CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Publication Date: October 28, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONF~
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 45
OCR NO.6115/58
31 December 1958
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS CHANGED TO)
NF-)CT T REViEW GATE: /_
DOCUMENT NO. 10
NO CHANGE IN CLASS, 0
DATE/
AU` H; JoW 70-2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET POSITION ON BERLIN
The Soviet leaders are
maintaining a firm posture in
their public pronouncements
on the Berlin question.
In his speech to the Su-
preme Soviet on 25 December,
Foreign Minister Gromyko warned
that if the dangerous situation
in West Berlin is not removed,
this "may become a second
Sarajevo." He emphasized that
"any provocation in West Berlin,
any attempt at aggressive ac-
tion against the German Demo-
cratic Republic, could start
a major war." First Deputy
Minister of Defense Marshal
Sokolovsky echoed this line,
warning that any Western re-
sort to force in connection
with Berlin would lead to a war
involving the use of intercon-
tinental ballistic missiles with
thermonuclear warheads against
the United States. Gromyko
strongly reaffirmed the USSR's
determination to transfer to
the East Germans control over
Allied access, if the West re-
jects the Soviet proposals on
Berlin.
In contrast to this un-
compromising public position,
Soviet officials are continuing
in private talks to stress the
USSR's desire for a top-level
meeting. Soviet Ambassador
Vinogradov told the American
ambassador in Paris on 23 De-
cember that the United States
and the Soviet Union should get
together and compose their dif-
ferences. He said the Soviet
leaders did not intend that
their Berlin proposals should
be interpreted as an ultimatum
and indicated that he personal-
ly would be in favor of a summit
meeting on the German problem
in general.
A TASS statement of 23 De-
cember on the communique is-
sued by the NATO ministerial
meeting deliberately distorted
the Western position on the
"1S@Rr_ m
)DEqL1&
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
relationship between the German
question and European security
arrangements. According to
TASS, "leading circles" in the
USSR have noted that the NATO
powers no longer "condition
a solution of the European se-
curity problem on a settlement
of the German question." In
an obvious appeal to West Euro-
pean proponents of various dis-
engagement schemes, TASS said
the USSR would be ready to dis-
cuss questions of European se-
curity and reiterated such long-
standing Soviet proposals as a
reduction of foreign forces in
European countries, a nonag-
gression treaty, creation of a
nuclear-free zone in central
Europe, and treaties of friend-
ship and cooperation between
the USSR and Western countries.'
The Soviet Foreign Ministry
handed notes to the Western
powers on 25 December stating
that the USSR would henceforth
refuse to accept Western notes
and documents which contain
"incorrect designations" of the
German Democratic Republic,
such as the "Soviet Zone of Oc-
cupation" and the "East Zone
of Germany." Soviet and East
German authorities can be ex-
pected to claim that any modi-
fication in the Western formula
made as a result of this pro-
test represents a further step
toward at least de facto recog-
nition of East German sover-
eignty.
There are
indications that Soviet author-
ities are already making prep-
arations for transferring their
East Berlin headquarters from
from the Karlshorst compound to
a new location outside the city.
In apparent preparation for a
transfer of controls, East Ger-
man military personnel were
noted on 19-20 December care-
fully observing Soviet officers
who were controlling documents
at a Berlin check int.
THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET SESSION
In a whirlwind legislative
session from 22 through 25 De-
cember, the USSR Supreme Soviet
approved the state budget for
1959, Khrushchev's proposals
for a reorganization of the
school system, and a revised
criminal code. Speeches be-
fore the meeting included one
by Foreign Minister Gromyko on
the Berlin situation and the
Geneva nuclear-.test talks. The
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 December 1958
session also appointed party
official Aleksandr Shelepin as
head of the secret police.
The Budget
The 1959 budget shows a
sharp rise in revenues and ex-
penditures--about 12 percent
over last year's, as compared
with an average increase of 4
percent annually since 1953.
Over two thirds of the increase
will go toward financing the
national economy, primarily in-
to investment for further rapid
industrial expansion. Centrally
planned capital investment is
to grow 11 percent, as compared
with a planned growth of 7.4
percent in 1958 and an expected
actual increase of 9.2 percent.
posal that would, in effect,
permit parents in minority areas
to choose one compulsory lan-
guage for their children--Rus-
sian or the native language.
Both suggestions were strongly
attacked in the press.
Criminal Codes
The new criminal codes--
principles on which the repub-
lics are to model their codes--
do not differ significantly from
the draft codes published for
public discussion last spring.
The new codes formalize the
legal concessions approved at
the 20th party congress. but re-
ject most of the more liberal
proposals called for earlier
in the public debate.
Explicit defense spending,
planned at 96.1 billion rubles,
is at virtually the same level
as it has been since 1956. Un-
stated defense expenditures,
however, appear in other budget
categories, and the general
growth of planned expenditures
is sufficiently large to permit
continuation of the rapid growth
of those military programs so
financed.
Scientific research estab-
lishments are allocated about
27 billion rubles as compared
with approximately 18 billion
for 1958. This increase, how-
ever, may result partly from
changes in accounting categories.
The theses on the reor-
ganization of the school sys-
tem, published for public dis-
cussion in November, were en-
acted virtually without change.
The law, however, fails to men-
tion the proposal to retain
special schools for artistical-
ly gifted children or the pro-
Some of the new features
of the codes include the elimi-
nation of the analogy clause,
under which a crime not covered
by a specific clause in the code
was tried under the clause most
analogous. The new codes re-
ject earlier suggestions made
by some Soviet lawyers that the
presumption-of-innocence prin-
ciple be recognized. The age
of criminal responsibility has
been raised from 14 to 16 years
and parole provisions altered--
persons sentenced for minor
crimes must serve at least half
their terms, those convicted of
major crimes their full sentence.
