CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002200030001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
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• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 30, 2006
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• Publication Date: October 18, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
9~ERET
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
OCI NO.1117/59
26 March 1959
OCUMEN T NO.
NO CHANGE IN Cl.;w3S. ^
CLASS. CH?!'4 r TO:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT
INTELLIGENClRETURN TO ARCHIVES ft RECORDS CENTER
IMME09ATE1Y AFTER USE
JOB .T BOX_
CONFIDENTIAL
State Dept. review completed
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iww
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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26 March 1959
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The USSR is continuing to play down the threatening
aspects of its Berlin policy. Soviet propaganda welcomed
statements by President Eisenhower and Prime Minister
Macmillan on a summit meeting but pictured the United
States as having been forced into negotiations. In a
major shift in Bonn's foreign policy, Chancellor Adenauer
has indicated his willingness to extend de facto recogni-
tion to East Germany in exchange for a guarantee of the
status quo in Berlin. The four-month truce in West German
politics on foreign policy was ended by the publication
of a new Social Democratic plan for unification and Euro-
pean security. Adenauer's sharp rejection of this plan
may provoke the first major foreign policy debate in West
Germany since the beginning of the Berlin crisis.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS .
Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact meets one of
the Iraqi Communist demands and undercuts Nasir's charge
that the Qasim regime was still attached to the "imperi-
alists." Nasir's anti-Communist campaign continues un-
abated and is receiving widespread support in other Arab
countries. However, various Afro-Asian neutrals have
become disturbed by the UAR-Iraq split, and a number of
offers of "good offices" have been madle to restore friendly
relations. Moscow has continued to meet Nasir's attacks
head on, but Soviet leaders apparently hope that the po-
lemics will subside without a further deterioration in
relations with Cairo. Various elements in Jordan apparently
are continuing to maneuver in the absence of King Husayn
THE SITUATION IN TIBET . . . .
Page 3
. Page 6
The unrest which erupted in Lhasa on 20 March appears
to have quieted. While Peiping will undoubtedly increase
its efforts to wipe out the remaining Tibetan dissidence,
guerrilla activity in outlying parts of Tibet and western
China is expected to continue for some time. The Dalai
Lama was headed for the Indian border on 26 March. The
Indian Government is gravely concerned over the situation
in Tibet, fearing its relations with Communist China will
be endangered.
CtAIVID FE
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND . . . Page 1
The ruling white minority in the Federation of Rho-
desia and Nyasaland has reacted to the challenge of local
African nationalism by demonstrating a determination to
maintain its position. In Southern Rhodesia, the govern-
ment has put into effect regulations which infringe on
civil rights and is enacting legislation to make them
permanent. The white voters in Northern Rhodesia have
given overwhelming support to federal Prime Minister
Welensky's firm racial policies. The recent events
seem likely to increase the doubt of both the Africans
and the British in the present federation's ability
to handle independence in 1960.
. Page 2
Despite the exchange of recriminations between Moscow
and Cairo over Nasir's anti-Qasim campaign, the Soviet
Union is continuing to meet its obligations under its
various economic and military assistance agreements with
the UAR. Soviet leaders probably want to avoid the effect
which an abrupt move to cut off further aid to the UAR
would have on other Asian and African states. Should
Nasir persist in his present tactics, however, Moscow
might retaliate by threatening to withhold aid or stalling
on the implementation of the aid agreements.
AFRO-ASIAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE . .
Sentiment is growing among the "Bandung countries"
for an Afro-Asian economic conference,, first proposed two
years ago by Ceylon's Prime Minister Bandaranaike. Repre-
sentatives of the five Colombo powers---India, Pakistan,
Ceylon, Burma, and Indonesia--are to meet in May to plan
such a conference, which Bandaranaike hopes will be held
later this year. The conference would deal with a wide
range of economic topics but no "political" issues.
ISRAELI-FRENCH RELATIONS . .
Israel's extreme rightist Herut party, which is
calling for a formal alliance with France, apparently
hopes to make this an issue in the Israeli parliamentary
election campaign this year. French Deputy Premier
Soustelle has in the past advocated an alliance as a
means of countering Nasir's support of the Algerian
rebels. The French and Israeli governments, however,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
PART II (continued)
while continuing their military cooperation, officially
desirable
d
.
un
oppose a formal alliance as unnecessary an
NUCLEAR TEST TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The USSR on 19 March agreed at the Geneva talks tothe
Western draft articles on duration of the proposed treaty
for cessation of nuclear testing and on periodic review of
the control system. The Soviet leader: probably believe
this demonstration of willingness to make concessions in
important East-West negotiations will increase pressure
on the West to agree to Soviet demands on the agenda and
composition of high-level East-West talks. They probably
also believe their concession on these important points
will place the USSR in a better position when the talks
reconvene on 13 April to demand concessions from the
West on the issue of voting in the control commission.
BRITAIN'S PROBLEM IN MALTA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Britain is making only slow progress toward a new
constitution for Malta, site of its principal Mediterranean
naval base, and toward diversifying the crown colony's
economy. Following former Prime Minister Mintoff's
repeated rejection of British plans for constitutional
reforms short of outright independence, London has been
ruling the island directly while attempting to introduce
much-needed fiscal reforms. During the transfer on 30
March of the naval dockyards to a civilian firm, Mintoff
may try to further his independence campaign by inciting
the dockworkers--whom he closely controls--to violence.
PORTUGAL TIGHTENING INTERNAL SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The recent creation of new top posts in the Portuguese
security forces indicates that the government is seeking
to strengthen its ability to deal with subversive action.
Premier Salazar is probably especially anxious to ensure
political stability in the event he should decide to des-
ignate a successor soon.
SOVIET ECONOMIC PLANNING CHIEF REPLACED . . . . . . . . . Page 7
The naming of A. N. Kosygin to the chairmanship of
the USSR State Planning Committee (Gosplan) and the
appointment of his predecessor, I. I. Kuzmin, to head the
new State Scientific-Economic Council of the USSR Council
of Ministers, both announced on 20 March, probably do not
presage alterations in the recently approved Seven-Year
Plan. Kosygin, although long associated with consumer
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
programs, reiterated at the 21st party congress the ortho-
dox view of promoting Soviet economic; growth by means of
the priority development of heavy industry. Kuzmin was
downgraded from deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers
to minister.
GOMULKA DOMINATES POLISH PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Gomulka succeeded at the third congress of the Polish
Communist party in establishing himself as undisputed mas-
ter in the party. The congress cleared him and his ad-
herents of the charges of "right-wing nationalist devi-
ations'" brought against him in 1958, and men who opposed
Gomulka in the past either made their peace with him or
were dropped from important party positions. The moderate
Polish internal policies adopted at the congress contrast
markedly with domestic policies elsewhere in the bloc,arid
this may lead to renewed friction with other Communist
regimes.
SOVIET DELEGATION COMPLETES INDIAN VISIT . . . . . . Page 10
The Soviet Government delegation which completed a
three-week visit to India on 19 March sought to assuage
recent frictions and to survey political and economic
conditions. It does not appear, however, to have made
a significant impact on either official or public opin-
FRENCH POSITION IN INDOCHINA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
President de Gaulle views the former French terri-
tories in Indochina as a sphere in which French prestige
and influence should be expanded. His goal seems to be
an association of Laos and Cambodia-with the new French
Community. France, while refusing to cooperate with
the United States in training for the Laotian Army, has
offered to send additional military instructors to Laos.
PLOTTING AGAINST CARIBBEAN DICTATORSHIPS . . . . . . . . Page 11
Two long-time militant enemies of Latin American
dictatorships, Venezuelan President Betancourt and former
Costa Rican President Figueres, have grave misgivings
concerning the methods and objectives of the latest
leader of the crusade against dictator, Cuban Prime
Minister Fidel Castro. Figueres went to Havana on 20
March in an apparently unsuccessful effort to dissuade
Castro from supporting pro-Communist Nicaraguan and
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PART II (continued)
Dominican revolutionaries and to seek Castro's support
for his own revolutionary plans. Basic differences be-
tween the two men will probably prevent their cooperation.
THE NEW COLOMBIAN CABINET . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The appointment on 23 March of a new Colombian cabi-
net with broader Conservative representation will probably
strengthen the eight-month-old National Front government
of Conservatives and Liberals and may reduce the political
tension and uncertainty of the past few weeks. President
Lleras' recent declaration that he would resign if the
coalition failed has evoked a reaffirmation of support for
the National Front from his own Liberal party.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
NATO'S TENTH ANNIVERSARY OUTLOOK . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
NATO's basic problem continues to be its members'
tendency to deal with domestic political pressures at the
expense of the alliance's military preparedness. Belgium
and Denmark are preparing to reduce conscription periods,
similar moves may occur in Luxembourg and the Netherlands,
and Britain plans to end conscription in 1960. As NATO
enters its second decade--an event coincident with the
foreign ministers' 2-4 April meeting in Washington--basic
assumptions of the alliance are being challenged for the
first time by a series of French actions, including the
withdrawal of the French Mediterranean fleet from NATO
command.
COMMUNIST STRENGTH ON CYPRUS . . .
. . . . Page 3
Present Communist strategy on Cyprus calls for support,
of Archbishop Makarios while waiting for the Greek Cypriots
to become disillusioned with both the Cyprus settlement and
the performance of the conservatives in office. The active
Communist party on the island, which may include as many as
10,000 card-carrying members, hopes soon to attain legal
he Communist appeal has been principally to
the Greek Cypriots; the Turkish Cypriots thus far have been
virtually impervious to Communist infiltration.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
PART III (continued)
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE POLISH WORKERS' COUNCILS . . . . Page
The Gomulka government dealt the Polish Workers'
Councils a final blow as a potentially effective instru-
ment for worker participation in industrial management with
the passage on 20 December 1958 of a law on Worker Self-
Government Conferences. The councils, created in the
revolutionary fervor of 1956 prior to Gomulka's take-over,
failed to fulfill the overoptimistic and unrealistic expec-
tations of the workers, contributed little to productivity
and labor discipline, and rarely developed into organs for
the effective participation of rank-and-file workers in
industrial management. The party could not safely tolerate
the growth of organizations that might develop into inde-
pendent power centers.
PEIPING'S DOCTRINAL CLAIMS AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . Page 9
The ideological disagreement between Peiping and
Moscow over the imminence of pure Communism in China and
the role of communes as a device for attaining that goal
culminated last month in Chinese pronouncements that the
USSR still sets the pace and the pattern throughout the
orbit for progress toward the ultimate state envisioned
by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The junior partner, probably
bitter over the forced retreat, retains its communes, not
as an internationally applicable breakthrough toward
Communism itself, but as a peculiarly Chinese innovation
required by local conditions.
ANNEX
SINO-SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITY IN TUNISIA, MOROCCO, AND
ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . Page 14
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CO HDLN I IAREr,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUtARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS
While awaiting the Western
replies to the Soviet note of
2 March, Soviet propaganda
media, following the line set
in Khrushchev's press confer-
ence on 19 March, are playing
down the threatening aspects
of the USSR's position on Ber-
lin and emphasizing the favor-
able prospects for negotiations
created by Moscow's initiatives.
Moscow claims that Pres-
ident Eisenhower acid -Prime
Minister Macmillan have, under
the pressure of world opinion,
at last accepted the Soviet pro-
posal for a summit meeting.
Soviet media also stress
alleged differences between
American and British views and
state that the "main result"
of the talks between the two
Western leaders was Macmillan's
success in persuading Presi-
dent Eisenhower to agree to
summit talks independent of the
outcome of a preliminary for-
eign ministers' conference.
