CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIA
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
z
COPY NO. 56
OCI NO. 3531/59
30 July 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFI DENTIAL
Fo- E2= in
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ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
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TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
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AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a --omplete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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30 July 1959
The Soviet leaders appear
to be less hopeful about draw-
ing further concessions from
the Western foreign ministers
on the issue of the form of all-
German negotiations. They may
have decided to allow the Ge-
neva talks to terminate with-
out making any important
changes in their position and
to press for an early summit
conference.
In his speech in Dnepro-
petrovsk on 28 July,Khrushchev
said. the "time has come" for
the heads of the government to
tackle "complex unsettled inter-
national issues." He made a
perfunctory call for "fresh ef-
forts" by the foreign ministers
to reach agreement "on what they
can agree upon," but contended
that "the other, more difficult
matters...will be considered
by the heads of government."
Khrushchev said the USSR
does not share the "unjustifi-
ably pessimistic estimates" of
prospects at Geneva made by
"some Western leaders" and con-
tended the foreign ministers
have already accomplished some
"positive work." He claimed
that all "misunderstandings"
have been eliminated regarding
the "term" of the proposed
agreement on Berlin and an all-
German committee and stressed
again that the time limit is
not of "paramount importance."
The Soviet premier continued to
insist, however, on linking the
creation of an all-German com-
mittee to an interim settle-
ment on Berlin and reiterated
previous statements that the
USSR will not underwrite any
agreement which perpetuates
the, occupation regime in West
Berlin.
The paper Gromyko handed
the Western ministers on 28 July
contained no important modifica-
tions in Soviet proposals on
Berlin and all-German talks.
It is unlikely that the USSR
would agree to an interim
Berlin settlement if the West
rejects all-German negotia-
tions. Gromyko?may propose
that the foreign ministers pre-
pare a document setting forth
their differences and agree-on
a date for a summit meeting.
Soviet officials continue
efforts to enhance East Ger-
many's status through a con-
tinued role in negotiations.
the Soviet leaders probably did
not expect any major change in
the Western position, they may
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
consider that the visit has
furthered the USSR's posture
as advocate of peaceful nego-
tiations and advanced prospects
for an early summit meeting,
and possibly for a Khrushchev
visit to the United States. The
visit has been accorded'prominent
and 'substantial:. Soviet newAs .e o erage.
Khrushchev Visit to US
In what appears to be a
calculated camppaignQ Soviet !of-
ficials':and- newsmen, in -seVeral
cities:-haye hinted that Khru-
shchev would be delighted to
receive an invitation to visit
the United States. The Soviet
chargd d'affaires in Paris on
20 July told an American offi-
cial that he very much hopes
Vice President Nixon's visit
to the USSR may furnish the
occasion for an invitation from
President Eisenhower to Khru-
shchev. He suggested that
Nixon might.extend this in*ita-
tion when sending thanks for
his reception in the USSR and
added'that such a visit would
be far more profitable than a
summit meeting, where the dif-
ferent attitudes of the British
and French would not contribute
to settling problems.
"Captive Nations Week"
The bloc reaction to the
Congressional resoiLutian and the
President's proclamation for a
week of prayer for the enslaved
peoples of Eastern Europe re-
flects the Soviet leaders:' ex-
treme sensitivity to any offi-
cial Western reference to the
subjugation of the Communist
nations. They exhibited par-
ticular irritation over its
coincidence with the Nixon
visit, Khrushchev set the tone
for the reaction in. a speech on
his return from Poland in which
he termed the American action
"direct interference" in Soviet
affairs. and an "infamous slan-
der." The Polish press voiced
regret that circles attempting
to sharpen the cold war had
drawn the President into the
affair. Khrushchev made fre-
quent references to the "cap-
tive peoples" while touring
with the vice president in Mos-
cow, and also in his 28 July
speech in the Ukraine.
Nuclear Talks
The Soviet delegation at
Geneva continues to press for
discussion of. its annual-
inspection quota proposal,and
is attempting to play down any
other East-West differences in
the way of a nuclear test
cessation agreement. On 24
July the chief Soviet delegate
expressed satisfaction with
what, he termed a "significant
rapprochement of positions" on
control-post staffing.
Using the figure of 30
specialists at each post given
by the West as an example in
presenting its new proposal
for one third Western, one
third Soviet, and one third
from nonnuclear countries,
he claimed that Moscow could
accept the "ten specialists"
prom the other side which the
West was proposing, and there-
fore had brought its position
in line with Western desires.
He charged, however, that the
addition of specialists from
nonnuclear countries, which
have not even. asked to be rep-
resented, would not be in ac-
cordance with the principle
of "mutual control" by. the
three powers. He said that if
the West Would drop this part
of its proposal., "artificiii.lly
introduced. into the conference,"
Moscow would allow two or three
of the ten Western representa-
tives to be from nonnuclear
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
countries if desired. He also
declared that the USSR would
"give up"`two-or three of its
ten places to representatives
of neutral countries.
On 28 July the Soviet del-
egation promised to study a
Western draft for a prepara-
tory commission to function
until the control commission
becomes operative.
West German Views
Bonn political leaders
expect an early climax to the
foreign ministers' conference
and fear that domestic pres-
sures may make it impossible
for the Western powers, partic-
ularly London, to break off the
conference over Moscow's de-
mand for an all-German commis-
sion. Chancellor Adenauer ada-
mantly opposes such a commis-
sion, and Bonn plans to fight
against acceptance of it, pos-
sibly even to the point of re-
fusing to participate.
Bonn has been. considering
a move to counteract continued
Soviet propaganda that West
Germany is the main obstacle
to a settlement. The govern-
ment evidently intends to keep
alive a plan which Foreign Min-
ister Brentano revived at the
cabinet meeting on 22 July for
Bonn to offer Poland and Czecho-
slovakia nonaggression pacts
and to renounce the use of force
in the settlement of boundary
disputes. Brentano argued that
although this could lead to
diplomatic recognition, Warsaw
and Prague, without a specific
renunciation of the German east-
ern territories, would reject
such a move. Although the cab-
inet at first rejected the pro-
posal on the grounds that Po-
land might accept it as a basis
for negotiations and later claim
Bonn should renounce the ter-
ritories as proof of its good
faith, government spokesmen
have since announced the govern-
ment's agreement "in principle."
Bonn apparently intends to use
hints of such a pact to deter-
mine Soviet bloc reaction, while
refraining from Making the ac-
tual proposal at Geneva.
West Berlin political lead-
ers are more pessimistic than
at any time since the crisis
began last November. They are
concerned that the Western pow-
ers may be forced to make con-cessions at Geneva, and would
prefer a complete breakoff in
the talks rather than any modi-
fication of the Western powers'
proposals. They fear new East
German harassment of access to
the city. Western observers
noted a marked decline in pub-
lic morale following the confer-
ence recess on 20 June, but
Secretary Herter's appearance
in Berlin on 25 July may have
bolstered spitits.
British Reaction
British press reporting
has tended to dwell on the
different attitudes of For-
eign Secretary Lloyd and his
allies at Geneva. Independent
and Conservative papers re-
ported on 24 July that Lloyd
had made clear Britain's satis-
faction with Gromyko's assur-
ances that no unilateral action
would be taken during the
period of an interim agreement
on Berlin.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 195'
French Comment
Since the Geneva confer-
ence reconvened, the French
non-Communist press has been
notable for its relatively
moderate tone and for the rel-
atively limited space devoted
to the talks. Emphasis has
been on the unity of Allied
ranks, and although the men-
tion of fissures in the West-
ern front is not completely
absent, remarks critical of the
British have been subdued. Al-
though the press has sought out
elements in Soviet statements
which might provide the basis
for hope that the two sides
were inching toward each other,
the absence of reconciliation
between the two sides has been
highlighted, and responsibil-
ties for the lack of progress
has been generally attributed
to MOSCOW.
(Concurred in by 05I
Iraq
The Qasim regime has ex-
perienced a quiet week, with
only minor clashes reported be-
tween Communists and anti-
Communists since the Kirkuk
troubles. Prime Minister Qasim
was reported to be resting
after his strenuous schedule
during the revolution anniver-
sary celebrations. However,
he held a press conference on
29 July in which he vigorously
denounced the "anarchists"--
by implication Communists--who
he said had fomented the re-
cent disorders in Kirkuk and
other provincial towns. He
also warned the newspapers to
curb their "news" of new plots
and to halt their recrimina-
tions.
Baghdad authorities mean-
while continued quietly to take
measures which have the effect
of limiting Communist influ-
ence in the army and bureaucracy
while they strengthen top con-
trol of the government apparat-
us. Major General Abdi, the
military governor general who
exercises over-all administra-
tive authority because the
country is still legally under
martial law, has banned the
Communist-inspired "committees
for the defense of the republic"
which had acted as unofficial
purge committees in various
government departments.
