CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002200060001-2
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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2005
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• Publication Date: October 18, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 54
OCI NO.1683/59
16 April 1959
DOCUMENT NO.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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RETURN TO ARCHIVES a I IC09S F
IN EDIATE1Y AFTER US?
CONFIDENTIAL
State Department, DIA review(s) completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFC)RMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND '794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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401.4 .91A.S.S.R.Rall, ON" -"We I
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 19,59
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS
The USSR is continuing its
display of moderation and re-
straint, with the professed pur-
pose of creating a favorable
atmosphere for forthcoming ne-
gotiations. In reply to Presi-
dent. Eisenhower's Gettysburg
speech, Khrushchev called on
all powers to "display patience"
and avoid any actions which
could interfere with the solu-
tion of the Berlin and German
problems. Soviet propaganda
has refrained from exploiting
the incidents involving American
transport aircraft in the Berlin
air corridors. The Soviet lead-
ers probably believe this exer-
cise in restraint will soften
Western positions in the forth-
coming negotiations.
Ambassador Thompson believes
the USSR's principal objectives
in forthcoming negotiations will
be to achieve a result which
will amount to Western acceptance
of the East European status quo,
symbolized by some sort of recog-
nitio of East Germany, He sug-
gests the USSR, in trying to
accomplish this, will seek to
inflict as much damage as pos-
sible on Western prestige and
unity.
In Thompson's view, the
USSR precipitated the Berlin
crisis in order to overcome
Western resistance to top-level
conferences and to exert pres-
sure on a very vulnerable West-
ern position. He suggests that
if the Soviet leaders succeed
in obtaining Western acceptance
of the status quo in Eastern
Europe and East Germany, they
may agree to a new Berlin ar-
rangement which will provide
the West with an "improved title"
for remaining in West Berlin and
with--!better,,defined; acc?es,;s '.rights
The ambassador warns that
failure to reach agreement on
Berlin will lead, at a mimimum,
to active Soviet probing and
pressures on Allied, and eventual-
ly West German, access to Berlin.
Whi]!e Thompson does not believe
Khrushchev is under any compels..
ling'domestic pressure to pro-
duce a victory, he emphasizes
that the Soviet premier is in
'"deadly earnest" in "aiming a
fatal blow at Western preten-
sions to challenging the exist-
ing boundaries of the Soviet
empire." At the same time,
the ambassador continues to be-
lieve there will be a strong
Soviet desire to avoid letting
matters get out of hand.
As for Soviet tactics at
the foreign ministers' conference,
Thompson suggests that the So-
viet representative, after
stating Moscow's established
positions on a German peace
treaty and Berlin, may put for-
ward "fall-back" positions on
individual articles of the So-
viet draft treaty, the specifics
of the free city plan, and the
temporary or provisional exclu-
sion of Czechoslovakia and Po-
land from the conference. Mos-
cow's essential "sticking point,"
however, will be over agreement
to any Western proposals which
do not give substantial de facto
recognition to East Germany.
Thompson feels the Soviet
leaders believe Adenauer's deci-
sion to seek the presidency has
injected new elements of fluidity
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
into the situation which will
provide opportunities for So-
viet exploitation of West Ger-
man groups which may be willing
to abandon the West's long-
standing policy on reunifica".
tion and "dicker" with the USSR
and East Germany.
A Soviet diplomat in Bonn
told an American official that
the USSR is very pleased by
the announcement that Adenauer
will retire from the chancellor-
ship since it will make
things easier for the Russians
and more difficult for the
Americans. He asserted that
Adenauer was forced out of of-
fice by the failure of his
policies, as shown by Western
disunity at the recent NATO
meeting in Washington and by
De Gaulle's public support
for the Oder-Neisse border,
and that his removal from real
influence increases prospects
for successful foreign min-
isters' and summit confer-
ences.
East Germany
The USSR appears to
be continuing its preparations
for the eventual withdrawal
of its Kommandatura from
East Berlin.
East Germany also is
taking steps to prepare for
the eventual turnover of ac-
cess control functions by the
USSR. New and elaborate fa-
cilities have been completed
in :recent weeks at the
Marienborn rail checkpoint
for the use of East German
personnel which will enable
them to halt all trains
moving in either direction,
carry out a complete in-
spection of all passengers and
baggage, and reload them on
other trains. This construc-
tion suggests that the USSR
and East Germany may plan
to impose much stricter con-
trols on passenger traffic
between East and West Ger-
many, particularly between
West Germany and West Ber-
lin.
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'CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
The importance of West
Berlin as an escape hatch for
East German opponents of Ul-
bricht was graphically il-
lustrated during the period
25 March to 7 April when
more than 5,400 refugees
asked asylum. This is the
largest for a two-week peri-
od" since: the close of the
usual summer mass flights
last September and greatly
surpasses the number flee-
ing during the comparable
Easter periods in 1957
(3,825) and 1958 (4,960),
although it is below that
of 1953 and 1956, the
two highest years. The in-
crease during this period
may indicate some growth
in popular alarm evoked
by recent declarations of
the regime that it will
intensify pressures for so-
cialization.
Western Views
The British press has shown
renewed concern over Western
political leadership. It has
emphasized that Secretary Dulles'
resignation will further deflate
the importance of the Geneva
foreign ministers' meeting, and
add to the significance of sum-
mit talks where Prime Minister
Macmillan may play a leading
role in achieving a negotiated
settlement. The Berlin corridor
plane incidents have brought
renewed expressions of con-
cern lest the West be un-
duly provocative, with La-
bor's Daily Herald demand-
ing that er can brass
hats not be allowed to
kill summit talks."
French Foreign Ministry
officials seem to feel that
British "flexibility" on Berlin
and , the German problem has be-
come more dangerous now that
Adenauer has decided to step
down. They had viewed Adenauer's
firmness as a valuable counter-
balance to British "softness"
and, following Adenauer's de-
cision, urged the United States
to join France in braking Brit-
ish eagerness.
Adenauer's renunciation
of the chancellorship has not
altered the West German Govern-
ment's decision to reject reuni-
fication and security proposals
previously agreed upon. In pub-
lic statements Adenauer, Foreign
Minister Brentano, Defense Min-
ister Strauss, and Economics
Minister Erhard all emphasize
that a German confederation
in any form is unaccept-
able. While expressing mod-
erate optimism about the
prospects ' for a success-
ful. foreign ministers':
Brentano spurns a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959)
confederation under any form
or' behind "any mask."
In public statements West
German leaders have also con-
tinued to attack any plans for
military limitations or "freezes'
not tied into political soluti ns.
Strauss, for example, rejected
a freeze on armaments in Central
Europe as too limited in area
and conceding to the USSR a de-
cisive superiority in both con-
ventional and modern weapons.
Adenauer's comments on British-
German differences in his 8
April speech reflected Bonn's
continuing concern over the
possibility that the West would
agree to a counterproposal which
would break the link between
German unification and European
security.
In Western discussions,
which began on 13 April in Lon-
don, Bonn submitted a revision
of its unification plan presented
by Brentano on 1 April in Wash-
ington. The new modifications,
however, were limited to a re-
phrasing with no major substan-
tive changes. Foreign Ministry
officials stated that the re-
visions were worked out at the
highest level in the Foreign
and Defense Ministries and per-
sonally approved by Adenauer.
Bonn apparently intends to
remain firm in its opposition
to anything which could be inter-
preted as a German confederation,
to separating European security
arrangements from political so-
lutions, and to submitting a
peace treaty draft to Moscow.
In return for Western agreement
to this position Bonn may ulti-
mately concede increased contacts
between the two Germanys, which
could open the way for Western
dealings with t Germany on
Berlin access-
West Berlin
The general economic situ-
ation in West Berlin continues
to show signs of improvement.
New orders for industry appear
to be increasing, probably as a
result of Bonn's new legislation
extending insurance coverage
to Berlin export customers and
granting tax advantages to
Berlin investors. American of-
ficials feel there has been an
improvement in morale, under-
cut, however, by general un-
easiness over the nature of
Western proposals at the foreign
ministers'meeting. Berlin lead-
ers prefer the status quo, how-
ever inadequate, to any new ar-
rangement.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
Iraq
The American Army attache
in Baghdad has confirmed the ar-
rest of the Iraqi Army's deputy
chief of staff for operations,
a non-Communist, and the appoint-
ment in his place of a pro-Commu-
nist officer who has been dire(,-
tor of operations since last
summer. The pro-Communist, Brig-
adier Farid Dhia Mahmud, is be-
lieved to have been responsible
for the transfer of a number of
antiregime officers to less im-
portant positions.
Another potential Communist
gain is indicated by the con-
tinued expansion of the Popular
Resistance Force (PRF), which
is.-estimated to have as many as
50,000 members. The Communists
have "demanded" that this group
be armed.
Prime Minister Qasim ad-
dressed the Iraqi Peace Parti-
sans' major rally in Baghdad on
14 April, warning against "divi-
sive and reactionary elements"
and aligning himself with the
"democratic forces" who embody
the "main inclination" in Iraq.
Although he also said there is
room in'the country for "all
parties of various inclinations
if the objective of their lead-
ers is to serve the country,
freedom, and peace," this is
the first time he has lent the
prestige of a personal appear-
ance to a clearly Communist-
sponsored event of this magni-
tude.
