petroleum company was de-
nounced in Congress and the
press late last year for "vio-
lating" Peru's national sover
eignty--a charge also frequent-
ly levied against Standard's
subsidiary.
The US-owned copper com-
pany at Toquepala, whose newly
inaugurated mine largely ac-
counts for Peru's expected 27-
percent increase in export
revenues for 1960, is strongly
criticized by the government-
linked APRA, Peru's only major
party, because it discourages
unionization. A further cause
of US-Peruvian friction is a
projected shipping decree now
being urged by the navy minis-
ter--who is said to have a local
U
DIRECT INVESTMENTS
655
505
shipping interest--which would
require 50 percent of all com-
mercial cargoes to be carried
in Peruvian vessels.
A serious new anti-Ameri-
can outburst is threatened over
proposed US congressional con-
sideration of increased tariffs
on lead and zinc--products which
in 1958 brought in 12 percent
of Peru's export proceeds. Sim-
ilar discussions in 1957 and
1958 caused anti-US attacks
in Peru's Senate which were
described as the most bit-
ter in 30 years. F_ I
EUROPE'S TRADE CONFLICT
Although conciliatory
statements from Bonn and De
Gaulle's recent visit to London
have somewhat relaxed the ten-
sion, no generally acceptable
solution is in sight for the
basic issues dividing. Europe's
trade blocs--the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) and the
European Free Trade Association
(EFTA). A late March meeting,
the first all-European trade
talks in more than a year, pro-
duced merely another investigat-
ing committee--whose findings
are likely to be used by each
side to justify its own posi-
tion.
Further talks are not sched-
uled until late May, by which
time the issue may have been
decided--if, as'still seems
likely, the EEC's governing
council decides on 10 May to
accept EEC President Hallstein's
plan to speed up the estab-
lishment of the Common Mar-
ket.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
Much of the re-
cent rancor--as evi-
denced by the uproar
over Prime Minister
Macmillan's alleged
ttack on the EEC
during his Washing-
ton visit--is attrib-
utable:,,, to the full-
er realization of the
decisive importance
of the Hallstein
plan. The EFTA was
set up in the belief
that, by matching
the internal tariff
reductions of the
EEC and persuading
it to reciprocate,
no trade preferences
--within Europe--
would arise, This
effort to achieve a
European free trad-
ing area--by a round-
about t,way--could suc-
ceed, however, only
if the EEC agreed to
postpone indefinitely
the effective imple-
mentation of its com-
mon external tariff
and thereby to forego
the objective of
creating a full cus-
toms union.
In the eyes of
Hallstein and his col-
leagues, such a
sacrifice of basic
principle would be
European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven
European Economic Community Common Market
fatal to the Common Market, and
they have offered their speed-
up plan in part to precipitate
a decision while economic and
political circumstances are
still favorable. However, even
an initial step by the EEC to-
ward application of its common
tariffs would be a major tacti-
cal defeat for the EFTA, and
might result in equally serious
long-term consequences. Should
the possibility of an "easy"
association with the EEC seem
to be foreclosed, some of the
"reluctant" members of the EFTA
whose trading interests are
primarily with the EEC might
feel they have no alternative
but direct affiliation with the
Common Market.
Many in the EEC are ob-
viously still sensitive to the
charge they are opening up a
permanent rift in Europe. Nev-
ertheless, since it was first
announced on 3 March, the Hall-
stein thesis has attracted in-
creased support. The EEC's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
European Parliamentary Assembly,
which represents a rough cross-
section of Continental parlia-
mentary opinion, almost unani-
mously endorsed the plan on 31
March.
President Gronchi's invi-
tation to Amintore Fanfani to
form a cabinet reveals Gronchi's
determination to push for a
center-left government as the
solution to the long-standing
dilemma of the Christian Demo-
crats (CD). Such a move to
the left risks alienating con-
servative ecclesiastical and
economic interests within or
allied with the party. Fer-
nando Tambroni's effort to
form an all-CD cabinet col-
lapsed because the party's left
wing, mindful of the general
leftward trend of the electo-v,
rate, refused to accept rightist
support.
Although an attempt to form
a center-left government under
Antonio Segni during the early
stages of the crisis was blocked
by conservative forces, there
is a good chance that the sec-
?ond attempt under Fanfani will
succeed. The revolt within the
Christian Democratic party
against participation in a gov-
ernment dependent on the votes
of the neo-Fascists, as would
have been the case with the
Tambroni government, provided
a rough gauge of the strength
of anti-rightist feeling with-
in the party.
The present crisis has
lasted much longer than any
previous postwar Italian crisis,
and there have been rumors of a
possible coup attempt followed
by a general strike initiated by
the left. Fearx~that .ItajS,!s in-
ternational status may be dam-
aged by the absence of a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
government with a clear man-
date is one of the principal
spurs to a solution, however
provisional. Regardless of
the crisis, Antonio Segni,
foreign minister by virtue of
his inclusion in the Tambroni
cabinet, will take part in the
Washington pre-summit confer-
ence.
In the event
Fanfani does not ob-
tain parliamentary
approval, Gronchi
will probably favor
installing a strict-
ly caretaker one-
party government
rather than experi-
menting with a cen-
ter-right formula.
The Liberals--who
precipitated the cCi -
sis in the first place by refus-
ing to go on supporting the Segni
government without being repre-
sented in the cabinet--presuma-
bly would demand inclusion in a
coalition government. This is a
conceivable solution but not a
likely one.in the face of oppo-
sition from the Christian Demo-
cratic left.
