CURRENT INTELLLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
I 1 ~
COPY NO. 56
OCI NO. 1014/60
31 March 1960
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. C I
ofL~/+ o
CLASS. . CHANGED TO: TS SC i~-
HE XT REVIEW DATE:
1UTfis R O?
DATE 4 REVIEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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TIAL
SOUTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
In the face of rising racial tension in South Africa,
the government has renewed its drive to suppress nonwhite
nationalist movements. Two African nationalist organiza-
tions are competing for the support of the 3,500,000 urban
Africans. The UN Security Council debate on the South
African question will also add to internal friction, par-
ticularly if the council passes a strop ly condemnatory 25X1
resolution.
CARIBBEAN TENSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Cuba is increasingly hospitable to Latin American
Communist activity. The Communists join Castro in con-
demning the alleged aggressive plans of US imperialism to
frustrate the Cuban revolution, and energetically exploit
the appeal of his radical reforms and ultranationalistic
programs. In the Dominican Republic, there are growing
signs that Trujillo's dictatorship may be nearing its end.
His ouster is likely to be so abrupt as to leave a power
vacuum, which Castro is probably preparing to exploit.
EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The initial talks between De Gaulle and Khrushchev
were devoted to a repetition of basic positions on Germany
and various aspects of disarmament. Khrushchev has con-
tinued to stress the German menace and the "natural al-
liance" of France and the USSR, and has repeated his threat
to conclude a separate treaty with East Germany. De Gaulle
countered by playing down the gains for the USSR of a sep-
arate peace treaty and insisting that France will not rec-
ognize East Germany. De Gaulle feels that the discussions
beginning on I A px il., w.i 1 1 yield more precise indications
of Soviet intentions on summit issues. French reaction
has varied, ranging from relatively large receptions in
Paris and Marseilles, where Communist efforts were evident,
to a marked coolness in Bordeaux and Rheims. The Soviet
bloc delegations at Geneva are seeking to obtain Western
agreement to a list of "agreed principles" on disarmament
for endorsement at the summit.
"ADENTIAL
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PART I (continued)
Page 7
Qasim's anti-Communist measures have encouraged the
anti-Communists and have increased the army's influence
over the political scene. The Arab League Council meeting
in Cairo is almost certain to intensify the bitter quarrel
among Nasir, Qasim, and King Husayn on the Palestine issue.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
AFRICAN NATIONALISTS PREPARING NEW MEETINGS . . . . . . . Page 1
Militant African nationalists will meet in four con-
ferences to be held at Accra, Conakry, and Casablanca
during the next two months. Projects to achieve greater
African unity will be given heavy propaganda play, despite
increasing strains within the growing bloc of emerging
African states. Western colonial powers and the Union of
South Africa will again be under heavy fire, particularly
at the second Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Conference
which is to be held in Conakry from 11 to 16 April with
Soviet and Chinese Communist representatives taking part.
FRENCH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENTS . .
. . . . . . Page 2
Paris has negotiations under way or in prospect for
granting formal independence to the 11 African states
which are members of the French Community. It hopes, how-
ever, to retain a greater number of common institutions
and official ties than prevail in the British Commonwealth.
Negotiations with the Malagasy Republic have been completed,
and independence is expected to be proclaimed in June.
French public opinion supports this political evolution,
and the National Assembly is expected to make the necessary
revisions in the French constitution.
PROSPECTS FOR SPECIAL UN MEETING ON FRENCH NUCLEAR
TESTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
UN Secretary General Hammarskjold is now polling UN
members in response to a 14 March request--signed by 22 of
the 29 members of the Asian-African bloc--for a special
session of the UN General Assembly on French nuclear test-
ing. Formal replies are not due until 14 April, and the
few received so far have been unenthusiastic. If France
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PART II (continued)
tests another nuclear device before mid-April, public
opinion may impel a majority of UN members to agree to
a special session.
ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . .
. Page 4
Political and economic differences continue to strain
Anglo-German relations. The British Foreign Office is
under considerable pressure to gain for Members of Parlia-
ment access to documents of the American-operated Berlin
Documents Center on ex-Nazis now prominent in West Germany.
Chancellor Adenauer's approval for accelerating institu-
tion of a common external tariff by the Common Market
countries has heightened British fears of early German dis-
crimination against British goods.
THE PROPOSED TAMBRONI CABINET IN ITALY . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The cabinet which Premier-designate Fernando Tambroni
is expected to submit for parliamentary approval in early
April is a slightly modified version of Segni's all -
Christian Democrat government whose collapse on 24 Febru-
ary under pressure from the right brought on the current
parliamentary crisis, The Tambroni cabinet, which features
the outgoing premier as foreign minister, is designed by
the party primarily as a stopgap
ARGENTINE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
In the 27 March elections to renew one half of the
Argentine Chamber of Deputies, the major opposition
People?s Radical party (UCRP) won more seats and about 3
percent more popular votes than President Frondizi?s In-
transigent Radical party (UCRI), The UCRI, which had
feared greater losses, still has an absolute majority in
the Chamber but probably faces increasing political dif-
ficulties with the unpopular US-backed stabilization
program.
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JCC:KG 1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO THE UAR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The USSR is attempting to fortify its role as the
UAR's primary source of foreign aid by speeding up imple-
mentation of its 1957 aid pact with Syria. New offers of
aid may result from talks now under way at Damascus to
renegotiate the agreement. In addition, major construc-
tion work will soon start on Egypt's Aswan Dam. There are,
however, indications that Moscow is having difficulty
meeting some commitments under its $175,000,000 economic
cooperation agreement with Egypt, and Cairo may seek West-
ern assistance, now becoming increasingly available, in
order to make up for Soviet deficiencies.
25X1
25X1 '
EAST GERMANS PLAN TO COMPLETE COLLECTIVIZATION THIS YEAR . Page 9
Encouraged by its success in rapidly completing col-
lectivization in eight districts, primarily in the north,
despite peasant resistance, the Ulbricht regime in East
Germany now has decided to bring all remaining private
farmers into collective farms by the end of this year.
The speed of the campaign thus far, however, probably
cannot be sustained in the southern parts of the country,
where greater resistance is expected. Although this am-
bitious project will probably be soft-pedaled temporarily
to encourage farmers to get on with spring planting and
harvesting, it is likely to be resumed thereafter.
SINO-NEPALESE AID AND BORDER AGREEMENTS . . . . . . . . . Page 10
The Chinese Communists, in an effort to expand their
influence in Nepal, on 21 March gave that country an ad-
ditional $21,000,000 in grant aid, bringing their total
there since 1956 to $33,600,000. The Chinese also will
establish a long-sought embassy in Katmandu and send tech-
nicians to Nepal. The Chinese accepted Nepal's request
that the "traditional" boundary between the two countries
be used as a basis for final demarcation,with "certain
discrepancies" to be ironed out by a joint commission.
Chou En-lai, in his coming talks with Nehru, probably will
cite the agreement establishing the Sino-Nepalese border
commission as a precedent for a similar agreement with
India and as evidence of Chinese reasonableness. 125X1
NEW INDIAN DEFENSE MEASURES . . . . . . . .
. Page 11
In an effort to improve its defense posture against
Communist China, India is strengthening administrative
controls in the Himalayan border areas, expanding military
reserves, seeking equipment from abroad to improve its
capabilities for high-altitude military operations, and
increasing its capacity to produce its-own materiel.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The Hague, long uneasy that Indonesia's growing mili-
tary strength poses a threat to Netherlands New Guinea,
is expected to renew pressure for assurances of military
support from Australia, the United States, and Britain.
While the Dutch show no disposition to negotiate with
Indonesia about the territory, they appear increasingly
inclined to join forces with Australia in sponsoring the
development of a Melanesian union which would include
New Guinea and adjacent trust territories.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST MILITIA .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Chinese Communist militia is primarily a security
and shock-labor force which Peiping views as an instrument
of control over the population and as a means of implement-
ing major internal reforms, such as imposition of rural
communes. This militia is the largest paramilitary organ-
ization in the world, but most of its members have had
little or no military training. In wartime, it could pro-
vide about 30,000,000 partly trained reserves to the regu-
lar forces and supply almost unlimited manpower for rear-
area duties
THE FRENCH ARMY IN POLITICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Although De Gaulle has energetically reasserted civil-
ian control over the military following the abortive French
settler insurrection in Algiers in January, the Paris gov-
ernment must still cope with an antidemocratic mentality
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i.;, SECRET Now,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III (continued)
which many French officers developed in the course of their
unsuccessful colonial campaigns. A minority of "activist"
officers has fostered this attitude among conscripts and
spread it'among the civilian population through veterans
organizations. De Gaulle is trying to convince the mili-
tary that the retention of Algeria cannot be the principal
goal of an army which must adapt itself to global commit-
ECONOMIC OUTLOOK FOR 1960 IN EASTERN EUROPE . . . . . . . Page 10
Industrial output in the European Communist satellites
is scheduled to continue growing at a high rate in 1960,
although in most countries the planned rates of growth,
ranging from 7.6 to 15 percent, are lower than those
achieved in 1959. The consumer is to benefit to a small
extent from large increases in industrial production, but
the share of national income earmarked for consumption will
decline slightly and that for investment will grow. Out-
standing problems during the year will probably involve
labor performance, inasmuch as a large share of the indus-
trial gains is supposed to come from increased productivity.
Polish workers are already reacting adversely to raised
work norms, and workers in the other satellites are under
similar pressures which are resented and occasionally re-
sisted. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
In the face of rising ra-
cial tension in South Africa,
the government has renewed its
drive to suppress antigovernment
movements. After an initial
period of apparent hesitation,
in which enforcement of the re-
strictive African pass system
was temporarily suspended, the
government moved to outlaw the
African National Congress (ANC)
and the Pan-Africanist Congress
(PAC), together with other
groups. representing smaller
minorities. A state of emergen-
cy has been declared in the
country's urban areas, 234 lead-
ers of all races have been ar-
rested, and the army's 20,000-
man civilian reserve has been
partially mobilized. Most of
the parliamentary opposition
has supported the actions taken
by the Verwoerd government.
Internal friction will be
increased by the UN Security
Council debate on the South Af-
rican question, particularly
if the council passes a strong-
ly condemnatory resolution. On
30 March the South African rep-
resentative withdrew from the
council table after stating his
country's objections to the de-
cision to debate the issue. As
a result of the substantive
discussion of the issue, South
Africa may soon withdraw com-
pletely from UN activities,
charging that the Security Coun-
cil debate constitutes an inter-
ference in its internal affairs.