Moscow is seeking to
create a picture of a reluc-
tant United States being
forced into summit talks against
its will. A TASS dispatch
states that Washington views
negotiations with Moscow "more
as an inevitable evil than as
a necessary means for the peace-
ful settlement of European prob-
lems."
. While welcoming the Eisen-
hower-Macmillan statement on a
summit meeting as a "favorable
development," Soviet propaganda
complained that the two leaders
failed to advance any new pro-
posals on Berlin or other
international problems. Izves-
tia warned that any attempt to
link a summit meeting with the
outcome of a foreign ministers'
conference would "complicate"
the task of summit talks and
might even doom them to failure.
A Czech newspaper said, "It is
obviously illusory to expect
the foreign ministers to reach
agreement on outstanding issues
prior to a meeting at the sum-
mit."
Bloc propaganda has also
criticized the West's alleged
position on the composition of
East-West meetings. Moscow
charged that President Eisen-
hower and Prime Minister Mac-
millan "took the line of
discrimination" in insisting
that Polish and Czechoslovak
representatives could partic-
ipate in a foreign ministers'
conference only as observers.
Warsaw radio dismissed these
terms as "definitely unaccept-
able" and said Poland and Czech-
os].ovakia expect "full member-
ship." Khrushchev, however, in
his recent press conference was
careful not to foreclose the
possibility of a compromise on
the parity question. He.refused
to answer a question on this
issue, stating, "It is a matter
for discussions between govern-
ments."
West German Policy
Chancellor Adenauer informed
the. executive committee of
his party's Bundestag faction
on 16 March that he would be
willing to extend de facto rec-
ognition to East Germany,
provided that in negotiating
r
9se*
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
this concession a guarantee of
the status quo in Berlin could
be obtained and contacts be-
tween East and West German in-
creased.
He based this major change
in Bonn's foreign policy on the
need to gain time to settle
broad 'East-West problems and to
avoid negotiations on disengage-
ment. He also claimed that this
new approach would not be a re-
nunciation of unification since
unity could be obtained only
within the framework of a gen-
eral detente, achieved by sta-
bilizing the present situation.
Adenauer called for and received
strong party support for these
views.
Bona
will hold these
concessions in reserve as a fall-
back position in East-West nego-
tiations. The chancellor prob-
ably feels that some sacrifices
on unification and Berlin are
preferable to running a serious
risk of war or entering discus-
sions which could lead to West-
ern troop reductions on withdraw-
The four-month political
truce on foreign policy ended
on 1.9 March with the publication
by the Social Democratic party
(SPDi) of its new unification and
European security plan. The plan
calls for direct negotiations
with East Germany on a temporary
confederation prior to unifica-
tion and accepts some elements
of the Rapacki Plan. It has
been sharply rejected by the
government and may provoke the
first major West German foreign
policy debate since the begin-
ning; of the Berlin crisis.
25X1
The government could have 25X1
difficulty in maintaining a unit-
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
General business conditions
in West' Berlin have not changed
markedly over the past week and
there are some signs of a re-
cent slight upturn in economic
activity. American officials in
Berlin continue to receive fur-
ther reports that orders for
heavy industry are declining.
A steel company, for example,
Iraq
Iraqi Prime Minister Qasim
has explained that Iraq with-
drew formally from the Baghdad
Pact 11 months before the ex-
piration of the pact's first
five-year term only after long
study and much concern. As
Qasim has said, however, with-
drawal from the pact was one of
the original aims of the 14
July revolution, and it would
seem that other motives led
Qasim to make the move at this
time. Qasim has recently been
pressed by both the Communists
and President Nasir to make
this break--the Communists pre-
sented it as one of their de-
mands which could no longer
wait, and Nasir cited Iraq's.:
membership in the pact as evi-
dence that Qasim is a party in
the "Zionist-imperialist-Com-
munist-opportunist" conspiracy
against the Arabs.
If Communist pressure was
the decisive factor,. Qasim may
soon accede to other more sig-
nificant Communist demands,
which include arming the Pop-
ular Resistance Force (PRF)
and executing imprisoned lead-
ers of the former Nuri govern-
ment. Arms are beginning to be
seen in the hands of PRF mem-
bers in Baghdad, but it is not
confirmed that the arms have
been regularly issued.
Regarding the fate of the
imprisoned "traitors," UAR re-
ports that some individuals
have been executed have not
been proved. However, Commu-
nist pressure is believed
to be responsible. for a de-
cision last week to. bring
to trial certain members of
the Nuri-government who had
been released on bail, and
who it was thought might go
free, Proceedings for their
trial, however, have been in-
terrupted by the trial of
officers engaged in the Mo-
sul uprising.
Although there is no evi-
dence of a resumption of serious
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reports that output will decline
by 50 percent in April and even
more in May, putting the firm
well. below the break-even point.
Other firms in structural steel
report that they are receiving
no benefits from Bonn's program
of giving new orders to Berlin.
An increasing number of small
firms are applying for permits
to ship their equipment out of
Berlin.
The'latest banking figures
show further declines in savings
and time deposits. Some of this
is attributable to withdrawals
of savings by East Germans. Sav-
ings are now $4,500,000 under
the level of 31 October 1958.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
disorders anywhere in Iraq, the
Qasim regime evidently remains
apprehensive. An area around
the town of Khanaquin, near the
Iranian border and athwart the
only direct route from Iran to
Baghdad, was declared a prohib-
ited area to vehicular traffic
early this week.
USSR-UAR Relations
Moscow has continued to
meet Nasir's anti-Qasimr, anti-
Communist attacks head'on, but
Soviet leaders apparently hope
that the polemics will subside
without a further deterioration
in relations with Cairo. Khru-
shchev, in response to a ques-
tion at his 19 March press con-
ference regarding differences
with the UAR over Iraq, stated
that the Soviet Union can main-
tain friendly relations with
both Arab countries because of
its policy of "nonintervention"
in the internal afffairs.of
other states.
Khrushchev went on, how-
ever, to criticize Nasir's reac-
tion to his earlier statement
of.16 March on the subject,
charging that the UAR President
--whom he described as "young
and passionate"--"went into a
passion." Western journalists
who were present report that
Khrushchev observed that Nasir
has taken on "more than his
stature permits," and that he
thereby "might strain himself,"
but these remarks were subse-
quently toned down in the TASS
version of Khrushchev's remarks.
One Soviet broadcast in Arabic
also softened his remarks by
pleading that they were made
"under the pressure of other
considerations."
Soviet commentaries on
Nasir's charges against Qasim
and Arab Communists stress that
they can only aid "imperialism"
and Israel, and welcome Arab
League offers to mediate Cairo's
differences with Baghdad. Mos-
cow's broadcasts to Arab audi-
ences also charge that Khru-
shchev's remarks on the subject
are being distorted by UAR of-
ficials and propagandists in an
effort to worsen UAR relations
with the Soviet Union.
Nasir continued to conduct
his anti-Communist campaign from
Syria, which some observers feel
may become the most important
arena in his struggle with
Qasim. Nasir's most telling
barbs last week were aimed at
Moscow, however. On 20 March
he stated publicly for the first
time that the Soviet warning to
the West at the time of the
Sues, war did not help the UAR,
and that the USSR would not
have! acted forcefully against
Western intervention in Iraq.
A Soviet broadcast in Arabic on
24 March called this statement
a "lie."
Nasir also replied to
Khrushchev's description of him
by asserting that were it not
for these qualities in.the Arab
people there would today be in
the Arab states Western missile
bases aimed against the Soviet
Union.
The religious leaders of
Al Azhar University in Cairo
have been persuaded to denounce
"thee instigators of chaos, de-
struction, and atheism," and
the sheik of the university
has declared a "holy war"
against the "campaign of athe-
ism and corruption."
The UAR authorities are
also using the anti-Communist
campaign as an opportunity for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
a general tightening of se-
curity in the Syrian region.
On 24 March the secretary
general of the Syrian trade
unions announced that the unions
.had decided to expel the Com-
munist elements from membership
so that the unions could join
other organizations and better
participate in the "struggle"
against Communism and "faction-
alism," This may be a concealed
effort by the government to
bring about a reorganization
of the Syrian trade unions along
lines which have transformed
the Egyptian unions into a kind
of "popular demonstration" arm
of the Nasir regime.
Nasir's anti-Communist cam-
paign has received almost unan-
imous support in other Arab
countries; The degree of en-
thusiasm has ranged from re-
strained approval to violent
demonstrations of support. An
outstanding exception, however,
is Jordan, where "Nasirism" re-
mains officially the paramount
threat to the established order.
Four days of intense anti-
Communist, anti-Iraqi demonstra-
tions in Tripoli, Libya, from.
18 to 21 March ended in near
riots requiring police inter-
vention and the posting of extra
guards around the Soviet Em-
bassy. The crowds presumably
were inspired and organized
by pro-UAR elements.
In Tunisia, where Presi-
dent Bourguiba is involved in a
long-standing dispute with Nasir,
the state-controlled Tunisian
radio has categorized develop-
ments in Iraq as a blow to "Nas-
ir's expansionist designs." The
Arabic-language press in Moroc-
co, published by the conserva-
tive faction of the ruling Is-
tigial party, has expressed
fear that the dispute may lead
to civil war and foreign inter-
ference in the Middle East.
Yemeni Crown Prince Badr,
according to the Cairo press,
has deplored "Iraq's deviation
from the right path" and af-
firmed Yemen's support for
Nasirr's positive neutrality and
nonalignment. The Persian Gulf
state of Bahrein officially
permitted pro-Nasir parades on
19 March, the first political
demonstrations held there since
1956. The conflict has even
erupted in Israeli villages,
where Arab supporters of Nasir
reportedly clashed with Commu-
nist sympathizers.
A Saudi offer of good offices in
the dispute has been criticized by the
Communist press in Iraq. The
new government of the Sudan has
asked the Arab League to take up
the subject, and a special meet-
ing of the league's political
committee has been called for
31 March in Beirut.
IL.i Lebanon, Moslems appear
wholeheartedly behind Nasir,
but some Christian elements are
reported "gleeful" at his dis-
comfiture over the abortive
Iraqi uprising, The Beirut
press is continuing attacks on
both Baghdad and Moscow. Com-
munist press and cultural in-
stallations in Beirut were bombed
on 15 and 22 March, and govern-
ment security forces have been
posted around the Soviet Em-
bassy. The Lebanese Government
is officially neutral,
Lebanese President Shihab
and Nasir held their long-planned
meeting on the Syrian-Lebanese
border on 25 March. An ostensible
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 19,59
motive for the meeting was the
resolution of Syrian-Lebanese
economic problems.
Shihab may obtain from
the meeting additional sup-
port against the more fanatic
Moslem elements in. Lebanon
who feel they have then cheated 25X1
of the fruits of their "vic-
tory" in last summer's civil
strife.
THE SITUATION IN TIBET
The unrest in Lhasa ap-
pears to have quieted following
several days of intense fight-
ing between Chinese forces and
Tibetan rebels which began on
20 March. The Chinese Commu-
nist-operated radio in Lhasa--
which has been silent since 19
March--has still not resumed
broadcasting. Peiping radio
continues to ignore the Tibetan
situation.
Little reliable informa-
tit is available on the scope
of the fighting; press reports
of the Communist bombing of
monasteries in Lhasa and the
rebel capture of the 'trade 'town
of Gyangtse cannot be confirmed.
