CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 20, 2006
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• Publication Date: October 27, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 5e
OCI NO. 1013/60
24 March 1960
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
3 r. v., rKE-11- 25X1
earn?WNTIAI;
5s. ^
L i DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED T()- TA C
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE:, REVLEWER:
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
T H E W E E K I.N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Soviet proposal of 19 March for a permanent ban
on all nuclear tests except small underground explosions,
which would be covered by a moratorium pending the results
of joint research to improve detection techniques, climaxes
Soviet maneuvers to draw the Western powers into a compre-
hensive ban on all testing. The USSR is seeking to force
the United States either to accept what is in effect a com-
prehensive ban on all tests, or to risk an open break with
London by rejecting the small-tests moratorium. In the
disarmament conference, the bloc delegations have refrained
from their customary procedural disputes, and have sought
to demonstrate a desire for serious negotiations. In his
first days in Paris, Khrushchev lost no time in developing
the main themes of his visit--the need for Soviet-French
cooperation on the German problem, disarmament, and the
elimination of nuclear weapons.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The Qasim government, apparently fearing further
clashes between Iraqi Communists and anti-Communists, has
tightened security precautions. King Husayn of Jordan
has reiterated his determinrtion to proceed with plans
for a plebiscite among the large Palestinian population
of West Jordan. President Nasir included several sup-
porters of Syrian security chief Sarraj in his appoint-
ments on 18 March to fill vacancies in the Syrian cabinet.
VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The riots on 21 and 22 March in Transvaal and Cape
provinces of South Africa resulted from the first well-
organized African nationalist protest action since 1957.
The Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), which arranged the
demonstrations, is a relatively new, militantly antiwhite
political group
The South African
Government can be expected to res r t the activities of
the PAC's leaders and to attempt to suppress the organiza-
tion.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART I (continued)
THE CUBAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The Castro regime is tightening its control over com-
munications media and extending its radical socio-economic
programs. Opponents of Castro's policies are becoming
more outspoken, however, particularly on the Communist
issue. Meanwhile, the extent of Chinese~Coaunist inter-
est in Cuba is emphasized by the appearance of Chou En-lai
at a rally of the newly formed China - Latin American Friend-
ship Association in Peiping.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
PEIPING ELABORATES DOCTRINAL CLAIM FOR MAO . . . . . . . Page 1
The Chinese Communists have substantially expanded
their claim for Mao Tse-tung as a theorist, crediting him
with a whole series of "discoveries" and formulations in
political economy. A recent article in People's Daily for
the first time attributes to Mao the "discovery" that
political indoctrination is more important than material
incentives in increasing worker productivity. It also
credits Mao with solving the economic problems connected
with China's own "road" to industrialization. Thus the
Chinese, in claiming "doctrinal originality" for Mao, con-
tinue to"raise a challenge to Moscow.
SINO-INDONESIAN RELATIONS .
. . . . . . . . . Page
Peiping, apparently fearing a burdensome increase in
the number of Overseas Chinese desiring repatriation from
Indonesia, has called on Djakarta to relax the pressures
forcing their departure. Djakarta may reduce harassment
of Chinese; but it is unlikely to accede to Peiping's re-
quest for a formal agreement on repatriation or to other
of its demands.
TAIWAN AND PEIPING COMPETE FOR AFRICAN RECOGNITION .
Communist China's recent threat to break diplomatic
ties with Guinea if Conakry received another Chinese
Nationalist delegation reflects Peiping's concern that
the "two Chinas" concept may be gaining acceptance in
Africa. Competition between Taipei and Peiping for rec-
ognition by emergent African republics was sharpened by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
PART II (continued)
the recent success of Nationalist China in establishing
relations with Cameroun and the favorable impression made
by Nationalist delegations on several African nations
which will become independent this'year.
SOVIET REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESSES . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Information coming out of the recently concluded Com-
munist party congresses. in various Soviet republics re-
veals that the shake-up last year in the top leadership
of several republics was part of a more extensive turnover
in important party and government officials than that fol-
lowing Stalin's death. The underlying aim seems to have
been to bring new blood to the leadership of party and
government at all levels to carry out Khrushchev's dynamic
new programs.
THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY IN 1959 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The economic gains achieved in Yugoslavia in 1959
indicate a sound basis for continued rapid economic expan-
sion. Significant increases in agricultural and industrial
production have reduced Yugoslavia's chronic foreign ex-
change deficit and will enable Yugoslavia to expand its
export trade, especially with underdeveloped countries.
Belgrade continues to need foreign economic investment,
ever, to ensure present rates of growth.
RUMANIA PLANS INCREASED EMIGRATION OF JEWS . . . . . . . . Page 7
Bucharest has apparently decided to permit a sizable
increase in the number of Jews emigrating to Israel. Arab
pressure led to a suspension of such emigration in Febru-
ary 1959 after 16,000 Jews had left Rumania in the pre-
ceding six months. To date, there has been only limited
Arab reaction to the small number permitted to leave
Rumania during the past four months. The Rumanians are
seeking to avoid publicity by increasing the number of
exit routes but have bad difficulty in securing coopera-
tion from Greece.
POLITICAL SITUATION IN KENYA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Although the London constitutional conference on
Kenya last February pointed toward eventual independence,
those Africans demanding immediate freedom have not been
satisfied by concessions such as London's agreement to an
African-dominated Kenya legislature. European settlers,
concerned over isolated instances of Mau Mau - type ter-
rorism, are deserting the moderate New Kenya party in
favor of the right-wing United party, which is pledged to
support white rule in Kenya.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
PART II (continued)
MOROCCAN LABOR CONFLICT SEEMS IMMINENT . . . . . . . . . Page 9
A prolonged struggle for dominance over organized
labor seems imminent in Morocco. A recently launched
right-wing labor federation, expected to be legalized by
royal decree, seeks to win over 650,000 workers affiliated
with the leftist Moroccan Union of Labor. While police
repression of leftist activities may have deterred an at-
tempt- to disrupt the right-wing organizing meeting.
clashes between rival labor factions seem almost certain
when leftist labor leader Ben Seddik returns to Morocco.
MODERATE GOVERNMENT FORMED IN CEYLON . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Moderate elements scored a substantial victory over
the leftists in Ceylon's parliamentary elections on 19
March, but political instability is likely to continue.
The conservative United National party (UNP) has only 50
seats, 29 short of a majority. Prime Minister Senanayake
intends to rule with a minority government, and may stay
in power temporarily by virtue of the opposition's dis-
unity, but new elections could become necessary in the
relatively near future.
SITUATION IN LAOS . . .
. . . . . . . . . Page 11
The Communist-front Neo Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) has be-
latedly entered 9 candidates for the 59 National Assembly
seats at stake in Laos' 24 April elections. Hanoi radio
has broadcast a purported NLHS appeal to the Laotian
people to vote for NLHS and other "peace-loving" candi-
dates. These developments suggest that the Pathet Lao
insurgents will not make a widespread effort to disrupt
the elections; however, they may'try to'influence the
vote in rural areas. Of the non-Communist candidates,
who make up most of the total of 158, some 60 are on the
government's "unified slate," and the rest are unaffil-
iated candidates, many of whom may be induced to withdraw.
DETERIORATING POLITICAL SCENE IN SOUTH KOREA . . . . . . . Page
The widespread resentment aroused by the Rhee govern-
ment's repressive and fraudulent election tactics marks an
increasing tnedency by the regime over the past year to
rely on force and repression:.
SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN AGREE ON DETAINEE EXCHANGE . .
South Korea's agreement to exchange 167 captured
. Page 14
Japanese fishermen for about 1,000 illegal Korean entrants
detained in Japan will relax the domestic pressures on
Tokyo for strong countermeausres against Seoul's "hostage
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
diplomacy." South Korea, however, has not committed it-
self to refrain from future seizures nor to release an
additional 47 fishermen when they complete their sen-
tences. A broad settlement of the many differences be-
tween the countries remains remote.
PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO DE GAULLE REGIME RISING . . . Page 15
De Gaulle's refusal to call a special parliamentary
session on agricultural policy has evoked widespread
criticism from the press and from parliamentary spokesmen.
While he has muzzled parliamentary opposition during
Khrushchev's visit, he will shortly face further demon-
strations by farmers in addition to efforts to topple the
Debrd government.
NATO DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The special meeting of NATO defense ministers in Paris
planned for 31 March and 1 April has been called to follow
up proposals made at the December 1959 ministerial meeting
on means of improving the Western defense effort in the
face of chronic deficiencies. While wide-ranging discus-
sions may be expected, significant decisions must await
the results of other studies not due for completion until
May, when the foreign ministers hold their regular spring
meeting.
THE OUTLOOK IN COLOMBIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Preliminary returns from the 20 March elections in
Colombia for the lower house of the national Congress indi-
cate that the National Front government headed by President
Alberto Lleras can no longer count on the two-thirds con-
gressional majority required to pass virtually all legisla-
tion. Lleras will arrive in the United States on 4 April
for an official visit, and he will probably seek to deter-
mine the availability of credits to promote his comprehen-
sive economic development plan, which was not an issue in
the recent elections.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
THE BOLIVIAN REVOLT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . Page 19
The brief threat posed by the rebellion of a police
regiment in La Paz on 19 March temporarily allayed feuding
within Bolivia's governing Nationalist Revolutionary Move-
ment. Further disorders are likely in the next two months
as the government prepares for the country's second presi-
dential election with universal suffrage. The quick sup-
pression of the police revolt suggests that President Siles
is likely to be the first Bolivian president in 30 years to
serve for a full term
VIOLENCE IN THE ECUADOREAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN . .
. Page 20
Recent politically motivated violence in Ecuador re-
flects the explosive and acrimonious nature of the campaign
for the June presidential elections and indicates that the
incumbent Conservative government will be hard-pressed to
maintain order both during and after the voting. The Com-
munist-backed coalition
will prob-
a y a emp o n ens y t e interparty animosity to ex-
ploit unrest. An organized revolutionary move is more
likely after the elections than before.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KREMLIN POLITICS AND THE KHRUSHCHEV SUCCESSION . . . . . . Page
The Soviet system has no mechanism for the orderly
transfer of the great power which in the USSR inevitably
becomes concentrated in the hands of one man. Many of
the dismissals of important central and regional officials
since late 1958 are probably attributable to failure to
get things done to Khrushchev's satisfaction, but some of
the principal changes seem to arise from rivalry for the
succession. The sharp decline of Aleksey Kirichenko, con-
trasted with the growing prestige and authority of Frol
Kozlov, presents the clearest recent evidence of this
rivalry. Kozlov seems at the moment to be in front.
SATELLITE ATTITUDES TOWARD EAST-WEST DETENTE . . . . . . . Page 5
The East European satellites' attitudes toward im-
provement of East-West relations have ranged from full
support of Khrushchev's position to echoes of Peiping's
divergent opinion. Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and
Albania particularly are at some variance with Moscow.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III (continued)
Soviet pressure has been increasing for a greater degree
of conformity on central issues in the pre-summit period.
Many satellite leaders continue to fear that a rapproche-
ment with the West may make their maintenance of internal
controls more difficult; expression of their reservations
as to the wisdom of Soviet policy probably have not been
completely silenced.
. . . . . . . . . Page 8
Successes of the African nationalist drive for self-
government emphasize the problem posed by the entrenched
European communities. A policy of hard opposition to
local nationalist movements is dominant among the 5,000,000
Europeans in Algeria, Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia, and
South Africa. This attitude tends to negate the efforts
of London, Brussels, and Paris to develop good will by
yielding control elsewhere in Africa to nationalist move-
ments.
ISSUES BETWEEN COMMON MARKET AND EUROPEAN FREE TRADE
ASSOCIATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Prospects are poor for compromising the key differ-
ences between Western Europe?s increasingly competitive
trade groupings--the European Economic Community (EEC or
Common Market) and the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA or Outer Seven). While a showdown may be avoided
at a 29 March meeting of all countries directly 4concernead,
EEC efforts to accelerate its tariff reductions are viewed
by members of the EFTA as a new threat to the major pur-
pose of their organization--the establishment of a pref-
erential Europe-wide free trade area.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OS.IMMEDIATE INTEREST
The Soviet proposal of 19
March for a permanent ban on
all tests except small under-
ground explosions--the latter
would be covered by a moratorium
pending the results of joint
research to improve detection
techniques--climaxes a long
series of Soviet maneuvers to
draw the Western powers into a
comprehensive ban on all test-
ing. This is the second time
that the USSR, at a critical
point in the long negotiations,
has adopted a proposal favored
by Britain as a means of com-
promising differences between
the Soviet and American posi-
tions.
The moratorium proposal,
based on a concept first ad-
vanced last October by Britain,
is designed to force the United
States either to accept what
is in effect a comprehensive
ban on all tests, or to risk
an open break with London by
rejecting the moratorium on
small tests.
Moscow is also seeking by
this move to strengthen Khru-
shchev's advocacy at the sum-
mit conference of a compromise
treaty incorporating the So-
viet proposal for an annual
quota of on-site inspections of
suspected nuclear explosions--
a concept first advanced by
Prime Minister Macmillan. 25X1
Before introducing the pro-
posal, Tsarapkin listed "nu-
merous Soviet concessions" which
have preceded this move: the
quota concept for on-site in-
spections; the package proposal
of 14 December for the compo-
sition and voting procedures
of the control system; the
"temporary criteria" proposal
introduced on 16 February, in
effect accepting American cri-
teria for dispatching inspec-
tion teams during the period
required for installing the con-
trarl system; and the agreement
to begin joint research for im-
proving the control system im-
mediately upon signing the
treaty.
Each of these proposals
was intended to press for a
total ban without requiring
Moscow to yield to any great
extent in its insistence on
maintaining control over the
day-to-day operation on Soviet
territory of the proposed in-
spection system.
Tsarapkin's public and pri-
vate interpretations of the
moratorium proposal suggest a
desire to blur the line be-
tween tests prohibited by the
treaty and those banned by the
temporary moratorium. On 21
March he asserted that the in-
spection quota should apply to
all underground events regard-
less of yield, therefore making
the question of magnitude "ir-
relevant."
