CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002300080001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 9, 1959
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
DATE:( REVIEWER
NCXT f~EVtGNI UA"t'E:
AUTIi: R 7G-2
a R~~4ASSll=tea
GU1S8. CNANGEI) TO: T,
COPY N0. 56
OCI N0~ 3528/59
9 July 1959
1~i f~}/~~V,QE (N GLASS. ~]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I' I OFFICE OF CURRENT Ii~ITELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF TFiE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ]ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 7!~4, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH I1J ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CC}NFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 19.59
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
QF IMMEDIATE. Il!TTEREST
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In Iran, pressures are growing far moves to improve
relations with the Soviet Union, although the Shah appar-
ently still holds to his firm policy. Israeli Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion, having forced left-wing critics out
of his cabinet, now heads a caretaker government, pending
elections next fall, Yemeni Crown Prince Badr's growing
reliance on Egyptian sup o
new outbrea
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS Page 5
Pronouncements by Soviet leaders since the foreign
ministers' conference recessed suggesi~ that Gromyko will
return to Geneva with instructions to make a serious
effort to obtain at least agreement iti principle on the
main elements of an interim Berlin sei;tlement which
could be referred to a summit meeting far final approval,
The Soviet leaders' minimum objective apparently will be
CQ~IDENTIAL
w
THE .CARIBBEAN SITUATION , Page 1
The Cuban and Venezuelan governments have-not aban-
doned their determination to oust thE~ Trujillo dictator-
ship in the Dominican Republic and are probably still
plotting against the Somoza regime ii- Nicaragua. There
are persistent indications that Haitian exiles in Cuba
are being pressed to launch an attaci: on the Duvalier
regime in Haiti, apparently as part of Castro's strategy 25X1
to open a new front against Trujillo, In dealing with
the problems posed by Trujillo's changes of intervention
the OAS faces its most critical test to date.
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS , , , ,, Page 3
Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim continues to oppose
local Communist demands, and the Comrr~unists may try to
stage major demonstrations to bolster their political
influence, Nevertheless the Iraqi Ge~vernment's relations
with the USSR remain close, and more Soviet materiel is
being delivered. At the same time, Qasim has responded
to the British arms aid offer by ordering jet light
bombers, The National Union elections held this week in
the UAR were aimed in part at reducing Baathist influence
in Syria,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 1959
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Part I (continued)
to obtain new arrangements which, in their view, would
supersede the postwar agreements on which existing Allied
rights in Berlin are based and be the point of departure
for future negotiatiot;s concerning the presence of the
Allies in Berlin. The USSR will also 'hope to win agree-
ment to the creation of an all-German ing of some mess-
halls in South China--constitutes a significant admission
of failure to obtain peasant comaliance with a major re-
gime program,
TAIWAN STRAIT , Page
The engagement on 5 July between Chinese Nationalist
and Communist fighter aircraft was probably precipitated
by Nationalist action and appears to have been an isolated
incident. Latest Chinese Nationalist claims are that one
MIG was shot down over the mainland ands one crashed in the
water. Communist alternate-day shelling of the offshore
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING Page 3
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Soviet central committee meeting from 24 to 29
June set forth an extremely comprehensive program for
drawing up detailed plans for the mechanization and
automation of industry .during the Seven-Year Plan (1959-
1965). Widespread mechanization and autamation is neces-
sary if the goal of an 80-percent increase in industrial
production in the plan period is to be achieved, Khrush-
chev's tough speech on the last day revealed impatience
with a number of deficiencies in the Soviet economy which,
if they remain uncorrected might threaten his economic
25X1 program.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 1959
PART II (continued)
USSR CHANGES POLICY~ON GRANT AID , , , Page 5
The USSR, competing directly with Western aid in
underdeveloped areas, has relaxed its policy against
grants. Moscow apparently was induced to extend its
first mayor grant to ensure the primacy of its position
in Afghanistan, where the United States continued its
aid program by grants following Kabul's refusal in late
195? to accept further loans, The USSR probably will
continue to promote chiefly loans, which will require
economic ties during the repayment period as well as
during the implementation of the aid program.
SOVIET ASSISTANCE TO INDIA AUGMENTED Page 8
In negotiations last month with a high-level Indian
mission, the USSR committed itself to provide additional
aid for the industrial development of India, Most of the
items discussed--worth about $300,000,000--either had
been offered earlier by Moscow or are for further work
on projects already agreed on, Soviet assistance, still
relatively small compared to free world aid to India, is
extended primarily-far key government-awned industrial
enterprises--petroleum steel and heavy machinery indus-
tries.
SITUATION IN KERALA STATE , , , Page 7
Prime Minister Nehru apparently ~~nticipates that the
Indian national government will be forced by mid-August to
intervene in the conflict between the Communist
and o osition rou s in Kerala Stat
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THE SITUATION IN CEYLON
. Page 8
Prime Minister Bandaranaike's government on 8 July
survived its first test in the Ceylons~se parliament since
leftist members of the coalition withcirew two months ago,
Bandaranaike thus has time for further maneuvering, but
remains in a precarious position. Hi.s one-man working
majority voted against the censure moi;ion, while several
opposition members abstained, apparent;ly reluctant to
bring down the government and force nE~w elections at this
time, The firm action taken by the government in the
past few days to counter leftist stril~:e activity appears
to have blunted the threat to Bandaranaike' position
from this direction..
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEIEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 1959
PART II continued)
INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE . , , Page 9
President Sukarno.?s reinstatement of the 1945 consti-
tution on 5 July provides a semblance of legality for
actions he has already taken toward "guided demacracy"
and paves the way for continued direct presidential
government. The change in constitution does not provide
any ready-made solutions to Indonesia?.a chronic difficul-
ties, nor does it indicate that Sukarno will make a deter-
mined new effort to cppe with the problems of a growing
Communist party9 continuing insurgent activities and a
deteriorating economy, 25X1
INTERNAL DISPUTE IN RULING MALAYAN PAR7PY , Page 1t3
Serious conflict may be develapin~; between Malay
and Chinese elements in the ruling All~.ance party of
Malaya over the apportionment of candidates for the 19
August general elections, While an open split will
probably be avoided at least until aftE~r the elections,
the situation points up the serious di]'_emma faced by
the Alliance on race relations, This ~~roblem could
ultimately destroy the organization and with it olit-
ical stability in Malaya, 25X1
CAMEROUN , , Page 11
Increased terrorism and an outbreak of labor disor-
ders in Cameroun are in prospect for this French trust
territory within the next few months. Exiled nationalist
leaders? who are probably behind this agitation, are
eager to discredit the moderate pro-French government
and-focus world attention on Cameroun in an effort to
have the United Nations call for new elections before
ndependence? scheduled for January 1960,
MOROCCO STRENGTHENING TIES WITH UAR , , Page 12
Moroccan Premier Ibrahim?s recent 12-day visit to
the UAR provides the latest manifestation of Rabat?s
desire to strengthen ties with Cairo. Plans for cooper-
ation in various fields? including the military, have
been discussed and in some cases worked out? and addi-
tional visits are scheduled by top Moroccan and UAR
officials, This new orientation is likely to strengthen
Rabat?s devotion to its nonalignment policy and reinforce
its determination to secure the early evacuation of
French, Spanish, and American forces.