Legacies of the Stalin era
long since abandoned were dropped
from the new codes. These in-
clude the label "enemy of the
people," the view that confes-
sion is sufficient proof of
guilt, and the special extra-
legal tribunals. Probably be-
cause of the abandonment of
the analogy principle, the code
is more specific on the nature
of treason, including--for the
first time under this category--
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 December 1958
"conspiring for the purpose of
seizing power." Formerly this
would have been tried as a
counterrevolutionary crime.
Foreign Policy
In response to questions
submitted to the government by
a group of Supreme Soviet dele-
gates, Foreign Minister Gromyko
on the last day of the session
made a speech in which he struck
a firm and unyielding tone on
both the Geneva nuclear-test
talks and Berlin. (See Part I,
page 1.)
Gromyko's remarks on the
prospects for agreement at
Geneva were very pessimistic.
He charged the United States
and Britain have decided to
prevent an agreement and at-
tacked the West's insistence
on linking extension of a one-
year test suspension to progress
on other disarmament measures,
and Western views on decision-
making procedures in the con-
trol organ. He warned that no
agreement will be possible if
the West does not abandon these
"invalid conditions."
Serov's Replacement
The appointment of Alek-
sandr Shelepin as head of the
secret police (KGB) is prob-
ably intended to make the
security forces more im-
mediately responsive to par-
ty control. Shelepin, a full
member of the Soviet cen-
tral committee with no
prior experience in police
work, has been in charge of
one of the two personnel de-
partments of the party cen-
tral committee since April
1958. Before that he head-
ed the Soviet youth organ-
ization (Komsomol) for over
five years.
Shelepin may be charged
with carrying out a shake-up
in the KGB staff, possibly in-
cluding a reorganization of
the security forces. This
would be in line with the in-
tention Khrushchev expressed
privately to Western officials
of reducing the role of the
secret police still'further.
Khrushchev may have in mind
divesting the KGB of some of
its domestic responsibilities
as a gesture to ease public ap-
prehension about police pow-
er. He presumably has no
intention of reducing
the role of the security
forces in foreign espion-
age and in counteres ion-
age, however.
NASIR AND THE IRAQI SITUATION
UAR President Nasir's
speech on 23 December attacking
Arab Communists has inspired
pro-UAR elements in Iraq to a
stronger effort against increas-
ingly pervasive Communist in-
fluence. Pro-UAR Baathist and
Communist demonstrators have
clashed repeatedly in Baghdad
during the past week. Troops
and police are reported to
have been called in there and
in other towns and to have
made numerous arrests of Baath-
ist partisans.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Prime Minister Qasim's
personal position remains
equivocal. Qasim once again
has assured American officials
of his desire for Western
friendship and is reported to
have commuted the death sentence
of ex-Foreign Minister Jamali,
Iraq's fieriest anti-Communist
under the old regime. The pro-
UAR members of the Qasim cabi-
net remain deeply concerned over
Communist influence, even though
some of them insist that the
Baathists will certainly over-
whelm the Communists in a show-
down and others assert that
Qasim himself will move "very
soon" against the Communists.
This latter line, incidentally,
is also being put forth by the
Israelis, who fear that emphasis
on the growth of the Communist
threat in Iraq could lead to a
rapprochement between the West
and their archenemy Nasir.
Qasim appears primarily
concerned with his own security,
as he has been at least since
his former deputy, Colonel Arif,
refused to accept assignment as
Iraqi ambassador to Bonn. He
is surrounded at all times b
bodyguards
The UAR's propaganda bar-
rage meanwhile continues un-
abated. Cairo and Damascus
press editorials this week em-
phasize the "link" between Com-
munists, imperialists, and Zion-
ists, thus putting all Arab
enemies in one basket. The
campaign led to a near-riot at
Damascus University when pro-
Communist students tore up a
pro-Nasir testimonial. At the
Arab Literary Conference in Kfi-
wait an Iraqi delegate was ac-
cused of distorting Arab history
to bring it into line with
Marxist theory.
The Communists possess
only one major Arab press or-
gan outside Iraq. In Iraq,
however, they not only control
a majority of the newspapers
but also are able to use the
government radio station under
the control of Information Min-
ister Salim Fakhri, a party
member.
Nasir reportedly intends to
follow up the propaganda cam-
paign with new security efforts
against the Communists in Egypt
and Syria, even though Iraq is
his real target. Khalid Bak-
dash, leader of the Syrian Com-
munist party, has again gone
underground and may have fled
to Eastern Europe. In Syria,
the anti-Communist drive serves
a double purpose of partially
distracting the Syrians from
the economic and administrative
ills which have followed their
union with Egypt. The presence
of UAR Interior Minister Zakaria
Muhieddin at the high-level
three-man commission which
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 December 1958
deals with the troubles of
the Syrian region has
given the commission an
anti-Communist gloss. This
effect was reinforced last week
by the Syrian region's Interior
Minister Sarraj, who warned 25X1
against the danger of Communist
"opportunists" who pose for
Arab unity.
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On 31 December, rebels in
Las Villas Province in central
Cuba continued to make gains
although government troops were
for the first time challenging
the rebel campaign. Air and
ground attacks had apparently
placed the rebels on the defen-
sive in several areas, including
the provincial capital of Santa
Clara. The government's in-
discriminate bombing of towns
held by the rebels was causing
considerable damage, and the
press reported large numbers of
civilians migrating west toward
Havana.