The USSR followed up its
basically factual press accounts
of the South African riots with
a TASS statement on 24 March
deploring the Sharpeville vio-
lence. The Soviet statement
said that "official quarters of
the USSR," as well as the So-
viet people, denounce the ac-
tions of the South African au-
thorities and call for immediate
measures to prevent further vio-
lence and to guarantee civil
rights to Africans in accordance
with the UN Charter. While Mos-
cow's subsequent press attention
has been relatively meager, So-
viet UN delegate Sobolev voted
for inscription of the issue on
the Security Council agenda,
and the USSR can be expected
to give strong support to Afro-
Asian efforts to gain UN censure
of South Africa.
The South African Govern-
ment will probably combine po-
lice repression with a relaxa-
tion of the most onerous aspects
of apartheid. This course will
not satisfy the nonwhites, who
demonstrated their increasing
willingness to take direct ac=
tion in the highly effective
work stoppage on 28 March. The
ANC and the PAC are apparently
competing for the support of
the 3,500,000 urban Africans,
and both groups are likely to
increase the stridency of their
antiwhite agitation. Intimida-
tion of moderate Africans, which
was an important factor in the
28 March riots, will probably
be used increasingly by the
militant African nationalists.
Although the government can
probably contain outward mani-
festations of African unrest for
the present, it is unlikely that
tension will be reduced to pre-
riot levels in the foreseeable
future. It will be extremely
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
difficult to reinstitute the
pass system in any effective
form. Without some kind of in-
flux control,' though, the cities
will be flooded with large num-
bers of unemployed Africans.
Moreover, the riots have placed
.serious strains on the European
political parties..
Prime Minister Verwoerd
apparently remains in control
of the ruling Nationalist par-
ty only because there is no one
else who offers a forceful pro-
gram for dealing with the sit-
uation; however, he is plagued
by a split between archconserva-
tives and relative liberals
within the party. The United
party, which holds the largest
bloc of opposition seats in the
South African Parliament, is
similarly divided. The Euro-
peans are presently united by
the African threat to their
hegemony; when the situation
has calmed somewhat, there
may be a realignment of po-
litical organizations within
the European community.
Castro's Cuba is increas-
ingly hospitable to Latin Amer-
ican Communist activity. The
Communists join Castro in con-
demning the so-called aggres-
sive plans of US imperialism to
frustrate the Cuban revolution,
and energetically exploit the
appeal of his radical reforms
and ultranationalistic programs.
Communists or pro-Commu-
nists from 15 Latin American
countries attended the cere-
monies of the "Week of Solidar-
ity With the Struggles of the
Latin American Peoples" in Havana
from 21 to 26 March. The "sol-
idarity week" was proclaimed by
the Cuban Labor Confederation
(CTC), the Communist-infiltrated
labor arm of the Castro regime,
and warmly endorsed by the Cu-
ban Communist party. A man-
ifesto called for an "anti-im-
perialist and anti-feudal rev-
olution" in Latin America and
the strengthening of Latin Amer-
ican solidarity with'the Cuban
revolution.
At the final rally, a Cu-
ban CTC leader announced plans
for a "great Latin American con-
gress to create the apparatus
to fight the common enemy, im-
perialism." He said Cuban del-
egations will leave on 1 May
for other Latin American coun-
tries "to give them help and to
request aid for the Cuban rev-
olution." Many of the week's
demonstrations stressed the
"unfortunate" plight of Puerto
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
Rico, "still under the bondage
of the common enemy."
and Raul Castro on 27 March
were apparently designed to
give the impression that a mer-
cenary invasion of Cuba, backed
by "American imperialists," is
a virtual certainty.
nearing its end.
Dominican Republic
In the Dominican Republic,
there are increasing signs that
Trujillo's dictatorship may be
25X1
25X1
The American Embassy re-
The "Latin American Con-
gress," which was promised at
the "solidarity week" rally,
could serve the purposes of the
ostensibly non-Communist "peo-
ples' conference" which was also
planned during the early 1959
meetings in Moscow. The in-
creased liaison among Latin
American Communists, now pos-
sible in Cuba, and the hemi-
sphere "peace conference"
planned for Havana in May or
June were also elements in the
program developed then in Mos-
cow.
Top Cuban officials mean-
while continue to employ at-
tacks on the United States as a
means of whipping up revolu-
tionary fervor. The strident,
combative speeches of Fidel
ported on 24 March that the
situation contains all the in-
gredients necessary to "blow
the lid off the political bar-
rel."
To counter the effect of
recent Catholic Church condem-
nations of the regime, the Tru-
jillo-controlled press has been
playing up a suggestion that
the Dominican people be given
an opportunity to proclaim the
generalissimo "Benefactor of
the Catholic Church" in a na-
tional plebiscite. A high
church figure told an American
Embassy official that only the
pope could bestow such a title
and that Trujillo has been in-
directly warned that pursuit
of this maneuver could result
in an open break with Rome.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
said the country wants a change
of government and would welcome
intervention by the United
States or even Cuba. Trujillo's
ouster, when it does come, is
likely to be so sudden as to
leave a power vacuum, which
Fidel Castro is probably pre-
paring to exploit through sup-
port of leftist and pro-Com-
munist exiles.
The first series of talks
between De Gaulle and Khrushchev
were devoted to a repetition of
basic positions on the German
question and various aspects of
disarmament, French Foreign
Minister Couve de Murville told
the American ambassador that
these conversations could be
summed up with the words "noth-
ing new." De Gaulle indicated to
the British ambassador that
there had been no meeting of
minds on Germany, but that he
expected Khrushchev to reveal
more of his position on major
questions in the private talks
beginning on 1 April.
According to the British
ambassador's account of last week's
talks, Khrushchev tried to leave
the impression, as he did with
Italian President Gronchi in mid-
February, that if the USSR does
not obtain some satisfaction on
the German question at the sum-
mit meeting, it will sign a sep-
arate peace treaty with East
Germany. In his public state-
ments in France, however, Khru-
shchev has avoided specifically
linking the timing of a separate
treaty to the outcome of the
May summit. In speeches on 25
and 29 March, he used the now-
standard and vague formulation,
threatening to take unilateral
action "if all our possibili-
ties are exhausted and our as-
pirations not understood."
De Gaulle opened the talks
by disagreeing with Khrushchev's
.fears of West Germany and stressed
that it was of "prime importance"
that Bonn remain with the West
in order to maintain the necessary
"equilibrium" in Europe. Reply-
ing to the threat of a separate
peace treaty, De Gaulle stated
that France would not recognize
East Germany and asked what the
USSR could hope to gain by such
a move. According to the French
foreign minister, there was little
mention of Berlin.
In discussions on disarm-
ament, De Gaulle reiterated his
refusal to be bound by any nu-
clear test ban unless accom-
panied by a disarmament plan
providing for destruction of
nuclear weapons. Khrushchev
attempted to appear responsive
to French views by endorsing
the priority of controls on
nuclear delivery systems.
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31 March 1960
In his speeches in Paris,
Khrushchev continued the pat-
tern of emphasizing the German
menace and the "natural" French-
Soviet alliance in containing
it. Reflecting the impasse on
the German question in their
private talks, both De Gaulle
and Thrushchev have engaged in
some oblique public exchanges.
At a dinner for Khrushchev on
23 March, the French President
referred to the "unbounded"
German ambition in two world
wars "which has since then dis-
appeared." Khrushchev seemed
to reply the following day when
he stated that he could not
conceal his apprehension at
the "tolerance and even encour-
agement of German militarism"
or accept "attempts to prove
that this militarism is some-
thing different from what it
used to be."
Khrushchev, however, was
more responsive to De Gaulle's
remarks that the major inter-
national issues should be taken
up "one by one with realism."
Addressing the Diplomatic Press
Association on 25 March, Khru-
shchev repeated his previous
statements that all controver-
sial issues cannot be solved
in one or two summit meetings.
He added that the main aim
of the May meeting would be to
find a "common language."
In an effort to appear ac-
commodating to De Gaulle's
views, Khrushchev also renewed
his carefully worded endorse-
ment of De Gaulle's 16 Septem-
ber program for a solution to
the Algerian question. Khru-
shchev avoided rejecting multi-
lateral aid to underdeveloped
countries by tying this question
to an agreement on disarmament,
and he parried questions on an
arms embargo in the Middle East
by repeating that the USSR
would be willing to reach agree-
ment that "no country should
sell its arms to any other country."
French reaction to the
visit has varied from large
turnouts in Paris and Marseilles,
where French Communist party
efforts were evident, to cool
receptions in Bordeaux and
Rheims, In Paris, Khrushchev
drew good but not tremendous
crowds, but the receptions
elsewhere have been enthusias-
tic only where French Communists
have been able to organize the
welcome. In Bordeaux the
streets were nearly empty and
the indifference of the popu-
lation was noticeable, but at
a stop in Trabes the reaction
was apparently enthusiastic.
The non-Communist Paris press
described the visit to Mar-
seilles as Khrushchev's "first
triumph in France." Communist
cheering sections were most prom-
inent in Lille. At Rheims crowds
were sparse. A French Foreign
Ministry official feels that
there has been "considerable
genuine interest" in the provinces
not inspired by the Communists.
Press reaction has ranged
from reserve and detachment to
open hostility, although most
of the press accepts the talks
as probably a useful prelude
to the summit. Editorial com-
ment has been increasingly
critical of Khrushchev's stress
,on the German menace and hos-
tile to advocacy of the need
for a French-Soviet alliance.
As a possible reflection of
this reaction, Khrushchev dur-
ing his tour of the southern
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
provinces has concentrated on
extolling Soviet economic and
technical accomplishments,
with only brief references to
Germany. In Verdun, for ex-
ample, he passed up an oppor-
tunity to recall French-Russian
cooperation against Germany,
but returned to the German
theme again. in. Rheims.
Other Pre-Summit Planning
Khrushchev may go to East
Berlin to review the results
of his talks with De Gaulle
and strategy for the summit.
He may also go to Czechoslo-
vakia; the new Soviet ambassa-
dor to Prague avoided a direct
answer when queried by the
American ambassador about this.
Khrushchev has been in all of
the satellites since his last
visit to Czechoslovakia in
July 1957, and there has been
some friction in Czechoslovak-
Soviet relations that may need
soothing.
