CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002300030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 20, 2005
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• Publication Date: October 19, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
OCI NO. 2733/59
4 June 1959
00CUMENT NO. -~--?
No CHANGE RN CLASS. 93
^ RECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T
NEXT' REVIEW DATE:
AUTH: 70-2
DATE!~4.Z~REVIEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
r. Tr
State Department review completed
~3-z2gs~hi~
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 June 1959
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS
FV
Foreign Minister Gromyko ap-
pears to be playing for time at
Geneva on the assumption that the
Western powers will eventually
take the initiative in working
out a compromise formula on
Berlin at a minimum cost to
the USSR,--a,. formula'which will
open the way to a summit;meet-
ing.
. Khrushchev and Gromyko have
maintained their unyielding pos-
ture on Berlin and a German
peace treaty in public state-
ments and have categorically
rejected the Western proposals
for an all-Berlin solution. In
his speech on 30 May in Tirana,
Xhrushchev declared, "We do not
have to make any concessions
because our proposals have not
beef made for bartering." The
Soviet leaders apparently are
counting heavily on their abil-
ity to exploit any divergences
among the Western powers regard-
ing terms for an interim Berlin
arrangement.
Soviet propaganda is stress-
ing that alleged Western in-
transigence is imposed by West
German "revanchists and mili-
tarists," abetted by French
"ruling circles." In his Tirana
speech,on 30 May, Khrushchev
made a thinly veiled attack
on President de Gaulle, remark-
ing that certain French states-
men, who not so long ago
"fled from the German troops
to Britain and other countries,"
have failed to "draw the rele-
vant lessons from the two
wars started by German mili-
tarism."
In the plenary session on
30 May, Gromyko defined the task
of the foreign ministers' con-
ference regarding Berlin as re-
placing the wartime four-power
agreement on Berlin by a new
agreement which adjusts the Ber-
lin situation to present condi-
tions in Germany. He defended
the Soviet free-city plan for
West Berlin and called for a
four-power pledge of noninter-
ference in the internal affairs
of the free city and a guarantee
of its "free relations" with
the outside world.
Gromyko also introduced a
proposal for a permanent com-
mission composed of the four
powers and East Germany to en-
sure that the free-city status
is observed. The counselor
of the Soviet Embassy in Paris
had suggested to an American of-
ficial in Geneva on 29 May that
free access and political free-
dom of West Berlin should be
guaranteed by a "Joint commission"
composed of the four powers only.
It is likely that Gromyko will
declare himself willing to bar-
gain on the composition of
such a commission to demonstrate
the USSR's desire for productive
negotiations.
Pressure on Bonn
Soviet propaganda attacking
the allegedly negative.attitude
of the West German delegation
at Geneva has been accompanied
by private efforts to induce the
opposition West German Social
Democrats (SPD) to push their
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plan for reunification and dis-
engagement
accord with Adenauer's poli-
cy." The article conclud-
ed, "Thus the SPD's road
must, lead to Geneva."
East Germany
The SPD proposal provides
among other things for an all-
German committee with equal rep-
resentation., a ban on nuclear
weapons, withdrawal of foreign
troops from a Central European
zone including Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Hungary,
and the withdrawal of these
countries from NATO and the
Warsaw Pact. The Russians prob-
ably believe that these aspects
of the plan can be exploited
to embarrass the Bonn govern-
ment and bring further.pressure
on the Western position.
Evidencing close coordina-
tion on this question with Mos-
cow, East German party First
Secretary Walter Ulbricht on 24
May declared that members of
the Bonn parliament who are "ad-
vocates of a peaceful solution
of the German question" should
explain their viewpoint to the
various delegations at Ge-
neva.
In line with this, the
party organ Neues Deutschland
on 27 May appealed o e
to propagandize its plan and
introduce it at Geneva as "the
plan of a great part of the West
German people who are not in
In a press interview on
27 May, Ulbricht reiterated the
standard East German line on
Berlin. He attacked the Western
proposals on Berlin, called for
a peace treaty with both German
states if possible or, failing
this, with East Germany alone,
and reaffirmed the bloc position
that a separate treaty would
end Western rights to remain in
West Berlin. On the question
of East Germany acting as the
agent of the USSR in exercising
Berlin access controls, Ulbricht
resorted to an ambiguous reply
whi ;h might possibly imply that
his regime would agree to accept
this role.
Ulbricht also stated that
in the event West Berlin is con-
verted into a free city, com-
munications between East Ber-
lin and the Western sector
would continue. He asserted
that East Germany would have
"no objections in principle"
to United Nations participation
in guaranteeing West Berlin's
status as a free city, although
"certain practical questions"
would have to be worked out
with the East Germans.
The East Germans stepped
up their attacks on Bonn's al-
leged "militarism" and "fascism"
with a press conference in Ge-
neva conducted by Defense Minis-
ter Lt. Gen. Heinz Hoffman. The
Swiss-manned secretariat of the
International Press Center sub-
sequently issued a sharp warning
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to the East German delegation
that further abuses of the cen-
ter's facilities would lead to
the withdrawal of privileges.
West German Opinion
The majority of West German
and West Berlin editorial opinion
expects two results from the
current foreign ministers' nego-
tiations: a communique agreeing
to maintain the status quo in
Berlin, with no definite time
limit; and an agreement on a
summit conference. Bonn's state-
ment in Geneva ruling out an
interim, status quo agreement
lasting only until the summit
meeting was interpreted as a
move to forestall British con-
sideration of such a solution,
Most papers saw the conference
as entering a crucial stage in
which the alternatives were a
limited Berlin agreement lead-
ing to a summit meeting or a
new "crisis."
Iraq
Non-Communists in Iraq are
hopeful that Prime Minister
Qasim intends to further limit
the influence of the Communists,
although Qasim has still
made no positive move in that
direction. Encouragement comes
in part from a new tone in Bagh-
dad radio during the past
two weeks but this may have been
due to the absence of the radio
boss, Salim Fakhri, in Mos-
cow. On 1 June the radio re-
turned to a more familiar
line, warning that erroneous
interpretations of Qasim's view
of political party activi-
ties had left an opening
for the "imperalists" and "re-
actionaries" to exploit.
The radio also hailed the
departure from Baghdad on 1 June
of an Iraqi delegation, headed
by a Communist leader and made
up largely of fellow travelers,
which is to explain Iraq's "re-
publican" policy to other Arab
and North African states. The
delegation's first stop is Mo-
rocco, and it hopes to visit
Tunisia, Libya, the Sudan,
Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon as
well.
Widespread rumors in Iraq
of an impending anti-Communist
coup attempt appear to be
a by-product of the apparent
coolness between Qasim and
the. Communists. Several
of the rumors have put
the coup date in early June.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
There are even more persistent
rumors that Qasim's pro-Commu-
nist aide-de-camp, Col. Wasfi
Tahir, and the pro-Communist
army chief of plans, Brigadier
Taha Ahmad, are to be given am-
bassadorial appointments. So
far there is no substantiation
of any of these rumors, although
there may have been some in-
cidents, as reported in the Bagh-
dad Communist press, of anti-
Communist activity in outlying
districts.
Qasim's own attitudes re-
main as ambivalent as ever.
He has explained that the can-
cellation last week of the
Iraqi-American military assist-
ance agreement, and of the spe-
cial assistance agreement which
followed Iraq's adherence to
the Eisenhower Doctrine, was to
remove "factors of animosity"
between the Iraqi and American
peoples. He also asserted that
he knows the Iraqi Communists
as "sincere, patriotic" people,
and he said he was certain that
"sincere" people would not be-
come "plotters,"
General Abboud, after an
initial period of indecision,
this week ordered the arrest of
the two top leaders of the abor-
tive military coup attempt of
22 May. The Sudanese Government
has announced that Brigadiers
Shannan and Abdullah, along with
a number of junior officers,
will be tried for treason by a
court martial. Abboud's move
followed the conclusion of an
army investigation into the coup
attempt. A meeting of army com-
manders was held in Khartoum at
the end of last week to hear the
evidence, and it apparently de-
cided to back Abboud in restor-
ing discipline and curbing the
junior officers' movement.
The Abboud regime moved at
the same time against Sudanese
leftists. A number of civilian
leaders of the Communist party
and other left-wing organizations
have been arrested as well as
some leaders of the pro-Egyptian
National Unionist party, There
appears to be no real relation-
ship between the arrests and the
conspiracy in the army, although
the Communists may have utilized
the recent period of uncertainty
to increase their activity.
While General Abboud and
the relatively conservative
senior officers seem to have
successfully asserted themselves,
the basic problems which pro-
duced dissatisfaction among the
junior officers have not been
solved, and a new movement may
develop. Its development would
be hastened if Abboud gave new
signs of appeasement; according
to some reports, he has relieved
Brigadier Hasan Bashir Nasir,
who was one of the Shannan
group's most determined oppo-
nents, as deputy army commander.
UAR President Nasir seems
to be in one of his more relaxed
and moderate moods. Although
Cairo's propaganda machine is
replying as usual to attacks it
feels have been made on the UAR,
no special campaigns seem to be
under way, and in this atmosphere
the UAR has been considering and
pursuing further negotiations
with its old enemies, Britain
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
While Nasir is willing, for
both diplomatic and more press-
ing economic reasons, to accel-
erate a rapprochement with
France, he still clearly fears
that such a development would
be used against him by Moscow,
Baghdad, and other enemies. Na
Sir also believes that the time
has come for a "re-*exarnination"
of the UAR's relations with
Britain. Real progress toward
a final settlement of the after-
math of the Suez war has been
stymied by Cairo's-unwilling-
ness to accord diplomatic priv-
ileges to the British financial
mission in Cairo.
