CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002400040001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 22, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
s&GRE-r
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 57
OCR NO. 4064/59
27 August 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
CONFIDENTIAL J1~ p I ; ~ ~5 t
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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27 August 1959
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST RELATIONS
On the eve of President
Eisenhower's trip to Western
Europe, Soviet propaganda, while
continuing to welcome the Khru-
shchev-Eisenhower visits and the
possibility of a relaxation of
tensions, laid increased empha-
sis on the differences among the
Western powers and on the opposi-
tion in certain Western circles,
to the visits and to an East-
West detente.
Earlier charges of a "Bonn-
Paris axis" determined to fore-
stall any such detente have been
revived. Commentators have as-
serted that Britain, in view of
the success of Macmillan's trip
to Moscow; favors the exchange
of visits, while France and West
Germany, as well as "certain
business and military leaders"
in the United States, are op-
posed. Propagandists allege
that Adenauer intends to use
the President's trip to Bonn to
prevent an East-West agreement
on disarmament and a nuclear
weapons ban. France's intention
to carry out nuclear tests in
the Sahara is laid to its de-
sire to "poison the political
atmosphere."
Khrushchev'e recent person-
al messages to several world
leaders apparently were designed
mainly to encourage the impres-
sion that his exchange of visits
with President Eisenhower is only
the opening phase of a long se-
ries of top-level meetings.
Pravda has termed the exchange
of visits the "beginning of great
negotiations between East and
West." The Soviet leader prob-
ably also hoped to minimize the
unifying effects of President
Eisenhower's trip to the three
Western capitals.
The British press has car-
ried reports of a letter from
Khrushchev to Prime Minister Mac-
millan with the speculation that
it also referred to the Khru-
shchev-Eisenhower exchange of
visits and to the Berlin and
German issues.
In an unusually lengthy
message to Chancellor Adenauer
dated 18 August but-not pub-
lished until the day of Presi-
dent Eisenhower's arrival in
Bonn, Khrushchev reiterated in
moderate language the Soviet
position on Berlin and Germany
and urged the chancellor to re-
consider his entire policy. He
pointed out that the economies
of the USSR and the Federal Re-
public are complementary and
stressed the advantages to both
of increased trade.
Stating that the USSR at-
taches great importance to the
forthcoming exchange of visits
with President Eisenhower, the
Soviet premier declared, "We
are probably on the eve of a
historical turning point in the
policy of the two existing blocs
--from further estrangement to
gradual rapprochement and the
settlement of outstanding is-
sues."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
In addressing letters to
UAR President Nasir and Iraqi
Prime Minister Qasim,Khrushchev
evidently hoped to reap the
benefits in good will that could
be obtained by this demonstra-
tion of Soviet concern for their
interests and desire to obtain
their views on international
issues. He solicited Qasim's
opinions on Middle Eastern prob-
lems and assured him he would
emphasize to President Eisen-
hower the Soviet Union's de-
termination to prevent "im-
perialist conspiracies" against
Iraq.
The Soviet ambassador to
Yugoslavia called on President
Tito on 17 August and may have
brought Tito similar verbal or
written assurances from Khru-
shchev regarding the forthcom-
ing talks.
Replying on 12 August to
a message from Indian Presi-
dent Nehru, Khrushchev stated
he shared Nehru's belief that
the visits will have "posi-
tive significance" and "help
to relieve international ten-
sion and achieve necessary
agreements."
COMMUNIST CHINA CUTS BACK 1959 TARGETS
Peiping has "readjusted"
downward to a significant de-
gree China's four main produc-
tion targets for 1959--for coal,
steel, grain, and cotton. The
Chinese admit "over-assessments"
of agricultural production fig-
ures in 1958--grain and cotton
output claims are reduced drag-
tically, and 1959 targets for
both were lowered to only one
half the original goals. The
readjustments of 1959 targets
are a setback for the prestige
of Mao Tse-tung and his lieu-
tenants who encouraged the most
extravagant expectations of
rapid economic development. The
leadership's call for further
intensive effort on the economic
front indicates there is to be
no relaxation of "leap forward"
pressures on the masses.
Peiping's decision was con-
tained in a communique issued
on 26 August by the Chinese Com-
munist party central committee,
following its eighth plenary
session at Lushan during the
first two weeks in August. The
communique attributes the "read-
justment" to a reassessment of
last year's production claims
and recent serious floods and
droughts over large areas.
Official investigations
during the first half of this
year revealed exaggerated re-
ports from statistical units
and hasty harvesting and stor-
age because of inadequate labor.
The findings enabled final
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
verification of only 250,000,-
000 tons of grain--375,000,000
tons had been claimed earlier
--and 2,100,000 tons of cotton
--3,350,000 tons had been
claimed. This grain figure
still appears to be inflated,
with actual output probably no
more than 220,000,000 tons.
The new steel target con-
firms that the "back-yard"
steel program was unsuccessful.
"Native" steel, which account-
ed for 3,000,000 of the 11,-
000,000 tons verified
for 1958, is no long-
er included in the
national plan, and
steel output for 1959
is scaled down by 33
percent. The Chinese
Communists have ap-
parently accepted the
fact that production
of steel by other
than "modern" tech
niques is economic
waste.from the point
of view of both ma-
terials and labor in-
put. The new goal
of 12,000,000 tons
in 1959 is probably
feasible.
The "verified" figures an-
nounced in the communique cor-
respond closely to Western esti-
mates of Chinese Communist capa-
bilities in 1958. Publication
of these "verified" figures
tends to support the view that
Communist nations, like others,
find it necessary to have ac-
curate and reliable statistics
in order to operate their econ-
omies efficiently and coherent.
ly. Reliable control figures
play a significant part in the
effective management of planned
economies.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S REA STMENT" OF
"THE FOUR MAJOR TARGETS"
(PRODUCTION IN MILLION TONS)
CLAIMED
FOR 1958
VERIFIED
1958 OUTPUT
1959 PLAN
( PROMULGATED
FEBRUARY 1959)
ADJUSTED TARGET
FOR 1959
STEEL
it
11*
18~*
12***
COAL
270
270
380
335
GRAIN
375
250
525
275
COTTON
3.35
2.1
5
2.3
* 3 "Primitive" and 8 "Modern"
Both "Primitive" and "Modern"
* * * All "Modern"
90827
Revision of the coal target
probably reflects a planned cut-
back in production by the small
local mines. The cutback in
total coal production for 1959
should have no retarding effect
on China's industrialization,
and the new target is much more
realistic.
The communique confirms ear-
lier indications that the slogans
"great leap forward" and "leap
forward" have been redefined in
much more modest terms. A Pei-
ping People's Daily editorial
on 6 August asserted that a 10-
to 20-percent increase could be
fairly called a "leap." At least
some 1959 goals are scheduled to
exceed these percentages. The
Second Five-Year Plan targets
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
proposed in 1956, previously
set aside as too conservative,
have been revived and proffered
as realistic goals for 1959
which can be overfulfilled by
sustained maximum effort...
The admission of false
claims for 1958 and the read-
justment of goals for 1959 en-
tail a loss of prestige for Mao
Tse-tung and his lieutenants
who were most prominent in the
"leap forward" from its incep-
tion. The latter group of par-
ty-machine leaders--including
Liu Shao-chi, the party's sec-
ond-ranking figure; Teng Hsiao-
ping, the party secretary oen-
eral; and Tan Chen-lin, the
secretariat's specialist in
agriculture since 1957--had
taken the lead with Mao in ex-
horting the "leap" and in
threatening those opposed to a
headlong course. For example,
Liu, during the height of the
program in the spring of 1958,
denounced those who still had
misgivings and were waiting for
the autumn harvest to prove
them right; "they will lose
out in the end," he said. Sim-
ilarly, Tan in Febrary 1959
threatened those who felt that
"leap" figures were "not reli-
able," and told them to solve
their "ideological problems"
before they damaged the whole
program.
Another group of party
leaders--principally senior ad-
ministrators and economic spe-
cialists, possibly including
Premier Chou En-lai--appeared
to have varying degres of res-
ervation about the "leap" from
the beginning. Although they
too foresaw a period of rapid
economic advance, they seemed
to disapprove of some features
of the program, such as the very
heavy reliance on exhortation
and coercion in general, and in
particular the incitement to
unrealistic agricultural goals.
The views of these leaders were
to some degree reflected in
those of the "gloomy clique,"
which was periodically assailed
in the party press and whose
position now has been vindicated.
Despite this latest in a
series of reverses which his
policies--both domestic and for-
eign--have suffered in recent
years, Mao apparently continues
to dominate the party. The com-
muniqu6 on the "leap" notes that
the party plenum was held un-
der Mao's "guidance" and it con-
cludes by urging the party and
people to unite under Moo's
leadership. Similarly, the
central committee resolution
affirms at several points the
general wisdom of Mao, "the
great leader of our party."
Chinese Communist pronounce-
ments to date do not suggest
that Mao will fix the blame
for the "leap's" shortfall on
the party-machine leaders,
despite their failure to de-
liver what they promised. The
resolution attempts to save
face for this group by assert-
ing that the "great victories"
of 1958 and thus far in 1959
have resulted from the increased 25X1
role of the party machine and
the principle of "puttin ol-
itics in command."
25X1
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27 August 1959
Communist partisan forces
retain the initiative and are
circulating throughout large
areas of northern Laos, propa-
gandizing and intimidating the
population. The Communists are
still operating in small bands
but can concentrate adequate
strength to seize individual
posts.. Elements of the former
Pathet Lao battalion that re-
belled in May- have arrived in Sam
Neua Province from their refuge
athwart the Laotian - North
Vietnamese frontier in Xieng
Khouang Province. These troops
are now threatening a government
post in southeastern Sam Neua
Province.
ty problems, especially since
there are already some 14,000
Vietnamese living in southern
Laos, many of whom might be
susceptible to Communist propa-
ganda.
Morale in some Laotian Army
fighting units is believed low,
and the poorly informed civilian
population in the provinces is
extremely susceptible to rumors
and propaganda spread by Com-
munist cadres. At the top levels
of the government and the army,
however, morale is high and
there is'confidence that Laos
will receive external assistance
if the situation worsens.
Insurgency has spread to
eastern Luang Prabang Province,
where the Communists are re-
ported to have executed a num-
ber of progovernment village
chiefs and forcibly indoctri-
nated the villagers. The fam-
ilies of government adminis-
trators and the affluent have
been entering the royal capital
at Luang Prabang in a steady
stream from these areas.
There have been several
incidents in areas only 60 miles
northeast of Vientiane, the ad-
ministrative capital, and there
are reports from other provinces
that small bands have infiltrated
to propagandize and organize
potential guerrilla forces.
These activities may be in prep-
aration for a country-wide ex-
pansion of guerrilla operations
when the wet season ends in
about two months.
Pro-Communist Vietnamese
refugees from northeastern
Thailand are reported to have
entered central and southern
Laos in several small bands.