In Oriente Province, rebel
units were approaching the city
of Santiago, and the government,
which had withdrawn most of its
forces from outlying posts to
the city, was reinforcing its
positions. There were uncon-
firmed reports that Guantanamo
City had fallen to the rebels.
Castro's forces were also mak-
ing gains in Camaguey Province.
Despite some gains in the
counteroffensive in Las Villas,
the government's position re-
mains precarious. Internal con-
flict in the armed forces ap-
pears to have resulted in a
power struggle between ranking
officers of the high command;
continued arrests and changes
in command will probably hinder
the effectiveness of the govern-
ment campaign. Many high of-
ficers are said to believe that
the government cannot defeat the
rebels, and some are reported
preparing to leave the country.
The government is also suffer-
ing a shortage of arms and is
believed to be negotiating with
the Dominican Republic for arms
shipments.
The increasing tempo of
the rebellion is resulting in
further deterioration of the
already weakened economy. The
fighting in Las Villas, center
of the cattle industry and
third most important sugar pro-
ducing area, has already caused
meat shortages in Havana. The
repair of disrupted transporta-
tion facilities in the three
eastern provinces will also be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 December 1958
delayed by the fighting and may
hinder marketing of the sugar
crop, despite the announced in-
tention of both the government
rupted harvesting of the crop,
which is scheduled to begin in
early January.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOVIET REGIME DEMANDS MORE APPLIED SCIENCE
The Soviet regime in mid-
December warned the scientists
of the USSR, as it had earlier
warned Soviet writers and
educators, that they may not
stand aloof, but must actively
participate in the solution
of the "vital tasks" set by
the party for the further de-
velopment of the Communist
state.
Lysenko's "particularly great
contributions" to Soviet bi-
ology and harshly criticizing
his opponents for hampering
the mobilization of Soviet
scientists for the further
development of the national
economy. The next day Khru-
shchev;. in his. agricultural re-
port to the central committee
plenum, made a highly laudatory
reference to Lysenko for his
The warning, couched in
work in biology. Khrushchev
terms of approval for applied
science as opposed to basic
then noted failings in various
scientific institutes which
theoretical research, included
had "separated themselves from
high praise for controversial
life" and suggested that the
biologist T. D. Lysenko and
salaries of the staffs of re-
sharp criticism of biologists
search institutes for plant
who oppose his views. Repeated
growing, livestock breeding,
praise of Lysenko is probably
and mechanization be made depend-
designed primarily to obtain
ent on the practical results of
greater practical results from
their scientific research.
scientific research in agri-
culture. It has the addition-
al
effect, however, of appear-
On 17 December Lysenko
ing
to give regime support to
addressed the central
committee.
his
theories on inheritance
He attacked President
of the
of
and
acquired characteristics
pose a potential threat
USSR Academy of Sciences A.
Nesmeyanov and the secretary
N.
to
basic theoretical research
of the academy's Biology Sec-
in
biology.
tion for failure to accept
his views and charged that
they preferred "theoretical
After Stalin's death,
Lysenko's critics began to be
heard, and he resigned as pres-
ident of the USSR Academy of
Agricultural Sciences in 1956.
Since then he has regained
some of the standing he lost.
However, he has not regained
the dictatorial control over
Soviet biological science which
he enjoyed in. Stalin's lifetime.
Pravda published an arti-
cle oii 14 December praising
assumptions from which no practi-
cal conclusions can be drawn."
Pravda on 18 December announced
that Lysenko's views had received
the support of the central com-
mittee.
On the same day the first
secretary of the Azerbaijan
Communist party reiterated to
the central committee the 14
December Pravda criticism of
Lysenko's opponents and urged
that all forces of science be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
united, to work not in the
defense of abstract disserta-
tions but toward the solution
of topical problems in the
development of agriculture.
On 19 December the central
committee decree approving
Khrushchev's agricultural re-
port noted that certain scien-
tists were "estranged" from
collective and state farms
and that their research made
no useful contribution to
agriculture. The Ministry of
Agriculture, the Ministry of
Finance, and the Lenin All-
Union Academy of Agricultural
Sciences were directed to work
out a system of payments to
scientific workers which would
help the development of farm'
production and science, pre-
sumably along the lines
gested by Khrushchev.
(Concurred in by OSI)
POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF FRENCH AUSTERITY PROGRAM
France's bold new aus-
terity program, while offering
the first genuine prospect of
stabilizing the country's
postwar economy, is neverthe-
less accompanied by political
hazards. It is arousing
opposition among broad segments
of: the population, and the
French Communist party (PCF)
has seized on it as the most
profitable public issue for
achieving working-class "unity
of action" in the period since
De Gaulle came to power.
Since the restrictive
effect of the program will
be felt most immed?ia.tely by
low-income groups, the PCF
can be expected to use the
issue to rally working-class
support and attract Socialist
backing. The Communist-
dominated General Labor Con-
federation had already called
for "unity from below" as a
means of exerting pressure on
the non-Communist unions to
join in "common action" on
economic issues.
Prior to the program's
announcement, the Socialist-
oriented Force Ouvriere (FO)
had repudiated any economic
steps involving deflation or
devaluation, and the Christian
Workers' Confederation (CFTC)
had publicly called for in-
creases in social welfare ex-
penditures, but both unions
have hitherto refrained from
overt opposition in order to
"give De Gaulle a chance."
The propaganda advantages
of a strong campaign against
such a program will encourage
Socialist leaders to adopt a
sharper opposition line than
party leader Guy Mollet may
have originally envisaged.
Mollet, whose immediate resig-
nation from the cabinet was
averted only by a personal ap-
peal from De Gaulle, now may
find his self-assigned role of
"loyal opposition" leader to
the future government compli-
cated by PCF success in its
efforts for unity from below.