In agreeing to a joint re-
search program, the Soviet pro-
posal moves beyond the 16 Feb-
ruary proposal to adopt "temporary
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
criteria" for determining when
to send out on-site inspection
teams. While part of any re-
search program would be de-
voted to refining these cri-
teria, the principal effort of
the experts under the latest
proposal would be devoted to
studies and experiments for de-
veloping adequate techniques
for detecting and identifying
possible underground explo-
sions. The joint research
would include underground ex-
plosions,intended to improve
available.data on seismic dis-
turbances.
On 21 March, however,
Tsarapkin repeated the asser-
tion he made earlier to the
press that the joint program
should be limited to non-nu-
clear chemical explosions,
thereby supporting the long-
standing criticism of Western
efforts to include nuclearexplo-
sions in any technical program.
Since introducing its 19
March proposal, the Soviet del-
egation has sought to create
the impression of flexibility
in working out a satisfactory
compromise. Tsarapkin asserted
on 21 March that the moratorium
should remain in force for four
or five years, although he im-
plied that this would be sub-
ject to negotiation. He sug-
gested that during this time
the joint research program
should stress the specific prob-
lem of detection and identifica-
tion of underground tremors,
with a view toward extending
the limited treaty to include
all testing.
Tsarapkin stated that if
the experts were unable to
solve the problem within the
time limit, the three powers
would have to work out a new
arrangement for the future. He
had told the press earlier that
in this case he presumed the
moratorium would be extended.
Although the Soviet bloc
delegates at the general dis-
armament conference continued
their efforts to secure priority
consideration for Khrushchev's
proposals by establishing that
"general and complete disarma-
ment" is the principal task of
the conference, they have re-
frained from resorting to cer-
tain tactics employed in previous
negotiations, such as refusing
to proceed to serious discus-
sions until the Western powers
agree to Soviet demands on the
agenda. The Communist dele-
gates also avoided raising ob-
stacles to a quick agreement
on procedural arrangements.
The European satellite del-
egates apparently have been as-
signed the task of prolonging
the exchange over complete and 25X1
general disarmament as the main
objective of the negotiations.
The Communists lost no
time in seeking explanations
of particular aspects of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Western plan as a means of dem-
onstrating their desire for
serious negotiations. Zorin's
remarks in particular were in-
tended to convey an impression
of reasonableness and flexi-
bility. He offered to change
the timetable of the Soviet
plan, moving a prohibition of
nuclear weapons from the last
stage to the first, and stated
it did not matter at what stage
the liquidation of foreign
bases would come about.
The bloc delegates have
also attempted to emphasize the
first stage of the Soviet plan
--reduction of forces--by de-
scribing it as a response to
previous Western proposals. In
presenting a detailed comparison
between the Western and Soviet
plans for conventional disarma-
ment in the first stage, Zorin
recalled force levels set otit
in the Western plan of August
1957.
He countered British crit-
icism of lack of precision in
the Soviet plan by requesting
specific force levels for Brit-
ish and French forces in the
first phase of the reductions
under the Western proposal.
The bloc has reinforced these
moves by strongly criticizing
or ignoring the other features,
such as preparatory studies
and arms storage, which are
proposed in the first stage of
the Western plan.
Khrushchev in France
In his public statements
during the first two days of
the visit, Khrushchev departed
from the usual generalities and
.emphasized the main theme of
his visit--Soviet-French coop-
eration against Germany. He
began this campaign in his ar-
rival speech by recalling De
Gaulle's wartime role and,
referring obliquely to the
problem of Germany and Berlin,
he indicated the possibility
of a concerted French-Soviet
position. In the formal toast
at a banquet on 23 March,Khru-
shchev again stressed the pos-
sibility of "working out a
common approach to the solu-
tion" of the problem of re-
straining German "revanchism."
The Soviet leader also be-
gan his effort to play on the
historic ties between the two
countries and on France's great-
power status. Foreshadowing a
possible proposal, similar to
the one offered Macmillan last
February, for renewing the war-
time treaty of friendship and
alliance, Khrushchev interspersed
his remarks with frequent ref-
erences to "Joint efforts,"
and "concerted positions on
basic questions." He asserted
that the situation in Europe
depends to a great extent on
relations between the two larg-
est countries--the USSR and
France.
Khrushchev placed his
visit in the context of the
forthcoming summit, and repeated
his forecast that his talks
with De Gaulle would be "good
preparation" for the summit.
As he did in Asia last month,
the Soviet premier expressed
hope that the May summit meet-
ing would lead to "a series of
important negotiations between
leaders of the great powers."
In addition to the German prob-
lem, Khrushchev listed disarma-
ment and elimination of nuclear
weapons as subjects which would
be taken up during his visit.
He attempted to demonstrate
Moscow's serious interest in
reaching settlements on these
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
issues by stating that the
USSR had not carried out an
underground nuclear test and
was not "preparing to do so."
He portrayed the nego-
tiations for a nuclear test
ban as on the verge of agree-
ment in claiming that,if the
Soviet 19 March proposal is
adopted, "all issues will be
settled, and a protocol can
be signed." He also sought
to further the impression of
Soviet interest in a disarma-
ment agreement by hinting that
the USSR would be willing to
proceed with additional uni-
lateral reductions of its
Ira q
The Qasim regime has tight-
ened its security precautions
during the past week,apparent-
ly fearing major clashes be-
tween Communists and anti-Com-
munists. A serious incident
between these groups took
place in Basra on 19 March and
was followed by many arrests.
A rash of Communist-in-
spired strikes in Baghdad and
labor difficulties in Basra
have accompanied an intensifi-
cation in antiregime propa-
ganda by the pro-Communist
press. The campaign,which be-
gan in mid-February, has been
particularly aimed at municipal
and provincial authorities,
who have for various reasons
arrested Communists and their
supporters, and at provincial
governors, who have been ac-
cused of discriminating
against Communist-dominated
peasant organizations.
At first this criticism
was aimed at individuals and
anti-Communist elements; it
now is aimed at the government
itself, which is charged with
"intellectual bankruptcy." The
propaganda does not, however,
attack Qasim personally. The
non-Communist press has re-
sponded in kind and is defend-
ing the regime, while accusing
the Communists of mastermind-
ing the labor troubles.
Jordan-UAR-Iraq
King Husayn has reiterated
his determination to or.oceed
with plans for a plebiscite
among the large Palestinian
population of West Jordan. He
appears convinced that this is
his best tactic for under-
cutting strong pressures from
the UAR and Iraq for creation
of a separate Palestine entity.
Husayn believes his announce-
ment of the plebiscite idea
caught Nasir, his principal
antagonist in this triangular
dispute, off balance, and he
wants to exploit his presumed
advantage.
Jordanian Prime Minister
Majalli has indicated the gov-
ernment would welcome "neutral"
--i.e., not UAR, Iraqi, or
Saudi Arabian--members of the
Arab League to determine wheth-
er Jordanian Palestinians want
such a plebiscite. At a ban-
quet held in Husayn's honor in
Jerusalem on 19 March, the
mayors of 11 West Bank towns
reportedly told the King that
a'"plebiscite was unnecessary,
since the country is firmly
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
united under his leadership."
Husayn could cite this and
other manifestations of Pales-
tinian support he has received
as reason for not holding a
plebiscite if he should change
his mind.
Opinion in Jordan varies
as to what-might be the result
of a free plebiscite. The Amer-
ican Consulate General in Jeru-
salem reports that private re-
actions there to the King's
offer have ranged from cynical
apathy to heated questioning.
Some Western diplomats in Amman
believe UAR propaganda might
swing a vote in favor of West
Jordanian independence.
Husayn professes confi-
dence that UAR propaganda would
not affect the outcome, since
he believes the experience of
Syria, as a member of the UAR,
has "opened the eyes" of Pal-
estinians to what he implied
were unhappy consequences of
accepting Nasir's leadership.
eanw e,
broadcasts from o Cairo and
-bth
Baghdad have alluded to the
possible assassination of Hu-
sayn.
UAR--Syrian Region
Nasir's new appointments
to the Syrian cabinet on 18
March appear to reflect the con-
tinuing influence of Syrian se-'
curity chief Abd al-Hamid Bar-
raj. Four of the seven new
been losing favor with-the UAR
President. Minister of Labor
and Social Affairs Akram Dayri,
Minister of State for Presiden-
tial Affairs Jadu Izz al-Din,
and Minister of Agrarian Re-
form Ahmad Hunaydi are all
former military men and were
members of Sarraj's "Little
Revolutionary Command Council"
prior to formation of the UAR
in 1958. Sarraj's secretary
general in the Interior.Minis-
try, Yusuf Muzahim, now has
been appointed minister of re-
ligious endowments.
had 25X1
appointees have been closely
associated with Sarraj, who,
of the military furnished an
acceptable alternative source.
The selection of Husni al-
Sawwaf as the new minister of
economy was probably based on
his excellent qualifications
for the position. The new min-
ister of culture and guidance,
Thabit al-Aris, is a Christian
and long-time member of the
Syrian foreign service and,
like Al-Sawwaf, appears to have
a pro-Western outlook. Jamal
al-Sufi, appointed to the new-
ly created Ministry of Supply,
is a former naval officer and,
in common with Dayri, Izz al-
Din, and Hunaydi, has had no
political experience.
While the evidence of
Sarraj's hand in some of the
appointments seems clear, it
is not conclusive. Such young,
aggressive military types
would appeal to Nasir in any
case and need not have been
recommended by Sarraj. Nasir
obviously did not wish to se-
lect new cabinet members from
the crowded Syrian stable of
old political work horses, and
the relatively untainted ranks
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
VIOLENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA
The riots on 21 and 22
March in Transvaal and Cape
provinces, in which at least
87 Africans were killed, were
the bloodiest in South Africa
since 1949. At Vereeniging,
30 miles south of Johannesburg,
police fired into a demonstrat-
ing crowd estimated variously
between 12,000 and 20,000,
SOUTH-WEST
411 ndhoek
WALVISBAAI Dec 59-1
(U. of S. Af.)
AFRICA
(Mandaoo-
U. of S. Af.)
UNION OF
ing away from work in some
areas.
Racial tension has increased
in South Africa in recent months,
and outbreaks have been fre-
quent. Previous disturbances--
such as the riots at Durban in
June 1959 and January 1960, the
Windhoek riots of December 1959,
Vereeniginy
Cope Town. peaff
11 Nov 1 No59-none killed
21 and 22 March 60- 7killed
Riots in South Africa
killing more than 80. The po-
lice were reinforced by army
units, citizen militia, and
air force jets; the government
also alerted the national
guard. A similar disturbance,
with seven Africans known dead,
took place near Cape Town.
Large peaceful demonstrations
have occurred elsewhere in the
country, and Africans are stay-
and smaller outbreaks else-
where in February, August, and
November 1959--were spontaneous
expressions of local grievances.
The most recent demonstrations,
on the other hand, were the re-
sult of an organized African
nationalist campaign--the first
to have significant impact since
1957.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
The demonstrations were
organized by the anti-Communist
Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC),
which broke with the older,
Communist-influenced African
National Congress (ANC) in early
1959. While the ANC is willing
to grant rights to non-African
minorities, the PAC's program
is militantly antiwhite; both
organizations, however, deny at
present that they plan to at-
tain African domination through
violence.
a result of a dynamic organiza-
tional campaign, this group
has apparently supplanted the
ANC as the nationalist spokes-
man for important areas of
Transvaal and Cape provinces.
The recent demonstrations were
part of a PAC campaign, in
which the ANC did not partici-
pate, against the South African
system of identity cards for
nonwhites. Taking advantage
of the present state of tension,
the ANC has called for a work
stoppage and day of mourning
on 28 March.
The Castro regime is tight-
ening its control over communi-
cations media and extending
its radical socio-economic pro-
grams. Over 80 radio and tele-
vision stations have been formed
into the "Independent Front of
Free Transmitters" (FIEL) with
the avowed purpose of "consoli-
dating the revolution and
orienting the people." Many
of the announcers are pro-Com-
munists, and the output often
follows the Communist line.
One FIEL announcer has said
The South African Govern-
ment can be expected to restrict
the activities of the PAC's
leaders and to attempt to sup-
press the organization. Presi-
dent Robert Sobukwe, a former
instructor at Witwatersrand
University in Johannesburg, has
been arrested and charged with
incitement and sedition, along
with 12 other PAC leaders.
Prime Minister Verwoerd has
stated,that they will be charged
with sedition.
Racial tension in South
Africa will probably increase
further. The 10,000 white
police--an estimated one third
of them under 21--have shown
a growing tendency to fire at
demonstrating crowds. Africans,
on the other hand, are increas-
ingly effective in organizing
their protests, and the wide-
spread response to the PAC's
call for demonstrations indi-
cates a new willingness to suf-
fer the consequences of militant
organized protests. Disturbances25X1
will probably occur with in-
creasing frequency in the
future.
that an inter-American network
is planned, with branches in
Mexico, Venezuela, and possibly
Panama.
According to Peiping's
New China News Agency, which
has been timely and accurate
on recent internal Cuban de-
velopments, the "people's
stores," organized by the re-
gime's Agrarian Reform Institute
to "eliminate exploitation by
the middleman" in retail sales,
are being extended to the cities.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Five such markets are said to
be operating in Havana, in
addition to more than 1,300
already established in rural
areas. Working on a 10-percent
margin, they may drive inde-
pendent grocers out of business.
The recent defections of
Cuban service attaches in the
United States and Venezuela and
the resignation of the moderate
finance minister, Lopez Fresquet,
coincide with increasingly out-
spoken attacks on Communism
by Cuban groups alarmed at re-
cent Communist gains. The
Autentico organization of former
President Prio issued a sharply
worded attack on Communism on
14 March and called for a "unity
congress" of groups supporting
the Cuban revolution. It warned
these groups against abdicating
their responsibilities, as such
a course would leave the field
open to the Communists.
Unrest is also reported
among Cuban students worried
by Castro's stated intention of
"reforming" the university,
eliminating its jealous
guarded autonomy.
