CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2005
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• Publication Date: October 18, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
Fp
COPY NO. 54
OCR NO1115/59
12 March 1959
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18. iUSC. SECTIONS 793 AND 794. TILE TRANSMIS-
SION OR. REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CON AL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EAST-WEST NEGOTIATIONS
Premier., Khrus 'i,;hev has
used his trip to East Germany,
ostensibly to visit the Leip-
zig Fair, to further impress
on Western public opinion his
apparent willingness to make
"concessions" and thereby to
increase pressure in the West
for a summit meeting. In a'
speech in Leipzig on 5 March
he offered to defer the trans-
fer of Soviet control functions
to the East Germans for a month
or two beyond the 27 May dead-
line if the West is prepared
to "negotiate reasonably."
This was intended to demonstrate
Moscow's professed desire for
a negotiated settlement of the
Berlin and German questions and
to undercut Western objections
to negotiate under threat of
an ultimatum.
As a further "concession,"
Khrushchev on 9 March suggested
that a "minimum number" of
forces of the Big Four or of
neutral states could be sta-
tioned in West Berli'm to guar-
antee its status as a "free
city" after Soviet control
functions. a a turned over to
the East Germans. Although
Moscow initially proposed that
the "free city" be< demilita-
rized, this modification does
not essentially alter the orig-
inal Soviet proposal turned
down by the West. Khrushchev
probably believes that Western
rejection of hi's two "conces-
sions" could be used as addi-
tional justification for trans-
ferring control functions and
signing a separate peace treaty
with East Germany.
While Khrushchev's state-
ment is the first public sugges-
tion that Western forces could
remain in West Berlin, Soviet
spokesmen have taken this line
in ;private conversations. The
counselor of the Soviet Embassy
in Paris on 27 January told an
American official that the West-
ern powers could keep their
troops in Berlin if they wished
and that an international con-
trol commission could be created
to protect the rights of the
West Berliners.
Khrushchev may plan to of-
fer before 27 May further "con-
cessions" designed to make the
USSR's proposals seem more attrac-
tive and keep the West off bal-
ance. Despite Khrushchev's ref-
erence in his 9 March speech to
the "absurdity" of proposals to
include East Berlin'in the free
city, Moscow may still have such
a move under consideration. Com-
munist sources in Europe were
circulating this idea in Decem-
ber and January.
Soviet spokesmen continue
to call for a meeting at the
sumtn;it as the only level at
which important decisions can
be made. The counselor of the
Soviet Embassy in Paris recent-
ly told an American official
that a foreign ministers' con-
ference must be followed by a
summit meeting and that these
negotiations will lead to an
East-West compromise. The only
"real solution" the Soviet dip-
lomat saw, however, was for
President Eisenhower, who en-
joYs enormous prestige in the,
USSR, to invite Khrushchev to
the United States. A member
of the Soviet delegation to the
United Nations in a talk with
a member of the US delegation
on 5 March expressed interest
in the possibility of a summit
meeting within the framework
of the General Assembly. He
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suggested that perhaps the USSR's
Berlin and German treaty pro-
posals were designed to compel
the West to negotiate and were
not the final position Moscow
would take during negotiations.
While adopting the appear-
ance of flexibility, Soviet lead-
ers reaffirmed their intention
to sign a separate peace treaty
and transfer Berlin access con-
trols to the East Germans if
the West rejects the USSR's pro-
posals. In his talk with West
German Social Democratic Chair-
man Ollenhauer on 9 March, Khru-
shchev stated that if there is
no progress in a foreign minis-
ters' or summit conference, the
USSR will conclude a separate
treaty and then turn over con-
trols to the East Germans.
that the USSR prefers to keep
"what we have now" bec'.use the
future actions of a reunified
Germany would be uncertain. H,^
also claimed to have precise
information that the United
States, France, Britain, and
"most West Germans" do not want
reunification.
Khrushchev's threats to
counter with force any Western
attempt to maintain access to
West Berlin once controls are
turned over to the East Germans
are meant to induce the West to
compromise rather than face such
an eventuality. In his 9 March
speech he asserted that the USSR
would not be "intimidated" by
"saber rattling" and added, "We
are ready to give due rebuff
to any attempt to use force
against us or our friends."
While the communiqud issued
on 11 March at the end of Khru-
shchev's visit to East Germany
made no specific mention of a
separate treaty, it repeatedly
stressed the determination of
the USSR and East Germany to
"strive for the conclusion of a
peace treaty at the earliest pos-
sible moment." After reaffirm-
ing standard bloc positions on
a German confederation, peace
treaty, and guarantees of the
"free city" status of West Ber-
lin, the communique announced
that the East Germans had ac-
cepted Khrushchev's-invitation
to send a government and party
delegation to Moscow in May.
This announcement, which carried
the implication that a separate
treaty would be signed during the
visit, probably was intended to
exert further pressure on the
West to accept Soviet terms for
early high-level negotiations.
The USSR's basic hostility
to German reunification was again
made clear in recent private
statements by Soviet leaders to
Western officials. Khrushchev
told Ollenhauer in blunt terms
Khrushchev attempted to use
his talks with Ollenhauer to ad-
vance Soviet efforts to split
West German opinion and induce
the Social Democrats to take a
stronger public stand against
Adenauer on the questions of
European security and reunifica-
tion. The Soviet premier stated
that the "USSR places the secu-
rity question in the foreground
of any discussion of the over-
all German problem and wants a
withdrawal of foreign troops"
from both German states. He
claimed Prime Minister Macmillan
had 'old him this ought to be
possible.
Khrushchev endorsed the So-
cial Democratic party's thesis
that reunification should pro-
ceed on a step-by-step basis,
beginning with a military re-
laxation in Europe. He declared
reunification negotiations would
be possible "only after an ab-
solutely clear settlement between
the USSR and the United States
of the military status of a re-
unified Germany." He said he
was convinced this problem could
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CURRENT INrrJLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 19159
be discussed with Secretary
Dulles and Prime Ministet'Mac-
millan but he was uncertain
about President de Gkulle's at-
titude. "The worst and most
difficult case," he said, "is
Adenauer. "'
New Soviet approaches to
the West German Social Democrats
and propaganda attempts to ex-
ploit the Macmillan-Khrushchev
reference to a European zone of
is limitation reflect the So-
viet leaders' confidence that
they can capitalize on West
European interest in various
disengagement schemes in any
future negotiations. Soviet
propaganda has declared that
the Macmillan-Khrushchev meeting
is the first time a Rapacki-type
plan has been "considered at top
level between East and West."'