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PART II (continued)
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THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY'S 15TH CONGRESS Page 13
The French Communist party devoted its long-postponed
15th party Congress from 24 to 28 June largely to an
effort to refurbish its public image as the leading ele-
ment of responsible opposition to De Gaulle. It appealed
for a united front with the non-Communist left and center.
The party seems to expect little impr wement in its posi-
tion in the near future but to be waiting in the hope
that a general disillusionment with the De Gaulle regime
will set in. Its most promising inst:rvment for widening.
its appeal appears to be the Communist-led General Confeder-
ation of Labor, which has recently en?joyed some coo era- ,
tion from free unions in token strikers. 25X1
PRESSURE FOR REVISING US - BRITISH WEST INDIES BASE
AGREEMENT . Page 14
Additional pressure is building ,up in Trinidad for
revision of the 1941 US-UK Caribbean lease agreement.
Premier Eric Williams, who has long c~~mpaigned against
the local US naval station at Chaguars3mas, has exploited
a constitutional dispute with London ever control of the
police to press the base issue as well. London wants
early talks with the United States on revising the 1941
ARGENTINE CRI SI S EASES _ Page 15
Argentine President Frondizi, by making new assign-
ments to several key military posts, leas considerably
reduced the revolutionary pressures oi? the past month.
This step was paramount among the numerous demands of the
armed forces, which had expressed thennselves strongly
against military assignments tinged wi'.th political favor-
itism as well as on-.the danger of Communist and Peronista
influence in the government. Despite having won a respite
from the danger of a militar revolt Frondizi still faces
serious labor discontent.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 195'9
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
STUDENTS FROM NON=COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN THE SOVIET
BLOC .
Page 1
About 3,000 students from the non-Communist world
attended institutions of higher learn;ing in the USSR and
its European satellites during the 19li8-59 academic. year--
constituting approximately ane sevent~~ of the foreign
students in these countries. Bloc scholarship offers
are gaining respectabilityy twice as many Soviet offers
were accepted in 1958 as in 195?. Wh~sre offers from the
West equal those from the USSR, the West is greatly
preferred. Attempts to convert the sttudents to Commu-
nism meet with limited success and pro-Communist students
are often disillusioned.
CONTINUING PROBLEMS FOR CYPRUS .
. Page 5
Mutual suspicion and hostility between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots have again come to the surface, In
addition, a rift has developed between Archbishop Makarios,
head of the interim Cyprus Government,, and the former
Greek Cypriot terroririr commander, General Grivas. Delays
in the negotiations on British base riights are contrib-
uting to Greek Cypriot suspicions and may make difficult
the cooperation necessary after Cypru.~ gains independence
in February 1960. Unrealistic populai? expectations re-
garding the island?s economic prospecl:s may create serious
problems for the new government.
THE FUTURE OF THE UN TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL .
With the attainment of independence by a number of
trust territories over the next two years, some Western
members of the 14-member UN Trusteeship Council=-France,
Italy, and possibly New Zealand--will lose their seats as
administering powers. The consequent decrease in the
membership of the council might encourage the 82-member
Fourth (trusteeship) Committee of the General Assembly
to seek to take over the activities of the UN in the
trusteeship field. In view of the strong anticolonial
sentiments of some members, this might result in serious
political difficulties for the remaining administering
powers, particularly the United States, and Britain. Pre-
vailing sentiment in the General Assembly seems to be
against ''freezing" the membership of the council at its
present level of 14 members, although such a solution
will probably be proposed at the forthcoming assembly
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co~~~aEN riAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 1;159
THE CARIBBEAN ,SITUATION
The Cuban and Venezuelan
governments have not abandoned
their determination to oust the
Trujillo dictatorship in the
Dominican Republic and may still
be plotting against the Somoza
regime in Nicaragua. There
are persistent indications that
Haitian exiles in Cuba are be-
ing pressed to launch an attack-
on the Duvalier regime in Haiti,
apparently as part of Fidel
Castro's strategy to open a new
front against Trujillo. In deal-
ing with the problems posed by
Trujillo's charges of interven-
tion, the Organization of Ameri-
can States (OAS) faces its most
critical test to date.
The Council of the OAS,
which is still studying the
The Caribbean Area
?A ~ BAHAMA
~
Havana
~-O~ ~ ISLANDS
CU~1a ~''`Z d l ,~ Dominican
Republic
9elize
British Honduras
JAMAIC~ `~-
Haiti
f~Lndings of its special committee
o~~ganized in early June to in-
veast igate Nicaraguan charges of
foreign involvement~in the abor-
tj:ve Nicaraguan rebellion, was
presented on 2 July with a for-
ms~l Dominican complaint against
Cuban and Venezuelan interven-
tj.on in the Dominican Republic
acid a request for OAS action.
Tree OAS is obliged, on the one
ha~.nd, to uphold the principle
of nonintervention by attempting
tcl halt the Cuban and Venezuelan
activities; on the other hand,
it must give recognition to the
very strong sentiment in Latin
Amjerica that dictatorships be
eliminated from the hemisphere.
:~
'iudad
Trujillo
~NFID~NTIA!~.
~ aANTIGUA
- ~?GUAGELGUPE
0
Q MAfl11NIQUE
9
DuAflenoos
British ~
.Guiana
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The weak Haitian Government
is alerted to the danger of an
invasion but
is virtually defenseless
against such an attack.- An at-
tack on Haiti would probably
provoke Tru,lillo's military in-
tervention there in support of
the Duvalier regime and bring
the Caribbean antagonists closer
to open war.