Other opportunities for the
Communists have been presented
this week by the reorganization
of the Ministry of Development
into five new economic minis-
tries, each handling a specific
sector--oil, planning, industry,
public works and housing, and
agrarian reform. Rumors in Bagh-
dad are strong that outright
Communists are to be appointed
to head at least some of the
new ministries.
The outstanding pro-Com-
munists in the cabinet, Economics
Minister Kubba, has reiterated
that the government intends to
honor its concession agreement
with the Iraq Petroleum Company.
However, the director general
of oil affairs has stated that
the government will grant no
more concessions but will in-
stead develop new oil resources
itself, hiring foreign techni-'
cians as needed. Soviet techni-
cians, the first such group in
the economic field to start ac-
tual work in Iraq, have replaced
Egyptians at the government-owned
Daura refinery, and the American
director there has been rele-
gated to an advisory capacity.
UAR-Soviet Relations
Nasir is keeping up his
propaganda attacks on the Iraqi
regime, larding new accounts of
alleged uprisings with stories
which appear designed to excite
the fears and mutual antipathies
of Iraqi minority groups. UAR-
controlled media also continue
to attack Communism generally.
Moscow, while irritated by
Nasi:r's current line, continues
to hope that relations will again
improve. On 11 April TASS issued
a statement denying the UAR press
and '.'radio charge that the 850
Kurdish refugees who were returned
to Iraq aboard the ship Gruziya
were Soviet-armed or trained
for guerrilla warfare in the
USSR, The statement, which at-
tributed such "fabrications" to
Western news agencies rather
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
than Cairo sources, was broad-
cast throughout the world and
repeatedly to Arab listeners.
Izvestia on 15 April strongly
a ac a the Cairo press for
originating reports that four
more Soviet ships are trans-
porting Kurds from the USSR to
Iraq. Izvestia specified the
four ships, cargoes and ports
of destination, pointedly noting
that two of the ships were car-
rying industrial equipment and
oil to the UAR.
Moscow has also continued
to criticize in general terms
the UAR's "anti-Soviet campaign."
Soviet Ambassador Kiselev, who
departed his Cairo post for
Moscow in early February and
subsequently extended his ab-
sence on grounds of illness,
returned to Cairo on 14 April,
and requested an interview with
Nasir. Kiselev will probably
attempt to persuade Nasir to halt
his attacks on Qasim, Arab Com-
munists, and the bloc.
Arab Petroleum Congress
The long-planned but often
postponed First Arab Petroleum
Congress was scheduled to begin
on 17 April in Cairo with rep-
resentatives from most Arab
states and observers from Vene-
zuela and Iran. Iraq, however,
is conspicuously absent. In
addition to government partici-
pation, more than 35 oil com-
panies will present papers and
exhibits. No surprises are ex-
pected from the congress', which
is set around four major topics
--technical and scientific, eco-
nomic, legal, and political as-
pects of the oil problem.
Venezuela is sending an
impressive delegation headed by
Dr. Juan Pablo Perez Alfonzo,
minister of mines and hydrocar-
bons, and including representa-
tives from the three major po-
litical parties. The Venezuelan
change of heart--the former min-
ister of mines planned to send
only a token delegation--re-
flects the new government's
deep concern over declining
prices and world overproduction
which are expected to make in-
roads on Venezuelan oil revenues.
The Arabs had been particularly
anxious to have Venezuelan at-
tendance, largely for symbolic
reasons--the unilateral Vene-
zuelan action changing the 50-
50 profit split to a 60-40
split in favor of the government
is universally admired in Arab
capitals.
Non-Arab Iran, in a sharp
reversal of its policy of non-
association with the Cairo-domi-
nated Arab League, made a last-
minute decision on 11 April to
send a token delegation. Here
too, the change of heart prob-
ably can be attributed to Tehran's
alarm at-softening petroleum prices.
Considerable behind-the-
scenes activity on the question
of stabilizing world oil prices
and coordinating production al-
most certainly will dominate the
congress' discussion, and from
it may well come eventually
greater pressure on Western oil
companies operating in the Mid-
dle East.
Jordan
Jordanian Prime Minister
Rifai has returned to Amman
from his trip to the United
States and Britain. He remains
as determinedly convinced as
ever that Nasir is the major
threat to the Middle East, de-
spite the growth of Communist
influence in Iraq, and that
Jordan's policy must be aimed
first of all at harrying and
blocking Nasir wherever possible.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
Rifai also professes to be
extremely pleased with his and
King Husayn's reception in Wash-
ington and London; Rifai still
is seeking to convince the West
that Jordan is a bastion of
pro-Western influence which
must be preserved at any cost.
Meanwhile, however, Nasir seems
to have lost little if any of
his appeal to the Jordanian
populace, and the Jordanian Gov-
ernment's position remains as
fundamentally insecure as ever.
The shake-up in Israel's
military high command, announced
this week as the cabinet's re-
sponse to the alarmist radio
mobilization announcement on 1
April which caused near panic
in Israel and provoked a Syrian
countermobilization, reflects
the government's deeper concern
over alleged "irregularities
in behavior and ethical conduct"
in the Israeli armed forces.
Prior to the removal from their
posts on 14 April of two brig-
adier generals--intelligence
chief Harkabi and operations
chief Zorea--Prime Minister Ben-
Gurion presided in his dual
capacity as minister of defense
at a lengthy meeting including
the general staff and nearly
all former chdefs of staff.
The subsequent transfer
of the officers was publicly
related only to the 1 April
incident, with the generals
accused of failing to clear
the mobilization announcement
with the chief of staff. The
general staff, however, ap-
parently also considered other
recent instances in which mili-
tary action reportedly was
taken contrary to government
wishes. During a parliamentary
debate, Ben-Gurion referred to
what he called the army's "mor-
al defects," stating the ir-
regularities indicated that
there was an "educational prob-
lem" within the army, particu-
larly among commanding officers.
The shake-up may be an ef-
fort to re-establish discipline
and reassert civilian authority
over the military as well as
an attempt to satisfy widespread
criticism of the government.
On 6 April, the governing coali-
tion defeated four motions of
no confidence connected with
the mobilization incident.
Premier Chou En-lai, in his
speech welcoming the puppet Pan-
chen Lama following his arrival
in Peiping on 14 April to attend
the National People's Congress,
said that the Tibet revolt had
been put down "in the main."
Tibetan rebels, however, continue
to hold areas of southeastern
Tibet, and it seems likely that
Chinese forces will have a long
and tough fight to suppress hos-
tile activity completely.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
The Communists are clearly
eager to maintain the fiction of
Tibetan "autonomy," in their ef-
fort; to neutralize sentiment in
Tibet for independence and to
undercut any representations
Nehru might make to Peiping on
behalf of Tibetans and the Dalai
Lama. Peiping recently informed
New Delhi that the 1951 autonomy
agreement between China and Tibet
would continue to be respected.
As a result of the revolt
the Chinese Communist dissolved
the Tibetan local government, in
violation of the 1951 agreement.
The agreement provided that the
Tibetans "have 'the right of
6IA
i~TEP
Rai 1 road
Major road
..... ^^^ Minor road, or trail
- - - - Road under construction
STATUTE MILES 400 BSIIIAR
30390
Tanghsinng
~hag
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
Sino-Indian Relations
Peiping's in-
creasingly cautious
statements and deal-
ings with India since
the Tibet revolt
started last month
are strong indica-
tions that the Com-
munists intend to
prevent the strains
in Sino-Indian rela-
tions from worsening.
Communist China has
thus far avoided
making a formal pro-Approach to the
test concerning In- Hungarian-made
dian Government state-
ments critical of the
Communist handling of
People's Daily
on 15 April Insisted
that Sino-Indian re-
lations will not be
"allowed to be im-
paired"
Concerning eru s recen e -
nial that Kalimpong was the
"command center" for the revolt,
however, People's Daily was im-
plicitly critical and cautioned
"our Indian friends" not to place
too much trust in Kalimpong-
based Tibetan leaders.
Nehru's primary tactic of
exerting pressure on Peiping to
TSINGHAI-TIBET HIGHWAY-1956
Tang Pass (16,770 feet). The trucks are
Csepels modified for use at high altitudes.
Tanghsiung airfield (about 14,000 feet).
grant genuine autonomy to Tibet
continues to be reflected in his
public statements. The prime
minister on.13 April stated that
the Chinese had not lived up to
their assurances to New Delhi
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16 April 1959
that Tibet's autonomous status
would be respected. On 14
April he said he could not
"imagine any solution without
the autonomy of Tibet;the Tibet-
ans are not Chinese." Nehru
ruled out the possibility of
the Dalai Lama's return to Ti-
bet under "present circum-
stances."
Chinese Logistical Problems
Since
the take-over in
1951,
the
Chinese Communists
have
built
two major highways
to Lhasa--a northerly route from
Lanchou via Golmo, and a south-
erly one from Chengtu via Chamdo.
At present only the former route
is completely operational. It
is a 1,400-mile, limited, fair-
weather road varying in width
from 15 to 30 feet. Its sur-
face is of gravel, crushed rock,
or packed earth. Most rivers,:,
and major streams are bridged,
but considerable fording is still
necessary over smaller streams.