ITALIAN PARLIAMENT
i-COMMUNITY MOVEMENT
UNITED MOVEMENT OF
SOCIALIST INITIATIVE- 5
(MUIS)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMARY
14 April 1960
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
STATUS OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC'S ECONOMIC DRIVE
The Sino-Soviet bloc last
year added $1 billion to the
total amount of aid it has ex-
tended to free world countries.
Moscow hopes by this program
to foster a permanently ex-
panded relationship with un-
derdeveloped countries through
a sustained growth in trade.
However, the bilateral trading
practices of the bloc, the pri-
orities of intrabloc trade,
BLOC `AID EXTENDED JO THE FREE WORLD
(Million, US Dollars)
Total ab eat.nded ICELAND
, Economic 3,175
n
LJ Military 780
consisted largely of military
assistance, now is principally
oriented toward providing cred-
its for economic development.
Almost no new military aid was
included in the $1.04 billion
in bloc credits and grants ex-
tended in 1959, and the more
than $550,000,000 extended dur-
ing the first quarter of 1960
was entirely for economic pur-
poses.
Moscow's blatantly political
motivation, and the Soviet Un-
ion's greater need for Western
industrial products are seri-
ous limitations to such growth.
The Aid Program
The bloc's foreign aid
program, which originally
Moscow has extended 75 per-
cent of the $3.9 billion in aid
provided thus far by the bloc
and in 1959 and early 1960 ac-
counted for 90 percent of bloc
aid. The role of the European
satellites, however, has not
diminished. The USSR frequently
turns to Eastern Europe to com-
plete specific projects called
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIMARY
14 April 1960
SINO-SOVIET BLOC AID TO FREE WORLD
MILLION DOLLARS
50 EAST GERMANY
12 RUMANIA
108 POLAND
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
ECONOMIC AID MILITARY AID*
* AS A RESULT OF DISCOUNTS AND DOWN PAYMENTS,
BLOC DELIVERIES OF MILITARY AID UNDER THIS
PROGRAM NOW TOTAL $1.2 BILLION
00408 A
for under the Soviet aid agree-
ments, and a substantial share
of other such projects is sub-
contracted to Eastern Europe.
Peiping's program in the free
world--totaling $162,000,000--
does not appear to be ittegrated
witbJ. Lthat.. #of :: the rest of the
bloc.
About one third of all
credits extended under the bloc
aid program have been utilized.
Most of the $780,000,000 in mil-
itary aid agreements has been
implemented, and economic as-
siStancw deliveries amount to
about $550,000,000. Construc-
tion of India's Bhilai steel
mill and a variety of projects
and other economic assistance
in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan
account for most of the economic
aid thus far delivered. The
relatively slow pace with which
bloc economic credits have been
utilized has resulted from a
lack of domestic funds to meet
local costs of construction,
poor planning by local officials,
and in some cases the unavail-
ability on short notice of par-
ticular bloc goods.
The operation of the pro-
gram has gone far toward elim-
inating the optimism initially
engendered in recipient countries
by bloc aid agreements. The UAR,
which recently accepted more
Soviet aid and is renegotiating
the Soviet-Syrian agreement, at
the same time is critical of
some lags in Soviet deliveries
and the unsuitability of certain
equipment provided. The eco-
nomic stagnation in Iraq has
led Baghdad to seek new Western
assistance and to cast asper-
sions on the Soviet program by
dismissing the pro-Communist
economic planning chief who ne-
gotiated the aid agreement with
Moscow. Iraq, like other under-
developed countries, mistakenly
expected Soviet aid to have a
more immediate economic impact
but is expected to continue to
seek such assistance.
The early psychological
impact--favorable both to Mos-
cow and recipient governments--
has been out of proportion to
the size of the aid and is grad-
ually being reduced as aid recip-
ients find the bloc suppliers as
realistic and hardheaded as
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE TO
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
1954-1959
BILLION DOLLARS
? EXTENDED C] DELIVERED
TOTALS 36.2
. SING. SOVIET BLOC 3.4
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FREE WORLD
PRIVATE ,INVESTMENT
FREE WORLD
GOVERNMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIEY
14 April 1960
their Western counterparts.
Nevertheless, bloc assistance
is still welcome, and many of-
ficials of underdeveloped coun-
tries which need more aid than
can be obtained from Western
sources continue to see advan-
tages of doing business with
the bloc. They cite the low
interest charges, the provi-
sions for repayment in surplus
commodities rather than cash,
and the ease of negotiating
credit agreements.
The superiority of the
bloc program in some respects,
however, is largely ephemeral.
While bloc interest rates are
usually well below those pre-
vailing in the West, the larg-
est part of Western aid to un-
derdeveloped countries has been
in the form of outright grants.
Less than 5 percent of bloc aid
has been in this form. The bloc,
on the other hand, has real ad-
vantages in its lack of a his-
tory of colonialism and in its
willingness to accept goods
rather than foreign exchange
in repayment.
The bloc also profits by
its ability to seize an exploit-
able situation, offer aid imme-
diately, construct a few proj-
ects with favorable propaganda
impact, and conclude a simple
document regulating the credit
extended. Bloc flexibility
frequently does not extend be-
yond this point. Because of
the planned nature of bloc econ-
omies, contracts once concluded
are rigid, and subsequent al-
teration of projects is virtual-
ly impossible.
The bloc program will,
however, continue to be accept-
able in the underdeveloped
countries, and bloc countries'
fulfillment of their credit
agreements--which for the most
part has been satisfactory--
probably will make underdevel-
oped countries increasingly
willing to seek aid from them.