The main purpose of the
coming session of the Supreme
Soviet, announced for 5 May,
will probably be to provide a
forum for a demonstration of
support for Khrushchev on the
eve of the summit meeting. In
addition to reaffirming basic
positions on the issues to be
taken up at the summit, Moscow
may use the occasion for a fur-
ther "peaceful initiative,"
such. as an announcement of a
reduction in Soviet, troops in
Eastern Europe. Khrushchev
told the West German ambassa-
dor in January that the over-
all reduction in Soviet forces
would be followed by a "pro-
..portionate" withdrawal from
Eastern Europe, and a Soviet
official at the disarmament
talks in Geneva recently re-
ferred to this possibility.
Disarmament Conference
The tactics of the Soviet
bloc delegations at Geneva last
week suggest that they are un-
der instructions from Moscow to
obtain Western agreement to a
list of "agreed principles" for
a disarmament agreement which
could be placed before the May
summit meeting for endorsement.
In private talks with the United
States delegation, Soviet dele-
gates have urged that such a list
begin by endorsing "general and
complete disarmament" as an
"agreed goal." Other items would
include the reduction and elimi-
nation of conventional forces and
armaments, elimination of nuclear
weapons and other means of mass
destruction, and a general state-
ment on international controls.
Bloc efforts to draw the
Western delegations toward such
a general statement of disarma-
ment goals were evident in Soviet
delegate Zorin's remark to the
British delegate on 23 March that
the USSR is anxious to proceed
to detailed discussion of meas-
ures but that there must first
be general agreement on final
objectives. In formal confer-
ence sessions last week, Zorin
took an optimistic line, con-
tending that the talks had
already produced useful results,
in revealing a "whole number of
points of contact" between the
two sides. The Bulgarian delegate
claimed that all the Western
delegates had now agreed that
the goal of the conference was
general and complete disarmament.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Despite these obvious ef-
forts to demonstrate a wide
area of agreement on principles,
the debate last week did not
narrow the gap between the two
sides on the basic issue of
.international controls. Bloc
delegates continued to hammer
on their slogan of "no disarma-
ment without control and no con-
trol without disarmament." They
attacked Western proposals as
attempts to substitute discuss-
ion of controls for discussion
of specific disarmament proposals.
Zorin served notice that while
he was prepared to discuss con-
trols in conjunction with specif-
ic disarmament measures leading
to complete disarmament, he
would not discuss controls for
"hypothetical measures."
Zorin has attempted to re-
fute Western criticism of the
Soviet position on controls by
repeatedly stating that the
USSR favors strict international
control over all stages of a
disarmament program. He insists,
however, that the extent of
control must be "commensurate"
with the various stages of the
disarmament process.
This vague formula is no ad-
vance over the basic position
outlined by Khrushchev to the
United Nations last September
that the functions of an in-
ternational control organ will
"correspond to the nature of the
disarmament measures that are
being carried out." Bloc
Iraq
Iraqi Communists suffered
three more rebuffs in the past
week at the hands of the Qasim
regime. On 27 March,Qasim com-
delegates have declined to spell
out this position beyond the
general proposition that the
scope.of the control system
would be enlarged as the arms-
reduction process advanced to-
ward complete disarmament.
Nuclear Test Talks
Moscow has protrayed its
proposal for a moratorium on
small underground tests as
having precipitated a crisis
in US-UK relations. Soviet
propaganda media have used ex-
tensive quotations from the
Western press to create the
impression that the Soviet ini-
tiative has led to "serious dis-
agreements" between the United
States and Britain, and provoked
a sharp struggle within the United
States. Soviet propaganda also
stresses that the Soviet pro-
posal "practically coincides"
with British plans, and that a
rejection would-expose the Brit-
ish proposals as "mere hypoc-
risy,"
Soviet propaganda describes
the Eisenhower-Macmillan communi-
que on nuclear test cessation
as having "accepted in part"
the Soviet proposal. Khrushchev
declined comment when asked about
the communique, but said that
the prospects for agreement are
"very good" if the United States
and Britain accept "their own"
proposals.
(Concurred in by OSI)
muted the death sentences im-
posed on a dozen key officials
of the former royal regime.
This was followed on 29 March
by the Ministry of Interior's
rejection; of the application
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
for legal recognition from the
Communist-front Republican par-
ty. The application of a group
with suspected Baathist backing
also was turned down.
Among those whose sentences
were commuted are former Foreign
Minister Fadhil Jamali (now 10
years' imprisonment), former
Deputy Chief of Staff General Da-
hhistarii (3 years' imprisonment),
and Nuri Said's son-in-law,
Khalik Kanna (10 years' imprison-
ment), This clemency on Qasim's
part was probably prompted main-
ly by his concern over sentiment
in the army, where Daghistani
is very popular, and a desire
to curry favor in religious
circles by announcing the com-
mutations on the eve of the
holidays at the end of Ramadan.
On 30 March,Qasim dramat
ically postponed the execution
of five Baathists condemned for
the attempt on his life last
October. This action is likely
to result in adverse Communist
reaction.
Further clashes between
Communists and nationalists
have occurred in the past few
days. The Communist press has
bitterly complained that Iraqi
police have stood aside while
"patriots" have been assaulted.
The capabilities of the secur-
ity forces to maintain public
order are likely to be sorely
taxed during the parades and
demonstrations which will ac-
company the opening of the Com-
munist-front Peace Partisans
Congress in Baghdad on 3 April.
The strength of anti-Com-
munist elements has been in-
creased by the Qasim regime's
anti-Communist measures. Qasim
is now more dependent than ever
on the army as his chief polit-
ical support; consequently, key
army officers, mostly anti-Com-
munist, will probably play a
vital role in future develop-
ments.
Arab League Council Meeting
The Arab League Council
meeting beginning 31 March in
Cairo is unlikely to end in
any clear-cut decision on how
to coordinate Arab policies on
the Palestine question, the
main topic scheduled for dis-
cussion. The UAR is expected
to increase pressure for accept-
ance of its proposal--submitted
at last month's meeting--for
the establishment of a new Pal-
estinian "entity" and army.
The last meeting, at which Jor-
danian opposition'to the pro-
posal was intense, ended with
the formation of a committee to
look into the problem.
Qasim, who has consistently
refused to send a representative
to Cairo, has continued to de-
nounce both the UAR and Jordan--
grouping them with Israel--for
their "occupation" of Palestine
in Gaza and West Jordan. He
has called for a return of the
Palestinians to their "homeland"
and on 27 March announced plans
for the training and equipping
of all Palestianians in Iraq to
form the core of an irredentist
army.
In the absence of an Iraqi
delegate, Jordan will probably
continue as the chief opponent
to the UAR's efforts to impose
its will on the league members,
King Husayn has tried to under-
cut Nasir's efforts by his offer
of a plebiscite to Jordanian
Palestinians. The publicity
given the arrest and confession
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Husayn has conditioned his
offer of a plebiscite on the
"willingness" of Palestinians
in Jordan to have one. The out-
come of such a vote--if a free
plebiscite should be held--re-
mains uncertain. Although there
is considerable dissatisfaction
among Palestinians with their
present status as Jordanian
citizens, the hazards of inde-
pendence or of isolated associ-
ation with the UAR, in the face
of possible Israeli occupation,
probably would influence many
voters to opt for the status
quo,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
AFRICAN NATIONALISTS PREPARING NEW MEETINGS.
Militant African national-
ists will meet at four confer-
ences to be held at Accra,,
Conakry, and Casablanca during
the next two months. Projects
to achieve greater African unity
will be given heavy propaganda
play, despite increasing strains
within the growing bloc of
emerging African states. West-
ern colonial powers--especially
France--and the Union of South
Africa will again be under
heavy fire.
Ghana's ambitious Prime
Minister Nkrumah, ever anxious
to keep himself in the fore-
front of the pan-African move-
ment, will be host at the first
meeting from 7 to 9 April.
Labeled an "emergency" confer-
ence to discuss "positive action
for peace and security" in Afri-
ca, this meeting was hastily
convoked a month ago after the
Ghana-backed drive to force
early UN action on France's nu-
clear testing program failed to
bring immediate results. Repre-
sentatives of both governments
and popular organizations
throughout Africa have been in-
vited, and the Ghanaians claim
delegates will arrive from at
least 20 countries.
The promoters of the con-
ference have indicated it will
concentrate on coordinating ef-
forts to forestall, or to react
against, further French nuclear
tests in the Sahara. The
"threat" of "neocolonialism"
and African "Balkanization"--
favorite themes of Ghana's lead-
er, who is deeply suspicious of
France and its African proteges
--was an item included on the
original agenda. Recent events
in South Africa now also appear
certain to attract much of the
participants' attention.
Still more extreme and
more sweeping anti-Western pro-
nouncements can be expected from
the second nongovernmental Afro-
Asian People's Solidarity Con-
ference (AAPSC), which is to con-
vene in Conakry, Guinea, from
11 to 16 April. However, the
solidarity movement, launched
in 1957 and used by the Commu-
nists and the UAR's Nasir as a
joint vehicle for exploiting
Asian and African nationalism,
has subsequently lost much of
its momentum. In recent months
its permanent secretariat has
been torn by dissension between
UAR-led neutralists and Commu-
nist representatives.
This dissension now seems
certain to be continued at the
Conakry meeting, to which Guinean
President Tourd, motivated pre-
sumably by his own pretensions
to African leadership, agreed
last fall. Close UAR control
over conference preparations
was assured when the Cairo-
based secretariat, rather than
a special committee, as proposed
by the Communists, was charged
with making the preliminary ar-
rangements. Moreover, the UAR
has made a strong effort to pro-
duce a majority of neutralist
delegates.
The Communist bloc repre-
sentatives and Communist members
of some nonbloc delegations never-
theless seem certain to make a
strong bid to gain control over
the conference once it is under
way. In this they will probably
be aided--perhaps decisively--
by the bloc's strong position in
Guinea. The outcome, and perhaps
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the future existence of the
AAPSC, will be heavily influenced
by the attitude of important but
heretofore largely indifferent
African elements,
The next meeting of the new
22-member steering committee of
the Accra-based All-African
People's Conference (AAPC) is to
be held in Accra on 22 April.
Means of implementing resolutions
adopted by the AAPC plenary meet-
ing in Tunis last January will
be discussed; major attention
probably will be given to the
forthcoming constituent confer-
ence of the proposed neutralist
All-African Trade Union Federa-
tion. At that conference, set
for Casablanca in mid-May, mil-
itant, leftist-oriented labor
elements controlled by Nkrumah
and Tourd are expected to push
hard--but almost certainly un-
successfully for the present--
for a clean break between affil-
iates of the new federation and
the pro-Western International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions.