This highway is capable of
supporting comfortably the 60,-
000 Chinese Communists troops
now in Tibet. These troops re-
quire an estimated 256 tons of
supplies every day for the limit-
ed type of action they are now
called on to perform. The figure
would increase sharply in the
event of heavy fighting.
If the road is reserved for
ten hours of military traffic
daily and if this traffic is
limited to daylight and good
weather, the road can handle
25 trucks each way per hour.
This means that about 750 tons
of military supplies could leave
Lanchou every day for Lhasa, 14
days away. Almost half this
tonnage, however, would be taken
up with gasoline to keep the
trucks moving, so that some 385
toms a day would actually arrive
in Lhasa. Therefore the highway
could support a total of 90,-
000 troops, 30,000 more than
make up the present garrison.
To reach this level of
operation, the Chinese Commu-
nists would have to assign a
total of 7,000 trucks to the
run, slightly over 5,000 of
which would be on the road at
any one time. This would not
place an undue strain on the
Chinese Communist truck park
of around 180,000 civilian
and, military trucks and
could be sustained for more
than three months without
need for major repairs.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
Overland supply of more
than 90,000 troops would re-
quire that the Chengtu-Lhasa
route be reopened. Peiping
has experienced great diffi-
culty in keeping this road on
since it was finished in 1954.
It has been closed to through
traffic for many months now as
the result of landslides and
guerrilla activity; its re-
opening would require both a
military campaign and exten-
sive reconstruction, which
would probably take at least
30 to 60 days. Even then the
road could carry only about half
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the traffic of the Lanchou-Lhasa
road, an amount sufficient to
sustain 45,000 additional troops.
it is doubtful that the
Chinese Communists have yet
succeeded in reaching capacity
logistic performance in this
area. Supplies moved by highway
can be supplemented by slow and
costly pack trains or by an
airlift. There is an airfield
at Ta:nghsiung, some 100 miles
north of Lhasa. It would be
possible to provide moderate
but very costly support by air-
lift.
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........SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
USSR REPORTS FAVORABLE FIRST-QUARTER PLAN RESULTS
First-quarter results pub-
lished by the Central Statisti-
cal Board of the USSR Council
of Ministers show gross indus-
trial production to have in-
creased by 11 percent over the
first quarter of last year a This
compares with a 10-percent in-
crease reported for 1958 and 11
percent for the first quarter of
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16 April 1959
1958 over the first quarter of
:.957. Since the Seven-Year Plan
(la59-65) calls for an average
annual increase 'in production
of 8.6 percent, the plan is
off to a good start.
Significant increases were
reported for pig iron, steel,
rolled metal, coal, oil, and
electricity. All sovnarkhozy
fulfilled their quarterly plans.
The increase in indiistrial out-
put reflects a rise of about
3.5 percent in the industrial
labor force and a 7-percent
growth in man-year labor pro-
ductivity. This growth com-
pares with an average annual in-
crease of 6.5 percent for the
last three years. The 7-percent
growth this year was achieved
even though the workday was re-
duced in several of the heavy
industries.
Soviet delegate Tsarapkin,
at the Geneva nuclear test
talks which resumed on 13 April
after a three-week recess, in-
dicated distress and alarm in
his initial reaction to the new
American proposal for a phased
approach to a test ban, begin-
ning with a cessation of at-
mospheric and underwater tests.
He said this proposal bears out
the USSR's "worst apprehensions"
concerning the outcome of the
talks. At the end of the 13
April session, the Soviet dele-
gate told reporters that the
American proposal is not ac-
ceptable and that all nuclear
tests must be stopped. Soviet
propaganda quickly charged
that the proposal ignores the
"demands of the world public
for a permanent, unconditional
cessation of tests."
The results of the first
quarter show that the recent re-
placement of Kuzmin by Kosygin
as Gosplan head was not because
of any failure to keep production
increases at a high rate. Since
the economy is running quite
satisfactorily, Kosygin can de-
vote time to solving certain
long-run problems, such as im-
proving the process of making
investment decisions and reduc-
ing anomalies in Soviet prices.
As for shortcomings, the
report points out that the first-
quarter plans for the production
of chemical equipment, electric
engines, tractor plows, self- 25X1
propelled grain combines, and
trucks fell slightly short of
fulfillment.
(Prepared by ORR)
Soviet propaganda
had attacked Senator Gore's sug-
gestion last winter for an Amer-
ican unilateral cessation of at-
mospheric tests, terming it evi-
dence of American opposition to
an over-all cessation agreement.
Tsarapkin recalled during the
13 April session that the Amer-
ican delegation had stated,when
originally queried on the sena-
tors proposal, that the United
States continued to seek a com-
prehensive agreement.
On the eve of the resump-
tion of the talks, the Soviet
Foreign Ministry issued a
lengthy statement summarizing
Moscow's position since
the conference began on 31 Oc-
tobEx, The statement seeks to
present the Soviet stand on the
remaining points in controversy
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
in a "reasonable" light con-
trasting it with the Western
position. It gives all credit
for progress made thus far to
Moscow and asserts that, in
order to reach a solution, the
United States and Britain must
"show the same willingness to
reach agreement as the USSR."
The tone of the statement
recalls two letters by Khru-
shchev to groups of private
citizens in the United States
and India, published during the
recess, in which the Soviet
premier attacked alleged West-
ern attempts to "obstruct"
agreement. It charges that the
Western proposals concerning
the composition of the control
commission and vote by majority
are efforts "to foist on the
Soviet Union unilateral deci-
sions on questions affecting
"vitally important interests of
the Soviet Union's security."
Ambassador Thompson be-
lieves there is some chance
Moscow will attempt to "sweeten
the general atmosphere" before
the forthcoming foreign minis-
ters' conference by making
"enough concessions at the atom
test talks to produce agreement
there."
Thompson suggested that
this would be intended to
strengthen the hands of those
Westerners who urge flexibility
and advocate European security
arrangements involving arms
limitation and inspection
schemes independent of progress
toward settlement of European
political questions. He be-
lieves, however, 'that .any major
new Soviet proposals on either
nuclear'tests or broader dis-
armament questions probably will
be held back'for Khrushchev him-
self to introduce at a summit
meeting.
To further the appearance
of a conciliatory attitude on
its part prior to negotiations
on Berlin, the USSR gay plan to
make further adjustments in its
post-11-ion at the nuclear test
talks on such issues as the
:.staffing of control posts and
L)ermanent inspection teams :
Tsarapkin on 15 April modi-
fied the Soviet position on the
functions of "foreign specialist"
members of control posts and con-
tended that agreement on staff-
ing would open the way for an
over-all cessation of tests,
thus obviating the need to dis-
cuss the American plan for a
partial agreement.
While Moscow may introduce
some formula designed to appear
as a compromise on voting pro-
cedure, it is unlikely that the
Soviet leaders would accept any
control and inspection arrange-
ments which would preclude an
effective Soviet veto over the
activities of the control
bodies.
cured n by OST)
FRENCH SENATORIAL ELECTIONS
Local political deals rath-
er than national issues will
probably control the outcome of
the French senatorial elections
on 26 April. They are expected
to produce an upper house some-
what less dominated by rightists
than the National Assembly cho-
sen in the Gaullist landslide
of last November. The new con-
stitution strengthens the legis-
lative role of the Senate, and
De Gaulle may lean on it for
support against the rightists
in the assembly. No substantial
shift in his policies is likely.
The 255 senators in France
proper will be chosen by some
108,000 "grand electors"--about
three fifths of them represent-
ing villages of under 2,500 popu-
lation. The 34 senators from
Algeria and the Sahara--two
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
thirds of whom must
be Moslem--will be
elected later, prob-
ably not before June.
The government's
austerity program and
the Algerian issue
will probably be sub-
ordinated to local
party arrangements
only indirectly re-
lated to the Gaullist
upheaval of 1958. The
Gaullist Union for
the New Republic is
expected to double
its present 28 seats,
an,d the Independents
also to gain. The
Radicals are expected
to be the big losers;
the Popular Republi-
ca11.is, the Socialists,
and the Communists
will probably remain
relatively stable.
The Fourth Re-
public's upper house
had a very limited
legislative role and
attracted or developed
few outstanding polit-
ical leaders. With a
status almost equal
to that of the assem-
bly, the Fifth Repub-
lic's Senate can be
expected to play an
increasingly signifi-
cant role in develop-
ing legislation and
in policy formation.
Ultimately it will
probably join with
the National Assembly
in attempts to regain
REPRESENTATION IN FRENCH SENATE
Overseas
Departments
Overseas
Territories
Algeria
From-h C ikz t.:vvi
Living Abro;a.
OUTGOING
NEW
244
255
9
7
44?<
5
14
34
6
320
307
" hc~i.cicneo s reputlica are now rcoresenled
in senate of French Gomr.munity
OUTGOING FRENCH SENATE
SOCIALIST
62
RADICAL
65
These were ./ vacancic_:;, includinq seats vacated by
senafers ncr;ly cleclei is assembly and ;y me.abers of
b(l)rc cabinet.
some of the power shifted from
Parliament to the executive by
the new constitution.
Four former senators in
De bre's cabinet, including Justice
Mit+A-,,,ter Michelet and Interior
Min:: titer Berthoin, are again
candidates. This may mean some
cabinet shifts if they,are elected.