While Peiping will undoubtedly
increase. its efforts to wipe
out the remaining Tibetan dis-
sidence, guerrilla activity in
outlying parts of Tibet and
western China is expected to
continue for some time.
The Dalai Lama, who fled
Lhasa on 17 March with a party
of 12 Tibetans,. is in southern
Tibet headed for the Indian
border. He expects to be met
by a Tibetan sent from a resist-
ance group in India. Peiping.
has listed the 'Dalai Lama among
the delegates to the forthcoming
National People-'s Congress--
an indication that the Chinese
had expected him to attend the
Congress meeting in Peiping on
17 April.
The Indian Government is
gravely concerned over the sit
uat;ion in Tibet, fearing that
the consequences of rebel ac-
tivity will endanger its rela-
tions with Communist China.
They Dalai Lama's presence in
India or in Indian-protected
Bhutan, representing a virtual
Tibetan government-in-exile,
would be highly embarrassing
to New Delhi. However, while
Nehru is reluctant to become
involved in an "internal" Chi-
nese problem, he probably would
not refuse some kind of asylum
to the Dalai Lama.
New Delhi is equally ap-
prehensive over the possibility
that Chinese troops, in an at-
tempt to wipe out guerrilla ac-
tivity, will eventually pursue
fleeing rebels into Indian or
Bhutanese territory and thus
engage Indian border forces.
Frontier checkposts have stand- 25X1
ing instructions to deny ad-
mission to dissident Tibetans.
Nehru publicly reiterated
his government's hands-off policy
toward the "Tibet region of
China" before an aroused Par-
lianient on 23 March. His state-
ment by implication put Pei-
ping on notice, however,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
that he regarded Chinese fail-
ure to respect Tibet's "au-
tonomous" status as a vio-
lation of previous assur-
ances.
SINKIANG UIGHUR
AUTONOMOUS REGI#r
.1.1 14_4
Nehru has been under in-
creasing pressure from both
the Indian Parliament and press
to take a stronger stand. F
and will
cidents.
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New Delhi, by
issuing official state-
ments confirming rebel
action, has also point-
edly reversed its past
policy'of playing down
reports of Tibetan
resistance.
Peiping may con-
sider New Delhi's "al-
lusion" to Tibetan
autonomy as "interfer-
ence in internal af-
fairs" and will prob-
ably protest release
of reports on the
Lhasa fighting by
"official" Indian
sources. Communist
China, however, does
not desire a rift in
relations with Indii6
seek to avoid in-
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CUI RENT INTELLIGENCE "JEST"LY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND I' I'A.SALAND
The ruling white minority
in the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland has reacted to
the challenge of local African
nationalism by demonstrating a
determination to maintain its
position. In Southern Rhodesia,
the government has invoked tem-
porary regulations which in-
fringe on civil rights and is
acting legislation to make
them permanent. The white vot-
ers in Northern Rhodesia have
:iv n overwhelming support to
federal Prime Minister Welensky's
firm racial policies. In Ny-
asaland.there have been only
scattered incidents, although
the situation throughout the
protectorate is still tense.
The recent events seem likely
to increase the doubt of both
the Africans and the British
in the present federation's
ability to handle independence
in 1960.
In the self-governing
colony of Southern Rhodesia,
the settler-controlled govern-
ment proclaimed a state of
emergency on 26 February in an
e:"fort to ;.,revent a spread of
African nationalist disorders
from Nyasaland. Regulations
promulgated under these powers
permit the government to con-
trol the movement of persons,
to ban meetings of more than
three people, and to search
premises without a warrant.
Press censorship has also been
imposed.
The four African National
Congress organizations operat-
in;g in the federation are out-
la-wed in Southern Rhodesia and
penalties are imposed for hold-
ing membership or office in
them. Furthermore, the minis-
ter of justice can detain any
person he considoi dauigerous.
Almost 500 Af r ca -s >:.ad been
detained by 5 March,
Although the emergency
proclamations were implemented
without significant criticism,
the government's plan to pass
a preventive detention bill
permitting a person to be held
for five years without trial
aroused considerable public
opposition, and the bill has
been withdrawn for rewriting.
In London, Joshua Nkomo, presi-
dent of the banned Southern
Rhodesian African National Con-
gress, has urged Britain to
veto Rhodesian legislation
which outlaws his organization.
In Northern Rhodesia,
European settler support for
the federation government's
firm handling of the racial
crisis was shown in the legis-
lative council elections on
20 March. The white voters
gave heavy backing to pro-
Welensky candidates in 13 of
;:Lie 14 European constituencies,
and, in the remaining one,
they backed a segregationist.
Despite this overwhelming set-
t'..e:r support, however, Welensky's
supporters do not have a major-
ity in Northern Rhodesia's 30-
member legislative council be-
cause of their failure to win
African constituencies .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 195w
SOVIET-UAR ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Despite the exchange of
recriminations between Moscow
and Cairo over Nasir's anti-
Qasim, anti-Communist campaign,
the Soviet Union is continuing
to meet its obligations under
its various economic and mili-
tary assistance agreements with
the UAR. Soviet leaders prob-
ably want to avoid the effect
which an abrupt move to cut
off further aid to the UAR
would have on other Asian and
African states. Should.Nasir
persist in his present tactics,
however, Moscow might retaliate
by threatening to withhold aid
or stalling on the implementa-
tion of the aid agreements.
The bloc--primarily the
Soviet Union--has extended
since 1955 more than $1 billion
in economic and military aid
to the UAR. The USSR is start-
ing more than 50 industrial
projects in the Egyptian region
under a $175,000,000 economic
and technical aid agreement
designed to promote Egypt's
five-year plan. Under an ad-
ditional $100,000,000 credit,
the USSR has begun the prelim-
inary survey work for construct-
ing the first stage of the
Aswan High Dam. The Soviet Un-
ion has, in addition, completed
surveys for the various irriga-
tion, transportation, and geo-
logical projects called for un-
der the Soviet-Syrian economic
development aid agreement and
now is preparing to begin their
implementation. Some of them
have been subcontracted to the
European satellites.
The bloc has extended
about $500,000,000 in military
aid to the two regions of the
UAR. The Syrian region, which
has received about $200,000,000
of this, has taken delivery on
most of the items it ordered
from the bloc. Although there
are :indications that the Soviet
Union is not as lenient in
agreeing to the UAR's requests
as formerly, negotiations for
additional arms purchases, co-
ordinated under Cairo's control,
are under way in Moscow. Ex-
tensive military training programs
continue both in the bloc and
in the UAR.
Trade between the bloc and
the "UAR appears to be continuing
at its normal pace. The bloc,
which during the 1957-58 cotton
season purchased about 65 per-
cent of Egypt's output and more
than 40 percent of Syria's, is
continuing to buy large quanti-
ties of the 1958-59 output. The
final deliveries of this year's
200,000-ton wheat supply agree-
ment are now arriving in Egypt
from the USSR. Furthermore,
bloc petroleum shipments to the
UAR, which thus far in 1959 have
averaged 200,000 tons a month,
are continuing.
Finally, Moscow announced
on 23 March that large amounts
of industrial equipment for en-
terprises under the $175,000,000
Soviet aid agreement with Egypt
now are arriving at Egyptian
ports. (Prepared 25X1
by ORR
AFRO-ASIAN ECONOMIC CONFERENCE
Sentiment is growing among
the "Bandung countries" for an
Afro-Asian economic conference,
first proposed two years ago by
Ceylon's Prime Minister Banda.ra-
naike, Representatives of the
five Colombo powers--India,
Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, and
Indonesia--are to meet in May
to plan such a conference, which
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
30372
0
Malaya, Singapore, and other nations not among the Bandung countries may
have been approached about attending the Afro Asian economic conference.
Bandaranaike hopes will be held
later this year.
The purpose of the confer-
ence would be to discuss a wide
range of economic issues, in-
cluding establishment of an
Afro-Asian bank, stabilization
of prices of primary export
products, formulation of com-
mon policies regarding private
foreign investment, and possibly
establishment of free-trade or
common-market zones between
certain countries in the area.
Means of furthering regional
cooperation in economic devel-
opment planning, food produc-
tion, shipping, and population
control would also be discussed.
Bandaranaike has specified that
political issues would be ex-
cluded.
Many of the 30-odd coun-
tries concerned have reserva-
tions about the conference,
however, and extensive prepara-
tions at the committee level
probably will be required be-
fore Bandaranaike's conference
plan is finally accepted. Some
countries question whether sub-
stantial advantages would be
gained from discussions among
nations representing such a
wide variety of economic in-
terests. India's Prime Minis-
ter Nehru still appears rela-
tively unenthusiastic about
the plan. Japan is also luke-
warm, and Tokyo apparently would
prefer to have the proposed
agenda items discussed by ex-
perts rather than at a full
conference.
Communist attempts to ex-
ploit any conference that en-
sues; from the planning meeting
in May probably would prove un-
successful in view of the re-
sentment caused among the Ban-
dun nations by Moscow's and
17eiping's efforts to identify
their policies closely with
the "spirit of Bandung.'/
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
Israel's extreme rightist
Herut party, which advocates an
aggressive foreign policy, is
calling for a formal Israeli-
French alliance. During the par-
liamentary election campaign this
summer and fall, Herut leaders
apparently intend to accuse Prime
Minister Ben-Gurion of jeopard-
izing Israeli security by fail-
ing to secure a regular treaty.
The government maintains
that a formal alliance is not
desirable at this time because
it would restrict Israel's free-
dom of action, and that all the
assistance which could reason-
ably be expected from France has
been forthcoming under the ex-
isting relationship. Furthermore,
it contends that the French Gov-
ernment likewise sees no particu-
lar advantage in an alliance at
present.
The Herut party has chal-
lenged the government to pro-
duce evidence to support its po-
sition,
Recent visits
--o prance by Foreign Minister
Meir and the director general
of the Defense Ministry may also
be related to this effort to
minimize the election signifi-
cance of the issue.
The appointment of Jacques
Soustelle as deputy premier in
the Debr6 cabinet has undoubted-
ly encouraged the Herut campaign.
Soustelle, who has close rela-
tions with the Herut party, has
long advocated a formal French
Israeli alliance, although his
motivations are primarily anti-
Arab, and particularly anti-
Nasir, rather than pro-Israeli.
He reportedly believes a strong
Israel would keep the Arab world
preoccupied and permit France
to resolve its problems in North
Africa with a minimum of Arab
interference. French Foreign
Ministry officials, on the other
hand, have apparently convinced
De Gaulle that France should
tone down its relationship with
Israel and that a pact with Is-
rael would endanger French-Arab
relations,
Meanwhile, quiet military
cooperation between France and
Israel is continuing.
The USSR on 19 . March agreed at
the Geneva talks to the Western
draft articles on duration of
the proposed treaty for cessa-
tion of nuclear testing and on
periodic review.of the control
system. As late as 16 March,
Soviet chief delegate Tsarapkin
had told Ambassador Wadsworth
privately that, under the Western
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959,
terms of reference, the USSR
could not agree to a treaty.
He had contended at the confer-
ence that the American duration
article had been designed to
make withdrawal from the treaty
"as easy as possible" and there-
fore was "harmful and dangerous
to international relations."
Tsarapki:--:z stated that link-
ing the right o.=' withdrawal from
the treaty t-:.. the effectiveness
of the control system was unac-
ceptable to the USSR and that
the only violation of the terms
of the treaty in the Soviet view
would be a nuclear test itself.
