CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002300040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2006
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO.
OCR NO.2734/59
11 June 1959
b CUMENT NO.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
TO ARCHIVES & RECOROS CENTER
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i-P
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
I.Y MT HSE
4 k1t.; 4.. .~ J[~
DOS review completed
OSD review(s) completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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COQ
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The USSR's new proposal for an "interim settlement"
of the Berlin problem apparently was designed to confront
the Western powers with a choice between taking the initi-
ative to break off the talks or abandoning their insist-
ence on an explicit Soviet reaffirmation of Allied rights
in Berlin. Although the Soviet leaders presumably expected
immediate rejection of their proposal, they probably hoped
this move would prompt an initiative by at:least one.of'.the
Western powers to prevent a breakoff and a subsequent sharp-
ening of the Berlin crisis. If the Western powers refuse
to modify their position, however, Moscow appears willing
to accept an early breakoff on the calculation that a period
of intensified pressure will eventually induce the West to
make additional concessions on Berlin, Germany, and Euro-
pean security and to resume negotiations on terms more
favorable to the USSR.
Page 4
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MIDDLE EAST HIGHLIGHTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Iraqi Communists may be attempting to generate
new pressures on Qasim to take further action against anti-
Communist elements; in general, however,, Iraq appears
OSD review(s) completed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
relatively quiet. In the Sudan, the Abboud regime, en-
gaged in restoring discipline in the army, now may be
faced with increasing demands for greater civilian par-
ticipation in the government. Israel is awaiting the
outcome of diplomatic efforts before taking the Suez
Canal shipping issue to the UN Security Council. The
Jordan-UAR border remains closed following the incident
there last week, and the UAR is undertaking a "restrained"
propaganda campaign against King Husayrn, Considerable
political maneuvering is likely in Lebanon following the
expiration of the Karami government's emergency powers.
THE UAR'S NATIONAL UNION ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The Nasir regime on 15 July will hold a popular elec-
tion--the first since the formation of the UAR--to choose
60,000 members for the country's only political organiza-
tion, the National Union. Successful candidates will be-
gin the task of organizing almost every facet of UAR polit-
ical life through the formation of local and provincial
councils and will furnish the cadre from which Nasir will
choose the first UAR national assembly? The authoritarian
government may hope the results will giLve it a new basis of
strength through ostensible public Participation in shaping 25X1
LAOS . . .
Page 4
The Laotian Army has abandoned its attempt to round
up the rebellious Pathet Lao battalion. The government
decision to free the top pro-Communist leaders from house
arrest was bitterly disputed in the cabinet by young civil-
ian and military reformers. They remain unreconciled to
the premier's policy of "moderation," and the divergence
of views may revive the factional disputes that preoccupied
the government in February and March. The Communist bloc
has brought new charges of a projected "military alliance"
between South Vietnam and Laos to support its campaign for
the reconvening of the International Control Commission.
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Indonesia has remained outwardly calm since the Con-
stituent Assembly's rejection of President Sukarno's re-
quest for readoption of the 1945 constitution. It appears
likely that the army decree of 2 June banning political
activity will preserve the status quo until President
Sukarno's return to Djakarta on 28 June, after which be
is expected to take some form of action to put the 1945
constitution into effect and form a no residential
cabinet. F 7 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 June 1959
PART II (continued)
MALAYA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The sweeping victories of the ruling Alliance party
in the Federation of Malaya's eight state assembly elec-
tions foreshadow its continued domination of national af-
fairs following the general elections in August. Despite
the victories of the multiracial Alliance, there is a tend-
ency for Chinese and Malayan votes to polarize along racial
lines. The Malayan leaders view the recent victory of the
left-wing People's Action party in Singapore as a threat
to Malaya, believing that the party intends to establish
its
lf i
e
n the Federation in an effort ? to win control of
M
'
alaya
s large Chinese minority.
DRIVE TO OUST COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN ][NDIA'S KERALA
STATE . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
. . . . . . . . . . . .
A coalition of non-Communist political and communal
groups in India's Kerala State appears to be moving toward
a showdown with the Communist state government. The Commu-
nists have frustrated previous opposition attacks but now
appear to be facing a more unified and determined effort.
Nehru has instructed his followers to avoid violence, but
e
xtremists' attempts to provoke Communist police units to
JJQA _- 1-4
ETHIOPIAN EMPEROR TO VISIT MOSCOW . Page 8
. . . . . . . . ... .
Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia apparently hopes
his forthcoming visits to Moscow, Prague, and Cairo will
convince African leaders of Ethiopia's :independence from
the West and thereby further enhance his stature as a
leader in the pan-African movement. Although Selassie
may be willing to accept limited credits from Moscow, So-
viet efforts to establish closer ties with Addis-Ababa and
to undermine Ethiopia's r ationshi wish the United States
are unlikely to succeed. 25X1
OPPOSITION TO CASTRO GOVERNMENT GROWING
. . . . Page
Plotting against Fidel Castro's regime is apparently
increasing among numerous groups in Cuba and in exile, al-
though they lack unity. No attempt to overthrow Castro is
likely to succeed at this time, but economic stagnation
and increasing doubts about the competence and political
orientation of the new administration are crystallizing the
opposition. The recentl
y promulgated Agrarian Reform Law
has provoked strong resentment among landowners and may im-
pel some of th
m t
e
o counterrevolutionary activity.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
STATUS OF THE NICARAGUAN REVOLUTION . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Nicaraguan President Somoza has overcome the immediate
threat to his regime but still faces a militant domestic
opposition and possible new invasion attempts. The busi-
nessmen's strike in the capital, which began on 1 June,
had ended by 8 June. Most of the men in the two small reb-
el. groups flown in from Costa Rica are reported to have
surrendered on 11 June. Further outbreaks of civil re-
sistance may occur, however
VIOLENCE IN ECUADOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Conservative President Ponce of Ecuador has overcome
the most serious challenge to his government's stability
since its inauguration in September 1956. Communists and
other extremists tried to exploit two days of violence
touched off by student groups in Guayaquil, but order was
restored under martial law. Ponce faces possible further
threats to stability from the followers of former Presi-
dent Velasco, who has considerable support among senior-
and middle-level officers in the armed forces.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE SICILIAN REGIONAL ELECTIONS . . . . . Page 11
Solid gains in the 7 June Sicilian elections by Sil-
vio Milazzo's Christian Social Union pose new problems on
a national scale for the Italian Christian Democratic
party (CD). If regular Christian Democrats join with
Milazzo, who founded his new party after he was expelled
in October 1958 from the CD for dissidence, in forming a
new regional government, it will probably aggravate tend-
encies toward disunity among national CI) leaders and
throughout the rank and file.
SPAIN'S RELATIONS WITH MOROCCO . . .
. . . . . . . . . Page
Spanish-Moroccan relations, marred in the winter of
1957-58 by armed clashes within Spain's enclave of Ifni,
now are maintaining the cordial atmosphere established in
April by Moroccan Premier Ibrahim's talks with top Spanish
Government leaders. These relations may soon become ruf-
fled, however, if Madrid persists in stalling in the. face
of rising Moroccan pressure for evacuation of Spanish
troops. The recently established joint commission on mu-
tual problems of a technical nature is to meet again early
next month, but little progress is anticipated.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
DE VALERA RETIRING TO IRISH PRESIDENCY . . . . , . . . . Page 14
The election on 17 June will probably mark a turning
point in Ireland's political development. Eamon de Valera,
who for three decades has dominated the Irish scene, is
assured of the ceremonial position of president. His prob-
able successor as prime minister is his, chief lieutenant,
.Sean Lemasso A referendum on the same day will probably
abolish proportional representation and thereby facilitate
the retirement of other veteran politicians and the even-
tual emergence of a two-party system.
AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN YUGOSLAVIA . . . . . . . . , . . . Page 15
Partly in response to bloc charges that Yugoslavia
is encouraging the restoration of capitalism in the country-
side, Yugoslav Vice President Kardelj reaffirmed in May
that Belgrade's long-range goal is the "socialization" of
agriculture. He stressed, however, that the regime intends
to continue its gradual approach, concentrating on the ex-
pansion of Yugoslavia's state farms and modest pressure on
the private farmer to engage in cooperative activity. This
course, the regime feels, is justified by past and prospec-
tive successes in agricultural production, particularly the
record crop expected this year,
USSR REVALUES CAPITAL EQUIPMENT . . . . . , . . . , . Page 16
A nationwide revaluation of fixed assets in the Soviet
economy, first announced three years ago, is to be carried
out as of 1 January 1960. The revaluation is the first
such comprehensive program since 1925. Based on 1955
prices, it is expected to result in an over-all increase
in the valuation of capital equipment and to be acpompa-
nied by an increase in amortization rates which will re-
flect a -greater consideration of technological obsoles-
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KHRUSHCHEV AND SOVIET IDEOLOGICAL SUPREMACY .