Well-known politicians who
lost their assembly seats in No-
vember and are now running for
the Senate include France's sec-
ond-ranking Communist, Jacques
DuclDs; Jeannette Vermeersch,
wife of Communist party Secretary
General Maurice Thorez; Radical.
former Premier Edgar Faure; pre-
war Radical Premier Edouard Da-
ladier; the Popular Republican
for,-4er parliamentary leader,
Pierre Henri>_ Teitgen; nd Social-
ist rninority leader Gaston Def-
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16 April 1959
The Japanese elections on
23 and 30 April--for municipal
and prefectural officials--will
provide the first popular test
between the ruling Liberal Demo-
crats and the opposition So-
cialists followigg the latters'
shift to the extreme left and
,the identification of their par-
ty generally with the Chinese
Communist position on Asian
questions. The outcome in sev-
eral major metropolitan areas
where the Socialists are par-
ticularly strong could create
a bandwagon psychology in fa-
vor of one or the other party.
This would then make itself
felt in the upper-house elec-
tions on 2 June and affect Prime
Minister Kishi's tenure in of-
fice,
On 23 April there will be
gubernatorial elections in 20
of Japan's 46 prefectures, mayor-
al contests in 176 cities, and
elections to the 46 prefectural
assemblies as well as to munic-
ipal assemblies in Osaka, Nagoya,
Kyoto, Kobe, and Yokohomaa Elec-
tions to the Tokyo municipal
assembly will take place a week
later, along with those for
town and village mayors and
city, town, and village assem-
blies.
Although national issues
usually are of secondary im-
portance in local contests,
leaders of both the Liberal-
Democratic and Socialist par-
ties, recognizing the opportuni-
ty to gauge public opinion be-
fore drafting their strategies
for the upper-house elections,
are campaigning vigorously on
major controversial issues on
the national scene, Essentially,
the conservatives are denouncing
the Socialists for their recently
adopted anti-US, pro-Peiping
posture, while the Socialists
are attacking the Kishi govern-
ment on security arrangements
and close cooperation with the
United States,
National attention is fo-
cused primarily on the guberna-
torial elections in the Tokyo
and Osaka areas, and in Hokkaido,
where close races are anticipat-
ed. The Socialists are accept-
ing Communist cooperation in
both the Tokyo and Osaka con-
tests.
An LDP loss in either Tokyo
or Osaka might have substantial-
ly adverse repercussions for the
party in the upper-house elec-
tions. Although the LDP almost
certainly will retain its'ma-
jor.Lty in the upper house, any
reduction in its majority prob-
ably would lead LDP dissidents
to renew their attacks on Kishi's
leadership. Additionally, should
a Socialist governor be elected
for the Tokyo area, he probably
would block attempts by the
Japan Defense Agency to estab-
lish a seriously needed guided
missile testing center on Niijima
IslaLnd, which lies within Tokyo's
administrative jurisdiction.
The Chinese Nationalists battalion to improve Chinmen de-
have reinforced the counterbat- fenses further. The increased
tery capability of the Chinmen firepower may alter the present
Islands by the addition of 12 Nationalist policy of retaliat -
ten-inch howitzers and are plan- ing only when the Chinese Commu-
ning to redeploy a battalion of nists fire a total of 200 or
12 155-mm, howitzers and a tank more rounds of high-explosive
shells in concentrated shelling.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
In return for this equip-
ment, the Nationalists have
agreed to reduce the total
forces on the Chinmens by 15,-
000 men. The Nationalists are
anxious to play down reports
of the reduction, rumors of
which have reached the press,
probably because they fear im-
pairment of morale of the Chi-
nese :mainlander element on Taiwan.
Morale of the Chinmen gar-
rison reportedly is good. Empha-
sis is being placed on building
protection for vehicles and plac-
ing communication lines under-
ground. Ammunition and ration
stocks on the islands exceed a
three-month level.
On Taiwan, infantry divi-
sions are being reorganized to
give a better balance between
infantry and artillery and to
create an increased capacity for
sustained combat. Three of the
present 21 infantry divisions
have already undergone this proc-
ess and another four are sched-
uled to complete it by December
1959.
Since the 30,000-round
bombardment of 7 January, Com-
munist artillery fire against
the offshore islands has been
light and most of the shells
used contained propaganda leaf-
lets rather than explosives.
The Communists continue to fire
on odd days only and,occasional-
ly, have withheld their fire
for as much as four days.
Both Communist and Nation-
alist naval units continue to
harass fishing vessels, and
shore batteries from both sides
fire on surface targets w' ^n-
ever there is an opportunity.
Peiping's present propa-
ganda continues on a low key.
It sticks to the shopworn theme
that the Taiwan Strait problem
is an internal affair which can
be settled between the Communists
and their Nationalist "compatriots"
without American "interference."
In the first few months of
1959 various sources have in-
dicated that Communist China is
not supplying rice in quantities
desired by certain consumers in
both the bloc and the free world.
A slowing down of Chinese rice
exports to Indonesia has been
noted, and the US Embassy in
Djakarta reports that Indonesian
officials do not expect to re-
ceive the total amount of rice
contracted for 1959.
Since China appears to have
harvested a record rice crop in
1958 and is planning an even
more successful crop this year,
its current export failures ap-
parently are a reflection of the
transport shortages and other
economic dislocations caused by
the "leap forward." But as these
problems are solved, Peiping is
expected to increase rice ship-
ments abroad only gradually in
order to avoid being accused of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
disrupting the rice trade in
traditional exporting countries
where Peiping is seeking to ex-
pand its influence.
Recent trade data show that
China almost doubled its rice
sales outside the Soviet bloc
last year--to an estimated 780,-
000 tons worth at least $75,000,-
000. However, this development
was not accompanied by any sig-
nificant disruption of the world
rice market and was primarily
the result of extraordinary
sales of 100,000 tons to Paki
Stan and entry into the Indone-
sian market.
Ceylon continued in 1958
to be the principal free world
recipient of Chinese rice ex-
ports, receiving a total last
year of 300,000 tons, Other
major Chinese rice sales last
year included 140,000 tons to
Hong Kong and 86,000 tons to
Japan. In Malaya and Singapore,
which usually buy some Chinese
rice,sales dropped to almost
nothing.
Contracts to supply rice
to the free world in 1959 and
their implementation in the
first quarter suggest that Pei-
ping's sales this year are not
likely to surpass those of 1958.
Present contracts, plus deliv-
eries carried over from last
year, call for shipment of more
than 300,000 tons to Indonesia--
a 100-percent increase over the
actual volume achieved in 1958.
Sales to Hong Kong will presum-
ably remain about the same, but
because of the trade impasse
with Japan no purchases are ex-
pected there.
Sino-Ceylonese negotiations
for a 1959 rice-rubber contract
are still under way, with Ceylon
reportedly seeking to buy as
much as 300,000 tons again this
year. After protracted discus-
sions the Chinese have apparently
agreed to a reduction in price,
which will probably be based on
that prevailing in the world mar-
ket.
Although the threat did
not materialize in 1958--and
probably will not in 1959--
the prospect of Communist China's
exporting huge quantities of
rice to the free world is still
causing considerable alarm in
rice-exporting countries of
Southeast Asia. These nations
can be expected to remain sensi-
tive to Peiping's ability to
wield its rice exports as a
useful political weapon,
(Pre-pared by ORR)
POSSIBLE CABINET CHANGES 1N THE PHILLIPPINES
President Garcia may short-
ly be planning to replace Phil-
ippine Secretary of Defense
Jesus Vargas, possibly as part
of a broad cabinet revamping
aimed at strengthening the rul-
ing Nacionalista party for the
local and senatorial elections
scheduled in November.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
Vargas has been under strong
criticism since late 1958 from
some of Garcia's closest fol-
lowers who have accused him of
harboring presidential ambitions
and of plotting a military coup
against the administration.
The campaign against Vargas
has also taken the form of de-
mands for the removal of mili-
tary officers from all civilian
roles in the government and
for drastic cuts in military
appropriations. The new con-
stabulary chief, who was ap-
pointed by Garcia in a command
shake-up following the coup
rumors, has been slowly replac-
ing local commanders by men who
are alleged to be more political-
ly amenable to the President.
According to Manila press re-
ports, prospective cabinet
changes were recently discussed
between Garcia and party lead-
ers. A broad cabinet reshuffle
would enable Garcia to remove
several key targets of the cor-
ruption charges leveled at his
administration by some members
of his own party as well as b
the opposition.
President Sukarno will ap-
pear on 22 April before Indo-
nesia's Constituent. Assembly to
propose a return to the 1945
constitution under which the
war for independence was fought.
}
SUMATRA
30356
nD II.5
SOU(h Chien S'O
FLO
SECRET
The readoption of this loosely
worded document is part of his
plan to increase executive powers
and decrease those of parliament
and the political parties. Bills
are also being prepared to reduce
'ANc1NF ic,ANDS
Manaclo
1A..TobolF
M.kasm~.
130
TALAUD ISLANDS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
the number of parties and change
the composition of parliament.