Soviet propaganda had also strong-
ly criticized the American draft
duration article before 19 iv,^.rch,
calling it another effort "~.imed
at preventing at any cost a to-
tal, unconditional, and perma-
nent cessation of tests."
The Soviet leaders probably
believed this demonstration of
willingness to make concessions
in important East-West negotia-
tions, occurring during Prime
Minister Macmillan's Washington
visit, would increase pressure
on the West to agree to Soviet
demands on the agenda and com-
position of high-level East-West
talks.
The Soviet leaders probably
also believe their concession
on these important points will
place the USSR in a better po-
sition to demand concessions
from the West on the issue of
voting in the control commission.
Soviet propaganda since 19 March,
while failing to exploit Mos-
cow's concession, has focused
on the "impasse" it claims has
been created by the West's "un-
realistic" position on voting
procedures in the control com-
mission and on the composition
of the control bodies.
In another effort to dis-
credit the Western attitude to-
ward the talks, Moscow also
charged that the...three-week recess,
proposed by the West "can in: no
way cause satisfaction" and "runs
counter to public sentiment,"
noting that the Soviet delegation
had urged that the talks continue
uninterruptedly.
On 24 March, Moscow published
Khrushchev's reply of 20 March
to a letter on the test cessation
question from 22 well-known Amer-
icans. He charged the United
States and Britain with "doing
everything they can to prevent
an agreement" and stated that
the talks therefore are "now
faced ;with failure." .He made
no mention of the USSR's accep-
tance of the Western article on
duration Moscow has furthe:c
asserted that the Mnerican an-
nouncement at this time of its
September high-altitude tests
is calculated "to undermine the
authority of the Geneva experts'
conference and therefore to make
the reaching of agreement on
stopping tests more difficult."
OSI
BRITAIN'S PROBLEM IN MALTA
Britain is making only
slow progress toward a new con-
stitution for Malta, site of
its principal Mediterranean
naval base, and toward diver-
sifying the crown colony's
economy. Since Dom Mintoff
resigned as Maltese prime min-
(Concurred in by 25X1
ister last April, London has
been ruling the island directly
and trying to institute much
needed fiscal reforms, establish
municipal government bodies, and
bring in a more capable adminis-
trator as governor. Some $81,-
200,000 over the next five years
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has been promised for capital
development, conversion of the
dockyard to civilian use, and
encouragement of secondary in-
dustr.ies.
London would like to re-
turn to the Maltese responsibili-
ty for their own affairs while
also ensur.~..ng Britain's indef-
inite use of the base, which
serves as headquarters of NATO's
Mediterranean Command. Mintoff
has so :ear rejected all British
constitutional offers, largely
The recent creation of new
top posts in the Portuguese se-
curity forces indicates that
the government is seeking to
strengthen its ability to deal
with subversive action. Pre-
mier Salazar is probably espe-
cially anxious to ensure polit-
ical stability in the event he
should decide to designate a
successor soon.
On 9 March, Colonel Arnaldo
Schulz, whose appointment as
interior minister last November
was generally interpreted as
presaging toughness toward po-
litical opposition, placed a
close army associate in the new-
ly created position of chief of
staff of the National Republic
Guard. About the same time, he
installed a captain attached to
the General Staff in another
newly created post--chief of
staff of the Public Security
Police-r-and assigned several
army officers to municipal
government positions.
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on the grounds that they -are ac-
companied by inadequate economic
aid. He has repudiated his own
earlier proposal for economic
and political integration with
Britain, and insists on inde.pend-
ence for the tiny, overpopulat-
ed island. The British are now
seeking to devise a new formula
for the island's future polit-
ical status, hoping in so do-
ing to undercut Mintoff, who
remains by far the most popu-
lar leader.
The Colonial Office may
try to obtain local acceptance
of a constitution by letting
the Maltese participate in the
drafting via a revival of the
historic Malta Assembly--a body
representative of interest groups
rather than political parties.
There is reason to believe
Min:toff might go along with
this approach. He may, however,
pursue his independence cam-
paign by inciting the dock-
workers---whose full support
he can command--to violence,
particularly during the
transfer on 30 March of
the dockyard from the Ad-
miralty to a civilian firm.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Schulz' immediate objec-
tive in reorganizing his minis-
try along military lines is
probably aimed at blocking fu-
ture attempts to overthrow the
regime.
A longer term objective is
probably to ensure a stable suc-
cession. Although there is lit-
tle evidence to support rumors
that Salazar will retire when
he reaches 70 in April, his recent
illness may induce him to step
down, soon. He was recently re-
ported planning to create a new
post of vice president for 1).im-
self, leaving the premiers1tip to
ex-Eefense Minister Colonel San-
SOVIET ECONOMIC PLANNING CHIEF REPLACED
The naming of A. N. Kosy-
gin to the chairmanship of the
USSR State Planning Committee
(Gosplan) and the appointment
of his predecessor, I. I. Kuz-
min, to head the new State Sci-
entific-Economic Council of the
USSR Council of Ministers is
apparently intended to strength-
en both the practical and theo-
retical aspects of Soviet plan-
ning and ceconomic decision
making. The new appointments,
both announced on 20 March,
probably do not presage altera-
tions in the recently. approved
Seven-Year Plan. Kosygin,I.al-
though long associated with
consumer programs, reiterated
at the congress the orthodox
view of promoting Soviet eco-
nomic growth by giving priority
to development of heavy indus-
try.
Kuzmin, who also lost his
government post of deputy chair-
man of the Council of Ministers,
apparently did not measure up
to the exacting job of heading
Gosplan. Under the increasing-
ly complex conditions accompany
ing industrial reorganization
and the drafting of the new
Seven-Year Plan, and especially
in the past year, Gosplan has
been subject to considerable
criticism for being too cumber.
some, and for taking too long to
reach decisions.
Kuzmin may also have been
held responsible for failing to
solve various other chronic
economic problems which plague
the Soviet leaders, such as rec-
onciling short-term and long-
term plans, improving price re-
lationship,establishing economic
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criteria for the introduction
of new technology, and prevent-
ing the accumulation of un-
finished construction projects.
Unlike his predecessors
Saburov and Pervukhin, Kuzmin
was not a member of the party
presidium. He was a technical-
ly trained party administrator,
appointed to head Gosplan at a
time when Khrushchev was push-
ing through his industrial re-
organization. The innovation
of having as Gosplan chief a
technical administrator who did
not participate directly in top
policy decisions as a member of
the party presidium may have
proved unworkable,osygin, al--
rfeady a candidate member of the
party presidium, has long been
at or near the top of Soviet
ru7'.ing circles and had formerly
been a first deputy planning
chief.
In an attempt to foster
stronger ties between scientif-
ic advances and economic prog-
ress, both a new State Commit-
teEe for Automation and Machine
Building, headed by A. I. Kos-
touusov, and a new State Scientif.-
ic-Economic Council, headed by
Ku2,min, were created on 28 Feb-
ruary. The relationship of
these two units to each other
and to the State Scientific-
Technical Committee--which ap-
parently is still in existence--
is not yet certain,
The new State Scientific=
Economic Council is not expected,
however, to have direct operation-
al or planning functions. Its
formation may well be part of the
formal response to the party con-
gress' criticisy of "lagging" eco-
nomic-science sra:Jort of planning
and. poli cy -ma a ?. ;; techniques in
the economy, T.,:: council may as-
sume certa:.:s:a responsibilities
for broad coordination and su-
pervision of economic research
activities,: recently undertaken
by USSR Gosplan, the USSR
Ministry of Higher Education,
and. the USSR Academy of Sciences.
(Prep;.red 25X1
jointly with ORR; concurred
in by OSI)
uomulka succeeded at the
third congress of the Polish
Communist party in establish-
ing himself as undisputed master
in the party. The congress
cleared him and his adherents
of the charges of 'fright-wing--
nationalist deviations" brought
against him in 1948 even though
Gomulka him nlf had once admit-
ted the charges were true, The
party's errors during the pre-
vious period we-ra ascribed to
the influence of cult of
personality,
Men who had opposed Gomulka
in the past either made: their
peace with him or were dropped
from important party positions,
Three pro-Gomulka stalwarts--par-
ty secretaries Edward Gierek and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
Zenon Kliszko, and Defense Min-
ister Marian Spychaiski -moved
up to. the politburo. Fourteen
of the 18 persons dropped from
the central committee were iden-
tified with the Stalinist Nato-
lin faction, which had opposed
many.of the freedoms permitted
.by Gomulka. Among the prominent
Stalinists dropped were the am-
bassador to Czechoslovakia,
Pranciszek Mazur, once considered
to be the Natolin leader; former
Vice Minister of State Security
Lewikowski, the man who arrested
Gomulka in 1951; and former po-
:litb{-r,o member and outspoken
Gomulka opponent Franciszek
,Tozwiak.
The present composition of
the central committee confirms
Gomulka's tight grip on the.party
apparatus and reflects his in-
tention to extend full confidence
to all Communists who now "stand
-firmly on the party line, " re-
gardless of whether they may have
committed the error of dogmatism
or revisionism in the past. All
the Stalinists were not dropped.
Boleslaw Ruminski, Eugeniusz
Szyr, and General Witaszewski
are still on the central com-
mittee, for example, but it must
be assumed that they have arrived
at some understanding with Go-
mulka. Some leading liberals
who have be?' fairly close to
Gomulka in k',Ae past, such as
Education Minister Bienkowski,
were, not named to the central
committee. Many of the new meni-
bers, who hold important posi-
tions in the party and govern-
ment have risen to prominence
since Gomulka.' :3 return i power
in 1956.
In gekeral, the congress re-
flected Gomulka's own views.
Party discipline must be strength-
ened, but there must be no re-
.sort to "administrative measures"
or police terrorism. There is
to be no open persecution of
the Catholic Church, but the
church must confine its activities
to matters of faith and "renounce
hopeless attempts to fight sow.
e;ialism," Collectivization of
agriculture is still the aim,
but it must be voluntary. The
rate of economic expansioi will
continue to be moderate and con-
sic'-??rably lower than in other
Communist countries which are
making a "leap forward."
The USSR apparently has ac-
cepted 1omulka's moderate domes-
tic policies, while the Polish
leader will follow the Soviet
line on foreign issues. The
moderate internal policies cor--
trast; markedly with domestic
policies elsewhere in the bloc 25X1
and this may lead to re-
newed[' friction with . other
Communist regimes .
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
The Soviet Government dele-
gation which completed a 24-day
tour of India on 19 March sought
to assuage recent frictions and
to survey political and economic
conditions. It does not appear,
however, to have made a signif-
icant impact on either official
or public opinion there.
The bland joint communique
issued at the close of the visit
stated that the delegation had
talks with Prime Minister Nehru
and other leading officials in
New Delhi on a number of inter-
national "problems," including
disarmament, Germany, Berlin,
and the bilateral defense pacts
recently signed by the United
States with Paki$tan, Iran, and
Turkey. The communique said
that the two sides agreed to
continue efforts to reduce in-
ternational tension and that
both favor an agreement for the
immediate suspension of nuclear
tests.
Originally, the delegation
was to have been headed by So-
viet President Voroshilov, but,
because of illness, he was re-
placed by A. A. Andreyev, a
member of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet. Andreyev, how-
ever, was overshadowed by N. A.
Mukhitdinov, a party presidium
member who has often acted as
a spokesman in conducting rela-
tions with the newly independ-
ent states of Asia and Africa.
sonaI letter from Khrushchev
offering to grant India a long-
term loan of $20,000,000 for
development of the Indian phar-
maceutical industry and to as-
sist with equipment and tech-
nical aid for the construction
of an oil refinery at Barauni.