The bloc, chiefly the USSR, will
be able to continue this pro-
gram at least at the 1958-59
level of about $1 billion an-
nually, and an expansion of this
rate is possible. Repayments of
existing credits, which will
reach a peak in the mid-1960s,
presumably will enable the bloc
to expand the program without
further increase in the burden
of foreign aid. These repay-
ments will tend to sustain trade
with the underdeveloped areas.
Technical Aid and Training
About 5,040 bloc economic
technicians are helping to fill
the need for qualified technical
personnel in the underdeveloped
countries.` Nearly half the spe-
cialists are engaged in planning
and supervising construction
projects, and the remainder are
employed in geological surveys
and prospecting or are construc-
tion personnel working on public
utilities.
For the most part, bloc
technicians enjoy a good reputa-
tion in the underdeveloped coun-
tries. They have refrained from
political activities. The most
frequent complaint seems to be
that they keep too much to them-
selves. This stems in part from
the language barrier.
Neither the USSR nor the
host countries publicize the
presence of the 1,500 bloc mil-
itary specialists abroad--more
than half of whom are located
in the UAR. They are engaged in
training and equipment mainte-
nance and, at least in Afghan-
istan, perform some staff func-
tions as well. Few complaints
have been registered about the
qualifications of bloc military
specialists.
Less successful is the
training and advanced education
within the bloc for workers and
students from the underdeveloped
countries. Innate distrust of
Communism and fear that their
citizens may be-subverted have
made governments reluctant to
foster this program. Since 1955,
3,500 military personnel--about
half from the UAR--and nearly
2,000 technical trainees--about
half of them Indian steelworkers
--have received instruction in
the bloc; just over 1,800 students
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY Sl1RY
14 April 1960
--80 percent from the Middle
East--have been sent to bloc
educational institutions.
The Trade Program
The bloc program of bar-
tering machinery, equipment,
with the bloc. Bloc trade with
the entire free world, however,
has risen only from 2 percent of
total free world trade in 1954
to 3.5 percent last year.
USSR,
SINO- SOVIET BLOC TRADE WITH THE FREE WORLD
MILLION DOLLARS
The bloc, especially the
formerly sought to expand
FREE WORLD __T
_ FREE WORLD
SECRET
UNDERDEVELOPED
INDUSTRIAL
TOTAL
AREAS
COUNTRIES
B
BLOC IMPORTS
LOC IMPORTS
BLOC EXPORTS
BLOC EXPORTS
1954
402
468
1408
1283
3561
1956
769
697
2126
1824 ?
5416
1958
1076
1044
2326
2331
6777
1959
482
551
i 1152
1067
3252
JAN-JUNE
I
I
and industrial raw materials
for surplus agricultural prod-
ucts has established trade ties
with the underdeveloped coun-
tries. While these exchanges
are expected to increase, they
are not likely to establish the
bloc as a major influence in
international commerce in the
near future. Despite the ex-
pansion of its trade in the
past few years, the USSR is
still only a minor force in
world trade; most of its trade
is still with other Communist
states. Furthermore, two
thirds of the USSR's free world
trade is with industrial coun-
tries whose economic and polit-
ical affiliations are relative-
ly well established.
On occasion, trade in cer-
tain commodities such as tin,
oil, rubber, and sugar--despite
statistical insignificance--has
had important effects in free
world markets. Moreover, bloc
trade in a few cases now ac-
counts for an important share
of the total trade of some non-
bloc countries. The UAR, Af-
ghanistan, Iceland, Yugoslavia,
Turkey, Finland, Uruguay, Aus-
tria and Guinea carry on from
10 to 33 percent of their trade
eral trade. Trade
presumably will con-
tinue to expand, but
except in special
cases and for limited
periods of time it is
expected to remain rel-
atively insignificant.
Bilateral trade
now is more frequently resisted
by underdeveloped countries,
where the practice has only tem-
porarily corrected trade prob-
lems resulting from surpluses.
Burma discovered in 1957 that its
rice barter deals with the bloc
COMMODITY COMPOSITION OF
BLOC-FREE WORLD TRADE
D
BLOC
IMPORTS
BLOC
EXPORTS
Crude raw materials
33
17
Manufactured goods
30
24
Machinery and
Transport Equipment
15
8
Foodstuff s
13
24
Chemicals
8
6
Fuels
18
Miscellaneous
1
3
100%
i 100%
prevented it from fulfilling
.cash orders from traditional
customers. This and other dif-
ficulties inherent in the direct
exchange of commodities were so
great that the bloc's portion of
Burma's trade fell from 16 per-
cent in 1956 to 7 percent in
1958.
SECRET
trade with underde-
veloped countries at
a rapid pace, but
these efforts have
been minimized by the
paramount priority of
intrabloc trade and
will be increasingly
hindered by the re-
strictions of bilat-
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14 April 1960
More recently, Indonesia
has refused to commit itself to
barter agreements involving rub-
ber, Argentina, Indonesia, and
Burma are terminating bilateral
trade agreements with bloc coun-
tries. The Sudan is not inter-
ested in maintaining last year's
level of cotton exports in ex-
change for Soviet goods. Some
underdeveloped countries also
have found themselves in a
creditor position as they ship
surplus agricultural commod-
ities and learn that desired
imports are not available in
the bloc.
The growth of multilateral
trade involving the bloc is not
likely. Such trade would loosen
bloc control over its imports
and exports, which are regulat-
ed to fulfill planned commit-
ments primarily within the bloc.
Moreover, the underdeveloped
countries probably would look
to the bloc more as a market
than as a source of goods--the
result of which would be to
drain off bloc holdings of for-
eign exchange for raw materials
and agricultural products at a
time when the bloc needs such
financing for the large imports
of advanced free world machinery
it seeks.