Their presence in Laos would
add to the government's securi-
Moscow has not yet replied
to the British proposal--pre-
sented to the Soviet ambassador
in London on 17 August--for a
joint UK-USSR demarche to the
UN secretary general to send a
neutral observer to Laos. So-
viet propaganda--although sharp
ly reduced in quantity the past
six days--continues to attack
alleged US military preparations
in Laos and to demand the reac-
tivation of the International
Control Commission (ICC). Pravda
has asserted that the United--
States has "virtually taken con-
trol" of the Laotian armed
forces and given "almost open
military support" to Vientiane.
A Soviet broadcast of 24 August
for.the first time referred
to the "present civil war in
Laos."
Peiping has not made any
formal statements on the situa-
tion in the last week, but like
Moscow has vigorously protested
the introduction of US-manufac-
tured planes from Taiwan. In
line with this protest, the
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27 August 1959
~k14RV
CANTON
MILITARY DISTRICT
356,000
IN SAM NEUA PROVINCE
Ck2 ~23RV
C~k 1 Dt321(ELMS)
~22 fk4(ELMS)
KUNMING
MILITARY DISTRICT
`NORTH
.......... ....................
VJ_LTNA_,
Muang
Lampang
7~
Luang Prabang
10
INSURGENT FORCES
SAM NEUA PROVINCE 1,000
PRONG SALY PROVINCE 200
TOTAL STRENGTH LAOS 22,500
SAM NEUA PROVINCE 2,800
PHONG SALY PROVINCE 100
I VIETNAMESE - I
L---_-_- J
? COMMUNIST FORCES
? NONCOMMUNIST FORCES
PL PATHET LAO
BV VOLUNTEER BATTALION
MAJOR COMMUNIST PRESSURE
SCATTERED INCIDENTS
INFANTRY
AIRBORNE INFANTRY
CORPS
DIVISION
Et BATTALION
entire bloc propaganda machine
can be expected to object vocif-
erously to the public announce-
ment that the United States will
finance an increase in the Lao-
tian Army and militia.
TOTAL STRENGTH
NORTH VIETNAM
Oil 0,4 --
BORDER AREA
STRENGTH
30,000
s
TouranE1
Hanoi continues to carry
the major portion of bloc prop-
aganda on Laos. In a 25 Au-
gust Foreign Ministry statement,
North Vietnam catalogued the
sins of the United States and
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C H I N
.Nanning
(ALERTED 12 ATUST)
TOTAL STRENGTH
SOUTH VIETNAM
144,000
STRENGTH
101151 MILITARY
REGION: _.
46.040...
HO JEET MILITARY IOLN
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27 August 1959
Phoui Sananikone governments in
"repudiating" the Geneva agree-
ments, "provoking" the civil
war, and "betraying" the former
Pathet Lao. The statement also
asserted that "as a signatory
of the Geneva agreements and
a country neighboring on Laos,"
North Vietnam cannot remain
indifferent to the serious sit-
uation which directly threatens
the security of North Vietnam
and the peace in Indochina and
Southeast Asia. Rejecting any
consideration of UN action,
Hanoi again called for reactiva-
tion of the ICC and strict ad-
herence to the Geneva agree-
ments as the only solution to
the present situation.
The Foreign Ministry state-
ment differs in emphasis from
statements attributed to the
Laotian Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ)
leadership by not making demands
for domestic reforms which
would automatically result in
giving the Communists a privi-
leged status in the Laotian
community; it may therefore
represent minimum Communist ob-
jectives. The domestic demands
made by NLHZ spokesmen include
the creation of a coalition gov-
ernment with Communist partici-
pation, the realignment of Laos'
pro-Western foreign policy, and
would constitute, in effect, a
return to the privileged posi-
tion secured in the 1957 unifica-
tion settlement.
UN Moves
UN Secretary General Ham-
marskjold, with the concurrence
of the Laotian emissary to the
UN, in a letter to Nehru on 22
August suggested that the Indian
prime minister approach Hanoi
and Vientiane in an effort to
work out a "mediation formula"
leading to the appointment of
a "neutral" mediator.
Hammarskjold considers the
most logical way to appoint a
mediator would be for the ICC
to request him to appoint one.
The secretary general would
probably choose a Swiss, since
he believes the mediator should
be an "absolute neutral" and
non-Asian. Although Hammar-
skjold admits that his plan
might require a formal meeting
of the ICC outside Laos to ap-
prove a request for a mediator,
he does not believe one such
meeting would reactivate the
commission.
In reply to Hammarskjold's
proposal, Nehru suggested that
assurances of "active support"
would be needed from Britain
and the USSR, as Geneva cochair-
men, and from Poland and Canada,
as members of the ICC. While
not rejecting the proposal,
Nehru apparently wants to en-
sure that there is agreement
among all concerned before In-
dia commits its good offices.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CARIBBEAN HIGHLIGHTS
The situation in Haiti is
the most pressing element in
the continuing tension in the
Caribbean area which led to the
recent conference of the Amer-
ican foreign ministers in San-
tiago. The newly strengthened
Inter-American Peace Committee
(IAPC) has been requested to
come to.Haiti to investigate
the 13 August landing there of
a small, rebel force from Cuba.
The invasion force, which
never posed a serious military
threat. to the Duvalier regime,
has apparently been dissipated,
with only a few members still
at large in the hills of Haiti's
southern peninsula. Government
officials identified four pris-
oners taken to Port-au-Prince
as Cubans.' The Haitian Govern-
ment continues to maintain that
all the invaders' except the
leader, a French national of
Algerian origin, were Cubans.
Other invasions antici-
pated by President Duvalier
have failed to materialize.
With the IAPC now focusing its
attention on Haiti, the external
threat to the government has
abated at least temporarily.
:The current outbreak of hostil-
ity toward the Catholic Church,
.however, could sharpen internal
opposition to Duvalier and, ac-
cording to US Ambassador Drew,
constitutes "an act of politi-
cal folly which could well lead
to his downfall."
Although nominally a Cath-
olic, Duvalier has long been at
loggerheads with the church,
which he has charged with en-
gaging in "subversive" activi-
ties against the government. The
general belief that Duvalier has
practiced voodoo rites in the
presidential palace has also ex-
acerbated his relations with the
church, which has long combated
pagan cults in Haiti.
Duvalier has apparently
averted a possible break with the
'Vatican by reversing his decision
to arrest or request the recall
of Archbishop Poirier, a French
citizen who had been ordered
arrested for having protested
the expulsion last week of two
French priests. The Vatican had
threatened to excommunicate all
connected with the arrest.
The public has reacted
calmly to this affair as well
as to an incident earlier this
year when government troops and
police broke up a religious
funeral procession and seized the
body of opposition leader
Clement Jumelle. Haiti's con-
cordat with the Vatican comes
up for renewal next year, how-
ever, and popular opposition
could be aroused by further
antichurch actions which oppo-
sition elements could construe
as 'indicative that Duvalier
may not renew the concor-
dat.
Cuban Foreign Minister Raul
:Roa returned from the Santiago
conference claiming a "historic
victory" for Cuba. The confer-
ence, he alleged, had been con-
ceived principally by the US
to "isolate internationally the
Cuban revolution" and to estab-
lish an inter-American police
force "to strengthen the shaky
position of" Latin American
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
dictators, but failed to achieve
these ends. Roa indicated sat-
isfaction with the declaration
and resolutions signed at San-
tiago but doubted that the Or-
ganization of American States,
"already abundantly discredit-
ed," could convert them to re-
ality.
Meanwhile, the Cuban Gov-
ernment has decreed a 30-per-
cent reduction in the rates of
the predominantly American-owned
electric company which supplies
about 90 percent of Cuba's elec-
tric power. Fidel Castro him-
self, according to his minister
of communications, refused the
company a prior opportunity to
challenge the government find-
ings, which had been promised
both to the US ambassador and
DE GAULLE REVIEWING ALGERIAN POLICY
President de Gaulle's cur-
rent tour of Algeria may preface
a fresh French initiative for
peace prior to the Algerian de-
bate in the UN General Assembly
session. opening on 15 September.
While there is no indication
that he is changing his stand
against recognizing the rebels
as sole representatives of Al-
geria, he may be considering a
meeting including the rebels to
discuss the political future of
Algeria.
lieve
army, which is imbued with the
idea that it has a "mission" to
"save" North Africa for the 25X1
West, and appears to be totally
unwilling to "abandon" Algeria.
He may still hope 25X1
to win acceptance for a "choice
place" for Algeria in the French
Community, presumably an auton-
omous status. In any event,
De Gaulle's aim will be to in-
De Gaulle had tended to be- educe the rebels to admit that
that his policy toward Algeria
was already sufficiently clear.
Nevertheless, government appre-
hension over a possible slow-
down in the military campaign
is apparent in De Gaulle's pres-
ent tour of military installa-
tions and in Premier Debrd's re-
cent carping demands for the
"fullest support" from France's
allies, and suggests that some
new gesture may be in the offing.
Debrd's speeches were reported-
ly cleared with De Gaulle, who
may advance similar demands as
a prerequisite to any new over-
tures to the rebels.
Despite De Gaulle's liber-
al views on Algeria's eventual
political system, he must still
maneuver under pressure from the
they are only one of a number
of elements representing the
Algerian people.
Meanwhile, most Algerians
rebel leaders continue to
advocate negotiations. Although
the intransigent among them no
longer openly demand recogni-
tion of Algeria's "right to
independence," they insist that
any negotiations in Paris must
be preceded by contacts in
a neutral area, and must
include discussion of Al-
geria's political future. While
they have stated that the door
to independence "must not be
closed," rebel leaders have al-
luded favorably to some form
of French - North African as-
sociation to include Morocco
Algeria, and Tunisia.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq
Political tensions in
Baghdad remain acute amid the
uncertainties created'by waves
of conflicting rumors. The
anti-Communist "nationalists"
are embittered by Prime.Minis
ter Qasim's maneuvering but,
at the same time, are heart-
tined by Brigadier Tabaqchali's
vigorous attack on the Commu-
nists and on Communist influ-
ence in the Iraqi Government
during his televised trial
this week before the "peoples
court.
The Communists seem to
have little to gain at the mo-
ment from provoking new dis-
orders, since this might well
serve only to alienate Qasim
further. Fear of Communist
violence, however, appears to
be real, and this probably ac-
counts for the apparently
grossly exaggerated assertions
of wide-scale violence last
week in the Kurdish area of
Sulaymaniya in eastern Iraq.
Economic difficulties,
which have been given relative-
ly little publicity amid the
political turmoil, are becoming
more immediate problems for the
Qasim regime. Grain, barley in
particular, has skyrocketed in
price, and with the slowing,or
stoppage of imports from Iraq's
normal Western sources, the
stage has been set for danger-
ous inflation and corruption.
"Expediters" in Baghdad are al-
ready reported to be selling
import licenses for grain at a
rate of $2.80 per ton.
The president of the Bagh-
dad chamber of commerce has an-
nounced that, because of bad
weather and confusion in the
agrarian reform, the harvest
has been only 45 to 55 percent
of normal. The regime is seek-
ing to facilitate imports, but
grain shortages, added to the
now chronic unemployment, may
still further complicate the
political situation.