The "Week of Solidarity
with the Struggles of the Latin
American People," declared by
the Communist-infiltrated Cuban
Labor Confederation for 20-26
March and warmly endorsed by
the Cuban Communist party, re-
sulted in several public mani-
festations and much propaganda
against the "dictatorial" re-
gimes in Latin America and in
support of the Puerto Rican
people's "struggle against
colonial rule."
The Chinese Communists
gave strong support to the
Cuban manifestations with a
mass rally in Peiping on 19
March, the first of the "China
- Latin America Friendship
Association" which was formed
in China on 16 March, Radio
Peiping reported that the rally,
"in support of the Latin American
people's national and democrat-
ic. movement and the Cuban peo-
ple's struggle against US im-
perialist aggression," was
addressed by Premier Chou En-
lai and a number of Latin
American delegates.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
PEIPING ELABORATES DOCTRINAL CLAIM FOR MAO
The Chinese Communists
have considerably expanded
their claim for Mao Tse-tung
as a theorist, crediting him
with a whole series of "dis-
coveries" and formulations in
political economy. An article
in People's Daily on 25 Feb-
ruaryryc=e that Mao "cre-
atively" explained the proper
relationships in a developing
Communist economy and "dis-
covered" the underlying prin-
ciple of "high-speed expansion
of socialist construction."
For at least 16 years,
the Chinese have been adding
new components to what they
term the "ideology of Mao Tse-
tung"; by 1957 the elements of
philosophical, military, lit-
erary, and governmental theory
were discernible. The People's
Daily article, which co-nT-alns
the most precise elaboration
of Mao's thinking on economic
problems thus far published,
appears designed to add a
political-economy component to
the "ideology of Mao-Tse-tung."
The article for the first
time attributes to Mao the "dis-
covery" that political indoc-
trination is more important
than material incentives in in-
creasing worker productivity--
a view previously expressed
by lesser Chinese spokesmen.
"The ideology of economism,
superficially emphasizing ma-
terial incentives and...'pay
according to work'... corrupts
the revolutionary will of the
working class," People's Daily
states.
"Comrade Mao Tse-tung,"
the article continues,'formu-
lated the concept that 'politics
takes command' and, in a basic
SECRET
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
manner, solved the relationship
between economics and politics
under socialism.... He dis-
covered the definite principle
for the encouragement of posi-
tiveness among workers: politics
taking command is first, while
material incentives can only
occupy the second position."
This line appears to be
intended as theoretical justi-
fication for China's departure
from certain Soviet practices.
It is an explicit contradiction
of Soviet doctrine and an im-
plicit rebuke to Khrushchev,
who had criticized the Chinese
for neglecting material incen-
tives in their commune program.
Another indication of Chinese
divergence is the article's
claim that Mao "solved" prob-
lems concerning the proper
proportion to be given to ag-
riculture and industry and "dis-
covered the completely correct
road" for China's industrializa-
tion.
The article suggests that
Mao's desire to remain foremost
among the world's Marxist thinkers
is as intense as Stalin's had
been and that he apparently
has not been deterred by Soviet
criticism of the personality
cult. The difficulty raised
for him in Moscow's appeal to
Lenin against Stalin on 30 June
1956 was temporary. Moscow
had stated, "'The 'wisdom of tens
of millions of creators,' V.I.
Lenin used to say, 'creates
somethiqg immeasurably higher
than the greatest foresight of
genius."' Chinese writers be-
gan to insist that Mao's genius
lies in his ability to "general-
ize" the ideas and experiences
of China's masses.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The study of Mao's works
has again become a major cam-
paign in China, and the Chinese
may be preparing to publish an-
other major doctrinal thesis by
him. Such a development would
be taken as another challenge
to the leadership of Moscow,
which praised Mao's works in
1954 but now is reluctant to
reduce Khrushchev's authority
among Soviet and non-Soviet Com-
munists by conceding doctrinal.
originalty to the Chinese lead-
er:. The extravagance of the
Chinese claims was indicated on
21 March by the first secretary
of the Sinkiang Uighur Autonomous
Region, who stated that Mao's
ideology is not only a "guaran-
tee" of the victory of socialism
in China "but also has a great 25X1
influence on the socialist and
Communist movements in the world."
SINO-INDONESIAN RELATIONS
Chinese Communist Foreign
Minister Chen Yi has called on
Djakarta to negotiate promptly
a formal agreement on Chinese
repatriation. Chen's request
was made on 15 March in reply
to Indonesian Foreign Minister
Subandrio's letter of 23 Jan-
uary denying that Indonesia had
violated the lawful rights and
interests of Overseas Chinese
and stating that consequently
there was nothing to negotiate.
Chen reiterated Peiping's
demands that Djakarta refrain
from "forcible" evacuation of
Chinese under its ban on alien
retailers in rural areas, com-
pensate those already evacuated,
and give those faced with re-
moval more time to decide be-
tween being relocated and re-
turning to China. Chen also
asked that dispossessed Chinese
who elect repatriation be per-
mitted to sell their property
and take the proceeds out of
the country, and that Djakarta
transport repatriates to ports
of embarkation, assume respon-
sibility for their accommoda-
tion while awaiting ships, and
provide "shipping facilities"
for their return to the main-
land.
ing hardships suffered by Chi-
nese may greatly increase the
number desiring repatriation.
There are growing indications
that Chinese in Indonesia be-
lieve they will remain "second-
class" nationals even if they
adopt Indonesian citizenship,
and that consequently they have
no real future in Indonesia.
Communist China has scored
an initial propaganda gain among
overseas "compatriots" by its
{ quick action in repatriating
some 7,500 Chinese, but the re-
gime has been indirectly en-
couraging others to remain abroad.
A mass influx of Indonesian Chi-
nese to the mainland, together
with the cost of transportation
and resettlement, would place a
heavy burden on the regime. The
majority of these already repa-
triated are indigent women, chil-
dren, and aged, according to
Peiping.
Probably the primary Chi-
nese Communist concern at this
point was expressed in a Peo-
ple's Daily editorial of i'3-
-M rch which stated that Peiping
would welcome "appropriate meas-
ures" by Djakarta to encourage
Peiping apparently is moti-
vated by fear that the continu-
more Chinese to choose Indonesian
citizenship, and that it was ready
to cooperate with Djakarta in per-
suading Chinese to make such a
choice.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
Despite Indoues .a'-s resi.s-t-
ance tb formal negotiations,
informal talks between Suban-
drio and the Chinese ambassador
have been in progress,since
early January, chiefly on the
subject of repatriation. No
specific results of the clis-
cussions have been announced,
however. a..Djakarta daily. which
frequently ref l6ct* ?government
policy vehemently attacked Pei-
ping radio ;on 24 March for
criticizing .Indonesia's-han-
dling of the. Overseas :Chinese and
threatened further delay and
obstruction.
TAIWAN AND PEIPING COMPETE FOR AFRICAN RECOGNITION
Communist China recently
threatened to break diplomatic
relations with Guinea if Cona
kry again officially received
a visiting Chinese Nationalist
delegation as it did last Jan-
uary. The harshly worded note,
delivered by a charge only a
few weeks after the Chinese
Communist Embassy was opened
in Conakry, shows Peiping's
apprehension that the concept
of "two Chinas" may be gaining
acceptance among emerging
African republics.
Communist China is spend-
ing a good deal of time, money,
and effort bidding for recog-
nition in Africa. Peiping so-
licits governmental contacts
with those nations which have
achieved independence and, as
the "true friend of national
liberation," is actively sup-
porting those Africans still
engaged in the "anticolonial
struggle." The Communists
view this support as an in-
vestment in future recognition.
Despite the appeal Peiping
holds for many Africans, how-
ever, the competition with
Taipei has become keener, and
the Chinese Communists have
real cause for concern.
Last year Libya recog-
nized Taipei. In January 1960
the new Cameroun Republic did
likewise, and last month the
Chinese Nationalist Legation
in Liberia was raised to em-
basSy status. Ethiopia.report-
edly, has put off a Chinese Com-
munistbid for recognition on
the grounds the moment'is not
opportune. Reluctance of these
countries to accept Peiping or
their preference for Taipei
may stem in part from Communist
China's bellicosity in Asia,
but, political considerations
for relations with the West and
renewed efforts by Nationalist
China in the area seem largely
responsible.
The Chinese Nationalists,
just. as bitter opponents of the
"two Chinas" concept as.the Com-
munists, realize the potential
value of recognition by new
African republics--each of which
will eventually' vote on the
Chinese representation 'issue in
the United Nations. Taipei has
sent. two official delegations
toAfrica in recent months in
an effort to promote recognition
and expand contacts..
Nationalist Minister of
Economic Affairs Yang Chi-tseng
established the diplomatic re-
lations with Cameroun, received
an invitation to Togo's inde-
pendence ceremonies on 27 April,
and was surprised at the friend-
ly reception given him in Guinea.
and in Dakar, where the Nation-
alists hope to open a_consulate
general before the Mali Federa-
tion becomes independent late
this spring. Only in Ghana,
which maintains it inherited
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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 recognition of Peiping from the
UK, but has not yet established
formal ties, did the Yang mis-
sion receive really unfriendly
treatment, although officials
in Nigeria and Tunisia were
cool.
A mission headed by Min-
ister Yang Hsi-kun, director of
African Affairs in the National-
ist Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
was warmly received in Somalia
UPPER
VOLTA
NIGERIA
FEDERATION
PC MALI ,
IVORY
COAST
HANK
LIBYA
with NC
RAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
BELGIAN CONGO
ANGOLA
FEDERATIO
RHODES
NYF
SOUTH-
WEST gECHUANALAN
AFRICA Y,
UAR
(EOPYT}
with CC
SUDAN,
with CC
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Country having formal
diplomatic relations with NC
with Nationalist China
Country having formal
diplomatic relations with CC
Independent country
Country expected to
become independent
in 1960
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU10(ARY
SECRET
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and assured of an invitation to
the independence celebration
there on 1 July. The mission
also was favorably received in
Ethiopia, where the Chinese
Communist ambassador to the
Sudan was soliciting recogni-
tion. The Nationalists are
planning to follow up these
visits by sending agricultural
advisers to various African
states and have hopes of pro-
moting trade.
J UNION /
UTH AFRICA ,J
MOZAMBIQUE
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Peiping's note to Guinea
indicates the seriousness with
which the Chinese Communists
view the Nationalist challenge,
but Peiping is not likely to
jeopardize its African program
by severing relations with
Guinea or any other nation
which briefly entertains visit-
ing Nationalists. Instead,
Peiping is likely to increase
its own political and economic
effort to broaden contacts at
all levels, calling on Africans
to "resist the trap set by the
United States and the Chiang
Kai-shek clique to undermine.
friendship between the peoples
of China and Africa."
SOVIET REPUBLIC PARTY CONGRESSES
Information coming out of
the recently concluded Commu-
nist party congresses in vari-
ous Soviet republicsreveals that
the shake-up last year in the
top leadership of several re-
publics was part of a more ex-
tensive turnover in important
party and government officials
than that following Stalin's
death. The congresses were the
required periodic meetings of
republic party organizations to
review the work of the leading
party bodies (central committee
and auditing commission) in the
republic and elect new members
to them. Four of the republics
--Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbeki-
stan, and the Ukraine--hold con-
gresses every four years; ten
meet every two years; there is
no republic party organization
in the Russian republic.
The report of the central
committee, normally given by
the first secretary, covers
major topics of domestic con-
cern to the republic--industry,
agriculture, science, culture,
and party work; foreign affairs
are not discussed. All reports
this year followed closely the
basic themes expounded at the
special 21st national party
congress last year, with empha-
sis on fulfillment of the Seven-
Year Plan (1959-65) as a major
step toward the establishment
of a Communist society.
Underlying nearly all the
criticism voiced at the con-
gresses was deep concern for the
human factor in increasing eco-
nomic productivity. In discuss-
ing deficiencies in the program
for developing the "new Com-
munist man," for example,
speakers emphasized the practical
need for inculcating in Soviet
citizens a more selfless atti-
tude toward work.
CENTRAL COMMITTEES AND AU
COMMISSIONS IN SOVIET RE
(IN PERCENT)
BELORUSSIA
TURKMENIA
TADZHIKISTAN
MOLDAVIA
UZBEKISTAN
KIRGIZIA
KAZAKHSTAN
LATVIA
ALL REPUBLICS
LITHUANIA
UKRAINE
ESTONIA
33 62 -}
40 53 + 1
37 47 + 1
so 58
30 46 +
s0 56
53 36
51 5
48 49
AZERBAYDZHAN 66
GEORGIA 71
The criticisms and elabo-
ration of defects, however, gave
few clues to the reasons for
the shake-ups last year. The
nationalist tendencies mentioned
so prominently in connection with
some of the ousters last year,
were not stressed at the congresses.
No new charges were made, al-
though the admission by the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
present Kazakh party boss, Din-
mukhamed Kunayev, that work
stoppages had occurred last
year at a construction site in
central Kazakhstan suggests
that the strike may have been
an added factor in the ouster
of former Kazakh party boss
Nikolay Belyayev.
Membership on the leading
bodies elected by party con-
gresses is given on the basis
of the individual's political
standing and position as an
important leader at some level
in the republic hierarchy.
Changes in these bodies, there-
fore, provide a good measure of
the turnover in officials at all
levels in periods between party
congresses.
The composition of the cen-
tral committees and auditing
commissions elected this year
shows that in eight of the four-
teen republics holding congresses,
the turnover in the period 1956-
60 was greater even than in the
period 1952-56, during which
the Beria purge and the
Khrushchev-Malenkov struggle for
power ravaged party organizations
throughout the Soviet Union.