Both projects had been previous-
ly discussed by Moscow and New
Delh_L .
After talks in New Delhi,
the delegation toured the coun-
try visiting new projects, in-
cluding the Bhilai steel plant,
which was formally opened in
early February,. :and attended
the opening of the Indian Tech-
nological Institute in Bombay.
Both of these projects were
built; with Soviet assist-
ance?
During a stop in Kashmir,
delegation spokesmen reiterat-
ed Soviet support for India
on the Kashmir issue. On a
number of occasions, the dele-
gation attacked the recently
conc]Luded bilateral defense
pacts as a "strategic spring-
board" aimed not only at the
USSR, but also at Asian coun-
tries. However, Nehru stated
at a press conference dur-
ing the visit that the
United States would not
be a party "to any ar-
rangement which may threaten
the security of India,"
thus undercutting the dele-
gation's attacks on this is-
sue. Con --- 25X1
On its arrival, the dele-
gation presented to Nehru a per-
curri d In by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
President de Gaulle views
the former'French territories
in Indochina as a sphere in
which French prestige and in-
fluence should be expanded.
Although his goal appears to
be the association of Laos and
Cambodia with the new French
Community, he may also feel
that unilateral French activity
in Indochina can be used to
strengthen France's demands for
tripartite US-UK-French global
strategic planning.
In Laos, the French ambas-
sador has placed Prime Minister
Phoui under heavy pressure to
bring Laos into association
with the new French Community.
Other recent signs of increased
French interest in Laos are
Paris' offer to send 80 addi-
tional military training in-
structors to Laos, its grant of
additional aid funds for road
building and geological surveys
and its opposition to the in-
troduction of American training
personnel to supplement :;.i..;
training of the Laotian Army.
PLOTTING AGAINST CARIBBEAN DICTATORSHIPS
Two long-time militant
enemies of Latin American dic-
tatorships, President Romulo
Betancourt of Venezuela and
former Costa Rican President
Jos4 Figueres,have grave mis-
givings concerning the methods
and objectives of the latest
leader of the crusade against
dictators, Cuban Prime Minister
Fidel Castro. Both are alarmed
at Castro's demagoguery and
his tendency to support pro-
Communist Nicaraguan and Domini-
can revolutionaries.
,On his visit to Cuba, be-
ginning on 20 March, Figueres
is believed to have tried to
dissuade Castro from actions
that would increase Communist
capabilities in the area and to
secure his support for Figueres'
own plans for ousting the re-
gimes in Nicaragua and the Do-
minican Republic.
Basic differences, which
appear likely to prevent effec-
tive cooperation between the
two :Leaders, were emphasized
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
Pacific Ocean
30370
[ter' MINICAN
Pot au Pry R SIIi Tiuii1I0?
ana a Caracas
VENEZUELA
,Bogota
COLOMBIA
during a labor rally in Havana
on 22 March. Figueres, while
lamenting what he considers the
lack of appreciation in the
United States for Latin America's
"war" on dictatorships and its
economic problems, concluded
that solutions to these prob-
lems can be negotiated and that
Latin America's.place is at the
side of the United States in
the cold ware He was heatedly
interrupted by Castro's labor
chief with the declaration that
Cuba "has no need to support
the United States, which is
still mistreating us."
Castro then harangued the
crowd for nearly two hours,
strongly disagreeing with.Fig-
ueres on a number of points,
repeatedly attacking the United
States, and affirming 'that
Cuba should be neutralist.
The differences. among the
leading crusaders against dic-
tatcorship 'do,-:not necessarily
mean a weakening of the revolu-
tioriary fervor now threatening
the regimes in Nicaragua and
the Dominican Republic. The
psychological climate for revo-
lutionary action is already
present, and plotting is ex-
pected to continue whether or
not all exile factions are
united.
The Communists, aided by
Castro's repeated charges that
the United States supports dic-
tatorships, evidently are at-
tempting to gain sufficient
control in the revolutionary
movements to ensure their in-
fluence in any postrevolution-
ary government in Nicaragua or
the Dominican Republic.
Other more moderate revolu-
tionaries, however, are look-
ing to Figueres, and pos-
sibly also to Betancourt,
for aid and guidance.
THE NEW COLOMBIAN CABINET
The appointment on 23 March
of a new Colombian cabinet with
broader. conservative represen-
tation will probably strengthen
the eight-month-old National
Front government of Conserva-
tives and Liberals and may re-
duce the political tension and
uncertainty of the past few
weeks. The 14 March mass
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMA 72
26 March 1959
resignation of President Lleras'
former cabinet, which followed
closely on widespread violence,
suggested that serious dissen-
sion was developing within the
government.
The National Front was in-
augurated last August following
Conservative-Liberal agreement
to rotate the presidency and to
share on a parity basis all ap-
pointive and elective offices
for a 16-year period. It has
been weakened by the opposition
of minority Conservative groups,
the resurgence of Communist
agitation, the plotting of the
followers of former dictator
Rojas, and reported growing op-
position of Liberals to rotation
of the presidency. The coordi-
nation process within the coal-
ition has also apparently slowed
down government decisions and
programs.
The cabinet now is composed
of six holdovers and seven new
members, including two repre-
sentatives of the important "Re-
publican" faction of Conserva-
tives which had refused to co-
operate with the government.
Their participation now may con-
stitute a major initial step
toward a rapprochement between
the principal elements of the
long-divided Conservatives,
The President's position
has also been improved by the
ratification of the coalition
agreements at a recent convention
of his own Liberal party--a step
which followed his earlier warn-
ing that he would resign if ro-
tation of the presidency were not
upheld, Moreover, the end of
Rojas' trial by the Senate, with
his conviction of misconduct
during his 1953-57 presiden-
tial term, may remove a dis-
turbing element from the
political scene and undercut
any further plotting by his
supporters.
The government thus far has
been successful in carrying out
its stabilization program, de-
signed to conserve foreign ex-
change, control inflation, and
pay the heavy commercial debt
inherited from the dictatorship,
However, any drastic drop in the
present low price of coffee, on
which Colombia depends for al-
most 80 percent of its foreign
exchange, might,threaten this
program and lead to economic
conditions readily exploitable
by opposition groups.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
At the NATO 2-4 April min-
isterial meeting, which coin-
cides wi'.b the treaty's tenth
anniversary, most questions
facing the ministers reflect
the allianc-_)'s continuing prob-
lem of achieving Western unity
in the face of increasingly
divisive tendencies of national
interests. Although the Cyprus
settlermen!.: has begun to heal
the rift among Greece, Turkey,
and Britain and has helped to
alleviate concern over the risk
to NATO's southeastern flank,
other issues still generate
discord among alliance members.
The Dutch have long been
concerned over the supply of
military equipment to Indonesia
and on 11 March they warned the
North Atlantic Council (NAC)
that if Italy sells four de-
stroyers to Indonesia, they
might redeploy some naval ves-
sels earmarked for the NATO
area. Strong reaction in Ice-
land to continued incidents in
the fishing dispute with the
British could jeopardize the
continued use of important
northern bases there. The out-
standing example of these di-
visive tendencies is the recent
series of French moves culminat-
ing '.n the announcement that the
Mediterranean f leet
would not be placed under NATO
command in the event of war.
The French Problem
is De Gaulle move, taken
without prior consultation, pro-
vo! ed expressions of grave con-
cern in member countries. Al-
though the NAC has deferred full
debate until the military au-
thorities' views are received,
British, Dutch, Norwegian, Greek,
and Turkish representatives
have spoken of the adverse psy-
chological impact the move
would have.
Other comments indicate
fear that a precedent might be
set for future unilateral West
German action. The Belgian
representative said his govern-
the French action cou ea to
a real danger in future years
by encouraging nationalistic
Paris has also been the
chief obstructionist for the
last two months over the de-
fense program approve:! at the
December ministerial meeting.
De Gaulle, by his strong oppo-
sition, has held up approval of
the first steps toward integrat-
ing NATO's air-defense system.
He has thus far refused French
concurrence in the common
financing of missile sites
and of nuclear stockpiles and
has suspended bilateral nego-
tiations on the provision of
American missiles. He claims
that France, which is about
to become a nuclear power, does
not have an adequate voice in
deciding on use of .these
weapons.
De Gaulle questions NATO's
structure and its geographic
scope.
it should be reorganize with
the accent on cooperation
rather than integration. His
idea of a looser coalition with
military forces primarily un-
der national command and his
opposition to the integration
principle and to giving weight
to the views of smaller na-
tions are strikingly at
variance with NATO's basic
principles.
French spokesmen have made
clear that these views and ac-
tions stem from De Gaulle's
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are corrected, the military
security of the NATO area will
be in serious jeopardy and will
require a major review of over-
all planning. Implicit was the
possibility of having to abandon
the forward strategy concept.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
frustration over what he consid-
ers the lack of Allied support
for French policy in Algeria,
and-from irritation at lack of
response to his November 1958
memorandum to President Eisen-
hower and Prime Minister Mac-
millan requesting tripartite
policy coordination on a glo-
bal basis. De Gaulle probably
regards NATO as the most vul-
nerable area in which he can
exert pressure on Britain and
the United States to accede to
these demands.
More bolts from Paris can
be expected. One such may be
foreshadowed in Foreign Min-
ister Couve de Murville's state-
ment on 19 March that France
wishes to have all French
forces at its,own disposal in
case of war in order to carry
out national missions. Article
12 of the North Atlantic Treaty,
providing for review of the pact
after ten years if any member
so requests, offers another op-
portunity for French revision-
ist efforts.
The Military Situation
Many members still fail to
meet NATO military goals, The
MC-70 study, setting forth the
minimum military requirements
program considered essential
through 1963, was not adopted
as a commitment but only "ap-
proved for planning purposes"
last spring' when Britain;'France,
and other members would not
agree to be bound by the allotted
force goals. The result, ac-
cording to the 1958 Annual Re-
view of NATO's defense status,
was a return to the military
shortcomings MC-70 had been de-
signed to correct.
Events of the past three
months show no reversal of the
unfavorable trends which caused
NATO military authorities to
warn the ministers at last Decem-
ber's meeting that, unless these
The bulk of France's NATO-
committed forces is still in
Algeria. Britain is continuing
the progressive reduction of its
armed forces through 1962 and
plans to end conscription next
West German divisions com-
mitted to NATO thus far, all are
under strength and none has a
significant divisional combat
capability. Additional defense
measures, which the Dutch be-
lieve necessary in New Guinea,
may deplete their NATO equip-
ment unless American aid fills
the gap.
There are also pressures in
the Netherlands and Luxembourg
for lowering the military
service period. Belgium's re-
duction from 15 to 12 months
will take effect in September.
Denmark's parliament is likely
to approve a defense reorganiza-
tion plan involving reduction of
conscription time for the army
from 18 to 12 months and for
the navy from 18 to 14.
Related projects, such as
air-0efense integration and the
introduction of modern weapons,
are :Lagging. In accordance with
the defense resolution adopted
at last December's meeting,
Secretary General Spaak will re-
port to the ministers in April
on progress in implementing
measures necessary to strength-
en the defense effort,
The Ministerial Meeting
The discussion of Berlin
and the German problem, which
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will open and dominate the NATO
foreign ministers' 2-4 April
meeting in Washington, will be
undertaken in the context of
various schemes for lessening
East-West tension in Central
Europe. Exchanges of views in
recent council sessions, while
far from conclusive, have under-
lined members' concern with the
urgency of developing a Western
position that will win public
sipport.