East Germans Ready
To Assume Cont-r s
Preparations for the East
Germans to assume control of
access to West Berlin have
reached a state of readiness
so that the transfer could be
effected at any time.
In the Potsdam district
bordering West Berlin, members
of the East German workers' mil-
itia (Kampfgruppen) were slated
to undergo a week's s ec i al
heavy-wea ons trainin
s raining was to
take priority over all factory
production work in order to com-
plete the establishment and
training of s ,'cbial heavy-.weap-
ons battalions of the Kampfgrup-
pen in this district by 21 March.
Officials of the police and
Kampfgruppen were informed that
'tprovocations" from West Berlin
and West Germany could be ex-
pected during the last teh days
of April, to reach a Climax on
26 and 27 April. They were also
told the army and border police
had already been ordered to sub-
mit, their final action plan by
21 March.
Western Views
Prime Minister Macmillan,
in talks in Western capitals
since his meeting with Khru-
shchev, is exercising increas-
ing personal authority over
British foreign policy and seek-
ing to take the lead in forming
the West's position in negotia-
tions with the USSR.
Macmillan has publicly
stressed his achievement in
securing Khrushchev's agreement
that East-West differences should
be settled by negotiations and
evidently believes there is con-
siderable hope that some real
progress on major problems might
be achieved by a summit meeting.
However, the government, having
helped inflate the British pub-
lic''s hope, may find itself un-
der formidable political pres-
sure to purchase agreement with
the USSR by generous concessions.
Prior to Macmillan's visit
to Paris, Adenauer and De Gaulle
on 9. March reached agreement on
a strong stand on access to Ber-
lin. De Gaulle is willing to
undertake major risks, and, if
necessary, an "exchange of
shots." French and German for-
eign ministers agreed that a
:foreign ministers' conference
is preferable but that a summit
conference could be accepted if
properly prepared. They saw
substantial difficulties on
agenda and participation, though
both Bonn and Paris would accept
the Poles and Czechs as "observ-
ers" on a German peace treaty.
to their talks on 9-10 March,
Macmillan and De Gaulle also
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12 March 1959
agreed on accepting a foreign
ministers' conference and a sub-
sequent summit meeting. The
British, however, are willing
to accept a more flexible for-
mulation of the agenda, and see
the inclusion of Czechoslovakia
and Poland as no major obstacle.
There is considerable di-
vergence in the West European
views of possible talks on dis-
engagement. Adenauer and De
Gaulle were seriously concerned
at the reference in the Mac-
millan-Khrushchev communiqud
to the "limitation of forces
and weapons, both conventional
and nuclear, in an agreed area
of Europe." British officials,
however, maintain that Mac-
ac-
mi l lan has not endorsed any
millan
troop withdrawals, but only
a study of "thinning out of
forces.
In West Berlin, Ollenhauer
has been sharply criticized for
his handling of his meeting with
Khrushchev. The press stressed
he was outL,:.atched by Khrushchev.
West German officials. and West
Berlin SPD leaders regard as a
particular blunder Ollenhauer's
acceptance of Soviet terminology
in the communique.
Willy Brandt's rejection of
Khrushchev's invitation to Ber-
lin talks was generally hailed
in West Germany and West Berlin.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
Iraq
The revolt of the Mosul
army garrison in northern Iraq
has been suppressed. Army units
from Baghdad have been sent
north to reinforce the local
security units in curbing tribes-
men who have been pillaging and
cutting communications in the
countryside. Reprisals against
rebel sympathizers are probably
also occurring in Mosul.
Colonel Shawwaf, the Mosul
garrison commander who led the
revolt, clearly expected imme-
diate support from army units
elsewhere in Iraq, and his plans
apparently depended in large
part on the success of an as-
sassination attempt against
Prime Minister Qasim. None of
the other phases of the plot
materialized, and even the best
known army opponent of Qasim's
policies, Brigadier Tabagchali,
commander of the Second Division
of which Shawwaf's force was a
part;, only sat briefly on the
fence before pledging support
to Qasim.
Remnants; of the rebel
force are reported to have fled
toward the Syrian border, under
strafing attacks by Iraqi Air
Force planes, but Shawwaf and
a number of his officers appar-
ently were killed by their own
men after a government air at-
tack on their headquarters.
The Iraqi Communists are
using the revolt to justify in-
tensified demands for a purge
of a].1 "sympathizers and sup-
porters" of the revolt from
the government and army, for
the arming of the Communist-
controlled Popular Resistance
Force, for the execution of
anti-?Qasim leaders now under
death sentence, and for immediate
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.
These "demands" are being broad-
cast by Baghdad radio, which is
Communist directed, and by the
Baghdad press. All ''"nationalist"
and pro-UAR newspapers in Bagh-
dad were put out of action by
mobs which destroyed their
presses on 10-11 March.
The most immediate inter-
national result of the suppres-
sion of the Iraqi revolt has
been a sharp deterioration in
Baghdad's relations with Cairo.
The Iraqi Government on 9 March
declared 11 members of the UAR
Embassy in Baghdad personae non
gratae,and some 30 Egyptians
left Baghdad the following day.
The expulsion of the Egyp-
tians was accompanied for the
first time by direct attacks,
without euphemisms, on Nasir and
the UAR as the instigators of
the rebellion, although local
Communist elements--following
Moscow's initial line--also
sought to throw some of the
blame on the United States.
The UAR President replied
to the Iraqi attacks in a speech
on 11 March in Damascus, where
he has been engaged in a round
of political fencemending and
handshaking. Frustrated by
the failure of the revolt and
stung by this and previous Iraqi
accusations, Nasir lashed out in
the strongest terms he has yet
used against Qasim and the Com-
munists. He said Qasim was di-
viding the Arabs--making a play
on Qasim's name, which means
"divider" in Arabic--and he de-
nounced the Communists as
"agents" of "the-foreigners."
He reiterated that his own
"mission" to bring about full
Arab unity remains unchanged.
He concluded with an oblique
reference to the possibility of
further difficulty between the
UAR and the Soviet Union by
saying he intended to pursue
his mission "regardless of the
harm which may befall us."-
This speech breaks the sur-
face concord which had been es-
tablished last month by Nasir's
speech and Khrushchev's letter
on their respective attitudes
toward Arab Communist movements.