Considerations of political
loyalty to Khrushchev, however,
The favorable economic
gains achieved by Yugoslavia
in 1959 indicate a sound basis
for continued rapid economic
expansion. Economic successes
were highlighted by the larg-
est agricultural harvest in
Yugoslav history and by?the-re-
gime's announcement in Novem-
ber that the goals of the 1957-
appear to play only a minor
role in the 1956-60 turnover,
as most of the changes occurred
in late 1958 and 1959 after
the repercussions of the oust-
er of Malenkov, Molotov, and
Kaganovich had largely died
away. The republics most af-
fected are, for the most part,
those least affected by the
events of the post-Stalin
struggle. In all republics,
moreover, carry-overs from the
Stalin era constituted a rel-
atively large proportion of
those dropped, suggesting that
the aim was to bring new blood
to the leadership of party
and government in order to
cope with the demands of
Khrushchev's dynamic new
programs.
An editorial in one re-
public newspaper expressed
the problem this way: "In
his time he was not a bad
leader. However, the new tasks
and accelerated pulse of our
entire life after the 21st
party congress demanded better
qualified party lea der;hip
over the economy, but Comrade
X, having attained his goal,
approached everything with an
old measuring tape."
61 plan should be essentially
achieved by the end of 1960.
In 1959, Yugoslavia in-
creased industrial production
13 percent and maintained a
high investment rate. An in-
crease of 17 percent in per
capita income, coupled with a
pi-ice index rise of only 2
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENT3
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
percent, contributed to im-
proved living standards. In
January 1960, however, rent
increases went into effect
which caused an 8- or 9 percent
increase in living costs. A-
chievement of the planned 8-
percent rise in national in-
come for 1960 would mean an
increase of 58.4 percent for
the 1956-60 period,.
Personal consumption in-
creased sharply, largely as a
result of a 36-percent increase
in national income originating
in private enterprise. Suc-
cesses on privately owned farms
were largely responsible for
this increase. Moreover, the
combined national wheat crop
was so great that Belgrade
announced in June the termina-
tion of all wheat imports after
1959. Winter crop reports in-
dicate that the 1960 harvest
will be smaller than last year,
but sufficient for all internal
needs without the necessity, of
imports.
There were, however, some
soft spots in the over-all eco-
nomic outlook. Investments
in industry and mining were de-
layed by difficulties in the
utilization of funds allocated
for underdeveloped regions--Mac-
edonia, Montenegro, and the Kosmet.
The delays, resulting
from shortages of local facil-
ities, equipment, and capable
planners, are made more acute
by the fact that these are the
areas of the greatest popula-
tion increase. Housing con-
struction did not generally
RUMANIA PLANS INCREASED EMIGRATION OF JEWS
Rumania has apparent-
ly decided to permit a
sizable increase in the
keep up with family growth in
the large industrial areas, even
though housing authorities re-
ported for the first time since
World War II that total new
housing construction had kept
pace with new families entering
the housing market.
The Yugoslav economy will
continue to need foreign in-
vestment to ensure present
rates of industrial growth, but
1959 production made possible
a 17-percent reduction, as com-
pared with 1958, of Yugoslavia's
chronic foreign exchange defi-
cit; total imports for the first
time in several years showed
no increase. The Yugoslav cur-
rent account showed a deficit
of $124,100,000 in 1959, com-
pared with a deficit of $132,-
000,000 in 1958, The regime
hopes to reduce this deficit
further by expanding its ex-
port trade, especially with
the underdeveloped countries
of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, with which it can ex-
tend developmental credits under
favorable conditions.
These moves are designed
to create new export markets
and to protect Yugoslavia from
unfavorable trade-community
actions in Western Europe,
where 50 percent of Belgrade's
foreign trade is now conducted.
Trade with the Soviet bloc was
maintained at the 1958 level--
25 percent of Yugoslavia's 25X1
foreign trade; exports were in-
creased and imports declined.
number of Jews emigrating
to Israel. In an attempt to
implement such a program,
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SECRET
24 March 1960
Bucharest is making every ef-
fort to avoid any publicity
over the renewal of emigra-
tion. In February 1959 strong
Arab pressures on Rumania and
the USSR forced the suspension
of Jewish emigration after 16,-
000 Jews had left Rumania in
the previous six months.
Bucharest has granted be-
tween 3,000 and 4,000 exit
permits since November 1959.
Since 1 January between 700
and 800 Jewish emigrants have
arrived in Greece, nearly
all of them on special char-
tered Rumanian civil airline
(Tarom) flights from Bucharest.
The Rumanian decision to
extend Jewish emigration ap-
pears to have been motivated
by internal considerations.
The political unstable Jew-
ish element, which numbers
about 225,000 persons, has re-
fused to be assimilated into
the "socialist" society. In
addition, Bucharest stands to
gain considerable economic
benefits as a result of the
exodus and concomitant appro-
priation of properties.
Nevertheless, the regime is
fully aware that it can pro-
ceed only gradually and cau-
tiously if it is to keep the
magnitude of the movement as
secret as possible.
The Rumanians have sought
to diversify the exit routes
for the emigres. Future siz-
able emigration to Israel may
be imperiled, however, as
Greece--one of the main exit
routes for the Jews--has not
been particularly cooperative
because of pressure from the
UAR and concern for the safety
of large Greek colonies in
Arab countries.
In a further complica-
tion, France has suspended the
issuance of all East European
visas from 1 March until the
end of Khrushchev's visit.
Limited emigration continues
via Hungary, Austria, and
Italy, and there is specula=
tion that a route through
Yugoslavia may be revived.
In an effort to reduce
Arab criticism of Rumania's ac-
tions, tacit agreements have
been reached among Israel, Ru-
mania, and some West European
countries--particularly France
and Italy--to provide "sojourn
visas" which do not state the
ultimate destination as Israel.
There is as yet no evi-
dence of Arab complaints to
West European nations concern-
ing this procedure. Other than
the pressure brought on Greece,
there has been no known adverse
Arab reaction to the renewed
emigration. Last month Radio
Cairo took cognizance of the
renewal, but played down the
development by saying that it
was restricted to the sick and
and the aged.
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
percent, contributed to im-
proved living standards. In
January 1960, however, rent
increases went into effect
which caused an 8- or 9 percent
increase in living costs. A-
chievement of the planned 8-
percent rise in national in-
come for 1960 would mean an
increase of 58.4 percent for
the 1956-60 period:.
Personal consumption in-
creased sharply, largely as a
result of a 36-percent increase
in national income originating
in private enterprise. Suc-
cesses on privately owned farms
were largely responsible for
this increase. Moreover, the
combined national wheat crop
was so great that Belgrade
announced in June the termina-
tion of all wheat imports after
1959. Winter crop reports in-
dicate that the 1960 harvest
will be smaller than last year,
but sufficient for all internal
heeds without the necessity-of
imports.
There were, however, some
soft spots in the over-all eco-
nomic outlook. Investments
in industry and mining were de-
layed by difficulties in the
utilization of funds allocated
for underdeveloped regions--Mao-
edonia, Montenegro, and the Kosmet.
The delays, resulting
from shortages of local facil-
ities, equipment, and capable
planners, are made more acute
by the fact that these are the
areas of the greatest popula-
tion increase. Housing con-
struction did not generally
keep up with family growth in
the large industrial areas, even
though housing authorities re-
ported for the first time since
World War II that total new
housing construction had kept
pace with new families: entering
the housing market.
The Yugoslav economy will
continue to need foreign in-
vestment to ensure present
rates of industrial growth, but
1959 production made possible
a 17-percent reduction, as com-
pared with 1958, of Yugoslavia's
chronic foreign exchange defi-
cit; total imports for the first
time in several years showed
no increase. The Yugoslav cur-
rent account showed a deficit
of $124,100,000 in 1959, com-
pared with a deficit of $132,-
000,000 in 1958, The regime
hopes to reduce this deficit
further by expanding its ex-
port trade, especially with
the underdeveloped countries
of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America, with which it can ex-
tend developmental credits under
favorable conditions.
These moves are designed
to create new export markets
and to protect Yugoslavia from
unfavorable trade-community
actions in Western Europe,
where 50 percent of Belgrade's
foreign trade is now conducted.
Trade-with the Soviet bloc was
maintained at the 1958 level--
25 percent of Yugoslavia's
foreign trade; exports were in-
creased and imports declined.
RUMANIA PLANS INCREASED EMIGRATION OF JEWS
Rumania has apparent-
ly decided to permit a
sizable increase in the
number of Jews emigrating
to Israel. In an attempt to
implement such a program,
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SECRET
24 March 1960
Bucharest is making every ef-
fort to avoid any publicity
over the renewal of emigra-
tion. In February 1959 strong
Arab pressures on Rumania and
the USSR forced the
suspension
of Jewish emigration
after 16,-
000
the
Jews had
previous
left Rumania
six months.
in
Bucharest has granted be-
tween 3,000 and 4,000 exit
permits since November 1959.
Since 1 January between 700
and 800 Jewish emigrants have
arrived in Greece, nearly
all of them on special char-
tered Rumanian civil airline
(Tarom) flights from Bucharest.
The Rumanian decision to
extend Jewish emigration ap-
pears to have been motivated
by internal considerations.
The political unstable Jew-
ish element, which numbers
about 225,000 persons, has re-
fused to be assimilated into
the "socialist" society. In
addition, Bucharest stands to
gain considerable economic
benefits as a result of the
exodus and concomitant appro-
priation of properties.
Nevertheless, the regime is
fully aware that it can pro-
ceed only gradually and cau-
tiously if it is to keep the
magnitude of the movement as
secret as possible.
The Rumanians have sought
to diversify the exit routes
for the emigres. Future siz-
able emigration to Israel may
be imperiled, however, as
Greece--one of the main exit
routes for the Jews--has not
been particularly cooperative
because of pressure from the
UAR and concern for the safety
of large Greek colonies in
Arab countries.
In a further complica-
tion, France has suspended the
issuance of all East European
visas from 1 March until the
end of Bhrushche$'s visit.
Limited emigration continues
via Hungary, Austria, and
Italy, and there is specula-
tion that a route through
Yugoslavia may be revived.
In an effort to reduce
Arab criticism of Rumania's ac-
tions, tacit agreements have
been reached among Israel, Ru-
mania, and some West European
countries--particularly France
and Italy--to provide "sojourn
visas" which do not state the
ultimate destination as Israel.
There is as yet no evi-
dence of Arab complaints to
West European nations concern-
ing_this procedure. Other than
the pressure brought on Greece,
there has been no known adverse
Arab reaction to the renewed
emigration. Last month Radio
Cairo took cognizance of the
renewal, but played down the
development by saying that it,
was restricted to the sick and
and th
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
this 66-member group, Senanayake
apparently hopes to retain power
because of the opposition dis-
unity and defections. He may
succeed temporarily. The SLFP
apparently does not yet intend
to ally with the leftists in
Parliament, and UNP elements
are trying, reportedly with
some success, to attract SLFP
members. The small size of Sen-
anayake's cabinet suggests that
he has reserved a few minis-
tries to offer likely defectors.
However, opposition elements
can topple his government at
any time they decide to unite
in a no-confidence vote. Opposi-
tion pressure alone might cause
him to resign voluntarily, as
he lacks the political nimble-
ness and tenacity of his prede-
cessors.
New elections would be the
most likely consequence. Gov-
ernor General Goonetilleke would
prefer to have the SLFP in power
and might maneuver toward this
end. The SLFP, however, prob-
ably could do no better than the
UNP. The principal leftist par-
ties are not in a position to
form a government, either singly
or in coalition. The Trotskyite
party, which won second place
in the 1956 elections, has suf-
fered considerable losses, and
former Agriculture Minister
Philip Gunawardena's Marxist
party made a poor showing despite
its appeal to the majority
Singhalese-Buddhist community.
The Communist party ranks low-
est of the main parties, with
only three seats.
New elections could result
in a large plurality or possi-
bly a majority for one party.
A substantial number of minor
party candidates who lost presum-
ably would not care to incur
the cost of another contest, and
most of the votes they divided
on 19 March probably would go
to the UNP and the SLFP. The
leftists would not make signif-
icant gains.
UNP leaders reportedly
fear that new elections would
result in a majority for the
SLFP. This seems unlikely,
provided elections are not held
immediately, for the wave of
emotional sympathy which the
SLFP aroused by evoking the
image of the late Prime Minis-
ter_ Bandaranaike probably can-
not be sustained indefinitely.
The Communist-front Neo
Lao Hak Sat (NLHS) has belated-
ly presented nine candidates to
contest the 24 April elections
for the 59-member Laotian Na-
tional Assembly. Almost si-
multaneously with the NLHS entry
into the race, Hanoi radio
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1.1
C H I N A
Luang Praban
Area of Laotian army
security sweep
o
broadcast a purported NLHS ap-
peal to the Laotian people to
support NLHS, Santiphab, and
other "patriotic and peace-
loving candidates" in the elec-
tions. The Santiphab is a
small left-wing neutralist
party which generally voted
with the NLHS in the previous
assembly'. It has openly pre-
sented only five candidates,
but a few of the unaffiliated
candidates are believed to be
associated with it. The NLHS
is also probably hoping that
other unaffiliated candidates,
if elected, will support the
leftist bloc in the next as-
sembly.
These develop-
ments suggest that
the Pathet Lao in-
surgents will make
no generalized ef-
fort to disrupt the
elections. They may,
however, exercise
their probably sub-
stantial capability
for influencing the
rural vote, endeavor-
ing to swing it in
favor of leftist can-
didates in districts
where there are such
candidates, and to
limit it in districts
where there are not.
The NLHS could still
withdraw from the
race if it considered
the odds too heavily
against it, but pres-
ent indications are
that it seriously in-
tends to participate.
While the NLHS and
allied elements
could not win control
of the assembly, the
Communists may hope
to elect a small
leftist bloc which
can use the assembly
as a propaganda forum
and can maneuver to
split the non-Commu-
nist majority likely to emerge
from the elections.
Of the nonleftist candi-
dates, who make up most of the
list of 158 candidates, some
60 are on the "unified slate"
agreed to by the reformist Com-
mittee for Defense of National
Interests (CDNI) and former
Premier Phoui's Rally of the
Lao People (RLP). This group
presumably will receive most
of the funds and other forms
of assistance the government
will probably commit to the
campaign.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Many of the unaffiliated
candidates may be induced by
the government to withdraw,
particularly in districts
having NLHS, Santiphab, or
other known leftist candidates.