25X1
Paris has negotiations un-
der way or in prospect for
granting formal independence to
the 11 African states which are
members of the French Community.
It hopes, however, to retain a
greater number of in-
stitutions and offi-
cial ties than pre-
vail in the British
Commonwealth. Nego-
tiations with the
Malagasy Republic
(Madagascar) have
been completed, and
independence is ex-
pected to be pro-
claimed in June.
Negotiations with
the Mali Federation
have been prolonged
by France's insist-
ence that the magni-
tude of economic as-
sistance after inde-
pendence depends on
continued French con-
trol of the naval
base at Dakar and on
a Mali commitment to
support French poli-
cies in internation-
al organizations.
Most of the other Commu-
nity states have been awaiting
the outcome of these negotia-
tions before pressing their
cases. Mauritania has announced
it will seek independence in
FRENCH AFRICA
fgfagir Department
Anntonoinous Republic
t- Overseas territory
j Trust territory
Federation of Mali
( 1~ Former French Equatorial Africa
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1961. Ivory Coast Premier Hou-
phouet-Boigny, a leader of the
four-state, West African Conseil
de 1'Entente and steadfast sup-
porter of close ties to France,
has publicly accepted the evo-
lution of the Community. The
four equatorial African states,
negotiating as a unit, are also
reported ready to begin discus-
sions with Paris regarding in-
dependence.
Economic problems are lead-
ing most of the new nations to
consider some form of loose po-
litical cooperation. The states
of former French Equatorial
Africa are apparently moving in
this direction, and recent meet-
ings of the Conseil de l'Entente
have strengthened ties and prob-
ably removed for the moment the
danger of further fragmentation
of this group.
Neither the French public
nor parliament seems inclined to
PROSPECTS FOR SPECIAL UN MEETING ON FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING
If France tests another nu-
clear device in the Sahara be-
fore mid-April, public reaction
may force a majority of UN mem-
bers to agree to a special ses-
sion of the UN General Assembly
to consider the subject. of
French tests. Secretary Gen-
eral Hammarskjold now is poll-
ing UN members in response to a
14 March request signed by 22
of the 29 members of the Asian-
African bloc. Response so far
has been sparce and unenthusias-
tic, but another French test
might change this attitude be-
fore 14 April, when replies are
due . `
Sparked by the African
group, the Asian and African
members of the UN decided to
ask for a special session after
25X1
France set off a nuclear device
on 13 February in defiance of
last fall's General Assembly
resolution calling on Paris to
refrain from such testing. Many
Asian and African members were
opposed to a special session
because they were convinced the
assembly had done all it could
to prevent French testing. After
a series of meetings, however,
the group presented the request
--feeling that since they talked
so much about it, they had to
do something.
Other factors weighing
against a special session are
the expense involved, the be-
lief that special sessions
should be held only in extreme
emergencies, and the reluctance
of many UN delegates to leave
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oppose this development, and
the government is likely to
have little difficulty gaining
ratification of the new accords
or the revisions in France's
constitution needed for inde-
pendent states to remain Commu-
nity members. Community insti-
tutions will also be revised to
conform to the emerging confed-
erative relationship. The most
important Community institution
--the Executive Council--will
probably be replaced by regular
meetings of the prime ministers.
Both French and African
leaders appear to want a smooth
transition to independence with-
in the Community. French in-
sistence on the maintenance of
too many formal ties, however,
would probably be unacceptable to
most of the African states and
could result in a complete sev-
erance of relations with France.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
their home capitals to return
to New York at this time. In
addition, Hammarskjold is known
to be opposed to such a session.
Forty-two affirmative votes
--an absolute majority of the
membership--are required to con-
vene a special session. At the
present time,the Asian-African
members estimate that they have
37 votes in favor,but in view of
the unenthusiastic attitude of
many of their claimed support-
ers and the known opposition of
France and other Western powers,
they do not seem confident of
gaining the five additional
votes required.
ANGLO-GERMAN RELATIONS
Political and economic dif-
ferences continue to strain An-
glo-German relations,which ear-
lier, this year fell to a postwar
low following anti-Semitic inci-
dents in West Germany and rev-
elation of Bonn's plans to es-
tablish supply bases in Spain.
The basic divergence between
Chancellor Adenauer and Prime
Minister Macmillan over deal-
ings with the Soviet Union,
especially regarding Berlin
and European security, may
again come to the surface
prior to the summit meeting.
British press charges of
Nazi influence in West Germany
have created pressure on the
government from Parliament to
arrange access to the records
on the Nazi party and affiliat-
ed organizations now held by
the American-operated Berlin
Document Center. The Foreign
Office is considering sponsor-
ing such access, and sent a
high official to Berlin on 23
March to obtain more informa-
tion on the documents, The For-
eign Office recognizes that in-
discriminate use of material
on former Nazis now prominent
in the Federal Republic would
hurt Anglo-German relations,
but one official states that
Foreign Secretary Lloyd's in-
clination to avoid parliament-
ary attacks for "shielding
Nazis" may cause him to give in.
Long-standing differences
between Britain and the Common
Market (EEC) countries may pro-
vide a further irritant to An-
glo-German relations. Adenauer
on 15 March endorsed the EEC
Commission's recommendations
for lowering members' internal
and external tariffs more rap-
idly and for taking the first
step toward the common external
tariff on 1 July 1960, 18
months earlier than scheduled.
A common EEC external tar-
iff move would raise some du-
ties in the Benelux countries
and perhaps in West Germany--
areas which account for two
thirds of Britain's EEC trade.
London's hope has been that the
impact of such a move could be
reduced by arrangements between
the EEC and the British-backed
European Free Trade Association
(Outer Seven). Adenauer's en-
dorsement of the acceleration
plan--blamed partly on the
United States by British offi-
cials--has dimmed British hopes
for making such arrangements
and heightened fear of early
German discrimra-t-ion against
British goods.
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`.r
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The cabinet which Premier-
designate Fernando Tambroni is
expected to submit for parlia-
mentary approval in early April
is a slightly modified version
of Segni's all.- Christian Demo-
crat government whose collapse
on 24 February under pressure
from the right brought on the
present parliamentary crisis.
The Tambroni cabinet, which
features the outgoing premier
as foreign minister, is designed
by the party primarily as a stop-
gap
.Tambroniwas designated af-
ter efforts to form a center-left
government under Segni collapsed
on 21 March. Segni presumably
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
acceded to pressure.from con-
servAtive forces in the Chris-
tian Democratic party (CD) who
are hostile to a government
that would have depended on the
support, even if indirect, of
Pietro Nenni's Socialist party.
In its endorsement of Tam-
broni, the CD directorate made
clear that it regarded his gov-
ernment as transitional and en-
joined him to work for passage
of the most important legisla-
tion now before parliament.
Pending legislation includes
draft laws on agricultural de-
velopment, education, and elec-
tions, among other matters.
Apart from this, Tambroni has
no announced program, and it re-
mains uncertain where he intends
to find a parliamentary major-
ity. Tambroni, who has served
previously as minister of in-
terior and as minister of the
treasury, is not a very popular
figure, even within his own
party, but he may be able to
scrape together a majority, re-
lying on scattered abstentions
and parliament's general weari-
ness with the crisis.
It is not out of the ques-
tion that Tambroni, an excep-
tionally shrewd and ambitious
politician, would, once voted
into ' cif f ice, make every effort
to shake off the "transitional"
label and entrench himself se-
curely in office.
ARGENTINE CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS
In the 27 March elections
to renew one half of the Argen-
tine Chamber of Deputies, the
major opposition People's Radi-
cal party (UCRP) won more seats
and about 3 percent more popu-
lar votes than President Fron-
dizi'sIntransigent Radical par-
ty (UCRI), according to nearly
complete but unofficial returns.
Strong discontent over the US-
backed economic stabilization
program denied Frondizi the
Peronista and other non-UCRI
support which gave him a land-
slide presidential victory in
1958, but he retained the sup-
port his party gave him in 1957.
The blank vote, advocated main-
ly by the Peronistas and Com-
munists, had a slight plurality.
The UCRI, which had feared
an even greater defeat, still
holds 111 of 192 seats in the
Chamber but probably faces in-
creasing political difficulties
with the stabilization program.
CRP
CRI
lsou.
Chamber
Votes
% of
Total
% of
Total
2,074,838
24.9
24.3
2,043,128
24.7
24.2
1,775,364
21.4
21.2
SECRET
* Unofficial nearly-complete returns.
** Constituent Assembly elections.
*** Protest vote, mainly Peronista, neo-
Peronista, and,in 1960,Communist,
31 MARCH 1960
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
ARGENTINA ELECTIONS FOR ONE HALF
OF SEATS IN CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES
DEFENSE ' (BASED ON UNOFFICIAL RETURNS)
PARTY
LIBERAL PARTY
OF CORRIENTES
PARTY
2
LIBERAL PARTY
OF CORRIENTES
2
The administration party
fared better than most observers
anticipated, in view of strong
_popular discontent over auster-
ity measures under the US-backed
stabilization program. Fron-
dizi has publicly admitted the
unpopularity of his program but
insists the program is neces-
sary for Argentina's long-range
economic rehabilitation. Since
the program began in January
1959, living costs have doubled,
the steepest rises including
food produced within the coun-
try. Just before the elec-
tions, Economy Minister Alvaro
Alsogaray announced a "price
stabilization campaign"
against unjustifiable price
rises.
By retaining a majority in
the lower house, as well as in
the completely UCRI Senate,
Frondizi has at least temporarily
avoided the UCRP threat to
scuttle his program. The con-
servatives, who now have four
deputies, have criticized the
program's execution, but ap-
proved its general outline in
contrast to the complete
condemnation of the UCRP.
The propaganda value of the
UCRP victory, however, will
make Frondizi?s task more
difficult and subject it to
even closer scrutiny by other
Latin American countries con-
sidering stabilization pro-
grams.
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO THE UAR
The USSR is attempting to
fortify its role as the UAR's
primary source of foreign aid
by renegotiating and speeding
implementation of the Soviet-
Syrian economic cooperation
pact of 1957. A Soviet team,,
led by a deputy chairman of the
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USSR's foreign economic rela-
tions committee, now is in
Damascus discussing changes,
and possible expansion of proj-
ects called for under Moscow's
$150,000,000 line of credit,
giving emphasis to projects
which can be implemented im-
mediately. The discussions
also may result in new offers
of Soviet aid.