Pressure might come from
NATO governments for more spe-
cific information on three-power
contingency plans to maintain
access to Berlin, particularly
prospective policy in the event
East Germans replace Soviet
personnel at checkpoints.
There is some anxiety that
the West may be pushed into a po-
sition of risking war over a le-
gal issue such as the competence
of East German personnel to
stamp documents. Public opinion
in the Scandinavian countries
and Britain, especially, would
not support this. While all
The present truce on Cyprus I
between the Communists and the
Greek Cypriot nationalists, led
by Archbishop Makarios III, is
not expected to last long once
the inevitable economic, polit-
ical, and social problems of
an independent Cyprus arise.
Present Communist strategy,
however, calls for supporting
Makarios as the only Greek Cyp-
riot, leader.
countries say they favor a firm
stand on Berlin, little consid-
eration has been given to spe-
cific methods or degrees of
firmness. Primary responsibility
is acknowledged to rest with the
former occupying powers, but the
other nations are alert to the
fact that a military showdown
would involve them all. At this
point, however, most members are
:counting on a negotiated peace-
ful settlement, or referral of
the matter to the United Nations
in case of an impasse.
25X1
Time will probably limit ex-
tensive consideration of other
to ics
could give
of the French 25X1
fleet affair as well as of the
whole question of force commit-
ments.
Despite this current collab-
oration with the nationalists,
the Communist leadership has fol-
lowed Radio Moscow's line in de-
nouncing the recent Cyprus accords
--thus putting itself in a posi-
tion to attract future support
from those who become disillu-
sioned with the implementation
of the settlement.
Communist Organization
The Communist Party of
Cyprus (KKK), established in
1922;, was outlawed in 1933 but
reappeared in 1941 as the Reform
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Party of the Working People
(AKEL). AKEL in turn was pro-
scribed in 1955. Archbishop
Makarios has indicated that he
will not oppose the legalization
of AKEL in the independent re-
public to be created.
The present size of the
Communist party on Cyprus is
not definitely known, but is
usually estimated at between
5,000 and 10,000 card-carrying
members. The party has made
great strides sine; its found-
ing, but its appeal has always
been almost exclusively to the
Greek Cypriot population. In
the municipal elections of 1953,
the last elections on the is-
land, Communist-backed candi-
dates secured 42 percent of the
popular vote of the Greek Cyp-
riot. community but attracted
few votes among the Turkish
Cypriot minority. The municipal
councils of three of the six
cities on the island now are
controlled by the Communists.
Ziartides, an extremely
able, Moscow-trained labor
leader, is the island's lead-
ing Communist. He is not
known to be an officer of the
party at this time but derives
his power from his position as
secretary general of the is-
land's largest trade union,
the 40,000-member Pan Cyprian
Federation of Labor (PEO). The
PEO has rapidly expanded during
the past five years and now
dwarfs in size and influence
the anti-Communist labor union
sponsored by the Greek Cypriot
nationalists. While the PEO
leadership has worked effectively
for improved labor conditions,
the leaders of the anti-Commu-
nist organization have devoted
their major efforts to the po-
litical struggle for enosis--
union of the island with Greece.
Ski-!ce 1949, the secretary
general of AKEL has been Ezekiel
Papaioannou.
he may have
been replaced in 1958 by the
central organizing secretary,
Andreas Fantis, Papaioannou re-
mains a leading AKEL spokesman.
Three front organizations--
the Reform Youth Organization,
Union of Cypriot Farmers, and
the Pan Cyprian Organization of
Democratic Women--were also de-
clared illegal in 1955 but pre-
sumably have retained their or-
ganizational structure and are
prepared to resume operations
with legalization.
At the same time, the five
Communist newspapers of Cyprus
were closed down. In February
1956, however, Haravghi (Dawn)
began publication as the voice
of the outlawed Communist party.
By 1958, under the able
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
management of 11 tgios Jacovides,
a doctrinaire Communist,
Haravghi had increased its
circulation to over 12,000
copies daily. No other news-
paper on Cyprus has a larger
circulation.
The Greek Nationalists
The Greek Cypriot national-
ists and Turkish Cypriots are
in uncoordinated opposition to
the Communists. The enosis-
minded Greek Cypriot national-
ists, led by the Greek Orthodox
Church, are made up of conserv-
ative elements with much of
their strength among the peas-
antry. They are loosely organ-
ized, and independence may pro-
vide the impetus for a splinter-
ing of this political grouping
into several parties. At the
very least, efforts are ex-
pected to be made to create
some form of political center
as an alternative to the Com-
munists and the reactionary,
church-dominated nationalists.
Such unity as exists among
the Greek nationalists is
largely the result of wide-
spread devotion to Archbishop
Makarios. The leaders of the
Greek Orthodox Church have
dominated Cyprus politics for
centuries, and Makarios, who
signed the recent Cyprus ac-
cords on behalf of all Greek
Cypriots, has brought this
supremacy to unprecedented
heights. His power was won in
part by acquiring the aura of
martyrdom through hl.s three-
year exile from Cyprus and
through the forfeiting of lead-
ership by the lay leaders of
the nationalist movement. The
enormously popular Greek Cypriot
underground leader Grivas, in
his farewell message to the peo-
ple of Cyprus, issued a strong
call to support Makarios.
Makarios staked his repu-
tation on the Cyprus accords
and is personally determined to
make them work. However, de-
spite his talent at political
compromise, he has little time
to produce satisfactory answers
to the various economic and po-
litical problems of Cyprus, and
there is some question whether
his approach to these problems
will be progressive enough to
meet popular demand. Moreover,
he has inherited a legacy of
ill will between the Turkish and
Greek Cypriots which will take
years to erase. Finally, the
nationalists, who have concen-
trated their energies on the
national struggle for enosis,
do not have the reputation for
good local government which the
Communists have developed through
their scrupulous attention to
local affairs.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
The Turkish Cypriots
The Turkish Cypriots, a
Moslem minority comprising 18
percent of the population, may
hold the balance of power in
future governments if the Greek
Communists and conservatives
become roughly, balanced in
strength. The Cyprus agree-
ments allow the Turks to hold
30 percent of the seats in the
legislature--enough for them to
control the operation of gov-
ernment. They are implacably
anti-Communist.
The Turkish Cypriot leader,
the astute Fazil Kuchuk, has in-
dicated that he is prepared to
work with Makarios for the cre-
ation of a Cypriot republic;
Makarios is expected to be
president and Kuchuk vice pres-
ident. Kuchuk, however, has
also given notice that he will
jealously guard the rights
granted the Turks in the Cyprus
agreements. There remains,
therefore, a possibility of
continued tension between the
Greek and Turkish communities
which the Communists can be
expected to exploit. The in-
evitable problem of minority
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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE
The Gomulka government,
with the passage on 20 Decem-
ber 1958 of a law on Worker
Self-Government Conferences,
dealt the Polish Workers'
Councils a final blow as a po-
tentially effective instrument
for worker participation in
industrial management. The
first Polish Workers' Councils
were based on the Yugoslav
model which Tito established
in 1949 and 1950 to gain
greater support for his regime
and were formed in the summer
of 1956 by the "labor intelli-
gentsia" as part of a campaign
against Stalinist methods of
factory management.
The basic aim of those who
led the struggle in Poland was
a more rational economic sys-
tem that would permit better
management at the individual
factory level. As the council
movement spread, it became
an integral part of the "lib-
eralization" process that
brought Gomulka to power in
October 1956.
Comparison With Yugoslav Model
In Yugoslavia the councils
were established by the party
to further its own aims, while
in Poland they were the result
of a_ spontaneous movement
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rights may even give the Com-
munists a chance to gain ad-
herents in the Turkish commu-
nity,
One controversial aspect
of the Cyprus settlement is
the ;power of veto given the
Turkish vice president and the
Turkish members of the legisla-
ture. While this power may
be a serious impediment to the
functioning of the new govern-
ment,, it may at the same time
provide a means for negating
much of the effect a rapid rise
in Communist strength would have
on the government.
The Cyprus accords also
provide for Britain, Greece,
and Turkey to resist any attack,
"direct or indirect," against
the independence of Cyprus and
for Joint or individual action
by the three powers to re-estab-
lish the "state of affairs" es-
tablished by the London accords.
These! provisions thus provide
the basis for future action by
one or more of the three states
to prevent Cyprus from fallin
to the Communists.
POLISH WORKERS' COUNCILS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY $iJMMARY
backed initially by the work-
ers themselves. The Yugoslav
councils are, in theory at least,
the basic management authority;
in Poland, they were permitted
only to "co-manage" the enter-
prises.
In general, the Yugoslav
councils have wider powers than
the Polish version ever had.
Workers' Councils in Poland
were limited to individual en-
terprises; in Yugoslavia they
extend upward to a coordinating
agency at the national level.
The Polish enterprise director
retained much more authority
than his Yugoslav counterpart.
The leaders of the Polish
Workers' Council movement be-
lieved that many of the tradi-
tional functions of the entre-
preneur could be transferred
to the councils within the frame-
work of the socialist system.
Their idea was that since the
workers of an enterprise had
the necessary material interest
in its operation, they could
be relied on to assume the re-
sponsibility for its co-manage-
ment. Such a system seemed to
conform to the socialist con-
cept of direct worker participa-
tion in the management of pro-
ductive activity and was ex-
pected to improve the efficiency
of both management and workers,
as well as to enhance labor
discipline and eliminate waste.
Establishment of Councils
The first Polish Workers'
Councils were inspired and con-
trolled by technical and admin-
istrative personnel rather than
by workers with a long history
of trade unionism. As a polit-
ical necessity, the Gomulka
regime accepted the principle
of Workers' Councils, but found
itself committed to a concept
without any clear notion of its
potential political and economic
consequences. Gomulka himself
is said to have felt from the
beginning that the councils
were anarchist and syndicalist
in nature and should be rendered
ineffective as quickly as pos-
sible.
The law establishing the
councils in November 1956 was
frankly experimental. There
was no provision for coordinat-
ing the activities of a number
of councils, nor did the coun-
cils have sufficient authority
to take actions that migh have
alleviated some of the short-
comings inherited from the pre-
ceding decade of mismanagement.
Under different conditions,
the councils might have devel-
oped into an effective movement
capable of improving Poland's
industrial situation and elim-
inating some of the worker
dissatisfaction. Their history,
however, shows that Polish labor-
ers are not sufficiently inter-
ested to participate actively
in management and to cooperate
voluntarily with measures aimed
at increasing productivity un-
less there are adequate eco-
nomic incentives.
Worker Disillusionment
When the councils did not
prove to be a panacea for all
the gills besetting the Polish
economy, there was widespread
disi]Llusionment. They were
hampered from the beginning by
lack of agreement on their proper
status and functions and by the
conflicting interests of the
councils, workers, managers,
and the party.
The fact that the leaders
of the councils were, in the
main, the technical and admin-
istrative intelligentsia rather
than the workers proved to be a
major cause of difficulty. The
intellectuals were able to see
the blunders and absurdities of
the doctrinaire party function-
aries and welcomed the oppor-
tunity to exercise leadership.
Many rank-and-file workers, how-
ever, soon charged that the
"technological elite" had more
in common with management than
with workers.