Moscow's initial commentary on
the Iraqi uprising sought to
avoid identifying it with the
UAR by asserting that the revolt
was a consequence of American
attempts to bolster the Baghdad
Pact, but it is unlikely that
Soviet leaders will be able to
ignore so blatant an attack on
the Communists as Nasir's latest.
The most recent Moscow comment
has predicted that the "secrets"
of the anti-Qasim conspiracy will
be revealed, as will the "threats"
which "lead outside the borders
of Iraq."
With the eclipse of his in-
fluence in Iraq, Nasir's contests
with Qasim and the Communists
may move into peripheral areas.
One possible arena is Kuwait,
whose oil revenues have long
been eyed by both Iraqi and UAR
leaders. Baghdad is in a favor-
able geographic position to ap-
ply pressure on Kuwait--there
are border disputes which could,
be revived on short notice--and
the Kuwaitis have traditionally
feared and resisted Iraqi pres-
sure.
Nasir has long been a hero
to the Kuwaiti populace; and his
propaganda has been spread by
non-Kuwaiti schoolteachers, taxi
drivers, newspaper writers, and
other professionals. The ruling
family has been less enthusi-
astic, but has sought both to
appease Arab nationalism by
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
making friendly gestures toward
Cairo and to suppress nationalist
sentiment by banning newspapers
and closing nationalist clubs.
UAR interest in Kuwait was pub-
licly demonstrated by the visit
of a UAR military mission in
mid-January.
Sudan
Additional changes in the
Sudanese Government have further
reduced the influence of the
relatively pro-Western members
of the Ansar sect and Umma
party. Major General Wahab,the
principal Ansar representative,
has been removed from both the
Supreme Army Council and the
cabinet.
The threat that Ansar
tribesmen might be brought in-
to Khartoum as counterpressure
has probably been parried for
the! moment.. The Ansar leader,
Sayyid Abd al-Rahman al-Madhi,
is reported to have urged about.,
a thousand of his followers to
return to their homes. The situa-
tion remains unstable, however,
and there still appears to be
considerable maneuvering within
the army. Although the Sudanese
foreign minister has attributed
developments to personal rivalries
among senior officers, the pro-
Egyptian sentiment of many jun-
ior officers is also playing a
role. More changes in the make-
up of the government seem inevi-
table, and a Cairo newspaper has 25X1
published a report that General
Abboud himself may step down
as head of the government. II
UNREST IN EASTERN AFRICA
The Africans in Nyasaland
--in the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland--are resorting to
guerrilla warfare in their
struggle against white-settler
rule. In Kenya, moderate Afri-
can nationalists may be forced
by extremists to resort to vi-
olence to win more political
rights and the assurance of fu-
ture control of that British
colony.
Nyasaland
There has been no letup in
the nationalists' campaign of
violence despite the govern-
ment's widespread arrests of
nationalist leaders.. Agitation
appears to have shifted from
crowd demonstrations in front
of public buildings to armed
attacks on targets of economic
or communications importance--
tea plantations, highways,
bridges, and airfields. Five
Rhodesian infantry battalions
now are in Nyasaland in addi-
tion to police units, but the
rebels have been able to block
the main north-south road and
destroy bridges.
The disorders have received
increased international atten-
tion. Partisan debate has be-
come more bitter in Britain,
and propaganda broadcasts and
statements have increased from
the Communist nations, the UAR,
and African organizations in
Nigeria, Ghana, and the Union
of South Africa. The United
Nations may become involved if
the Tanganyika Government is
reprimanded in the Trusteeship
Council for using its police
to quell riots outside the trust
territory. Furthermore, a
crisis in London's relations
with the Rhodesian federation
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
might arise if Britain moved
troops from Kenya, now on a
six-hour alert, to Nyasaland
without the federation's re-
quest,
Kenya
Britain may soon face vio-
lent demonstrations in Kenya
if Tom Mboya, the moderate
leader of the Africans, is
forced to go along with extrem-
ists of the proviolence wing
of his party. The extremists
now are aroused over Britain's
arrest of their leader, Omolo
Agar.
Mboya has not been able to
obtain Britain's agreement to
a "round-table" discussion on
his terms for eventual African
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control of Kenya and immediate
political reforms. There are
indications, however, that
London plans to issue a: new
policy statement for East Af-
rica, probably in April. Since
the new policy purportedly will
establish "parliamentary democ-
racy" and the governor has
commented that it may lead
some Europeans to leave Kenya,
the statement apparently will
favor African interests. In
this event, European extremists
might provoke demonstrations.
If a gradual program ex-
tending over a decade or more
is envisaged, it is also likely
that most African nationalist
leaders will be dissatisfied
with the pace of feform.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
NOTES AND COMMENTS
KISHI?S RIVALS CRITICIZE US-JAPANESE TREATY
Dissidents in Japan's ruling
Liberal-Democratic party (LDP),,
seeking to deny Prime Minister
Kishi and Foreign Minister Fuji-
yama full political credit for
an acceptable revision of the
US-Japanese security treaty,
are demanding sweeping changes
in the administrative agreement,
the status-of-forces document
which spglls out the broad
terms of the treaty itself. The
changes go far beyond the Japa-
nese Government's position in
negotiations to date. Kishi
has been forced to abandon
plans to submit both documents
to the Diet for early ratifica-
tion until he can restore suf-
ficient conservative unity to
cope with strong Socialist op-
position to the treaty.
Anti-Kishi elements in the
LDP have fallen into line on
terms for the revision of the
treaty itself. The generally
accepted Japanese position
calls for advance consultation
on the deployment of US forces
in Japan and on their use in
hostilities outside Japan; ex-
clusion of the Ryukyu and Bonin
Islands from the Area to be
covered by the treaty; elimina-
tion of US authority to quell
Japanese civil disturbances;
and a ten-year time limit on the
treaty.
The initial Japanese posi-
tior.n on the administrative agree-
ment; called only for the elimina-
tiorL of the requirement that
Japan contribute local currency
for the support of US forces
and facilities. Under pressure
from the dissidents, however,
Tokyo may seek additional changes
involving criminal jurisdiction,
the extent of US control over
bases in Japan and their access,
air traffic controls, and im-
portation into Japan of equip-
ment and materiel--including
nuclear weapons--for US forces.