The American Embassy in Vien-
tiane'suspects that many
entered the race in order
later to be "bought off" by
the government, or in the hope
that wide-open competition
would be allowed in districts
having no leftist candidates.
Meanwhile, a major Laotian
Army operation involving 5,000
men is apparently progressing
on schedule in the three south-
ernmost provinces of Laos. The
most ambitious of a series of
such security sweeps under-
taken in various parts of the
country since January, the
operation is designed to im-
prove security conditions in
preparation for the elections
and to provide more effective
government control in the coun-
tryside after the elections by
establishing small military
units in many areas in which
the Communist insurgents
hitherto have had an open
field.
The results of the opera-
tion are unlikely to come up
to government expectations, but
security conditions in the towns
and larger villages may be im-
in the countryside.
proved, and there may be a
slight change for the better
DETERIORATING POLITICAL SCENE IN SOUTH KOREA
The widespread resentment
aroused by the Rhee government's
repressive and fraudulent elec-
tion tactics--which resulted
in serious election-day dis-
turbances--could lead to es-
trangement between the govern-
ment and a majority of the
Korean people. There has been
an increasing tendency by the
regime during the past year to
rely on force and repression.
Those newspapers not con-
trolled by the government have
been outspoken in their criti-
cism of the administration's
election tactics, which pro-
duced an overwhelming victory
for President Rhee and his
running mate, Yi Ki-pung.Large
numbers of students have par-
ticipated in widely scattered
demonstrations. Korean youths,
already disenchanted with the
Rhee government, now have a
group of martyrs--the students
killed by police during the
bloody election-day riots at
the southern port city of
Masan.
The
Democratic leadership has
called the election "null and
void," and the party's repre-
sentatives have walked out of
the National Assembly.
There are indications
that the government is con-
cerned and would like to bring
about a relaxation of tensions.
The home minister has publicly
accepted responsibility for
the Masan riots, and Rhee has
accepted his resignation. The
administration might use the
traditional resignation of top
ministers following a presiden-
tial election to drop or reassign
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those most closely associated
with the election. An exten-
sive police shake-up also ap-
pears likely.
There is no indication,
however, that dominant ele-
imate opposition into subver-
sive channels.
South Korea's reluctant
agreement to exchange detainees
with Japan will relax temporar-
ily pressures within Japan for
stern action against South
Korea's "hostage diplomacy."
The exchange, which Seoul post-
poned repeatedly since last
August in order to extract fur-
ther concessions, is scheduled
to begin on 28 March and to be
completed in early April. It
will be smaller in scope than
the first such program in 1958.
Seoul, apprehensive about
the growing Japanese enmity,
has agreed to release 167 cap-
tured Japanese fishermen who
have completed lengthy sentenc-
es--in many instances. more
than three years--for fishing
within the "ghee line." Ac-
ETATOT[-Man .
31009
rSOUT
KOREA
SEA; OF JAPAN
cording to Tokyo's figures, South
Korea has seized 170 Japanese
fishing vessels--149 of which
have been confiscated--and has
imprisoned 2,209 Japanese fish-
ermen since it established the
fishing boundary in 1952.
As its part of the agree-
ment, Tokyo will return about
1,000 Koreans who have been
detained at Omura prison for
illegal entry. Japan has also
agreed to buy 30,000 tons of
Korean rice, despite some strong
official opposition on the
grounds that the rice is surplus
to the country's needs and is
tantamount to paying ransom.
Unresolved problems con-
nected with the detainee ex-
change may not block the ex-
change itself, but
they are likely to
SECRET
ments in Rhee's Liberal party
have revised their intentions
of monopolizing political
power after Rhee's death. Such
a policy could force the legit-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NORTH
K(JR
:ficulties. The dis-
position of 47 Jap-
anese fishermen who
have not yet completed
their sentences in
South Korea has not
been decided. Tokyo
is seeking a South
Korean commitment to
release them automat-
ically when their
terms expire, but
South Korean Ambas-
sador Yu in Tokyo has
stated that further
consultations are nec-
essary on this point.
In addition, 176
Korean detainees, not
I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY `BURY
now scheduled for repatriation,
have expressed a desire to go
to North Korea. Ambassador Yu
has insisted that they "quietly"
be sent to South Korea, but
Japan is unlikely to agree.
Immediately prior to South
Korea's agreement to the ex-
change, Tokyo was considering
a stronger policy toward Seoul.
This included referring the
Rhee line and the detainee dis-
putes to the UN, expelling the
South Korean diplomatic mission
in Japan, and taking additional
measures to protect Japanese
fishing vessels from seizure.
Inasmuch as there are many
differences remaining between
the countries--including the
continued existence of the Rhee
line, the threat of future sei-
zures, and vast unsettled prop-
erty claims--an over-all solution
appears remote. Tokyo already
has announced that after 1 April
its patrol boats in the Rhee
line area will , mount three-inch
guns as well as machine guns,
although orders lifting firing
restrictions have not been is-
sued. Other countermeasures 25X1
will probably be considered if
Seoul returns to an intransigent
position.
PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO DE GAULLE REGIME RISING
De Gaulle's refusal to
call a special parliamentary
session on agricultural policy
has evoked widespread criticism
from the press and from parlia-
mentary spokesmen. While he
has muzzled parliamentary op-
position during the 23 March -
3 April visit of Khrushchev,
he will shortly face further
demonstrations by farmers in
addition to efforts to topple
the Debr6 government.
The farm bloc includes
enough deputies in the major
assembly groups to put consid-
erable pressure on the govern-
ment when parliament reconvenes
on 26 April. The agricultural
lobby can count on other in-
terests, too, because several
groups opposed to De Gaulle's
tactics and policies are using
the farm issue as a vehicle for
their own ends.
The rightist Independents,
with few exceptions, are against
De Gaulle's self-determination
policy in Algeria, and they
have been moving into overt op-
position to the government since
the dismissal of Finance Minister
Pinay. The Independent right
wing, convinced De Gaulle will
be unable to solve the Algerian
problem, is maneuvering with an
eye to the period after De Gaulle.
The Union for a New Republic
(UNR), the other principal member
of the Debr6 coalition, although
under control of "loyal" Gaull-
ists, is split on De Gaulle's
Algerian policy. Dismissed UNR
leader Jacques Soustelle may '
lead as many as 40 UNR deputies
into a new formation advocating
a "French Algeria."
Left and center parties--
including the Popular Republic.
canS,the third member of the
coalition--appear to believe
they can no longer afford to de-
emphasize their opposition to
various government domestic and
foreign policy issues in order
to give De Gaulle a freer hand
in Algeria. Dismayed by the
implication in De Gaulle's re-
cent statements on Algeria that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
he is dismissing the possibility
of a negotiated cessation of
hostilities, they feel that if
they are to keep their own in-
fluence, they must press the
government on social and eco-
nomic issues and on foreign
policy. The left and center,
moreover, are increasingly un-
happy with De Gaulle's tendency
toward "one-man" government.
The political climate in
France is rapidly changing, and
the "honeymoon" with De Gaulle
is probably over. Nevertheless,
the lack of a ready alternative
to De Gaulle will remain the
fundamental deterrent to an all-
out campaign against him. The
Socialists, although publicly
joining in the criticism, have
SECRET
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 16 of 20
toward one-man rule.
already indicated privately they
must continue to support Do
Gaulle as the only French lead-
er capable of solving the
Algerian problem. Do Gaulle
will almost certainly have in-
creasing difficulty in imple-
menting his policies, although
Premier Debr6 will bear the
brunt of the attack, as there
is no easy constitutional mech-
anism to curb the President.
Do Gaulle will not compromise
where he feels a matter of prin-
ciple is involved, and the Fifth
Republic constitution makes it 25X1
possible for him to pick as the
best solution further moves
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NATO defense ministers,
who meet in Paris on 31 March
and 1 April, will follow up pro-
posals made at the December
1959 ministerial meeting, and
developed in subsequent studies,
on means of improving the West-
ern defense effort in the face
of chronic deficiencies in man-
power, training, equipment, and
installations. Other studies on
ways of overcoming the defici-
encies in the individual coun-
try programs, which were author-
ized at the December 1958 min
isterial meeting, are not due
until May, however, and impor-
tant decisions are unlikely
without them. The agenda in-
cludes logistics in peace and
war; cooperation in armaments
research, development, and pro-
duction; NATO defense planning;
and meeting the defense burden.
The scheduled report on
the air defense integration
question was deleted for fear
of jeopardizing "the very deli-
cate discussions now in progress"
between the French and NATO
military authorities. In view
of urgent requests for substan-
tive information on this matter,
especially on the part of Bel-
gium and the Netherlands, Sec-
retary General Spaak has called
for a report to the North At-
lantic Council (NAC) as soon as
possible, but in any event
shortly after the spring minis-
terial meeting in May.
A German paper proposing
to keep the German build-up coor-
dinated with NATO by establish-
ing substantial integration in
logistics poses the alternative
of erosion of the system, estab-
lished by the 1954 agreements,
of checks and balances on the
development of an independent
German military force. This
item is likely to be referred
to General Norstad for study
and recommendation.
German and British propos-
als designed to give impetus
to cooperation in armaments pro-
duction will be discussed. De-
fense Minister Strauss may also
raise a German suggestion for
NATO-wide cooperation and coor-
dination in the field of psycho-
logical warfare. A British
paper on defense planning pro-
poses greater emphasis on NATO
preparedness for the first phase
of a nuclear war at the expense
of the second.
The lack of response to
the American plea for European
members to undertake an increased
share of the common defense
effort has prompted Spaak to
call for specific proposals by
member governments to be dis-
cussed at this meeting. None
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
is known to have advanced any
such proposal so far.
Recommendations by a spe-
cial steering group on the re-
form of the Annual Review ex-
ercise, including the addition
of a triennial review, have
been approved in principle by
NAC and referred to the Annual
Review Committee for detailed
study. This matter was con-
sidered to be too complex for
useful discussions by the de-
fense ministers.
Preliminary returns from
the elections on 29 March in
Colombia for the lower house of
the national Congress indicate
that the National Front govern-
ment headed by President Alberto
Lleras can no longer count on
the required two-thirds con-
gressional majority required
to pass virtually all legisla-
tion.
Colombia's National Front
is a parity system under which
elective and appointive posi-
tions at all levels are divided
equally between the Liberal and
Conservative parties. Each
party must contend with dissi-
dent factions, which reportedly
gained enough congressional
seats in the elections to be
able to disrupt the government's
two-thirds majority. Although
the dissident elements are un-
likely to cooperate to obstruct
the administration, a long-
standing struggle between the
two principal Conservative
factions for control of the
party may flare up again and
create new strains for the Na-
tional Front.
Lleras, a Liberal with con-
siderable popularity in his
country and prestige in Latin
America, has restored democratic
government to Colombia since he
took office in August 1958 with
an overwhelming popular mandate.
Prior to his accession to pow-
er, an interim military junta
had ruled for more than a year
after the ouster of former mil-
itary dictator Rojas Pinilla
in May 1957.
In the economic sphere,
the government has practiced
import austerity, rebuilt for-
eign exchanges reserves, and
refunded the backlog of commer-
cial debts accumulated during
the dictatorship. Its recently
issued development plan en-
visages the need of about $185,-
000,000 annually in public
credits from abroad and private
foreign investment. This basic
program emphasizes increased
agricultural production and
crop diversification.
Lleras will arrive in the
United States on 4 April for an
official visit, and he will
probably seek to determine the
availability of credits to pro-
mote his comprehensive economic
development plan, which was
not an issue in the recent elec-
tions. Lleras is expected to
press for credits for agrarian
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reform, which he considers
essential to end prolonged
and widespread rural violence
and to undercut the Communist
potential for subverting the
rural population.
Lleras' ability to dem-
onstrate progress in socio-
economic improvement during
his last two years in office
could bear heavily on the
survival of the National Front,
which may face a critical test
in 1962 when a Conservative
candidate is scheduled to fill
the presidency.
The brief threat posed by
the rebellion of a police regi-
ment in La Paz on 19 March tem-
porarily allayed feuding within
Bolivia's governing Nationalist
Revolutionary Movement (MNR),
although the rebels apparently
favored the party's right-wing
faction. Both the party ma-
jority leader, Victor Paz
Estenssoro, and his bitter op-
ponent, Walter Guevara, rallied
to President Siles' support
while the fighting was in prog-
ress. Despite recent serious
dissension within the army,
air force, and civilian mili-
tia over the approaching pres-
idential and congressional
elections, none of these forces
joined the rebels.
Two days later, however,
an armed band fired on Guevara,
who was unharmed. The attack
was evidently designed to deter
him from resuming active lead-
ership of a right-wing splinter
group of the government party.
This attack and the resigna-
tion of two cabinet ministers
in apparent protest against
President Siles' tolerant at-
titude toward the splinter
group suggest the likelihood
of further disorders prior to
the presidential elections on
22 May.
The revolt was led by
Guevara supporters, although
Guevara seems to have been un-
aware of the plot.
The willingness of key
followers of Guevara to attempt
a revolt reflects their pessi-
mism about the 22 May elections.
Guevara's supporters among the
delegates of the 15-21 February
convention of the MNR--which
polled 80 percent of the vote
in 1958 and 1956--were so few
that they boycotted the meeting.
Paz was nominated unanimously
for the presidency, and Juan
Lechin, intensely disliked by
Guevara's followers, won the
vice-presidential nomination by
a large margin. The MNR nominees
for six vacancies in the Senate
and 34 in the Chamber of Deputies
will be selected by a newly
chosen group which is almost
unanimously anti-Guevara.
in August.
Further disorders are like-
ly in the next two months as the
government prepares for Bolivia's
second presidential election with
universal suffrage. Quick sup-
pression of the 19 March revolt
suggests, however, that.Presi-
dent Siles is likely to be the
first Bolivian president in 30 25X1
years to serve a full term: his
four-year administration ends
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
VIOLENCE IN THE ECUADOREAN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
Recent politically moti-
vated violence in Ecuador re-
flects the explosive and acri-
monious nature of the campaign
for the June presidential
elections and indicates that
the incumbent Conservative gov-
ernment will be hard pressed
to maintain order both during
and after the voting. The
Communist-backed anti-Conser-
vative coalition (UDNA)i
will probably
attempt to intensify the ani-
mosity among the parties and to
exploit unrest. Although the
possibility of widespread dis-
order will continue, an organ-
ized revolutionary movement is
more likely after the elections
than before.