The key factor in the suc-
cess of the austerity program
will probably be how well De
Gaulle succeeds in convincing
leaders of the largest assembly
group--the Union for the New
Republic (UNR)--that the plan
does not negate their position
on economic expansion. Michel
Debre, currently considered
De Gaulle's most likely choice
for premier, recently reaffirmed
UNR support for economic
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expansion, and UNR Secretary
Roger Frey has taken the posi-
tion that deflation could only
mead to unemployment and thus
jeopardize chances of weaning
workers from the Communists.
Nevertheless, the chief UNR
economic theoretician, who
argues that economic expan-
sion must be maintained and
that either investment cuts
or tax increases would jeopard-
ize it, has already announced
his support for the plan.
De Gaulle probably decided
against the UNR thesis because
he sees austerity as a move
toward enabling France to stand
on its own feet economically,
but he probably was also in-
fluenced by the likelihood of
attracting foreign aid, if
necessary, as a last resort.
The promise of support from
various European central
banks enhances the program's
prospects for success.
Although France probably
has the economic capability to
bear both a stabilization pro-
gram and the current drain of
resources in Algeria, the un-
known elements of the Algerian
situation--particularly the
duration of military pacifica-
tion--pose both economic and
political threats to the pros-
pects of the austerit program.
The cabinet of Istiqlal
left-wing leader Abdallah
Ibrahim, invested by King
Mohamed V on 24 December, will
give Morocco a broadly based
government probably less
sympathetic to Western inter-
ests than any of its three
predecessors since Morocco
gained its independence in 1956.
The new government plans to
"consolidate Morocco's inde-
pendence," alleviate unemploy-
ment, and organize local elec-
tions sometime in 1959.
Ibrahim, who is both
foreign minister and premier,
has recently become closely
identified with the powerful
Moroccan Labor Federation and
other radical elements which
have demanded measures such as
"Moroccanization" of agricul-
tural holdings and nationaliza-
tion of much of the economy.
Thus he is likely to give
considerable latitude to Deputy
Premier and National Economy
Minister Bouabid, who favors a
directed economy.
Party Secretary Balafrej
and other prominent spokesmen
of the Istigial's right, or
essentially bourgeois, wing
appear to have been bypassed
by a new alignment of forces
representing the restless urban
and rural masses. The left
wing's acquisition of all
important ministries suggests
that the King made greater con-
cessions to Istiqlal extremists
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
than he intended in order not
to delay fur per the formation
of a government.
Although the new govern-
ment contains at least three
Berbers, including Driss M'
Hammedi as minister of interior,
it will probably have great
difficulty in dealing with the
most pressing internal problem
--Berber tribal dissidence.
M'Hammedi's acceptance of the
interior portfolio suggests
that the King yielded to Isti-
glal extremists' demands that
the police be placed under the
control of the interior minis-
ter. However, the designation
as defense minister of a royal-
ist partisan with little po-
litical stature indicates that
the King has retained, at least
for the time being, effective
control over the army.
Previous statements of
prominent left-wingers, as well
as the likelihood that the cabi-
net will feel it necessary to
balance a potentially unpopular
and repressive domestic policy
with an expansionist foreign
policy, indicate that the Ibrahim
government will renew pressure
for the evacuation of foreign
forces from Morocco. There are
about 28,000 French and 10,500
Spanish forces still in the
country, as well as five Ameri-
can-operated air bases. The
new government is also likely to
extend more energetic support
to the Algerian rebels. Such
actions, especially if accompanied
by any move to expropriate French-
owned agricultural lands, might
precipitate vigorous counter-
measures, possibly including 25X1
independent action by French
military elements in Algeria
or Morocco.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
President Sukarno and Pre-
mier Djuanda apparently are tak-
ing the first steps to limit
the Indonesian Army's previous-
ly expanding political powers.
Wide press publicity, presum-
ably with Sukarno's sanction,
was given the President's state-
ment at a recent security con-
ference that the army should
concentrate on security matters
and "leave civilian affairs to
the civilian government." Di-
rect authority over barter trade
has been transferred from the
army chief of staff, General
Nasution, to the cabinet. Al-
though the responsible cabi-
net minister--the minister for
economic stabilization--is an
army officer, he will be cir-
cumscribed by Djuanda and the
cabinet.
depose him.
The development of firmer
curbs on army power probably
will depend on the effective-
ness of a diverse group of po-
litical and military elements
who stand to lose by Nasution's
growth in stature. The princi-
pal pressure will come from the
Communist party, which for some
time has been quietly conduct-
ing an antimilitary and anti-
Nasution campaign. Other pres-
sures being brought to bear
come from other political par-
ties and, to a lesser extent,
from the navy and air force.
Furthermore, Sukarno may be
concerned that Nasution is a
personal threat, and the Pres-
ident may therefore move to
MEETING OF NORTH VIETNAM'S NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
North Vietnam's National
Assembly, as the first order of
business at its recent four-day
session, approved a revamped
version of the Three-Year Plan
for economic development (1958-
60) announced last spring.
Principal emphasis is still on
increasing agricultural out-
put--particularly food produc-
tion--and the main target is
to produce 7,600,000 tons of
paddy rice in 1960 compared
with 4,500,000 claimed for
1958--the best production rec-
ord to date. To achieve this
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
high goal the regime is rely-
ing on its ability to complete
the basic socialization of ag-
riculture by the end of the
plan period.