. . . . Page
At the specially summoned 21st party congress in Feb-
ruary, Khrushchev asserted primacy in matters of Marxist
doctrine. He placed the seal of orthodoxy on his entire
program, probably hoping to correct the ideological con-
fusion that arose from the air of improvisation inherent
in some of his programs. Moreover, he has attempted to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 June 1959
PART III (continued)
provide the international Communist movement with a foun-
tainhead of theory and interpretation lacking since the
death of Stalin--a move intended to check the erosion of
Soviet leadership and bloc unity caused by Yugoslav her-
esies and Chinese claims to have found in the communes a
short cut to Communism.
CIVIL DEFENSE PREPARATIONS IN EASTERN EUROPE . . . . . . Page 4
All East European satellite countries have increased
civil defense preparations during the past two years. The
present level of preparedness varies, but three or more
satellites have introduced universal, compulsory civil-de-
tense training--including measures against atomic and bio-
logical attack; have begun organizing special civil defense
troops; held air-raid drills in selected cities; sent civil
defense officials to the USSR for extended periods of train-
ing; and are continuing construction of air-raid shelters.
The tempo of activity and a few target dates mentioned in
connection with civil defense training suggest that some
predet level of re ;redness is planned for 1960 or
1961.
25X1
CHINESE NATIONALIST FORCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Nationalist China?s armed forces continued to improve
during 1958. However, they are not capable of defending
Taiwan and the Penghu Islands against an all-out Chinese
Communist attack without American air, :naval, and logisti-
cal support. They could hold out only from four days to
two weeks on the offshore islands. Improvement can be
expected to continue, but at a slower puce, as present
reorganization plans near completion. inflationary pres-
sures are forcing consideration of strength reductions,
and, as the government's objective of a return to the
mainland becomes less and less likely of fulfillment, in-
creased
ff
e
orts probably will be necessary to maintain
f
e
ficiency and satisfactory morale.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Foreign Minister Gromyko's
proposal at Geneva for an "in-
terim solution" of the Berlin
problem, introduced
plenary session on 10 June, was
a major bid to crack the hither-
to unified Western position de-
manding an explicit Soviet re-
affirmation of Allied rights in
West Berlin. Gromyko's offer
to permit the Western powers to
maintain "certain occupation
rights" in West Berlin for one
year, which he portrayed as an
effort to find common ground
for an agreement, was apparently
designed to compel the Western
ministers either to modify their
position and accept a compromise
which would omit any reference
to Allied rights or to take the
initiative in breaking off the
talks.
Khrushchev's interview on
6 June with the Hungarian press
agency was intended to under-
score the firmness of the So-
viet stand. The USSR, he de-
clared, "cannot under any pres-
sure accept an agreement which
perpetuates the occupation re-
gime in West Berlin." This
statement was in reply to Presi-
dent Eisenhower's call in his
press conference of 3 June for
a clear Soviet commitment re-
affirming Western rights in
Berlin. Khrushehev's firm
tone was intended as a warning
that Moscow was under no compul-
sion to make concessions, par-
ticularly on Berlin, in order
to ensure the holding of a
summit meeting. He said the
question of whether there would
be a meeting was entirely in
the hands of the Western leaders.
If they do not desire to solve
outstanding questions, he de-
clared, then the meeting "natural-
ly will not take place and world
opinion will be able to see who
is to blame for the frustra-
tion of the summit conference."
Although the Soviet lead-
ers presumably expected an im-
mediate Western rejection of
the harsh terms of the new pro-
posal, they probably hoped it
would have the effect of prompt-
ing at least one of the Allies
to take the initiative to pre-
vent a breakoff and a subsequent
sharpening of the Berlin crisis.
If the Western ministers re-
fuse to abandon or defer the
question of Allied rights in
West Berlin, however, Moscow
seems prepared for an early
breakoff on the calculation that
a period of intensified pressure
will eventually induce the West
to make additional concessions
on Berlin, Germany, and European
security and to resume negotia-
tions on terms more favorable
to the USSR.
Soviet spokesmen moved
quickly to place the West in a
difficult position in rejecting
the new Berlin proposal. Deputy
Foreign Minister Zorin indignant-
ly denied that the one-year
period of grace constitutes an
ultimatum. He called on the
Western ministers to present
their own proposals if they do
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