In sending the delegation,
Moscow apparently was prompted
in part by Cairo's complaints
that the USSR was not meeting
its commitments under the 1957
agreement, which concentrates
largely on hydroelectric, irri-
gation, and transportation proj-
ects. Soviet leaders, presum-
ably well aware of Nasir's drive
to step up economic development
in the Syrian region, may have
welcomed the opportunity to re-
furbish the Soviet aid program
for the northern region; this.
has been stymied in part by
Syrian lack of cooperation.
Moscow probably feels it
can convince Cairo of its good
will by reviving the Soviet-
Syrian aid pact. This would
tend to reduce Nasir's suspi-
cions that Moscow is actively
supporting Arab Communist agi-
tation to regain independent
status for Syria. In contrast
to the USSR's efforts in Egypt,
its activity in Syria has been
lagging since creation of the
UAR in 1958.
While the Soviet Union can
be expected to step up the pace
of its economic aid program in
Syria, Moscow also will persist
in its efforts to maintain its
prominent position in the Egyp-
tian region. The Soviet show
project there unquestionably is
the Aswan Dam, and Moscow appar-
ently will do its utmost to com-
plete the project rapidly and
efficiently. Preliminary work
began early this year, shortly
before Cairo announced that the
USSR would construct the entire
project. Subsequent statements
by Nasir have ruled out Western
participation in building the
dam, but have invited aid for
other economic projects. Soviet
engineers probably will start
major construction work in the
next few months, now that the
final blueprints have been sub-
mitted to Cairo for approval.
In addition, the Soviet
Union is proceeding with the
implementation of its $175,-
000,000 line of credit which
is largely oriented toward the
industrial sector of Egypt's
economy. Most of the projects
agreed to under the credit have
been contracted for, and in
some instances actual construc-
tion work has begun.
There are, however, in-
dications that Moscow is en-
countering some difficulties
in meeting its commitments
under this agreement. Any de-
lay may hamper Cairo's goals
for its new development pro-
gram. Egyptian officials are
also unhappy with Soviet per-
formance to date on the Alex-
andria shipyard project.
Although certain deficien-
cies inherent in Soviet economic
aid may at times disturb UAR
officials, Cairo undoubtedly
is cognizant of the offsetting
advantages. Moscow not only
has allowed low rates of in-
terest and long-term payment
schedules, but also will per-
mit Cairo to repay credits
largely in cotton. Thus, while
Cairo may ultimately cancel
certain projects under the
Soviet credit and seek Western
assistance, which is becoming
increasingly available, it
presumably will also maintain 25X1
its policy of utilizing Soviet
credits to their fullest ex-
tent. (Prepared by ORR)
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Ulbricht regime has de-
cided to complete collectiviza-
tion of the'East German country-
side by the end of this year,
The decision was apparently
based on the succegs in complet-
ing collectivization during the
first three months of 1960 in
eight districts, most of them
in the northern part of the
country. This campaign raised
the percentage of East Germany's
socialized arable land from 52
to more than 80 percent. The
speed of the campaign thus far
probably cannot be maintained,
however, in the southern parts
of the country where great-
er peasant resistance is ex-
pected.
The East German regime has
probably taken this decision in
order to make even more emphatic
its contention that East Ger-
many,with a "popularly accept-
ed socialist system," is a sepa-
rate state from West Germany.
The regime will try to cite
complete collectivization to
strengthen its claim that re-
unification on any but Commu-
nist terms is an impossibility.
The regime is troubled by
many charges both within and
outside East Germany that force
is being used to collectivize
the peasants; in fact, it has
publicly admitted that some
excesses occurred. Ulbricht's
problem'is clearly one of how
to use coercion in the more
resistant southern districts
without appearing to do so.
Unlike the northern dis-
tricts, where farmers general-
ly live in villages, most
peasants in the south live on
individual farms.
The ruthless methods used
by the Communists reportedly
have led to sharp differences
in the central committee and
widespread criticism among rank-
and-file party members.
The successful operation
in the northern districts has
not been carried out without
cost to the regime. The re-
sulting social upheaval has
threatened to cause production
losses, and increasing numbers
of peasants may attempt to
flee to the West. Precautions
have been increased, and a re-
cent report states that the
zonal and sector borders around
West Berlin are being cleared
to aid authorities in halting
flights. In spite of these
measures, more,peasants can be
expected to attempt an escape
as the hopelessness of their
status as private farmers be-
comes evident.
Farmers will find only mo-
mentary encouragement in the fact
that the regime now is soft-ped-
aling the collectivization drive
and is encouraging them to gdt
on with the spring field work.
This lull is probably temporary,
and if a reasonably successful
harvest is attained,a full-scale
campaign is likely to be re-
sumed after the harvest.
by ORR)
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(Concurred in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Communist China is making
a substantial effort to expand
its influence in Nepal with
grant aid--now brought to a to-
tal of $33,600,000 by the Sino-
Nepalese aid agreement signed in
Peiping on 21 March. Besides ac-
cepting a new grant of $21,000,-
000 to augment that of $12,600,-
000 given in 1956, Nepal's Prime
Minister Koirala agreed that
Chinese technicians may come to
Nepal to implement the develop-
ment program.
Nepal, which has been wary
of an influx of bloc experts,,
quickly utilized more than $4,-
000,000 in cash under the 1956
agreement but has done little
about the remainder, which was
to be provided in the form of
machinery and equipment for
small industrial plants. Pei-
ping, apparently anxious that
its aid program appear success-
ful, probably suggested that
Katmandu accept Chinese tech-
nicians and discharge its re-
sponsibilities on the Chinese-
financed projects without fur-
ther delay, The Nepalese, how-
ever, probably will
limit the number of
Chinese technicians
to the minimum
necessary to carry
out the aid proj-
ects.
New
Delhi
Nepalggnj
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Koirala also agreed that
the Chinese may open an embassy
in Katmandu, a matter Peiping
has been pushing for at least a
year, In 1956, the Chinese re=
ceived Nepal's approval to open
a consulate general in Katmandu
and several trade agencies else-
where but agreed to delay estab-
lishment of these posts, Chou
En-lai, who is expected to
visit Nepal in late April, now
may press for permission to
open these posts as well as
the embassy. Nepal has a con-
sulate general in Lhasa and
trade agencies in Tibet, and
will open its own embassy in
Peiping.
According to-the joint
communiqud released on 25
March after Koirala's 11-day
trip to China, the two nations
will sign a treaty of peace
and friendship during Chou's
return visit, Peiping report-
edly is pressing the Nepalese
to include a clause in this
treaty on nonparticipation in
military alliances,but Koirala
mans ed to put off discussion
of this .
Railroad
Road
- - - - Trail
A Nepalese Trade Agency
A Designated market for Nepalese
traders
Rounderies ore not necessorily those
recognized by the U.S. Government.
~z O a.
fa
is n4N QIOmr
t
7;eim ndu N
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SECRET `"W
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In a third document, also
signed on 21 March, Peiping ac-
cepted Nepal's request that the
"traditional" boundary be used as
a "basis" for final border de-
marcation. A joint commission
will set out markers and work
out exact alignments in areas
where boundaries shown on Chi-
nese and Nepalese maps do not
coincide. In those few areas,
"actual jurisdiction" over the
ground will determine which side
gets the territory, and, if there
is disagreement on this point,
the matter will be settled in
consultation. Both sides have
agreed to withdraw armed military
units 12.5 miles from the fron-
tier, leaving the border zone
under civil administration.
The jurisdiction and bound-
ary commission clauses will allow
Peiping to prolong final demar-
cation if it wishes, yet they
acknowledge its position that
jurisdiction is a .significant
factor in determining ownership.
The Chinese have repeatedly ad-
vanced this contention in their
dispute with India, and, when
Chou visits Nehru for border
talks in April, he undoubtedly
will cite these aspects of the
agreement with Nepal as a prec-
edent for a future agreement
with India and as an example of
Peiping's flexibility.
Koirala's objective had
been to secure Peiping's recog-
nition of the customary boundary,
This, he felt, would forestall
border incidents and possible
entanglement in the Sino-Indian
dispute. While the Chinese
may have used Koirala's con-
cern about the boundary in
bargaining for greater economic
and diplomatic contacts, the Nep-
alese prime minister in turn
was able to get the border agree-
ment and increased financial
aid by playing on Peiping's de-
sire to impress India with its
reasonableness. He probably
feels the agreements consoli-
date Nepal's neutral position
and balance its relations with
the major powers in such a way
as to gain maximum benefit from
each. (Prepared jointly
with ORR) 25X1
Since the fall of 1959, the
Indian Government has intensi-
fied measures designed to im-
prove its over-all defense pos-
ture, especially in the Hima-
layan border regions. Sino-In-
dian difficulties along the
border resulted in an increase
of about 2 percent--and possi-
bly more--in the original 1959-
60 defense allocation of $578,-
400,000 in the current and capi-
tal accounts while the 1960-61
allocation will be about 11 per-
cent higher.. Finance Minister
Desai has hinted that he may
have to ask for even more "if
circumstances necessitate it."
The bulk of the increase
intended for the army; a
large portion will go toward
higher pay and more benefits
for military personnel. In ad-
dition, the Territorial Army,
a stand-by reserve force, is
to be revitalized; the Nation-
al Cadet Corps, which provides
youths with elementary mili-
tary training, is being broad-
ened to include 50,000 youths;
and investment in India's gov-
ernment-owned ordnance facili-
ties will be slightly augmented,
The provinces, too, have
been affected. Administration
in Assam and the North East
Frontier Agency (NEFA) has been
tightened up. More intensive
administration of the 1-order
areas is planned in UttarPra-
desh and Himachal Pradesh. Uttar
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
INDIAN BUDGET
(MILLION DOLLARS)
1957-58" 1958-59" 1959-60'
ACTUAL (EINALI FIGURES n REVISED BUDGET ESTIMATES
1960-61`
BUDGET ESTIMATES
Pradesh has budgeted nearly $2,-
000,000 in 1960-61 for improv-
ing border communications and
for other development programs.
About 16,000 National Cadets
will receive training in that
state alone.
Measures to improve military
capabilities in..the Himalayan re-
gion have included:
(1) the purchase of
1,000 pack mules from
abroad; (2) the es-
tablishment of "a
high-altitude research
laboratory" in Uttar
Pradesh to study "all
aspects of life" for
troops at high alti-
tudes; (3) the trans-
fer of nearly a divi-
sion from the Punjab
to the Assam area;
(4) the regrouping
of another division
in the Assam area;
(5) the establish-
ment of a corps head-
quarters to supervise
these. divisions; and
(6) an Apparent in-
tensification of op-
erations to quell the
rebellious Naga
tribesmen, against
whom New Delhi has
spent nearly $5,000,-
000 during the past
two years.