Should
serious difficulties develop,
Sukarno and the army may dis-
miss the assembly and proclaim
the constitution by executive
decree. The threat of such
action might in itself be suf-
ficient to persuade the parties
to accept Sukarno's plans. The
President will leave Indonesia
on 23 April for a trip of ap-
proximately two months to Europe
and Latin America; presumably
no decisive action would be
taken against the assembly until
his return,
e present parlia-
ments wi 1 remain until elec-
tions in 1960, but its powers
presumably will be curtailed
in accordance with the 1945
constitution. The immediate
effect of the proposed reor-
ganization would be barely
noticeable, however, since un-
der the present "state of war"
the army and President Sukarno
have in fact held primary au-
thority.
Dissident activity continues
in both Sumatra and North Cele-
bes. Rebel rai
agricultural es
are becoming in
ds on
tates
creasi
foreign
in Sumatra
ngly se-
vere,
25X1
25X1
east of Manado,
North Celebes, the government
has recouped losses suffered in
a dissident offensive in March,
but is still unable to dislodge
the rebels from their base south-
ARGENTINA MOVES AGAINST COMMUNIST AGITATION
Argentina's action in de-
claring personae .non gratae, one
Rumanian and four Soviet diplo-
mats was based not only on the
cited evidence that they aided
3 April but also on
ear ier So-
viet bloc subversive activity.
At present Argentina does not
intend to break relations with
the bloc or outlaw the Commu-
nist party, but after Congress
reconvenes on 1 May, President
Frondizi will submit a bill re-
questing wide powers to deal
with Communism. By publicizing
in the meantime the extent of
Communist subversion, the gov-
ernment apparently hopes to re-
duce the widespread public fear
of any repressive legislation.
While Argentina was offended
by the Soviet and Rumanian notes
strongly protesting against its
action of 7 and 8 April, it
apparently does not intend to
strain relations further by
ousting the mission heads, but
instead hopes they will be with
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM
16 April 1959
Regarding Soviet bloc com-
plicity in the 3 April disturb-
ances, however, Interior Minis-
ter Vitolo informed the public
that the government had "ir-
refutable proof" not only of
Communist responsibility for
the serious attacks against
people and property, but also
that the Communists were obey-
ing directions from abroad. He
said his government reaffirms
its intention to maintain rela-
tions with all countries but
will not permit anyone to inter-
fere in Argentina's internal
affairs.
Local Communist strategy 25X1
is emphasizing attack on the
US-backed austerity program andi
the Frondizi government's policy
of permitting foreign companies
to participate by restricted
contract in petroleum develop-
ment--moves which other Latin
American nations are watching
closely as a solution to
critical economic difficul-
ties.
Brazil, plagued with declin-
ing coffee markets, is faced with
the prospect of defaulting on
international obligations by
midyear,, but President Kubit-
schek is increasingly reluctant
to come to terms with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) on
exchange reform measures as a
condition for stand-by financial
aid.
Brazil is urgently seeking
balance-of-payments loans from
the IMF and the United States
totaling about $306,000,000.
Dollar availabilities stood at
only $43,600,000 in the first
week. of April and are likely
to drop to almost nothing with-
in A few months as coffee sales
hit their seasonal low. Brazil's
fixed payments obligations due
in 1959 in convertible curren-
cies amount to about $450,000-
000 over and above short-term
commercial debts. While coffee
sales have been near normal in
the first quarter of 1959, the
price has continued to decline
and long-run prospects are poor.
President Kubitschek has
been quoted as saying that the
exchange reforms required by the
IMF'--designed to promote exports
and restrict imports--are im-
possible because of the cost-of-
living increases he believes
they would engender. In mid-
March, with living costs sky-
rocketing as a result of crop
failures and reduced import sub-
sidies for wheat and fuel, Kubit-
schek decreed an emergency price
freeze on public services and
announced measures to increase
the food supply in an apparent
attempt to forestall planned
hunger marches and demonstrations.
Previous emergency measures, de-
creed in November following riots
in five state capitals, proved
ineffective.
Kubitschek has been,in-
creasingly preoccupied with the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
effect of this unrest on his
party's chances in the October
1960 presidential election, lie
cannot stand for re-election,
but he and his relatively mod-
erate financial and political
policies are already under elec-
tioneering attack from both the
right and the left, principally
on the nationalist and cost-of-
living grounds. A continued
worseni ; of the financial sit-
uation is almost certain to
intensify the existing anti-US
overtones of the campaign and
create a 1a:=. z er. audience for
charges by ~+ a President Gou-
lart's leftist Labor party that
foreign investors are "bleed-
ing" the country.
.. The government may attempt
to focus attention on Communist
involvement in some of the re-
cent strikes. Kubitschek's
chief military aide announced
on 8 April that he had been
given a document relating to
the labor movement and written
in Russian. The government ap-
parently is attempting to place
some of the blame for strikes
on the Soviet bloc diplomats ex-
pelled from neighboring Argen-
tina on charges of intervening
in labor affairs.
REVISION OF WEST INDIAN BASE AGREEMENT SOUGHT
Pressures are mounting for
revision of the 1941 US-UK
agreement whereby the United
States obtained facilities in
the Caribbean on a 99-year
rent-free lease. Principal
facilities involved are the
naval station and experimental
early-warning radar at Chagu-
aramas, Trinidad, and guided
missile tracking stations at
Antigua and St. Lucia.
Eric Williams,
anti-American chief
may force the federal govern-
ment to support his request.
Williams continues to want
Chaguaramas for the federal
capital and is dissatisfied
with the US assurance that
the military need for Chaguar-
amas will be reconsidered
about 1968.
London argues that by re-
vising the agreement now with
British assistance, the United
,CAIGDS ISLANDS
minister of Trini- 0 C ~^ d TURNS ISLANDS
dad, recently pro- _21--.-
to the West HF.ITI
CAYMAN o'>
ISLANDS Indies Federation JAMAICA
that a conference be
held by Trinidad, the
federation govern-
ment, the United
States, and Britain.
His political influ-
ence--stemming from
his control of the
seeor , , largest fed-
eral. unit at a time
when the largest,
Jamaica, is talk-
ing of secession--
NICARAGUA
c)
COSTA CANAL
RICA LONE ~'-.~
SECRET
NI P AHT VIRGIN
DOMINICRA
' ~`^~
,REPUBLIC CD-ISLANDS ~ h,vls
o?. Antigua
St. L'hrist Mpher G?adaIo pP
MMnlserrat ~
?Dnmirica
Q5Marlinique.
Q;t. Lucia
SL I/Incept. 9
Rarhados
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
States will get better terms
than by waiting until the fed-
eration becomes independent,
probably in about five years,
and that the US base position
will be more secure if the fed-
eration subscribes to the leas-
ing agreement.
Britain now favors only
minor revisions--regarding cus-
toms exemptions and jurisdic-
tion within base areas, for ex-
amp-Le--but might also suggest
that the US offer an annual rent
to the federation. On the West
Indian side, Williams is be-
lieved to want, in addition,
a promise to evacuate all bases
by it specified date--presumably
before the lease expires--and
immediate return to the West
Indies of all unused areas,
such as the United States has
already done in St. Lucia.
There appears to be little
;opular feeling against the
presence of US bases per se,
but the British believe the
trend is running against con-
tinuing the 1941 agreement
in its present form. This
trend may be stepped up for
internal political reasons dur-
ing the federation's June con-
ference on its policy toward
revising the constitution.
DEVELOPMENTS IN MOROCCO
A new government crisis
may be imminent in Morocco,
where internal political dis-
sension is acute and economic
conditions continue to worsen.
The government of Premier Ab-
dullah Ibrahim, installed last
December as a stopgap measure
following a prolonged cabinet
crisis, is under increasingly
sharp attack by the Istiqlal
party's right wing. Moreover,
the factional fight within the
Istiqlal party is erupting in-
to violence more frequently.
Neither the Istiglal right
wing, led by the party's theore-
tician, Allal el-Fassi, nor its
left wing, which has at least
the tacit support of the Ibra-.
him government, is clearly as-
cendant in the bitter struggle
for control of the party ap-
paratus. The El-Fassi press ap-
pears to be dedicated to baring
every weakness of the Ibrahim
government and protests insist-
ently against alleged repres-
sion. The left-wing Istiqlal
press--edited by party members
who advocate a state-controlled
economy, including the nation-
alization of industry and re-
sources--demands that "officials
who have fallen behind the times"
be weeded out of the adminis-
trative structure. Only the
occasional intervention of the
King in support of Ibrahim or
to restrain the left wing has
:I.ept the situation from becom-
ing worse.
Several highly charged
issues, such as the control of
organized labor, may make an
early showdown inescapable. The
prestige of the El-Fassi fac-
tion rests largely on its suc?m
cess in attracting the rank and
file of organized labor from
the Moroccan Labor Union (UMT).
The :Left wing, which cannot
afford to lose the unions which
form its major strength, is
fighting El-Fassi's effort to
gain official recognition for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
his autonomous unions. The
customary parade held on 1 May
should provide a fairly dra-
matic test of opposing claims
to labor's support.
Another issue--devaluation
of the Moroccan franc to realign
it with the French franc re-
valued in December--could top-
ple the government.
The massive emigration of
Jews from Rumania remains sus-
pended despite statements by
Rumanian officials that the exo-
dus will be resumed at some
future date. About 14,000 Jews
have documents ready and await
only permission to leave. Mean-
while, Israel is experiencing
difficulties in absorbing its
recent immigrants. A total of
26,100 have arrived since last
September, including 17,400
Rumanians.