Political violence erupted
in two provincial capitals in
early March, and campaign ten-
sion was heightened by the
deaths of five persons in riot-
ing on 19 March in Quito, when
former President Velasco--a
slight favorite in the presiden-
tial race--arrived for a polit-
ical rally. The clashes were
primarily between Velasquistas
and members of the National
Democratic Front, a coalition
of Liberals and moderate Social-
ists which supports former Presi-
dent Galo Plaza. The Conserva-
tives, whose candidate is for-
mer cabinet minister Gonzalo
Cordero, were involved to a less-
er degree.
Communists were also
charged by a high government
official with some responsi-
bility for the riot;
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Communist coalition,
which includes leftist So-
cialists and the demagogic Con-
centration of Popular Forces,
will probably attempt to pro-
voke disturbances in order to
take advantage of a favorable
moment for a revolutionary
attempt--particularly if its
candidate, Antonio Parra, is
defeated. Parra's chances
are not considered so favor-
able as those of Velasco or
Plaza, but his backers have
an excuse for an extralegal
move in the public statement
of the top Velasquista leader
that his party will not per-
mit the election to be stolen
from it, and that it will
take the presidency by "as-
sault" if necessary. Conserva-
tive President Ponce is a
bitter antagonist of Velasco,
and if the Velasquistas are
defeated in June, they will
probably charge that the Presi-
dent conducted a dishonest
election.
Government concern over
the political climate is re-
flected in the decree issued
after the riots on 19 March
banning outdoor political ral-
lies through the electoral
period. The possibilities of
widespread disorders during
the campaign may also be re-
duced by the increased capa-
bility of the army and police,
which recently received train-
ing and equipment from the
United States for controlling
riots.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KREMLIN POLITICS AND THE KHRUSHCHEV SUCCESSION
After more than 40 years,
the Soviet system still has no
mechanism for the smooth trans-
fer of the enormous power which
in the USSR inevitably becomes
concentrated in the hands of
one man. Heretofore there has
been a period of transitional
committee rule overlying an
intense dogfight from which
has emerged the new "sole lead-
er," the man who best combines
a determination to lead with
two other staples of political
strength: first,a program which
most nearly fits the temper of
the handful of oligarchs who
command decisive voices, and
second ,organizational support,
which rests on a consensus--
primarily among top party pro-
fessionals--that the dominance
of one or another of the con-
tenders is the best safeguard
of their own future.
must combine the qualities of
discretion, a keen sense of
political timing, and strong
nerves.
A potential successor
must also reckon now with Khru-
shchev's image of himself. Ever
since 1957, when he finally
eliminated the remaining ob-
stacles to total power--Malen-
kov, Molotov, and Zhukov--Khru-
shchev's view of himself has
come increasingly to center on
two symbols of accomplishment:
domestically, on an economic
program which promises to pro-
vide greater material comfort
as well as more personal secu-
rity; internationally, on the
establishment of the USSR as a
great-power equal of the United
States.
Party "Reorganization"
The Question of Succession
Khrushchev, now approach-
ing his 66th birthday, may re-
main on the scene for many
years. His concern about his
durability is shown, however,
by his frequent allusions to
the subject and his lengthen-
ing vacation periods. There
is no doubt that Khrushchev
would like to handpick his
successor. Much as he might
want to guarantee an orderly
transition, however, it is in
the very nature of his posi-
tion, as well as of his per-
sonality, that he can del-
egate or bequeath only a lim-
ited amount, if any, of his
authority.
Thus, despite the more
"civilized" aspect of the post-
Stalin regime, Kremlin pol-
itics remain an intricate,
brutal, bitter, "dog-eat-dog"
business. Anyone who has his
sights on Khrushchev's powers
For the men closest to
Khrushchev, his present sense
of destiny presents both the
hazard of failing to meet new
criteria and the opportunity of
influencing significant new ap-
pointments. In Khrushchev's
eyes, political loyalty is no
longer a sufficient test for
important office in a man whom
he otherwise rates as inept or
clumsy. As he told the party
central committee last Decem-
ber, "Friendship is friend-
ship, but work is work." It is
probably this thought which
largely accounts for the changes
made, }beginning in late 1958, in
most of the USSR's 15 republics
and many key sectors of the cen-
tral party and government ma-
chine.
Altogether, this "reorgan-
ization" has cut more deeply in-
to the ranks of the higher party
and government hierarchy than
any of the earlier, more drh-
matic post-Stalin "purges,"
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24 March 1960
RECENTLY TRANSFERRED KHRUSHCHEV MENU"
PRESENT PAST PREVIOUS POST
BELYAYEV, N. 1.
SEROV, I. A.
KUZMIN, 1. I.
CHURAYEV, V. M.
SEMICRASTNY, V. Ye.
LUNEV, K F.
MYLARSHCHIKOV, V. P.
DOROSHENKO, P. Ye.
KAPITONOV, 1. V.
00322 33
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIDEM
First Secretary, Rostov Oblast
Party Committee
First Secretary, Stavr
Party Committee
Chief, Military Intelligence Di-
rectorate (GRU) (?)
Chairman, State Scientific Eco-
nomic Council
Chief, Party Organs Department
for Union Republics, CC, CPSU
Second Secretary, CC Azerbay-
dzhan Communist Party
Recently Replaced as Chief, KGB,
Kazakhstan, because of illness
Director, State Farm Trust,
Moscow Oblast
First Secretary, Chernigov Oblast
Party Committee
First Secretary, Ivanovo Oblast
Party Committee
Second (?) Secretary, Central
Committee (CC) Soviet Com-
munist Party (CPSU)
First Secretary, C' Kazakh
Communist Party
Chief, Committee of State Se-
curity (KGS), USSR
Chief, State Planning Commit-
tee (Gosplan)
Chief, Party Organs Depart-
ment for RSFSR, CC, CPSU
Chief, Party Organs Depart-
ment for Union Republics,
CC, CPSU
First Deputy Chairman KGB,
USSR
Chief, Agriculture Department
for RSFSR, CC, CPSU
Chief, Agriculture Department
for Union Republics, CC, CPdU
First Secretary, Moscow Oblast
Party Committee
to be handed over to
party secretaries
Averky Aristov, Leo-
nid Brezhnev, and Ni-
kolay Ignatov. Khru-
shchev's preoccupa-
tion with high-level
affairs of state prob-
ably means that he
has come to rely in-
creasingly on the ad-
vice of his lieuten-
ants in making key
appointments.
Kozloy--A Beneficiary
The major bene-
ficiary of Kirichenko's
decline may well be
Frol Kozlov--Kirichen-
ko's contemporary and
obvious rival for the posi-
beginning with Beria and end-
ing with the Malenkov-Molotov
debacle. Many of the men af-
fected are graduates of organ-
izations headed by Khrushchev
in the Stalin era, either in
the Ukraine or in Moscow
Oblast.
Some of these men have
been given responsible but less-
er new jobs. In other cases,
demotion is more clearly in-
volved. Presidium members
Nikolay Belyayev and Aleksey
Kirichenko, once rated among
Khrushchev's closest political
allies, have tumbled far from
the summit of power.
Some of the changes will
have only an indirect bearing
on high-level political rival-
ries. The disgrace of Kiri-
chenko, especially, is bound
to have its effect on the
alignment of power at the top
today and on the prospects for
the succession in the future.
His transfer from Moscow to
Rostov opens up to others the
substantial authority in party
affairs he once exercised. The
so-called cadres function--
overseeing key party appoint-
ments--assumes particular sig-
nificance. It is most likely
tion of heir apparent. The ear-
nestness of Khrushchev's declara-
tion to Governor Harriman last
June now becomes more believable:
Kozlov would succeed him, Khru-
shchev asserted, adding that
Harriman would be backing the
wrong horse if he picked Kiri-
chenko. Since then the groom-
ing of Kozlov has apparently
continued: his visits to the
United States in June and July
1959 and to India in January 25X1
and February 1960 signify a wid- 25X1
ened scope of interest and ex-
perience;
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Kozlov's lack of a posi-
tion in the party secretariat
and, therefore, presumably of
direct influence on party op-
erations and appointments has
been considered his most seri-
ous handicap in the succession
sweepstakes. Kozlov himself
may no longer be a member of
the central committee's Bureau
for the RSFSR (Russian Repub-
lic), the dominant party or-
ganization in the USSR's larg-
est and most important repub-
lic, but two men who are con-
sidered close to him politi-
cally are+-Dimitry Polyansky,
premier of the Russian repub-
lic, and Ivan Spiridonov, Koz-
lov's successor as chief of
the Leningrad party organiza-
tion.
The Leningrad Network
There are signs of the
emergence of a kind of Lenin-
grad network in the upper
echelons of the Soviet party.
In view of Kozlov's long con-
nection with Leningrad, cover-
ing the better part of 30 years,
the staffing of pivotal posts
with alumni of the Leningrad
organization is a potential
gauge--although one which has
its limitations--of Kozlov's
strength.
Among such appointments,
the most recent was the trans-
fer in January of Nikolay
Rodionov from second secretary
of the Leningrad Oblast party
to the party's second-in-com-
mand in the troubled Kazakh
Republic. In discussing the
appointment before the Kazakh
party central committee, the
first secretary, himself newly
named, described Rodionov as
"a pupil of the Leningrad party
organization, which is strong
in its revolutionary tradition."
The past year has also
brought the appointment of sev-
eral Leningraders to posts in
the party's central headquar-
ters, a string-pulling center
through which party function-
aries, although not of the first
rank themselves, can exert con-
siderable influence on the
course of party politics. For-
mer Leningraders are now head
and deputy head of the central
committee's Department of Agri-
culture for the Russian.: Repub-
lic and the chief of the Depart-
ment of Administrative Organs,
charged'with party su-
pervision of'secret
police and judiciary
organs in the union
republics.
KOZLOV, F. R. Member, Presidium Central Commit-
tee (CC) of the Soviet Communist
Party (CPSU); First Deputy Chairman
Council of Ministers, USSR
RODIONOV, N. N. Second Secretary, Central Committee,
Kazakh Communist Party
GRISHMANOV, I. A. Chief, Construction Department for
Union Republics, CC, CPSU
KAZMIN, N. D.
MALIN, V. N.
Chief, Science, Schools and Culture
Department for RSFSR, CC, CPSU
First Secretary, Leningrad
Oblast Party Committee
First Secretary, Leningrad
City Party Committee
First Deputy Chairman, Lenin-
grad City Executive Committee
Secretary, Leningrad Oblast
Party Committee
Chief, General Department, CC, Secretary, Leningrad City
CPSU Party Committee
MIRONOV, N. M Chief, Administrative Organs Depart- Chief, Administration of Com-
ment for Union Republics, CC, CPSU mittee of State Security (KGB)
for Leningrad Oblast
VOROBYEV, G. I. Chief, Agriculture Department for Chairman, Leningrad Oblast
RSFSR, CC, CPSU Executive Committee
SEMYENOV, P. S. Deputy Chief, Agriculture Department Member, Leningrad Oblast So-
for RSFSR, CC, CPSU viet
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 3Ul0 ARY
SECRET
They join other
department heads ap-
pointed in recent
years--those of the
Department of Science,
Schools, and Culture
for the Russian Re-
public, of the Con-
struction.Department
for the union repub-
lic, and of the. Gen-
eral Department--to
give Leningrad strong,
probably.disproporr,
tionate, representa-
tion in the headquar-
ters staff.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SPRY
24 March 1960
Aristov-Brezhnev-Ignatov
Besides Khrushchev;-'s pa-
tronage, Kozlov would do well
to have the support or at
least the benevolent neutral-
ity of men like Aristov,Brezh-
nev, and Ignatov. These three
--all experienced veterans of
the party machine--are members
of both the party presidium
and the secretariat. `"heir
roles are played mostly behind
the scenes, but they are high-
ly skilled in high party poli-
tics.
Aristov, formally second-
in-command to Khrushchev on
the Bureau for the RSFSR, ac-
tually exercises day-to-day
control of operations and ap-
pointments in the Russian Re-
public.
Brezhnev, who has had a
role in the party supervision
of the armed forces and possibly
the security organs, may have
taken on some of the responsi-
bilities for personnel appoint-
ments in the wake of Kiri-
chenko's removal. For example,
he presided over the recent
change of command in Kazakhstan
and was treated to the kind of
elaborate flattery which would
befit a man of growing conse-
quence.
The third member of this
trio,Ignatov, has made a come-
back after a brief period of
apparent eclipse, and he may
be entrusted once again with
top-level party supervision of
agricultural policy. For a
period of several months in
1953 he was Kozlov's superior
in the Leningrad party, but
whether this ephemeral rela-
tionship produced political
friendship or enmity is not
clear. There is a hint of the
latter in the fact that the
appointment of the Leningrader
Vorobyev to his central com-
thittee agricultural post in
April 1959 coincided with Ig-
natov's presumed removal,
temporary though it may have
been, from authority in the
agricultural sphere.
The more Kozlov appears
the heir apparent, the more
likely he is to become the
target of other ambitious men
and the more he may be in-
clined to overreach himself.
For now, however, he seems to
have some formidable assets:
Khrushchev's personal backing,
a rapidly broadening experience
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in both domestic and interna-
tional affairs, and at least
the nucleus of a personal ma-
chine. He probably needs time
to build on these beginnings.
If Khrushchev were to leave
East European attitudes
toward improved East-West re-
lations range from support of
Khrushchev's position favoring
"peaceful coexistence" to an
echo of Peiping's avowed dis-
trust of the detente and in-
terest in maintaining world
tensions. The Stalinist re-
gimes of Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, and Albania have
adopted propaganda positions
in sharpest variance with Mos-
cow, while Rumania and Poland
have been most responsive to
Khrushchev's example on this
issue. The responses of the
satellite leaderships reflect,
to varying degrees, their
basic political orientations,
the degree of their servility
to Moscow, the geographic sit-
uations of their countries, or
their involvement in a specific
foreign policy situation.