The Jordanian monarchy's
sense of security does not ap-
pear to have been materially
enhanced by the arrest of former
chief of staff Sadiq Shara on
charges of plotting a coup dur-
ing King Husayn's recent world
tour. Amman remains full of
rumors of further retirements
of army officers who are not ac-
ceptable to the Bedouin officer
clique, although there are a few
.signs that the government may
be trying to avoid complete domi-
nation by a Bedouin-controlled
army.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Khrushchev arrived in
Tirana on 25 May for a scheduled
12-day visit, accompanied by
Defense Minister Malinovsky,
presidium member Mukhitdinov,
Deputy Foreign Minister Firyubin,
and six other officials. The
ostensible-purpose for the visit
was to strengthen the appearance
of bloc solidarity and to dem-
onstrate Soviet concern and in-
terest in Albania. At the same
time, Khrushchev used the oc-
casion to make pronouncements
on "the German question," the
foreign ministers' and summit
conferences, and to sharpen the
Soviet attack on projected US
missile bases in Italy and Greece.
In his most explicit
statement on missile bases while
in Albania, Khrushchev also
warned that if Greece "embarks
on the same dangerous road as
Italy" in yielding to US pres-
sure, the USSR and Albania would
be forced to "agree to the
establishment on Albanian soil
of rocket bases aimed at Italy
and Greece."
Khrushchev recalled a
proposal first made by Rumanian
Premier Stoica in September 1957
for a Balkan conference of heads
of government to discuss "con-
solidation of peace in the area.
He also renewed a proposal first
made by Bulgarian Premier Yugov
in January 1958 for a Balkan
zone in which nuclear weapons
and rockets would be prohibited.
Subsequent propaganda by Moscow
suggests that the bloc may fol-
low this up with~a call for a
regional "summit conference"--
to include Yugoslavia, Greece,
Turkey, and Italy--in order to
discuss the creation of a nu-
clear-free zone in the Balkan
and Adriatic area.
ALBANIA
The Soviet delegation's
visit to traditionally anti-
Yugoslav Albania was accompanied
by a marked abatement in anti-
Yugoslav propaganda by the bloc
countries, and the official com-
muniqud placed renewed stress
on the "normalization" of state
relations with Belgrade.
speeches and in the final com-
munique to "revisionism" as the
main danger to the Communist
movement, however, indicated
that no alteration has occurred
in the bloc's basic attitude
toward Yugoslavia.
It was rumored that Khru-
shchev would attempt to meet
with Tito during the visit, but
no such meeting took place. Tito
at the time was making a deliber-
ate show of unconcern by touring
eastern Serbia.
Speculation in Western
newspaper circles concerning an
impending "meeting" of bloc lead-
ers in Albania also was not borne
out by events. The speculation
arose from the simultaneous
presence in Albania of East Ger-
man Premier Grotewohi and Chinese
Defense Minister Peng Te-huai,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and from a statement by an of-
ficial Yugoslav spokesman that
overflight clearances had been
requested "from most East Euro-
pean countries to Albania." By
4 June, however, all of the So-
viet delegation had departed,
and there was no evidence that
any other bloc leaders had ar
rived in Albania.
Khrushchev and Malinov-
sky arrived in Budapest on
4 June--rather than 6 June,
when their Albanian visit
was scheduled to conclude--
in order to meet with
Hungarian leaders.
POLISH COMMUNIST PARTY EXTENDING ITS CONTROL
Developments in Poland so
far this year suggest a tight-
ening of party and government
control over domestic affairs.
The effort has become more pro-
nounced since Gomulka emerged
from the third party congress
in March as undisputed master
of the Polish party. While the
Polish regime still retains
characteristics which set it
off from its orthodox Communist
neighbors, Gomulka has been mov-
ing to restrict practices which
are inconsistent with Communist
philosophy.
Gomulka has long wanted to
strengthen the party's hold over
the population at the expense
of the Catholic Church, and at
the party congress he warned
the church to stay out of poli-
tics. The state has recently
reinterpreted the law exempting
church funds used for religious
purposes from taxation. If ap-
plied extensively, the new taxa-
tion would tend in the long run
to make the population more de-
pendent upon the regime for so-
cial and charitable services.
Gomulka, can be expected to move
cautiously so as not to jeopard-
ize the internal stability he
has achieved.
In the countryside, the re-
gime's policy has been to use
persuasion father than coercion
to extend party influence. The
state continues its support for
private farmers--a sharp departure
from bloc practice. Since the
party congress, the regime has
encouraged the development of a
countrywide network of agricul-
tural "circles"--loose cooperative
associations. Local party or-
ganizations will give economic
aid to the "circles," a move
Which will. increase present de-
-pendence on the party.
Problems with dissident in-
tellectuals and recalcitrant
youths still plague the regime.
Gomulka's remarks on writers at
the party congress indicated that
the regime would continue:to
force conformity with its policies
and would not permit revisionist
literature to be published. Eco-
nomic sanctions, such as refusal
to publish an author's work, may
in time force many writers to
be more cooperative. The re-
gime is approaching the subject
cautiously, however, apparently
to avoid accusations of having
returned to the abuses of the
pre-Gomulka era.
In the universities, the re-
gime is demanding political in-
doctrination courses and impos-
ing greater discipline. Incoming
students and instructors will be
screened for proper political
orientation, and those students
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
who are of worker or peasant
origin will be given preference.
Compulsory courses in Marxism-
Leninism will be reintroduced
in the universities, probably
next fall, to combat the strong
currents of liberalism and anti-
Marxism.
While Polish police and
judicial practices continue in
sharp contrast to those in other
satellites, the regime claims that
the prospecution':organs have been
compelled to return to summary
procedures to deal with the
"dangerous situation" resulting
from the widespread economic
crimes. This is a definite
step backward in the legaliza-
tion of Polish court practice
effected since 1956.
A crop failure is likely
in the southern European satel-
lites this year unless the
drought which began last sum-
mer ends soon. By the end of
May, the situation had become
critical in Bulgaria and Ruma-
nia--especially in the Danubian
Plain and the Dobruja area--
and was only slightly
less serious in Al-
bania. The gravity
of the situation in
Hungary has been at
least temporarily
alleviated by rains
since mid-May.
The development of winter
grains--wheat and rye--and of
spring-planted crops has been
retarded; pastures, early veg-
tables, and first cuttings of
hay will also suffer. Unless
at least normal precipitation
occurs throughout June and July,
the drought will not only lower
Beginning in the
summer of 1958, the
drought generally re-
duced yields of grains
harvested in late sum-
mer below average,
and has continued
practically unbroken
through the middle
of May. In only two
of the past twelve
months has precipi-
tation in the south-
ern satellites been
normal or above.
Long-range forecasts
by Bulgarian meteor-
ologists predict be-
low normal precipi-
tation for June in
the Danubian Plain,
a major grain-produc-
ing region for both
Bulgaria and Ruma
nia.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEI{LY SUMMARY
N SOUTHERN SATELLITES
( MONTHLY AVERAGE AS PERCENT OF NORMAL)
small-grain production for the
second consecutive year but
will have a disastrous effect
on over-all agricultural produc-
tion.
In addition to drought,
other developments which normal-
ly have adverse effects on agri-
cultural production have been
taking place in these satellites.
Rapid collectivization drives
or vast organizational changes
have occurred throughout the
area since the 1958 harvest.
Bulgaria has followed extensive
merging of collective farms with
initial reorganization of
machine-tractor stations, labor
and payment innovations, and
introduction of an agricultural
procurement system similar to
that in the USSR. Hungary al-
most doubled the socialist sec-
tor of agriculture by tripling
the area.in collectives between
mid-December and the end of
March. Albania and Rumania
have combined less dramatic col-
lectivization with substantial
organizational changes.
Below average grain produc-
tion coming after these drives
and organizational changes could
increase unrest among peasants
and retard collectivization. If
the drought goes unbroken, ex-
port obligations of agricultural
commodities to other bloc coun-
tries cannot be fulfilled and
the USSR will once again have
to supply urban populations of
the southern satellites with
large quantities of grain.
Crop prospects in the north-
ern satellites--Czechoslovakia,
East Germany, and Poland--where
distribution and amounts of pre-
cipitation have been more nearly
normal, are relatively much bet-
ter---at least for the winter 25X1
grains, which usually constitute
50 percent or more of grain
production in that area.
ORR)
(Prepared by
PEIPING'S'FARM WORRIES
Communist China's Minister
of Agriculture Liao Lu-yen
warned in a recent speech that
the nation may "lose" some 14,-
000,000 tons of foodst ffs--al-
most 3 percent of the rear's
goal--as a result of a reduction
in acreage planted to early
crops, and he urged all communes
to use "every inch" of arable
land, to plant late crops. This
is the first public suggestion
from the regime that the 1959
crop may not measure up to the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
party's heady expectations.
These were based on a claimed
doubling of food-grain produc-
tion last year--a claim which
grossly overstated the results
of a good crop year.
There may be some basis
to Liao's fears of a short-
fall as a result of acreage re-
ductions. It is possible that
the regime's brave talk about
the practicability of reducing
sown acreage while farming lim-
ited areas with the intensive
cultivation methods introduced
last summer did lead to actual
reductions.
Peiping is also concerned
about the effect this spring of
other "leap forward" farm poli-
cies. Indiscriminate applica-
tion of intensive cultivation
methods has led to the threat
of widespread lodging--the ina-
bility of grain to stand up
during the ripening period. Usu-
ally caused by heavy rain and
wind, lodging can also result
from the close planting and
heavy manuring practices advo-
cated by Peiping. A more ration-
al application of these tech-
niques is being urged.
Anxiety over peasant reac-
tion to extravagant farm goals
may lie behind the strictures
in a recent edition of the
theoretical journal Red Flag
against targets whic1rdev ate
from reality." The journal
cautions that farm goals cannot
be set by a "handful of men be-
hind closed doors" but must be
openly discussed with the farmers
themselves. It went on to argue
the case for setting actual
targets some 10 to 20 percent
below feasible levels in order
to give the peasants a chance
to "achieve awards and gain sat-
isfaction." In addition, local
cadres have once again been
warmed against padding produc-
tion forecasts "level by level"
as they are passed upward to
Peiping.
. Peiping continues to give
broader application to.measures
designed to increase peasant in-
centives. It has recently at-
tempted to encourage individual
peasants to raise hogs by pro-
viding that they can raise hog
feed on individual plots set aside
for the purpose and that they be
ensured of a profit plus a share
of the pork. For the past month
or more, the Chinese press has
abounded with articles designed
to "motivate the masses" to a
speedy and careful harvest of
early crops, in an effort to
avoid last fall's losses. These
articles have also emphasized the
need to transfer the state's in-
creasing share off the commune
as quickly as possible.