Hanoi previously has
stressed a gradual approach to
this knotty problem, although
a recent issue of the party's
theoretical journal, Hoc Tom,
has suggested the possibility
of achieving a Chinese-style
"great leap forward" in this
field. The plan now calls for
a great majority of the nation's
farm families to be enrolled
in at least lower-level cooper-
atives by the end of the plan
period, private enterprise 'in
handicrafts and trading is also
to be virtually liquidated by
that time.
While industry is not an
area of priority attention,
the regime does hope to build
more enterprises to turn out
raw materials and to be able
by 1960 to provide a great part
of the country's needs in con-
sumer goods. Hanoi, while ask-
ing the people to rely primarily
on their own efforts in working
out the plan, acknowledges that
the assistance of other bloc
countries will be crucial. Most
of the 90-odd new industrial
plants called for in the plan
will be built with equipment
and by experts provided by bloc
countries.
In addition to ratifying
the state plan the assembly ap-
proved the membership of the
Scientific Research' Commit-
tee, a new body chaired by
Truong Chinh, vice premier and
third-ranking figure in the re-
gime. Six members of the com-
mittee are cabinet ministers,
and its secretary general is
vice minister of national de-
fense. Although the specific
function of this board remains
unclear, it may be empowered
to coordinate government-wide
operations.
In presenting the major
report to the assembly, Pre-
mier Pham Van Dong emphasized
that since mid-1958 a new "rev-
olutionary surge" has swept the
country--thus implying that
the regime feels it has moved
out of the doldrums which have
impeded progress since the land
reform fiasco of 1956-57.
President Ho Chi Minh
apologized for not having
finished the new constitution
--drafting began in December
1956--and promised it would
be ready by June. The thorn-
iest problem in writing it
centers on the approach Hanoi
should take toward South Viet-
nam and on the provisions for
re-electing Southern deputies
to the assembly. For the first
time since the armistice Hanoi
preferred to have no speaker
at this assembly session dis-
cuss its progress toward the
reunification of Vietnam, sug-
gesting that the regime now is
almost willing to admit publicly
that it has been stalemated on
this issue.
(Prepared jointly with ORR)
VENEZUELAN TAX INCREASES AFFECT FOREIGN OIL COMPANIES
The Venezuelan junta's re-
cent action increasing the or-
dinary income tax law in effect
modifies the 50-50 division oA-
profits between the government
and the oil and iron mining com-
panies, so as to grant the gov-
ernment an estimated 60 to 65
percent of the profits. The
move, retroactive on 1958 in-
come, could have an adverse
effect on the oil industry and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
on the Venezuelan economy in
general. President-elect Bet-
ancourt may seek an even higher
share of oil company profits for
the government after his in-
auguration early next year.
Although all major Vene-
zuelan parties and their lead-
ers were committed prior to the
7 December elections to seek
a revision of the 50-50 profit-
sharing with the companies, the
junta maintained that it in-
tended to honor existing ar-
rangements during its tenure.
In practice, the new retroactive
tax reportedly will give the
government at least 60 percent
of the industry's profits.
Betancourt, who claimed that he
was aware of but did not col-
laborate in the measure, had
stated he would revise profit
sharing only after careful
study and negotiation with the
companies.
The junta's action may have
been designed in part to obtain
additional revenue immediately
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
to meet obligations inherited
from former dictator Perez' re-
gime and to avoid foreign bor-
rowing, which is politically
unpalatable in Venezuela. Al-
though the junta seems responsi-
ble for the method used, the
action is likely to undermine
confidence in Betancourt and
his promises on profit-sharing
revision and to reawaken seri-
ous doubts in the business com-
munity about his intentions to-
ward private enterprise.
In a statement which ap-
parently is representative of
strong industry reaction, Pres-
ident Haight of Creole, Vene-
zuela's largest producer ac-
counting for about 40 percent
of production, denounced the
tax and the method of adoption,
and pointed out its probably
harmful economic effects. He
said some of the companies that
had paid almost $700,000,000
for new concessions granted
in 1956-57 might feel de-
frauded by the junta's
action.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUXIIfARY
CONFLICT IN THE ITALIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
The Christian Democratic
party (CD), which has dominated
the Italian Government since
the end of World War II, faces
a period of severe internal
stresses as the party secretary
general, Premier Fanfani, sup-
ported mainly by left-center
elements, strives to consoli-
date his control over the party.
The CD has always contained
a wide variety of political
views and economic pressure
groups, held together by Ca-
tholicism. Some factions are
simple interest groups like
the small farmers' organiza-
tion led by Paolo Bonomi; oth-
ers are mere personal follow-
ings. The right-wing groups,
which include such "notables"
as former Premiers Pella and
Scelba, generally favor main-
tenance of the economic status
quo and an alliance of their
party with those further to
the right such as the Liberals,
the Monarchists, and possibly
the neo-Fascists--although in
the past they have apparently
also sought temporary tactical
accords with the Communists.
The left-wing groups, which
include President Gronchi and
the important labor leader
Pastore, press for speedy im-
plementation of the large socio-
economic reform program long
since accepted by the party in
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principle. Some of these groups
favor a limited working under-
standing with the Nenni Social-
ists if they can be isolated
from their Communist allies.
One of these leftist "currents,"
Fanfani's "Democratic Initia-
tive," has been attracting in-
creasing sentiment from the
center factions and is now prob-
ably the strongest group in the
party.
The Christian Democratic
party is influenced from the
outside both by its own confed-
Fanfani's Approach
Alcide de Gasperi as party
secretary tended to leave the
various factions free to operate
with a considerable degree of
autonomy; but since De Gasperi's
death in 1954, Fanfani has been
building up his own organization
in which many of the old party
war horses have found themselves
increasingly circumscribed. In
the 1958 national elections,
Fanfani was able to consolidate
his position as party secretary
by purging many of his opponents
from the party's electoral lists.