Meanwhile, Fidel Castro
is facing intensifying unrest
on the home front. His deter-
mination to push his drastic
agrarian reform law has aroused
open opposition, even among
small landowners, and there is
growing concern among informed
Cubans over. the activities of
Communists--particularly their
penetration of the armed forces.
Scattered acts of antigovernment
terrorism have occurred in the
capital, and several groups of
armed oppositionists are re-
ported active in isolated areas
of the country. The govern-
meat is arresting many individu-
als charged with counterrevolu-
tionary activity. In addition,
the regime fears an imminent
attack by Dominican-supported
exiles, who claim to be prepar-
ing to attack before the end
of July,
Indications of a Cuban ef-
fort; to develop closer political
and trade ties with the Afro-
Asialn bloc are evident in the
curY~ent trip of Castro's close
associate, pro-Communist Ma-
~or "Che" Guevara, to the UAR,
India, and at least eight other
Afro-Asian countries. Guevara,
who made bitterly anti-US com.-
ment s while iti the UAR, was given
"red.-carpet" treatment by Presi-
dent Nasir,
There are signs of a left-
ist trend in Guatemala, where
the weak Ydigoras government re-
ceived a setback in the impor-
tant 5 July mayoral election in
the capital city, wan by a mod-
erate leftist. Leftist forces,
which received more votes than
both rightist candidates combined,
are clearly gaining strength, and
if the trend continues they could
sweep the congressional election
scheduled for late this year?
S~CR~Z'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 1959
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS
Iraq
Tensions between Communists
and anti-Communist :nationalists
in Iraq are growing as the coun-
try approaches the emotional
peak of the.14 July celebration
of the first anniversary of the
revolution, A number of clashes
between coffeehouse partisans
for each side occurred in Bagh-
dad on 4 and 5 July and. security
forces were compelled to inter-
vene,
In a press interview and
a speech to the Popular Resist-
ance Force on 5 July, Qasim
implied that the bulk of the
blame for lcactional strife lies
on the Communists, and he spe-
cifically opposed their new
united national front as an im-
proper move during what he calls
Iraq's "transitional" period.
Without naming any specific
papers, Qasim also warned the
press against disseminating
false reports, he s~.id he would
be thankful for guidance if he
strayed from the "path of truth,"
but added that he would feel
free in turn to give guidance
to newspapers which strayed.
The military governor gen-
eral at the same time made it
clear that'.the newspaper the
regime` has in m nd is the prin-
cipal Communist organ. Mean-
while, it appears that the prb-
Commumist director of Baghdad
radio has been arrested.
There has been no sign of
a Communist retreat before the
growing boldness of the nation-
alists
PART' I
.Although the Communists
would seem wiser to avoid a di-
rect; trial with Qasim at this
stage, fear that their recent
loss, of momentum may mark the
beginning of a more permanent
decline could spur them to try
extreme tactics to maintain
their .position.
Iraq's relations with the
USSR remain close, despite
Qasim?s quarrel with the local
Communists, and deliveries of
Soviet military equipment con-
ti#~ue. At least three addition-
al shiploads of .:aircraft,
armored cars,and other equip-
ment arrived at $asra in June,
and orther shipments probably
~vi].1 arrive ~hi~r~l~.
In wtiat he said was an ef-
fbrt to bala~lce Iraq's foreign
relations, however, Qasim has
ordered from Britain 14 Canberra
(H-5'7} ,het light bbmbers. This
brdeir, a r+~spbnse to n. $ritish
arms aid offer o~ lgst spring,
was made--according tb the
Irat~Ls--in spite bf the much
lowe~~ price quoted them for So-
viet I~,~-~8 het bombers, one of
which has already been seen
flying over Baghdad.
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Effoir.ts by the Nasir regime
to re-enlist Baathist support
in Iraq could be undercut by
the regime's simultaneous ma-
neuvers against the Syrian
Baath party. In the elections
held on S July for the Nation-
al Union, the UAR's mass polit-
ical organization, one of the
ob3ectives in the Syrian region
apparently was to reduce the
influence of the Baath. With
some covert encouragement and
overt declarations of neutral-
ity from the authorities, Syrian
conservatives organized a tem-
porary alliance to bring the
Baath down, largely succeeding
in many areas,
The prospect of such a suc-
cess was arousing qualms even
before the elections, however,
since the effect of the Baath's
demise would be to leave the
field of independent political
activity exclusively to the Com-
munists and to strengthen the
impression that Syria is entire-
ly subservient politically to
its Egyptian partner,
Israel
Cairo's most immediately
pressing foreign policy problem
continues to be the issue of the
use of the Suez-Canal by Israeli
shipping and shippors. UN Sec-
retary Geheral Hammarsk3old dis-
cussed the sub,~ect with the
Egyptians last week and may have
obtained a clarification of the
UAR's public position, .as-well
as its "effective" policy on
the question,
Israel's cabinet crisis
has run its course, and Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion has an-
nounced his. intention to take
a "working vacation';" He now
heads a caretaker cabinet with-
out participation either by ma-
~or left- or right-wing minority
parties. The conservative Gen-
eral Zionists, who backed Ben-
Gurion in the confidence vote
last week, have said they re-
gard the caretaker arrangement
as the least of the possible
evils, pending elections early-
next November, but have de-
cli;,ned to participate in the
government.
The Shah, although continu-
ing his firm policy toward the
Sov:let Union, faces mounting
domestic and foreign pressures
to improve relations, Former
prime minister and elder states-
man Tabatabai, who represents
some conservative, neutralist
elements, is urging that steps
be taken to appease the USSR.
Tabatabai believes a good-
wila mission should be sent to
the USSR immediately to permit
Sovilet leaders to save face and
enable them to end their hos-
t i le; propaganda . He also ad-
vocates the signing of a non-
aggY~ession pact, believing that
thi.~ would cause the USSR to
overlook Iran's participation
in t;he Baghdad Pact and the
bil~~teral defense agreement
witY,~ the United States. Tabata-
bai, who again may be seeking
the premiership, suggests the
removal of Prime Minister Egbal
as a~ scapegoat for the current
d i 1 e:~mma .
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The Shah
could suceum to ese pressures
and agree to consider moves to
bring about improved relations.