In his major speech during
Egypt's revolution anniversary
celebration, Nasir delivered a
lengthy apologia regarding his
attitude toward Iraq. Although
his remarks in general were
conciliatory, he still put the
blame on Qasim for coolness of
VAR-Iraqi relations, and this
is said to have ruffled the
Iraqi leader again.
The UAR President put his
main emphasis, however, on two
other aspects--one was a lengthy
interpretation of the signifi-
cance and duties of the Nation-
al Union, the regime's mass or-
ganization. It appears that the
union in Nasir's mind is not a
monolithic "party" in the Com-
munist or fascist sense but a
movement of the whole people
which will find its most signif-
icant expression in practical
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
works, such as community de-
velopment and agricultural im-
provement projects on the vil-
lage level, rather than in po-
litical activity.
Nasir's other theme was
the Israeli issue, He claims
the UAR is ready for a new Is-
raeli attack at any time, and
revived the propaganda claims
of 1956 that the Egyptian Army
was not defeated, but merely
withdrew in order to be better
able to fight the British and
French.
The revolutionary celebra-
tion and Nasir's speeches fall
within a period appointed by
Cairo for a "cultural seminar"
for UAR students in the Soviet
bloc which may be designed to
reindoctrinate the students as
well as to attempt to determine
the extent to which Communist
indoctrination has been success-
ful. The authorities are not
known to have decided yet wheth-
er to curtail their program of
education in the bloc.
Nasir's blasts at Israel
last week took the form of
replies to a speech by Moshe
Dayan, the former commander of
the Israeli Army who has en-
tered politics under the wing
of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion.
The Dayan thesis appears to be
that Israel should adopt a
more actively tough policy, re-
turning UAR "hostility" in kind.
This statement may well
have been a trial balloon for
some new policy determination
by the Israeli Government,since
Tel Aviv has officially indi-
cated that a "reconsideration"
of the UAR position on the Suez
Canal issue is under way. While
the Israelis had previously in-
dicated that the canal itself
was not of major economic im-
portance to them, they now talk
of the delays and inconveniences
experienced by their Asian cus-
tomers as a result of the UAR's
actions and of the more serious
effects these actions have on
their over-all position.
Dayan's speech sounded like
a menace to Cairo, and the cur-
rent Israeli diplomatic line
will probably confirm this im-
pression as will indications
than Israel intends to launch
an international publicity cam-
paign to block the UAR from ob-
taining a World Bank loan for
Suez, Canal development.
Israeli Army summer maneu-
vers, which reportedly involved
some 35,000 men, are scheduled
to conclude with an air defense
exercise during the first week
of August. They involved mo-
bilization practices and ground-
air cooperation as well as this
exercise.
Lebanon
Public order in Lebanon,
which is always somewhat pre-
carious, received another blow
this week with the assassina-
tion of Naim Mughabghab, a top
aide of former President Cha-
moun
The mur er
o ug a g a , apparently at
the hands of anti-Chamoun Druze,
follows a recent increase in
the number of incidents of vio-
lence in Lebanon, and has set
off further shootings and un-
rest, particularly in the Chris-
tian community,
How much political, capi-
tal will be made from the affair
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY: SUMMARY
30 July.. 1959
depends on Chamoun, who has been
gathering his forces to attempt
a political comeback. So far
all political groups, Moslem
as well as Christian, have con-
demned the killing, and the
Lebanese Government is seeking
to minimize its impact by cen-
sorship of the press and by
stringent security measures to
prevent revenge missions.
in conspiracy against the Ab-
boud government has concluded
in Khartoum, but no sentences
have yet been announced. Polit-
ical tension remains fairly
high among civilian as well as
military groups.
Former Premier Azhari has
confirmed that plans are being
made for a return to ostensi-
ble civilian government, pre-
sumabl* with the cooperation
of the top army command. The
commanders would assume the
functions of the former Supreme
Council of.State, while civil-
ians would man the cabinet
posts. Such plans do not seem
likely to jell, however, at 25X1
least until after Abboud
has brought the military
under firmer control.
The trial of a third high
officer accused of participation
SITUATION
The renewal of Communist
partisan attacks on Laotian
Army outposts in Sam Neua Prov-
ince is designed to create in%-
ternational pressures for the
return of the Geneva truce com-
mission to Laos. The Communists;
insist that Laotian neutrality,
which they assent was promised
by the 1954 Geneva agreements,
has been undermined by various
acts of the Phoui ':'Sananikone
government%' Simultaneous with
the partisan attacks, the bloc
has unleashed 'a heavy propaganda
campaign charging that, the in-
troduction of American military
training personnel--now artiv-
ing in Laos--is a "crude viola-
tion" of the Geneva agreements.
Both Peiping and Hanoi
have accused Vientiane of try-
ing to "expand the civil war in
Laos" and State that the Lao-
tian Government seems willing
IN LAOS
to allow the country to be trans-
formed into a. military base
for American aggression. On
27 July the North Vietnamese
Foreign Ministry issued a
statement demanding that Vien-
tiane expel American military
advisers,, return to the five
principles of peace and coexist-
ence, and allow the return of
the International Control Com-
mission (ICC) to make an im-
partial investigation of the
situation--a proposal also
urged by Moscow.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
Paratroop and infantry re-
inforcements are being rushed
to Sam Neua Province, where the
government's position has dete-
riorated rapidly in the past
ten days. The two battalions
normally stationed there are
widely scattered and many small
units apparently have' been:
pinned down and isolated by
guerrilla forces and several
outposts lost. The situation
is confused, but a broad are to
Skirmishes
THAILAND
DONE TA
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the West of Sam Neua apparently
is in enemy hands and the pro-
vincial capital itself is re-
ported under threat of attack.
Loss of the airfield at Sam
Neua would cut off the govern-
ment's principal means of ac-
cess to this remote province.
Panic has struck the town
and a general exodus of inhabi-
tants and government officials
is taking place by air and on
foot. There are no check points
around the town of Sam Neua and
Communist partisans reportedly
are infiltrating the area.
Antigovernment forces in
the province number perhaps
1,000. They apparently comprise
pro.-Communist local tribesmen,
augmented by company-size units
of the former Communist Pathet
Lao, and possibly some Viet-
namese Communist cadres. The
rugged terrain favors the enemy,
and the nearby frontier facili-
tates covert support from North
Vietnam. In a 29 July com-
mun:Lque, Laos openly charged
North Vietnam with complicity
in the current fighting.
At least two incidents of
harassing attacks on army six-
man "civic action teams" have
occurred in two provinces in
central Laos. These may be
designed to forestall addition-
al reinforcements for the north.
The military commander in cen-
tral Laos views the situation
there as such that he cannot
spare any of his troops at
present.
Laotian officials view the
over-all situation as "grave,"
but do not believe the present
fighting heralds full-scale
civil war throughout Laos.
Premier Phoui believes the
enemy's primary purpose is to
take possession of Sam Neua, and
later Phong Saly Province, both
Pathet Lao strongholds prior
to the unification settlement
with the government in November
1957'. In addition to the in-
ternational implications, the
attacks may have the aims of
forestalling the government's
increasing efforts to combat
Communist influence at the grass
roots and disrupting the army's
new training program.
The government's announced
intention, however, to prosecute
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CURRENT I! "ELL:I:GENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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the leaders of the Laotian Com-
munist-front organization, the
Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ), for col-
laboration with "foreigners"
could trigger a general return
to the bush of former members
of the Pathet Lao. NLHZ chief
Prince Souphannouvong-who to-
'gether with nine other .top
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leaders of the party has been
arrested in Vientiane--ear-
lier this month threatened
a resumption of civil war
unless the government ceased
its persecution of the NIILZ,
which he stressed enjoyed
"solid foreign" support.
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UGA"Op
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
PART II
NOTES AND COMMENTS
TOP CHINESE LEADERS MAY BE REV][EWING BASIC POLICY
Only five members of Com-
munist China's 26-man party
politburo have been reported in
Peiping during the past month,
which suggests that the top
leadership has been meeting out-
side the capital for a basic
policy review. Mao Tse-tung
has not been seen since 18 June,,
and Liu Shao-chi and Chou En-lai
since 25 June, The request
early,inJuly by a Canadian mem-
ber of parliament to see Mao,
Liu, and Chou was rejected as
"inconvenient because they are
at a retreat in the mountains@"
There has been Some loss
of momentum during 1959 in the
"giant leap forward" and the
commune campaign. The regime
seems to be backing away from
extravagant 1959 economic tar-
gets, especially in agriculture.
Also Peiping has had consider-
able trouble with the communes
and now is emphasizing more
material incentives and a less
rigidly controlled life for
the overworked peasant members.
Renewed attention is being given
the country's economic difficul-
ties.
the members were apparently ab-
sent from Peiping, One, Li
Hsien-nien, has since been re-
ported in Shanghai presiding
over an agricultural conference.
His appearance there suggests
that some of the leaders now may
be explaining the regime's
domestic policies at the region-
al level.