Peiping's anxiety is heightened
by a very tight food situation
in both city and countryside.
Shortages in large cities have
been described as "grim," with
evidence of malnutrition noted.
A growing black market in food
is reported from Shanghai, and
retail prices of food are said
to be on the rise in Peiping.
As to rural areas, rations have
been reduced on some communes
in Central China, and the
inadequacy of the diet in
,convmunal mess halls in
South China has been widely
reported. The situation
has not gotten out of
nand, but the regime is
insisting that strict con-
servation of food must con-
t.ime' to be practiced even
after the early harvest.
ORR.)
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CURRENT INTELLI(ENCEWEEKLY SUMMARY
CHINESE COMMUNISTS ATTEMPTING TO STEM REFUGEE FLOW
The continuing flight of
refugees from the mainland is
leading to greater Chinese Com-
munist efforts to intercept them
and has already resulted in
minor incursions into the ter-
ritory of neighboring countries.
There have been no clashes with
non-Communist troops, however.
Peiping probably is motivated
by a desire to put an end to
refugees' stories of dissatis-
faction with communes and other
difficult conditions, including
food shortages.
Two reported border cross-
ings into Burma last week by
Chinese patrols were probably
in pursuit of refugees from
Yunnan Province. The movement
of people from China into Burma
increased sharply last fall
with the attempted establish-
ment of communes among border
peoples--a program which re-
portedly has been postponed in-
definitely in western Yunnan.
Agreements were made with Bur-
mese border authorities at that
time to allow only those hold-
ing permits to cross the border.
For the past seven years the
Chinese had permitted the migra-
tion of border peoples, and in
some cases even provided emigres
with forged Burmese documents
to prevent their arrest in Burma.
Chinese Communists patrols
also entered Laotian territory
on several occasions in April
in search of refugees and Chi-
nese Nationalist irregulars and 25X1
have used force and persuasion 25X1
to try to induce refugees to re-
The fairly constant flow of
mainland Chinese into Macao now
is made up almost wholly of es-
capees. On 31 May a group of
over 50 Chinese--mainly farmers
--reportedly fled by boats in
one of the largest escapes into
Macao. The Chinese Communists
in recent weeks have been seiz-
ing and firing on such boats at-
tempting to escape. Communist
gunboats reportedly maintain a
24-hour patrol outside Macao and
have on occasion entered its
harbor to force back mainland
s
YUNNAN Kunmingl KWANGTUNG\
\
Areas of ref" border crossings s~ Canton
Nanning / 0
-'~ MACAO HONG KONG
(PORT.) (U K,)
Bay of Bengal
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
fishing junks. The Portuguese
authorities, aware that the en-
clave continues to exist only
on Communist sufferance, have
not protested such Communist
activity.
The Chinese Communists had
previously not hindered the flow
of refugees into Hong Kong and
had rejected or ignored British
requests that border crossings
be controlled. Last month, how-
ever, a Chinese Communist tug-
boat intruded nine miles into
British waters around Hong Kong
and seized two fishing junks
which had sought refuge from
the, mainland. The occupants of
the junks swam ashore at the ap-
proach of the Chinese vessel.
The British have not yet pro-
tested the incident, stating
they want first to ascertain
all legal points. Their hesi-
tancy probably arises from a
continuing desire to avoid a
showdown over enforcement Of
China's: :unilaterally declared
12-mile territorial-waters
limit in the Hong. Kong
area.
Talks at Geneva between
representatives of the Japanese
and North Korean Red Cross So-
cieties on repatriation of Ko-
rean residents of Japan to North
Korea are drawing to a close
and are likely to end in com-
promise, according to the chief
of the International Committee
for the Red Cross (ICRC)e For-
mal agreement has not been
reached and depends on further
negotiations.
The talks began on 13 April
and dragged on for several weeks,
largely because of Pyongyang's
opposition to Japanese proposals
for participation of the ICRC
in the repatriation process.
Failure of the two sides to
reach common ground resulted in
a recess of nearly two weeks
beginning 8 May. When the North
Koreans rejected a so-called
"final" Japanese plan on 20 May,
it appeared that the negotia-
tions might be broken off.
After private discussions
between leaders of the Japanese
and North Korean delegations,
the Japanese Government decided
on a modified proposal in which
Tokyo retreated from its earlier
insistence that the ICRC partic-
ipate'directly. The new pro-
posal, presented on 1 June, per-
mits the ICRC to advise on the
organization and operation of
a repatriation system and ensure
that the system operates "Just-
ly, properly, and impartially."
One reason for North Korea's
intransigence in the talks may
have been a desire to exploit
the Japanese political situation
to gain concessions from Tokyo.
The Japanese Government has been
under considerable domestic
pressure to make arrangements
to repatriate those of Japan's
600?000 Korean residents who
wish to return home, and Prime
Minister Kishi's Liberal Demo-4
cratic party would have profited
from any progress shown at Ge-
nevao Indications of a less
negative response to Tokyo's
latest plan by the North Korean
delegation came as elections to
the upper house of Japan's Diet
were already under way.
Agreement between Japan
and North Korea may precipitate
a formal rupture of stalled ne-
gotiations for the normalization
of relations between Seoul and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Tokyo. Such action by Seoul
probably would be accompanied
by a renewal of threats to use
force if necessary to block any
attempt to repatriate Koreans
to North Korea. Ambassador
Dowling in Seoul has commented
that, should actual repatria-
tion begin, the Rhee government
might resort to drastic action
no matter how ill-advised such
action might be.
An agreement to repatriate
Koreans from Japan to North Ko-
rea would enhance Pyongyang's
international status. Such
an agreement would further ad-
vance North Korean interests
by complicating the already
badly strained relations be-
tween South Korea and Japan
and Eby diminishing Seoul's
standing in the eyes of the
world. Japan's dilemma is
to balance these factors
against its desire to get
rid of a troublesome mi-
nority group.
COMMUNIST PROSPECTS UNDER THE LEFTIST SINGAPORE GOVERNMENT
Pro-Communists can be ex-
pected to take full advantage
of the greatly improved climate
for subversive activities in
Singapore following the land-
slide victory of the left-wing
:People's Action party (PAP) in
the 30 May general elections.
The Communist-infiltrated PAP
will dominate the legislative
assembly, where it holds 43 of
51 seats. The constitution
which created the new partially
self-governing State of Singa-
pore was promulgated on 2 June.
The British retain control of
external affairs and defense and
a voice in internal security.
The new governing party al-
most certainly will not invoke
Singapore's antisubversion laws
in the stringent manner of the
former government. As a result,
there is likely to be a marked
increase in Communist influence
on the island, especially in such
highly susceptible groups as labor
unions ' and in the Chinese- schools.
Communist prospects may
also be enhanced by a decline
in British prestige and ability
to control subversion. The
successful PAP demand that the
British release from jail eight
pro-Communist PAP leaders on
threat of refusing to form a
gove=rnment has already cast
doubts on British ability to
counter future PAP moves.
Release of the extremist
PAP leaders, several of whom
enjoy great personal popularity,
will improve Communist chances
for a dominant position in the
party and, through it, the gov-
ernment. Meanwhile, it is doubt-
ful if the PAP "moderates" can
successfully prevent infiltra-
tion of all levels of government
by the estimated 50 percent of
the active workers in the party
who are are pro-Communist.
The British have built a
number of antisubversion safe-
guards into the new constitution.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 June 1959
It is questionable, however,
how effectively these safeguards
can be administered under a PAP
government. Moreover, the gov-
ernment, even if it should come
The commander of the re-
bellious Pathet Lao battalion
has requested that negotiations
be reopened for the return of
the unit to Laotian Army con-
trol. The army plans to reply
with a leaflet drop offering
the Pathet troops a choice of
integrating into the army or
returning to their villages as
civilians. The army considers
that the negotiations may be
part of Pathet stalling tactics
to gain time for external as-
sistance.
The army intends to launch
an attack against the battalion
if the current negotiations
increasingly under Communist
influence, will probably be
careful not to provide the
British with a clear-cut rea-
son for exercising their right
to suspend the constitution.
Britain's hopes for main-
tain.ng its position in Singapore
short of suspending the con-
stitution rest in large part
on the `15rime ' imi star des-
ignate, , Lee Kuan Yew. While
under present conditions de-
pendence on Lee may be the
best, alternative, it is a
risky one, Lee
~ may
prove to have neither the
desire nor the influence
necessary to control the
extremist elements in his
party.
fail, but is probably incapable
of preventing its escape if it
breaks up into small groups.
Premier Phcui Sananikone told
the American charge on 29 May
that Prince Souphannouvong and
other leaders of the Communist-
front Neo Lao Hak Zat party
(NLHZ) will be charged with in-
citing the Pathet battalion to
open rebellion. He said that
no action will be taken to sup-
press the functioning of the
NLHZ as a political party.
North Vietnam's Premier
Pham Van Dong has dispatched a
series of letters, the latest
dated 2 June, to the Vientiane
government, which warns that
the "rekindled" civil war is
"drawing nearer and nearer to
our frontier" and insists that
the country is being trans-
formed into an "aggressive"
American military base. In the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
past two weeks, he has also
sent formal letters to the USSR,
Britain, India, Communist China,
and France, protesting the ar-
rest of NLHZ leaders and the
action taken against the rebel-
lious battalion, All of Dong's
notes have'characterized Vien-
tiane's moves as violations of
the 1954 Geneva agreements con-
stituting a serious menace to
peace in Indochina, and they
demand the immediate recall of
the Laotian International Con-
trol Commission (ace).
The Communist bloc consid-
ers that the return of the ICC
would serve to limit US efforts
to strengthen Laos' internal
security capability while pro-
viding the domestic Communists
with a degree of protection from
possible government repression.
The recently achieved US-French
agreement on joint training of
the Laotian Army would probably
have to be reviewed if the ICC
were to return.