Bloc propaganda attacks on
the Shah's regime continue at
a high level; an 30 June the
East German radio broadcast a
s~c~~r
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CURRENT IN'~ELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 195~~
Tudeh (Communist) party com-
muniqu~ in Persian calling for
"Death to end hatred for the
Shah and his associates."
The Yemeni situation re-
mains basically unstable, al-
though Crown Prince Badr has
survived the immediate crisis
created by mutinous activit
in army units.
Libya
Prime Minister Kubar, look-
ing toward parliamentary elec-
tions at the end of the year,
is becoming increasingly impa-
tient to resume negotiations on
the future level of American
financial assistance under the
Libyan-American base agreement.
In initial negotiations last
March the Libyan Government
aslt,ed for a ma,~or increase in
American aid as "runt" for
~'heelus Air Base, as well as
for much greater Libyan con-
trol over how the money is
spent.
I~ubar, who is sub,~ect to
dismissal at the Whim of King
Idriss and who has been steadily
criticized bar other gdvernment
officials, has been able to
hold an to the premiership large-~
ly because of his earlier suc-
ce.~~es in increasing British
and American aid commitments.
He has not Daly been pressing
the American ambassador for a
resumption of negotiations but
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als~~ has beam encouraging res-
sur~e by the Lib an press .
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EAST-WEST NEGOTIAPCIaNS
Pronouncements by Soviet
leaders since the foreign min-
isters' conference recessed
suggest that Gromyko will re-
turn to Geneva with instrudtions
to make ~, sef~io~is effairt tb rsl~-
tain ~,t least agreement in prin-
ciple on the main elements of
an interim Berlin settlement
which could be referred to a
summit meeting for final ap-
proval,
Gromyko's negotiating-~tgc.-
tics probably will be aimed at
achieving two minimum oblec-~
tines im such an agreement.
First, to induce the ~Vestera
minister to agree to new ar-
rangements which, in Moscow's
view, would establish a new
status for Berlin by superseding
PART
the postwar, agreements on which
exi.~tiag Allied rights- in Ber-
1in~~ are based. Z'Yiis new sta-
tus,, in the t7SSR's strategy,
wou]Ld ctitistitute the paint of
ciep`~~rtii~e fb~ etibse~iieat moires
artd ~tegotiations .conceraing'.the
t~est:ern positit~s is Bes'Iin. The
Soviet leaders probably believe
it arould be a mayor step toward
tertiiiriating the Allied "occupa-
tiar~ regime" acid Would further
erodle the Western legal. posi-
tio~~, and deteritiiaatiot~ to re-
mair~, in Berlih.
Z`he second Soviet ob~ec-
ti've probably j.s to win Western
agreement to the creation of an
a11-German committee on a parity
basis to discuss expansion of
contacts, reunification, and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE YY'EERLY SUMMARY
9 July 19:i9
?~hg principles of a peace
treaty. Such a committee, in
Mos-cow's view, would be a mayor
advance toward at least de
facto Western recognition of
the existence of two German
states and would enhance the
international status of the
East German regime.
After preliminary maneuver-
ing for position, Gramyko may
agree ?to adopt bath the Soviet
proposals of 10 and 19 June and
the Western proposals of 16
June as the basis for negotia-
tions.
Soviet officials have taken
an optimistic line on Geneva
prospects, Deputy Foreign ~din-
3:ster Zorin remarked to Ambas-
sador Thompson on 2 July that
if the West really wanted to
resolve the Berlin problem, an
agreement could certainly be
reached at Geneva. The coun-
selor of the Soviet Embassy
in Paris privately expressed
the belief that the second
phase of the conference-would
last only two weeks.
Gromyko probably will de-
velop the line set forth in-his
statement on 28 June in which
Tie attempted to convey the im-
pression that Western rights in
West Berlin would not be chal-
lenged at-the end of the pro-
posed time limit on all-German
negotiations and that these
rights would be respected during
an indefinite period of East-
West negotiations. Iiis state-
ment was also intended to en-
courage the belief that the
present system of Soviet con-
trols over Allied access to
West Berlin would be maintained
after the expiration of the
time limit.
In his efforts to induce
they West to agree to an interim
BeY~lin settlement on terms fa-
vor~able to the USSR, Gromyko
may offer concessions on such
points as the level of Western
"taken" forces in West Berlin
and. the inclusion of East Ber-
lin in a ban on subversive ac-
tivities and on nuclear weapons
and. missiles.
First Deputy Premier Kozlov
has closely adhered to the of-
fic:tal Soviet line in his pub-
lic and private statements in
the United States. Iie has de-
clared that a summit meeting
would be "very useful for soly-
ing ripe international ques-
tioris" regardless of the out-
comf~ of the foreign ministers'
coni'erenee.
Re~~etion to German Election
There has been no official
bloc. reaction to the. West Ger-
man presidential election in
West Berlin on 1 July, Pravda
ternned it a "gross provocation"
and the "crowning of Bonn's ob-
structionist deeds" which serves
to emphasize the urgency of a
Berlin settlement, An East
German editorial attributed the
bloc's failure to take counter-
measures to a desire not to
jeopardize the success of the
Geneva negotiations.
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9 Jit1y 195E-
Western Attitudes
While public morale in West
Berlin remains high, political
leaders there fear Moscow will
be encouraged by Western diver-
gencies and concessions to
adopt a more intransigent posi-
tion when the Geneva conference
resumes on 13 July. Berlin
leaders feel Bonn's performance
during ;the first six weeks at
Geneva confirms their belief
that the Adenauer government
cannot be fully trusted. They
see London under domestic pres-
sure to convene a~ summit meet-
ing at any price, and consider
the French "vocal firmness" on
Berlin as lacking any real au-
thority because of French mili-
tary weakness. Believing'that
Berlin's fate rests in the
hands of the United States,
they have become especially
alarmed over what they see as
"Berlin fatigue" in America.
The British press, taking
its cue from Prime Minister
Macmillan's optimistic stage-
meats and from Foreign Office
briefings, continues to antici-
pate early agreement on holding
a summit conference. Recogniz-
ing the present deadlock on the
Berlin question, British comment
increasingly sees the nuclear
test bane talks as providing the
essential measure of progress
to ,justify a meeting of heads
of governmeht. Government
spokesmen have encouraged the
belief that a summit conference
might endorse a draft test ban
agreement, despite their aware-
ness that Paris has underlined
its refusal to have this. topic
considered..