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Party Objections
Production problems fre-
quently arose as a result of
administrative confusion and
rivalries among the councils,
trade unions, the party, and
factory management. These
were combined with the general-
ly narrow interests of many
councils themselves and their
inability to cope with the com-
plexities of industrial man-
agement. The party from the
beginning had been critical
of the idea that the councils
should have substantial powers
over the administration of
industry. Party leaders felt
they could not tolerate any
organization which might com-
pete for power with the party.
At the party central com-
mittee's plenum in May 1957,
Gomulka took great pains to
criticize the "false concepts"
that had appeared in public
discussions of the councils'
role. He maintained that man-
agement of the enterprises by
the councils would mean the
destruction of the planned
economy. The organization of
the councils on an industrial
and nationwide basis, he argued,
would do nothing to improve
efficiency but would merely
foster the concept of an anar-
chist utopia and the prolifera-
tion of duplicating administra-
tive bodies. He implied that
the councils had no functions
that could not be 'performed
as well by other existing organs.
Gomulka's concept was that
the councils should be limited
to reducing production costs,
assisting in fuller exploitation
of plant capacity, planning for
the constructive use of sur-
plus manpower, advising on ap-
pointments to supervisory posi-
tions, combating theft, bribery,
and other dishonest practices,
and dealing with matters of
labor discipline and distribu-
tion of surplus funds.
Gomulka proposed at the
Fourth Trade Union Congress in
April 1958 establishment of
Workers' Self-Government Con-
ferences(WSGC), The councils
would become organs of the
WSGC, lose their autonomous
status, and in fact become sub-
ordinate to the party and trade
unions.
The regime inaugurated an
intensive drive to establish
WSGC in individual enterprises
on a "voluntary" basis, and by
mid-February 1959 more than
8,000 had been formed.
New Law
Under the complicated
statute passed by the Sejm on
20 December 1958, the WSGC is
to be an instrument for the
control of labor by the party
and its subsidiary organization,
the trade-unions; the range of
worker self-government activities
is to be carefully circumscribed;
and the "binding principle of
one-person management" is strong-
ly affirmed, thus ruling out any
effective worker participation
in industrial management. While
leaving the councils legally in
existence, the law in fact for-
malizes their demise and pro-
vides a procedure for their
abolition.
The new law merges the
Workers' Councils into a quadri-
partite body--council leaders,
party functionaries, union of-
ficiaals, and management repre-
sentatives. Furthermore, the
law does not even make Workers'
Councils mandatory, merely stat-
ing that they "may" exist or be
formed.
While it is still theoreti-
cally possible for the Workers'
Councils to have an effective
voice in the WSGC, voting pro-
cedures have been stacked a-
gainst them. They will be in
a minority from the beginning,
as the trade unions are merely
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26 March 1959
party organizations in another
guise and the enterprise di-
rector is dependent on the
party for his position.
Should a Workers' Council
attempt to maintain its in-
fluence in the direction of a
factory, the party and trade
union representation in the
WSGC could easily be enlarged
or the factory director could
always use his veto power.
Furthermore, the law makes it
easy for party and trade union
members to infiltrate the
Workers' Councils and to gain
control if necessary. A system
of checks and balances will also
serve to keep the councils in
a subordinate position. The
presidium of the council must
include union, party, and man-
agement representatives, who
will thus be in a position to
control the presidium's deci-
sions. Moreover, council elec-
tions will be controlled and
supervised by the trade unions.
Prospects
The reorganization of the
system offers the party every
opportunity to increase its
activity and influence among
industrial labor. While the
roles of the unions and manage-
ment have been enhanced, the
party will gain most.
Prospects for true worker
participation in policy and
administrative decisions in-
volving the direction of the
PEIPING'S DOCTRINAL CLAIMS AND SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS
Faced with strong Soviet
opposition, Peiping's retreat
from the early ideological
claims made for the Chinese
communes culminated last month
in Chinese pronouncements that
the USSR still sets the pace
and the pattern throughout the
orbit for progress toward the
ultimate state envisioned by
Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The
junior partner, probably bitter
over the forced retreat, re-
tains its communes, not as an
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economy are virtually nonexistent
There are already indications
that the WSGC is to be used
largely as a propaganda forum
for exhorting workers to great-
er productive efforts, since
existing conferences are push-
ing worker competitions and
pledges to exceed planned goals
and quotas. The same worker
indifference to party propaganda
which characterized the general
attitude toward the Workers'
Councils and hastened their de-
terioration, however, is likely
to impede efforts to use the
WSGC to raise productivity.
The WSGC does offer the
prospect of improving adminis-
trative coordination among groups
responsible for the organization
of production, but they are
likely to be overburdened with
petty details, and the interests
of individual factories rather
than those of the entire econ-
omy are likely to be emphasized.
Management will gain greater
authority, responsibility, and
reward under the new system.
Workers' Councils probably
will continue to exist only
where they have active worker
support and are economically
effective. Since they are even
less likely to meet these cri-
teria, under the WSGC than be-
fore, it is likely that most
councils will gradually die
away, probably with little
objection from the workers.
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26 March 1959
internationally applicable
breakthrough toward Communism
itself, but as a peculiarly Chi-
nese innovation required by lo-
cal conditions for the "building
of socialism" and the eventual
transition to Communism.
The episode is typical of
several occasions since 1953
on which Peiping has independ-
ently claimed the discovery of
new ideological truths, only to
be forced subsequently to aban-
don or scale down its claims.
Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues
will probably continue to seek
enhanced prestige as "creative"
Marxists, but the communes con-
troversy indicates that they
consider the Sino-Soviet alli-
ance too valuable to be jeop-
ardized by doctrinal disagree-
ment.
When the Chinese Communists
first instituted the communes
program last July, it was with
the claim that "Communism is
not far distant in China." Bas-
ing their claims on quotations
from Marx, Engels, some of Le-
nin's early writings, and even
works of Utopian Socialists,
they said the "Chinese people,"
in seeking to "grope out a con-
crete road" to Communism, had
discovered under the guidance
of Mao and the Chinese party
that the commune, a qualitative
improvement over collectiviza-
tion, was the best means of
transition. Soviet theorists
since Lenin were not even men-
tioned in passing.
The ideological claim may
have been motivated by the need
for a psychological incentive
during intense reorganization,
a conviction that Soviet stand-
ards could not realistically
be applied to China, and Mao's
own desire to refurbish his
prestige as an independent in-
terpreter of Marx after the
about-face on his "hundred f low-
ers" thesis. Practical economic
necessity appears to have dic-
tated the commune program and
its retention today shorn of ma-
jor doctrinal pretensions. Liu
Shao?-chi, Mao's chief lieutenant,
has stressed that essential
rapid industrialization depended
on a revolution in agriculture,
a revolution which could be
achieved only through regimenta-
tion and complete control of the
labor force.
The Chinese were aware that
the 'USSR had experimented brief-
ly with communes, but they ap-
parently believed that Peiping
could exploit peasants more in-
tensely than Moscow because Chi-
nese peasants had less to lose,
their resistance had been more
completely broken, and they had
gone through decades of war and
social anarchy.
The commune program not
only contradicted earlier Soviet
experience, however, but in its
role as a shortcut , to Commu-
nism flew in the face of the So-
viet dictum that considerable
material abundance and highly
developed technology are pre-
requisites for the entry into
this final stage of Marxism.
Possibly rationalizing away the
impossibility of meeting these
requirements in China in the
immediate future, the Peiping
theorists seemed to imply that
these considerations had some-
thing in common with bourgeois
materialism, and harked back to
the original Marxism "To each
according to his needs."
Recent Soviet doctrine,
recognizing the need for in-
centive, holds that each
should receive "according to
his effort." But the Chinese,
unable to deliver even the
beginnings of material abun-
dant,e during the drive to.
industrialize, sought to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIGIARY
26 March 1959
substitute for material incen-
tives the vision of reaching the
ultimate goal, no matter how
grim the short cut, within the
not-too-distant future.
Mao and his colleagues
may have felt they were shielded
in this independent ideological
pathfinding by the 12-party Mos-
cow declaration of November
1957, which Mao helped draft.
This provided, as an alterna-
tive to "separate roads to so-
cialism," that the individual
parties would use "creativity"
in applying the general build-
ing codes of socialism, "in ac-
cordance with the concrete con-
ditions of their countries."
But developments made it clear
that the Kremlin was angered by
the Chinese claims of
progress toward Com-
munism, and that the
Soviet leaders were
less than gr'clous in
showing their pique
and indicati,~" that
the claims we:.?~s pre-
sumptuous.
The independence
and boldness of the
Chinese claims suggest
that Peiping did not
expect a severe re-
buff from Moscow, but
rather concurrence
that the Chinese par-
ty is competent to
discuss the building
of socialism and Com-
ments for completing the build-
ing of socialism in a few years;
furthermore, he may well have
implied that China might find
it increasingly di:ft:z.cult to
get them. In a speech on 6 No-
vember in Peiping, Yudin had
nothing to say about the communes
and much to say about high-level
industrialization and the dawn
of Communism in the Soviet Un-
ion.
The degree of Sovii.t. i:i-
ritation with the Chinese is
indicated by Khro,hchev's will-
ingness to disparage them before
Westerners. He told Senator
Humphrey that the communes were
in fact simply a method of using
massive amounts of labor in agri-
culture. He also said that the
Soviet Union had found the prin-
munism. The continuation of
Chinese claims through September
and October further suggests
that Moscow at first attempted
to use silence to indicate its
growing displeasure, hoping that
the Chinese leaders would take
the initiative in moderating
their statements. When this
approach failed to dampen Chi-
nese enthusiasm, the Sov1e1
leaders apparently decided to
object more directly.
Soviet Ambassador Yudin
probably informed the Chinese
leaders frankly that China did
not have the material require-
ciple Of "to each according to
his need" impractical--that in-
centives were necessary.
Faced with blunt Soviet
disapproval, Peiping's claims
on the imminence of pure Communism
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
were sealed down. The retreat
on the issue of incentives, how-
ever, was also dictated by prac-
tical domestic considerations;
the 10 December resolution of
the Chinese Communist party
central committee plenum called
for stress on incentives to spur
"production" and indicated that
the principle of distribution
of money and supplies "accord-
ing to work" would be the re-
gime's policy "for a long time
to come."
The ideological retreat
was embarrassing to the Chinese
party and required a rationali-
zation. Chinese writers provid-
ed this by stating that the rev-
olution could neither "stand
still" nor dash forward without
adequate material foundations.
In effect, however, Mao's the-
sis of "uninterrupted revolu-
tion" was modified by acknowl-
edging the need for "revolution-
ary stages." In January the
party's theoretical journal,
Red Flag, reasserted the point
iii a ao 20 years ago that
"the political and social revo-
lutions cannot be accomplished
at one stroke."
The extent of Peiping's
public retreat is emphasized
by two major commentaries on
Khrushchev's report on the So-
viet 21st party congress.
People's Daily on 5 February
and a aag on 16 February ac-
cepte-rus chev's "clarifica-
tions" and made no attempt to
blur the doctrinal points at
issue between Peiping and Mos-
cow.
The major points acknowl-
edged by the editorials were
that: (1) common "laws" pre-
clude a separate path to social-
ism; (2) Communism requires an
abundance of goods and must be
erected on a highly industrial-
ized base which will require
decades to build; (3) remunera-
tion "according to work" is
still the basic principle of
distribution under socialism
and will continue to be "for a
long time to come," and (4) China
will not move toward the USSR's
advanced position at a rate
faster than that of the satel-
lites.