The dissident demands are
motivated largely by a desire
to prevent Kishi from scoring
a major political success
prior to the upper-house elec-
tions in June and to obscure
the ]Fujiyama "stamp" on the
initial Japanese stand. This
position, if accepted by
the United States, might estab-
lish Fgjiyama as a logical
successor to Kishi for
the prime ministership,
JAPAN-KOREA REPATRIATION ISSUE
The International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) is under
strong pressure from.both North
and South Korea not to partici-
pate in the screening of Korean
residents in Japan to determine
which ones desire to go to North
Korea. The Japanese Government,
possibly interpreting contintued
ICRC indecision as tantamount to
rejection of its request, is con-
sidering direct contact between
the Red Cross societies of Japan
and North Korea under nominal
ICRC auspices.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
The ICRC is planning to
send a delegation to South Korea
to seek assurances of noninter-
ference before making a final
decision. Seoul almost certain-
ly will refuse such assurances.
ICRC wavering appears to have
hardened the South Koreans' at-
titude and increased their self-
assurance. They have rejected
Tokyo's proposal to resume ne-
totiations for normalizing re-
lations between the two coun-
tries and are planning to rein-
force their armed patrols along
the "ghee line." Despite con-
tinued anti-Japanese statements,
however, Seoul appears as yet
to be avoiding precipitous ac-
tion against Japan.
Pyongyang has rejected any
screening, probably fearing that
its claim that 100,000 of the
600,000 Korean residents desire
repatriation.: to North Korea is
exaggerated. A Japanese Foreign
'Ministry official believes that
this is an unnegotiable North
Korean position which was made
to prevent ICRC acceptance of
the Japanese request.
Tokyo desires to avert a
major domestic
political prob-
lem 'before the upper-house elec-
tion in June, b
ut it is under
increasing
pressure
from leftist
Koreans in
Japan and
from a
propaganda
campaign
sponsored
by Pyongyang to settle the re-
patriation issue. Domestic
pre ssure, combined with continued
lack of cooperation on the part,
of both North and South Korea,
may force Japan to refer the is-
sue Ito 'the United Nations.
USSR STEPS UP PRESSURE ON JAPAN IN FISHERY NEGOTIATIONS
New proposals introduced
by the USSR at the annual fish-
ery negotiations in Tokyo on
6 March would drastically limit
Japanese fishing operations in
the northwest Pacific. They
apparently are designed to force
Tokyo either to discuss further
restrictions on Japanese fishing
or to move the discussions up to
the "political" level. Foreign
Minister Fujiyama said on 10
March that Tokyo would seek a
11political solution" to Moscow's
new proposals.
Moscow proposes to restrict
Japanese salmon fishing in the
treaty area to four zones, none
of them east of 165 degrees east
longitude, end the'fishing sea=
son on 30'July instead of 10
August, and limit the catch of
red salmon to 10,000 metric tons
instead of 25,000 as permitted
last year.
Tokyo has flatly rejected
the Soviet proposals, claiming
they would cut Japan's operating
area under the 1956 Soviet-
Japanese fishery treaty 82 per-
cent and would permit a total
salmon catch of only 35,000
tons, compared with the 1958
catch of 110,000 tons. Never-
theless, the Kishi government
will be under mounting pressure
to reach an agreement as the
fishing season approaches. Fish-
ing for some species is scheduled
to begin on 5 April,
Since the negotiations be-
gan on 12 January, Soviet nego-
tiators have built a strong case
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SECRET,, ,.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
00
U
60
120
S
S
? Yakutsk
140 1
R
R
60
165? 1 0 160 1,40
rovideniy
cA L A S K A
C.P. Novann
A
de
~'
New area i which USSR
proposes t prohibit
Japanese a Imon fishing
Kunashiri
.
adiv0510k
okkaido
P
4 C I F I C 0 C E A N
CHINA
SEA OF
40
JAPAN
KOREA
JAPAN
] Area prohibited to Japanese salmon fishing as of 1959
Fishing area open to Japanese only under restrictions
EAST
defined by Soviet-Japanese fishery treat of 1956
CHINA o
SEA
12 MARCH 1959
0 NAUTICAL MILES 1000
?
165 ? 30355
for conservation, contending
that fish resources have been
depleted by intensive Japanese
open-sea salmon fishing and by
treaty violations on the part
of Japanese boats. Tokyo denies
that Japanese fishing is respon-
sible for the salmon shortage,
but its negotiatiors have admit-
ted violations and have accepted
a resolution requesting tighter
controls over Japanese boats--
the only agreement reached so
far.
Two Soviet moves during
the talks apparently were de-
signed to increase pressure on
Tokyo. A Soviet broadcast to
Japanese listeners on 9 Febru-
ary announced that several small
areas in the Soviet Far East
would be closed to fishing for
flatfish and herring--an activi-
ty encouraged by the Japanese
Government in recent years.
The broadcast added that other
areas would be closed in the
future. Then, on 5 March, Mos -
cow informed Japanese maritime
authorities that in the future
Japanese fishing vessels would
be banned from entering Soviet
territorial waters for shelter
durin- storms without prior per-
mission. Although Soviet fish-
ery officials later denied that
such measures would be implemented,
Moscow nevertheless might resort
to unilateral closures in the
future ?
Moscow may attempt to use
its 'bargaining assets on fishery
issues to draw Japan into peace-
treaty negotiations. Previously,
however, the Kremlin has settled
for additional restrictions on
Japan's fishing when important
political concessions were not
forthcoming. The Seven-Year
Plan envisages sufficient ex-
pansion to bring the USSR into
direct competition with the Jap-
anese fishing industry,
ORR j
(Concurred in by
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CU L ZENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
There is no sign of an im-
minent Soviet move to break off
the negotiations at'Geneva on a
nuclear test cessation agree-
ment. In his initial reaction
to the American draft article
introduced on 10 March which
provides for indefinite dura-
tion of the proposed treaty,
Soviet chief delegate Tsarapkin
charged that the West is seek-
ing to give any party the uni-
lateral right to withdraw from
the treaty on the basis of an
"arbitrary evaluation" of the
effectiveness of the control
system. While implying ulti-
mate rejection of the proposal,
however, Tsarapkin reserved the
right to elaborate at a later
time on his "preliminary" com-
ments.