His left-center wing emerged
from the elections as the domi-
nant element in the. party
with the support of the
enlarged Christian Democratic
labor representation.
Fanfani also has influen
tial backers in business circles.
Vittorio Valletta, head of the
FIAT. automobile firm, and Enrico
Mattei of the government oil
monopoly, ENI, are noteworthy
examples. In running the par-
ty, moreover, Fanfani tends to
be authoritarian and to regard
it mainly as his own instrument
of control.
eration of trade unions, CISL, At present most of his
and by the lay organization of backing is labor oriented, but
the Roman Catholic Church, Ca- he can count on continued labor
tholic Action, under the lead- support only to the extent that
ership of rightist Luigi Gedda. he succeeds in pressing reforms.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 December 1958
The recent decline in the in-
fluence of non-Communist unions,
which has been aggravated by
the development of a new em-
ployer-sponsored Christian Demo-
cratic union in competition
with CISL, may in the long run
weaken labor support for the
party.
Right-wing Opposition
When organizing his gov-
ernment last July, Fanfani was
obliged to give cabinet recog-
nition to such individual Chris-
tian Democratic right-wingers
as Treasury Minister Andreotti,
whose election was a personal
victory. Although these right-
wing opponents reluctantly al-
lowed Fanfani to form a coali-
tion with the Democratic So-
cialists, dependent on the be-
nevolent abstention of the Re-
publicans, the right-wingers
have on numerous occasions voted
against government-sponsored
measures in Parliament.
Right-wing resentment over
Fanfani's tightening control
was exacerbated when the pre-
mier agreed, under pressure
from the Social Democrats, to
undertake an investigation of
the Bankers Anonymous invest-
ment scandal, which involved an
implication of negligence on
Andreotti's part. The resent-
ment broke into the open when
ex-Premier Mario Scelba appar-
ently encouraged his fellow
Sicilian Christian Democrats
to disregard Fanfani's order
to disband their new regional
government formed with Commu-
nist and neo-Fascist support.
The party's right wing,
again including Scelba, was
also apparently involved in at-
tacks against Fanfani's foreign
policy. Recent extensive
changes in the Foreign Minis-
try, which Fanfani heads, have
been cited as evidence that
Italy is loosening its ties
with NATO. This rumor may have
originated with disgruntled
Foreign Ministry officials.
No drastic reorientation of
Italian foreign policy seems
in prospect, although increas-
ing economic prosperity has
encouraged greater independ-
ence in foreign affairs.
The most effective attack
on Fanfani's position is prob-
ably the systematic practice
of defeating the government in
secret parliamentary votes--
in several of which it has been
apparent-that a number of Chris-
tian Democratic deputies voted
in opposition. Fanfani met
this attack by calling for a
vote of confidence on 6 Decem-
ber, but, despite his victory,
his opponents reverted immedi-
ately to their blocking tactics,
and on 11 December he lost an-
other technical vote.
It is apparent, therefore,
that the Christian Democratic
right wing is not ready to ac-
cept responsibility for Fanfani's
overthrow in a recorded vote,
but will probably continue to
vote against him on secret bal-
lots in an attempt to destroy
his prestige. Parliament, now
in recess, is scheduled to re-
convene on 20 January, and Fan-
fani has indicated that he fears
he cannot hold the present gov-
ernment together much beyond
that time.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY : SUMMARY
31 December. 1958
Fanfani's Resources
Fanfani's great weakness
in his precarious margin of
votes in the Chamber of Depu-
ties. His strongest card at
present appears to be the back-
ing of President Gronchi. The
President can call for new
elections if the government
falls, and the Christian Demo-
cratic right-wingers fear even
greater electoral losses than
they suffered in 1958.
Earlier help may come
from the mid-January congress
,of the Nenni Socialist party
(PSI), where Nenni plans to
push a policy of independence
from the Communists and free-
dom to cooperate with the gov-
ernment on specific issues. If
the congress should result in
ITALIAN PARLIAMENT
NENNI
SOCIALISTS `:
\ (PSI)
COMMUNISTS
(PCI)
OF DEPUTIES
596 SEATS
SOUTH
TYROLEANS(SVP)
some kind of understanding be-
tween Fanfani and a large part
of Nenni's following to provide
the government a working major-
ity on social reform measures,
the premier could be freed from
dependence on his own party's
right wing. On the other hand,
should pro-Communists dominate
the PSI congress, Fanfani's
position vis-a-vis his right-
wing colleagues would be con-
siderably weakened.
Conclusions
The next few
months promise to be
critical for Fanfani's
effort to reshape the
Christian Democratic
party. He must balance
his desire to con-
solidate control over
the party against the
need to expand its
approval. He is in-
clined toward au-
thoritarian methods .within
the party, yet he must com-
promise with influential fac
tions in order to hold it to-
gether. A master of equivoca-
tion, he must also show the
vigor needed to increase
further the popular vote
won in the 1958 elec-
tions.
The Christian Democratic
congress, scheduled for next
spring, was purposely-planned
to follow the Nenni Social-
ist congress, which will be
held from 15 to 18 January.
Fanfani's effort to determine
the direction his party will
take may depend on the outcome
of that congress.
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CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS
(C Q)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY StTMRY
The 15 major territories
of French Tropical Africa, which
have a population of more than
30,000,000, have been experienc-
ing a rapid political evolution.