While the North Atlantic
Council discussion on 6 July
PART' I
seemed to end pressure for. spe-
cial NATO foreign ministers'
consultations, same uneasiness
aver the Western position was
revealed, The Dutch and Bel-
gia,n delegations stressed the
desirability of further infor-
mation on the Soviet version
of an all-German committee in
ord~:er to clarify whether this
offered possibilities for agree-~
men:t .
There was general empha-
sis on the desirability of con-
tinuing talks with the Russians,
with some representatives opin-
ing that it would be necessary
under any circumstances to hold
a summit meeting. The discus-
sions also brought out state-
ments that there was a need for
further clarification from the
USSR regarding the status of
Western rights in West Berlin
at the expiration of a time
limit on all-German negotiations.
Geneva Nuclear fialks
Soviet delegate Tsarapkin
las-fr week sought to bring fur-
ther pressure on-the Western
pos:tion in the test--cessation
negotiations by accusing the
Unitted States and Uritain of
sta'LYing ~y avoiding a reply
to ~Chrushchev's proposal for
an annual quota of veto-free
inspections; of sites of sus-
peci;ed nuclear explosions. He
presised the Western delegates
for an early answer, asserting
that: the nggoitions had made
no progress during the last
two months since ~hrushchev
introduced his proposal,
Soviet propagaiada echoed
this, theme, charging "United
States military quarters" with
blocking agreement by raising
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9 July 1959
obstacles such as "unaccept-
able demands about the composi-
tion of control-post person-
nel and the arbitrary dispatch
of inspection teams," At the
same time, however, Moscow
stressed that the remaining
issues are not insoluble and
that agreement could be con-
cluded quickly if the West will
"exert efforts to reach agreed
decisionsb" Soviet First Depu-
ty Premier Kozlov reportedly
took a similar line in Detroit
on 7 July, expressing the view
that the three nuclear powers
are close to an agreement on
an :Lnspection system based on
Khr~~shchev's proposal for an
ann~xal inspection quota.
The Technical Working
Groixp on the detection and
identification of high-altitude
exp:Losions has agreed on methods
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9 July 195!
In its only cobuuentary
on the incident, Peiping on
6 Juiy denied Nationalist claims
of five MIGs shot down,.al-
though admitting that one~~MIG
crashed while making a high-
speed dive. Communist odd-day
bombardments of the offshgre
islands have been light! The
Communists, however, have suf-
ficient resources in the off-
shore islands areas to in-
tensify military activity
with little or no warn-
ing.
On 5 and 6 July, Peiping
issued the 54th and 55th "seri-
ous warnings:," charging that
American naval vessels had "in-
truded" into Communist-claimed
waters -near Pingtan Island and the
Paiehuan Islands, The warnings
suggest Peiping is particularly
anxious at this time to demon-
strate American responsibility
for continued tension in the
Taiwan Strait,
As part of their effort
to demonstrate leniency toward
Nationalist military personnel,
the Communists on 30 June re-
leas~ed three pilots captured
last fall and on 6 July per-
mitted ten members of a Nati?nal-
ist "intelligence team" to re-
turn "to`their families an
Taiwan a ~'
American officials on Tai-
wan :reported on 30 June that
the ivationalists, as scheduled,
had ~~ompleted the .withdrawal
of 15,000 troops from Chinmen
Island, leaving an estimated
05,O~0 troops on the Chinmens
orga~aized into five infantry
divi~~ions, four tank battalions,
one artillery group, , and vari
ous tamaller units.
SOVIET CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING
The Soviet central commit-
tee meeting from 24 to 29 June
set forth an extremely compre-
hensive program for drawing up
detailed plans for the mechani-
zation and automation of indus-
try during the Seven-Year Plan
(1959-65). In the final reso-
lution, which assigned detailed
responsibilities to government
and party organizations at all
levels, 36 separate tasks were
enumdrat~d4
Guidance was given for
each branch of industry a,s to
the 1:echnological processes and
improvements that are to be
emph~~sized, Reconstruction and.
expansion of existing plants are
stre~~sed over the building of
new plants, Khrushehev?s gen-
eral policy of using material
ineen~tives rather than coercion
is ag;ain appliede prices,
wages,, and bonuses are to be
amendled so that managers and
workers will welcome new
machinery--not resist it, as
has often been the case. USSR
Gosplan was instructed .to
work ou1+, together with
other organizations, proposals
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY g~~jgY
9 July 1959
USSR: SELECTED TASKS SPECIFIED BY RESOLUTION OF PARTY
CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, JUNE 1959
ORGANIZATIONS
Gosplan USSR
State Committee for Automation
and Machine Building
State Committees of USSR Council
of Ministers
TASKS
standardized regulations for
creating, producing, and testing
experimental models of new ma-
chines and handing them over to
series production.
COORDINATION AND DEADLINES
will see to it that brandies of
industry and construction, in
agreement with Councils oi' Min-
isters of Union Republics, work
out and confirm within three
months --
Gosplan USSR will work out in conjunction proposals for improving finan-
Ministry oP Finance with organizations concerned and cial methods Por introduction
submit to the TiSSR Council of Min- of new machines. This would
isters by 1 September 1959 involve better allocation of
funds and material resources
and the. setting of prices which
will stimulate the manufacture
as well as the use of the new
machines.
State Committee on Labor and
Wages
Gosplan USSR
Ministry of Finance
All-Union Central Council of
Trade Unions
State Scientific-Technical
Committee
will prepare jointly wit: Coun-
cils of Ministers of Union Re-
publics, State Committees of the
USSR Council of Min iste~~s, and
branches of industry and con-
struction and submit to the par-
ty central committee and the USSR
Council of Ministers by 1 ttovember
1959 - -
will work out, together with the
State Committee on Automation and
Machine 3uilding, the State Com-
mittees on industry and construc-
tion of the USSR Council of Min-
isters, the Councils of Ministers
oP the Union Republics, and the
sovnarkhozes, and submit to the
party central committee and the
7558 Council oP Ministers by 1 De-
cember 1959 -- -
on the priorities and time lim-
its for integrating automation
in various national economic
branches. These proposals are
to be submitted to the central
committee and the USSR CounC11
of Ministers before 1 December
1959,
Widespread mechanization
and automation of Soviet indus-
try is necessary if the goal
of an 80-percent increase in
industrial production in the
Seven-Year Plan period is to
be achieved. This goal appears
feasible, and the detailed work
done in preparation for the
central committee meeting puts
the vital mechanization and
automation programs off to a
well-ordered start. The recent
"socialist competition" pledges
to meet goals in five or six
instead of seven years were
continued at the ~ileaum, and
PA9,T I I
proposals for establishing eco-
nomic stimuli to encourage en-
terprises and construction or-
ganizations to introduce new
technology, and for raising ma-
terial incentives of workers to
adopt new technology.
proposals on the priorities and
time limits for carrying out
integrated automation in var-
ious branches of the national
economy.
the "appeal" issued by the
plenum emphasized fulfillment
ahea+d of schedule.