I
A discussion of foreign
policy also may be linked to
a top-level conference. Peiping's
ambassadors to India, Pakistan,
Cambodia, Indonesia, and the
UAR and its charge in Yemen
have been reported returning
to China since early June. The
Chinese Communist ambassadors
to Burma and the USSR are ab-
sent from their posts, suggest-
ing they too have returned.
A recent article by the
Kwangtung Province party first
secretary appears to be defend-
ing Mao against, criticism of
his "leap forward" and commune
programs. The article states
that "greatness" lies not in
always being correct--which is
impossible--but in continually
uncovering new problems and
changing policies accordingly.
American officials in Hong Kong
note that Mao is the only Chi-
nese characterized as "great"
in the mainland press,
A meeting of the politburo
could have been held during the
last week in June, when all of
t
Foreign policy talks now
would probably seek to apprise
Chinese leadership of internal
developments in the countries
to which the ambassadors are ac-
credited and to assess the de-
gree of damage done to Peiping's
prestige by 1958's truculent
policy and by suppression of the
Tibetan revolt. 'Last winter,
Peiping indicated its basic
policy is still to "isolate the
United States" and improve Com
munist China's international
standing, and that a less bel-
licose attitude would be adopted
toward certain Western nations
and the uncommitted Asians.
A recent acrimonious note
to Pakistan and the recrimina-
tions exchanged with India and
the UAR suggest, however, that
the protection of its own in-
terests will not be sacrificed
to the pursuit of friendship.
While the situation in the
Taiwan Strait would almost
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
certainly be discussed at
any conference of the Chinese
leadership,
Khrushchev has again ex-
pressed disapproval of the
commune system despite the Chi-
nese Communist regime's con-
tinuing commitment to that form
of organization and despite the
fact that differences on this
issue have been an irritant to
Sino-Soviet relations in the
past. The Soviet premier's
latest disparagement, during
his recent tour of Poland, was
made publicly and has been
carried in the Polish and So-
viet press, whereas his earlier
comments were made in a private
interview with Senator Hum-
phrey.
Addressing a meeting at a
collective farm near Poznan on
18 July, Khrushchev recalled
that efforts had been made to
set up agricultural communes
in the Soviet Union in the
early 1920s but that "nothing
came of many of these communes."
Tracing their failure to the
absence of the necessary ma-
terial and political conditions,
Khrushchev concluded that the
sponsors of the movement "had
a poor understanding of what
Communism is and. how it is to
be built." In the setting and
context, it ie probable that
Khrushchev's remarks were in-
tended primarily to reassure
Polish peasants against hasty
socialization of agriculture,
but this renewed criticism of
the commune is not likely to set
well with the Chinese Communists.
Khrushchev had expressed
himself in similar terms in
his meeting with Senator Hum-
phrey last December. The Chi-
nese communes, Khrushchev said,
were "old-fashioned, reaction-
ary, and impractical" because
they-ignored the principle of
incentives as a spur to pro-
duction. Following publica-
tion of Humphrey's account of
the interview, Peiping report-
edly protested to Moscow, and
at the 21st party congress in
January, Khrushchev disavowed
his statements, alleging that
they had been fabricated.
Since late last year, Pei-
ping has retreated from its
extreme ideological claims.
The Chinese "transition to
Communism" has been put off;
the principle of free supply
has been drastically altered
in favor of Khrushchev's "ma-
terial incentives"; and the
assertion that the commune is
"the basic form for the future
Communist society" is muted.
The Chinese have repeatedly
stressed, moreover, that their
commune is specifically tai-
lored to Chinese conditions.
Soviet media subsequently car-
ried several mildly favorable
reports on the communes. How-
ever, these have appeared most-
ly in media which reach non-
blocc audiences, and they have
consistently pointed out that
the commune's advantages are
limited to "Chinese conditions."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
Khrushchev's Poznan speech
has not been reported by the
Chinese. Peiping's propaganda
continues to praise Soviet
achievements--from which the
"Chinese must earnestly learn"
--and to affirm Moscow's lead-
ership of the bloc. Peiping has
shown that it prefers a picture
of Sino-Soviet unity unmarred
by public debate on the commune.
However, the Chinese leadership
is certain to take Khrushchev's
Poznan remarks as criticism,
which is especially to be re-
sented in view of Peiping's ef-
forts to accommodate itself to
Moscow's disapproval of the
communes. Peiping can be ex-
pected to renew its protest to
Moscow, insisting, at the least,
that future criticisms of Chi-
nese policies be expressed
privately rather than in a
public forum
YUGOSLAVIA'S DISPUTE'?'wl'rH SOVIET BLOC
The dispute between Yugo-
slavia and the Soviet bloc has
resumed much of its original
character despite the tactical
maneuvering which followed
Khrushchev's visits to Albania
and Hungary during late May and
early June. Recent unconfirmed
reports of a future meeting be-
tween Khrushchev and Tito seem
unfounded, since neither side
is willing to make concessions
to achieve a rapprochement or
even a stable detente.
no change
o a u es s i t ly while
Khrushchev and Tito are in power.
nce Khrushchev's
visit to Hungary and Albania,
however, the Yugoslavs have
attacked the USSR only once--
for misleading press treatment
of its agricultural system and
production results--in contrast
to their daily contention in
the press with all the satel-
lites except Poland,
A change was noted, too,
in Yugoslavia's economic re-
lations with'the USSR, and
early this month Belgrade opened
negotiations with Moscow over
the developmental credits grant-
ed by the USSR in 1956 and
suspended in 1958. At the one
session to date,' the Yugoslavs
presented a claim for damages
to their economy caused by the
suspension. Officials on both
sides doubt that any signifi-
cant part of the credits will
be rescheduled or that the
talks will be continued at a
higher level.
Belgrade also charged that
Moscow has violated its trade
agreement by refusing to sell
wheat at market prices
elgrade expects
to be treated on the same favor=
able trade terms as bloc mem-
bers. The Yugoslavs, for example,
sought Russian wheat at the
same price set for the Albanians.
Moscow apparently does not
feel it has to bargain for
Yusoslav foreign policy support
because Belgrade's "socialist
pretensions" already force it
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
to assume positions fairly
close to those of Mos-
cow. Belgrade, on the other
hand, holds the Kremlin
directly responsible for
the satellites' daily at-
tacks and publicly pro-
claims that this bad faith
toward Yugoslavia casts
doubt on the USSR's pose
as the prime protector
of world peace,
Belgrade is apparently re-
inforced in its intransigence
by i1:he belief,
t a in-
ternational and internal bloc
developments are forcing Khru-
shcliev closer and closer to
Yugoslavia's revisionism, It
will probably interpret Khru-
shchev's endorsement of Poland's
agricultural program as evidence
of the accuracy of this belief.
25X1
25X1
THE INTER-AMERICAN MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTERS
The foreign ministers of
the 21 American republics will
convene in Santiago, Chile, on
12 August to discuss threats of
war in the Caribbean arising
mainly from efforts by Cuba and
Venezuela to "liberate" the
peoples under dictatorships.
This dispute has endangered the
effectiveness of the Organiza-
tion of American States (OAS)
and confidence in its collective
security system.
The meeting grows out of
Dominican dictator Trujillo's
complaint against Cuba and Vene-
zuela for complicity in three
small rebel landings in the
Dominican Republic and his re-
quest on 2 July that the OAS
put into effect the consulta-
tions called for under the In-
ter-American Treaty of Recipro-
cal Assistance, Before the re-
quest came to a vote, the vari-
ous OAS. delegations made it
clear that widespread hatred
for Trujillo in their countries
would make it impossible to
vote for consultations regarding
Cuban and Venezuelan interven-
tion, regardless of the facts
of the matter? Paradoxically,
this position is a revereal of
the customarily adamant Latin
American insistence on the
principle of nonintervention.
As an alternative, the OAS
Council called the meeting in
Santiago to consider political
tensions in the Caribbean, which
threaten such countries as Haiti
and Nicaragua, as well as the
Dominican Republic. Avoiding
specific charges, the brief
draft agenda for the meeting
emphasizes: 1) consideration
of Caribbean tensions in the
light of principles and standards
which govern the inter-American
system, 2) effective observance
of the principles of noninter-
vention and nonaggression, 3)
the effective exercise of rep-
resentative democracy and re
spent for human rights, and 4)
the "perfection" of inter-Ameri-
can instruments and procedures
to help maintain peace.