In 1946, Paris startled the co-
lonial world by granting full
French citizenship, including
virtually universal suffrage,
to its African subjects. Al-
though these privileges did not
bring legislative equality nor
any commitment to independence,
they led to a growth of power
at the African territorial capi-
tals and also at Dakar and Braz-
zaville, where France's West
and Equatorial African terri-
tories respectively have been
administered.
In 1956, France gave way
to the demands of African na-
tionalists and passed a basic
reform law (loi cadre) under
which territorial assemblies,
which had been largely consulta-
tive, received genuine, though
still limited, legislative pow-
ers. They gained control over
the budget and taxation and re-
ceived the right to form minis-
terial councils which, however,
were basically under the control
FrS1ERRA'
SIERA
LEONE
le
................ FRENiCH
SUDAN : ??"
.. .i' UPPER
IVORY
COAST
Abidjan_
of the French governors. By
1957 the governors' powers had
been reduced and African pre-
miers presided over the councils.
The trust territories of Cameroun
and Togo advanced even faster
and now enjoy virtually complete
autonomy.
As the territorial assem-
blies received most of the at-
tributes of self-government,
many African leaders began to
demand genuine legislative and
executive institutions at Dakar
and Brazzaville. Younger na-
tionalists, even those within
conservative African parties,
talked of a "commonwealth solu-
tion" for French Africa, and
their ideas gained rapid support.
The French Community
In line with this growing
African demand, the constitu-
tion for the Fifth Republic in-
corporates a new concept known
as the French Community, which
differs markedly from the Brit-
ish Commonwealth. The Communi-
ty--an association of Metropoli-
tan France, Algeria, overseas
departments and territories,
"; CONGO
?:'(MIDDLE
GABON `-.CONGGOO
URU I
Usumbu UAND
NDl
FRENCH 'j
SOMALI NO
OliEwti Lf
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and 12 African autonomous re-
publics which have exercised
their option to join--will be
under strong metropolitan French
influence. Through the Communi-
ty organization, Paris will
have responsibility for foreign
affairs, defense, currency, and
economic policy, and in the ab-
sence of specific agreements
with the republics it will also
control justice, higher educa-
tion, and communications. In
contrast, the Commonwealth is
composed of fully independent
nations linked by economic and
political arrangements.
The tropical African ter-
ritories which have chosen re-
public status have lost their
former representation in the
French National Assembly and
Senate, but they will be repre-
sented in the Community's Exe-
cutive Council and Senate and
entitled to participate in the
election of the President of
the French Republic, who is also
President of the Community.
The Executive Council,
though' not a cabinet, is to
carry out the instructions of
the President where Community
interests are concerned. Its
membership includes the prime
ministers of all the republics
and French cabinet ministers
with responsibility for matters
affecting Community affairs.
The council will probably be
divided equally between French
and African officials.
The Senate--a consultative
body on primarily economic af-
fairs--has no control over the
Council or President, and its
exact numerical make-up is not
specified in the Constitution.
Because delegates from both
the French and African legis-
latures will be apportioned on
the basis of population and re-
sponsibilities in the Community,
it is likely that French influ-
ence will dominate.
In Tropical Africa, only
French Somaliland and the rela-
tively unimportant Comoro Is-
lands near Madagascar chose to
remain overseas territories.
All other areas have become re-
publics, some with the intent
of exercising within a few years
their constitutional option of
achieving complete independence
through a legislative resolution
and a popular plebiscite.
The Problem of Federation
The paramount issue now
being debated in the African
republics--excluding Madagas-
car--is the question of trans-
forming the heretofore largely
administrative groupings of
West and Equatorial Africa into
politically meaningful "primary"
federations. Among African na-
tionalists there is increasing
desire for regional associations
to unite the new and unstable
states within a more viable
unit. Many French African lead-
ers--albeit suspicious of Prime
Minister Nkrumah of Ghana--are
impressed by the present efforts
of Ghana and Guinea to coordi-
nate many aspects of their for-
eign relations.
Since 1904, when govern-
ments-general were first estab-
lished at Dakar and Brazzaville,
there has been a gradual cen-
tralization of economic and ad-
ministrative liaison for the
vast areas of the two federa-
tions. The two capitals have
acquired distinct personalities,
and after World War II they took
on added importance as the po-
litical symbols of African na-
tionalism.
Stimulated by the concept
of the Community, however, the
representatives of three terri-
tories have recently attacked
the intermediate position of
the federations in favor of di-
rect ties with France. The
Ivory Coast and Gabon, rich in
resources, resent subsidizing
the poorer regions, while Cau-
casian Mauritania fears close
political identification with
the Negro territories of French
West Africa.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUYYARY
Disagreement over this is-
sue, particularly in West Africa,
may well split the leading po-
litical party in French Africa,
the African Democratic Rally
(RDA). The party's moderate
president, Felix Houphouet-
Boigny, a rich planter from the
Ivory Coast and a minister of
state in recent French govern-
ments, opposes a primary federa-
tion with strong political in-
stitutions. However, he is rap-
idly losing support within the
RDA, and several RDA-controlled
territories--including the Upper
Volta, which had been considered
strongly influenced by him--
have indicated support for a
strong federation.
Many RDA leaders, among
them Gabriel d'Arbousier, a vice
president, feel Houphouet-Boigny
is wrong in trying to oppose the
popular African federation move-
ment and in carrying on a vin-
dictive campaign against Guinea's
Sekou Toure, premier of the only
French territory to opt for im-
mediate independence and idol
of many nationalists throughout
West Africa.
Houphouet-Boigny suffered
a serious blow to his prestige
in late October when he was un-
able to control violent riots
against African workers from
Togo and Dahomey in his own po-
litical citadel of Abidjan. With-
in a few months he may retain
only the allegiance of his tight-
ly controlled organization in
the Ivory Coast and the support
of conservative tribal chief-
tains elsewhere who are rapidly
losing their influence.