In a tough, hard-hitting
spassition's intensified agita-
tion with repressive police ac-
tior~ are likely to touch off
serious disturbances, ?-ih-hich
cou]'.d cause New Delhi to act
prior to mid-August.
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THE S ITUATION I1~T CEYLON
Prime Minister Bandara=
mike's government on 8 July
survived its first test in the
Ceylonese ,parliament since left-
ist members of the coalition
withdrew two months ago. Ban-
daranaike thus has time for
further maneuvering, but remains
in a precarious position. His
one-man working majority voted
against the censure motion--
which was defeated 54-41--while
several opposition members ab-
stained, apparent'~,y reluctant to
bring down the government and
force new elections at this
time. The firm action taken
by the government in the past
few days to counter leftist
strike activity also appears
to have blunted the threat to
Bandaranaike's position from
this direction.
Opposition groups had
united to censure the govern-
ment following debate in parlia-
ment on the 30 June speech from
the throne, which has been wide-
ly criticized for its lack of
constructive proposals. The
Trotskyite Lanka Sama Samar
party (LSSP) led.. the attack on
Bandaranaike, alleging that his
government was corrupt and had
forfeited its mandate following
the breakup of the coalition.
Virtually all other leftist and
right-wing elements in the op-
position ~oin+~d in the motion
disapproving the government's
prog:ra~n .
Some parliament members,
however, apparently decided to
abstain or be absent during the
vote:, presumably because they
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9 July 1959
want t? avoid elections at this
time. Conspicuous among these
were the three Communists and
several Communist sympathizers,
who probably fear elections would
enable conservative elements
to recc-ver considerable strength
in parliament.
By taking a firm stand in
negotiations to end the current
Colombo port strike,Ba,nda.ranaike
has forced a showdown with the
powerful LSSP-led unions which
have threatened a general-strike.
His parliamentary victory, com-
bined with growing public op-
position to strike activity,
should strengthen his hand in
dealing with labor disturbances.
Response to the government's
recruitment of a 5,000-man
''volunteer" labor force to main-
tai.n essential services during
strikes has been enthusiastic,
with 12,000 persons applying
during the past few days.
Bandaranaike remains vul-
net~;~,ble, however, since pos-
sible defections by either left-
ist or rightist members of the
government party can easily de-
pri~ve him of his slender majori-
ty. In addition, conservative
elements in and out of parlia-
men7t who desire an end to
Bandaranaike's ineffective rule
and early elections may renew
the~tr consideration of various
plans to seize power through
INDONESIAN CONSTITUTIOi~TAL CHANGE
President Sukarna's rein-
statement of the 1945 constitu-
tion on 5 July, part of his ef-
fort to bring "guided democracy"
to Indonesia, provides a sem-
blance of legality for actions
he has already taken and paves
the way for continued direct
presidential government. His
earlier attempt to secure the
constitution?s re-adoption failed
on 2 June when the now-dissolved
Constituent Assembly failed to
approve the move by the required
two-thirds majority.
The new presidential cab-
inet which ~uas announced in
part on 9 July is dominated by
technicians and the army. It
is again led by the nonparty
Dr. Djuanda, who now holds the
title of'first minister,"
since under the constitution
Sukarno himself theoretically
heads the cabinet . The key posts
of finance, defense, and far=
eign affairs are held res~aec-
tiveiy by Djuanda, Army Chief
of Staff General Nasution, and
Subandr3.a, who retains the
portfolio he held in the former
cabinet.
The cabinet also includes
as e~x officio ministers the
chiefs of staff of the three
armed forces and three high-
rank:ing civil government offi-
cials. Yet to be appointed
are a number of deputy minis-
ters whose political orientation
may- alter the complexion of
the cabinet. Lt has not been
announced whether General Nasu-
tion will serve concurrently
as army chief of staff and de-
fense minister or whether he
will resign from the former post.
A provisional legislature--
comp~~sed of members of the pres-
ent. ~ ;parliament reinforced by
regional and'functional" rep-
rese>tatives--and a provisional
"sup:reme advisory council" are
to b~~ created "within the short-
est ~oossible time.tT The means
of their formation--whether by
elections or appointment-=has
not Keen specified.
The change in constitution
does not provide any ready-made
solui;ions to Indonesia's chronic
diffilcultiES, nor does it indicate
that Sukarno will make a determined
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new effort to cope with the
problems of a growing Commu-
nist party, continued insurgent
activities, and a deteriorating
economy. 'The constitution is
vaguely written, and until its
provisions are spelled out by
legislation ar determined by
precedent it will lend itself
to a flexible, improvised, and
highly centralized administra-
tion.
The army has consistently
supported Sukarno's return to
the old constitution. It al-
readly holds extraordinary pow-
ers under the prevailing ''state.
of ~!ar," and, with its increased
pol3.tical role, it may make fur-
ther efforts to curtail the
growth and activities of the
Communist party.
INTERNAL DISPUTE IN RULING MALAYAN PARTY
Serious conflict may be
developing between Malay and
Chinese elements in the ruling
Alliance party of Malaya over
the apportionment of candidates
for the 19 August general elec-
tions. The Malayan Chinese As-
sociation (MCA), the Chines?
component of the Alliance, is
demanding 40 of the 104 nomina-
tions- in an effort to assure a
veto over any unilateral Malay
effort to amend the donstitution.
While this figure corresponds
roughly to the percentage of
Chinese in Malaya's population,
it far exceeds the proportion
of Chinese among the country's
registered voters,
The MCA also is demanding
that the Alliance election mani-
festo endorse the principle of
school examinations in Chinese
until such time as holding them
in the official Malay language
becomes practical--a concession
which might cause a serious ad-
verse reaction among Malays.