Estimates of the number of
immigrants expected in Israel
during 1959 had ranged as high
as 150,000 before the Rumanian
movement stopped. Considerable
sentiment developed against pro-
posed taxation to finance the
immigration, as Israelis, already
heavily taxed, began to question
the government's ability to plan
for both the needs of immigrants
and the welfare of the rest of
the state. The Knesset never-
theless passed on 1 April the
government's amended budget
based on proposals for a com-
pulsory "loan" and large in-
creases in indirect taxes, and
on 7 April the loan bill itself
was passed. More than half the
funds required to pay for immi-
gration still are expected, how-
ever, from Jewish communities
abroad.
Most of the new Rumanian
immigrants are well educated.
Engineers can be absorbed most
readily, and although the
medical profession is near-
ly saturated, the Health, Min-
istry plans to expand its re-
search program and to broaden
medical services in an attempt
to utilize the new doctors.
Many lawyers and other pro-
WEL COME!
Ben-Ourion : "I don't know how anybody is going to do
it, but I know we shall absorb them all right."
From Maariv
fessionals, however, will
have to change their voca-
tions.
These difficulties led the
Rumanian Immigrants' Association
to criticize the Jewish
agency, which guides Is-
rae:Li immigration, for its
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
alleged failure to adequately
explain employment possibili-
ties and the general situation
regarding professional oppor-
tunities in Israel. There has
also been dissatisfaction among
older immigrants, mainly those
undereducated Jews of Asian
and African origin, who still
live in temporary housing,.while
more permanent facilities are
being provided for the Ruman-
ians.
Israel's economic and so-
cial problems have caused many
Israelis privately to welcome
the halt in Rumanian immigra-
tion while publicly supporting
immigration in principle. Such
ambivalence may also be shared
by the government; however, it
remains committed, even if
it should desire the con-
trary, to welcome immigration
regardless of the difficul-
ties involved. Israel exists
as a Jewish national home in
fulfillment of political Zion-
ism, and the state's Law of
Return gives every Jew,
with the exception of those
who are security or health
threats, right to enter and
settle there permanently,
GREEK MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
The pro-Communist United
Democratic Left (EDA) lost-some
popular support and failed to
gain an absolute majority in
any key Greek city as a result
of the elections on 5 April for
councilmen. In Athens, Piraeus,
Salonika, and other major cities,
however, the total opposition
vote was greater than that of
the government-supported candi-
dates. EDA is still the second
largest party.
The councilmen, who were
elected on the basis of propor-
tional representation, will be
installed on 7 June and will
elect the mayors from among
themselves on 14 June. If na-
tionalist councilmen can be
united against EDA-sponsored
candidates, the election of na-
tionalist mayors in all key
municipalities is assured.
The slight drop in the vote
for candidates sponsored by EDA,
claimed by the government to be
about 7 percent as compared with
the 1958 parliamentary elections}
is misleading and cannot be re-
garded as indicating a definite
popular trend away from the
left. EDA did not enter the
elections to demonstrate popu-
lar strength but to gain re-
spectability and discredit the
government. It has been able
to ensure the presence of EDA
members on municipal councils
and undoubtedly will be able to
obtain a number of strategic
municipal administrative posts.
EDA leaders are worried, how-
ever, that the political isola-
tion in which they now find them-
selves may seriously weaken their
party's potential in future
elections. Other opposition
parties are realizing that co-
operation with the extreme left
is politically impractical.
EDA's greatest failure was
its inability to discredit the
government of Prime Minister
Karamanlis over the issues of
Cyprus, American missile bases,
and police violation of civil
liberties. The party's attempt
to.form an antigovernment front
of all opposition parties failed
completely. Only Sophocles Ven-
ezelos, leader of one faction
of the Liberal party, agreed to
limited cooperation with EDA.
As a result he was almost total-
ly repudiated by liberal
voters.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
The Karamanlis government
is considerably heartened by
the election returns, although
it is worried by the political
vacuum caused by the further
shattering of the political
center. Unless a new healthy
political organization is soon
formed reorganizing the center
groups, as recently recommended
by Karamanlis, there appears to
be no alternative to gravita-
tion to the two major political
forces, the governing National
Radical Union (ERE) and the
United Democratic Left (EDA).
The Greek Government ap-
parently believes that if na-
tional parliamentary elections
were held now, EDA would probably
not receive more than 17-18 per-
cent: of the total popular vote,
as compared with its approximate-
ly 25 percent in 1958. The
American Embassy notes, however,
that there still remains in
Greece a significant seg-
ment of the electorate
willing to back the
treme left?
CIVIL AVIATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET
Closer cooperation in the
field of civil aviation may be
one of the more important com-
mercial phases of the develop-
ment of the European Common
Market (EEC). During the past
several months, representatives
of the EEC countries' five ma-
jor airlines--Air France, Sabena,
?ELM, Alitalia, and Lufthansa--
have held a number of meetings
on the possibilities for joint
operations. While no agreement
has yet been reached, some
progress has evidently been
made, and a further meeting is
scheduled to be held later this
month in The Hague.
The proposed collaboration
would apparently involve the
establishment of two new organi-
zations--EUR000NTROL and EUROP-
AIR. The former, with head-
quarters in Luxembourg, would
be concerned with the creation
of a flight-information and air-
traffic-control region covering
the air space of the six EEC
countries. EUROPAIR, a pool
in which the five airlines
would retain separate national
identities but fly aircraft
bearing a EUROPAIR designation,
would attempt to coordinate
flight schedules, pool aircraft
for certain services, and make
joint use of certain foreign
landing rights. Passenger-
handling facilities abroad might
also be n-e_ _^d, and revenues
and expenses of the pool be
shared.
The EUROCONTROL talks have
been conducted by aeronautical
officials and will presumably
result in an intergovernmental
convention. In view of the ex-
tent of government control over
all the airlines involved, of-
ficial blessing of the EUROPAIR
negotiations is also implied.
Ultimate review of any agree-
ment by the EEC Council also
seems likely since civil avia-
tion is a "reserved area" under
the terms of the EEC treaty.
Article 84 provides that, by
unanimous decision of the coun-
cil, the general rules respect-
ing coordination and nondiscrimi-
nation in land and waterway
transportation may also be ap-
plied to sea and air traffic.
While the proposed pool
is in keeping with the trend
toward consolidation throughout
the Common Market, its immediate
motivation seems to be fear of
foreign competition--particularly
that of the United States and
Britain. In general, 1958 was
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
not a good year for most of the
Continental companies, and they
now seem convinced that the
high cost of jets is facing
them with the choice of pooling
their resources or relinquish-
ing the profitable internation-
al routes to their rivals.
EURCPAIR could be a formidable
competitor both in bargaining
for new equipment and in demand-
ing the additional American land-
ing rights the Europea have
long sought to obtain.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
Recent political develop-
ments in Britain's dependencies
of Kenya and Uganda suggest that
important changes leading toward
increased African influence may
be imminent in both territories.
In Kenya, the white settler
group which has long resisted
African advancement appears to
be fragmenting and a moderate
faction led by Michael Blundell
has expressed its willingness
to support political and social
reforms. In Uganda, African
nationalist forces, which have
been torn by dissension, appear
to be coalescing under the aegis
of a new movement. Britain may
soon endorse a new basic policy
in favor of the federal type of
state demanded by powerful Afri-
can political forces in Uganda.
Kenya
The political evolution of
Kenya has been delayed since
1952 by the growing racial and
political antagonism between
the dominant white settler com-
munity of 60,000 persons and
the mass of the population--
6,000,000 Africans and some
150,000 Asians and Arabs. Dur-
ing the Mau Mau uprising from
1952 to 1955, the Africans' po-
litical advance was halted;
since then, the nationalists
led by moderate Tom Mboya have
faced a determined white
settler group which has re-
sisted every effort to in-
crease African political in-
fluence or to open up the
valuable White Highlands
agricultural area which is re-
served for European occupancy.
The African politicians
have reacted by refusing to
participate in their minority
role in the government and
have constantly demanded con-
stitutional talks in order'to
increase their political role.
They declare that Kenya must be
IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA
developed as a democratic
African state. Such a decla-
ration would necessarily en-
visage early African control
of Kenya, a development stren-
uously opposed by the white
settlers, who have consider-
able influence in London.
The political impasse
may have been broken on 1
April when 43 Kenyan legis-
lators, including members of
all of Kenya's racial groups
but none of the 14 elected
African members led by Tom
Mboya, announced their will-
ingness to open the White High-
lands to African and Asian
settlement and to consider
non-European political advance.
The following day, settler leader
Michael Blundell resigned his
position as minister of agri-
culture in order to devote full
attention to promoting these
new policies. The group ap-,
pears to have the support of
most of the nonrural Europeans,
a bare majority among white
farmers, substantial but not
majority support among the
Asians, but only fringe back-
ing from the Africans.
The initial African na-
tionalist reaction was critical.
Mboya called the announcement
"vague" and mere lip service to
nonracialism. He warned against
belated promises and called on
Africans to be prepared to go
to jail for their political
goals and opposition to colo-
nialism.