On the other hand, there
is a more natural relationship
in Soviet trade with the indus-
trialized countries. As Mos-
cow frequently states, the im-
portant economic aspect of its
trade drive now is to procure
Western equipment and technol-
ogy to improve its productive
capability, particularly in
the chemical field. Soviet de-
mand for such imports--which
was beginning to assume major
proportions in late 1959--is so
great that it has spurred ex-
ports to earn foreign exchange
to support these purchases.
For the past two years Mos-
cow has actively sought credits
from Western suppliers to fi-
nance such imports. Governments
of free world industrial coun-
tries already have indicated
that a minimum of $250,000,000
is available as a guarantee for
equipment delivered on credit
to the USSR alone. Recent crit-
icism by members of the Soviet
Academy of Sciences about the
lack of progress in the petro-
chemical industries suggests
that Moscow will continue its
efforts to exploit advanced West-
ern technology through imports.
The satellites' success in
establishing fairly promising
trade ties in the underdeveloped
countries results largely from
the valid economic basis for
such trade, as opposed to the
USSR's attempts, which often
appear contrived--even to the
underdeveloped countries in-
volved.
Czechoslovakia and Poland
are seeking to expand markets
for growing industrial output aswell
as sources of raw materials and
agricultural products. The same
is frequently true of East Ger-
many, although in its search for
diplomatic recognition East Ger-
many has participated more in
propagandistic activity than
other satellites. The satellites
continue to account for 50 per-
cent of the Sino-Soviet bloc's
trade with the underdeveloped
countries. Pre- 25X1
pared by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
ARAB POLITICS AND A PALESTINE "ENTITY"
Although the Arab states
usually speak in unison about
the "crimes" of Israel and its
"creators"--the Western powers--
they are frequently in discord
on other facets of the Palestine
problem. More than a million
Palestinian Arab refugees from
what is now Israel are pawns
in their disputes.
Some 604,000 of them still
reside.. in Jordan : in what was
formerly Palestinian territory
on the West Bank of the Jordan
River; 252,000 are in the Gaza
strip, the other remaining Arab
portion of Palestine; 113,000
live in the Syrian region of the
UAR; and 135,000 are in Lebanon.
With the exception of Jordan,
their host states generally
refuse to absorb the refugees,
ostensibly fearing that the
Palestinians' claims against
Israel might be prejudiced,
but also to keep the Palestine
issue before the eyes of the
world. The UN, through its
Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees (UNRWA),
supports the refugees.
Leadership of the Pales-
tinians' cause--restoration of
Arab "rights" to live and re-
gain property in Palestine--
now is contested by UAR Pres-
ident Nasir, Iraqi Premier
Qasim, and Jordan's King Hu-
sayn. This rivalry has re-
cently focused on the question
of a Palestine "entity" or
state which in theory would
embrace the remaining Arab ter-
ritories of Palestine and
unite all Palestinian Arabs
for an all-out campaign against
Israel. These proposals are
important as propaganda for
Qasim and Nasir, but for Jordan,
which opposes them, they threat-
en the very existence of the
state. Jordan includes more
than 2,200 square miles of for-
mer Palestinian territory, and
two thirds of its population
is Palestinian.
On 3 April, the Arab League
political affairs committee
failed to agree--as had the Arab
League Council a few weeks ear-
lier--on the UAR's proposals to
create a Palestinian "national
entity" and army. Further dis-
cussion of the problem was de-
ferred until a special session
of the Arab League Council at
the foreign ministers' level
scheduled for 30 April.
The deadlock involved only
the UAR and Jordan, inasmuch as
Iraq boycotted both the council
.and the political affairs com-
mittee meetings because they
were held in Cairo. The Iraqis
have said they will not attend
the foreign ministers' meeting
either, unless it takes place
outside the UAR. Whether Iraq
attends will probably have lit-
tle effect on the already dubi-
ous prospects for a settlement
of the dispute.
. 1947 Partition ,
Although the partition of
Palestine in 1947 by the United
Nations was intended to facil-
itate the formation of a new
Arab state, as well as a Jewish
homeland, King Husayn's grand-
father, King Abdullah, sought to
incorporate the Arab sectors into
his Kingdom of Transjordan. Egypt
and Saudi Arabia refused to ac-
quiesce in this and countered by
proclaiming a phantom "Government
of All-Palestine" under the no-
torious Grand Mufti of Jerusalem,
Hajj Amin al Husayni.
Nevertheless, Abdullah pro-
ceeded in 1950 to annex the so-
called West Bank area of the
Jordan River adjacent to his
territory and to change the name
of his kingdom to Jordan. Egypt
occupied the "Gaza strip" por-
tion of Arab Palestine adjoining
its eastern frontier. The Mufti's
continued agitation on behalf of
his "government" from outside
Palestine has had little effect.
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14 April 1960
Recent Developments
The disagreement among the
Arabs regarding Arab Palestine
was more or less quiescent until
1958, when the UAR, at an Arab
League meeting in April, called
for the formation of a "Pales-
tine army." On 16 May 1958,
the Gaza Legislative Council
adopted two resolutions: one
called for the establishment of
a Palestine Liberation Fund;
the other proclaimed the estab-
lishment of the Arab National
Union with the objects of re-
covering "usurped Palestine,"
establishing "complete Arab
unity," and organizing a demo-
the West Bank and that Pales-
tinians under its jurisdiction
already have Jordanian citizen-
ship and serve in Jordan's army.
The league was unable to settle
the differences. Jordan's Prime
Minister Majalli claims the
league refused to discuss a Jor-
danian plan for solution of the
over-all Palestine problem.