Some prominent MCA leaders are
reportedly willing to split the
Alliance if the United Malay
National Organization (UMNO),
the Malay-oriented and dominant
organization in the Alliance,
fails to agree to MCA demands.
While an open split will
probably not develop prior to
the. general elections, the situ-
ation points up the serious
dilemma faced by the Alliance
an race relations. This problem
could ultimately destroy the
organization and, with. it, pa-
lit'ic;a stability in Malaya. On
the one hand, added concessions
to the Chinese may become in-
creasingly necessary if the MCA
is to stay in the Alliance and,
at the same time, develop into
an effective spokesman for the
37 percent of the population
which is Chinese, On .the other
hand, concessions to the Chinese
are likely to alienate a growing
number of Malays.
Holding the party together
under these conditions is likely
to become increasingly diffi--
cult in the face of the stead-
ily growing strength of opposi-
tion parties whose programs are
designed to appeal to a single
race, Rule by any party pri-
marily concerned with the in-
terests of either Chinese ar
Malays could easily lead to
widespread disorders in Malaya,
where intense suspicions already
exist between the two races.
The first major defeats
suffered by the Alliance oc-
curred last month when the nar-
row, racially oriented Pan-
Malayan Islamic party swept
two state assembly elec-
tions in the predominantly
Malay states of Trengganu
and Kelantan.
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9 July 1959
CAMEROON
Incre~,ti?d. terrorism : in :.the
first week of July in Cameroun
and the threat of serious labor
disturbances at the seaport of
Douala suggest that nationalist
extremists may be initiating
disorders in order to discredit
the moderate government and to
focus world attention on this
French trust terr~.tory before
it gains independence, ached=
uled for January 160.
The violence, directed at
targets ranging from cafds and
stores to a gendarmerie post,
has already resulted in the
deaths of at lest 13 persons,
including six Europeanso The
government has announced a
state of alert in four areas,
armed police patrolled the
streets of the capital on 6 July,
and Europeans have demanded per-
mission to organize ""self-
defense groups." The French
high commissioner reportedly
plans to group all Europeans
in one area. and to reinforce
Location of recent terrorist actions
.~EC'1~ET
the .police and gendarmerie with
reserve officers and men.
Concurrently the Cameroun
Government is concerned over the
posisibility that there may be a
gent~ral and prolonged strike
among part, electrical, railroad,
and communications workers at
Douala; officials allege that
the local labor organization is
recEaiving financial support from
Communists via agents on ships
calling at the seaports A suc-
cessful strike, however, does
not appear likely at this tima~
be,ca.use of the organizational
weal!:ness of the labor unions
The terrorism and threat of
labc-r disturbances may be a des-
peratte effort of the extreme
nationalist movement, the Union
of the Cameroons Population (UPC),
to alisrupt the .territory?s econ-
omy in order to show the world
that the present moderate and pro-
French government is incompetent
and that new elections are needed
before independence.
The UPG created serious
disorders in Douala in
1955 and subsequently
conducted guerrilla war-
fare against the govern-
ment for two years,
Following its mil-
- itary defeat last au-
tumn, the movement ap-
pears to have split ?:.
with one faction willing
to use legal political
means to achieve an ex-
treme nationalist pro-
gram However, an ex-
tremist wing, apparently
led by Felix Moumie and
composed largely of ex-
patriates, carries on
antigovernment activi-
ties from other African
areas., ,particularly
Guinea
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 19~i9
Prodded by the Maumie fac-
tion, Guinea and Ghana are seek-
ing to obtain backing in the
autumn UN General Assembly ses-
sion for new Cameroun elections
to be held under international
supervision. However, there is
little international support
for a reopening of the Cameroun
question--the subject of a re-
sumed General Assembly session
lasot February and March,
MOROCCO STRENGTIiENING TIES WITH UAR
Moroccan Premier Ibrahim's
15-27 June visit to the UAR a-
gain demonstrates Raba.t's desire
to strengthen ties with Cairo--
a desire apparent since April
when Crown Prince Moulay Hassan
and two Moroccan ministers un-
dertook a similar trip.. Previ-
ously Morocco had remained rel-
atively aloof in its dealings
with UAR President Nasir, whose
aspirations for hegemony in
North Africa were resented by
Moroccan authorities.
In addition to producing
a noticeably warmer attitude to-
ward the Nasir regime among the
high Moroccan officials directly
involved, these visits have .led
to wide-ranging discussions and
to plans far cooperation. in variP
ous fields, Reports circulated
at the time of Moulay Hassan's
visit indicated that a plan had
been drawn up whereby Morocco
would buy LIAR arms and send ca-
dets to the UAE military academy,
A desire to bolster Ibrahim?s
domestic prestige also seems to
have" .~e~tered ? ..into King-
Mohamed V's :decision to
send the premier to Cai-
ro.
Ibrahim, who talked with
a,nd lavished public praise on
Nasir an several occasions,
signed a cultural agreement pro-
viding for an exchange of teach-
ers, scholastic missions, and
sc ient if is personne 1, and for
the establishment of new cultur-
al centers in both countries.
He had also hoped to conclude
a new payments agreement, but
negotiations are still going
on in Rabat.
The premier also reportedly
urged a reform of the Arab League,
with the aim of transforming it
into an instrument of general
Arab rather than just UAR pol-
icy, This objective has in re-
cent months stimulated Morocco
to take a more active part in
league affairs--evidenced asps-
cially by its participation with
Leb.a,non and Libya in the league's
special subcommittee on the Iraq-
UAR dispute--and to promote at
least a formal reconciliation
bet~~-een Tunisia. and the UAR--a
seemingly imminent development.