Arab League Conference
Arab diplomatic activity
has been concentrated this week
on setting the stage for the
Arab League conference which is
to open in Casablanca on 1 Sep-
tember. Iraq, piqued over the
rejection of Baghdad as the con-
ference site, appears to have
decided finally not to send a
delegation. This decision re-
duces the importance of the
meeting, which it was hoped
might provide the means of pro-
moting a modus vivendi between
the Qasim and Nasir regimes.
The Arab diplomats will
vary considerably in status,
since Jordan, for example, will
be represented by Prime Minister
Majalli, while Saudi Arabia's
delegation will be headed merely
by the education minister. Never-
theless, the delegates are ex-
pected to produce some new mani-
festo on the Palestine refugee
problem as well as to hash over
Algeria and other old issues.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
Discussion of Palestine
results from the need for a re-
ply to UN Secretary General
Hammarskjold's recent proposals
for the continuation of the
United Nations relief program
in a drastically modified form,
but a new pronouncement on the
area will not necessarily be
arrived at easily.
The Jordanian Government
is already irritated by "sug-
gestions" from Lebanese Chris-
tian leader Peirre Jumayyal
and from the notorious fanatic
Haj Amin al-Husayni, ex-grand
mufti of Jerusalem, calling
for the creation of a Palestine
government and the concentra-
tion of all refugees in West
Jordan. Such a government
would most logically be set up
there because it is the former
eastern area of Palestine and
contains the largest number of
refugees.
Israel
Saudi Arabia and the UAR
apparently are continuing to
stand firm against Ceylon's de-
sire to send Ceylonese crews to
Eilat in the Gulf of Aqaba to
pick up two Israeli frigates the
Ceylonese have purchased. Cey-
lon's ambassador to the UAR has
returned to Colombo for consul-
tations on the issue. Israel
this week moved another torpedo
boat overland to Eilat from the
Mediterranean, but this merely
brings the Israeli flotilla in
the gulf back up to normal
strength.
Marseilles, allegedly cutting
short his "vacation," official
Israeli sources stated to the
press that Israel would take
the issue to the UN General
Assembly this fall.
pital."
Israeli officials in
Paris ha
Gurion's
new mili
between
the visi
have had
ve denied that Be
presence indicat
tary or other agr
France and Israel
t nonetheless may
some effect on I
n-
es any
eement
, but
well
srael'
decision
on any action it
may
take in
its dispute with
the
UAR over
use of the Suez
Canal.
Shortly
after Ben-Gurion
left
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
meanwhile is returning from a
holiday in southern France--
official Israeli announcements
said he was resting in a "hos-
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27 August 1959
Domestically, the Israelis
are preparing for parliamentary
elections which are scheduled
for mid-November. There has
been serious unrest and grow-
ing political consciousness
among the Jews of North Afri-
can and other so-called "Ori-
ental" origin in Israel, who
feel they are being discrimi-
nated against by the dominant,
better educated Israelis of
European background. This has
made the elections appear less
predictable in outcome than
previously.
Most Israeli parties are
making special efforts to ap-
peal to the Orientals, although
the conservative General Zion-
ists are seeking to reassure
their members of European back-
ground that their party will
resist the lowering of economic
and cultural standards which
might result from a sudden sur-
render to the demands of the
Oriental community. The elec-
tion campaign so far is quiet,
however, so much so that a num-
ber of stalwarts of the domi-
nant Mapai party were observed
sleeping during an election
rally address by Foreign Min-
ister Meir at a Tel Aviv the-
ater last week.
Lebanon
The recent departure from
Lebanon of Christian ex-Presi-
dent Chamoun on an Aegean cruise,
the embarkation of extremist Mos
lem leader Saib Salaam on a Euro-
pean tour, and the seclusion of
Druze leader Kamil Jumblatt in
his castle in southern Lebanon
add::: assurance that the country
is returning to a period of po-
litical peace unknown since the
spring of 1958. Chamoun's fail-
ure in particular to derive capi-
tal from the assassination in
July of his principal lieutenant
has seriously weakened his hold
over the Lebanese Christian com-
munity, although some unexpected
incident of violence could en-
able him to resecure his fol-
lowing.
Concurrently with Chamoun's
temporary retirement and loss of
influence, there has been a some-
what parallel reduction in the
standing and influence of the
UAR. Part of this decline re-
sults from the shift in Communist
tactics from supporting Nasir to
favoring Iraq's Qasim as the mod-
el Arab leader. Communist in-
fluence in this respect is par--
ticularly impressive to Prime
i Minister Karami, much of whose
support in his home area of
Tripoli in northern Lebanon de-
pends on the Communists.
The multiplicity of pro-
UAR groups operating within
Lebanon has also adversely af-
fected the UAR position, since
the UAR Embassy and UAR intelli-
gence frequently appear to be at
odds with each other while
Nasir's Syrian hatchetman, Abd
al-Hamid Sarraj, operates inde-
pendently of both and at times,
it would appear, even in conflict
with Cairo's policy. In conse-
quence, several former Lebanese
rebel leaders now speak openly
against Nasir.
The general public's weari-
j ness with conflict and its dis-
illusion with its former heroes
may smooth a cabinet change
scheduled for October. The re-
organization is necessitated by
the illness of Foreign Minister
Uwayni, now hospitalized in
Paris with a heart ailment.
Ambitious politicians, maneu-
vering behind the' traditional
desire of religious minorities
for cabinet representation, are
seeking to expand the cabinet
beyond its present four-man size.
The major contest seems likely
to occur over the Druze seat,
since the Druze remain sharply
divided between the supporters
of the traditionalist Majid
Arslan and the "socialist"
Jumblatt.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
Yemen
The Imam is continuing his
violent purge of c mili-
tary officials. ~~~
Y[Yemeni
or is a s nave despair of any
improvement in the government
as long as the Imam, lives. So
far, however, there is no indi-
cation that the Imam has taken
direct action against his son,
Crown Prince Badr, and the Yem-
eni radio has reiterated that
Badr is still the heir to the
throne despite the machinations
of the imperialists.
Yemeni government business,
meanwhile, is at a standstill,
with the exception of the police
and prison administration, and
Yemeni officials believe it may
be another month before the
Imam's policy line becomes evi- 25X1
dent.
MOSCOW SEEKS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH THE UAR
Moscow is renewing its
efforts to re-establish close
political ties with Cairo and
to consolidate its position as
chief source of economic and
military assistance to the UAR.
Soviet leaders apparently hope
they can offset recent steps
by Cairo to improve relations
with Western countries, par-
ticularly the United States,
and thus reduce the UAR's eco-
nomic dependence on the bloc.
Nasir has also decided not to
allow UAR students--now home
on vacation--to return to the
Soviet Union because they have
shown the effects of political
indoctrination by Soviet au-
thorities.
The bloc has recently re-
ceived favorable publicity in
the UAR on projects under its
$168,000,000 credit to the
Syrian region. The UAR has an-
nounced that the Soviet Union
will begin work on a number of
water projects, including both
hydroelectric and irrigation
schemes. Considerable fanfare
was also given the opening in
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27 August 1959
early August of the Homs oil re-
finery, which was constructed
with Czech economic and techni-
cal aide
Work has already begun on
a number of the enterprises
called for under the Soviet $175, -
000,000 economic aid credit to
Egypt, and most of the contracts
for the remaining projects have
been completed.
Preparations for construc-
tion of the first phase of the
Aswan High Dam--to begin in
late 1959--are progressing rap-
idly. In early August the UAR
minister of public works an-
nounced that the prices for
construction equipment and the
materials to be used had been
agreed on. A group of more
than 80 Soviet engineers and
technicians, including the
USSR's chief expert on dam con-
struction, has,. begun to ar-
rive e (Pre- 25X1
pared jointly with
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
EAST GERMAN PRESSURE FOR ACCESS CONTROLS APPEARS SUSPENDED
The USSR, in a move prob- I traffic to Berlin and has de-
ably related to the upcom-
ing Khrushchev-Eisenhower talks,
has apparently reversed a June
decision which appeared to fore-
cast increased East German har-
assing tactics against Allied
tided not to press at this time
for more East German authority
on the access routes.
General Zakharov, the So-
viet commandant in Berlin,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
replying, on 22 Au-
gust to his American
counterpart's pro-
test over East Ger-
man interference with
official American
travelers on the au-
tobahn, said these
harassments "seemed
unnecessary" and
that he would look
into the matter..Hav-
ing just returned
from a two-month ab-
sence.. Zakharov
seemed surprised to
learn of the matter.
The acting Soviet
commandant on 30 July
had replied in a
similar conciliatory
vein to an American
protest over East
German interference
with a US military
train.'
These two almost
apologetic replies
follow sporadic ef-
forts during the
Berlin crisis to as-
sert East German au-
thority on the auto-
bahn. On 22 June the acting
Soviet commandant had stated
in a letter to the US comman-
dant that, while the USSR ac-
cepted the responsibility to
control Allied traffic at the
checkpoints, the autobahn it-
self was beyond the Soviet
"sphere of influence." The ef-
fort to impose East German con-
trol has mainly been on the
autobahn, with only a few minor
attempts to include East Ger-
mans in the checking procedure.
on the railroads. Moscow evi-
dently considered the heavily
traveled autobahn route most
susceptible to East German en-
croachment.
This apparent Soviet deci-
sion not to press for East Ger-
man authority on the access
- Railroad Autobahn - Road
Canal Air Corridor. -
Control Points for Allied Traffic-
A Soviet A Allied
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
p east A West
routes probably does not please
the East Berlin leaders, who
are sensitive on the sovereign-
ty issue and would like to push
ahead to improve their regime's
status wherever possible. Con-
cern over this issue may be one
reason party boss Ulbricht is
presently conferring with Khru-
shchev on the.Black Sea coast.
Ulbricht may fear that Khru-
shchev, in his coming talks with
President Eisenhower, may make
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
some concession at the expense
of East German aspirations for
sovereignty.
While an agreement that
would bar East Germany perma-
nently from trying to assert
its sovereignty over the ac-
.cess routes is unlikely to
result from the Khrushchev-
Eisenhower exchange, the East
Germans will probably be re-
strained from interfering with
Allied traffic at least until
after the visits.
CONSULTATIONS AMONG ASIAN COMMUNIST LEADERS
During July and part
of August, when Communist
China's leaders were absent
from Peiping, two of the
three other Asian Communist
chiefs visited Moscow--one
going on to Peiping--and
the third was absent from
his capital. This suggests
the likelihood of consul-
tations with China ,and
the USSR ".covering a broad
range of Far Eastern is-
sues.
Ho Chi Minh of North Viet-
nam visited both the Soviet
Union and Communist China with-
in the past few weeks. He met
informally in Moscow in early
July with Kremlin leaders. He
then spent about a month on a
"vacation" tour of parts of the
USSR. After leaving the Soviet
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27 August 1959
Union, Ho made a leisurely trip
through Communist China, partly
by train, during which an un-
explained gap in his schedule
could have allowed time for a
conference with Chinese leaders.
He was given an official recep-
tion in Peiping on 21 August by
government Chairman Liu Shao-
chi and Premier Chou En-lai and
left for Hanoi on 25 August.