KASHMIR
ISt.ha In Lfl. is
SECRET
INDIA
Area of Naga hostilties
31 MARCH 196?
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
NETHERLANDS NEW GUINEA
Renewed tension between
The Hague and Djakarta is in
prospect as a result of growing
concern in the Netherlands for
the security of West New Guinea.
Long uneasy over Indonesia's
growing military strength, the
Dutch have again been disturbed
by recent reports of the con-
struction--with Soviet aid--of
a marine institute on Amboina
(Ambon) in the Moluccas. They
see further cause f6r worry in
Indonesian Army Chief of Staff
efforts to build up' their
defense in, New Guinea.
They consider the issue a ques-
tion of NATO solidarity, and
will probably renew pressure
for assurances of military
support from the United States
and Britain, as well as from
Australia. They have in the
past threatened to divert NATO-
committed equipment to the"ieland.
Although still determined
not to relinquish the colony
Iunn K.,,,i TAIWAN
(l!K)
"r-SOUTH VIETNAM
31 MARCH 1960
31083
Nasution's recent statements
that his government plans to
intensify the "struggle" for
New Guinea.
In view of Indonesia's suc-
cess in strengthening its mili-
tary position by purchases from
the bloc as well as from the
Netherlands' allies, the Dutch
can be expected to continue their
( FRAM,
I A 'AMEOINA NEW GUINEA
A _ fr., n:~:.
e,
u
to Djakarta, The Hague realizes
some adjustment of policy is
necessary. Dutch officials
fear that a fifth UN General
Assembly debate on the issue
would result in a closer vote
than any of the previous four,
and one official has recently
suggested that the Indonesian
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
claim be referred to the Inter-
national Court of Justice,
Djakarta would almost certainly
oppose any such approach, main-
taining its position that the
only acceptable solution is
cession of the area to Indonesia.
There are still differences
of opinion in the Netherlands
over the long-term future of
West New Guinea, The beginnings
of a policy may emerge, however,
from the current consideration
of recommendations by T. H. Bot,
the Interior Ministry's state
secretary on New Guinea affairs,
that Dutch-Australian cooperation
and coordination in the develop-
ment of New Guinea be acceler-
ated.. Bot hopes this would
eventually lead to the develop-
ment of a Melanesian union, in-
cluding Australian-administered
trust territories on the main
island and adjacent to it.
There is renewed interest in
this approach as a result of
the successful joint efforts
of the Dutch and Australians
since 1958 to improve economic
and social conditions on the
island.
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WSMOP, SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
Shortly after Marshal Lin
Piao became minister of nation-
al defense in October 1950,
there were indications that
steps were being taken to re-
vitalize the vast Chinese Com-
munist militia organization
after a period of partial ob-
scurity in late 1958 and most
of the following year. The
relatively Well-drilled and
well-equipped militia division
that appeared in the parade in
Peiping on 1 October was given
considerable publicity; in No-
vember a number of articles on
the militia appeared; and in
December and January a series
of regional militia conferences
were held.
Peiping released informa-
tion in early February on a
national militia conference re-
cently held in that city. This
conference, attended by Chou
En-lai, Marshal Ho Lung, Chen
Yi, and other notables, passed
a resolution to "continue the
policy of further intensifying
militia construction and the
large--scale organization of
Militia Division in 1 October 1959 Parade, Peiping.
militia units." A series of
rallies has since been held
throughout the country,
Militia After 1949
Prior to the takeover of
the mainland in 1949, the
11... To turn the whole nation into soldiers
through the militia system has many advantages.....
It can build up reserve forces with a high degree
of political consciousness and military training....
It can set up unified labor organizations.... It
can scientifically distribute labor power, raise
the people's labor efficiency, and promote a big
leap forward in product ton. It can increase the
organization, discipline, and militancy of the peo-
ple." --Philosophical Stud 10 January 1959
"The organization of militia divisions is a
good things. It should be universally popularized.
Militia divisions are military, labor, educational,
and physical culture organizations all rolled into
one."--1W Tse-tung, People's Daily 1 October 1959
Communist militia, at that
time virtually indistinguish-
able from other military units
in the Chinese Communist ar-
mies, was a significant force
in the large-scale guerrilla
operations against the Nation-
alists. After victory had been
SECRET
achieved, however, yin
terest in the militia
declined both on the
part of the profes-
sional military, who
became primarily in-
terested in modern-
izing the regular
army, and the Commu-
nist irregulars, who
wanted to return to
civilian life.
Early in 1950
the regime began to
take more notice of
the militia and pro-
moted the organiza-
tion of units through-
out the country. There
were no age limits and
apparently few physical
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
requirements for militia candi-
dates, but political reliability
was stressed. Despite the min-
irnal requirements and the prom-
.iso of extra rations, there was
very little initial respo11sb to
Peiping's appeals.
Nevertheless, the regime
felt that the militia had been
of considerable value in fur-
thering domestic policies;
moreover,.the concept of armed
masses was basic to Mao's mil-
itary doctrines. In late 1950,
therefore, the organization was
further expanded, a more formal
structure developed, and addi-
tional toles were assigned.
The militia's duties were
redefined to include: (1) as-
sisting the regular army in all
its functions and taking over
some garrison duties; (2) main-
taining peace and order in the
villages; (3) assisting-in tax
collection and the collection
of all foodstuffs; (4) recruit-
ing and supervising civilians in
construction projects; (5) tak-
ing a population census; (6) com-
bating bandits and apprehending
spies, saboteurs, and cot rater--
revolutionaries; and (7) in time
of war, maintaining and preserv-
ing order in rear areas, protect-
ing and transporting wounded,
and fighting alongside the reg-
ular army and public security
troops.
During the Korean war, the
militia was increased in size
and was given more public secu-
rity duties to perform. It is
not believed to have participated
directly in military operations
in North Korea.
Conscription and the Militia
Until 1954 the regime
stressed that recruiting for
the militia should not be com-
pulsory, but in March of that
year all males between the ages
of 18 and 45 were required to
enlist in local units. The
structure was broken into two
major components: "cadre" mili-
tia and universal militia--a
distinction which has taken on
increasing importance. The
more carefully selected cadre
militia, was made up of able-
bodied men between 18 and 25
who had been recommended by the
cadre company commander, under-
gone a period of political ob-
servation, and been approved by
lower level party and govern-
ment officials,
One of the early goals of
the militia was to pave the way
for the establishment of a com-
pulsory military-service pro-
gram. In 1955 the first con-
scription law was passed and
men were drafted into the Peo-
pl'e's Liberation Army. The
"From now on retired servicemen will Join the
militia every year; they will adopt the method of
apprenticeship to train soldiers in curious catego-
ries.... They may train a naval reserve in connec-
tion with the fishing and shipping industry, an air
reserve force in combination with civil aviation...
a tank reserve through the operation on tractor sta-
tions.... In this way militia training can be com-
bined with production and construction." --Peoalets
Daily, 1 i?hy 1959
"The active assistance of People's Liberation
Army units to the various local departments in mil-
itia work has markedly raised the political con-
sciousness and the military standards of militia-
men.... The PLA unite also systematically train
military instructors and enable them to teach gen-
eral military theories as well as conduct actual
drills." --New China News Agency, 23 lhrch 1960
militia had only a small admin-
istrative role in carrying out
this first draft, but by 1958
nearly all conscripts for the
army were taken from militia
ranks, where they were to have
received some military training
and indoctrination.
Peiping then incorporated
the reserve program into the
militia, and the reserve ceased
to exist as a separate entity.
Demobilized servicemen, veterans,
and former reservists were urged
or compelled to go into cadre
militia units, where they were
used as instructors. There now
are about 7,000,000 of these,
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Iftopr SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and this proportion can be ex-
pected to expand considerably
in the future, as demobiliza-
tions begin to. affect the 500,_
000-800,000 conscripts inducted
by the regular armed forces
each year since 1955; conscripts
remain on active duty for three
years in the. ground,, forces, four
years in the air force, and five
years in the navy. An able-
bodied male in Communist China
now can expect to spend most of
his adult life associated with
military or paramilitary organ-
izations.
Militarization-of Population
In mid-1958, the militia
received considerable impetus
from the vast commune develop-
ment program. An enormous sup-
ply of trained. and "disciplined"
manpower was needed to carry
out communal projects. Further-
more, the regime, anticipating
strong resistance to its plans,
apparently felt extraordinary
controls over the population
were needed before the socio-
economic structure of the coun-
try could be reorganized.. The
militia was thus made one of
the principal instruments for
implementing such controls, and
a huge "everyone a soldier" cam-
paign began... To stimulate en-
listments, nationalistic prop-
aganda themes and such slogans
as "Liberate Taiwan" and "Hate
the United States" were stressed.
The attacks on the Nationalist-
held offshore islands that fall
may have been undertaken, at
least in part, to further this
program.
Numerically, the gigantic
recruitment program appears to
have been a success; some re-
gions reported that every able-
bodied man and woman between
the ages of 15 and 50 had en-
rolled. According to the Com-
munist press, there were more
than 220,000,000 people in the
militia at the end of Septem-
ber 1958. They were organized
into 155 divisions, 345 inde-
pendent regiments, 392 independ-
ent battalions, and 435 inde-
pendent companies. The unit
designations were, and still
are, little more than conven-
ient labels attached to militia
units for administrative pur-
poses.
The decline of military ac-
tivity in the Taiwan Strait and
a slowing down of the commune
movement tended to minimize
both the real and ostensible
reasons for pushing the mili-
tia, and Communist press and
radio commentary on it declined
toward the end of 1958. There
was no indication of any change
in its size or structure, but 25X1
military train-
25X1
ing for members of the universal
militia may have been de-emphasized
Artillery Training
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and their activities directed
toward special construction
tasks or emergency operations
:such flood work and drought
and insect-plague relief. Cadre
units, on the. other hand, ap-
parently continued and expanded
their training programs,
Training
Most members of the mili-
tia have had little or no mil-
itary training beyond a few
indoctrination lectures and a
minimum of close-order drill.
About 30,000,000 have received
some generalized instruction,
primarily in infantry tactics,
and about 14,000,000 have fired
live ammunition either in mili-
tia units or while on active
duty in the army.
Training for the militia
varies considerably from unit
to unit, depending on the loca-
tion of a unit and its function,
as well as on local political,
economic, and military condi-
tions. Cadre militia in "front"
areas--such as Fukien Province,
opposite the Nationalist garri-
sons of the offshore islands---
are given comprehensive instruc-
tion with the most modern weap-
ons and equipment available and
are, in fact, integrated with
the army for much of their peri-
ods of active duty.