All the satellite regimes
are mindful of events in 1955
and 1956, when the "Geneva
spirit" contributed to danger-
ous internal relaxations. Con-
cern over the effects of de-
tente at home have been expressed
publicly and privately, par-
ticularly last fall in all the
satellites. Soviet efforts--
most recently at the bloc meet-
ings in Moscow in February--to
interpret and explain Khru-
shchev's detente policy have
evidently silenced some of the
fear. Initial reactions coupled
with some later expressions of
concern, however, indicate don-
the scene soon, for example,
Mikoyan might become a sort of
interim chairman of the board.
Over the longer run, however,
Kozlov now looks like the man
to beat.
tinuing apprehension among a
number of the satellite leaders.
Rumania and Poland
The Rumanian and Polish
regimes have come closest to
echoing Khrushchev's policies
of internal relaxation. Bucha-
rest, although hard-line*in
orientation, has followed the
line primarily because of its
fidelity to Moscow. Early
fears of the effect of such a
program on internal Rumanian
developments were admitted by
Rumanian leader Gheorghiu-Dej
at a diplomatic gathering on 7
November: "My people," he said,
"had some doubts at first about
the benefits that could result
from Khrushchev's American
visit."
This fear evidently has
been relegated to the back-
ground, for Bucharest has pressed
for claims settlements and great-
er cultural and economic ex-
changes with the West, and it
has been the loudest advocate
of Khrushchev's calls for a
Balkan "zone of peace." It has
also used detente for its own
specific ends, and began even
before Khrushchev's US trip to
make friendly gestures in the
economic and cultural fields.
The. more liberally inclined
Polish regime has also been a
strong advocate of rapproche-
ment, but for different reasons.
Warsaw has consistently followed
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY BUIMARY
Soviet foreign policy since
1957,partly to lessen pressures
for conformity in internal pol-
icies, and it has been a leader
in Central European disarmament
schemes since Foreign Minister
Rapacki presented his plan to
the United Nations in October
1957. Poland may also be moti-
vated by a belief that a detente
would lead to a settlement of
the German problem and Western
recognition of the Oder-Neisse
line, and that a lessening of
world tensions would reduce So-
viet pressures on Warsaw. Most
recently, Poland has reached
agreement with the United States
over outstanding American claims
for nationalized properties.
Bulgaria
The Bulgarian leadership,
one of the most rigidly ortho-
dox in East Europe, has re-
verted to total support of Mos-
cow's internal and foreign pol-
icies after having strayed be-
yond Soviet examples in evolv-
ing a "great leap forward" in
late 1958 and early 1959. In
recent months Sofia has pub-
licly echoed Moscow's "peace-
ful coexistence" theme, co-
operating with Rumania, Albania,
and the USSR in supporting So-
viet plans for a Balkan nuclear-
free area.
Further ev ence
of a warmer attitude toward the
West is the cooperation the
American advance party, and now
the legation, has obtained from
Bulgarian officials since last
fall. 25X1
Despite these public ex-
amples of support for "peace-
ful coexistence," however, some
party members I I appear 25X1
very concerned about the desir-
ability of a rapprochement with
the West. A high-ranking Bul-
garian official, for example,
noted at the time of Khru-
shchev's visit to the United
States that international re-
laxation could lead to a weaken-
ing of internal control in Bul-
garia. Bulgarian Foreign Min-
ister Karlo Lukanov warned the
National Assembly on 3 Novem-
ber of
effect
the
of a
possible harmful
detente on the
"na-
tional
liberation movement."
Czechoslovakia
The Czech leadership has
also expressed considerable
skepticism concerning a de-
tente. Czech propagandists have
emphasized anti-American themes.
and seized every opportunity to
charge that the West is working
against coexistence and is in-
terested in rapprochement only
in the hope of stimulating re-
visionism from within through
increased contacts.
Certain Czech actions have
reflected this attitude. While
there have been isolated tac-
tical moves to conform with Mos-
cow's line, these are more than
counterbalanced by such actions
as the virtual suspension of
the four-year-old negotiations
with the United States on an
economic settlement, the rejec-
tion of the US efforts to ex-
pand cultural exchanges, and
the defaulting on British and
French loan payments, which
had been serviced without inter-
ruption since before World War
II.
Party leader Novotny,long
an advocate of tough policies,
clearly views Khrushchev's more
moderate policies with misgiving.
Czech party leaders were
pset by
n Peaceful
Coexistence" in the October is-
sue of Foreign Affairs, fearing
that it in cate a di position
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,CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S$g
to compromise with the West.
Novotny, who demonstrated his
understanding of Chinese re-
luctance to a detente during
anniversary celebrations in
Peiping in October, has in-
sisted on tight control and
isolation from the West, be-
lieving this to be-`the only
means of communizing a nation
with advanced West European
democratic traditions and
orientation. He apparently be-
lieves coexistence would
erode the internal progress
toward the Soviet model which
the Czech party has achieved.
Czech leaders--and Novotny
in particular--may still have
reservations about the thesis
and may have expressed them at
the recent Moscow meeting of
the Warsaw Pact. Such an ac-
tion could, in part, explain
why Novoay was the only party
first secretary who did not
have a private audience with
Khrushchev while in Moscow.
East Germany, Albania, Hungary
The attitude toward a de-
tente exhibited by East Germany,
Albania, and Hungary is heavily
influenced by fear that it would
permit external forces to affect
their stability. The East German
leadership fears that East-West
negotiations might lead to a
settlement detrimental to East
Germany. It has followed a pol-
icy of maintaining tension and
challenging the integrity of
any Western proposals designed
to ease the cold war. Last
September, Ulbricht
feared that Khrushchev, in his
eagerness to secure agreement
with the United States, might
make concessions at East Ger-
many's expense. There is, how-
ever, agreement on the basic
goals of Moscow's German policy,
and Khrushchev has sought to
allay Ulbricht's fears of anyad-
verse settlement of the German
issue.
Recent East German propa-
ganda--perhaps reflecting Ui-
bricht's Satisfaction with
Khrushchev's tactical planning
for the summit--has conformed
with the Kremlin line on Soviet
policy toward Germany. Never-
theless, some East German ap-
prehension over the tactical
treatment-of the German prob-
lem will remain as long as
East Germany's international
Albania has given lip
service to detente but has a-
dopted a hostile and militant
propaganda position. Tirana's
reservations, which parallel
Peiping's position, are based
largely on a fear of the al-
leged threat Yugoslavia poses
for Albanian security in the
event of international relaxa-
tion. Party leader Hoxha under-
lined this fear on 21 September
when he warned, "Vigilance is
essential, because the imperial-
ists and their servants the re-
visionists are waiting to pounce
on any bloc weakness to stab us
in the back."
Hungary has, in the main,
supported a rapprochement, but
it has taken a more hostile at-
titude than Moscow toward the
United States because of a con-
tinued American challenge to
the legitimacy of the present
Budapest regime. Hungarian
party First Secretary Kadar, a
loyal supporter of Khrushchev,
gave evidence of concern over
the possible internal effects
of international relaxation in
a speech in November to the
party congress.
Warsaw Pact Meeting
The Warsaw Pact meeting
was probably designed, at least
in part, to clarify Khrushchev's
policies for other bloc members
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and to establish
a unified
bloc
satellite regimes by Khrushchev.
position for the
summit.
The
These variations tend to re-
final communiqud
indicated
that
flect the political character
a surface unity
had been
a-
of the satellite leaderships.
chieved. Peiping's publica-
tion of the speech by Chinese
delegate Kang Sheng itemizing
Peiping's objections to a de-
tente, however, raises consider-
able doubt over the extent to
which agreement was achieved
during the closed sessions.
Chinese opposition may
have fallen on sympathetic ears
among the East European leaders,
particularly those from East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, and
Albania. While there is no
firm evidence that satellite
leaders supported the Chinese
positions or that Peiping
sought to enlist such support,
the similarity of Chinese ob-
jections with those of certain
satellite party leaders can
hardly pass unnoticed in the
bloc.
Prospects
Variations in the treat-
ment of and response to the
detente theme have been possible
because of the increased maneu-
verability accorded individual
Some of the more orthodox lead-
ers have been troubled by Khru-
shchev's pragmatism--a prag-
matism which they feel weakens
the capabilities of the regimes
to maintain internal controls.
To assuage such fears, Khru-
shchev has repeatedly declared
that there can be no ideologi-
cal relaxation with the West;
in turn, some satellites con-
tinue to tighten internal dis-
cipline.
meeting.
During the past few weeks,
there has been a greater de-
gree of satellite conformity
over the central question of
East-West rapprochement. Such
unity--as expressed in the War-
saw Pact communiqud in February
--is likely to be increasingly
manifest in the pre-summit peri-
od.. The fears of the satel-
lite leaders, however, have
not been permanently put to
rest and are liable to find ex-
pression when the overriding
need for outward expressions 25X1
of bloc unity on the detente
theme lessens after the summit
The success of
the
Afri-
can nationalist drive
for
self-
government has tended
to
obscure
the problem posed by
the
en-
trenched European communities.
The 5,700,000 whites of Algeria,
Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia,
and South Africa may wipe out
the good will the Western colo-
nial powers have earned in
yielding control to the in-
digenous Africans. Settler
opposition to local national-
ist movements may eventually
provoke considerable bloodshed.
Among Africa's total pop-
ulation of 236,000,000, the
small European minority has made
the major contributions
to the economic and political
development of the continent,'
but the influence of individual
European groups varies consider-
ably as a result of the geo-
graphic, historic, and economic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
factors in different areas. In
West Africa, the few small
European settlements pose no
great problem. In the higher
altitudes of East and South Af-
rica, whites are more numerous
and in several areas show a de-
termination to retain their in-
fluence regardless of the con-
sequences.
Areas With Little Tension
In West Africa, European
merchants and slave traders be-
gan to exercise growing mili-
tary and political power along
the coast more than 250 years
ago. Adverse climate limited
the European element to trad-
ers, missionaries, and a few
administrators until late in
the last century, when exten-
sive penetration of the hinter-
land began.
Today, in the vast region
stretching from the Sahara to
the Congo River, there are over
74,000,000 Negroes and only
about 165,000 whites. Of these
Europeans, at least a third are
located at Dakar, which has
played an important role as the
French administrative capital,
defense post, and economic cen-
ter. In this area, where there
are few white settlers, racialism
is relatively unimportant, and
the white minority enjoys no
special privileges which would
delay the achievement of inde-
pendence by African states.
In the East African terri-
tories of Ethiopia, Uganda, Rw-
anda-Urundi, and the Somalilands,
there are about 30,000,000 indigenous
people. and only 45,000 Euro-
peans. Here, too, the influ-
ence of the white man in com-
mercial and adminis-
trative capacities is
decreasing and the
African exercises in-
creasing political
power.
AFRICA: ESTIMATED POPULATION IN 1960
( SELECTED COUNTRIES )
INDIGENOUS
(AFRICAN)
NO RACIAL PROBLEM
Cameroun 16, 000 3,350,000
Ethiopia 23,000 16, 100,000**
French Community Republics 49, 000 16, 200, 000
(exc. Mali, Malagasy)
Ghana 15, 000 5,000,000
Guinea 8, 700 2,800,000
Liberia 300 1,250,000
Malagasy Republic (Madagascar) 74, 000 5,100,000 Mali Federation 57, 500 6,250,000 Nigeria 16,000 35, 000, 000
Ruanda-Urundi 5,000 4,900,000
Somalilands 8, 300 2)000,000**
Uganda 9,000 5,950,000
Other West African 3, 000 4,500,000
NATIVE PREDOMINANCE
WITH EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Belgian Congo 115,000 13, 500,000
Kenya 65,000 6, 560, 000***
Morocco 270,000 9, 600, 000*
Tanganyika 22, 000 9,150,000
Tunisia 130,000 3,800,000*
EUROPEAN STRONGHOLDS
Algeria 1,200,000 9, 850, 000*
Fed. Rhodesia and Nyasaland 300, 000 7, 600,000
Portuguese (Angola, Mozambique) 178, 000 9,900,000
Un. South Africa and SW Af. 3,150,000 12, 400, 000***
* Arabs
** Hamites, Semites
*** Also includes Asians; in S. Africa, also Cape Coloreds (Mixed Bloods)
Independent Nations
SECRET
Europeans Under
Native Rule
In the North Af-
rican states of Morocco
and Tunisia, about
400,000 French, Ital-
ian, and Spanish set-
tlers play a signifi-
cant economic role.
In both nations the
size of the foreign
community has declined
in the four years of
independence--in Tu-
nisia from about 255,-
000 to 130,000. This
reflects both the
withdrawal of French
administrative per-
sonnel as well as ap-
prehension among Euro-
pean businessmen and
farmers regarding the
policies of the new
states. President
Bourguiba's policy of
gradually buying all
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
European agricultural holdings
for distribution to Tunisians
is likely to bring a further
decline.
In Tanganyika, Belgian
Congo, and Kenya--which are ex-
pected to obtain independence
as predominantly African na-
tions--the settler communities
face a drastic loss of economic
and political influence. In
Tanganyika the 20,000 whites,
who have a strong economic po-
sition in the sisal industry,
have never considered themselves
strong enough to dominate the
(SENIEGAL)
GAMBIA,
PORq
GUINE
ERATION
MALI
ALGERIA
UPPER
VOLTA
9,000,000 Africans. and 100,000
Asians, as do the whites in
Kenya. They have not opposed
African nationalism and prob-
ably can,continue to play an
important role in an independent
Tanganyika.
In neighboring Belgian Con-
go, where the Africans' politi-
cal advance has been spectacular
in recent months and the Euro-
peans' position has changed
rapidly, 115,000 Europeans view
with alarm the prospect.3 of
rule by 13,500,000 Congolese.