On 20 August, while Ho was
in Peiping, Soviet 'Premier
Khrushchev received Mongolian
-First Secretary Tsedenbal in
Yalta for "friendly cordial
talks," according to Moscow
newspapers. Furthermore, Ulan
Bator announced that Tseden-
bal would visit Hanoi shortly
in response to an invitation
from the North Vietnamese party
and government. Since Tsedenbal
is not known to have visited
Communist China since 1952, he
may stop off at Peiping en route
to or from Hanoi for a meeting'
with Chinese leaders.
While North Korea's Kim I1-
sung is not known to have partic-
ipated in the putative meeting
of Chinese leaders nor to have
journeyed outside the country
during the summer, he was absent
from Pyongyang for a period of
about five weeks coincident with
the absence of Communist China's
leaders from Peiping, and could
thus have joined their meeting
or visited other bloc nations.
There has been no public
report of the topics discussed
at the announced meetings in-
volving Asian Communist leaders.
The meeting of Chinese leaders
was probably concerned largely
with domestic matters, but the
Laotian situation must have been
considered. In view of Ho Chi
Minh's prior contacts with So-
viet leaders, it is possible
that he served as intermediary
in a move to coordinate bloc
policy on Laos. Five members of
the Chinese Communist party po-
litburo believed responsible for
military affairs were not re-
ported present at a Supreme
State Conference in Peiping on
24 August and may still be dis-
cussing military problems.
Khrushchev's meetings with
at least two Asian Communists
suggest that another motive in
these recent contacts may have
been his desire to reassure
Asian members of the bloc that
their interests would not be
slighted during the forthcoming
exchange of visits between him-
self and President Eisenhower.
Peiping continues to be
plagued with armed resistance
in Tibetan areas and possibly
faces a new flare-up of rebel
activity. Tibetans in India
seem fairly well informed on
the present situation in Tibet.
Areas of combat have been pin-
pointed in recent statements by
the Dalai Lama's brother.
Chinese Communist troops,
which may number over 100,000
in Tibet alone, appear to be at-
tempting to eliminate armed dis-
sident groups by cutting them
off from money, food, and sup-
plies, by eliminating elements
of the population friendly to
rebels, and by carrying out mass
trials of "reactionaries" op-
posed to the reform program.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August'1959
T ! >B E T
Zhikatse
The Dalai Lama stated on 23 Au-
gust that he is not surprised
by reports of the Panchen Lama's
arrest and that there is "every
possibility" the reports are
true. He described the Panchen
Lama as a "man with feeling" for
his country, people, and reli-
gion, and one whose attitude
may well have been affected by
Communist atrocities in Tibet.
Reports of Chinese Commu- 25X1
nist incursions below the Ti-
betan border continue to draw
considerable attention in South
Asia.
Within Tibet, the Chinese
continue to harass foreign na-
tionals and to restrict their
travel. Nehru told the Indian
Parliament on 24 August that
Communist China had advised
India to discourage pilgrimages
to ''Tibet' because of an
SECRET
Unconfirmed rumors persist
that the Communist-sponsored
Panchen Lama has been placed
under house arrest in Lhasa be-
cause of his leadership in a
projected new uprising. A Brit-
ish newsman for the Communist
London Daily Worker now in Lhasa
has denied the rumors, and a
group of foreign newsmen re-
protedly interviewed the Panchen
Lama at his residence in Zhikatse.
IASj-tMIR
T r 51F t}IgA
J e1
Mu so rie
vDIA
Z
+ Railroad
Motorable road
- - - Minor road or trail
------ Motorable road under
construction
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
"expedition" against the rebels.
Officials of both Nepal and Bhu-
tan are concerned over recent
Chinese actions in Tibet. Ne-
pal has complained to Commu-
nist China about treatment of
Nepalese traders and is "in-
vestigating" reports that Chi-
nese troops are attempting to
exercise authority in border
areas of the kingdom; Bhutan
apparently has-abandoned its
historic policy of isolation,
and its prime minister will
arrive in New Delhi on 7 Sep-
tember to discuss security
problems with Nerhu. The In-
dian prime minister on 25 Au-
gust re-emphasized India's
"responsibility to defend Bhu-
tan and Sikkim" against "any
incursions."
JAPANESE - SOUTH KOREAN RELATIONS
Negotiations which began
between Japan and South Korea
on 12 August for the settlement
of outstanding differences have
only limited prospects for im-
proving relations between the
two countries as long as Seoul
persists in its efforts to block
the repatriation of Korean resi-
dents in Japan to North Korea.
Seoul is continuing to delay
the exchange of Japanese fisher-
men held in Korea for violations
of the Rhee Line for those Ko-
reans detained for illegal en-
try into Japan, has not resumed
trade with Japan, or stopped
the seizures of Japanese fish-
ing boats.
Seoul is insisting that the
settlement of the legal status
of Korean residents in Japan be
given priority over the numerous
other issues, claiming that un-
less, Japan agrees to remove al-
leged legal and other forms of
discrimination, these Koreans
will not have a "free choice"
of residence. The South Korean
press is continuing to urge that
the talks be used to block re-
patriation to North Korea, and
has commented favorably on Presi-
dent Rhee's statement that all
Korean residents are South Ko-
rean citizens and cannot be sent
anywhere without Seoul's consent.
Tokyo is willing to dis-
cuss the legal status of Ko-
rean residents provided this
will not prejudice the repatri-
ation to North Korea and that
Seoul is prepared to exchange
detainees immediately. Although
irritated by the recently re-
sumed seizures of Japanese
fishing boats, Tokyo is unlike-
ly to use force in patrolling
the Rhee Line.
Meanwhile, steps are being
taken to carry out the repatri-
ation agreement between the Jap-
anese and North Korean Red Cross
Societies signed at Calcutta on
13 August. Marcel Junod, vice
president of the International
Committee of the Red Cross,
arrived in Tokyo on 23 August
to oversee the repatriation
processing. The Japanese Red
Cross will soon undertake ini-
tial repatriation procedures, 25X1
and the first repatriation ship
is expected to depart for North
Korea in early November.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
BLOC RENEWING ECONOMIC AID. ACTIVITY IN INDONESIA
The signing of additional
protocols for implementing the
Soviet Union's $117,500,000
aid program in Indonesia sug-
gests that Moscow intends to
revitalize the bloc's lagging
economic efforts there.
According to a recent an-
nouncement, top priority under
present implementation contracts
will be assigned to the Asian
Games stadium project to be
built with $12,500,000 in So-
viet credits. This stadium
reportedly will seat some 100,-
000 persons,and, although dif-
ficult to justify in the light
of Djakarta's pressing economic
needs, is calculated to provide
the maximum psychological im-
pact on Indonesia's population.
Although the Indonesian
Government wanted a recent
credit of $5,000,000 for educa-
tional purposes to be split
among various educational insti-
tutions already in existence,
the Soviet Union insisted that
it be used to establish a tech-
nological institute at Ambon,
the capital of the Moluccas--an
area in which Soviet influence
has been negligible. Construc-
tion has reportedly been post-
poned indefinitely by the Indo-
nesian Government, increasingly
concerned over Soviet motives
in this area.
Of the more than $240,-
000,000 in economic aid ex-
tended to Indonesia by the bloc
since 1955, some $135,000,000
has been obligated but only
about $60,000,000 utilized.
Most of the credits used have
been delivered in the form of
equipment, foodstuffs, and con-
sumer goods, and only about
$13,000,000 has been used on
economic development projects.
The good will generated
by such projects has been off-
set to a large extent by dif-
ficulties and misfortunes. A
tire and rubber plant, con-
tracted early in 1956 from
Czechoslovakia, was not formal-
ly inaugurated until 6 May 1959
--one and one-half years behind
schedule; it is the first bloc
project successfully completed
in Indonesia.
The East German sugar mill
in Jogjakarta, after having
broken down last year, was re-
opened in May and apparently is
operating successfully, but only
SINO-SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO INDONESIA
MILLION DOLLARS
ECONOMIC
90825 2
EXTENDED (NEGLIGIBLE)
175
MILITARY
after incurring the wrath of
local sugar producers who suf-
fered during the delay. Com-
plaints of faulty bloc equip-
ment, continue to be heard among
Indonesian officials, who gen-
erally prefer Western equipment.
These difficulties, however, .
also reflect Indonesia's short-
age of trained technicians and
the absence of a sound mainte-
nance system.
Other bloc projects in
Indonesia, most of which are
still in preliminary stages,
include a $5,000,000 shipyard
built with Polish help, a So-
viet-assisted glass factory now
under construction, two steel
plants, and a large Soviet pro-
gram for building roads in Bor-
neo. Communist China, which
makes its greatest contribution
to the bloc's economic offensive
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
in trade with Indonesia, re-
cently augmented its efforts
by extending a $30, 000, 000 loan
to equip three textile mills,a
soda factory and a cement plant.
Difficulties and delays
in implementing these agree-
ments have been balanced by
timely and efficient deliver-
pared by
ies under the large military
aid program. Since early 1958
the bloc has provided Indonesia
with almost $175,000,000 in mili-
tary assistance. With the ar-
rival of two W-class submarines
on 25 August, deliveries under
existing military agreements
have virtually been
pleted. (pr.e- 25X1
INDONESIAN INTERNAL PROBLEMS
The new Indonesian Govern-
ment, faced with mounting infla-
tion and a scarcity of essen-
tial goods, took its first ma-
jor remedial measures on 24 Au-
gust when it took over 90 per-
cent of the deposits in bank
accounts exceeding 25,000 rupi-
ahs (approximately $555 at the
new rate of exchange) and de-
valuated by 90 percent 500- and
1,000-rupiah bank notes. Im-
port taxes on luxury goods were
increased, a complicated export-
certificate system introduced
two years ago was abolished,
and the exchange rate was fixed
at 45 rupiahs to the dollar,
replacing the former rate of
11.4 to the dollar.
The government reportedly
expects the withdrawal of 8.5
billion rupiahs from the 31
billion formerly in circula-
tion as a result of the currency
reform, and the withdrawal of
3.5 billion from the freezing
of accounts. The measures will
probably be principally effec-
tive, however, in undercutting
extensive black-market opera-
tions rather than in reducing
general price levels. The
government also hopes the re-
forms will hurt the Sumatran
and Celebes rebels by forcing
their counterfeit notes,mostly
of high denomination, out of
circulation.
The reforms, involving an
obvious effort to protect low-
income groups from the effects
of devaluation, will seriously
damage Indonesia's business and
moneyed classes, with the Chi-
nese probably the principal
victims. The currency losses,
combined with the freezing of
bank accounts, will make the
operation of much large private
enterprise virtually impossible.
Provision has been made, how-
ever, for exemptions from the
freeze for certain categories
of institutions and for pur-
poses consistent with govern-
ment financial and economic
policy.
The Communists apparently
have scored a victory in gain-
ing the army's reluctant ap-
proval for the convening of the
party's sixth national congress
on 7 September. The explanation
for their success appears to be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
a combination of Communist
bluff, an army mistake, and
interference by President Su-
karno on behalf of the party.