Cadre units in metropol-
itan areas are often given more
specialized training than their
rural counterparts, possibly
because of the more advanced
technical skills of the members
and the greater availability of
instructors and equipment. In
Shanghai, for example, naval
engineering, naval navigation,
radar operations, and tele-
communications were taught in
1959.
Rural cadre units usually
are drilled in rifle squad de-
fensive and offensive tactics
and combat supply and engineering
problems. Universal militia--
by 1959 these were usually
called ordinary militia--are
more likely to be given instruc-
tion in first aid, fire fight-
ing, or highway construction.
Throughout the militia
program; there is considerable
effort to relate the civilian
activity to training: a farm
tractor driver often becomes
a tank driver; a shipyard work-
er studies naval damage con-
trol. Militia regulations em-
phasize that such instruction
must not interfere with produc-
tion. Thus urban cadres cus-
tomarily drill before and after
the working day, and in rural
areas training usually is given
on a full-time basis during
slack periods in the growing
season and during the winter.
A militia handbook states,
"Political training should be
made the basis of militia train-
ing, with military training
taking second place." This
is carried out in practice, as
militia on full-time training
duty are required to spend up
to three hours each day on po-
litical studies, Defectors
have indicated that most, and
in some instances all, instruc-
tion given ordinary militia
members is political.
Weapons, ammunition, and
equipment for militia are usu-
ally issued only for the dura-
tion of the specific training
periods, except where the mili-
tia is performing security duty,
The present practice differs
considerably from that of pre-
vious years, when small arms
were issued on a permanent or
semipermanent basis. The
change was probably made when
the number of men exceeded the
available supply of small arms,
but there is some indication
that the regime felt it would
be safer to maintain a close
control of all available weap-
ons as some of the less popular
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
internal reforms were put into
effect. There are no govern-
ment uniforms available to the
militia, although a few of the
wealthier communes have sup-
plied some of their units
Control of the Militia
Regulations state that in
case of mobilization, militia
units--probably only cadre
types--will be drafted into the
regular units with which they
train. In case of conflicts
with bandits or reactionaries,
militia serving alongside or in
army and public security units
will come under the command of
those units. The over-all con-
trol of the militia in peace-
time probably comes under the
Types of Units
In various sec-
tions of Communist
China the militia takes
on unique characteris-
tics. In coastal
areas, for example,
small naval craft seem
to be permanently as-
signed to the militia,
and fishing boats be-
longing to militiamen
are frequently armed
with automatic weap-
ons---including 37-mm..
guns. These craft
have often been ef-
fective in protecting
fishing fleets and on
occp,-;ion have driven
off or crippled South
Korean and Chinese Na-
tionalist vessels. The
presence of these units
also minimizes the
possibility of other
fishermen defecting to
Taiwan.
Department of Mobilization of
the, Ministry of National Defense;
at lower echelons a combined
army-party-government structure
appears to be charged with the
control of the various units.
A militia manual states
that these forces are subject
to the direct command of the
People's Liberation Army at all
levels, but that party committees
have the responsibility for or-
ganizing the headquarters of the
militia, for organizing training,
and for commanding the militia.
To promote party control, secre-
taries of party cells are re-
quired to serve concurrently as
political commissars in militia
units.
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In many areas
there has been consid-
erable emphasis on re-
cruiting women. In
some instances these
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women are given combat infantry
training, although usually they
are only given a few first-aid
and political lectures. Women
are incorporated into both ca-
dre or universal organizations
or even organized into all-
women units.
Still another type of unit
that has appeared in some parts
of the country is the Rear Serv-
ice Militia, composed of youths
under 15 and infirm males over
50. These perform various me-
nial tasks in lieu of military
training during peacetime; in
wartime they are to handle sup-
plies and care for the wounded.
Native units were formed
in Tibet during 1959 for use
against rebels, but the expe-
riment apparently was not suc-
cessful and was soon terminated.
Some Tibetan militia reportedly
took advantage of the arms and
the training to mount opera-
tions against the Communists.
Summary
The diversity in the kinds
of militia troops, the differ-
ent ways in which regulations
are applied, and the varied
type of training given through-
out China indicate that the re-
gime has developed the militia
with considerable flexibility
and expediency and has attempted
to gain all possible advantages
--political, military, and
economic--with only a minimum
of expenditure; efforts to es-
tablish nationwide uniformity
in regulations and operations
are clearly secondary to these
considerations.
The great majority of the
200,000,000-260,000,000 Chinese
said to be in militia units,
with the little military train-
ing they have, could not form
a first-line reserve. Nazi
Germany, scraping its manpower
barrel toward the end of World
War II, was barely able to
boost its armed forces over
10,000,000, well under 15 per-
cent of the population. Hence,
even with the "equality" of
women for militia service, it
is impossible to give full mil-
itary weight to an organiza-
tion whose membership by Chi-
nese claims approaches 40 per-
cent of the population.
Despite its experience
with the militia, Communist
China appears still to consid-
er the present organization
embryonic in form; for example,
the regime has stated that in
"five years" the militia will
take an effective part in tacti-
cal operations. The organiza-
tion, now primarily a security
and a shock-labor force, may take
on greater military significance
as a "storage place" for regular
army units if Communist China
should make some disarmament
moves.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE FRENCH ARMY IN POLITICS
Although be Gaulle has en-
o11 et:i.cally reasserted civilian
control over the military fol-
lowing the abortive French set-
tler ins,tir:rect.ion in Algiers in
January, the Paris government
must still cope with an anti-
Republican mentality which many
French officers developed in
the course of their unsuccess-
ful colonial campaigns. A mi-
nority of "activist" officers
has fostered this attitude among
conscripts and spread it among
the civilian population through
veterans organizations,, De
Gaulle is trying to convince
the military that the retention
of Algeria cannot be the prin-
cipal goal of an army which
must adapt itself to global com-
mitments.
Political Forces in Arm1
Most French Army officers
prefer to confine their inter-
ests to matters of national de-
fense, and they have no desire
to involve the army directly in
politics. Prior to January,
many of these would have been
swayed by their desire to avoid
any threat to the unity of the
army, and there was a serious
danger they might follow the,
lead of extremists intent oil
changing government policy.
Chief of Staff Fly, for example,
argued in cabinet meetings that
the preservation of army unity
was the overriding necessity in
viewing any government action
against the insurgents. Never-
theless, he supported De Gaulle,
as did the great majority of-top
officers. These men had long
subordinated France's position
in Algeria to other elements of
national defense policy--crea-
tion of an independent nuclear
deterrent, relations with NATO,
or the modernization of conven-
tional forces,
Nevertheless, a different
perspective prevailed in lower
officer echelons, and De Gaulle's
reminder, to the army in early
March that it has global re-
sponsibilities reaching far
beyond Algeria was probably
aimed at officers whose polit-
ieal.ideology has been warped
by a narrow interpretation.of
France's postwar problems.
Many of them have been
disillusioned by the ineffec-
tiveness of the republic. They
view the struggle for Algeria
as the culmination of a long
battle against "the politicians"
who, they feel, were responsible
for an ignominious withdrawal
from Indochina and the loss of
Tunisia and Morocco, and they
supported De Gaulle because
they felt he would put an end
to the debilitated democracy of
the Fourth Republic. Disappoint-
ment at De Gaulle's adherence
to democratic forms, however,
has subsequently led many of
those officers to oppose him,
and the preservation of France's
position in Algeria became their
rallying point.
Spearheading these ele-
ments it a group of middle-grade
officers who are convinced that
the ota.ly viay to defend France
against the Communist threat is
to adopt the "revolutionary war"
techniques the Viet Minh used
against the French in Indochina.
This group would indoctrinate
the armed forces with these
techniques and, if necessary,
apply them' in the domestic po-
litical sphare as well by cre-
ating an authoritarian regime
which, it holds, could meet
the Communist challenge.
These officers pushed the
creation of psychological war-
fare schools in which all new
officers and draftees are in-
doctrinated, Elite troops
such as parachute regiments,
Foreign Legion elements, and
specially trained African units
have been singled out for spe-
cial political indoctrination.
While this has resulted in dis-
ciplined, efficient fighting
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
units, it has widened the rift
between the fighting man and the
society he is pledged to defend.
An anonymous army major writing
in the semiofficial army mag-
azine Message of the Armed
Forces emphasized this rift when
he attempted a theoretical jus-
tification of disobedience when
the state fails to take army
views into consideration.
Army's Impact on Politics
In the long run, the most
important aspect of this atti-
tude will be its impact on
French political life. The
French Army now is barely 30
percent professional, with the
lower officer and enlisted
categories largely conscripts
and reserve officers fulfill-
ing their military obligation.
Although this opens the
army to the moderating influ-
ence of a continuous and exten-
sive turnover of personnel, the
return of conscripts to civilian
life after 27 months of indoc-
trination widens the political
influence of the psychological
warfare officers and provides a
channel for their ideas to the
general population. The wide-
spread use of veterans' organ-
izations and service magazines
edited by psychological war-
fare officers and addressed to
the demobilized civilian has
proved an efficient means for
continuing political indoctri-
nation.
Direct identification of
military personnages with po-
litical movements has not been
extensive in the past in France,
and even in the 1958 National
Assembly elections, few high-
ranking military leaders played
an active role. Despite the
military overtones of the 13
May coup, in the ensuing elec-
tions only 17 generals and
colonels ran for office in
metropolitan France, and only
five of these were elected.
The military has much in-
direct support, however, from
the large number of veterans
groups, and rightist political
parties and cabinet members have
frequently identified themselves
with policies considered favor-
able to the armed forces, Al-
though veterans have devoted
themselves largely to pressing
for continued or increased pen-
sions, the exposure to authori-
tarian political ideas while on
active duty has had an impact on
their broader political orien-
tation. Veterans and reserve
army groups in Algeria showed
in January that former military
men were willing to move out-
side the legal framework, if
necessary, to assure government
adherence to their desires.
In metropolitan France,
veterans groups have rarely
participated directly in nation-
al elections, and the total
membership of the various seg-
ments of the badly split vet-
erans' movement is not large.
The French Ministry of the In-
terior has admitted, however,
that these groups have a strong
influence not only in extreme
right-wing circles, but also in
the classical right and the po-
litical formations opposed to
Communism?