Peiping has followed up
Chinese Communist Foreign Min-
ister Chen Yi's 25 May letter
to the cochairmen with a spate
of ;propaganda. The People's
Daily on 3 June warned tffat any
acT on in violation of the Geneva
agreements would "threaten the
security of China."
Neither Peiping nor Hanoi
has threatened military ac-
tion to aid the dissident
battalion, but may now find
it advantageous to imply that
such action might be taken.
Hanoi has announced that its
border units have been warned
to be on the alert against
any "provocations,"
The refusal of the Constit-
uent Assembly in three separate
votes to approve President Su-
karno's demand for a return to
the 1945 constitution has
created a political stalemate
in Indonesia. The 1945 consti-
tution, which would increase
executive authority at the ex-
pense of Parliament and politi-
cal parties, is a facet of Su-
karno's concept of "guided demo-
cracy" in which the army would
also gain increased political
power.
Rejection of the constitu-
tion resulted from the stand of
the Moslem parties that the 1945
document does not provide suf-
ficilent guarantees to the Is-
lamic religion. By demanding
an amendment to this effect,
which Sukarno is unwilling to
-rant, they succeeded in pre-
venting the necessary two-thirds
vote to adopt the constitution.
Wholehearted support for Su-
karrio's position came, paradoxi-
cally, only from the Communist
party, which apparently is de-
termined to avoid alienating
the President.
The initiative for breaking
the present deadlock now rests
with the army and Sukarno
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Furthermore, in
addressing the Constituent As-
sembly on 27 May prior to the
voting, Premier Djuanda warned
that failure to approve the
constitution might precipitate
"undesirable events" similar
to those in neighboring coun-
tries--apparently referring to
a possible army coup.
Following the assembly's re-
jection of the constitution and
its decision to recess indefinite-
ly as of 3 June, Army Chief Na-
sution on 2 June banned all po-
litical activity throughout In-
donesia, in what could be a pre-
liminary step to an army take-
over. Nasution, however, may
have imposed the ban to avoid
political disruptions during a
period of critical decisions.
Since he is believed unlikely to
act without approval of Sukarno
and Djuanda, a solution within a
legal framework will probably
be sought. Attempts by Pre-
mier Dj uanda to reach a compro-
mise with the Moslem parties may
also continue.
Prime Minister Koirala's
new government, which took of-
fice in Katmandu on 27 May,
controls an absolute majority
in parliament and may, for the
time being at least, create a
relatively stable situation in
Nepal. Koirala has stated his
intention of concentrating on
land reforms; education, small
industries,iand health. Inter-
nationally he will probably. try
to.maintain a neutral:position
between the USSR and Communist
China. on the. one hand and
India and :the West on the
other.
Koirala, who also holds
the posts of defense and foreign
affairs, is assisted by seven
other ministers and 11 deputy
ministers, all apparently from
his Nepali Congress party. He
expects parliament to convene
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in late June. In the immediate
future, parliament is expected
to support his policies. How-
ever, dissension within Koirala's
own party and machinations by
King Mahendra or by opposition
leaders may eventually reduce
the government's effectiveness.
The King
may seex to un er-
m ne- him i Koirala's domination
of parliament appears to threaten
the royal paramountcy.
Koirala has welcomed the
agreement--signed by the pre-
vious government--for establish-
ment of a Soviet Embassy in
Katmandu and has indicated that
the United States is also wel-
come.
The USSR has promised to
construct a hydroelectric plant,
a hospital, and two factories.
and.. to survey 'for a road.
There is also US aid for
projects in agriculture, mining,
health, education, and village
development and a new agreement
on aviation. In addition to
supplying five planes to Nepal,
the United States will provide
equipment for nine airfields,
including one at Mustang on the
Tibetan border. This last may
become a target for Chinese
Communist propaganda regarding
"American air bases" in the
Himalayan area.
Koirala has remarked that
Nepal's friendship with India
has become closer and that re-
lations with Communist China
will be unimpaired. Peiping
has the treaty right to open
a consulate general in Katmandu,
and the Chinese ambassador, who
resides in New Delhi, may have
broached the subject of opening
a resident mission when he had
an audience with the King in
Katmandu on 1 June. Katmandu
says it has no Tibetan refugee
or border problems and probably
would comply with any Chinese
request to establish such a
mission.
Koirala, however, has been
supported by India in his polit-
ical. campaigning, and he might
try to balance any increased
Chinese influence by expanding
Katmandu's ties with New Delhi.
Nehru is to visit Katmandu from
11 to 15 June and probably will
caution the Nepalese not to
expand their international re-.
lations too rapidly.
ISRAELI SHIPPING THROUGH THE SUEZ CANAL
Since the 1956 Sinai cam-
paign, Israel has partially cir-
cumvented Cairo's restrictions
on Israeli shipping through the
Suez Canal by chartering 39
foreign-flag ships to carry its
cargoes. No Israeli-flag ship
has attempted to transit the
canal since 1954 when the Bat
Galim was seized and confis-
cated and its captain and crew
imprisoned for three months.
Earlier this year, however,
cargoes from two Israeli-chartered
ships were seized, and the
Danish Inge Toft now is being
detained, preparatory to possible
confiscation of its cargo.
This latest incident oc-
-curred despite UAR assurances
to UN officials in the last two
months that Israeli.ships'should be
permitted to transit the canal
if their cargoes did not "en-
danger the canal's security"
and if the shipping manifests
showed the cargoes were not
Israeli owned. Israeli advance
publicity of the "test" by the
Inge Toft, however, may, have
prompted Cairo to take some
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 June 1959
action against the ship to
avoid hostile Iraqi press and
radio attacks charging UAR
"softness" toward Israel.
The UAR contends that it
learned only early this year
of Israeli chartering arrange-
According to VAR authori-
ties, the Israeli charters make
the vessels "enemy" ships, and
confiscation of their merchan-
dise is justified regardless of
ownership of the cargoes at the
time of seizure.
Ceylon, to which some of
use of the canal.
tofore in Israel's dispute over
,e merchandise had been en
route, has made a vigorous pro-
test to Cairo, and Denmark has
also made representations con-
cerning the Inge Toft. Other
governments have thus become 25X1
more directly involved than here
LIBERIA INCREASING ROLE IN AFRICAN NATIONALISM
Liberia's President Tub-
man appears determined to as-
sociate his country more close-
ly with the militant African
nationalism of Prime Minister
Nkrumah of Ghana and President
Tourd of Guinea. Although
Tubman was recently re-elected
over only token opposition to
another four-year term, he now
apparently feels he must make
a major effort to remove the
stigma of "black agents of the
imperialists" which other
Africans widely apply to the
ruling Americo-Liberian Oli-
garchy.
Tubman is also aware of
the growing strength of the
younger elements within the
ruling party who demand Libe-
ria's closer identification with
Africa and a more dynamic gov-
ernmental policy to counteract
Ghana's increasing prestige.
Furthermore, officials in Mon-
rovia may be concerned about
the danger of ' antiregime activities
in the tribal hinterland organ-
ized-by Guinean elements across
the poorly policed frontier.
The new policy line has re-
cently been reflected most strik-
ingly in Tubman's agreement to
permit nine independent African
states to hold a conference on
Algeria in Monrovia in August.
At this gathering, which is cer-
tain to annoy France, Liberia
may go along with a forthright
statement of support for the
Algerian rebels. It will
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probably hesitate, however, to
extend diplomatic recognition
to the Algerian rebels' pro-
visional government.
In another gesture obvious-
ly aimed at demonstrating
Liberia's solidarity with Afri-
can nationalism, two exiled
SECRET
SPANISH r -r
SAHAR J i ? ALGERIA
N.., i ~~...~
SOUDAN J NIGER 1 1
GULF OF
GUINEA
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
xlo...~' or~~ 7
BELGIAN
~ ~.
ONG
A,Ael 30443'
extremist nationalist leaders
from Cameroun have recently
been accorded warm receptions
in Monrovia. Tubman is re-
portedly planning an early
public statement, similar to
that by Nkrumah and Toure,
endorsing the Cameroun extrem-
ists' demand for UN-supervised
legislative elections before
their country receives its in-
dependence, now scheduled for
1 January 1960.
Plans appear well advanced
for Tubman, Nkrumah, and Tourg'
to meet in Liberia in July, pre-
sumably in an attempt to recon-
cile conflicting proposals for
associating the independent
African states more closely.
Tubman had earlier proposed an
"Associated States of Africa"
which would involve a coordina-
tion of nonpolitical activities
among the independent countries.
Ghana and Guinea in their rather
vague declaration of 1 May en-
visaged a "Union of Independent
African States" with stronger
government ties including a union
bank,, common flag and defense
policy, and single citizenship.
Tubman apparently hopes
this meeting will result in a
general policy agreement among
the three leaders and pave
the way for yet another
conference in Monrovia, to
be &ttended by all inde-
pendent and near-rode n -
lent African e
AFTERMATH OF ALGERIAN ELECTIONS
Victories by leading mod-
erates in Algeria's 31 May elec-
tions for the French Senate
threaten the political dominance
of Algeria's European extrem-
ists for the first time since
De Gaulle's assumption of pow-
er. Only in the city of Al-
giers, long a stronghold of
sentiment for integration with
France, did extremist senti-
ment dominate the balloting.
The elections appear to
be a victory for De Gaulle, who
has long sought the emergence
of valid spokesmen for Algerian
Moslems as a counterpoise to
the rebel National Liberation
Front (FLN) and the extremists.
Although the elections were in-
direct, with 6,067 "grand elec-
tors" choosing 32 senators,
Moslem participation was as-
sured by stipulations that two
thirds of the electors and 20
of the senators were to be Mos-
lems. The elections were nota-
ble for the extent to which
Moslems were willing to partici-
pate in French-sponsored elec-
tions in the face of possible
rebel terrorism.
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CURRENT,-INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The emergence of any Mos-
lem "third force" in Algeria
would be a threat to both the
rebels and the European extrem-
ists. A recent increase in in-
stances of rebel terrorism may
in part reflect concern among
the rebels over the possibility
that they are losing the sup-
port of uncommitted Moslems.