Several officials have al-
ready expressed pessimism about
its results. The debate will
probably be acrid and complicat-
ed by other issues, Cuba, for
example, wants to stress econom-
ic problems as the Caribbean's
worst ill; on 28 July Foreign
Minister Roa said Cuba might
boycott the meeting if economic
problems are not included in the
agenda, Venezuela, which en-
joys high prestige in the hem-
isphere as a genuinely demo-
cratic government, is already
campaigning for the ouster of the
Dominican Republic from the OAS,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
HEMISPHERE REACTIONS
While Fidel Castro's strong
hold over the Cuban masses was
again demonstrated in the 26
July celebrations in Havana, the
overwhelming public approval of
him reflected in the press of
most Latin American countries
when he overthrew the Batista
dictatorship last January has
gradually turned to disillusion-
mento His authoritarian maneuver
of 17 July forcing President
Urrutia's ouster is regarded by
many leading newspapers elsewhere
in the hemisphere as a clear in-
dication of Castro's dictatorial
tendencies? Argentine observers
now liken him to former dictator
Juan Peron,
The important left-of-cen-
ter Argentine newspaper Razon,
bitterly critical of Cas r s
demagoguery and totalitarianism,
called him a "great disappoint-
ment for the democrats of the
continent," Another Argentine
paper likened Castro's 17 July
resignation maneuver to "Peron's
grandiose show of renunciation"
in 1955 when he withdrew his
"resignation" before a giant
labor rally.
A Colombian paper called
Castro "lord and master of the
island which he governs with the
methods rejected by Christian
peoples," and the Peruvian Gov-
ernment paper commented: "This
is not the first time that a
TO THE CASTRO REGIME
liberator... has developed a more
oppressive dictatorship than the
one deposed." Prominent Brazil-
ian and Chilean press organs
liken Castro to Dominican dicta-
tor Trujillo, Venezuela's ex-
Careful old buddy-- the Caribbean is very
dangerous... It is infested with dictators.
--front Topaze, Santiago de Chile, 22 July 1959,
dictator Perez Jimenez, and to
Batista and Peron. Mexican
and Central American editorial-
ists have also been critical of
Castro, and their comments ap-
pear to reflect a genuine dis-
illusionment of many who first
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEE:LY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
looked on Castro's victory over
Batista as a great step toward
democratic government in the
hemisphere.
There is also increasing
concern in the Latin American
press over indications of Com-
munist penetration of the Castro
government. The hemisphere
Communist newspapers are among
Castro' s most avid defenders.
ARGENTINE MILITARY UNREST SUBSIDES
Argentine President Fron-
dizi's appointment of Navy
Secretary Clement on 26 July
ended the near rebellion in
the navy and promises to give
him some respite from the sharp
military pressures of the past
two months. As in the case of
the new army secretary, Clement
has not been involved in the
recent service quarrels and was
selected by Frondizi to restore
discipline and thereby dis-
courage military efforts to
dictate to Frondizi.
Frondizi was finally forced
to replace former Secretary
Estevez;when top naval officers
stated they would no longer
follow Estevez' orders because
he did not adequately repre-
sent navy views. The fleet
returned to its main base from
maneuvers to reinforce this
stand. The majority of top
admirals had tendered their
resignations but at the same
time had told subordinate units
that the admirals,. not Esteirez,
were in charge of the navy.
The new secretary, a re-
spected retired'officer, should
be acceptable to the navy not
only because of his background
but also because he has not
been involved in the recent
service quarrels. He requested
retirement in December 1954,
participated in the anti-Peron
revolution of September 1955,
and subsequently served in the
provisional government.
Estevez' departure has al-
ready eased tension and, to-
gether with the earlier cabinet
and service changes, reduces
the area for effective exploi=
tatioa by die-hard plotters.
Army Secretary Anaya, a retired
officer appointed on 1 July,
continues to make a good im-
pression in his similar prob-
lem of restoring discipline.
The air force, since its bitter
intraservice dispute in Sep-
tember 1958, has managed to
keep out of the spotlight.
Apparently quieted tempo-
rarity by the military crises,
Peronista and Communist labor
leaders now have renewed their
agitation for emergency wage
increases to offset the rise
in living costs, which have
about doubled since Frondizi
took office on 1 May 1958. The
strike called by the , Peronista-
dominated metallurgical workers
on 2,6 July resulted in running
battles with the police and
threats to try to promote a
general strike. Bombings
have also increased, although
not necessarily because of the
strike.
Anti-Peronista labor is
also restive, but rejects the
defiant and partly politically
thd'
inspired tactics of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
Peronista and Communist labor
leaders. The latter announced
in mid-June their intention to
wage a joint campaign against
austerity measures under the
US-backed stabilization program.
This combination is be-
lieved to have contributed to
the sharp drop in popular votes
received by Frondizi's party--
63 percent below 1958--in the
12 municipal elections in Santa
Fe Province on 26 July. The
number of blank ballots--mostly
from the Peronistas--was larger
than the vote of any single
party. Some 10 percent of the
tota l'vote was received by the
Communist party, which was al-
lowed to participate despite 25X1
Frondizi's April decree out-
lawing Communist political
activities.
France apparently expects
that its first nuclear weapons
test--now anticipated early in
1960--will meet the United
States 'legal requirement for
"substantial progress" and
thereby qualify France for
broad American aid on nuclear
weapons construction. In this
expectation, the French Govern-
ment now seems to prefer to
work out its first test of a
nuclear weapon unaided, and is
increasingly inclined to see
eventual advantages for France
in the idea of limiting the
number of nuclear powers.
Minister of Armed Forces
Guillaumat admitted in June
that help from the United States
would have been welcome five
or six years ago, but he
stressed that for France to
receive aid now "for the first
explosions, which can and will
be purely French, would be a
grave error of policy." A
Foreign Ministry spokesman in-
terprets Guillaumat's State-
ment to mean that American aid
to the French nuclear weapons
program now would jeopardize
more extensive aid after the
first French tests. Some French
officials have hinted that be-
fore the French tests-are con-
ducted, a definite promise-of
American aid or perhaps even
the establishment of a "work-
ing-level" committee to decide
the type and extent of aid to
be granted would be more wel-
come than actual aid in the
first tests.
The French argue that the
Soviet Union already has the
information they would receive
from the United States, and
that with American aid, France
would save money which could
then be used to meet its NATO
commitments. NATO Secretary
General Paul-Henri Spaak had
publicly told the Atlantic
congress in June it seemed
logical that there should be
no secrets between allies.
:Presumably because of its
growing expectations, Paris no
longer rejects out of hand a
limitation on the size of the
"nuclear club" to as few powers
as possible. There is evidence
that some French officials be-
lieve that ultimately the "prin-
ciple"' of :limit ng the club
fnaj- 'work to 'French benefit..
They :reason that once France's
first weapon is tested without
foreign assistance, France
would qualify as the fourth
nuclear power, and the
"principle" would discourage
any "fifth power" in the
nuclear weapons field.
by OS ;I )
(Concurred in 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU]I~AR
30 July 1959
SCANDINAVIAN REACTION TO CANCELLATION OF KHRUSHCHEV VISIT
Khrushchev's cancellation
of his August visit to Denmark,
Norway, and Sweden has occa-
sioned surprise, some embarrass-
ment, and sharp political con-
troversy in Norway and Sweden
but no serious alarm regarding
relations with the USSR.
The Scandinavian govern-
ments in their notes to the
Soviet Union regretted the
"postponement" of the visits,
which they had somewhat re-
luctantly scheduled in return
for the visits of the three
Scandinavian premiers to the
USSR in 1955 and 1956. How-
ever, various officials, par-
ticularly members of the for-
eign ministries, have indicated
they are glad to avoid at this
time any discussions with Khru-
shchev which might involve them
in Soviet propaganda gestures
regarding a "Baltic sea of
peace" or a Scandinavian zone
free of nuclear weapons and
missiles.
Some concern was suggested
by the care taken in the notes
to express the hope that the
traditional good relations be-
tween Scandinavia and the USSR
would not be affected. Nor-
way's Prime Minister Gerhard-
sen in a public statement
has severely criticized the
opposition parties and the
press for irresponsibility'
and for influencing Norway's
relations with the USSR "in
a negative manner'," In both
Norway and Sweden, a vitriolic
political controversy has
flared up between the So-
cialist governments and their
opposition, with the Social-
ist press accusing the op-
position of playing domestic
politics with the visit.
In Finland, which Khru-
shchev was to have visited
on a less formal basis en
route back to the USSR, of-
ficials and the press appear
to have maintained their
characteristic reserve in
making any comments on the
Soviet move. One independent
newspaper, however, predicted
that Khrushchev's decision
indicated a "harder and more
restricted Soviet foreign
policy toward the Scandina-
vian countries" and, by im-
plication, Finland.
BRITISH PARTY CONTROVERSY OVER CENTRAL AFRICAN POLICY
Two weeks of House of Com-
mons debates have pointed up
the dilemma London faces in
preparing for next year's re-
view of the constitution of
the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland. This review was
envisaged when the British Gov-
ernment granted virtual self-
government to the white-settler-
controlled federation in 1953,
but pledged not to withdraw
its protection from the Afri-
cans of Northern Rhodesia and
Nyasaland without their con-
sent.