Administrative officials, who
'RAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
AFRICA
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
Colony,
Protectorate, I Trust
etc. Territory
United Kingdom
France
Belgium
Portugal
Spain
Italy
Union of
South Africa
Independent
country
Area of heaviest
European population
.0
BELGIAN CONGO
SOUTH=
T
AFRICA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUNKARY
total about 25 percent of the
employed Europeans, are centered
at the capital in Leopoldville
and have no strong ties to hinder
their return to Belgium. How-
ever, the future holds greater
concern for the rest of the com-
munity, including the 50 percent
concerned with manufacturing and
industry and the 20 percent en-
gaged in independent commerce.
Many of these persons, par-
ticularly those in the eastern
Congo and in mineral-rich Ka-
tanga Province, fear heavy eco-
nomic losses whether they sell
out and return to Belgium or re-
main under an inexperienced Afri-
can regime. Some settlers in Ka-
tanga may emigrate to neighboring
Rhodesia. Others are apparently
already supporting schemes for
Katanga's secession from a Congo
state. The large foreign com-
panies--particularly the copper-
processing Union Miniere--ap-
parently expect to weather the
transition period and do busi-
ness with the new Congolese gov-
ernment. They may, however,
face early nationalization.
The recent constitutional
conference in London clearly in-
dicated that the British colony
of Kenya would be developed as
a predominantly African state.
This served notice on the 65,000-
member European community that
most of its economic, political,
and social privileges would soon
end.
To date, a small minority
of the whites--primarily the
families on the 4,000 European
farms--have spoken for the en-
tire white community. Their
conservative policies frequently
have not been genuinely repre-
sentative. This group also has
had a disproportionate influ-
ence--as have its counterparts
in Rhodesia--on the formulation
of British policy.
The Europeans, however,
have recently lost their exclu-
sive right to inhabit the re-
served highlands in Kenya. They
will probably soon lose their
advantage in the civil service
pay scale, in educational facili-
ties, in credit arrangements,
and in agricultural regulations.
The prospect of rule by Af-
ricans in the next few years
probably will decrease the size
of the European community in
Kenya. Hard-core rightist set-
tlers are likely to instigate
incidents during this period.
Of the 4,000 landowners, 40 per-
cent are reportedly considering
emigration to South Africa, 40
percent to the Rhodesian Federa-
tion and Commonwealth countries,
and 10 percent to Britain. Only
10 percent desire to remain in
Kenya under an African govern-
ment.
European Strongholds
Algeria is one of the four
areas in which an entrenched
European minority appears de-
termined to resist an indigenous
take-over of power. Here 1,200,-
000 French, Spanish, and Corsican
settlers are resisting the grow-
ing political demands of almost
10,000,000 Moslems,
In Algeria, as elsewhere,
out of the 330,000 gainfully
employed Europeans, a small
landed minority of about 40,000
has exercised influence out of
proportion to its numbers. The
groups engaged in manufacturing,
construction, the professions,
and administration are three
times as numerous as the landed
class, but they seldom speak
with a united voice. Under
French President de Gaulle the
settlers have suffered a rebuff,
but their determination remains
unshaken. They might even con-
sider secession from France
rather than face the prospect
of Moslem domination.
In Portugal's African pos-
sessions, particularly Angola
and Mozambique, Lisbon's deter-
mination to resist African
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 March 1960
nationalism is likely to lead
to bloodshed eventually. In
these areas where the only
officially promoted European
colonization plan in Africa
operates, about 180,000 Portu-
guese settlers confront 10,000 ,.
000 Africans. However, no
radical change in the racial
proportions is likely because
of Portugal's limited popula-
tion and economic strength.
Another crucial area is
the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland,where 300,000 whites
face almost 3,000,000 Africans.
In the 60 years of European
settlement, the whites have
maintained virtually complete
domination, although African
economic strength and politi-
cal awareness are rapidly in-
creasing. There is a slow
trend toward some official
amelioration in the natives'
status, but advocates of white.
supremacy are supported by newly ar-
rived settlers, and they may expect
more backing from future immigrants
from Kenya and the Congo.
At a conference in London
next October, a decision prob-
ably will be reached concern-
ing the federation's readi-
ness for independence. Britain
faces a dilemma because of the
increasing racial antagonism
in the federation. Pronounced
support for the Africans could
lead the 220,000 whites of
Southern Rhodesia--and perhaps
the 80,000 in Northern Rhodesia's
copper-producing region--to de-
clare for separate independence.
On the other hand, British sup-
port for the white minority
would provoke African nation-
alist disorders and might im-
peril the federation's con-
tinued existence in view of
the growing native opposition
to the white-dominated federal
government.
Southern Rhodesia, which
has considerable secondary in-
dustry, mineral wealth, and
agricultural riches, could be
viable as an independent state.
Moreover, most Europeans there
believe that if they are pushed
too far by pro-African interests,
Southern Rhodesia can probably
associate itself with the Union
of South Africa, even though
they openly criticize the ex-
tremism of Pretoria's racial
policies.
The strongest white cita-
del is the Union of South Afri-
ca, whose 3,000,000 Europeans
constitute over half of all
the whites in Africa. There,
both tradition and a govern-
ment dedicated to a vigorous
espousal of white privileges
minimize any immediate threat
to white supremacy. Neverthe-
less, the influence of the 12,-
000,000 natives, those of mixed
blood, and Asians is growing in
the economic field. They are
increasingly doing semiskilled
and even skilled labor, even
though it is illegal. However,
their political strength has
shown no significant gain in
recent years because of govern-
ment repression and a lack of
unity.
None of the solutions for
racial relations advanced so
far in South Africa--e.g., de-
velopment of separate, self-
contained native areas--is
either economically or political-
ly feasible. Because of the
unwillingness of the Europeans
in South Africa to compromise,
the non-Europeans probably will
ultimately seek a revolutionary
solution. The English-speaking
minority--largely engaged in
commerce and mining--may be will-
ing under heavy native pressure
to give up and emigrate else-
where. However, the more numer-
ous Afrikaners, descended from
17th century Dutch settlers,
have no ties outside of South 25X1
Africa and are likely to resist
any African domination by all
means available.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ISSUES BETWEEN COMMON MARKET AND
Prospects are poor for
compromising the key differences
between Western Europe's in-
creasingly competitive trade
groupings--the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) and the
European Free Trade Association
(EFTA). While a showdown may
be avoided at a 29 March meet-
ing of all countries directly
concerned, EEC efforts to ac-
celerate its tariff reductions
are viewed by members of the
EFTA as a new threat to the
major purpose of their organi-
zation--the establishment of a
preferential Europe-
wide free trade area.
Underlying Issues
A major objective
of the proponents of
the EEC is eventual
political union. As
a first step toward
this goal, the six
members--France, West
Germany, Italy, and
the Benelux countries
--are making important
sacrifices of sover-
eignty and national
economic freedom, in-
cluding adoption of a
single common tariff
against all other
countries. The seven
members of the EFTA--
Britain, Portugal,
Switzerland, Austria,
and the Scandinavian
countries--are unwill-
ing to accept the re-
strictions inherent in
membership in a simi-
lar system, but they
want free commercial
access to the EEC, the
largest and fastest
growing trading area
in the world.
The EFTA coun-
tries are urging the
EEC to link up with
them in an association
without tariffs among
Netherlands
14%? 25%A
Switzerland
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EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION
member states but leaving the
original EFTA countries free
to fix national tariffs against
the rest of the world. The
EFTA maintains that the link-
age it proposes is necessary
to prevent political friction
between two trade blocs and to
discourage discriminatory EEC
policies that would damage the
trade of outsiders.
In the EEC view, such an
arrangement would serve the
commercial interests of the
EFTA while undermining the
European Free Trade Association (Outer Seven)
European Economic Community (Common Market)
Percent of imports ? from and exports a to the European Economic Coromun
France
Belgium-Luxembourg
14.5%? 16%e
United Kingdom
36X?
? 32.5%0
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
' INTERNATIONAL TRAt OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY AND EUROPEAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION
1938,
D
EFTA
EEC
Imposts
Exports
Imports
Exports
Total trade*llions of dollars)
19
$16
23
$23
Percent of Trade with EFTA
f7%
17%
16%
a 23%
Percent of Trade with EEC
28%
22%
30%
30%
Percent of Trade with US
9%
8%
10%
7%
Percent of Trade with rest
of world
46%
53%
44%
40%
economic rationale and long-
range political aims of the
EEC. The United Kingdom, as a
nexus of two trading systems
in Europe and the Commonwealth,
would, EEC countries argue, be
thereby in a particularly ad-
vantageous position to attract
most of the heavy American in-
vestment now flowing into the
EEC area.
Discriminatory practices
against the trading interests
of outsiders arerestrained,
however, by the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). A session of the GATT
this fall will review EEC and
EFTA conformity with its cri-
teria, and non-European signa-
tories will oppose any dis-
criminatory arrangement that
may be worked out between the
EEC and the EFTA.
Current Differences
Relations between France
and Britain were cool follow-
ing the acrimonious breakdown
of EEC-EFTA negotiations at
the end of 1958. Some improve-
ment is apparent,, however, as
a result of an agreement' reached
in the mid-January meeting in
Paris of representatives of
both groups and the United
States and Canada. It was
agreed that the interested par-
ties would undertake to find
organizational and procedural
arrangements to accommodate
conflicting interests and as-
sure coordinated use of free-
world resources. The
tariff reductions
scheduled to be made
by both groups on 1
July and the need to
minimize the impact
these cuts will have
on other contracting
parties to the GATT
lend special urgency
to the 29 March meet-
ing..
EEC Position
An interim solution per-
mitting coordination of tariff
cuts and avoidance of discrim-
ination had seemed in prospect
following a proposal last No-
vember by the EEC to extend on
a reciprocal basis to EFTA and
other GATT parties the 10-per-
cent tariff cut EEC member coun-
tries are scheduled to make on
1 July. A recent recommenda-
tion of the EEC Commission makes
the EEC position uncertain.
Under the terms of this
new proposal, cuts in tariffs
among EEC member states sched-
uled for this July would be
doubled to 20 percent to satis-
fy desires of the six, par-
ticularly of France,for accel-
erated consolidation of the
EEC as a distinctive unit. As
a further move to speed up the
EEC timetable, initial steps to
establish the common external
tariff would be advanced by 18
months to 1 July 1960. As a
concession to internal and ex-
ternal pressure for a liberal
trade policy, however, it would
be agreed to reduce eventually
the level of this common ex-
ternal tariff by 20 percent.
Such a voluntary reduction
would go a long way toward
countering the EFTA argument.
that linkage in a larger free
trade area is necessary to pre-
vent a protective EEC policy.
France appears to be will-
ing to go along with the proposed
cut in the common tariff only
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
on condition that EFTA and
other GATT countries, particu-
larly the United States, grant
reciprocal 20-percent cuts.
Other forces within the'EEC,
notably in the Netherlands and
among West German industrial-
ists, have strong reservations
about both accelerated action
and cutting the common external
tariff. They desire a merger
of the EEC with the EFTA in a
larger free trade area and are
apprehensive that the EFTA
might not be able to coordi-
nate its own 1 July tariff
reductions with those of the
EEC so as to keep open the
possibility of later union.
EFTA Position
The speed-up proposed by
the EEC Commission would be a
setback for the EFTA, limiting
the time and scope for bargain-
ing toward a multilateral trad-
ing arrangement. British of-
ficials profess readiness to
accept compromise arrangements
on the 1 July tariff cuts so
long as they do not foreclose
an eventual tie-up between the
two groups, but London's free-
dom to compromise is limited
by demands of other EFTA mem-
bers which, because of their
great dependence on trade with
the EEC area, are pressing for
arrangements to facilitate
linkage in a large free trade
area.
Toward this end they would
have EEC countries extend to
the EFTA nations the 10-per-
cent reduction in internal EEC
tariffs scheduled for 1 July.
Such an extension in addition
to the 10-percent EEC cut of 1
January 1969--which was made
available to all GATT.' countries
--would put EEC tariff reduc-
tions in phase with those of
20 percent to be made by EFTA
countries on 1 July. Tariff
reductions coordinated only be-
tween the two groups, however,
would discriminate against
other GATT countries. Member
countries of the EFTA now con-
strue as favoritism in support
of the EEC the emphasis by the
United States and Canada on
the need to adhere to GATT'
principles of nondiscrimina-
tion against outside GATT par-
ties in reaching an EEC-EFTA
agreement.
Subject to these internal
pressures and external bargain-
ing disadvantages, the EFTA
countries decided at their
meeting in Vienna on 11 March
to proceed on 1 July with their
scheduled 20-percent cut in
tariffs against each other and
to offer to extend this cut on
a reciprocal basis to EEC mem-
ber countries.
Prospects
In view of France's tra-
ditional protectionism and its
recent tendency to exploit its
key position in the EEC for ad-
vantages of national prestige,
French acceptance of the pro-
posed 20-percent cut in the
EEC external tariff would be an
impressive step toward multi-
lateral trade liberalization.
If other GATT countries, in-
cluding those of the EFTA, were
to agree to such a proposal and
to negotiate reciprocal reduc-
tions in the GATT mechanism,
problems relating to external
trade relations of the EEC could
be considerably eased.
On the other hand, hostile
reaction among EFTA countries
to the EEC Commission's pro-
posal on, tariff reductions
augurs ill for any arrangement
at the 29 March meeting for co-
ordinating future action on
tariffs. Sweden and Switzer-
land see the suggested cut of
20 percent in the common ex-
ternal tariff, with the stipu-
lation that it be generally ex-
tended, as deliberately de-
signed to undercut the EFTA and
forestall any later merger be-
tween the EEC and the EFTA.
They contend that agreement on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
their part to go along with
the proposal would prevent
their practicing the limited
degree of discrimination au-
thorized by the GATT' as es-
sential to the existence of
a free trade area.
It is possible that re-
criminations may break out
at the meeting and revive po-
litical controversy between
the two groupings. In any
event,a renewed effort to
find bases for a compromise
on coordination of tariff
reductions on 1 July appears
necessary.
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