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
CXandre5Ta
c 4 P Ru s;~. Baniyas
'Aleppo/1
UAR'?,,
Hums (SYRIA)
.cratic, socialist, and coopera-
tive society, to include "all of
Gaza, the West Bank. .and the
other Arab countries."
Nasir, possibly to advance
his leadership of pan-Arab na-
tionalism in the face of Qasim's
rivalry, again proposed the for-
mation of a Palestine government
and army at the Arab League meet-
ing in Casablanca in September
1959. Jordan opposed the plan
on the grounds that it infringed
on Jordanian sovereignty over
and Jordanian plots against his
regime. In a series of speeches
in December 1959, he proclaimed
his own championship of the Pal-
estinian cause and branded the
UAR and Jordan as partners of
Israel in "occupying" Pales-
tine. He has since also an-
nounced unilateral plans to or-
ganize and train an "army" of
Palestinians, presumably fi-
nanced by the fund he has es-
tablished for a Palestine re-
public. Qasim has expressed
the hope that this fund, which
SECRET
Qasim then seized on the
Palestine state issue as a prop-
aganda weapon to counter UAR
N~osul
Kirkuk
as accepted by the United
on 29 November 1947
Arab
J wit,
---Armistice Tin
1949
Palestinian Arab Refugees Registered with UNRWA
as of 1 January 1960
J,.rd nn 604,000
Gaza Srrip 252,000
Lch:n,un, 135,000
UARISyria) 113,000
tonal 1,104,000
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEIU T SUMMARY
14 April 1960
has been enriched by contribu-
tions from Iraqi workers and
industries, eventually will to-
tal $5,600,000. On 5 April he
said the Palestinian situation
had reached a stage requiring
"violent action."
These statements cost
Qasim little, for Iraq is re-
mote from Israel and only about
5,000 Palestinian refugees live
within its borders.. Such agi-
tation is nevertheless trouble-
some to the UAR and Jordan,
which harbor many more refugees
and have common frontiers with
the Israelis.
Nasir has responded vigor-
ously to Qasim's attacks. He re-
introduced his Palestine pro-
posals at the Arab League Coun-
cil meeting on 8 February, de-
spite the certainty of continued
Jordanian opposition. In Jan-
uary 1960 he set up the Pales-
tine National Union in Gaza and
expanded it to Syria with the
aim of expanding it into an or-
ganization of all Palestinians.
An army of Palestinians report-
edly is also being organized in
the UAR. In speeches in Syria
during the Israeli-Syrian bor-
der crisis in February, Nasir
challenged Qasim to demonstrate
his sincerity by sending troops
to the Israeli border and ac-
cused Jordan of having withdrawn
its troops from the Jordanian
frontier near the scene of the
clashes in order to avoid in-
volvement in the fighting.
Problem in Jordan
Jordan has indicated it
will not engage in any further
discussion of the entity "inno-
vation" at any level whatever.
Husayn, reacting to the Nasir-
Qasim maneuvers, has shown in-
creased concern about the West
Bank. He has visited its cities
more often than previously in
an effort to generate support
for his regime and has arranged
to hold meetings of the Jor-
danian assembly in Jerusalem.
This violates, as does the pres-
ence of the Israeli Government
in Jerusalem, a UN resolution
favoring internationalization
of the city and its environs--
the Holy Places.
Husayn implicitly attacked
Nasir and Qasim on 1.March for
their statements about Palestine,
arousing Nasir.in particular to
renewed outbursts against the
King. Husayn announced on 13
March that he would accept the
results of a plebiscite among
his Palestinian subjects on the
question of whether or not they
wish to become separated from
Jordan. He hopes this move will
undercut the potentially subver-
sive proposals of Nasir and Qa.-
sim, whom he suspects of wanting
to bring down his regime.
Husayn has insisted the of-
fer is not a mere propaganda
gesture and claims he will ac-
cept the result whatever it may
be. However, he has provided
himself with a possible excuse
for not fulfilling his offer by
making a plebiscite conditional
on the desires of Palestinians
to have one. The King could
cite the numerous expressions
of support he has received since
the announcement as "evidence"
that a vote is not wanted, al-
though he has said he will ac-
cept'; the determination of "neu-
tral members" of the league--i.e.,
Lebanon, Yemen, Libya, Sudan,
Tunisia, and Morocco--on the
question.
The relatively urban and.
Westernized Palestinians of the
West Bank are not amalgamating
easily with the more isolated
and conservative Jordanians of
the East Bank. Many of these
Westernized Palestinians, bey
lieve, as do some Western diplo-
mats in Jordan, that the major-
ity of voters in a plebiscite
would opt for separation from
the Amman government and for
association with the UAR. Some
Palestinian opponents of Husayn's
regime are.even'?said to oppose
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY `STA'RY
14 April 1960
either independence or asso-
ciation with the UAR because
the West Bank would be left ex-
posed to possible occupation
by Israel. The Israelis, ex-
tremely sensitive to;develop-
ments in the West Bank, have
indicated that UAR control there
would "necessitate" its occupa-
tion by Israel as a defensive
measure,
Neither a West Bank pleb-
iscite nor the special session
of the Arab League foreign min-
isters scheduled for 30 April is
likely to resolve the Palestine
controversy. As long as Nasir,
Qasim, and Husayn remain heads
of their respective states, the
dispute probably will endure as
part of their rivalry for pan
Arab leadership. Under these con-
ditions, Arab?unity will remain
a long-range dream, and divisive-
ness will continue to weaken the
effectiveness of Arab opposition
to Israel.