Among the European settlers,
the elections may presage the
further isolation of those ex-
tremists who seek to perpetuate
their privileged economic and
political position in Algeria.
The alliance between the extrem-
ists and the French Army, which
in 1958 brought about the down-
fall of the Fourth Republic,
has degenerated, and there now
is little coordination between
the army and the faction-ridden
"committees of public safety."
The settlers remain a political-
ly powerful force, but they suf-
fered in the senatorial elections
from having boycotted previous
balloting for the "grand electors."!
With the election results
in mind, the Algerian bloc in
the French National Assembly may
further modify its program.
Following De Gaulle's public re-
fusal to be pushed into espous-
ing "integration," it has changed
its demands for the "integration"
of Algeria with France to "unifi-
cation."
De Gaulle's willingness to
move ahead with politico-economic
measures for Algeria was reflect-
ed in the introduction in the
assembly of a bill which provides
the inclusion in the French
budget of the heretofore separate
Algerian budget and the exten-
sion of French currency to Al-
geria. Such moves toward "eco-
nomic integration" may be
designed in part to reassure
Algeria's European settlers
and the army that a nego- 25X1
tiated settlement of the
war would not mean Fr nce's
abandonment of Algeria,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SURY
THE US VISIT OF THE.THREE "EUROPEAN .PRESIDENTS"
The official visit to Wash-
ington from 9 to 11 June of the
presidents of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC), the Coal-
Steel Community (CSC), and EUR-
ATOM comes at a time of growing
concern over the future institu-
tional development of the Euro-
pean Community movement.
Stronger by treaty than
either the EURATOM or Common
Market (EEC) commissions, the
CSC High Authority is in an es-
pecially difficult position.
President Finet and his col-
leagues have been in a caretaker
status since their appointments
expired last February, and de-
spite pleas for action, the mem-
ber governments have declined
thus far either to reappoint the
present incumbents or to agree
on replacements. Coinciding
with the sharp rebuff given by
representatives of member coun-
tries to the High Authority last
month on its handling of the
coal crisis, this delay has con-
vinced some observers that anti-
European elements, particularly
in France and West Germany, want
permanently to impair the High
Authority's influences
The EURATOM and Common
Market commissions. are in a
somewhat better position, but
their relations with the national
governments--represented by the
two Councils of Ministers--have
been delicate. The councils,
for example, have rapidly expanded
the staffs of permanent national
representatives in Brussels--
staffs which potentially compete
with the commissions in the con-
duct of Community affairs.
This reluctance to see
supranational institutions mature
rapidly is probably also a factor
in the long deadlock over the
site of the "European capital."
The EURATOM and Common Market
commissions are de facto in
Brussels, the CSC High Authority
remains in Luxembourg, and all
of them are physically separated
from their potentially strongest
source of support--the European
Parliamentary Assembly in
S3trasbourg
The three presidents prob-
ably hope that their Washington
visit will not only assist them
in coping with opposition from
European government representa-
tives, but also increase Ameri-
can interest in the European Com-
raunity's potential as a free-
world "partner." President
Hirsch of EURATOM has recently
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PAUL FINET
(Belgium)
President, CSC High Authority, since
January 1958, member of High Author-
ity since 1952. Metallurgist by pro-
fession, but has spent most of life
in trade union aotivitiea. Became
secretary general of Belgian General
Federation of labor in 1946. In CSC,
has been concerned primarily with
labor and social affairs.
ETIENNE HIRSCH
(French)
President, EUPATOM commission, since
February 1959. Educated as civ.tl min-
ing engineer, spent much of early
life in research activities connected
with improvement of fuels. Became
associated with Jean Monnet in 1943
as member of Free French Forces,
worked closely with him during early
postwar years, and succeeded him as
commissioner general for the French
recovery plan when Monnet was ap-
pointed first CSC president in 1952.
said that the "most important
subject of interest" which he
and his colleagues could dis-
cuss during their visit is the
need to maintain the community's
.economic growth at an annual
rate "approximating that of the
USSR."
Common Market officials
have also stressed the impor-
tance of American support in
working out the EEC's relations
President Luis Somoza's
attempts to provide a peaceful
transition period of increas-
ing political freedom follow-
ing his father's long dictator-
ial regime have received severe
setbacks from both domestic and
exiled opposition forces. He
has taken prompt action against
both, but opposition efforts
will probably continue. There
was early widespread public
cooperation in a general strike
WALTER HALLSTEIN
(German)
President, EEC Commission, since Jan-
uary 1958. Law professor in various
German universities during the inter-
war period. Prisoner of war in US,
Hallstein returned to this country
in 1948 as guest professor at George-
town University before entering Bonn
government. Formerly foreign affairs
expert in Bonn Chancellory, still
very close to Adenauer.
with the international trading
community. The three presidents
will, probably discuss their
ideas on a program of economic
and technical assistance to under-
developed areas, reiterate thea.r
support of the US-proposed round
of world-wide tariff negotiations
to begin next year, and seek US 25X1
reactions to the possible
association of other countries
with the Common Market,
called on 29 May by a domestic
opposition unity group repre-
senting widely disparate eco-
nomic and political interests.
At one point, Somoza is report-
ed to have offered important
concessions to the leader of
the Communist-dominated General
Confederation of Workers in an
effort to forestall vital con-
federation support of the strike.
Later, the arrest of opposition
leaders, the enforced silence
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WE`EKLY'NU MARY
4 June 1959
of the nongovernment press and
radio, and the effects of mar-
tial law reduced the impact of
the strike.
position Union, has been coordi-
nating efforts of non-Communist
groups
25X1
25X1
The Nicaraguan Governtnent
has appealed to the Organika-
tion of American States for in-
tervention to prevent attacks
by numerous Nicaraguan exile
groups known-to be active in
other Caribbean countries. In
Costa Rica, President Echandi
has already restricted the non-
Comri:tunist Nicaraguans there who
are probably supported by ex-
President Jose Figueres. This
group sent the two planeloads
of revolutionaries which landed
in Nicaragua on-31 May and 1
June and set off some fighting
in central provinces. The re'v--
olutionaries apparently have re-
ceived little internal support.
Dr Enrique Lacayo Farfan,
exiled head of the National Op--
President Somoza's state-
ments on the current crisis in-
dicEate that he feels his efforts
at moderation have been used
against him and that the tough
policies recommended by his
father had merit. He is prob-
ably supported in this view by
his brother General :Anastasio
Somoza, Jr., commandant of the
5,000-man National Guard,gen-
erally considered the chief
deterrent to the success
any opposition moves
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 June 1959
STATE OF SIEGE REIMPOSED :[N PARAGUAY
Paraguayan President
Stroessner's political posi-
t{on is increasingly delicate.
His anxiety is reflected in
his ordering the arrest of some
40 leaders of the ruling Colo-
rado party and in his dissolu-
tion of Congress, which con-
sists exclusively of Colorado
members. Along with the state
of siege, reimposed for 60 days
on 30 May after several student
disturbances, these moves seem
a panicky reaction to increas-
ing antidictator pressures both
within Paraguay and in Latin
America generally.
The strongest pressure on
Stroessner has been recent criti-
cism by dissident Colorado lead-
ers, including those arrested,
who urge speedier and fuller
political reform. Affirming
that the country was facing one
of its worst crises, these lead-
ers in mid-March had recommended
various measures, including a
full amnesty and consultation
with opposition leaders on the
best way to attain "institutional
normalcy" most rapidly. Since
they wanted the Colorado party
and their own group to get the
credit for such steps, these
leaders resented Stroessner's
lifting on 28 April of the 12-
year state of siege by presi-
dential decree, rather than
through Congress.
Other Colorado circles,
including part of the military,
have favored more caution in
altering Paraguay's traditional
one-party rule, seeing a threat
to their special privileges as
well as to the security of the
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CURRENT INTELLI.GENCZWEEKLY SUMMARY
4 June 1959
regime. Extremists opposition
elements, especially exiles
active in plotting, saw the re-
gime's liberalizing moves as
undercutting potential support
for an outright revolt. Their
desire to bait Stroessner in-
to unpopular security measures,
as they have done in the past,
was probably one factor in the
recent student demonstrations
against the rise in bus fares.
Stroessner's reimposition
of the state of siege will
probably be interpreted as
a sign of weakness and will en-
courage expanded plotting. The
armed forces, his main power
base, are reported firmly be-
hind him, but the addition of
acute Colorado party dissension
to :Labor and student unrest may
help corrode his military sup-
port.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
INFLUENCE ON DE GAULLE'S DECISIONS
Concentration of the de-
cision-making power in France
in the hands of the president
has created opportunities for
individuals on De Gaulle's per-
sonal staff and the staffs. of
some cabinet members to distort
information on which he bases
major policy decisions and to
misrepresent decisions he has
made. Most of these individuals
seem to be aggressive, ambitious
men identified with the French
Resistance in World War II. Per-
sonal rivalries and De Gaulle's
habit of ranging far afield for
information somewhat limit their
power, but their influence ap-
pears to be growing and at criti-
cal moments could seriously
circumvent the President's con-
trol over major policies--particu-
larly in foreign affairs.
Policy decisions in the
Fourth Republic were primarily
the product of political com-
promises in the National Assem-
bly, which determined what ma-
jor decisions a government could
take without the risk of over-
throw. Under 'the Fifth Republic,
parliament's role has been min-
imal, and decisions of profound
significance have been made by
De Gaulle personally. Shifting
decision-making from the 500-
plus deputies to one man has not
only changed the process, but
has also sharply focused the
target for those who would manip-
ulate policy.
This situation has opened
quasilegal portals of power to
the personal staffs of the Presi-
dent, the premier, and the other
cabinet ministers. These staffs
prepare basic policy reports,
collect and present dossiers on
current matters, and transmit
instructions from the President
and government to the adminis-
trative machinery of the state,
which executes the decisions as
transmitted, This layer of the
bureaucracy was important under
the Fourth Republic also, but
then had to share its influence
on policy decisions with parlia-
ment, the army, and the labor
unions.