Extreme Rightists and the Army
Much right-wing identifica-
tion with pro-army policies prob-
ably results from a similarity of
interests in increasing the na-
tional strength and maintaining
the French position in Algeria
rather than from any direct in-
fluence of the army on political
groups or personalities. As a
result of the Algerian war, sup-
port for the army has been most
evident in the Independent party,
in the Algerian Unity of the Re-
public party, and in a portion
of the Gaullist Union for the
New Republic.
Ties between the army and
such fascist organizations as
the Young Nation headed by Pierre
Sidos, Robert Martel's Popular
Movement 13, or Georges Sauge's
National Catholicism movement
are difficult to pinpoint, but
probably result more from the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
initiative of the extreme right-
ist groups than of army elements.
gauge, an ex-Communist who now
preaches an extreme form of
Christian crusade against Com-
munism,,has been quite success-
ful in getting army officers to
attend sessions at his Center
for Advanced Studies and Social
Psychology, and he, reportedly
floods army posts with propa-
ganda pamphlets.
Algeria Still the Key
The key to the uneasy mili-
tary-political relationship is
the eventual , disposition, of Al-
geria. French control of Algeria
has become for the army a,symbol
of continued greatness. for France
and of the preservation of West-
ern civilization,from Communist
subversion. Moreover, the army's
economic and social work has
tied it so closely to Algeria
that anything short of the kind
of Algerian solution it wants
would be likely to stir up dan-
gerous new risks for .Paris.
Hard on De Gaulle's reaf-
firmation of civilian control
over the armed forces following
the insurrection in Algiers, the
government moved to separate the
military'and political functions
of army leaders in Algeria and
to make the administration there
more responsive to policy direc-
tives from Paris. Police services
in Algeria were reorganized and
placed under the direct. control
of the civilian' delegate general.
Officers who had been serving as
departmental prefects were re-
placed by civilians, and the army
was reminded that its primary
mission is to conduct the war.
On the eve of De Gaulle Is 3-5
Mari-:h trip to field 'installations
the separation. of military and
civilian responsibilities was
emphasized in a government di-
rective ordering the army to
concentrate on operational ac-
tion and remain. above political
discussions and electoral opera-
tions." -
Specific trouble spots in
the army were handled directly.
Three generals whose sympathies
were suspect--Jacques Faure,
Andre Gribius, and Henri Miram-
beau--were relieved of their
commands. Several colonels who
had' been close to paratroop Gen-
eral Massu or who had been im-
plicated,in the Algiers insurrec-
tion were recalled and later
indicted. The reserve territor-
ial units, many of whose troops
had,. manned the barricades,, were
disbanded, and their members
assigned-to other components to
fulfill their periodic active-
service requirements. Finally,
the army's psychological action
bureau,.which had blatantly prop-
agandized. the integrationist
cause, was dissolved and its
functions distributed to other
army services-. Psychological
warfare sections were retained
at the divisional and lower
levels, however, to meet legiti-
mate,needs.
.De Gaulle was nevertheless
careful to praise the army as
a.whole for its social and eco-
nomic program in Algeria. The
vigorous statements on the paci-
fication campaign he made in his
March visit were partly designed
to warn the Moslem rebels, but
they were also aimed at assuring
the army that its'importance was
recognized. De Gaulle's success
in reconciling the army to tradi-
tional French democratic processes
will,,however, be limited as
long as the war with the Moslem
rebels continues.
De Gaulle's prestige is suf-
ficient to guarantee the technical
reforms; his, difficult task will
be to divert the army's present
interest from Algeria by offering
it the. chance of new success and
new prestige in other fields.
The army has been encouraged to
take pride in France's nuclear
progress and to recognize France's
growing international responsi-
bilities, so that Algeria will
be viewed in the broader perspec-
tive which the civilian population
has generally accepted. The
most likely. prospect for the
immediate future is a continua-
tion of the uneasy truce which
leaves, the government. prey to
intemperate decisions by.military
"activists"..or civilian extrem-
ists.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Tndustrial output in the
I':ast European Communist satel-
lites is to continue growing at
a high rate-in 1960, although
in most countries the planned
rates of growth for 1960, rang-
ing from 7.5 to 15 percent,are
lower than those achieved in
1959. Bulgaria, having failed
by a close margin to achieve
the 28-percent increase in in-
dustrial output planned for
1959, has set a less ambitious
goal for 1960---about 15 per-
cent. It is followed closely
by Rumania--with 14 percent--
then Czechoslovakia with 10
percent and Hungary with about
8 percent. Poland has scheduled
the lowest rate of growth--7.6
percent; East Germany has not
yet announced its plans.
Industrial Plans
During 1960,in conformity
with past practices, the con-
sumer is to receive some bene-
fit from large increases in
industrial production; perhaps
as much as 5 percent more in-
dustrial goods than last year
will be available to the con-
sumer. Generally, however,the
share of national income ear-
marked for consumption will
decline slightly, and that for
investment will increase. The
rapid growth of output of
heavy industry will support
both increased investments in
the satellites and larger ex-
ports of machinery to the So-
viet Union and China. The
satellites now export twice as
much machinery as they import,
with the Soviet Union the major
market.
The major share of indus-
trial growth in 1960 is to
come from increases in labor
productivity. In most of the
satellites, revisions of work
norms, amounting to a speed-up,
are being implemented or are
planned for the near future.
1960 IN EASTERN EUROPE
Such reforms are well advanced
in Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
and Rumania, are under way in
Poland,-and are scheduled in
Bulgaria. Newly commissioned
plants and some replacement of
obsolete machinery are also to
play a role. Also planned are
increases in industrial employ-
ment, except possibly in Poland
--where the regime is attempt-
ing to carry out strict economy
measures--and in East Germany,
where the flight of refugees is
continuing, although at a re-
duced rate.
Achievement of these sub-
stantial industrial goals is
also predicated on growing im-
ports from the USSR, since, in
general, the satellites are
deficient in such industrial
raw materials as iron ore, non-
ferrous metals, rubber, petro-
leum, wool, and cotton. Indi-
vidual trade agreements for
1960 call for a considerable
expansion of trade between the
USSR and the satellites.
Although prospects for a
rapid increase in industrial
production in the satellites
are favorable, certain important
aspects of the industrial plans
may be underfulfilled. Con-
struction of some large indus-
trial projects has tended to
lag behind schedule, and pro-
duction of certain key types
of machinery may be below
planned investment and export
requirements. The poor quality
of production will continue to
cause problems and will keep
satellite machinery at a compe-
titive disadvantage in Western
markets.
Agricu lture
Agriculture continues to
be the weakest sector of the
satellites' economies. The
production by collective and
state farms has shown little
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 March 1960
response to such regime meas-
ures as larger investments and
allocations of fertilizer--and,
in the northern satellites,was
adversely affected in 1959 by
the weather.
There were increases'in
crop production over last year,
especially in Rumania and Hun-
gary, but meat production fell
in East Germany and Poland,
where the resulting meat short-
ages have tended to increase
discontent. There have been re-
ports of short industrial strikes
in both Poland and East Germany
in protest against inadequate
ANNUAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE IN
GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
supplies of certain foods, and
freight cars loaded with meat
for export are said to have
been broken into by mobs. At
least sporadic shortages will
continue through June.
Prospects for a substan-
tial increase in agricultural
output, especially in bread
grains, for 1960 are not good.
Bad weather during thefall
hampered grain sowing in some
areas and reduced planted acre-
age. Unusually good weather
this spring could correct this
shortcoming to some extent,but
a bumper crop is very unlikely,
particularly in the
northern satellites.
PERCENTAGE OF COLLECTIVIZED
AGRICULTURAL LAND
1960
1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 (PLAN) 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
31 MARCH 1960
00321 2
1960
(PLAN)
Collectivization
Policies
All satellite
regimes except the
Polish will continue
their programs to in-
crease state control
over agriculture in
1960. In Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, and
Albania, where 80 to
100 percent of the
land is already so-
cialized, these pro-
grams will be mainly
concerned. with the
amalgamation of exist-
ing collectives and
with improvements in
the organization and
management of the
farms. Efforts to
squeeze out the re-
maining private farms
will continue.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 77 84.
65
43 41 47
45 54
31
24 25 29 ji 3 Mj3d
56 #
30 28 \\\\\\\ \26 28
\\\\
1/%%dmii ia
57
35 39
111~\IMNENN\
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959
e Percentage of arable land only.
# Increased to 70 percent by 2 March 1960.
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In Hungary, the
amount of arable land
now being worked col-
lectively or by state
farms increased from
27 percent to 57.5
percent of the total
during 1959, and to
70 percent by mid-
February 1960. The
regime now is con-
cerned with the need
to consolidate its
gains, and few new
collectives are likely
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
to be formed until after the
harvest. Steady pressure to
bring private farmers into col-
lectives is likely to continue
in Rumania and has been speeded
up in East Germany. In Poland,
however,where collective farms
account for only one percent and,
together with state farms, for
about 13 percent of all agri-
cultural land, there will prob-
ably be no renewed efforts to
collectivize.
There may, nevertheless,
be some increased tension in
Poland between the regime and
the peasant, as the regime at-
tempts to extend its influence
in farm areas through the or-
ganization of government-spon-
sored "agricultural circles."
The Gomulka regime also plans
to collect large arrears of
taxes and has made the delivery
of coal to the peasants contin-
gent on stipulated meat deliv-
eries to the state. It is un-
likely, however, to take the
strong measures that would be
necessary to achieve these
objectives in full.
The recent Moscow con-
ference on agricultural and re-
lated matters appears to have
been concerned predominantly with
means of raising lagging agri-
cultural output. It appears
that coordination of certain
economic efforts, including
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agricultural, was also dis-
cussed.
Reactions to Economic Problems
Popular morale probably
suffered in all of the satel-
lites in 1959, but the greatest
setback was in Poland, the coun-
try with the most personal free-
dom. There is little prospect
of any significant increase in
the standard of living during
1960; a large share of the an-
ticipated increase in indus-
trial output is to be used to
reduce the adverse trade balance.
Moreover, there will be con-
tinuous attempts to raise work
norms, employment in'some in-
dustries will be reduced, and
Gomulka's strongly adverse at-
titude toward protests and
strikes is unlikely to change.
There are indications of rapid-
ly rising discontent among the
Polish urban workers.
In the other satellites,
laborers are under pressure to
work harder. Gains in wages,
if any, will probably not com-
pensate for the increase of
effort demanded. In East Ger-
many and Czechoslovakia, where
an effort to increase work
norms is well under way, the
industrial labor force has
stepped up its passive resist-
ance to regime plans.
(Prepared by ORR)
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