The party had earlier ap-
plied for and received army
permission--granted apparently
in ignorance of the scope of
the meeting--to convene the con-
gress on 22 August. Party Sec-
retary General Aidit ignored
a later army request for "indef-
inite postponement" of the con-`
gress,claiming that permission
had already, been granted. There
are indications that at this
point President Sukarno over-
ruled army efforts to cancel
the meeting and possibly sug-
gested the compromise date of
7 September.
The party is anxious to
hold the congress, having re-
peatedly postponed it from its
initially scheduled date in
mid-1958, largely because of
army pressures. With an in-
creased membership and a do-
mestic situation less favor-
able to Communist interests,
party leaders wish to brief
cadres and lay down revised
tactical lines.
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Various control measures
and the absence of organized
political opposition assure a
victory for the Diem government
in South Vietnam's National As-
sembly elections on 30 August.
The administration:'s political
apparatus is even more encom-:
passing today than in March
1956, when the nation's first
general elections produced a
solid pro-Diem legislature.
Less certain, however, is the
smoothness with which the elec-
tions will take place, particu-
larly in view of possible dis-
ruptive tactics by the Commu-
nist underground,
The majority of the 123
assembly seats at stake will
probably be filled by members
of the National Revolutionary
Movement (NRM), the govern-
ment's instrument for political
control of the masses and the
only significant party partici-
pating in the elections. "In-
dependent" candidates enjoying
covert government support are
expected to win the bulk of
the remaining seats. Govern-
ment favorites probably face
their most serious challenge
in Saigon, where an average of
ten candidates are competing
for each of the prefecture's
nine seats. In the absence of
real policy issues, the ten-day
campaign period has been waged
largely on personalities. A
new factor in the elections will
be the votes of the approximate-
ly 100,000 Chinese naturalized
by decree since 1957.
President Diem is anxious
for the elections to appear as
democratic as possible for
reasons of international pres-
tige, particularly with the
psychological impact on the North
Vietnamese masses in mind. The
government, however, apparently
is prepared to resort to intimi-
dation and to marshal military
votes to defeat candidates con-
sidered inimical to'national
interests. Included in this
category are several candidates
backed by the labor unions,
which are believed to have been
penetrated by Communists, Aside
from considerations of political
reliability, Diem is interested
in improving the quality of the
unicameral legislature's member-
ship.
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%Vt
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
Despite stringent security
measures imposed during the
election period, particularly
in the Saigon area, Communist-
instigated acts of terrorism
aimed at discrediting the Diem
government are possible. The
RULING ALLIANCE PARTY SWEEPS NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN MALAYA
The more than two-thirds
majority in the House of Repre-
sentatives won by. the ruling Al-
liance party in the 19 August
general` elections improves im-
mediate prospects for political
stability in the Federation of
Malaya and apparently assures
the continuation of the feder-
ation's pro-Western orientation
and moderate domestic policies.
The Alliance won 73 of the 104
seats in the House, which re-
places the partially elected
Legislative Council formed prior
to Malayan independence. Of the
principal opposition parties,
the Pan-Malayan Islamic party
won 13 seats, the Socialist
Front, eight, and the People's
Progressive party, four,
The sweeping victory is a
personal triumph for Abdul
Rahman, who resigned as prime
minister in mid-April to devote
full time to campaigning and to
strengthening the Alliance or-
ganization. Rahman resumed of-
fice on 21 August and announced
a new, but as yet incomplete,
cabinet which is expected to
place new emphasis on economic
development. New ministries
for national development and
information will probably be
created, as well as a separate
ministry of justice.
The government's large ma-
jority will allow it to amend
the constitutionto provide more
effective antisubversive meas-
ures before declaring an end to
the stringent emergency regula-
SECRET
July attests to the increasing
aggressiveness of the well-
entrenched Communist underground.
assassination of two American
MAAG members near Saigon on 8
tions in effect as a result of
the 11-year-long Communist re-
bellion. At the same time, the
Malays as a race failed to ob-
tain two thirds of the seats,
and this eliminates for the pres-
ent the danger of unilateral
amendment of the constitution
by one racial. group.
The election results reflect
a steady decline in the strength
of the multiracial Alliance, de-
spite its victory, and a trend
toward polarization of voting
along racial lines. The Al-
liance's percentage of the total
vote was only 51.4 percent in
contrast to 55.5 percent in the
state elections earlier this
year and about 80 percent
in the 1955 national elections.
mount Ruler.
be selected by Malaya's Para-
For the first time, the Al-
liance, which controlled 50 of
52 elective seats in the previous
legislature, will face significant
legislative opposition, especially
in foreign affairs, where all op-
position parties will be united
against the government's pro-
Western policies. Internally,
however, the opposition will
probably be sharply divided on
racial issues between left-wing
Chinese and Malay nationalists.
The Alliance will also have firm
control of the new 38-member
Senate. Twenty-two senators will
be elected by the 11 state legis-
latures, nine of which are con-
trolled by the Alliance, while 16 25X1
mainly pro-Alliance senators will
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
NORTH AFRICAN STATES BID FOR ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
Morocco and Tunisia, hav-
ing reached stalemates in eco-
nomic negotiations with France,
apparently are consulting on
measures to resist French eco-
nomic pressures. Following a
first round of talks in Rabat,
Moroccan Deputy Premier Boua-
bid is spending several days
this week in Tunis. The two
governments may be considering
simultaneous announcement of
their withdrawal from the French
franc zone.
Since midyear the Moroccan
Government has been beset by
financial paralysis, partly re-.
suiting from the cumulative ef-
fects of Paris' devaluation of
the franc in December and from
its freezing on 1 July of Mor-
occo's foreign exchange balances
--a maneuver aimed at forcing
Morocco also to devaluate its
currency. Ultranationalistic
groups of both left- and right-
wing tendencies have been press-
ing the government to break
away completely from economic
and .financial dependence on
France, and they consequently
oppose devaluation.
The Ibrahim government, al-
ready split regarding the eco-
nomic need to devaluate, is re-
ported to have decided on 19
August to leave-the franc zone.
It may hope that the fanfare of
such an announcement would blunt
the political repercussions of
devaluation. Exploring alterna-
tives to devaluation, the Ibra-
him government has discussed
economic aid with the USSR, pos-
sibly including short-term for-
eign exchange assistance. It
is also pressing the United
States for retroactive payment
of duties on materials imported
into Morocco in connection with
the American air bases.
Tunisia, which also refused
to ~align'.itS' dinar with the
French currency last December,
seems to have fared somewhat
better financially than has Mo-
rocco. President Bourguiba has
accompanied his many threats to
leave the franc zone with a more
effective fiscal policy and a
concerted effort to expand Tu-
nisia's foreign trade with non-
franc areas, including the So-
viet bloc.
Most recently, on 20 August,
Bourguiba announced the abroga-
tion effective 1 October of the
Tunisian-French customs union..
This gesture--designed primarily
to curb domestic criticism that
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
he is too cooperative with
France--was virtually meaning-
less, however, because agree-
ment had already been reached
with France on new customs
regulations which in effect
would nullify the customs un
ion.
Were Morocco and Tunisia
to break away from the franc
zone, both governments probably
would increase their demands for
economic assistance from the 25X1
United States and become more
receptive to Soviet aid over-
tures.
ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS WITH US MAY DETERIORATE
Ethiopian officials deny
that the recent agreements
reached by Emperor Haile Selas-
sie in Moscow and Prague signify
a change in Ethiopia's tradi-
tional pro-Western orientation.
Nevertheless, an apparent change
in the attitude of Ethiopian
officials toward the Kremlin
and the veiled threats directed
at the United States by Acting
Prime Minister Aklilou and For-
eign.Minister Deressa suggest
that American interests in
Ethiopia face difficulties.
The American Embassy in
Addis Ababa believes the "red-
carpet" treatment accorded the
Emperor and his aides:. by their
Communist hosts contributed to
a considerable change in their
attitude toward Moscow. Aklilou
told the embassy that he had
seen in the Soviet Union "real
personal liberty," and "millions
of gay, well-dressed, and well-
fed Russians." Furthermore, he
is convinced that the leaders
of the Kremlin want peace.
Both Aklilou and Deressa
have reiterated that Ethiopia's
acceptance of bloc assistance
indicates no change in its re-
lations with the United States;
they insist that the credits
were accepted, for economic rea-
sons. Deressa reasons that
since the amount and direction
of assistance from the United
States is insufficient for Ethi-
opia's needs, aid from other
sources is necessary. He as-
serts that Ethiopia's reliance
on private enterprise--both
foreign and domestic--has failed
to industrialize the country
and that a study of the move-
ment of investment capital to
underdeveloped economies through-
out the world convinces Addis
Ababa that economic progress
must be directed by the state,as
in the Soviet Union.
Aklilou and Deressa declare
that continued good relations
between Addis Ababa and Wash-
ington depend on the degree of
American support in the UN.
They claim that'Addis Ababa
has been. subjected to consider-
able political embarrassment
over its support of US positions
in the . UN,.especially from the
Afro-Asian nations. They warn
that unless the United States
supports issues of primary im-
portance to Ethiopia, such as
its border dispute with Somalia
and the Greater Somali issue,
Addis Ababa will be forced to
align with the Afro-Asian group
and with 'the Soviet bloc.
The embassy comments that
the arrival in.Ethiopia--prob-
ably.in October--of large numbers
of bloc personnel in connection
with implementation of the Mos-
cow and Prague credits, the new
respectability attained by Mos-
cow, and Addis Ababa's pique
over American failure to support
Ethiopia in the UN will greatly 25X1
Ethiopia.
facilitate bloc activity there
and complicate US relations with
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
GRIVAS BECOMES MORE ACTIVE IN GREEK POLITICS
General George:Grivasfor-
mer leader of the Greek Cypriot
underground organization EOKA,
is becoming steadily more ac-
tive in Greek politics. His at-
tacks on government "corrup'
tion," his call for greater so--
cialjustice, and his demand
that Greece be "respected" by
its allies are the major planks
of his political platform.
Grivas has already suggest-
ed that he might be called to
power by popular demand, but
his drive for the premiership
probably *ill. not.' ' hit full
stride until release of his mem-
oirs in September. These mem-
oirs are said to be extremely
critical of. the Karamanlis gov-
ernment's attitude toward EOKA
during the Greek Cypriot strug-
gle and will probably present
in detail the basis of Grivas'
opposition to the negotiated
Cyprus settlement of last Feb-
ruary.
Grivas apparently hopes to
remold his reputation as an ex-
treme rightist by adopting pol-
icies more likely to appeal to
center and left-of-center voters
and to attract the widespread
opposition to the Karamanlis
government revealed in recent
elections. At present, those
who oppose the right-center pol-
icies of Karamanlis must either
continue to support the rapidly
disintegrating center parties
or cooperate with the Communist-
front United Democratic Left.
support from the far left by ad-
vocating an amnesty for politi-
cal prisoners, an "atom-free"
Balkan zone, and equal friend-
ship for all nations.