Soviet propaganda promptly
charged that the American draft
article on duration "would as-
sure a possibility for the
United States to resume tests
at any time"--a reference to
language in the draft making,
duration subject to the inhei
ent right of any party to with.-
draw if provisions of the treaty
are not observed.
Af ter the meeting, in Ge-
neva on 9 March several members
of the Soviet delegation, in-
cluding the chief delegate him-
self, individually approached
members of the American dele-
gation suggesting that, "since
we obviously have nothing to
talk about now," the meetings
should be cut down to "one or
two a week." Since Moscow
probably believes it has fully
developed its position for the
record, this apparent desire
to prolong the talks suggests
that the Soviet leaders hope
to avoid the possible un-
favorable effect that a break-
off of negotiations at this
time, would have on their cam-
paign for East-West talks on
the Berlin crisis.
(Concurred in by OSI)
25X1
Tito's defiant replies to
bloc criticism of Yugoslavia
during his tour of Asia and Af-
rica and his expressed determi-
nation to answer bloc charges
blow for blow in the future
foreshadow a further worsening
in relations, especially with
Albania and Bulgaria. Stating
that he had not replied before
in deference to his hosts, Tito
spoke on 6 March--only a few
hours after returning to Yugo-
slavia--before 200,000 people
in Skoplje, Macedonia, and on
the next day to over 300,000
in Belgrade. In these speeches
he defined his trip almost ex-
clusively in terms of Yugosla-
via's dispute with the bloc.
Tito claimed that the bloc's
attacks, instead of isolating
Yugoslavia, actually served to
increase its stature in the Afro-
Asian areas; thus, he said, the
efforts by Chou En-lai and others
to sow distrust against Yugosla-
via backfired. The Western
forces, he said, at least had
the wisdom to keep quiet.
Tito saved his strongest
invective for the bloc's "dis-
honest policy" of distorting
the facts about Yugoslavia and
his trip. His speeches were
addressed to the people over
the heads of their leaders, a
tactic previously employed by
the bloc against Yugoslavia. He
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 claimed that the bloc coun-
tries dared not print the truth
about his trip, because the
people would then see the fal-
sity of the entire bloc cam-
paign against Belgrade.
Tito stated his belief
that his dispute with the bloc
is not one of theoretical dis-
agreements but of occasional
"differences of opinion on cer-
tain issues which the practice
of socialist development has
raised both in other countries
and in Yugoslavia." He said
these were matters "for discus-
sion "
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
Tito accused his critics
at the Soviet 21st party con-
gress of misrepresenting Yugo-
slavia by charging that Belgrade
had betrayed the interests of
the working class and had mini-
mized the role of the party.
In fact, he said, the Yugoslav
party is in full control and
directs the development of so-
ci;alism "as the Yugoslav people
think best." In his Skoplje
speech Tito accused Bulgarian
and Albanian leaders of attack-
ing Yugoslavia "under orders
and directives from outside,"
implying that they should act
independently of Moscow's con-
trol,
Tito's emphatic denial
that Yugoslavia sought.to create
a third bloc or to revive the
Balkan Pact--which he said would
be to refute everything he had
said about pacts during his
tour--accentuated his apparent
determination that Yugoslavia's
policy of nonalignment be care-
fully preserved as the most ef-
fective position for exerting
.influence in international af-
DISSIDENT ACTIVITY IN I19DONESIA
. The Indonesian Army has re-
cently faced increasingly severe
attacks by dissidents of the
so-called Provisional Republic
of Indonesia,(PRRI) in' North
INDON A
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1ro --
South China Sea
DJAKARTA
JAVA
PrinciDal areas of PRRI dissidcnen
TALAUD ISLANDS
PACIFIC OCEAN
Celebes and North Sumatra. In
addition, there has been renewed
harassment by the Moslem dissi-
dent group,-the Darul Islam, in
South Celebes'and West Java.
Nf,QQ
Balikpopon~
Mancido
r?....,r.~ndano
Corontalo
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Pnlu
6f686S
Po!gpor
Kencuri
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
The resurgence of PRRI ac-
tivity has forced the govern-
ment to augment its air and
ground units, particularly in
Celebes, where some, 1,200 troops
were sett from Java on 25 Feb-
ruary.'Army. Chief Nasu.tion's
recent emergency decree order-
ing two-year compulsory mili-
tary service for all males be-
tween the ages of 18 and 23 is
indicative of his?ooncern over
army losses and the general
state of insecurity in widely..
scattered areas of Indonesia.
Recent press reports of
heavy fighting around the for-
mer dissident capital of Manado,
in North Celebes, state that
government control of the town
is threatened. The Indonesian
Air Force during the past week
has mounted a series of air
raids in the northern tip of
Celebes. The PRRI commander
there, Colonel Sumual, claimed
in early March that his'five
light battalions had gained the
initiative after probing govern-
ment strongholds around Manado
and had "pretty well severed"
the government's defense line.
In North Sumatra, the PRRI
dissidents have resumed attacks
on American- and British-owned
rubber estates south of Medan,
apparently with the aim of dis-
rupting production, intimidating
workers, and ultimately-of re-
ducing government revenues. In
a 1 March raid, a British estate
manager was beaten and his life
threatened--the first reported
instance 'of violence against a
European.
C0UII$JNISTS' PRESS FOR RESUMPTION OF 1CO1NTROL COLIUISSION IN LAOS
'Peiping and Hanoi, confi-
dent that the.1954 Geneva agree-r
menls give them a sound legal
position, are pressing demands
for immediate resumption of In-
ternational Control Commission
(ICC) activities in'Laos. The
presence of the ICC in Laos as-
sured the Communists that there
would be no effective build-up
of,Laotian forces and that no
American bases would be estab-
lished near North Vietnam; it
also served to safeguard local
Communists against. government
repression. Furthermore, any
weakening of the Geneva agree-
ments undercuts one of Hanoi's
basic_policy'goals -the reuni-
fication of Vietnam under terms
of the 1954 accords.