Both British political
parties are worried about Af -
ricart developments, but they
differ sharply over colonial
policy; clashes on this sub-
ject have been unusually acute.
The Macmillan government is
principally anxious that the
review be accomplished, in
such a way a$to bring neither
renewed African violence, like
that in Nyasaland last winter,
nor open thwarting of London
by the federation government.
The labor party disputes the
white minority's insistence on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 195EI
perpetuating its
control, and makes
a special point of
demanding that the
British Government
honor its'' '1953
pledge.
The Labor par-
ty's parliamentary
attacks are accen-
tuated by its search
for a popular issue
for the general
elections expected
this fall. Although
colonial issues do
not normally carry
much weight with the
British electorate,
Labor's failure to
attract popular sup-
port for its ecoAr
nomic program or its
proposal for disarma-
ment through a "non-
nuclear club" makes
this issue likely to
draw unusually heavy
party attention.
RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
The Labor party is en-
couraged by some independent
press support for its demands
that Colonial Secretary Lennox-
Boyd resign, and will probably
continue exploiting the find-
ings of the independent Devlin
Commission that the Macmillan
government exaggerated an Af-
rican "massacre plot" to justi-
fy invoking a state of emergen-
cy in Nyasaland last March.
Party leader Gaitskell, in
raisingfar:-reaching objections
to Prime Minister Macmillan's
plan to establish a new 26-mem-
ber commission drawn from Brit-
ain,, Central Africa, and the
Commonwealth to prepare for
SOUTHERN
RHODESIA
next year's review, has already
laid the groundwork for disso-
ciating the Labor party from any
commission findings,even if par-
ty members participate in the
commission's work.
The Laborites' present attacks
on the government will greatly
hamper the constitutional review
if they win the British elections
and have to deal with the feder-
ation's prime minister, Sir Roy
Welensky,with whom they have
feuded for years. The attacks
may also be expected to strengthen
most African leaders in their op- 25X1
position to any new arrangements
consolidating the white minoritvb
control.
ETHIOPIA:GAINS SUPPORT AGAINST SOMALI NATIONALISTS
Emperor Haile Selassie's
recent visits to Cairo and
Paris, apparently have devel-
oped a measure of international
support for Ethiopia's diplo-
matic, efforts against the as-
pirations of Somali national-
ists who seek to deprive
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
Ethiopia of about a third of its
territory. The boundary be-
tween Ethiopia and Somalia, a
UN trust territory administered
by Italy'and scheduled for inde-
pendence in December 1960, is
still undemarcated after eight
years of negotiation. Addis
Ababa is increasingly concerned
over the Greater Somalia move-
ment, which proposes to unite
2,500,000 Somali tribesmen
scattered through five terri-
tories--Somalia, British and
French Somaliland, Kenya, and
Ethiopia.
In Cairo, the Ethiopians
reportedly obtained President
Nasir's promise to change his
attitude '.tdward- ,Addis 'Ababa.
In the past, Cairo radio has
broadcast anti-Ethiopian prop-
agandaain favor of the Moslems,
and Egyptian agents have been
active among the Moslems of
Somalia and to a lesser extent
those of Ethiopia. As a result,
relations between Cairo and
Addis Ababa have been tense;
the Emperor had repeatedly put
off a visit to Cairo during
recent years.
Nasir now apparently has
agreed to end the press attacks,
to support Ethiopia at the
United Nations on the Somali
boundary issue, and to withdraw
support from the Greater Som-
alia movement.
Nasir's reported,about-
face may stem from a desire for
an accommodation with his
African neighbors. Addis Ababa,
suspicious of his motives, plans
to test his sincerity by send-
ing a delegation to Cairo for
talks.
SECRET
French support of Ethiopia,
expected because of Paris' fear
of Somali nationalism in the im-
portant naval base of Djibouti,
was reiterated during the Emper-
or's visit to Paris.
The reports of diplomatic
support for Ethiopia from Cairo
and other capitals have aroused
fears of Somali leaders that
Ethiopia now may adopt a more
aggressive attitude in eastern
Africa. On 17 July, Somali Pre-
mier Issa publicly accused Addis
Ababa of seeking foreign support
The Horn of Africa
Approximate area of proposed
Greater Somalia
!? / SOMALIA
KENYA
Mogadisci%
permanent secretariat.
to threaten Somalia's forth-
coming independence. Meanwhile,
the Somali nationalist leader of
French Somaliland, Mahmoud
Harbi, who was forced out of
the premiership by Paris late
last fall, is reported trying
to organize a "'Pan-Somali con-
ference" in the hope that it
would be able to establish a 25X1
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30 July 1959
THE MALAYAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN
The decision of the Malay-
an Chinese Association (MCA) to
remain in Malaya's ruling Alli-
ance party has, at least tem-
porarily, resolved a serious
political crisis and improved
the Alliance's prospects of
winning a substantial majority
of the 104 seats at stake in
the 19 August general elections.
The compromise settlement re-
sulted, however, in the resig-
nation of a number of MCA lead-
ers and a probable decline in
Alliance strength in predomi-
nantly Chinese districts. The
dispute:also has almost cer-
tainly increased racial ten-
sions, which could reach;
the breaking point during
the current campaign.
Communal. issues, principal-
ly candidate apportionment and
the use of the Chinese language
in school examinations, were
the basis for the MCA rift with
the United Malay National Or-
ganization (UMNO), the Malay
component of the Alliance. The
final apportionment of candi-
dates resulted in 69 UMNO, 31
MCA, and 4 Indian nominees--
numbers which reflect roughly
the relative strengths of the
three Alliance partners.
Opposition candidates in-
clude 58 from the Pan-Malayan
Islamic party, 19 from the
People's Progressive party, 37
from the Socialist Front, 11
from two smaller parties, and
29 independents, All of these
opposition. parties tend to in-
cite communal discontent in
their campaigns, for virtually
all their candidates are play-
ing to only one of the two ma-
jor racial groups, Malays or
Chinese.
Recent events in Malaya,
including the::state assembly
elections and the MCA-UMNO
squabble, indicate that there
is a continuing trend toward
voting along strictly racial
lines. In the 11 state asses-
bly elections, the vote for the
multiracial Alliance totaled
approximately 54 percent--a
sharp decline from the 80-per-
cent total in the last nation-
al election in 1955. This de-
cline in Alliance strength prob-
ably will not be fully reflect-
ed in the forthcoming elec-
tions, however, ? because of the
disunity of the opposition
parties and their lack of a
nationwide organizational base.
SOUTH KOREA'S LEADERSHIP PROBLEM
President Rhee may no
longer be exercising full con-
trol over the operations and
decisions of the South Korean
SECRET
This impression of a grow-
ing incapacity to govern has
been reinforced by Rhee's stum-
bling bling speech before the Asian
Peoples' Anti-Communist League
in early June, by his failure
to appear at some public func-
tions which he formerly attend-
ed regularly, and by the in-
ability of all but the most im-
portant visitors to see the
President. The South Korean
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
vice minister of foreign af-
fairs told Ambassador Dowling
confidentially on 27 July that
Rhee was increasingly forget-
ful of details.
There is some indication
that leadership has been as-
sumed by-a triumvirate compris-
ing Minister of Home Affairs
Choe In-kyu, Minister of Jus-
tice Hong Chin-ki, and Minis-
ter of Finance Song In-song,
and by the "hard" faction of
Rhee's Liberal party.. The
presidential secretariat also
appears to exercise consider-
able influence over government-
al decisions by controlling
what and whom the President
.sees. Pak Chan-il, the most
powerful member of the secre-
tariat, is reported to be even
more anti-Japanese than Rhee,
and he may be encouraging the
President in his present nega-
tive policies toward Japan.
Democratic party.
co-leader of the opposition
Recent developments illus-
trate the ability of Rhee's
entourage to isolate the Presi-
dent. Those dependent on Rhee
for public office--and conse-
quently financial privilege--
have a vested interest in pro-
longing the illusion of his
ability to govern. Given the
possibility of Rhee's total
incapacity and the lack of a
legal basis for removal of an
incapacitated president, South
Korea could face a protracted
period of instability during
which public knowledge of his
condition would destroy the
ability of the government to
rule effectively.
The most powerful men un-
der Rhee have recently sup-
ported, if not actually insti-
gated, repressive measures
against the opposition Demo-
cratic party to assure a Lib-
era]. party victory in next
year's presidential election.
The extreme lengths to which
these interests are prepared
to go to retain power suggest
they would strongly resist
the orderly constitutional
succession to the presidency
of Vice President Chang.Myon,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE WAR IN ALGERIA
The war in Algeria, now in
its fifth year, appears to be
entering a crucial phase. The
French are increasingly, hope-
ful of being able to announce
the "pacification" of the rebel-
lion before the UN debate on
Algeria this fall; leaders of
the rebel Army of National Lib-
eration (ALN) maintain that the
start of the rainy season in
October will permit them to re-
organize and resupply their
forces as they have in the past.