In early April the 14
elected African members, along
with four Asians, two Moslems,
one Arab, and one European,
formed a new movement--the Con-
stituency Elected Members Organ-
ization--demanding equal rights
for all citizens. Its repre-
sentatives are expected to lobby
in London to influence a British
CONFJ~D NF~TIAL
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JGl.itb I -
NOW
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
E T H 1 0 P I A
Butembo.
Lake F.dwai
BELGIAN
Lac Kit
CONGO
La
Alter
\ S
Buganda
oro i `Buso
S~\Entebbe0"
, nkole Lal&F
Victoria ,r
(BeIg.) -0
16 SU miura
Albertville
(Lake
? Rudolf
SOMALIA
(tty
INDIAN OCEAN
policy statement on Kenya which
may be issued in the near future.
Fear of violence may make
some Africans sympathetic to
Blundell's efforts, but general
native support is unlikely with-
out tangible evidences of a Euro-
pean change of heart. Neverthe-
less, London, which favors cau-
tious African political evolu-
tion, may now find an opportu-
nity in Kenya to hold consti-
tutional discussions leading
toward African political and
social advancement and concur-
rent European concessions, thus
avoiding violence on the part
of either Europeans or Africans.
Uganda
Political change may also
be imminent in the neighboring
British protectorate of Uganda.
Here, where there is no sizable
white minority, racial strife
has been avoided. However,
African nationalists have not
been able to surmount factional
strife nor to resolve the sep-
aratist demands of the dominant
Buganda region, although both
problems now may be on the way
to resolution.
Within the past few months
a new nationalist force, the
Uganda National Movement
(UNM) has emerged and appears
to be attracting increasing pub-
lic support. It demands inde-
pendence for Uganda in 1960, and
has instituted a boycott of non-
African shops and specific items
such as beer and cigarettes. The
boycott has had surprising suc-
cess; European breweries are un-
able to sell beer within a 40-
mile radius of Kampala--the cen-
ter of UNM organization. Non-
African--usually Asian--mer-
chants report an appreciable
drop-in trade with a growing
number of shutdowns of Asian
shops;. Some Asians are contrib-
uting funds to the UNM to get on
the approved list.
The government fears vio-
lence at the large public meet-
ings organized by the UNM, and
has banned meetings of over 250
persons throughout much of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
Buganda Province despite the
danger of a critical African.
reaction.
African political forces
may be further consolidated if
a federal constitution proposed
by the ruler of Toro Province
receives the anticipated ap-
proval of the other three power-
ful local rulers of Uganda prov-
inces. It calls for self-gov-
ernment in 1961 and independence
within the Commonwealth by the
end of 1963 and for a constitu-
tion establishing a privy coun-
cil to act as a court of last
appeal on legal and constitu-
tional matters, a bicameral
elected legislature, a govern-
ment of the majority party, and
a prime minister responsive to
parliament.
MONGOLIAN CLAIMS TO INTERNATIONAL STATUS
Since World War II Mongo-
lia has repeatedly claimed to
be an independent, sovereign
state with the right to have
representation in various in-
ternational bodies, particu-
larly the United Nations. Al-
though the country's foreign
policy is completely subser-
vient to the Soviet Union,
Mongolia has established for-
mal diplomatic relations with
three nonbloc states and has
informal trade contacts with
several others. Sparsely pop-
ulated, Mongolia is wedged
between the two greatest pow-
ers of the Communist world--
linking them, in fact, by the
Trans-Mongolian Railroad.
Despite the obvious grounds
for friction--Russia and China
have at various times in his-
tory competed bitterly for su-
premacy in Mongolia--today the
two seem to be cooperating in
Mongolia's development.
Both the USSR and China
have in the past annexed terri-
tory which historically was
part of Mongolia: the Soviet
Union;, Buryat-Mongolia; and
China;, Inner Mongolia. Pan-
Mongolism does not seem to
present much of a problem at
present, primarily because
both of the larger states have
reduced the Mongolian elements
in their territories to minor-
ity status by settling large
colonies of Great Russians and
Han Chinese in the areas. The
USSR has clearly been the para-
mount influence in Ulan Bator
since the Mongolian Communist
revolution in 1921, but it has
been withdrawing its advisers
and experts since the early
1950s, and the Mongolians take
great pride in the fact that
their own countrymen now are
trained to hold engineering
positions and university pro-
fessorships.
Nationalism
SECRET
The reported agreement of
Buganda's ruler to the proposed
constitution suggests that the
ruler, who long has beery a block
to Uganda's independence because
of his separatist demands, may
now be willing to abandon his
extreme regionalism.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 April 1959
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a x TSagaan 04 1
? Baatar Haan An
+-+- Railroad35:gavg~
d~71aa Bai~r~
strong
nationalistic spirit of the
Mongolians, who number some-
what over 1,000,000 persons.
Emphasis on Mongol history,con-
cern for purity of the race,
pride in economic and educa-
tional progress, resentment of
Soviet influence, and a desire
to increase contacts with,
countries' outside' the bloc
have all been cited
as : evidence: . of
Mongolia's growing nationalism.
On 5
January 1946, following a pleb-
iscite in which Mongolia opted
for independence, Nationalist
China extended recognition.
Few Chinese work in Mon-
golia in a professional capac-
ity? although at least 10,000
contract laborers, with wages
paid by China, are
there on various con-
struction projects,
including road and
civic improvements.
There seems to be lit-
tle antipathy toward
the Chinese, and sev-
eral Mongolians have
expressed regret, in
view of the short la-
bor supply, that Chi-
nese laborers do not
choose to settle per-
manently after expira-
tion of their contracts.
Resentment over
Soviet influence ,how-
ever, is voiced on
several subjects. Con-
tempt is expressed
for Premier Tsedenbal's
willingness to accede
to the USSR''s demands,
principally because
his wife is Russian.
Resentment is said to
have flared into open revolt--
quickly put down--early in 1958
when the Soviet Union allegedly
seized territory near Lake Hob-
sogol rich in cobalt deposits.
Foreign Minister Avarzid re-
portedly protested this move
officially and was consequently
removed from office.
The purge of the party po-
litburo last month may have been
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
influenced by nationalistic
factors; the leader of the
purged faction,Dashin Damba,
was installed as party first
secretary during the height of
the bloc's de-Stalinization
campaign in a move to ensure
"collective leadership." The
timing of Damba's rise and fall
from powers plus the charges of
"polit,ical backwardness"recent-
ly leveled at him, suggests that
he belonged to the more liberal
faction of the Mongolian party.
Since 1921, Mongolia has
been able to establish a na-
tional educational system which
has successfully raised the na-
tional literacy rate from al-
most zero to nearly 80 percent.
Mongolian history and culture
are emphasized in the schools,
and, although the Russian lan-
guage is taught in secondary
schools, few persons ever learn
to speak it fluently. Recently
there has been a return to the
old Mongol script in what ap-
pears to be a deliberate move
to invigorate the national cul-
tural tradition.
The regime has also begun
the reconstruction of what was
once the most important Bud-
dhist monastery in Mongolia, Er-
deni Tzn, which was destroyed
by Soviet troops in 1937. It
is being made into a shrine to
Mongol culture rather than a
center of Buddhist culture,how-
ever, Lamaistic Buddhism J
is dead for all practical pur-
poses in Mongolia.
Economic Development
The legislature has just
ratified the Three-Year Plan
for economic development (1958-
60). The present version is
more ambitious in some respects
than earlier ones. Slow prog-
ress has been made under past
economic plans toward relieving
the economy's extreme reliance
on livestock raising., but the
present aim is to continue this
process.. Nevertheless, live-
stock raising remains the corner-
stone of the plan, which calls
for a 7.2-percent increase in
the total number of livestock
by 1960--to a total then of 25,-
000,000 head.
The plan also provides for
increased attention to farming
and industry. The area planted
to crops is to be sharply in-
creased, as is grain output.
The gross value of industrial
production is to increase by
more than 50 percent over the
three-year period. The 1960
target for petroleum output--
only 30,000 tons--confirms ear-
lier indications that the field
at Sayn Shanda has failed to
live -up to earlier Mongolian
and Soviet expectations.
'The country will be heavi-
ly dependent on the assistance of
its "fraternal" bloc partners
for construction plans. While
capital investments out of its
own funds during the plan period
will lbe larger than the amount
spent during the previous ten
years, over 30 percent--some
$100(,-'000,000--of planned con-
struction spending--will be ac-
counted for by these sources,
principally the Soviet Union and
China,
Since 1956, Communist China
has extended about $65,000,000
in economic aid to Mongolia for
use in the development of various
small--scale industrial, agricul-
tural,, and power projects. The
Soviet Union has provided about
$275,000,000 worth of economic
aid since 1948; in addition, it
has turned over without charge
to Ulan Bator assets in former
Soviet-Mongolian joint stock
companies--most notably in petro-
leum and metals--valued at $100,-
000,000,
The Three-Year Plan aims to
develop and consolidate the "so-
cialized sector" of the economy.
Some 96 percent of the agricul-
tural and animal husbandry house-
holds are already enrolled in co-
operatives. In addition, the re-
gime has recently begun a process
of abolishing township-level gov-
ernments and of merging the next
higher level administration,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
equivalent to a county, with
the cooperatives. Under this
system the administrative head
of the county is also director
of the cooperative. While this
system has some of the trappings
of China's commune system, it
follows more closely the pat-
tern of Bulgaria and North Korea.