Chinese Communist Foreign
Minister Chen Yi complained on;
6 March that "outside forces"
were seeking to undermine the
Geneva agreements, "creating
tension in Southeast Asia," but
he concluded his remarks on a
moderate note. Comment. from
Hanoi has been equally restrained,
although the Vietnamese Commu-
niists have more at stake and re-
portedly induced the Chinese to
request formally that the Geneva
conference co-chairmen--Britain
and the USSR--act to revive the
commission's operations.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 19:59
Moscow has sought to play
down the issue even more than
Peiping. The Kremlin delayed
one month in transmitting to
Britain the formal letter
North Vietnam's Premier Pham"
Van Dong sent the Geneva con-
gerence co-chairmen. Presum-
ably Hanoi now thinks that
Moscow will make representa-
tions in its behalf. North
Vietnam recently published the
text of an 11 January letter
from Neo Lao Hak Zat chairman
Souphannouvong;m the ICC pro-
testing alleged acts of repres-
sion and reprisal against for-
mer Pathet Lao members by the
Vientiane government,
The Communists apparently
believe that even though they
cannot prevent the introduction
of US military personnel into
Laos, they can impede it and
inhabit Laos' recent drift to-
ward a closer alignment with the
West. They are seeking to make
an impression on Asian neutrals
by stressing the "illegal" nature
of Laotian and American moves,
but they have given no indica-
tion that they would tako any
military action even if the United
States should send military ad-
visers.
As a rule, some time elapses
before appeals to the co-chairmen
are answered. Meanwhile, Pei-
ping and Hanoi will avoid mili-
tary threats, demand that re-
prisals against former Pathet
Lao personnel cease, and repeat
their proposal for government-
level talks between Hanoi and
Vientiane concerning the bor-
The Somali Youth League
(SYL)--governing party of the
Italian trust territory of
Somalia--won 83 of the'90 seats
in the 4-8 March national legis-
lative assembly elections, but
it now faces the threat of in-
creasing tribal frictions within
its ranks. The new legislative
body, elected for a five-year
term, is to write Somalia's con-
stitution, select a chief of
state, and guide the new state
after its scheduled independence
in December 1960.
The election was bitterly
contested by the UAR-supported
Greater Somalia League (GSL),
which failed in its attempt to
form a coalition of opposition
parties to boycott the election.
This action was to be taken in
protest against the highhanded
tactics employed by the SYL and
the Italian authorities, such as
hampering election registrations
and arresting GSL leaders on po-
litical charges. The fact that
SYL candidates were unopposed
in districts considered opposi-
tion strongholds raises serious
doubts whether the assembly is
representative of the Somali
people.
The GSL retaliated by resort-
ing to violence in Mogadiscio on
24 and 25 February. The SYL-
controlled police suppressed the
rioting, enforced a dusk-to-
dawn curfew, and arrested about
300 leaders and extremists from
opposition--largely GSL--parties,
In an attempt to destroy the
GSL's grass-roots appeal, the
governing party immediately fol-
lowed up this action by adopting
the GSL's popular demand for early
creation of a Greater Somalia
stater
In addition to its suscep-
tibility to opposition charges
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
of electoral fraud, the SYL will
suffer from lack of an effective
legislative opposition. This
will favor the re-emergence of
bitter tribal animosity within
the governing coalition. Alle-
gations by the rival tribal
groups of favoritism and dis-
crimination in political appoint-
ments may result in a party split
along tribal lines and be re-
flected within the administra-
tion, including the police.
Moreover, opposition charges of
corruption could discredit the
government in 1960 when the UN
discusses the procedure for 25X1
termination of the trusteeship
preparatory to complete independ-
The selection of a politi-
cal bureau composed largely of
conservatives at the 2-5 March
congress of Tunisia's ruling
Neo-Destour party assures the
continuation. of President Bour-
guiba's moderate policies with-
in party and government. Sev-
eral strong supporters of a
more radical point of view,
notably Ahmed ben Salah, former
head of the principal Tunisian
labor federation, failed to be
elected. The political bureau
can be expected, nevertheless,
to press Bourguiba to develop
a neutral course in foreign af-
fairs and lean toward the pol-
icy of "nonengagement" which he
enunciated last fall.
President Bourguiba com-
pletely dominated the congress
--the first held since 1955 when
his rival, Secretary General
Salah ben Youssef, was ousted
in a struggle which sharply di-
vided the party. Bourguiba,
while refusing life tenure. as
party president, accepted unan-
imous. re-election.
While Bourguiba certainly
will continue to dominate Tuni-
sian politics, a potential ri-
val emerged at the congress.
Mongi Slim, Tunisia's 51-year-
old ambassador to Washington,
secured more than 97 percent
of the delegates' votes for
membership on the political bu-
reau. Believed to aspire to
succeed Bourguiba, who report-
edly does not trust him com-
pletely, Slim may be relieved
of his diplomatic duties and re-
turn to more active politics.
Algerian independence and
a Maghrebian (North African)
federation--which Tunisia has
soft-pedaled recently--were the
keynotes of the congress. Ob-
servers from the Algerian Nation-
al Liberation Front, the Moroc-
can Istiglal party, and the pro-
Communist Union of the Cameroun
Peoples were seated with the
diplomatic delegation. In his
opening speech Bourguiba renewed
his, bid for a negotiated solu-
tion of the Algerian rebellion
by holding forth the possibility
of French-Maghrebian cooperation
when peace is established in Al-
geria. Toward the end of the
congress, however, he indicated
pessimism regarding De Gaulle's
ability to solve the Algerian
problem and the effectiveness of
a meeting with De Gaulle, which
he has recently demanded.
Having successfully con-
cluded the party conclave, Bour-
guiba probably will soon promul-
gate the long-deferred constitu-
tion, expected to legalize his
position by providing for a
strong and centralized execu-
tive. Promulgation could occur
on 20 March, the third anniver-
sary of Tunisian independence, and
might be followed by some popular
endorsement of Bourguiba as Pres-
ident. Legislative elections
would then follow within six
months to select a parliament to
replace the Constitutent Assembly,
which drafted the constitution.
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 March 1959
AUSTRIAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS
The 9 March decision of
the Austrian coalition parties
to hold national parliamentary
elections on 10 May 1959 cli-
maxes months of increasing dis-
sension within the People's par-
ty Socialist coalition,which
has given Austria a stable gov-
ernment for 13 years.