De Gaulle's Aloofness
Confusion in procedures for
taking decisions was to be expect-
ed in the early stages of the
new regime, and particularly un-
der the ambiguous provisions of
the new constitution, which di-
vides the executive power. This
confusion is compounded, however,
by De Gaulle's deliberate self-
restraint--in accordance with
his view of himself as primarily
an arbiter--in trying to avoid
imposing his personal views to
settle intramural disputes ex-
cept where broad'policy princi-
ples are involved.
An example concerned Finance
Minister Pinay's threat to resign
unless he received exclusive
jurisdiction over all financial
matters and the counterclaims of
Minister of State Lecourt and
Community Secretary General Janot
to control. of financial affairs
of the new French Community. This
dispute was never decisively ,set-
tled" by De Gaulle, and Pinay was
induced to remain only after a
loose modus vivendi gradually
came about. Moreover, De Gaulle
has also avoided--from personal
preference as well as because
he recognizes expert competence--
interference in ministries or
other government agencies pri-
marily concerned with technical
matters.
De Gaulle's aloofness and
refusal to become embroiled in
what he regards as "petty de-
tails" of policy give conscientious
staff personnel the opportunity
to expedite important matters,
but other actions of less scrupu-
lous "staff men" have come to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
public attention. According to
the Paris daily Le Monde, the
final draft of one o ze numer-
ous recent major decrees "sur-
reptitiously" retained a sec-
tion which De Gaulle had severe-
ly criticized in a cabinet meet-
ing and had ordered deleted.
Le Monde also charged that alarm-
ing reports and cables on rela-
tions between France and "a
newly independent state" were
fabricated. This was inadver-
tently revealed when a govern-
ment spokesman referred to them
in a press conference.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The Soviet regime will at-
tempt~at a central committe meet-
ing?this month to lay the founda-
tion for introducing improvements
as rapidly as possible in indus-
trial technology, particularly
with respect to mechanization
and automation. Progress in
these fields is especially im-
portant to achieve the ambitious
gains in industrial productivi-
ty envisaged during the Seven-
Year-Plan period (1959-65).
These gains are necessary to
compensate for additions to the
labor force smaller than hereto-
fore resulting from the low
birth rate during and after
World War II, as well as to per-
mit the promised continued reduc-
tion in the workweek.
Earlier this year a State
Committee for Automation and
Machine Building was established to
aid the mechanization and automa-
tion programs. The State Scientif-
ic-Economic Council, which.was
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
set up at the same time, may
also have a role in formulat-
ing solutions for these problems.
The USSR can, over the next
seven years, make impressive im-
provements in the average level
of its industrial technology by
the broadened exploitation of
many generally known techniques
as well as by pioneering advances.
The extent of the opportunity
to advance is indicated by the
fact that the capital investment
plan for 1959-65 envisages total
"productive investment" about
twice that of the preceding
seven years.
Status of Industrial Technology
Soviet industry has demon-
strated a capability to incor-
porate advanced techniques into
the rapidly expanding industrial
base of the USSR. In many areas
of heavy industry, which histor-
ically has been accorded the
highest priority, technological
practices have been introduced
which are on a par with the best
in the West. In some cases, as
in blast furnaces, petroleum ex-
traction, machine building, and
prestressed concrete, the Soviet
Union has made notable pioneering
adaptations and developments.
On the other hand, the food-
processing, textile, and other
light industries are far behind.
Certain types of transport, civ-
il telecommunications, and some
aspects of construction have
been accorded only grudging at-
tention, and many technological
practices in these areas are
similar to those used in the
West some 25 years ago.
The unevenness which occurs
within as well as between indus-
tries is primarily the product
of political and economic deci-
sions and of historical circum-
stance in the USSR, rather than
of significant technological
failure. Soviet technological
development started from a small
base compared with the West. It
has been and is conditioned by
different scarcity relationships
and industrial requirements, it
is directed toward different
political objectives, and its
progress is gauged in accordance
with a different rationale and
a different scale of values.
Central directives emphasize
increased physical output rather
than increased quality. For ex-
ample, technological advances
in the iron and steel industry
have been concentrated largely
in the blast furnace and the
open hearth because of the com-
manding demand to maximize steel
output rather than to improve
the quality or diversity of prod-
ucts. As a result the Soviet
Union has established a new
world standard for efficient
blast-furnace operation; however,
certain problems in mining, ore
preparation and rolling-mill
and finishing technologies have
not been accorded equivalent
priority.
These directives tend to
discourage the introduction of
new technology because of the
likelihood of distuptions, which
would jeopardize output goals.
Furthermore, they inspire a con-
servatism in plant management
which results in a considerable
lag between development and
practical application. For ex-
ample, an automatic line for
producing wheel rims had not
been installed in one automotive
plant in 1958, although it had
been in storage at the plant for
a year. At the same plant an
automatic line for stamping
wheel discs had been left un-
touched for two years.
Another important factor
affecting industrial technology
is the Soviet policy with respect
to obsolescence. The great
emphasis on expanding current
output has tended to foster re-
tention of existing capacity and
has kept older, technologically
less advanced plants in opera-
tion much longer than is the case
in the West.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 June 1959
Both in the West and in the
USSR, no clear distinction can
be made between the terms "mech-
anization" and "automation."
Generally speaking, however,
mechanization refers to replac-
ing human labor with machinery,
and automation to replacing
human control with mechanical
or electronic devices.
Soviet progress in develop-
ing automatic control systems
is more readily discernible in
military than in industrial ap-
plications. The USSR lags be-
hind the United States in the
range and extent to which de-
velopments in automation are
applied to industrial practice,
but when applied, Soviet tech-
nology is not inferior to that
in the United States.
Substantial advances have
been made in research and de-
velopment involving servomech-
anisms and electronic and com-
munication instruments, as well
as devices capable of perform-
ing a sequence of logical, self-
correcting operations. In his
theses on the Seven-Year Plan,
however, Khrushchev criticized
the lag in industrial applica-
tion of Soviet research achieve-
ments in automation. He also
admitted that a lag exists in
implementing mechanization when
he derided the low level of So-
viet industrial mechanization
and pointed to the fact that
manual labor represents up to
50 percent of the entire working
time of the Soviet machine-build-
ing industry.
The most highly automated
sectors of the Soviet industrial
economy are the electric-power
and ferrous-metallurgical indus-
tries. Even in these industries,
applications of automation have
been more widely applied to some
processes than to others. For
example, automation in steel
manufacturing has made a signif-
icant contribution to the
iron-and-steel-making process,
in contrast to the rolling and
other finishing processes.
In other industrial sectors,
such as the chemical and petroleum
refining industries, the USSR
has made only relatively minor
advances in applying modern tech-
niques of automation and mech-
anization. While these Soviet
industries have been making ef-
fective use of simple automatic.
control instruments, in the
United States several chemical
and petroleum companies have an-
nounced that in 1959 they will
achieve truly automated plants,
i.e., the entire manufacturing
process will be fully controlled
by a computer-based, closed-loop
scheme of automation.
In the machine-building
sector, the USSR lags far behind
the United States in the range
and extent of industrial applica-
tion of automation and mechaniza-
tion. The greatest number of
such Soviet automatic and semi-
automatic lines are installed in
the plants of the automotive
and associated industries such
as piston, engine-block, and
bearing factories. The USSR
has pioneered in three areas:
an automatic piston factory,
an automatic bearing line, and
an automatic gear-making line.
The significance of each
of these automated endeavors is
not only that they produce prod-
ucts automatically, but also
they serve as laboratories in
which the USSR is developing
the fundamentals necessary for
a systematic approach to build-
ing future automatic lines. Dur-
ing the period of the Seven-Year
Plan. (1959-65), a total of 50
additional experimental plants
are to be build to cover every
sector of the Soviet industrial
economy.
Electronic Computers
The USSR has been more
successful in developing the
production of analogue computers
than digital computers. At least
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
ten different types of analogue
computers were reported to be
in serial production in early
1958.
The USSR has encountered
serious difficulties in produc-
ing electronic digital computers
in quantity, particularly in the
case of the high-speed and very-
high-speed types. Their use in
the USSR has been confined main-
ly to large scientific and de-
sign establishments. Produc-
tion has not been adequate to
permit their application to prob-
lems of industrial automation
and business data handling.
Responsibility for the cur-
rent lag in production of digital
computers and other instrumenta-
tion for automatic control of
production processes has been
placed squarely on the elec-
tronics industry. According to
1958 Soviet reports, automa-
mation in the USSR is being
"greatly impeded" by failure of
the electronics industry to
achieve "mass production of
standarized miniaturized compon-
ents, standardized elements and
subassemblies, and especially
semiconductor devices."
In one report a specific
example was cited in the devel-
opment of the small M-3 digi-
tal computer. This machine, de-
signed in 1954, was not yet in
commercial-scale production by
the middle of 1958. Also Aca-
demician Blagonravov, a promi-
nent scientist, has charged that
the length of time between de-
sign and industrial production
of instrumentation in the USSR
is "inadmissibly long--four to
seven years, as against one
to two Years in the United
States." (Pre- 25X1
pared by ORR; concurred in
by OSI)
AFGHANISTAN'S USE OF THE $100,000,000 SOVIET CREDIT
Several large Afghan de-
velopment projects under the
Soviet $100,000,000 line of
credit granted in early 1956
have entered the construction
stage, resulting in an increase
in obligated funds from about
$12,000,000 in 1957 to possibly
$71,000,000. Several of the
projects originally planned un-
der this credit, however, re-
main indefinitely suspended.
Emphasis on transportation de-
velopment continues, but more
attention is being given hydro-
electric and irrigation dam
projects. The projects under
construction are located in
northeast Afghanistan, along
the main transportation artery
connecting the Soviet border
with the Khyber Pass.
Soviet bloc credits out-
side the $100,000,000 loan, in-
cluding $32,391,000 for arms
aid and $15,000,000 for oil ex-
ploration, probably totaled
about $59,000,000 by the early
spring of 1959. In May, how-
ever, Afghanistan and the
USSR concluded a new economic
cooperation agreement which
provides for the construc-
tion of a 470-mile road
from the Soviet border to
Kandahar.