Area of
Current French Offensive
With the French now con-
ducting an all-out campaign
against rebels in mountainous
eastern Algeria, the course of
the war in the next few months
may determine whether the rebel-
lion can be defeated militarily,
or whether a settlement can be
reached only through negotia-
tions. The moderate Algerian
leadership---which recognizes
that the rebel army cannot force
the French out of Algeria--has
long favored negotiating with
the French, but De Gaulle-has
refused to discuss any politi-
cal issues, only a cease-fire.
He has also insisted that talks
must be held in Paris rather
than in a neutral country as
desired by the rebels. The French
are unlikely to modify this
stand as long as there is a
possibility of a military victory.
French.Strategy
Under the lead-
ership of air force
Gen. Maurice Challe,
French forces now are
putting more pressure
on the rebels than at
any time in the war.
Concurrently, the
French are making
strenuous efforts to
win the allegiance of
the uncommitted Mos-
lems and to keep the
rebels from contact-
ing their Moslem sup-
porters. Without of-
fering independence,
De Gaulle has sought
to convince the Mos-
lems that a French
victory will not turn
back the clock or re-
turn them to the sta-
tus of second-class
citizens.
Militarily, Challe's plan
emphasizes the aggressive pur-
suit of rebel forces in the
field, the garrisoning of
"pacified" areas, and the de-
nying of supplies to the rebels
by the patrolling of electri-
fied border barriers. In con-
trast to past years, when rela-
tively immobile French forces
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
often lost the initiative to
hit-and-run rebel bands, the
Challe plan stresses the en-
gagement and'destruction of
rebel units, as well as the
rounding up of escapees. By
making effective use of hel-
icopters and aerial recon-
naissance, Challe's "pursuit
commandos" have had consider-
able success in keeping rebel
bands from escaping into the
hills.
Rebel Problems
To date the rebels have
been fskir2y successful in sup-
plying and maintaining an army
which appears to number between
15,000 and 20,000 effectives,
down from a 1956 peak of about
40,000. However, the rebels
depend for both supplies and
reinforcements on staging areas
in Morocco and Tunisia, areas
which have been increasingly
denied them since the spring
of 1959 by French border bar-
riers. These barriers, to-
gether with some reduction in
the support given the rebels
by the Moroccan and Tunisian
governments, have forced the
rebels to depend on supply
lines consisting largely of
caravans south of the barri-
ers, but even these have been
subject to interception.
In addition to supply dif-
ficulties, the rebels have'had
problems of morale and disci-
pline. Since the death in com-
bat of several of the rebels'
top field commanders earlier
this year, the percentage of
prisoners among rebel casual-
ties has risen sharply; pris-
oners.~ now comprise about a
third of total rebel losses.
Prospects
Faced with the increased
effectiveness of the Challe plan,
the rebels until recently tended
to split into small units to
avoid capture and destruction.
While this lessened their ef-
fectiveness as a fighting force,
activity by small groups in-
creased their capability for
terrorism and for sabotage of
French installations.
Since the 14 July attack
in force on Ain Zana near the
Tunisian border, however, the
rebels may have become con-
vinced that occasional large
operations must be launched, if
only for propaganda purposes.
The rebels also appear to be
attempting to provoke incidents
between French and Tunisian
forces along Tunisia's bor-
der in order to enlarge
the latter's participation
in the war and to direct
world attention on Algeria
before the UN debate.
Good weather now faeili-
tateas French pursuit of reb-
el bands in the mountains
and policing of barriers
along the border. The French
offensive in the Kabylie
mountain area of eastern
Algeria appears to be an
attempt to end organized
rebel resistance prior to the
UN debate, and the French
may, for diplomatic reasons,
announce the defeat of the
rebels before the end of
the year. Even should the
French prove successful in
largely eliminating the reb-
els' field forces, however,
terrorism and activity by
small groups probably will go
on and will continue to re-
gtire the presence in Algeria
of large numbers of French
troops.
Long-term French objectives
in Algeria--maintaining polit-
ical hegemony and access to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
PAKISTAN
and
Amindive Is:
The financial problem of
finding adequate sums--about
$1.25 billion--to compensate
the zamindars also impeded the
program. Furthermore, the dif-
ficulties of compiling land
records and setting up a new
revenue collecting service made
rapid action impossible. It
was not until 1955 that the
abolition of the zamindars sys-
tem was accomplished in West
Bengal--the last major state
to enforce such legislation.
The rights of the former
zamindars, most of whom were
permitted to retain their home
farms, generally accrued to the
states, and the only immediate
benefit realized by the tenants
was the elimination of the bur-
densome charges in addition to
rentals which the zamindars
had customarily imposed. The
tenants were usually given the
right to become owners, but few
could pay the necessary sums,
and many came to believe that
the reform had been of little
CHINA
`West
Benga
Calcutta
BURMA
benefit. The program did in-
crease the revenues of the state
governments and help establish
a closer state-tenant relation-
ship., Much of the new state
revenue was used for agricul-
tural development programs which
aided the tenants.
Tenancy Reform
The abolition of the zamin-
dars system removed only the up-
permost layer of the interme-
diaries between the state and
the tenants. Tenants who held
land under the zamindars fre-
quently leased it to subtenants.
The same situation developed in
non-zamindars lands where some
landowners had large holdings.
Thus much of the land remained
cultivated by tenants, and re-
forms were necessary to improve
the status of the tenant.
The tenancy reforms adopted
generally fall into three groups:
security of tenure, including
the question of the landlord's
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PART III
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
if the government made a major
effort to carry out the program.
In contrast to the expan-
sion of cooperatives, the lim-
itation of landholdings would
be unlikely to benefit Indian
agriculture for some time. If
the ceilings on landholdings
were low enough to be polit-
ically effective in winning
peasant support, it would take
land away from both the rela-
tively large landowners and
the smaller ones who produce
much of the food that supplies
the cities. Therefore, unless
adequate consumer goods were
made available in the villages
to induce the new owners to-.work
hander and,exchange.their,p.r.o-J
ducts for iconaumerl,goods...it.).yvould
become increasingly difficult
to:,:supply.the cities with food.
Since nearly 300,000,000
persons are now dependent on
about 400,000,000 acres of cul-
tivable land, only 1.3 acres
per capita or about 6.7 acres
per family are available. Thus,
even if the ceiling for land-
holdings,were as low as 25
INDIA: DISTRIBUTION GOWNED AREAS
PERCENTAGE OF PERCENTAGE OF
SIZEOF AREA HOUSEHOLDS OWNED LAND
(ACRES) OWNING PLOTS MADE UP OF PLOTS
THIS SIZE THIS SIZE
0
22
0
0 - 1
25
1
1-2.5
14
5
2.5-5
14
10
5-7.5
8
10
7.5-10
5
9
10 -15
5
13
15 -20
3
10
20 - 25
1
5
25-30
1
8
30-50
1
13
OVER 50
1
16
(1956 DATA)
100
100
acres, the amount of land avail-
able for redistribution would
provide only about three acres
per family for those families--
about half of the total--which
now have less than three acres
of land.
Even less realistic is the
plan to set up joint farms,
which appears to have been
adopted without much thought
as to how the scheme would work
in practice. Few joint farm-
ing societies now in existence
in India have been successful,
and it seems unlikely that the
numerous administrative and
financial problems involved
could be solved, even if the
political opposition could be
overcome.
Nehru apparently believes,
however, that such a program
would increase crop yields. He
probably also feels it would
help the Congress party polit-
ically by demonstrating its
continued ability to think and
act dynamically. He may hope
they program--in addition to
INDIA: CULTIVATED LAND PER CAPITA
POPULATION CULTIVATED CULTIVATED CULTIVATED
DEPENDENT ON AREA LAND PER LAND PER
AGRICULTURE (MILLION CAPITA FAMILY
(MILLIONS) ACRES) (ACRES) (ACRES(
North India 47 48 1.01 4. 8
East India 68 86 1.25 6. 3
South India 49 57 1.17 5. 7
West India 24 54 2.29 11. 7
Central India 38 99 2.57 11.9
Norttwest India 23 59 2. 59 13. 1
(1951 DATA) 209 403 1.61 7. 9
90720A 30JIJLV 1959
being the Indian answer to Com-
munist China's communes--would
undercut the appeal of the Com-
munist party in India in rural
areas, just as the Congress
party's adoption in 1955 of the
policy of promoting a "socialist
pattern of society" undercut the
appeal of the leftist opposition
parties.
To date the program--except
for the expansion of service co-
operatives--has already aroused
considerable political opposi-
tion from a large section of the
Indian public, including many
members of the Congress party.
Despite Nehru's assurance that
joint farming would be instituted
on a voluntary basis, many feel
such a move would be a step to-
ward totalitarianism, and a new
conservative party--the Swatantra
--has been formed chiefly to op-
pose the new agricultural program.