Tension between Chancellor
Raab's People's party and the
Socialists has been growing
since the generally unexpected
victory of the Socialist can-
didate in the presidential elec-
tions in early 1951. The So-
cialists' success, while re-
storing the balance upset by
their poor showing in the 1956
parliamentary elections, in
effect deepened the cleavage
between the two parties and in-
creased the competition between
them. Coalition leaders decided
last December to advance the
1960 elections to October 1959,
but Raab was evidently persuaded
by his party strategists to
force the reluctant Socialists
to accept the earlier date.
assured by the absence of any
real alternative to it in a
country where excessive partisan-
ship in the interwar period led
to sporadic civil conflict.
Several factors now could
make postelection agreement
more difficult than before:
the tendency of party leaders
to harp on historic issues,
rising bitterness over mutual
charges of corruption, and the
ever'-present possibility that
either party might score an
unexpected electoral success.
AUSTRIAN NATIONALRAT
LOWER HOUSE -1956 ELECTIONS
There are no real foreign
policy differences between the
coalition parties, both of which
are strongly pro-Western; and
major domestic issues--such as
public housing, state-church
relations, and administration
of the nationalized industries
--are likely to be overshadowed
by uncertainty over the future
of the coalition, itself. After
previous postwar elections,
restoration of People's party -
Socialist cooperation has been
SOCIALIST PARTY
ra
PEOPLE'S PARTY
82
While Raab has expressed
himself in favor of continued
cooperation with the Socialists,
he has also declared that the
coalition pact which has made
it possible is much too "rigid."
If the elections should give
Raab's party a workable majority,
either by itself or in combina-
tion with the small right-wing 25X1
liberals, Raab would be sorely
tempted to shut out the Social-
GREEK MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
A new test of the strength
of the outlawed Communists in
Greece now is slated for early
April, when municipal elections
will be held throughout the
nation. The elections will also
permit an evaluation of the
effectiveness of the government's
recent anti-Communist program,
inaugurated following the large
pro-Communist vote--24 percent--
in the parliamentary elections
of May 1958.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959
Spokesmen for the govern-
ing National Radical Union (ERE)
have announced that the party
will not enter formal lists of
candidates, and they have ex-
pressed the hope that the elec-
tions will be "rsonpolitical."
Leaders of both the Communist-
front United Democratic Left
(EDA) and non-Communist oppo-
sition parties, however, have
announced their determination
to make the elections a test
of the government's popularity.
The recently passed munic-
ipal electoral law provides
for the election of municipal
councilors by proportional rep-
resentation and the subsequent
election of mayors by these
councilors. This system was
advocated by the government in
preference to a majority system
in a move to prevent the cre-
ation of electoral fronts be-
tween EDA and the non-Communist
opposition parties. The system
will permit EDA to place members
on nearly all municipal councils
but should also ensure a nation-
alist, non-Communist majority
on most councils. The indirect
and open vote for mayors should
prevent the election of EDA can-
UNREST IN
The antigovernment violence
in Bogota on 3 March, climaxing
two months of sporadic demon-
strations there and in other
parts of the country, was part
of the exploitation by opposi-
tion elements of Colombia's
continuing economic difficulties.
President Lleras, who has act-
ed to forestall further out-
breaks, has accused the Com-
munists and followers of former
dictator Rojas of provoking the
disturbances in an effort to
undermine his seven-month-old
National Front government of
dilates in most of the munici-
palities.
'DA, in preparation for
the elections, launched a wide-
sp:read effort to create an elec-
toral front "to rid the nation
of minority rule." Most non-
Conamunist opposition leaders,
however, have been wary of col-
laborating with EDA. EDA lead-
ers now indicate they will
throw their support to non-
Communist opposition candidates
innany areas in any case, in
an attempt to defeat candidates
favored by the government.
New victories for EDA in
the municipal elections would
not immediately affect the sta-
bility of Greece, as the central
government maintains a large
degree of control over the mu-
nicipalities through appointed
provincial officials. Such
victories, however, would dis-
courage all Greek anti-Commu-
nists, would indicate that the
government's anti-Communist
program is ineffective, and
would give ammunition to those
who advocate a right-wing author-
itarian regime as the answer to
the Communist thre
COLOMBIA
Liberals and Conservatives. The
government appears to be stable
and in control of the situation,.
although it may be confronted
by additional violence.
The 3 March rioting, which
necessitated the use of the army
to restore order, was prompted
by recent increases in bus fares..._
frequently a cause of violence
in Latin American cities. Since
early January, Communist agita-
tors have been prominent in or-
ganizing worker-student demon-
strations in the capital against
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the increases. The government
believes Communists also ex-
ploited or provoked widespread
provincial demonstrations in
February, most of which were
against increased consumer
prices in cities where Commu-
nists have strong influence
among labor unions.
The unrest suggests the
possibility that dissident Con-
servatives might join Rojistas
to undermine Lieras. Rojas,
who has occasioned considerable
public tension since he returned
to Colombia last'. October,
was detained in December for
allegedly plotting against the
government and is now on trial
before the Senate for misconduct
during his 1953-57 term in of-
fice. His followers are deft-
nicely linked with the demon-
strations, and the dissident
Conservatives, who passively
or actively oppose the National
Front, have apparently been
attempting to justify or magnify
the recent disturbances.
The coalition government
appears to be stable and to re-
tain the loyalty of the armed
forces. It will probably face
further violence and increased
opposition activity, however,
unless it controls these demon-
strations.
ACTIVITIES OF PARAGUAYAN REVOLUTIONARIES
Paraguayan exile groups
seem to be having some success
in the war of nerves they are
conducting against the Stroess-
ner dictatorship through a hos-
tile press campaign in neigh-
boring countries, paramilitary
forays across the border, and
feints of invasion. ,
The exiles--based mainly
in Argentina and Uruguay--ap-
parently adopted the new tac-
tics partly because the change
of government in Uruguay on 1
March makes the situation.
there less favorable for more
violent activity. They may
also believe that since the
Paraguayan Army still supports
President Stroessner, their
best hope is to create tension
within the ruling group and
thereby exploit existing dif-
ferences within Stroessner's
cam
The exiles made a number
of harassing attacks with small
armed groups against Paraguay
in' February and early March.
The government easily repelled
the invaders but seems disturbed
over the press campaign. The
government has shown deep con-
cern over the effectiveness of
such criticism outside Paraguay
and, by way of countering it
both at home and abroad, has
even permitted the arrest of a
high police officer accused of
brutality.
Exile hopes of conducting
extensive guerrilla activity in
the future are encouraged by
the prospect of foreign assist-
ance. Some Venezuelan elements
sympathetic to the exiles may
already have given financial
aid to the exiles.