Grivas needs the support of
established politicians and po-
litical organizations. Thus
far, however, while not discour-
aging. opposition politics or
anti-Karamanlis deputies in the
government party from contact-
ing him, Grivas remains uncom-
mitted to any existing party
program or leader.
Grivas has several alter-
native strategies in his drive
to power, but each poses diffi-
culties. If he waits until the
scheduled 1962 parliamentary
elections, his popularity may
wane and his drive lose momen-
While Grivas' opposition to
the Cyprus agreement and call
for eventual inclusion of Cyprus
and northern Epirus (southern
Albania) in a "greater Greece"
are designed to appeal to the
tum. If he seeks to replace
Karamanlis by parliamentary
means now--a defection of 20 dep-
uties would bring the premier
down--King Paul might call for
elections at once, and Grivas
nationalists, his advocacy of lacks the organization necessary
reforms, redistribution of wealth, to wage a successful electoral
and economic planning are aimed campaign. A military coup is
at the left-of-center elements. not without precedent in Greece,
In addition, he may pick up some but most senior military
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY. SUMMARY-
27 August 1959
officers are believed loyal to
the regime. Moreover, Grivas
also faces the' opposition'.of a
politically shrewd prime min-
ister, the Communists, andprob-
ably,the palace '.
While Gri'vas does not
appear to be .a serious -threat
to the Karamanlis government
at the moment, any political or
economic crisis in Greece
might be the catalyst that 25X1
would attract to Grivas the
mass support he needs to become
premier.
BRITISH LABOR PARTY'S VIEWS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS
The ten-day visit to the
USSR by British Labor party
leaders Galtskell and Bevan will
provide an opportunity to test
Khrushchev's reactions to their
proposals for easing East-West
tensions. Since preparations
for the Eisenhower-Khrushchev
exchange will overshadow their
own trip--beginning 29 August--
the Labor leaders may be eager
to dramatize their meetings with
the Soviet leaders in view of
the general election campaign
expected this fall. Labor is
especially concerned about the
Conservative party's popular
lead, which had increased to 5
percent in mid-August opinion
polls.
The Labor party has seen
.the electoral appeal of its ap-
proach to East-West relations
2. Indefinite suspension of Britain's nuclear weap-
one tests.
2. Ultimate abandonment of nuclear weapons through
organization of a 'hwnnuclear club" embracing all na-
tions except the United States and the Soviet Union.
3. "Tighter control" of American bases in Britain,
while honoring Britain's NATO commitments.
increasingly stolen by the Mac-
millan government. Labor's pro-
posals for easing East-West ten-
sions retain a distinct charac-
ter, nevertheless--mainly the
"Gaitskell Plan" for a broad
central European neutral belt.
As described in conversations
with American Embassy officials,
Bevan's and Gaitskell's views
stem partly from a conviction
that normalization of relations
--with the satellites as well
as with Moscow--may prove more
important in preserving peace
than maintaining the West's
present military stature.
1. Gradual withdrawal of all foreign military
forces from a "neutral zone" of West and East Germany,
Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia.
2. Establtahment of controls over national armed
forces in this zone.
3. German reunification on the baste of free elec-
ttone.
4. Guarantee of territorial integrity of neutral
zone states by themselves and by the United States,
Britain, and the Soviet Union.
5. Withdrawal of Germany from NATO and of Poland,
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia from the Warsaw Pact.
While believing the West
would gain propaganda advantage
from appearing more "flexible,"
the Labor party leaders insist
that only "self-enforcing" agree-
ments should be reached. They
give full credence to Russian
fears of German military resur-
gence--a worry Bevan and many
Laborites share. They would en-
courage independent Polish ac-
tions, as by discussing with the
Poles the Rapacki Plan for a nu-
clear-free zone, and see no harm
in accepting de facto dealings
with the East German regime if
these would facilitate Western
access to Berlin.
The Labor party's official
disarmament policy, formulated
in June, is similarly keyed
largely to possible propaganda
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
purposes, with little prospect
of an actual British sacri-
fice.
talks.
strengthens Gaitskell and Be-
van's position for the Moscow
A 'major ra e
union's a an onment on 21 Au-
gust of its demand for unilat-
lateral British disarmament 25X1
UN MEMBERS CRITICAL OF PROPOSED DISARMAMENT GROUP
The negative reaction of
the 20 Latin American countries
to the Geneva foreign minis-
ters, proposal for a ten-member
disarmament group--consisting
of representatives of five West-
ern and Soviet bloc countries
--will be shared by many other
UN members resentful of their
exclusion from disarmament ne-
gotiations. The Latin Ameri-
can bloc,.which in the past has
strongly opposed the USSR's de-
mand for parity between East
and West in UN bodies, now
feels "let down and exposed"
and will be reluctant to take
a similar strong stand in the
future.
On 20 August the Latin
American group was briefed by
Ambassador Lodge on the pro-
posed new disarmament group.
The reaction was immediate and
negative. While most of the
ambassadors remained "glum and
silent," the Brazilian, Argen-
tine, and Ecuadoran ambassadors
spoke out strongly. The Bra-
zilian said the proposal com-
pletely ignored the UN charter
and warned that some "essence"
of the UN must be injected in-
to the proposed group or "we
could expect a bad vote on dis-
armament" from the General As-
sembly.
The group objected to the
exclusion of Asian and Latin
American members from disarma-
ment discussions and regretted
the inclusion of only NATO coun-
tries on the Western side. Ac-
ceptance of parity was charac-
terized as a "premature conces-
sion" to the USSR. The Ecuador-
an ambassador believes this will
seriously undermine the West's
stand against parity in other
UN bodies.
Many other UN members, such
as India, which has desired ac-
tive participation in disarma-
ment negotiations for many years,
probably share these views.. Some
have already objected to the
proposal because of the lack of
an effective link to the UN.
To meet this criticism and
make the proposal more palatable
to the majority of UN members,
Secretary General Hammarskjold
has agreed to call a meeting of
the 82-member UN Disarmament
Commission just prior to the
opening of the next session of
the General Assembly. There he
will state his willingness to
appoint an observer, presumably
a high-ranking member of the
secretariat, to the proposed
group. Although Hammarskjold
basically does not like the
composition of the new group or
its lack of effective ties to
the UN, he is willing to. lend 25X1
the full weight of his office
to break the impasse in disar-
mament negotiations.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
The harmony in Polish-
Soviet relations demonstrated
during Khrushchev:'s tour of
Poland in mid-July contrasts
sharply with the hostility evi-
dent in October 1956, when Khru-
shchev arrived in Warsaw fearing
Gomulka's accession to power
might lead to an attempt to
withdraw Poland from the Com-
munist bloc. There are many
indications, as Khrushchev
claimed in his speech on 21
July, that the Polish and So-
viet leaders have overcome their
differences. Khrushchev has de-
cided that Soviet purposes will
best be served by permitting
the Polish party and state a
substantial degree of internal
autonomy--within the general
framework of Communist ide-
ology--to satisfy Polish so-
cial, economic, and cultural
requirements.
Gradual Change
This improvement in rela-
tions has been a gradual proc-
ess. By 1958, Gomulka.'s al-
tered attitude on such issues
as the Hungarian revolution,
Yugoslavia, and the role of the
Soviet Union in the "socialist
camp" apparently had dispelled
most of Khrushchev's reserva-
tions. The consolidation of
Gomulka's,position within the
Polish party and the relative
success of his policies, to-
gether with his position on
revisionism, seemed to vindi-
cate Khrushchev's acceptance
of the Polish leader in 1956.
At the same time, the
greater rigidity demonstrated
by other Communist leaders--
including the Chinese--strength-
ened the belief of many Polish
Communists that Khrushchev was
the only bloc leader with whom
they could deal. This belief
apparently was bolstered by
the effusive cordiality with
which Khrushchev received Go-
mulka and the Polish delega-
tion during their lengthy visit
to the USSR in October and No-
vember 1958. There is evidence
that Khrushchev used this visit
to "sell" the Polish leadership
to influential circles of the
Soviet party apparatus. On his
return to Poland, armed with
Khrushchev's qualified accept-
ance, Gomulka was able to deal
more effectively with his oppo-
nents in the party and to con-
solidate his position in prep-
aration for the party congress
in March 1959.
If there are elements of
Gomulka's brand of Communism
that Khrushchev does not like--
and presumably there are--it
appears certain that he has re-
solved to tolerate them for the
sake of harmonious relations.
Khrushchev probably views con-
ditions in Poland today as the
best that can be expected un-
der the circumstances and far
better than he anticipated in
1956.
The Two Leaders
Gomulka's own character
appears to have been an impor-
tant factor in the present state
of relations between Poland and
the Soviet Union. In his ap-
proach to difficult problems,
the Polish leader has repeat-
edly demonstrated great strength
of character, combined with a
keen sense of political realism,
and, within the framework of
Marxism-Leninism, a singularly
undogmatic flexibility. The
speed with which Gomulka gained
control of and revived the Pol-
i.s:ht party heightened Khru-
shchev's respect for him.
Reports of the development
of mutual respect--if not actual
friendship--between Khrushchev
and Gomulka appear borne out by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
the Soviet leader's
warm praise of Go-
mulka during his
tour of Poland last
month.
For his part,
Gomulka frequently
praised Khrushchev
and the Kremlin dur-
ing the July visit.
He apparently had
lost his former dis-
trust of Khrushchev,
probably because he
has come to believe
that the Soviet lead-
er is a pragmatist
who realizes that
Gomulka's approach
is the only effec-
tive way to "build
socialism" in Po-
land. At any rate,
in the numerous
speeches throughout
the visit there were
Former German territories and former Free City of
Danzig (Gdansk; now under Polish administration
Former Polish territory annexed by the USSR
no indications of a divergence
of views, such as was noted on
previous occasions. Gomulka
has declared full support for
Soviet policy on a German
peace treaty, a settlement of
the Berlin problem, Communist
China's right to Taiwan, and
nuclear testing.
The Oder-Neisse
International recognition
of the Oder-Neisse line as
Poland's legitimate western
boundary is a major preoccu-
pation of Polish foreign pol-
icy, and Warsaw realizes that
only the USSR can guarantee
the boundary, in view of the
Western powers' refusal to
recognize its validity until
there is a peace treaty with
Germany.
Khrushchev chose Szczecin
--the former German port of
Stettin--as the locale for his
speech pledging support for the
Oder-Neisse line. There he re-
iterated Soviet determination
to maintain the boundary and
promised that the USSR would
fight to defend it if neces-
sary. Aware of the Polish
O MILES 200
24633
feeling that the Western Terri-
tories are irrevocably Polish,
Khrushchev could not have
missed the significance of the
fact that he received more en-
thusiastic applause for this
speech than on any other occa-
sion during his tour.