Many observers, including
high Indian officials, believe
the joint farming program will
never be implemented. It has al-
ready cost the Congress party
support among both large and
medium landowners, without yet
winning it additional support 25X1
from the peasants, who remain
unaware or skeptical of the ben-
efits they would receive,
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
THE EAST GERMAN REFUGEE
The continued flight of
several hundred refugees from
East Germany each day, follow-
ing the more than 3,000,000
who have fled to the West since
World War II, indicates that
14 years of Communist rule have
failed to inculcate a universal
belief in Communist ideology or
satisfaction in Communist
achievements. Discontent and
a hope for a better life lead
the refugee to take serious
risks, leave his possessions,
and seek an uncertain future
in West Germany. Some become
disillusioned and return to
East Germany to face possible
imprisonment.
Who Is the Refugee?
Most of the refugees are
workmen, housewives, or clerks,
but nearly every occupation
has been represented, includ-
ing police and the military.
Most refugees have been adults
aged 25 to 66 and children
from 7,, to.. l4,years old.
The most significant refu-
gee today--because East Germany
can ill afford to spare him--is
the professional man, a doctor
or teacher from a university or
lower school. Because great
numbers in this category have
fled, the East German regime
is suffering serious manpower
shortages, especially in the
medical field, but also in the
dental, pharmaceutic, engineer-
ing, and technical fields.
Motivation
In general, the
refugee flees because
of personal griev-
ances against the
Communist system. He
may be a farmer un-
able to meet impos-
sibly high delivery
quotas. He may be
a small businessman
faced with national-
ization of his shop,
or a worker fleeing
constantly increas-
ing work norms. The
refugee might:. be a
UELZENV,-
24%
12 WEST
GERMAN 37 %
STATES
19~%/
GIESSEN Ls
youth escaping military service
or the girl friend who follows
him. He may be an intellectual
subjected to increasing pres-
sures to compromise his pro-
fessional standards, or a
Christian escaping the, in-
creasing atheistic pressures?
He may simply have responded
to the strong attraction of a
prosperous West Germany.
In the case of the refugee
intellectual, there is often no
single clear-cut motivation. A
new development or changed cir-
cumstance probably provides the
immediate stimulus to flight.
He may receive a summons to ap-
pear before a party or govern-
ment functionary to explain
some previous statement or ac-
tion. Recent moves to Commu-
nize educational institutions
in line with the regime's ''poly-
technical education" program
may depress. him. He may be
physically or mentally exhausted
by overwork or psychological
harassment. A party member
with limited professional qual-
ifications may be promoted over
him. Probably more important
than any other reason is. the
regime's deliberate and sys-
tematic discrimination against
his children in education.
Escape Procedure
The refugee can travel
freely anywhere in East Germany
except in the restricted zones
on the western border, but he
FLOW OF EAST GERMAN REFUGEES
(APPROX. PERCENTAGES 1958-59)
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 15
record, or is otherwise under
suspicion, he will not obtain
an exit permit.
Without an exit permit,
the refugee's next best course
Li an. .q,. YV aaiN a.a.. el i..VV +V~
If he is rejected for security
reasons or for a criminal rec-
ord--which does not happen
often--he has numerous op-
portunities to appeal his
case,
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EMPLOYMENT
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
To be eligible for screen-
ing through the emergency ad-
mission procedure provided by
West German law, the refugee
has to leave East Germany per-
manently and stay in the Fed-
eral Republic or West Berlin.
He is accepted as a "recognized"
refugee if : a) his life was
endangered because he engaged
in political activities in East
Germany; b) he wants to be re-
united with his family; or c)
he can prove there is a job
for him in the West so he will
not become a public burden.
If.:he.,does, trot meet',these
requirements, he is a "nonrec-
ognized" refugee who may re-
main in the West but will not
get the assistance given recog-
nized refugees. However, the
refugee authorities might grant
him recognized status, if its
denial would mean an extraordi-
nary hardship to him.
"The reu::gn: zed:;ref-
ugee is usually flown
to West Germany, at
no expense to himself,
and treated like any,
other German citizen.
He is given a resi-
dence permit, permis-
sion to work, or pos-
sibly a pension, an-
nuity, or social re-
lief. He may also
stay in West Berlin,
which takes 10 per-
cent of the recog-
nized refugees as
its quota.
The., -nenrecog-
nized escapee is
merely given refuge
under the provisions of the
West German public welfare laws
which guarantee a minimum sub-
sistence to each person in need.
He is given food and lodging,
medical service, and, if urgent-
ly necessary, clothing or other
items; if he is accommodated
in a camp, he gets some spend-
ing money. Under no circum-
stances is he compelled to
return to East Germany.
While at Marienfelde, the
refugee is interrogated by the
three Western powers and by
West Berlin authorities for se-
curity and intelligence infor-
mation.
Refugees in Berlin
In addition to its 10-per-
cent quota of recognized refu-
gees, West Berlin is also re-
sponsible for all nonrecognized
refugees. Furthermore, any
refugee who elects to remain
in Berlin may do so, regardless
of his status.
The nonrecognized refugee
is a serious burden on Berlin.
Privileges accorded to recog-
nized refugees but denied to
him include the right to ?vote,
permission to hold a job, as-
sistance in finding housing,
Reception center in Berlin.
and free transportation by air
for resettling in West Germany.
The nonrecognized refugee there-
fore must decide whether to re-
turn to the East, go to West
Germany on his own responsibility
and expense, or remain in West
Berlin. He may return to East Ger-
many; it is less likely that he
will try to go on to West Germany.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
If the nonrecognized refu-
gee chooses to remain in West
Berlin, he is permitted to live
and eat without charge in per-
manent camps and to receive one
dollar per month. Legally he
cannot hold a job, but the la-
bor market has been invaded by
nonrecognized refugees on an
unofficial basis. Since he
cannot apply through the labor
office for a job, he works be-
low the legal minimum rate.
The effect is not as great as
might be expected, however, be-
cause many such workers hold
jobs in small Plants which sur-
vive only because they can se-
cure help at lower than the
legal minimum. Many of the
nonrecognized refugee workers
are domestic servants employdd
by people who would dispense
with this luxury if required
to pay the legal rate.
The refugee, whether he
remains in Berlin permanently
or temporarily, is probably
housed in a camp. He may go
for two or three weeks to a
transit camp where persons live
during the screening process.
His camp may be a former fac-
tory, hastily improvised as an
emergency shelter. Or the
refugee may go to a permanent
camp, a smaller installation
holding from 70 to 800 people,
with somewhat primitive condi-
tions.
The refugee may live with
relatives or friends, or, if
lucky, be placed in an apart-
ment. Life in a camp inevita-
bly causes lower morale, so
the government is attempting
to settle families in apartment
buildings.
Refugees in West Germany
To cut down the process-
ing in Berlin, the refugee may
be flown to a camp in Giessen
or Uelzen in West Germany where
he completes his processing and
is assigned a permanent loca-
tion. He may also be flown to
a camp in whichever West German
state has accepted him under a
quota system.
Since West German law ap-
plies to East German citizens
who come to Berlin or the Fed-
era]'. Republic, the refugee may
go directly to friends or rela-
tives without registering in a
camp. He thus avoids the long
stay in various camps and pos-
sible assignment to undesirable
locations and employment. He
may fly from Berlin to West
Germany at his own expense; he
might at a later date report to
Giessen or Uelzen and be record-
ed there.
The principal problems for
the refugee in West Germany are
housing and employment, for
which the state governments are
responsible, but with help from
the federal authorities.
In general, the refugee
will have little difficulty
being resettled in West Germany,
although in some states he will
find housing inadequate and
might have to remain in a camp
for as long as two years or
wait in Berlin to be flown to
West; Germany.
The refugee will have
little trouble finding a job
in West Germany--on 30 June
job openings there exceeded
the number of unemployed per-
sons. He may, however, have
difficulty in finding a job
commensurate with his training
or previous experience,and be-
come! discontented. Moreover,
he may expect to improve his
lot in West Germany without
having a skill or training to
offer. Private organizations,
particularly professional .
groups, will assist the govern-
ment; in placing him in his pro-
fession if he is qualified.
Sometimes the refugee de-
cides to go back to East Ger-
many. The reasons for such de-
cisions are many and complex,
but generally they add up to
dissatisfaot'ion with conditions
in the West or some compelling
personal condition.
The returnee may fall into
the large group of adventurers
who move back and forth across
the border. Possibly he com-
mitted a criminal offense in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
THE BLOC'S FOREIGN MILITARY AID PROGRAM
The Sino-Soviet bloc, since
the start of its arms aid pro-
gram in 1955, has extended more
than one billion dollars in mil-
itary assistance to underdevel-
oped countries, particularly
the .UAR, Iraq, Afghanistan,: and In-
donesia`. In addition, it has
provided arms and materiel to
Yemen, Algeria, Guinea, Finland,
and Austria, and reportedly
agreed recently to supply arms
to Ethiopia. Offers have also
been made to provide-arms to
a number of other countries, in-
cluding Tunisia, Burma, and
some of the Latin American
republics.