Cuba
as orlere arms to e action-
alized exiles if they agree to
unite in a front in which all
parties participate.
For the present, however,
the rebels remain divided and
Stroessner, despite his own
difficulties, still seem strong- 25X1
er than his opponents.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NEW SOVIET COMMITTEE FOR AUTOMATION AND MACHINE BUILDING
The USSR has established
under the Council of Ministers
a new State Committee for Auto-
mation and Machine Building.
This shows serious concern about
effective implementation of the
ambitious Seven-Year Plan pro-
gram.for integrated mechaniza-
tion and automation and about
reducing the time lag between
scientific development and in-
dustrial application.
Last month's 21st party
congress noted that "the trans-
ition to complex mechanization
and automatically controlled
production by means of electron-
ic technology is the chief
characteristic of contemporary
technical progress" and repre-
sents the decisive means of en-
suring further technical prog-
ress in the Soviet economy. It
will then, in turn, lead to an
advance in labor productivity,
lower production costs, and im-
prove the quality of production
as well as working conditions.
The reason for this Soviet con-
cern over mechanization and autD-
mation of industial production
processes becomes more apparent
in Khrushchev's statement that
over 50 percent of the work in
the machine -building, indus-
try is performed by hand
labor.
SECRET
One of the problems which
has arisen in trying to imple-
ment this program has been lo-
cal resistance to innovation,
which has caused a significant
lag in the introduction of new
techniques into industry. The
unremitting pressure for in-
creases in output has discouraged
enterprise managers from adopt-
ing innovations which they see a5
likely to disrupt production
and jeopardize plan fulfillment.
Despite the claim of the planners
that "overstrains" from unreal-
istically ambitious planning
have been eliminated, the for-
mation of the new committee im-
plies a continuing need for cen-
tral initiation, promotion, and
coordination.
The committee's chairman,
A.I. Kostousov, was formerly
minister of the USSR Machine
Tool Building and Instrument
Industry; since mid-1957 he
has been chairman of the Moscow
Oblast Council of National
Economy. Kostousov's former
ministry had the main burden
for planning, directing, and
coordinating the mechanization
and automation of the machine-
building industry.
(Prepared by ORAL;
curved in by.OSI)
25X1
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CDNFtDE TF~ &
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
DE GAULLE'S NEW
Formation of the new French
Community is a major step for-
ward in France's colonial rela-
ions, but President de Gaulle
"..as in practice pre-empted the
decision-making functions for
the community, leaving the Afri-
can representatives only an ad-
visory role. He may also plan
to manipulate the new grouping
to strengthen France's claims
for a larger voice in i,aterna-
tional affairs. The rising
tide of African nationalism
may soon undermine the commu-
nity, especially if its formal
organization proves too rigid
to accommodate African desires
for territorial federation.
Republic of France Q Autonomous Republics
UN Trust Territories
CONFIDENTIAL
FRENCH COMMUNITY
The French Community is a
voluntary association of France
and those African states which
opted for the status of auton-
omous republic under French pro-tection. Besides the Republic
of France, it includes the Mal-
gache Republic (Madagascar),
four territories which formerly
constituted French Equatorial
Africa, and seven of eight ter-
ritories once grouped as French
West Africa. The overseas de-
partments; and the remaining
territories are considered part
of France. Paris' hopes of
"associating" the former. French
colony of Guinea and the Indo-
chinese states with the coimuu-
nity were disappointed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
12 March 1959-
The community,
in essence, will be
responsible for "corn-
mon affairs"--de-
fined as foreign pol-
icy, defense, eco-
nomic and financial
policy, justice, and
higher education--
and will be the chan-
nel for French eco-
nomic and technical
assistance to the
African territories.
Through it, De Gaulle
apparently hopes to
protect Prance's mil-
itary bases and
sources of raw ma-
terials in Tropical
Africa, while at the
same time giving the
Africans substantial
reasons for maintain-
ing political ties
with France.
Another poten-
ARBITRAL
COURT
Appointed by
President
PRESIDENT
President of Republic of France
is ex officio President
of French Community
_.1
Elected by assemblies
of all
member republics
Composition:
Premiers of all member
republics
Cabinet ministers of
Republic of France
with functions common
to entire community
REPUBLIC OF FRANCE
Continental France
Algeria
Sahara
Overseas Departments
(Reanion, Guadeloupe,
Martinique, Guiana)
Overseas Territories
(Somaliland, Comoro Islands,
New Caledonia, Oceania,
St. Pierre and Miquelon)
Soudan
Mauritania
Volta
Ivory Coast
Dahomey
Niger
Chad
Gabon
Congo
PREMIER
REPRESENTATIVE
'L_ OF PRESIDENT
CABINET
ASSEMBLY
Malgache Republic
Central African Republic
tially important purpose, illus-
t=aced by French radio comments
f.~ the community council's 3
:,arch communique expressing
,'complete unity of views" re-
-,.;arding the Berlin problem, is
to bolster French claims for a
larger voice in determining
Western international policy
by playing up De Gaulle's posi-
tion as spokesman for a "vast
and united community stretch-
ing across two continents.
Institutions
The community organization
consists of a president, an ex-
ecutive council, a senate,, and
a court of arbitration. The
president of the Republic of
France is ex officio president
of the community and has con-
siderable power to "formulate
... measures for the management
of common affairs and ensure
their execution," Ho has a rep-
resentative in each of the mem-
ber states, replacing the former
governors.
The Executive council con-
sists of the premiers of th,::
l3 member republics and approx-
imately a dozen French cabinet
ministers whose departments have
responsibility for "common af-
fairs." The council, the "su-
:preme institution" for coopera-
tion between the governments of
member states, apparently will
mneet at intervals of one or two
months. De Gaulle handles the
council sessions just as he con-
ducts French cabinet meetings
--drawing up the agenda, request-
ing the opinions of the partici-
pants, and making policy deci-
) ions without taking a vote.
In its two sessions so far,
the council dealt only with tech-
jaical organizational matters
and was steered away from any
issue which might have revealed
dissension. Its most important
accomplishment has been planning
for the inclusion of African per-
sonnel in certain French diplo-
matic missions and on the commu-
nity's Arbitral Court. This
should help in training native
administrators badly needed in
Africa.
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JC.C;KQ 1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WE:EI