DE GAULLE'S VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES
The timing of De Gaulle's
acceptance of the long-standing
invitation to visit the United
States was probably determined
by his desire to sharpen on the
eve. of the summit conference
the image of France as a great
power, In his talks in Wash-
ington from 22 to 25 April, De
Gaulle will probably seek to
subordinate specifically French-
American issues to a discussion
of world problems and, as the
most recent Western statesman
to have held discussions with
Khrushchev, to expound his pro-
posals for dealing with the
Soviet bloc. He can be expected
to continue to press for further
implementation of Western tri-
partite global discussions and
for extension of NATO responsi-
bilities to Africa, and to probe
US attitudes on the development
of independent European defense
capabilities.
De Gaulle delayed accepting
President Eisenhower's invita-
tion for almost two years, largely
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEILY SUAEY
14 April 1960
because he was preoccupied with
Algeria and with the domestic
problems consequent to the over-
throw of the Fourth Republic in
May 1958. He now:.~probably be-
lieves that France's nuclear
achievements, the popular sup-
port he continues to command at
home, and his success in induc-
ing Khrushchev to visit France
have sufficiently bolstered
France's international position
to give weight to French views,
despite the stalemate on Ali
geria.
Personal Diplomacy
On his visit to the United
States, shortly after his talks
with Khrushchev, De Gaulle will
probably be anxious to compare
notes and expound his estimate
of the Soviet leader's inten-
tions, and to suggest tactics
for the summit meeting.
The talks with Khrushchev
have apparently not altered De
Gaulle's opinion that the So-
viet Union is motivated primari-
ly by nationalist drives or that
Communism is a passing phe-
nomenon. He has believed for
some time that the Soviet Union
is under domestic pressures for
higher living standards, and
that the external pressures from
an aggressively expanding China
will eventually oblige Moscow
to cooperate with the West.
Khrushchev probably sought to
encourage De Gaulle in the view
that cooperation between "white
men" is the only reasonable
eventuality.
De Gaulle has long insisted
on a firm Western position to-
ward the USSR on immediate prob-
lems. His hope for a long-range
East-West reconciliation may
have led him, however, to read
into Khrushchev's noncommittal
reaction some positive endorse-
ment of French proposals for
easing East-West tensions: a
joint East-West economic aid
program to less-developed coun-
tries, a noninterference agree-
ment, and an agreement to control
arms shipments to neutral areas.
In addition to such summit
topics as disarmament, Germany,
and East-West relations--on
which French and American views
are in general agreement--De
Gaulle in Washington will prob-
ably want particularly to dis-
cuss Africa and Communist China,
which he regards as especially
troublesome world problems. He
apparently believes the Peiping
regime is the greatest danger
to world peace, and he feels
some means must be found to
curb the Chinese. He rejected,
however, Prime Minister Macmil-
lan's recent suggestion that
Peiping be admitted to the UN.
De Gaulle apparently hopes that
Moscow-Peiping differences can
be exploited to the advantage of
the West, and he may spell out
some suggestions as a result of
his attempts to raise the China
problem with Khrushchev.
De Gaulle is particularly
concerned over increased Chinese
Communist interest in Africa.
He believes that retention of a
dominant Western influence in
Africa is necessary for the sur-
vival of Europe. This is why he
insists that joint aid, nonin-
terference, and an arms sales
ban be discussed at the summit
level. He may press for tripar-
tite action to counter Communist
expansion by extending Western
defense responsibilities in Afri-
ca, perhaps combined with a tri-
partite economic aid program.,
Differences With US
De Gaulle certainly has
little hope of obtaining US sup-
port for the retention of French
bases in Morocco and Tunisia,
but he can nevertheless be ex-
pected to continue to seek some
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
way to reduce pressures for
France's withdrawal 'from. Africa
and some means of indicating
US support for French policies
there, He will want a formal
US endorsement of his Algerian
policy in the official communi-
que ending his visit here. The
absence of a reference to Al-
geria in the communique follow-
ing the Khrushchev visit may
have been due to De Gaulle's
unwillingness to restate his
acceptance of the Oder-Neisse
line as Germany's eastern bor-
der, or because Khrushchev had
again endorsed "self-determina-
tion" publicly.
Partly to maintain the
"global" atmosphere of his
Washington talks and partly be-
cause of the imminence of Amer-
ican presidential elections,
De Gaulle will probably not
make an issue of any of the
questions which have disturbed
US-French relations in the past
two years. His dislike of sub-
merging national identities in
an integrated NATO, his opposi-
tion to foreign control of nu-
clear weapons based on French
soil, his reasons for withdraw-
ing the Mediterranean fleet from
NATO control, and his unhappi-
ness with US policies in North
Africa are all unchanged. More-
over, his primary aim continues
to be to win for France equal-
ity with its "Anglo-Saxon" al
lies in Western councils, in-
cluding a voice in any Western
decision to use the nuclear
bomb.
A French-led Europe
While De Gaulle is unlikely
to make any direct request for
US aid to the French nuclear
weapons program, he may ask
clarification of President Ei-
senhower's statement of 3 Feb-
ruary on the possibility the
United States might make avail--
able to its allies atomic in-
formation already known to the
Soviet Union. De Gaulle is de-
termined to establish a French
nuclear striking force armed
with sophisticated weapons and
a modern delivery system. He
has also shown increasing in-
terest in the development of a
European defense capability to
provide military backing for the
Continental European bloc he
hopes to establish.
De Gaulle's basic aim is
to "free" Europe from its pres-
ent dependence on US- and Brit-
ish-controlled nuclear weapons,
and to make a French-led Europe
strong enough to play a leading
role in East-West relations. He
is also anxious that Europe be
prepared for the day when the
United States might decide to
withdraw its forces from the
Continent.