Progress Since 1957
Construction was completed
in 1.958 on three relatively
small Soviet projects under the
$100,000,000 credit. These
were the oil storage depots at
Qizil Qala, Pul-i-Khumri, and
Pul-i-Matek, which were already
under construction at the be-
ginning of the 1957 summer build-
ing season.
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Bagra
KABU
,K?lif Ter
4,+ Darya
(Area of Mazer i
Sharif_
expl ation) 44
MotQt ab
AFGHAN
(tad to be constructed
under M15 agreemen
f010
Ifandahar
I Broad-gauge railroad _%,, f l v,,S S R
Nine larger projects en-
tered or remained in the con-
etrudtion?stage in'1958. Two,
the Bagram military airport and
the Jungalot group of workshops
in Kabul, were begun in 1957.
Seven others entered the con-
struction stage in 1958. These
were the Salang Pass road and
tunnel, the runway at the civil
airport in Kabul, the Qizil Qala
river port, the Naghlu and Pul-
i-Khumri hydroelectric projects,
the Jalalabad irrigation dam
project, and an oil storage de-
pot at Bulola.
The Afghan Government ap-
parently has not yet taken ad-
vantage of the Soviet offer made
in the spring of 1958 to do free
surveys for additional projects,,
presumably to speed up utiliza-
tion of the $100,000,000 line
of credit, and no new projects
appear to be under construction.
On the other hand, eight
projects have apparently been
fort
Sandeman
JAM M U
AND
KASHMIR
(Status in dispute)
Rawalpindi
Construction initiated
Completed
Dropped or indefinitely suspended
Salang Pass road
SO Vehicle repair shop I Oil storage
depots
Hydroelectric project Laboratory
~--~ Irrigation project Port
Metal-working * Airfield
factory
indefinitely suspended. These
are the Kabul fertilizer plant,
the Kabul physical laboratory,
the Herat and Pul-i-Khumri vehi-
cle repair shops, the Sardeh,
Paltu, and Kharwar irrigation
projects, and an oil storage
depot at Kandahar.
Transportation Emphasized
Projects under the $100,-
000,000 line of credit which
will contribute to the develop-
ment of Afghanistan's transpor-
tation system are being empha-
sized. The three oil storage
depots completed in 1958 were
all along the road from Qizil
Qala, on the Soviet border, to
Kabul. This road will eventually
be considerably shortened by the
$12,000,000 Salang Pass road and
tunnel project.
The other projects which
have reached the construction
stage are also located along the
road connecting Qizil Qala and
SECRET
- Narrow-gauge railroad
S g a
Ja us Saraj
Bulolh
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Kabul and on the road leading
from Kabul to the Khyber Pass.
The development of this artery
will facilitate Afghan trade
with the USSR and the bloc un-
der the terms of the new trans-
it agreement signed on 8 Jan-
uary 1959.
In addition, the new eco-
nomic and technical assistance
agreement signed by the Afghan
delegation in Moscow on 28 May
1959, provides for Soviet con-
struction of improvement of the
Herat-Kandahar road, the west-
ern artery leading from the So-
viet border to Pakistan. This
project may be financed by a
new credit rather than under
the $100,000,000 loan.
Dam Projects Started
The Afghans are using part
of the $100,000,000 credit for
dam projects to expand their hy-
droelectric power capacity and
to provide additional irrigation
waters to increase agricultural
production.
On 30 December 1957, Kabul
approved a construction agree-
ment for a dam near Jalalabad.
This dam is part of an irriga-
tion project which may use as
much as $23;000,000 of the cred-
it. The Afghan Government may
feel such an expensive project
in this region is desirable for
prestige reasons. Jalalabad
lies near troublesome Pushtu
tribal areas, and the Pakistani
Government, which competes for
prestige among these tribes,is
building an even more ambitious
dam at Warsak, across the border.
Kabul also approved agree-,
ments in 1958 for construction
of the hydroelectric projects
at Naghlu and Pul-i-Khumri.
The Naghlu project, however,may
be subject to further price ne-
otiations, since the USSR has
apparently raised its cost esti-
mates and now anticipates that
over $12,000,000 in scarce Afghan
domestic currency will be required.
Increased construction ac-
tivity on projects under the
$100,000,000 credit has led to
an influx of Soviet nationals:.
An estimated 800 bloc technicians
may be working on development
projects in Afghanistan, prob-
ably mainly in Kabul, Bagram,
the Salang Pass region, and in
the oil exploration area west
of Nazar-i-Sharif, where work
is being carried out under the
separate $15,000,000 oil ex-
ploration agreement.
The Afghan Government, how-
ever, is sensitive about politi-
cal activity by foreign techni-
cians and limits Afghan con-
tacts with foreigners. Bloc
technicians apparently observe
Kabul's strictures in this
matter.
Utilization of Funds
Afghan Foreign Minister
Nairn indicated in December 1957
that his country would use all
of the Soviet $100,000,000 cred-
it. It seems likely that the
entire amount will be obligated
by 1964, when the Afghan Govern-
ment must begin repayment over
a period of 22 years. The re-
maining funds available under
this credit, however, may be
spent on new projects rather
on those which now appear to be
indefinitely suspended.
The Afghans will probably
continue to proceed cautiously
because of shortages of Afghan
domestic funds required by for-
eign-assisted projects'and be-
cause of shortages of Afghan
technical and administrative per-
sonnel, The USSR--presumably'to,
overcome this caution--has of-
f ered free surveys for projects and
free consumer goods to sell on the Af-
ghan market to generate needed local
fundLs'. For. the. same purpose,. it has
made a gift of 40,000 tons of
wheat. The Afghans may feel
that the sooner the remaining
uncommitted portion of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
$100,000,000 credit is convert-
ed into completed projects,
the sooner Afghanistan's gross
national product and ability
to repay the credit will
rise.
The Afghans feel that the
great Soviet technical and
(Concurred in by ORR 25X1
MAO TSE-TUNG'S ARRANGEMENTS FOR A SUCCESSOR
Mao Tse-tung has taken a
number of steps since 1956 to
prepare the Chinese Communist
party and the Chinese people
for his eventual replacement
as party chairman--perhaps in
1961--by his favorite lieuten-
ant, Liu Shao-chi. Liu's ap-
pointment as chairman of the
government appears to have been
the latest of these. Mao's ar-
rangements seem well calculated
to provide a smooth transition
and to encourage the continued
solidarity of the party leader-
ship. There are, however, sev-
eral possible threats to an
orderly succession.
Liu knew Mao when both were
students in Hunan, but they were
not close. After two years in
the USSR, Liu joined the Chi-
nese Communist party in 1921
and thereafter became known
chiefly as a labor organizer.
He was named to the Chinese Com-
munist party politburo in 1931
?--a year earlier than Mao--when
it was dominated by Comintern-
sponsored youths.
In 1932 Liu followed other
party leaders from Shanghai to
Mao's "soviet"--a rural base--
in Kiangsi in South China. There
he reportedly stood with Mao
in opposing the Comintern-spon-
sored group which, with Chou
En-lai, continued to dominate
the party.
When the Chinese Communists
were dislodged from their Kiangsi
base in 1934, Liu joined the
Long March to the north as a
political officer. In January
1935, at a party conference in
Tsunyi during the march, Liu
supported Mao in a winning show-
down with the Comintern's favor-
ites--whom Mao accused of bun-
gling.
Liu and Chou both supported
Mao) in another intraparty dis-
pute in 1935--the question of
the destination of the Communist
forces. After arriving in
Shensi (Mao's choice), Liu be-
came an underground leader against
the:) Japanese forces then in China.
He returned to Yenan in Shensi
in 1937 and, shortly thereafter,
supported Mao in another winning
fight--as to what kind of "united
front" to establish. He ap-
parently began at that time to
specialize in party organiza-
tional work.
Liu first appeared as a
spokesman for Mao on party affairs
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economic assistance should be
balanced in part by free-world
participation in Afghan eco-
nomic development programs, and
Kabul has secured increased free-
,world assistance, mainly from
the United States.[ 25X1
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INOP
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
in 1939, in writing on the train-
ing of a party member. In the
next four years, while engaged
in party work in various parts
of China, Liu published several
other articles of this kind.
One of these set forth princi-
ples for the party's first "rec
tification" campaign.
Mao became chairman of
the central committee in 1943,
and changes in the politburo
and secretariat left those
bodies completely responsive
to him. His politburo included
himself, Liu, Chou, Chu- Te, and
Chen Yun, of the party's current
officers. The secretariat was
built around Mao, Liu,and Chou.
Liu's Emergence as Favorite
Liu emerged as Mao's first
lieutenant in 1945. His re-
port to the party's seventh
congress was second in impor-
tance only to Mao's, and the
congress adopted a revised
party constitution which Liu
had apparently drafted. Mao
was elected chairman of the
central committee, politburo,
and secretariat, and Liu was
re-elected to those bodies be-
low him. Chou En-lai and
others were named below Liu in
the hierarchy. Later in the
year, Liu was acting chairman
of the party in Mao's absence.
When the Peiping regime
was proclaimed in 1949, Mao
became chairman of the Central
People's Government, while Chou
was given the key government
post of premier. Liu retained
the more important role of Mao's
first lieutenant for party work
and continued to build his base
of power in the party machine.
When the Peiping regime was
reorganized in 1954, Mao became
chairman of the People's Repub-
lie of China and Liu became
chairman of the body which the-
oretically supervised the cabi-
nei.. Chou En-lai was again
named premier.
Also in 1954, Liu, presid-
ing over a central committee
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 June 1959
plenum in Mao's absence, de-
nounced unnamed party leaders
for factional activity. Shortly
thereafter, Teng Hsiao-ping be-
came the party's secretary gen-
eral, working under Mao and Liu
in supervising the party machine,
and in 1955 he announced the
purge of two top party leaders
--which Liu's denunciation had
foreshadowed. From that time
Teng seemed to be Liu's chief
aide for party affairs, just as
Liu was Mao's.