Chou En-lai, attempting to
mollify the Soviet leaders, told
the Soviet party congress that
the communes were Chinese for-
mations evolved from and for
Chinese conditions and, by im-
plication, that Peiping did
not intend to export the idea.
The Chinese persist, however,
in the obvious contention that
the commune is more than a form
of collectivized agriculture--
it is a unit of society differ-
ing significantly from the So-
viet model.
The Soviet leaders contin-
ued to be sensitive to this con-
notation of "commune"; for ex-
ample, Khrushchev and Yudin
failed to mention it in their
speeches at the congress. Yudin,
who advised that those who want
to know "what Communism is" must
study documents of the congress,
referred only to China's "so-
cialist transformation of rural
communities."
There is no reliable evi-
dence that the Soviet Union made
any concessions to obtain the
Chinese recantation. Long-term
aid and technical assistance
may have been used either as a
weapon or a bribe, but the Sino-
Soviet economic agreement signed
on February does not seem to
extend Peiping special considera-
tion". In the ideological area,
Khrushchev's thesis that the so-
cialist countries would "more
or less simultaneously pass to
Communism" removes the earlier
hints that the European Commu-
nist countries would achieve
this goal first. While this
may represent a concession to
Chinese pride, it also pulls
Peiping back to travel with and
not ahead of the satellites.
Khrushchev's remarks at
the congress that "countries
economically backward in the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
past are able to make up rapid-
ly for lost time by drawing on
the experience, cooperation, and
mutual assistance of other So-
cialist countries" appears to
be a reminder that Peiping's
aspiration to status of a major
industrial power depends on So-
viet aid. In this, Khrushchev
is relegating China almost to
the level of the satellites,
who continue to stress the role
of Soviet aid in their advance
toward socialism.
Mao's prestige as a theo-
rist in the bloc particularly
in Eastern Europe--if zot dam-
aged, has not bee. erg .:anced, and
the forced ide(,~ogicai retreat
almost certainly left the Chi-
nese with some feeling of bit-
Peiping's recantation of
certain ideological points in-
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dicates that the Chinese are
unwilling to risk serious dam-
age to a profitable alliance
over doctrinal pretensions.
In yielding to Soviet pres-
sure, the Chinese are fol-
lowing a pattern which marked
earlier ventures in the doc-
trinal field.
The Chinese Communists con-
tinue to consolidate the com-
munes, considering them the
"best; form for China to make the
transition from socialism to
Communism," Regardless of the
ideological retreat, the com-
munes involve major modifica-
tions of Peiping's economic
pattern, which originally was
based on the Soviet example.
In the event that Mao issues
a thesis on the subject, he
will probably apply it to "Chi-
na's concrete conditions" in
order to avoid a direct chal-
lenge to Moscow's ideological
leadership in the bloc. More-
over, any independent doctrinal
claims he advances will probably
be on a modest scale and with
more ambiguity than those the
Chinese made in 1958.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
ANNEX
SINO-SOVIET BLOC ACTIVITY IN TUNISIA, MOROCCO, AND ALGERIA
1. General Bloc Policy:
The over-all aims of ino- oviet
bloc policy in North Africa
continue to be disruption of
Western interests, establish-
ment and expansion of lasting
political and economic rela-
tionships, and encouragement
of an anti-Western neutralist
posture in the area. In the
last six months, the bloc has
enlarged the modest scope of its
trade relations. Soviet First
Deputy Premier Mikoyan declared
in January that the USSR, with-
out attaching political strings,
would be "always disposed to
study" any Tunisian requests
for economic development loans.
Moscow scored an initial break-
through in the political field
by exchanging ambassadors with
Morocco, and Morocco has also
given agrement for a Chinese
Communist ambassador, who ap-
parently will be a Chinese Mos-
lem. Soviet propaganda through-
out the period called for im-
mediate American withdrawal from
air bases in Morocco.
2. The bloc has furnished
political and propaganda support
for the Algerian provisional
government established in Cairo
in September, but Moscow and the
European satellites, eager to
preserve good relations with
France, so far have stopped
short of recognition. China and
the Asian satellites, on the
other hand, have recognized the
provisional government. The
bloc is interested in stimulat-
ing anti-Westernism and nation-
alist regionalism throughout
North Africa, and bloc govern-
mental activities in this regard
often parallel those of the UAR.
3. Diplomatic Activity:
The Soviet Embassy in Rabat,
opened in October and now staffed
with 33 nationals, is the only
bloc diplomatic post in the
area. In February Morocco named
an ambassador to Moscow. The
USSR and Czechoslovakia main-
tain trade missions in Tunis,
and the USSR, Czechoslovakia,
and :Poland have trade missions
in Casablanca. Soviet officials
in Rabat have moved quickly to
make initial contacts both with
Moroccan society and with the
Mauritanian and Algerian nation-
alist movements. The Polish
trade mission in Casablanca,
and to a lesser extent the Soviet
and Czech missions there, are
actively expanding social and
propaganda activities and ef-
forts to promote trade. Tunisia
is committed in principle to an
eventual diplomatic exchange
with both the USSR and Communist
China.
4. Economic Activity: In
recent months the bloc has in-
tensified its efforts to increase
commerce with North Africa, but
trade with the bloc continues
to be only a small fraction of
the total foreign trade of Tu-
nisia and Morocco. Bloc commerce
constitutes about 4 percent of
Morocco's total trade, somewhat
over 2 percent of Tunisia's to-
tal trade, and one percent of
Algeria's trade carried on with-
in the French economic frame-
work..
5. If recently concluded
agreements between Morocco and
bloc countries are fully imple-
mented, a substantial increase
in the present small amount of
trade will occur in 1959. Agree-
ments with Communist China and
Czechoslovakia call for an in-
crease of roughly 100 percent
in trade turnover. In Tunisia,
recent trade accords, especially
those with the USSR and Commu-
nist China, foreshadow a con-
siderable increase in 1959. The
agreement with China calls for
$2,000,000 in trade each way
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 March 1959
compared with total exchanges
in 1957 of only $600,000. Both
the Casablanca and Tunis trade
fairs continue to be focal
points for bloc promotional
activities. The USSR will ex-
hibit for the first time at the
Casablanca trade fair in April.
6. Morocco has experienced
great difficulty in its trade
with Peiping because of China's
unwillingness or inability to
absorb Morocco's traditional
agricultural exports. In 1958
China's large exports of green
tea to Morocco were balanced
by Chinese imports from France.
A Chinese trade delegation re-
cently spent three months in
Rabat and worked out a series
of triangular trade transac-
tions as well as Chinese pur-
chases of phosphates in an ef-
fort to correct this imbalance.
9. Cultural and Propaganda
Activity: Peiping installed a
New China News Agency represent-
ative and opened information
offices in Rabat in November,
immediately following the Mo-
roccan-Chinese agreement in
principle to establish diplo-
matic relations. The USSR is
reported to have tentative
plans to open a cultural center
in Rabat and it will reportedly
include a secondary school
staffed with Arabic-speaking
Soviet teachers. In Tunisia,
the USSR and Czechoslovakia
are the most active bloc coun-
tries in local propaganda di-
recited at the press and theaters.
The USSR has recently attempted
direct mailing operations; it
has provided a free and un-
solicited supply of Arabic-
language literature to Tunisia's
largest Arabic book wholesaler.
However, there appears to be
no widespread public distribu-
tion of bloc publications.
10. Subversive Activity:
om-
The Tunisian and Moroccan
munist parties have apparently
been unable to penetrate the
nationalist movements and domi-
nate political parties which
they support publicly. Domi-
nant nationalists still regard
the Communist parties as for-
eign organizations, since party
leadership has been in the past
predominantly European. Commu-
nist parties in all three areas
have, however, substantially
"Arabized" themselves in the
last several years. In Tunisia,
there are about 300 hard-core
Communists; in Morocco, where
the party is formally illegal
but tolerated, less than a thou-
sand; and in Algeria, where it
is also illegal, between 5,000
and 10,000. Several higher
level Moroccan government offi-
cials, including the director
of mines, are Communists. In
addition a considerable portion
of the French teachers supplied
to both Tunisia and Morocco
are Communists or Communist
sympathizers, and this is a
potentially serious source of
Communist influence.
11. It is probable that,
with the establishment of the
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26 March 1959
Soviet Embassy in Rabat, North
African Communists may receive
some degree of direct guidance.
The three parties are apparent-
ly in consultation with each
other on regional questions,
and they have maintained covert
contacts with a number of Euro-
pean Communist parties, espe-
cially those in Italy, France,
and Belgium. Direct contact
with Moscow through visits of
party leaders is the mechanism
for basic guidance.
12. Reaction to Bloc Ac-
tivities: The governments of
'Morocco and Tunisia have cau-
tiously accepted a wider meas-
ure of bloc relations, but they
have been slow to do so and they
have rejected many bloc initia-
tives. Both are sensitive to
the dangers posed by a growth
in bloc influence. Their se-
curity services tend to dis-
count the potential of local
Communists, and the services'
concern over UAR, French and,
especially in Tunisia, Algerian
activities tends to push the
Communist question into the
background. Given their pre-
occupation with organizational
and political questions and
their present capabilities, the
security services probably could
not cope effectively with sub-
stantial Communist subversive
operations.
13. President Bourguiba
has used the threat of limited
arms procurement from the bloc
to induce Western aid. Al-
though the Tunisian Government
indicated in July that it would
exchange ambassadors with both
Moscow and Peiping, the govern-
ment has ignored Soviet over-
tures and it has apparently
dropped the question for the
time being.
14. Both Morocco and, to
a lesser extent, Tunisia ad-
vocate a foreign policy of "non-
dependence" which the bloc, for
reasons of its own, has so far
heartily endorsed. Both gov-
ernments, particularly Tunisia,
tend to be Western oriented
and to be proud of their veneer
of French culture. Political
factions in both countries ad-
vocating disengagement from the
West were apparently strength-
ened in 1958 by rising North
African dissatisfaction over the
continuing war with Algeria,
Western failure to meet Tunisian
arms demands, and the continued
presence of American, French,
and Spanish bases in Morocco.
15. The Algerian rebels'
contacts with the bloc, primarily
made through Cairo, but also
through Rabat and Bengasi, have
increased during the past year.
The Algerians have attended in-
ternational Communist-front
meetings and a delegation visited
both Moscow and Peiping. Both
Morocco and Tunisia continue to
seek to influence the provision-
al government along moderate
lines, but their concern over
foreign influences on the move-
ment is directed at the UAR rath-
er than the bloc.
16. The Outlook: The bloc
will probably-continue to make
slow progress in broadening its
political and economic relation-
ships with North Africa and, if
circumstances permit, it will
move on into the field of eco-
nomic aid. Trade turnover be-
tween Morocco and Tunisia and
the bloc will probably increase
but will remain within the range
of the present small percentages.
Future bloc efforts will con-
tinue to be affected to a large
degree by the course of the Al-
gerian war and by the periodic
crises that recur in France's
relations with Tunisia and Mo-
rocco. The Tunisian and Mo-
roccan governments would prob-
ably be inclined to accept bloc
economic assistance to supple-
ment American, other Western,
and UN aid.
17, North African Commu-
nist parties have improved some-
whaLt their effectiveness as
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they have "Arabized" themselves
and have continued to identify
themselves with the cause of
national independence. Any
significant extension of their
inf ?,uence in domestic policy
depends on the extent to which
the position of the leading con-
servative political figures is
further eroded by internal crises
or by the lack of visible gains
resulting from cooperation with
the West.
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