Morocco's new orientation
toward the UAR and the Arab East
promises to be developed further
whe> Moulay Hassan returns to
the UAR for its 23 July eele-
bra~tions and King Mohamed makes
a s7tate visit next January. On
the USSR's side, its top military
man? Vice President Abd al-Hakim
Amin?, is scheduled to go to Mo-
rocco in November. As a result
Morocco's devotion to its non-
alignment policy will probably
be strengthened, along ~-ith its
detf~rmination to secure the early
evacuation of all foreign forces
and bases in Morocco. These in-
clude the five American air bases,
as Drell as the regaining 22,04
Frer.~ch and 0 5 troops .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUllCI[AxY
9 July 1959
25X6
THE FRENCH 'COMMU'NIST PARTY'S 15TH CONGRESS
The French Communist party
(pCF} devoted its long-postponed
15th party congress from 24 to
28 June largely to an effort to
refurbish its public image as
the leading element of respon-
sible opposition to De Gaulle
and his Fifth Republic. The
party seems to expect little
improvement in its position in
the near future but to be wait-
ing until general disillusion-
ment with the De Gaulle regime
sets in. Secretary General
Thorez predicted 'ta long
hard struggle" to "'regroup
worker and democratic
forces."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 1959
Congress proceedings il-
lustrated the difficulties the
party faces in this effort.
Patently handicapped by the ab-
sence as yet of any widespread
dissatisfaction with De Gaulle,
the congress nevertheless de-
nounced him as a "fascist" and
asserted that the French econ-
omy is about to collapse. It
also bucked prevailing nation-
alist views in France by reaf-
firming Algeria's right to in-
dependence and charged that
French development of atomic
and hydrogen bombs is "con-
trary to the national interest."
Thorez? reference to':the
problem of recruiting as '"one
of the persisting weaknesses
of the party" and his lengthy
denunciation of "revisionism"
suggest that the decline in
party fortunes continues and
that there are still internal
dissensions. However, PCF Lead-
ers insisted that party policy
was correct and gave no indica-
tion of altering the basic line.
The principal strategy laid
down at the congress was the
achievement "at all costs" of
unity of action with all f1dem-
ocratically inclined forces,"
particularly the rank-and-file
Soci~.alists. There was mare
empY~asis than at the 1956 con-
gress on winning over the "urban
pett;y bourgeoisie." The party
may see some prospect of a
temporary alliance with tradi-
tiorially anticlerical groups
on t;he thorny church-school is-
sue, which may be brought up
in Parliament later this month.
The party, however, is in a poor
posj,tion for action in Parlia-
ment, where it now has only IO
depv~ties and I4 senators, even
though it has regained since
the November parliamentary elec-
tion most of the electoral fol-
lowing it had under the Fourth
Republic ,
In view of the unpopular
political Line taken by the
party, its most promising line
of attack on the De Gaulle re-
gime at present appears to be
through the Communist-led Gen-
eral. Confederation of Labor
(CGT). A recent CGT appeal to
the nan-Communist unions for a
"common front" against the gov-
ernment program and far eventual
organic unity has been rejected,
but increasing practical coopera- 25X1
tion among the unions has been
evident in several recent token
strikes.
PRESSURE FOR REVISING IIS - BRITISH WEST INDIES .BASE AGREEMENT
Trinidad's anti-US premier,
Eric Williams, is enjoying some
success in his Long-standing
efforts to limit American use
of naval facilities in Trinidad,
He is calling for a conference
of representatives from the
United States, Britain, the
West Indies Federation Govern-
ment, and the Trinidad Govern-
ment to consider revising the
1941 US-British agreement giving
the United States rent-free use
of Caribbean bases--notably the
naval station at Chaguaramas,
Trinidad--for 99 years,
Williams insists that
Chaguaramas be the site for the
capital of the year-old federa-
tion and has rejected US assur-
ances that the military need for
Chaguaramas will be reconsidered
about 1968.
Sentiment far revision
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEI~~KLY ~SUI~M~IRY
9 July 1959
is increasing, not only in
Trinidad, but in the West Indies
generally.
Most .recently, Williams'
attacks have been centered on
London and the West Indies Fed-
eration's prime minister, Sir
Grantley Adams, principally be-
cause of Adams? request. that
the Macmillan government ar-
range a meeting with United
States, British, and West Indies
Federation officials, but with-
to deal with what he termed
"flagrant violations" of the
Chaguaramas base agreement.
Landon granted this demand on
3 July.
London wants early talks
with the United States on re-
vising the base agreement. It
argues that nationalist senti-
ment may rise further and that
Williams will one day be the
West Indies prime minister.
Parliamentary Under Secretary
saianos ?~ C'r
JAMAICA.
Caribbean
,Federation of the Wes[ Indies
i
out separate representation for
Trinidad. As part of this cam-
paign, Williams precipitated a
constitutional crisis on 20
June when the revised Trinidad
constitution came into force.
This revision establishes a cab-
inet system, with the prime min-
ister rather than the governor
presiding over the cabinet.
Williams demanded that his
government and not London have
control of the police in order
for Colonial Affairs Julian.
Amery, who flew to Trinidad to
deal with the local constitution-
al crisis, is said to believe
that Williams will never ac-
quiesce in talks being held
without Trinidad's participa-
tion. -The demagogic premier
may well seek to fortify his
local position by calling for
new elections if his demands
are not met
ARGENTINE CRISIS EASES
Argentine President Fron-
dizi, by naming new officials
to several key military pasts,
has considerably reduced the
revolutionary pressures of the
past month. This step was
paramount among the numerous de-
mands of the armed forces, which
had expressed themselves strong-
ly against military assignments
vueraro
n~~IC---O^^--..,, VIRGIN - - -
L/~ISL~ANDS ~! - NeVIS -
~l~'~ (Antigua
St. Christopher Gvedeloupa _
Montserrate r?
OGominica
flMa rti niq ue.
~Sl. Lucia
Si. Vincent. ?
Barkados
Grenada~?
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CUftftENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 July 19b9
tinged with political favoritism
as well as on the danger of
Communist and Peronista influ-
ence in the government,
The new military appoint-
ments were in response to two
specific demands: separation
of the top army and navy com-
mands from the army and navy
secretaries, and the ouster of
former Army Secretary Solanas
Pacheco, who had permitted fa=
voritism to undermine discipline.
The new army secretary, ap-
pointed on I July, is 71-year-
old Brig. Gen, Elbio Anaya, who
had retired in 1947.. Both Anaya
and the new undersecretary are
known as strong officers who
avoid politics. They are said
to be making good first impres-
sions . Ma j . Gen. Hector Lambaxdf,
a noncontroversial officer, was
named active army commander in
chief ,
Admiral Adolfo Estevez, a
key figure in the anti-Peron
revolution of 1955 and a strong
supporter of constitutional gov-
ermE3nt, remains as naval secre-
tar,~ despite a deep cleavagd
in i~he navy over his tenure,
The post of chief of naval oper-
ati