Approval of Gomulka's Road
In his 21 July speech in
Warsaw on the occasion of the
15th anniversary of Poland's
"liberation," Khrushchev ap-
proved Poland's right to handle
its domestic affairs in its
own way. He stated, "One can-
not demand that the Polish
party, in solving any question
of the internal life of Poland,
pursue a policy which coin-
cides fully with the policy of
the Communist party of the So-
viet Union. Each country must
build socialism and advance
toward Communism by taking into
consideration its national, cul-
tural, and ideological peculi-
arities." In none of his
speeches was there any evi-
dence of pressure on Poland
to adhere more closely to the
Soviet pattern.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
Khrushchev categorically
rejected the idea that Poland
occupies a special place among
the "socialist" countries be-
cause of differences in ap-
proach to domestic problems.
rejected any drastic restric-
tions on this liberty. The
press, despite certain restric-
tions, has remained lively and
undogmatic, with more freedom
of expression than is found
elsewhere in the
bloc. The Polish
press sometimes
even takes issue
with Soviet crit-
icism of the Polish
scene, and it also
carries a substan-
tial volume of news
coverage and feature
stories about life
in the West.
His warning to the imperialists
of the futility of their "hope
of tearing Poland away from the
socialist camp" was also de-
signed to discourage any ele-
ments in Poland which might be
susceptible to Western influ-
ence.
Khrushchev lashed out at
both dogmatists and revision-
ists within the Polish party.
While terming revisionism the
greater danger, he warned the
Polish dogmatists that they
were wrong in attempting to
emulate the Soviet example too
closely. Their opposition to
Gomulka only weakened the party
and provided "a nourishing soil
for revisionists and opportun-
ists."
Polish "Freedoms"
There is no evidence that
Khrushchev sought to persuade
Gomulka to restrict the free-
dom of the Polish people, which
is greater than that in any
other bloc country. The lead-
ing revisionists and dogmatists
remain at liberty, although they
have been under some pressure
from the regime to desist from
"deviations." While Gomulka
has tightened controls, he has
The universities,
which were largely
freed from political
control following the
events of October
1956, have managed
to retain most of
their internal freedoms, even
though the teaching of Marxism-
Leninism is being reintroduced..
There have been some restrictions
Khrushchev and Gomulka on Polish warship during
the Soviet premier's 1959 visit to Poland.
on university publications,
especially in the social sci-
ences.
The existence of these
freedoms is known within the
intellectual and liberal circles
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
of other bloc countries; thus
it is a potential source of
trouble for their leaders, al-
ways concerned lest the intel-
lectuals use the Polish example
to demand greater freedom of
expression.
An accord with the Soviet
Union has many implications for
the Polish domestic scene. Go-
mulka can, for the time being
at least, pursue his own inter-
nal policies without fear of
Soviet pressure. Regime pol-
icies toward the church, the
peasantry, and the press may
harden somewhat, but Gomulka
is unlikely to go so far as
vigorous persecution of the
church or excessive oppression
of the peasants. While he
probably would like to cur-
tail some freedom of expres-
sion, he is strongly opposed
to any return to police-state
methods.
Polish Agriculture
Perhaps the most impor-
tant of Khrushchev's statements
dealt with the most crucial is-
sue in Soviet-Polish, and in-
deed Polish-bloc, relations--
collectivization of agricul-
ture. Warsaw's refusal to
make any determined efforts to
push collectivization since
Polish agriculture reverted al-
most entirely to private farm-
ing after Gomulka's return to
power in 1956 is a particularly
serious deviation from standard
bloc policy at a time when all
other bloc countries are accel-
erating their drives for col-
lectivization.
Nevertheless, Khrushchev
explicitly endorsed the Polish
regime's unorthodox agricul-
tural course. His speech at
the Plawce cooperative farm
near Poznan was a folksy at-
tempt to convince the peas-
ants of the superiorities and
benefits of collectivized as
opposed to private farming.
At the same time, however,
he repeated that "you cannot
forcibly drag people into co-
operatives" and that in a few
years these same peasants would
agree with him on the virtues
of collectivization. His em-
phasis on persuasion and his
rejection of the use of force
in collectivization--while hypo-
critical in the light of
Soviet and bloc practice and
perhaps carrying overtones of
pressure for greater speed--ap-
pear to eliminate for the time
being the likelihood of friction
between Poland and the USSR
over the collectivization issue.
Effect on the Bloc
Although the pragmatic So-
viet approach to Poland may be
designed for that country alone,
it is possible that other satel-
lite regimes may consider that
Khrushchev's statements on free-
dom to determine internal pol-
icies have a general application.
Many of his statements in Poland
could be seized on by leaders or
factions in other bloc countries
to justify independent or diver-
gent policies. Poland's devia-
tion from orthodox Communist or-
ganization in the countryside--
apparently with Soviet approval
--is a striking anomaly within
the bloc and may heighten what-
ever difficulties other bloc
countries are encountering in
pursuing the universally unpop-
ular policy of collectivization.
Khrushchev may not be great-
ly concerned over the potential-
ly disruptive effect of his tol-
eration of Polish differences
from other bloc countries. He
may hope that he can exert pres-
sure on other satellite leaders
to minimize any disruptive ef-
fects of the Polish practices
during the next few years, while
Poland's deviation will in time
diminish. Khrushchev may ex-
pect Gomulka to step up the tem-
po of socialization in Poland,
narrowing the differences between
that country and the other Com-
munist countries.
On the other hand, if the
gulf between Poland and the re-
mainder of the bloc continues to
widen, it may cause such difficul-
ties that Khrushchev might de-
cide the risks of forcing great-
er conformity on Poland are not as
dangerous as permitting Poland to25X1
course,
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27 August 1959
The Seventh World Youth
Festival held in Vienna from
26 July to 4 August--the first
one outside the bloc--appar-
ently fell far short of Commu-
nist expectations, and its
failure to realize objectives
can be regarded as a major prop-
aganda setback for the bloc. In
holding the meeting in Austria,
the USSR hoped to demonstrate
that it was not a Communist-
dominated front and to further
the bloc's posture as advocate
of peaceful coexistence, par-
ticularly among delegates from
underdeveloped areas.
The festival had a moder-
ately successful beginning, but
a series of unpleasant develop-
ments, outbreaks of physical
violence, well-organized anti-
festival activities, and an ap-
parent miscalculation by the
planners regarding anti-Commu-
nist feelings caused the atmos-
phere to degenerate until the
close, which was marked by dis-
illusionment for many. The
brutal and violent tactics em-
ployed by local Communist "goon
squads" and bloc security of-
ficers against any antifestival
demonstration, =incipient hos-
tility, and even anti-Communist
sentiment did most to thwart the
Communists' objectives and dam-
age their cause.
The festival organizers
seem to have miscalculated the
nature of anti-Communist activ -
it would appear that the festi-
val authorities were prepared
to put down hostile demonstra-
tions and physical violence;
they were not prepared, how-
ever, for the large, well-or-
ganized, and effectively ex-
ecuted counterpropaganda cam-
paign of the anti-Communist
elements. They apparently real-
ized their error too late to de-
vise effective countermeasures.
Handicaps
Bloc efforts to ensure that
the event would live up to its
advance notices were hindered
by the absence of a favorable
atmosphere such as prevailed at
the previous festival held in
Moscow in 1957. The Communists
could not control either the
apathy of the Austrian people
or the antipathy of Austrian
youth groups, who not only re-
fused to participate but set up
counterattractions throughout
the city. An anti-Communist
daily newspaper was published
in seven languages and distributed
to the delegates. There was
strong opposition from the Aus-
trian church, and the boycott of
festival news by the non-Commu-
nist Austrian press minimized
popular interest and limited
local attendance at cultural
events.
On the surface, Austrian
officials displayed a relatively
"correct" approach: they were
generally cooperative; pro-
,vided facilities; attempted to
discourage the more provocative
antifestival activities; af-
:Eorded excellent police pro-
tection; and, at the last mo-
ment, sent a top.-ranking civil
servant to represent the gov-
ernment at the opening cer-
emonies.
Many antifestival activ-
ities of the Austrian youth
organizations, however, were
both actively and tacitly sup-
ported by local officialdom;
considerable problems for the
festival organizers also devel-
oped because of lack of organ-
ization, inefficient adminis-
trative arrangements and Aus-
trian lethargy.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
Heavy rains, mediocre to
poor housing--some in remote
areas--bad food, and transpor-
tation difficulties (despite
an influx of bloc buses) dis-
comfited the delegates. With
few exceptions, the events
were neither well nor enthu-
siastically attended. Activ-
ities were decentralized, and
on only three occasions were
mass rallies held. Some sem-
inars were effectively dis-
rupted by anti-Communists who
insisted on presenting non-
Communist points of view. The
interplay of pro- and antifesti-
val elements was an underlying
current.
Bloc Protective Measures
To minimize the dangers
of exposure to Western influ-
ences, bloc delegations were
made up of hand-picked, loyal
Communists, cultural perform-
ers, and athletes. Contrary to
figures in the Western press,
there are reports--still uncon-
firmed--of only three defec-
tions among bloc delegates.
Bloc delegates were isolated
from other festival partici-
pants--billeted in Soviet in-
stallations in restricted and
distant areas, including house-
boats on the Danube, and trans-
ported to and from events in
bloc buses. They discussed sub-
jects and answered questions
with an inflexible Communist
line.
Polish delegates were the
freest in discussions with
Westerners, Rumanians the most
carefully controlled, and Chinese
Communists the most ideologi-
cally hidebound. The well-
disciplined Czechs often o-
liced festival functions.?
The true nature of the
festival became clear to many
of the delegates early, when
initial attempts at free dis-
cussion and expression of ideas
met with strong ideological re-
sponses or complete silence.
African-Asian delegates at a
special gathering on the sec-
ond day of the festival were
emphatically told by the Chi-
nese Communists that Tibet
was "an internal matter" and
would not be discussed.
The split among the ap-
proximately 350 American del-
egates was a large factor in
setting the tone. The non-
Communist majority--denied
recognition in favor of the pro-
Communist faction--publicized
the "rigged" leadership of the
US delegation and used the is-
sue to point up the undemocratic
direction of the festival.
Moscow radio gave consider-
ably less propaganda attention
to the Vienna festival than to
the 1957 event--790 items com-
pared with 3,048. A sizable
proportion of broadcasts to
'Western Europe concentrated on
rebutting Western "slanders"
against the festival. Early
propaganda charged that "reac-
tionaries" had tried to make
the festival impossible through
pressures on the Austrian Gov-
ernment; later broadcasts, how-
ever, placed primary blame for
"obstructionist" tactics on the
United States and West Germany,
accusing them of financing the
"wrecking activities," includ-
ing the use of "antifestival
publications" and "paid agents."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
Evaluation
The communiqu6 at the
close of the festival claimed
18,000 participants from 112
countries; Western sources es-
timated a total of about 14,000
delegates. Some nations--includ-
ing Ghana, the UAR, Burma, Sudan,
the Philippines, and Thailand--
banned participation, and a
number of others took steps to
prevent attendance. The image
of the festival as depicted by
the free-world press was one of
dissension, conflict, and vio-
lence, and the festival's repu-
tation certainly suffered from
this publicity.
the organizing cam= ee
was "horribly chastised" by
Soviet officials and told that
the festival was "not half as
successful as expected." The
committee was criticized for
being too defensive against
Western measures and repri-
manded for having lost control
of festival participants--al-
lowing them to roam over the
city, to engage in discussions,
and to be provoked by Western
reactionaries who were not
"exposed or attacked with suf-
ficient vehemence."