De Gaulle's public state-
ments have from time to time
reflected the fear expressed
in some European circles that
the United States and Britain
would be reluctant to use their
nuclear weapons to defend Eu-
rope for fear of provoking So-
viet retaliation. He has re-
peated. as recently as February
that France must provide for its
own defense "without relying on
others." In a November press con-
ference, he justified France's
development of a nuclear capabil-
ity, indicating he did not ex-
pect the "sort of equilibrium"
which exists between the United
States and the USSR to remain
static. He warned that the ad-
vantage of "sudden advances" in
the capabilities of either side
might be so great as to overcome
peaceful inclinations.
"Who can say," De Gaulle
stated, "whether in the future
the two powers having the nuclear
monopoly will not agree to di-
vide the world.... Who can say
...whether on some awful day
Western Europe should be wiped
out from Moscow and Central Eu-
rope from Washington." "France,"
the French President said, "in
equipping herself with a nuclear
weapon, will render a service to
world equilibrium."
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SECRET
Moscow's charges that dis-
armament inspection, as envis-
aged by the West, equals espi-
onage are symptomatic of Soviet
preoccupation with internal se-
curity. The 71remlin boasts Of
military and technological su-
periority, concedes that war
between East and West is no
longer "fatally inevitable,"
and claims that the "victory
of socialism in the USSR is
final and complete," but it
still treats an ordinary tele-
phone directory as a classified
document.
Despite the partial lift-
ing of the iron curtain, the
Soviet regime, through such
means as all-pervasive censor-
ship, travel restrictions, sur-
veillance, and harassment,
~NtKOLAY V r' ( _
5EV kOAArIY{{pi yy pDlEpkfSPE RO SK
~iFEODl951Y~.
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LLIN
Rrq, i/ reached pain Qo
SHK1A
L 1
ASHKE-0, -fglltyT~F
M~~V F
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'lly
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s+al,s:/ma
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rsk, Ferkeposl, f'... zk,
k,
Yiacnv i\ MOK W -~RE5 1 ,.. ~olchir{g o5d Pelrodwrers are ree
HER OV1 Y 'LAND tlAN51T ?~ ~' y
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Is Rebhc (A.S.S.R.
!,hla,t or kray
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.31105 fui
CURRENT.INTELLIGENCE?WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
USSR MAINTAINS SECRECY
/8 780 T /3lt 3 L p \ o' ~' ._ 7
4b 1 O C
O YA AND ..~~
a E~
'La Y 0
TE o
.9 R .~
A P
'? V A
SECRET
seeks to hide from foreign ob-
servers, -both official and
private,, as much as possible,
except that which may-contrib-
ute directly to its political
and propaganda aims.
Travel restrictions have
been revised three times since
1953, a series of East-West ex-
changes have been arranged, and
a policy of selective disclo-
sure of scientific and mili-
tary information has been-
adopted.- Although thenet re-
sult has been a generally more
relaxed attitude, in some re-
spects, the freer flow of peo-
ple.and ideas hasinduced in
security officials a. height-
ened sense of vigilance, and
the shield of secrecy around
objects of military or
U __ "\ 130~lr1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU"hll'j
14 Aril 1960
technological interest is as
thick as ever.
Closed Areas
The complex set of prohi-
bitions which governs the trav-
el of foreigners in the USSR
was amended in June 1953, Au-
gust 1957, and August 1959. On
balance, the effect has been
to open up some areas, in the
Baltic states and the Western
territories seized in 1939-41,
for example, which had previous-
ly been denied because of po-
litical or economic instability,
while adding to the prohibited
list a number of areas of in-
telligence interest from the
military or technological point
of view. Also denied are the
Soviet Far North, the bulk of
the Far Eastern provinces, the
northern and eastern shores of
the Caspian Sea, and parts of
Central Asia, which have been
formally forbidden to foreign-
ers all along.
There are, in addition,
the devices of "temporary" and
de f acto..'c iosures . Many of
those parts of Central Asia
normally open are "temporarily"
closed each year during spring
maneuvers. Other areas offi-
cially accessible are, in fact,
denied on various pretexts.
Numerous requests by Western
representatives to visit Vorkuta,
the former slave-labor center
above the Arctic circle, were
denied,,although it has been
formally prohibited only since
August 1959.
In other cases, approved
travel is subjected to indirect
restrictions along the route.
Misroutings or delays are used
to ensure that the observer
will pass through an area of
interest at night.
Surveillance, provocations,
and staged incidents have long
been familiar to Western diplo-
mats and military attaches in
the Soviet Union. With the ex-
pansion of East-West exchanges,
the various forms of surveil-
lance and harassment have been
extended to cover exchange stu-
dents, delegations, and ordinary
tourists. Such activities di-
rected against tourists have ap-
parently increased.
Printed matter was care-
fully inspected by customs of-
ficials at entry points in 1959,
although in previous years lit-
tle concern had been shown. In
some cases, books were confis-
cated at the"border and never
returned to their owners. Fur-
thermore, last year for the
first time there were instances
in which men's wallets and
women's purses were inspected
and pockets turned inside out.
Customs inspections at exit
points also became increasingly
severe.
Searches were more frequent.
In a number of instances snaps
and locks were simply broken.
Personal items such as cameras
and diaries frequently disappeared
from their owner's rooms for days.
In other cases, tape recorders,
cameras, and unexposed film were
obviously tampered with and some-
times put out of commission. Noc-
turnal telephone calls as a check
or reminder of surveillance,tele-
phone taps, and concealed micro-
phones were encountered with in-
creased frequency.
In 1959, American tourists
and businessmen resident in the
USSR long enough to receive for-
eign mail noticed that their let-
ters were being opened. In many
cases there was little or no at-
tempt to conceal the tampering.