Military assistance to
underdeveloped countries--a
major factor in the bloc's pene
tration drive--is relatively
easy to implement and is of
substantial propaganda value
to the contributors. Arms aid
accounts for about one third
of Sino-Soviet bloc aid of
all types extended to underde-
veloped countries but comprises
more than one half of all aid
actually delivered.
The bloc has been able
through its arms deals to con-
tribute to its posture as a
big-power supporter of nation-
alism in the neutralist countries,
thus assisting local Communists
to attain political influence.
Playing on the underdeveloped
country's desire for manifesta-
tions of independence, the bloc
supplies it with symbols of
national defense, regardless of
the country's ability to fully
use the arms. The recipients
of this aid become increasingly
dependent on the bloc for the
continued maintenance of their
armed forces, and Moscow hopes
they eventually will become
more susceptible to bloc political
pressures.
Meanwhile, the bloc, os-
tensibly remaining aloof from
internal problems, can pose as
the recipient country's best
friend and stanchest supporter
os Underdevelo
~__. IIII IIIfl~lllll 1111 III I I lIITI III III Il IfII II IIIIIII III IIIII
IIIII IITIIIIII IIIIIIII IIlIllTlillI III III IIII(Il fill (ITI II III IIII ~~
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%waftole SECRET
facers have been detailed to the
armed forces of these nations
to provide instruction. on mili-
tary tactics as well as to ad-
vise at the senior military
level. During the first six
months of 1959, there were ap-
proximately 1,500 bloc military
technicians and advisers serv-
ing in recipient countries--
mainly in the UAR, Iraq, Afghan-
istan, and Indonesia.
Since 1955 more than 2,500
nationals from countries that
have concluded arms agreements
with the bloc have taken mili-
tary training in the bloc.
Courses of instruction have in-
cluded many phases of ground,
naval, and air training and
were undertaken primarily in
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
of its nationalistic struggle
with "the imperialistic and
capitalistic West."
In negotiating its arms
deals, the bloc has displayed
a willingness to grant huge
discounts--in some instances
as much as two thirds of
quoted prices. In addition,
the bloc accepts partial, if
not complete, repayment in
surplus commodities rather
than demanding full payment
in hard currencies.
The export of arms is for
the bloc a relatively inexpen-
sive means of penetration. The
continual re-equipping of the
bloc's own armed forces with
new models of weapons results
in a sizable stockpile of ob-
solescent items,
While Czechoslovakia and
Poland have in the past "front-
ed" for Moscow, the USSR has
in the last year come to deal
more directly with the coun-
tries receiving bloc arms. It
supplies by far the greatest
amounts of arms,accounting for
more than two thirds of all the
bloc arms delivered to the UAR,
Iraq, Afghanistan, P .d Indonesia.
Communist China now par-
ticipates in the bloc's arms
aid program and its role prob-
ably will increase, particular-
ly in Southeast Asia and in Al-
geria, where lack of diplomat-
ic ties obviates repercussions
in relations with Prance. Al-
though China's arms aid to Al-
geria and Indonesia has been
limited, Peiping probably will
attempt to increase its stature
in Southeast Asia by offering
additional aid to Djakarta.
Technical Aid and `raining
In conjunction With the
arms deals, the bloc also pro-
vides technical assistance to
the countries receiving arms.
Bloc personnel, mainly Soviet
nationals, are sent to conduct
courses in the use and main-
tenance of the weapons and
equipment supplied. Soviet of-
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE UNDER BLOC MILITARY
AID PROGRAM
BLOC MILITARY SPECIALISTS IN
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES
(1 JANUARY-JUNE 1959)
USSR CZECHO. POLAND TOTAL
UAR 680 225 10 915
IRAQ 150 -- -- 150
AFGHANISTAN 150 150
INDONESIA 100 30 20 150
YEMEN 60 15 75
GUINEA 5 5
1,140 275 30 1,445
MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM UNDERDEVELOPED
COUNTRIES TRAINED IN THE BLOC
(1955-JUNE 1959)
OTHER
USSR POLAND CZECHO. EUROP. SATELL. TOTAL
UA R 740 525 335 50 1 650
IRAQ 90 45 - 135
AFGHANISTAN 50 50
INDONESIAN -_. 500 150 --- 650
the USSR, Poland, and Czecho-
slovakia.
The Soviet Union has pro-
vided, most of the training in
land armaments but. has also given
flight training courses. In addi-
tion,staff and line officers
through the rank of general are
being trained in the USSR for
command assignments in their re-
spective armies. Poland has pro-
vided facilities for most of the
naval training that the bloc has
offered:, and Czechoslovakia'has been
the major center for flight training.
The increased contact be-
tween bloc military personnel
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30 July 1959
and members of the armed forces
of these underdeveloped coup-
tries provides opportunities for
ideological indoctrination, es-
pecially when such contact takes
place inside the bloc. Since
the military groups in these
underdeveloped countries have
been traditional sources of
authority, the effect of bloc
training on future military
leaders may be expected to in-
fluence their political orienta-
tion. Bloc personnel both at
home and abroad, however, ap-
pear to have conducted them-
selves in such a way as to a-
void criticism. The increased
contacts with the military per-
sonnel of the recipient coun-
tries has not yet resulted in
any obvious subversive attempts
by bloc personnel.
The UAR
Since 1955 the bloc has
provided Egypt and Syria, now
the UAR, with arms, equipment,
and training amounting to an
estimated $700,000,000. The
bloc presumably will continue
to supply arms and materiel to
Since the .`format1,on of th&-
UAR in 1958, Cairo has regulated
the purchases of bloc arms for
both regions, dealing almost
exclusively with" the Soviet
Union. Moscow in turn has in-
creasingly dominated the bloc's
military assistance program in
the UAR during recent years.
Despite the frictions
caused by Nasir's anti-Communist
campaign in the Middle East,
the bloc has continued to pro-
vide military aid to the UAR.
The technical assistance phase
of the bloc military aid pro-
gram in the UAR has continued
unhampered and appears even to
have increased. Moscow appar-
ently intends to continue to
depend on its economic and par-
ticularly its military aid pro-
grams in the UAR to maintain the
close ties which had been shak-
en by the exchange of recrimina-
tions between Moscow and Cairo
earlier this year.
Iraq
Iraq, the latest major
recipient of bloc military
assistance, concluded an arms
deal with Moscow in late 1958
The bloc, thus far, is esti-
mated to have supplied Iraq with
as much as $100,000,000 in arms
and materiel since deliver-
ies of military equipment began
late last year. Additional
shipments of materiel probably
will continue to be delivered to
Iraq throughout the remainder
of 1959.
Moscow, in its dealings
with Iraq, has demonstrated
the value the bloc leaders
attach to their overseas arms
aid program. While the Soviet
Union and other members of the
bloc were in the process of
granting recognition to the
new Iraqi regime and also con-
cluding trade agreements with
it Moscow in November 1958
quickly arranged to provide
arms to the Iraqi armed forces.
Bloc arms and materiel began
arriving immediately and mili-
tary technicians and advisers
were dispatched to Iraq. It
was not until March of this
year that Moscow was able to
extend a meaningful economic
credit to Baghdad. While the
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SECRET VMVRVI
30 July 1959
USSR is still in the
survey stages of its
economic aid program,
bloc arms in large
quantities are con-
tinually arriving in
Iraq.
Afghanistan
The bloc, par-
ticularly the Soviet
Union, has since 1956
supplied Afghanistan
with an estimated
$75,000,000 in mili-
tary assistance. In
addition the Soviet
Union concluded a new
arms agreement with
Kabul in June of this
year. While the
scope of this agree-
ment is not yet ap-
parent, Moscow pre-
sumably will continue to grant
substantial discounts to Kabul
on its arms purchases. This
arrangement probably will per-
mit Afghanistan to make mere
token payments for the bloc
military aid it is receiving
while modernizing its armed
forces.
Other Recipients
The bloc has provided
Yemen with more than $30,000,-
i1 military aid under an
agreement concluded in 1956
with Czechoslovakia, but prob-
ably financed:by:.Moscow. By
early 1958, practically all the
arms and equipment arranged for
under this deal had been 'de-
livered.
The bloc made gift ship-
ments of obsolete arms to
Guinea earlier this year.
The value of these arms--
estimated at $500,000--is
insignificant in comparison
with their psychological im-
pact.
arms to Algeria via Egypt.
The Algerian rebel gov-
ern e, earlier this year, was
granted an estimated $5,-
000,000 in military aid by
Communist China. Peiping's
grant was made in response
to a visit to Communist
China by a rebel mission.
A subsequent rebel mission
visited China this spring, re-
portedly to make arms purchases
under Peiping's grant. China
presumably will deliver the
SET
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