The bloc has already be-
gun its effort to offset the
unfavorable publicity by ex-
aggerated and distorted praise
for the festival. The Soviet
press widely publicized the
5 August communiqu6 which pro-
claimed the "success" of the
meeting, made possible by the
"profound belief in progress,
freedom, and peace among na-
tions" brought to Vienna by
"millions of young people
throughout the world." Pravda
on 6 August set the propaganda
stage by stating that the fes-
tival demonstrated the unity
and solidarity of the youths
of all continents, "in spite
of the efforts of international
reaction to hinder it."
The head of the Hungarian
delegation, in a speech on his
return to Budapest, proclaimed
the meeting "a complete suc-
cess, exceeding all expecta-
tions." He admitted that the
"difficulties of a political
nature were many times greater
than financial obstacles;' but
asserted that they "did not ham-
per or even reduce the world-
wide success of the festival."
He stated that the "hackneyed
and discredited propaganda
slogans of the other side" had
failed, and that "the accusa-
tion that the festival is an
exclusive Communist affair only
to carry out propaganda" had
"collapsed irrevocably" before
the display of peace and friend-
ship.
It is unlikely that the
festival will again be held in
a Western European city. Since
a return to a bloc location
would generally be regarded in
the free world as a retreat, the
Communists may seek a neutral
Asian cite. The Preparatory Com-
mittee reportedly hopes to hold 25X1
the next festival in Colombo,
Ceylon, which had offers to be
host for the 1959 event.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHAN-SOVIET RELATIONSHIPS
The USSR's continued turn the local balance of power
blandishments, which have been further against Afghanistan.
welcomed in Afghanistan, and
Kabul's fear of the military
government in Pakistan have Expanded Relations With USSR
resulted during the past year
in a major expansion of ties
between Kabul and Moscow. In As a result of a visit by
its effort to keep Western in- Foreign Minister Naim to Moscow
fluence in Afghanistan
to a minimum, Moscow AFGHANISTAN
has given Kabul the
largest sum of grant
aid yet provided a
free-world country
and has increased the
quantity of its mili-
tary assistance. So-
viet leaders appar-
ently hope that the
magnitude of their
own ties with Afghan-
istan will completely
overshadow those of
the West.
After a.period
of increasingly cor-
dial relations with
the West which reached
a peak in the summer
of 1958, the Afghans
reacted strongly to
a series of develop-
ments during the fol-
lowing fall and win-
ter. They were es-
pecially disturbed
by the ouster of Pak-
istani President Mirzg
with whom they felt
they could do business on the
Pushtoonistan issue--Kabul de-
mands that the Pushtu tribes-
men in Pakistan be given the
right of self-determination.
The Afghans were also bothered
by the bilateral defense agree-
ments negotiated by the United
States with Pakistan and with
Iran, which they feared would
27 AUGUST 1959
SELECTED FOREIGN PROJECTS
us
Road paving *Kandahar International Airfield
USSR
* Airfield Port
Road paving
? Salting Pass Road Area of oil exploration
- Irrigation project j7p "iu~umau~c y~utcwr
S Metalworking factory Oil storage depot
early in January 1959, the Af-
ghans received the first large-
scale grant aid ever given by
Moscow to a free-world country.
This aid is being used princi-
pally on a road project, the
largest single development proj-
ect scheduled in Afghanistan,
which, it is said, will cost
$80,000,000.
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27 August 1959
Afghanistan is becoming
increasingly dependent on the
USSR for spare parts for its
weapons as it modernizes its
army and air force. The USSR
now accounts for over 40 per-
cent of the country's foreign
trade, and the Afghans would
find it costly to shift their
markets in a short time should
they be threatened by a less
friendly Soviet trade policy.
Soviet projects are implemented,
as well as by the favorable terms
offered by the USSR. In addi-
tion, the Afghan Government
seems to feel it can safely ac-
cept a large increase in Soviet
assistance without endangering
its own control of the country,
since there has been no apparent
effort by Soviet technicians
to propagandize or engage in
subversion.
SOVIET MILITARY EQUIPMENT IN AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE DAY PARADE
Early assistance from the USSR
generated a desire for more
aid, and the recent agreement
will probably induce Afghani-
stan to seek still more.
The Afghans appear im-
pressed by the speed with which
SECRET
Kabul Relaxes Its Guard
Confident of its ability
to deal safely with the USSR,
Prime Minister Daud's govern-
ment seems to be relaxing its
guard somewhat. The Afghan
Government has opened up new
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 August 1959
areas of its territory to So-
viet activity. In the past,
there has been a rough'north-
south division of the country,
with Russian technicians working
in northern Afghanistan and
Western technicians mainly in
the south. This division will
cease with the introduction of
the Soviet technicians who are
to work on the new road from
the Soviet border to Kandahar,
Afghanistan's southernmost major
city.
Pakistan and Iran as compelling
Afghanistan to take steps to
redress the local balance of
power.
Subsequently, there have
been complaints in Kabul that
the United States is not genu-
inely interested in helping Af-
ghan economic development and
that it is deliberately employ-
ing a "go-slow" policy in im-
plementing its assistance proj-
ects in Afghanistan.
Also of interest is the
assistance being provided by the
USSR in building three bridges
just north of the Khyber Pass.
The powerful Mohmand tribe liv-
ing in this border area, like
other Pushtu tribes, strongly
opposes any attempt by "out-
siders," including the Afghan
Government, to strengthen con-
trols over tribal territory.
Mohmands opposing a road-build-
ing project in the tribal area
killed a district official last
December. Introduction of So-
viet technicians into this
sensitive tribal area may there-
fore create additional friction
both with the tribes and with
Pakistan.
Cooling Relations With West
Daud's willingness to ex-
pand Afghan ties with the USSR
apparently reflects a belief
that the chief threat to his
regime comes from Pakistan.
Kabul strongly resents the fail-
tire of the present military
regime in Pakistan to respond
to Afghanistan's Pushtoonistan
campaign. Daud may also suspect
that the Pakistanis are capable
of attempting to overthrow his
government and replace it with
another more friendly to Karachi.
Kabul seems to consider
that American interest in Af-
ghanistan has cooled, and finds
this especially disturbing in
view of its suspicions of Paki-
stan. In December 1958, Daud
initiated a new policy of public
opposition to the Baghdad Pact,
denouncing US military aid to
Daud and his colleagues
probably also see as an indica-
tion of American indifference
the comparatively slight show
of high-level official US in-
terest in Afghanistan as com-
pared with the frequent and ex-
tensive displays of interest by
Moscow. Since the visit by
Bulganin and Khrushchev to Ka-
bul in December 1955, there have
been frequent exchanges of cul-
tural delegations and high-level
visits, featuring lavish red-
carpet receptions in the USSR
for the Afghan King and a num-
ber of his ministers.
Present Position
The Afghans have reacted
toward what they consider the
hardened attitude of the Paki-
stani military regime and the
cooling interest of the West by
stepping up their propaganda
against Karachi's "oppression"
of Pushtu tribesmen living in
Pakistan and by an occasional
commentary critical of the United
States. Most recently, Kabul'-s
propaganda has even claimed that
US-Pakistani defense agreements
are intended to convert Paki-
stan's Pushtu region into an
American military base.
On the other hand, Afghani-
stan's leaders have in the past
clearly shown they are aware that
Soviet friendship is motivated
by world-wide aggressive ambi-
tions. They probably believe
the controls of their own police
state will provide protection
against any attempts at subver-
sion. They probably also hope
that Moscow's goals will fall
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SECRET
27 August 1959
areas of its territory to So-
viet activity. In the past,
there has been a rough'north-
south division of the country,
with Russian technicians working
in northern Afghanistan and
Western technicians mainly in
the south. This division will
cease with the introduction of
the Soviet technicians who are
to work on the new road from
the Soviet border to Kandahar,
Afghanistan's southernmost major
city.
Also of interest is the
assistance being provided by the
USSR in building three bridges
just north of the Khyber Pass.
The powerful Mohmand tribe liv-
ing in this border area, like
other Pushtu tribes, strongly
opposes any attempt by "out-
siders," including the Afghan
Government, to strengthen con-
trols over tribal territory.
Mohmands opposing a road-build-
ing project in the tribal area
killed a district official last
December. Introduction of So-
viet technicians into this
sensitive tribal area may there-
fore create additional friction
both with the tribes and with
Pakistan,
Cooling Relations With West
Daud's willingness to ex-
pand Afghan ties with the USSR
apparently reflects a belief
that the chief threat to his
regime comes from Pakistan.
Kabul strongly resents the fail.-
tire of the present military
regime in Pakistan to respond
to Afghanistan's Pushtoonistan
campaign. Daud may also suspect
that the Pakistanis are capable
of attempting to overthrow his
government and replace it with
another more friendly to Karachi.
Kabul seems to consider
that American interest in Af-
ghanistan has cooled, and finds
this especially disturbing in
view of its suspicions of Paki-
stan. In December 1958, Daud
initiated a new policy of public
opposition to the Baghdad Pact,
denouncing US military aid to
Pakistan and Iran as compelling
Afghanistan to take steps to
redress the local balance of
power.
Subsequently, there have
been complaints in Kabul that
the United States is not genu-
inely interested in helping Af-
ghan economic development and
that it is deliberately employ-
ing a "go-slow" policy in im-
plementing its assistance proj-
ects in Afghanistan.
Daud and his colleagues
probably also see as an indica-
tion of American indifference
the comparatively slight show
of high-level official US in-
terest in Afghanistan as com-
pared with the frequent and ex-
tensive displays of interest by
Moscow. Since the visit by
Bulganin and Khrushchev to Ka-
bul in December 1955, there have
been frequent exchanges of cul-
tural delegations and high-level
visits, featuring lavish red-
carpet receptions in the USSR
for the Afghan King and a num-
ber of his ministers.
The Afghans have reacted
toward what they consider the
hardened attitude of the Paki-
stani military regime and the
cooling interest of the West by
stepping up their propaganda
against Karachi's "oppression"
of Pushtu tribesmen living in
Pakistan and by an occasional
commentary critical of the United
States. Most recently, Kabul's
propaganda has even claimed that
US-Pakistani defense agreements
are intended to convert Paki-
stan's Pushtu region into an
American military base.
On the other hand, Afghani-
stan's leaders have in the past
clearly shown they are aware that
Soviet friendship is motivated
by world-wide aggressive ambi-
tions. They probably believe
the controls of their own police
state will provide protection
against any attempts at subver-
sion. They probably also hope
that Moscow's goals will fall
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 10 of 14
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SECRET
27 August 1959
short of making Afghanistan a
Soviet satellite and remain
limited to keeping Western in-
fluence in Afghanistan to a
minimum. Although the Afghans
are still sensitive to infringe-
ments on their independence,
they may find that the sheer
magnitude of their growing
ties with the USSR will make
it increasingly difficult to
set national policy with-
out reference to Soviet wishes.
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 14
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