Looking ahead, the regime
says that it is working on a
five-year plan to cover the
1961-65 period. The plan, now
in preliminary draft, is said
to open "remarkable prospects"
for the further development of
production and the further im-
provement of the standard of
living.
Foreign Policy
The Mongolian People's Re-
public has repeatedly ^laimed
to be an independent, sovereign
state with a right to represen-
tation in international bodies,
especially the United Nations.
It came closest to securing a
seat on the latter body in 1956
in a package deal which was
finally killed by a Chinese Na-
tionalist veto,
Although Ulan Bator con-
tinues to lobby for UN member-
ship, it concentrates on at-
tempting to join functional and
specialized organizations such
as the International Postal Un-
ion and the World Meteorological
Organization. In an attempt to
bolster its qualifications for
membership in the latter body,
for example, Mongolia has re-
cently publicized the completion
of a new observatory. Despite
the regime's persistent efforts,
it has been rebuffed on almost
all fronts.
Ulan Bator has met with
more success in establishing
diplomatic relations. Prior
to World War II Mongolia had
formal relations only with the
USSR? but, beginning in 1948,
embassies were established in
the European satellites and
China. Then in 1955 Mongolia
received de jure recognition
from India and concluded 'an
agreement to exchange diplomatic
representatives; this was quick-
ly followed by similar agree-
ments with Burma and Indonesia.
Although no countries have
recognized the regime since 1956,
it has been successful'in expand-
ing its private trade with West-
ern countries since that time-
an Bator also sup-
plies a large percenta, o' the
world's cashmere wool through
the 17SSR (Concurred
TWO YEARS OF COMMUNIST RULE IN INDIA'S KERALA STATE
The Communist government
in India's Kerala State. seems
well entrenched after two years
in power, despite the decline
in its popular support and grow-
ing economic difficulties since
mid-1958. The Communists formed
their government in April 1957,
after winning some 2,000,000
out of 5,800,000 votes and 47
percent of the state assembly
seats in the general elections.
Most of the Kerala electorate
appeared satisfied with the min-
istry's performance.during its'
first year in office. The Com-
munist party may even have in-
creased its popular support.
The government's accomplish-
ments were limited, but its drive
and apparent dedication con-
trasted creditably with the in-
effectual performance of previous
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
Congress and Social-
ist party governments
in the state. Kerala
voters were prepared
in any case to give
the Communists at
least a year to ful-
fill their campaign
promises. A series
of developments be-
ginning in the mid-
dle of 1958, however,
has cost the govern-
.went some support.
Political Setbacks
Since mid-1958,
agitation by opposi-
tion elements on sev--
oral controversial issues has
kept the Communists on the de-
fensive. The first effective
challenge to the regime came
last July in the form of stu-
dent demonstrations, which Chief
Minister Namboodiripad's govern-
ment was able to control only
by resort to violent police ac-
tion, The Communists' attempts
to terrorize opposition politi-
cal groups stimulated further
agitation. These clashes were
followed by a highly publicized
strike of plantation labor which
led the police to open fire,
again on demonstrating .Workers,..
As a result of the recur--
ring incidents, oppositionsenti
ment in the state rose sharply
and national attention was
focused on the problem of Kerala.
The state government's strong-
arm methods, which were not in
step with the Communist party's
current nonviolent, "peaceful"
tactic, produced demands through-
out India for -intervention by
the national government to main-
tain law and order. The dis-
turbances subsided during the
fall of 1958, but the question
of 'insecurity" in Kerala for
all non-Communists had been suc-
cessfully developed by the op-
position into a telling attack
on the Communist government.
Economic Problems
The Kerala government's
failure to make noticeable prog-
ress in solving the state's ma-
jor economic and social problems
has weakened the Communists'
position during the past six
months even more than have po-
litical difficulties. In the
two most critical sectors of the
Kerala economy, food production
and employment, the Communists
have shown themselves unable to
keep pace with other states in
raising agricultural yields and
to attract the industry needed
to relieve widespread unemploy-
ment.
A serious food shortage de-
veloped toward the end of 1958
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itow SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
INDIA
KERALA STATE ASSEMBLY
CONGRESS
PARTY
43
* 1NCLUDfS (DM1 UNIST SPEANER WO VOTES AS A Tl#-BRFAKFF,.
** APPOINTED n6MBE?. WO USUALLY ABSTAINS OR VOTES WITH OPPOSITION.
which provided the basis for
considerable agitation by so-
cialist parties against the
government. Kerala officials
also were severely ,,cr tl.cized
in 1958 for signing an agree-
ment with national industrial
interests to construct a rayon
pulp factory under terms con-
sidered detrimental to the in-
terests of the working class.
The net effect of these
political and economic develop-
ments has been to tarnish the
Communist reputation to a con-
siderable degree, but without
threatening the downfall of the
government.
Factionalism has long weak-
ened the Kerala branch of the
party, but the Communists' suc-
cess at the polls in 1957 in-
spired a sense of unity and co-
operation among the several
cliques during the party's first
year in office. By the fall of
1958, however, the trend of
events in Kerala reportedly had
led to questioning among party
leaders whether it was politi-
cally advisable for the party
to remain in power while its
position deteriorated.
The wrangling over party
tactics in Kerala has been re-
flected in the party's national
executive as well, where some
leaders have felt obliged to
INDE BEN
DEN1
criticize publicly sev-
eral actions of the
Kerala government.
Both national and in-
ternational Communist
party enthusiasm for
the Kerala "experi-
ment" has waned as
the government's short-
comings have reduced
its usefulness as a
Communist"showcase.
Communist Advantages
Despite the trend
in recent months, sev-
eral factors in the
situation work to the
Communists' advantage.
During two years in
power the party has taken full
advantage of its position to
strengthen itself both financial-
ly and organizationally. The
government's personnel policies
within the administrative depart-
ments have favored party members
and sympathizers. Contracts have
been [riven to individuals or con-
cerns prepared to return a por-
tion of profits to party coffers.
Communist-directed cooperatives
are f avored in the awarding of gov-
ernment contracts. Cabinet offi-
cials have interfered in the ad-
ministration of justice in such
a way as to give special protec-
tion to Communists.
The minimum wage in Kerala
has been raised in a bid to ex-
tend -the party's support among
workers. Communist control of
the state's extensive educational
apparatus has been greatly fa-
cilitated through the education
bill, despite modifications en-
forced by the central government.
The party also appears to be
making inroads in the career police
service, strategically the most
important arm of the government.
By appointing one of the two in-
spectors general of police to a
special commission organized to
draft a new police code "for the
welfare state," the Communists
apparently have left the field
clear to his rival, who is re-
puted to be a "party man."
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)I1LI f I N%o
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
16 April 1959
In addition to tightening
the party's control over state
departments and services in
Kerala, the Communists are plan-
ning to reorganize local gov-
ernment units so as to entrench
themselves in village politi-
cal bodies. Passage Of L.".,e
agrarian reform bill in April
should also strengthen the par-
ty's position in rural areas.
The Communists' greatest
ass`.'- in Kerala is the party it-
self. It remains, despite re-
cent setbacks and some dissen-
sion among the leadership, the
strongest, best organized,
and most disciplined political
party in the state, with an ac-
tive membership of about 60,000.
The party apparently has ample
funds with which to buy votes.
Opposition Weakness
The Communist party's
strength contrasts strikingly
with that of the leading anti-
Communist groups. After two
years of opposition, the Con-
gress party in Kerala remains
weak and demoralized.
Lack of effective leader-
ship is still the root problem.
.Most of the party's once popu-
lar leaders now are inactive,
and those who remain are largely
discredited. Congress politi-
cians have not encouraged po-
tential leaders among the young-
er generation. Communal and
regional cliques continue to
dominate the party in Kerala,
and this division nearly pre-
vented the election of a new
state party president recently.
The Congress also still
lacks the effective propaganda
machinery and corps of full-
time field workers which con-
tribute so much to Communist
strength.
Congress leaders have never
been able to evolve a united
policy with which to oppose the
Communist government. Some
sections of the party call for
immediate ouster of the Commu-
nists through whatever means
are available, and they complain
about lack of support from the
central government and party.
Others argue that more time is
needed to expose the emptiness
of Communist promises and that
the opposition is not yet pre-
pared to provide a more effec-
tive government.
The primary problem of the
opposition in general has been
its inability to form the genu-
inely united coalition needed
to challenge the Communists'
bare majority in the Kerala
State assembly. Cooperation
among the Congress, Praja So-
cialist, and smaller parties is
endorsed by nearly all leaders,
but It has yet to be effected.
Mutual recrimination continues
to make difficult any electoral
understandings in critical as-
sembly by-elections and in 1959
village council elections.
In recent months, however,
evidence of growth toward a uni-
fied approach has begun to be
apparent in opposition circles.
(Plans for
mass agitation are hampered, how-
ever, by lack of funds and organ-
ization as well as by the Commu-
nists' tactics of intimidation.
Despite this progress toward
a unified anti-Communist front,
the opposition in Kerala does not
appear capable of ousting the
Communist regime in the near fu-
ture.
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- moo 41 few
*000, 1
nA -In
"mv , ula~
-fi~-qlrmv I Nt
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