At the party's eighth con-
gress in September 1956, Mao
revealed some preparations for
his eventual replacement as
party chairman. One of these
was the provision in the revised
party constitution for the cen-
tral committee to establish the
post of "honorary chairman"--
which would permit Mao to step
aside during his lifetime.
Mao in effect designated
a group to carry on in the event
of his retirement or death. The
congress, re-electing Mao chair-
man of the central committee
and politburo, named four of his
"close comrades" as vice chair-
men and confirmed the post of
secretary general. Mao and
these five became the politburo
standing committee--a.small'
superpolitburo,now numbering
seven in all, which was to re-
place the outgoing secretariat
but would have no chairman.
At the same time, Mao once
again made it clear that he fa-
vored Liu Shao-chi to succeed
hizu as the party's principal
figure. Liu was named first
among the vice chairmen of the
central committee and politburo
and placed immediately below
Mao on the politburo standing
committee; Chou En-lai was named
below Liu. Even more strikingly,
Litt was chosen to deliver the
four-hour "political report" to
the congress--the equivalent of
the report Mao had made to the
1945 congress.
Liu's close associate Teng
Hsiao-ping was re-elected secre-
tary general and named to head
the) new secretariat, which was
to administer and coordinate
the party machine at all levels.
Teng thus became--and remains--
the only party leader concurrent-
ly a member of the politburo,
standing committee, and secre-
tariat. Teng gave the report
on the party's revised constitu-
tion--a subject Liu was assigned
in 1945.
Liberalization ": and Reversal
In the period from the
eighth congress in 1956 to the
summer of 1957 there were indica-
tions of possible disagreement
between Mao and Liu--relating
chiefly to Mao's experiment with
"liberalization." For much of
this period, Mao was contributing
to the Soviet Union's troubles
by encouraging dissident forces
in Eastern Europe. He was also
insisting on his "hundred-flowers"
program at home, coinciding with
the "ebb tide" in China's eco--
nomic growth. Liu Shao-chi and
Teng Hsiao-ping played very
small public roles in late 1956
and early 1957; they may have
believed that some of Mao's
policies were ill conceived.
looked thin and tired
In this same period, Mao
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The question arose
as to whether other party lead-
ers would attempt to exploit
his ill health and his mistakes.
Liu seemed to remain a
faithful servant, however--one
content to let Mao step aside
at a time of his own choosing.
In June 1957 Mao himself sig-
naled the change to a very hard
line in both intrabloc and do-
mestic affairs. He strongly
reaffirmed orthodox positions,
justified the "antirightist
struggle," and linked the par-
ty's "rectification" campaign
with the task of a speedier ad-
vance in "socialist construc-
tion." In July, Mao set forth
"clear-cut principles" for a na-
tionwide rectification campaign.
Thereafter, Liu Shao-chi
and Teng Hsiao-ping played the
major roles in helping Mao re-
pair the damage, regain both
political and economic momen-
tum, and restore his personal
prestige. Teng was chosen to
state publicly, in September
1957, the leadership's plans
for indoctrinating the entire
populace in basic dogmas. "Par--
ty-machine" figures--principal-
ly Liu, Teng, and Teng's deputy
Tan Chen-lin--took the lead in
exhorting an "upsurge" in eco-
nomic growth, which became the
"great leap forward" of 1958.
Mao and Teng went to Moscow in
late 1957 to state the party's
hard line on intrabloc relations,
announced simultaneously by Liu
in Peiping.
Throughout the winter of
1957-58 the Chinese press gave
further touches to the image of
Liu as Mao's successor. There
was much personal publicity for
Liu which stressed his close as-
sociation with Mao from the ear-
liest days of the party, gave
him some of the credit for the
party's unswervingly correct
course under Mao, and made an
effort to brighten his gray
and solemn personality.
The party congress of May
19513 provided further evidence
of JLiu's stature and of the in-
PRINCIPAL CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANS
POLITBURO
CHAIRMAN
Mao Tse-tung
VICE CHAIRMEN
Liu Shao-chi
Chou En-lai
*Chu Te
Chen Yun
* Lin Piao
FULL MEMBERS
Teng Hsiao-ping _
* Lin Po-chu
* Tong Pi-wu
Peng Chen
* Lo Jung-h
uan
Chen Yi
Li Fu-chun
Peng Te-huai
* Liu Po-cheng
* Ho Lung
Li Hsien-nien
Ko Ching-shih
Li Ching-chuan
Tan Chen-lin -
ALTERNATES
Ulanfu
Chang Wen-tien
Lu Ting-'
Chen Po-ta
Kang Sheng
Po I-po
POLITBURO
STANDING COMMITTEE
(NO OFFICERS)
-.Mao Tse-tung
Liu Shao-chi
Chou En-lai
-.,Chu Te
Chen Yun
Lin Piao
* Esteemed but apparently
unimportant,
SECRET
prestige and power of
Liu's "party-machine"
associates. Liu was
again chosen to give
the principal report
to the congress. More-
over, in his report
he felt free to group
himself with Mao as
having been right
all along in intra-
party disputes on
polity. The other
two major reports were
given by the "party-
machine" figures Teng
Hsiao-ping and Tan Chen-
lin. After the con-
gress, three new polit-
buro members were named
--all persons close
to Liu and Teng as well
as to Mao.
Mao and Liu in
The Past Year
Sometime prior
to July 1958 it was
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SECRETARIAT
SECRETARY GENERAL
. Teng Hsiao-ping
SECRETARIES
Peng Chen
Wang Chia-.hsiang
Tan Cheng
Huang Ko-cheng
Li Hsueh-feng
(plus three
alternates)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
decided to establish the huge
"people's communes" as the "basic
unit" of Chinese society. Liu
was firmly identified with this
program. In July he told some
students that Communism in China
could be realized "very soon"
--the most extreme claim attrib-
uted to any Chinese party leader.
Late in 1958, Mao took an-
other step toward retirement,
asking that he not be renominated
for the largely ceremonial post
of chairman of the government.
He said he wanted to conserve
his time and energy to deal with
questions of theory and national
policy. This was plausible,
especially in the light of the
need for further study--and
theoretical justification--of
the audacious commune program.
The central committee ple-
num which approved Mao's resig-
nation also retreated some dis-
tance in the commune campaign--
modifying both Peiping's claims
for the program and the practi-
cal program itself. This action,
following the regime's with-
drawal from the Taiwan Strait
venture, provoked much specula-
tion that Mao was being forced
to step down. However, the only
party leaders strong enough to
press Mao--the "party-machine"
group--were the very ones most
closely associated with Mao's
major policies since mid-1957.
Mao retained all of his party
posts, and the December plenum
emphasized that Mao himself had
ordered the modification of the
commune program and that his
"guidance" would continue.
The central committee met
again in April 1959, with Mao
presiding. Of several changes
in the government posts announced
thereafter, the naming of Liu
to the government chairmanship
was the only significant one.
Chou En-lai was named to another
.our-year term as premier, and
Uhou's entire cabinet was re-
appointed.
Mao's decision to give the
rather empty and wearisome gov-
ernment chairmanship to the al-
ready burdened Liu surprised
many observers. There has been
speculation that Liu is being
retired into the job.
Assuming, however, that
Liu is not seriously ill, the
most plausible explanation of
his appointment is that Mao saw
it as a necessary step in pre-
paring the Chinese people--as he
has been preparing the party
since 1956--to accept Liu's
eventual primacy. That is, in
becoming accustomed to "Chair-
man Liu" of the government suc-
ceeding Mao, the populace will
be better prepared for "Chair-
man Liu" of the party succeeding
Mao. The Chinese press, by
distinguishing between Chairman
Mao "the great leader of the
Chinese people" on the one hand
and Chairman Liu and other lead-
ers of the government on the
other, continues to underline the
greater importance of the party
post and to discourage speculation
that Liu has already displaced
Mao.
Prospects for the Succession
Any plenum of the central
committee can establish the post
of "honorary chairman" and elect
new officers, but a further sub-
stantial period of build-up for
Liu would seem desirable. Thus,
assuming that Mao's health re-
mains passably good, it seems
likely that Mao will keep the
party chairmanship at least until
the party's ninth congress in
1961, which will coincide with
the 40th anniversary of the Chi-
nese Communist party.
Mao's arrangements seem
calculated to provide a smooth
transition in the party leader-
ship :and' to encourage a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 June 1959
continuation of the remarkable
solidarity of that leadership.
There are, however, several pos-
sible developments which could
alter the entire picture.
One such possibility is
that Mao will give further thought
to the "King Lear problem"--the
problem of securing obedience
after one has relinquished the
instruments of power. Mao may
recognize that once he has given
up his party posts and the com-
position of key party organs
has changed, he will have no as-
surance that his wishes will be
carried out. Contemplating this
prospect, he might choose not
to step aside for anyone.
Should Mao attempt to re-
tain the party chairmanship in-
definitely, Liu, who is already
61, might gather his "party-
machine" group and make a fight
for it. This possibility would
increase sharply if an ill and
arbitrary Mao were to find him-
self a new favorite whom he re-
garded as more responsive to
his will.
Another disruptive possi-
bility is that Mao will die be-
fore the transition is effected.
In such an event, Liu might be
challenged by a coalition of
key figures who have been impor-
tant not primarily in party work,
but as senior administrators,
economic specialists, and mili-
tary men. Some of these latter
figurres seem to have resented
the :role of the "party-machine"
group in leading the party's ma-
jor campaigns of the past two
years and to have disapproved
of important features of these
campaigns.
Perhaps the most serious
concern for Liu is the possibil-
ity that his "party-machine"
group will prove unstable. With
Mao gone, Liu's position would
seem to depend in particular on
the supportct.Teng Hsiao-ping,
whose strength in the party
machine is already formidable
and can be expected to grow.
If an ambitious Teng were to
join the opposition to Liu, Liu
might well succumb to such a
combination.
In sum, the question of
Mao's successor is not closed.
Liu remains, as he has for
14 years, the leading candidate
for the post of party chairman.
He may have to fight for the job,
however, and he might not win.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CONfIDENTiAL
QNf1DEEllAt.
D
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