Intourist guides make it
clear that tourists are not
permitted to photograph mili-
tary installations, railroad
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
stations, airfields, bridges,
government buildings, indus-
trial enterprises, and the
like. On the whole,Americans
have abided carefully by the
regulations, but in 1959 a
number of Americans were de-
tained or arrested for "mis-
using" their cameras. Some
made the mistake of photograph-
ing unflattering scenes, but
others had photographed ob-
jects of natural interest to
tourists whihh, unknown to
them, included areas considered
by the USSR to have military
or economic intelligence in-
terest. `
Since Stalin's death, and
particularly since 1958, the
Soviet regime has lost some of
its inhibitions against the
release of economic data. Sta
tistics on the production of
some items, on trade of some
articles, and some planning
data have replaced the former
releases, which consisted of
announcements of a series of
percentage changes on A', base
year for which data were con-
cealed. Still protected,how-
ever, is a very wide range of
production data on the output
of individual plants, armament
and military-related products,
and other state secrets such
as practically all data re-
lating to the output of pre-
cious or base nonferrous
metals.
Limitation of Contacts
Contacts between foreign-
ers and Russians have expanded
markedly in recent years as a
result of both the increase in
East-West exchanges and a great-
er sense of personal security
on the part of Soviet citizens.
There remains, however, a con-
siderable barrier to free,
spontaneous contacts. Western
officials must continue to
reckon with more or less per-
manent surveillance, while of-
ficial delegations and tourists
are almost constantly under the
watchful eye of official guides,
who operate under instructions
from security officials.
Disclosure or public dis-
cussion of security--related
topics in recent years has
given the appearance of some
relaxation, but, with hardly
any exceptions, a self-serving
aim is always evident. For
example,'Chrushchev's disclosure
in January of the size of his
armed forces, although unprec-
edented,. was intended to
strengthen his hand in disarma-
ment negotiations. On vital
points the'. ' Soviet '. sense of
security remains extremely
strict. The USSR consistently
denies access to information
and facilities when it feels
that such access would weaken
military security, and that de-
tails on similar activity in
the West will routinely become
available in open sources. and
not'-.require a quid pro quo trade.
Guided Missiles
Statements by high Soviet
officials, designed to under-
score Moscow's self-confidence
and to buttress its interna-
tional prestige, have occasional-
ly thrown some light on the gen-
eral development of the USSR's
guided missile program, but have
not revealed details.
Travel restrictions may
be a barometer of sensitivity:
five cities added to the denied
list last August--Vorkuta,Gorky,
Kazan, Kuybyshev, and Dneprope_
trovsk--may be involved in some
aspect of the guided missile
program. Soviet aircraft de-
signer Tupolev was given a tour
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1960
of Thor missile production fa-
cilities during'a visit to the
US, and Mikoyan was offered a
trip to Vandenberg AFB. However,
a request by the Nixon party
for a visit to a Soviet missile
production facility was never
answered.
Airdraft 'Industry, Shipbuilding
Aircraft factories are in
many instances situated in
closed areas. Where this is
not the case,Western travelers
approaching areas known to con-
tain aircraft plants are fre-
quently turned back by security
police or the military. The
Russians have gone so far as
to put a smoke screen around
a factory airfield when it was
known that the US air attached
would be passing the field by
train. General Twining's group
in 1956 visited. Airframe Plant
20 and Aircraft Engine Plant
45, both in Moscow, but neither
of the plants was doing work of
military interest at the time.
With these exceptions, aircraft
factories have been strictly
out of bounds to Westerners.
Some foreigners, includ-
ing a few Amerieans,have been
allowed to visit certain Soviet
shipyards producing merchant
vessels. However, shipyards
producing or suspected of pro-
ducing naval vessels such as
submarines and destroyers are
generally located in closed
cities, or, as in the case of
Leningrad, access is prevented
by the denial.bf travel re-
quests or by on-the-spot ac-
tion by servicemen, police, or
ordinary citizens to prevent
observation and photographing.
The USSR has not agreed to an
exchange of shipbuilding spe-
cialists. Only after strenuous
protests was Admiral Rickover
allowed to make anything but
the most superficial tour of
the nuclear-powered icebreaker
Lenin.
Military Secrecy
Secrecy concerning all
phases of the development and
production of new weapons is
extremely heavy until there
is a public showing of the new
weapons or an announcement that
such weapons exist. These dis-
closures are always tied to
the current propaganda line
in order to?_emphasize that the
USSR has the strength to back
its policies. The USSR never
publishes information on the
size of its military stock-
piles, nor does it ever invite
Western?attachds to unit exer-
cises or publish the specifics
of significant tactical or
strategic doctrines.
Vigilance Stressed
There is thus no sign of
a reduction of Moscow's far-
flung internal security sys-
tem. With the sharply increased
influx of foreign visitors,
the accent may fall on more,
rather than less, internal se-
curity.
The State Secrets Act issued
in 1956 is, like the ' 1947 statute it
replaced, a lengthy compendium prohi-
biting divulgence of many kinds of
information regarded elsewhere a
public property. A rigid cen-
sorship of domestic publica-
tions and of outgoing press
dispatches continues J
A resurgence of "security
consciousness" was also evi-
dent in the extensive "vigi-
lance" campaign in the press
in the latter half of
1958--a campaign which stressed
the dangers of carelessness
and complacency arising from
"peaceful coexistence" and
warned against the depreda-
tions of US intelligence,
which is said to employ "tens
of thousands of people who
bend all efforts to in-
flict damage in the
tries Of socialism."
(Concurred in by ORR)
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