The Senegal Government,
led by the rival African Regroup-
ment party (PRA), has circulated
copies of a federal constitution
to other territories; a meeting
of representatives from parties
and governments was scheduled
for late December to review
the proposed draft. PRA leaders
expect representatives from at
least six West African areas.
The constitution generally par-
allels d'Arbousier's ideas on
a strong federation and provides
for a federal president, coun-
cil, and assembly, with power
over fiscal policy and customs,
civil service, labor regulations,
the judiciary, development plans,
budget, and arbitration.
Delegations from almost
all of the new republics went
to Paris in mid-December for
consultations regarding the size
of economic and financial aid
which the African republics can
expect from France. Paris re-
portedly has attempted in vain
to work out a compromise on the
federation issue to satisfy the
Ivory Coast and forestall the
breakup of the RDA.
The situation among the
four states of French Equatorial
Africa is less complicated, but
the same dangers of Balkaniza-
tion are present. Gabon, rich
in resources, has resisted ef-
forts to create a strongly cen-
tralized federation, and Barthele-
my Boganda of Ubangi-Shari failed
in late November in his efforts
to form a Central African Re-
public embracing all four Equa-
torial territories. While pri-
mary federation has many strong
supporters, representatives of
the four territories decided in
mid-December to have only con-
sultation on a number of econom-
ic and social matters.
Cameroun and the UN
One of the greatest,stimu-
lants to African nationalism in
West Africa has been the rapid
political evolution of the trust
territories of Cameroun and To-
go, both of which have advanced
further than the other French
areas and now have been promised
independence in 1960. In the
case of Cameroun, French policy
has been under question by the
Asian-African bloc in the United
Nations, and a full-scale debate
is likely in February.
Since 1955, when the Commu-
nist-influenced Union of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM ARY
Cameroun Population (UPC) was
outlawed following violent riots
at Douala, the UPC has both con-
ducted guerrilla warfare in the
southwestern region of Cameroun
and has sent representatives to
the UN Trusteeship Council and
General Assembly to lobby against
France and the present moderate
Cameroun Government. This lobby-
ing, along with the prevalent
distrust of colonial powers
felt by several Asian nations,
has led the Asian-African bloc
to question the representative
nature of the present Cameroun
Government and to demand a
special UN-conducted plebiscite
not only on independence but
also on the leadership of the
present government.
The visiting mission which
had previously been sent to the
area did not have time to com-
ingly took the unusual step of
voting to reconvene on 20 Feb-
ruary to consider the mission's
report and to decide on the
necessary steps for Cameroun
independence in 1960.
Cameroun's problem is com-
plicated by Britain's trustee-
ship over the smaller party of
the onetime German colony
which has been administered as
part of Nigeria. The difference
in the timing of independence
for Cameroun and Nigeria--Janu-
ary as opposed to October 1960--
raises a problem for the Cam-
erounian, British, and French
officials, who favor different
solutions to the question. Lon-
don had not planned to conduct
a plebiscite in British Cam-
eroons until mid-1960, but it
now fears that a plebiscite de-
layed until after Cameroun has
plete its report--which was es- achieved independence might
sentially favorable to the French, lead the inhabitants of British
view that any further popular Cameroons to vote to rejoin
consultation is unnecessary--
before the termination of the
regular UN General Assembly in
mid-December. The assembly,
at the instigation of the Asian-
African representatives, accord-
their independent kinsmen in-
stead of selecting regional sta-
tus in a federal Nigeria. The
Camerounians, on the other hand--
unification,
and the UPC in particular--are
increasingly interested in re-
THE ROLE OF WOMEN UNDER CHINESE COMMUNISM
The Chinese Communists
have made the "liberation" of
women from household "drudg-
ery" a key feature of the com-
mune program. Peiping claims
that this step is being taken
in order to free more women
for productive labor and to
give them equal status with
Chinese males--a precondition
for the eventual achievement
of Communism. The regime ap-
parently intends to use this
feature of communal living to
make a final assault on the
traditional family system.
Assault on the Family System
Breaking down the old
Chinese family system has been
a fundamental policy of the
Chinese Communists, Tradi-
tionally the Chinese family
has assumed roles in local
government, welfare activi-
ties, and finance and business
which the Communists must take
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIMRY
over in order to perpetuate
their power. Under the old
system, male supremacy was the
order and women were relegated
to second-class citizenship.
Early in the game the Chinese
Communists decided that the
emancipation of women was the
ON A CONSTRUCTION PROJECT
IN THE MINE
SECRET
key that would unlock the tra-
dition-bound family.
With the establishment of
the present. regime in 1949,
women became equal to men un-
der law, although in fact there
was little change in their status.
ON THE FARM
IN THE FACTORY
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMItAR.Y
In May 1950 the regime enacted
a marriage law which the Commu-
nists publicized as doing for
women what land reform was to
do for the peasantry. The mar-
riage law banned. arranged and.:
child marriages, forbade po-
lygamy, concubinage, and sale
of children, facilitated di-
vorce for women, encouraged
the remarriage of widows, and
generally arranged for protec-
tion of the rights of women.
The sudden release of wom-
en after centuries of male dom-
ination resulted in excesses--
especially an alarming increase
in murders of and suicides by wom-
en--which by 1953 forced Pei-
ping to stop enforcing the mar-
riage law and to substitute a
longer term educational program.
Nevertheless, the marriage law
was a sharp blow at male suprem-
acy. and thus weakened the tra-
ditional family structure.
Peiping continued to under-
mine the family, though less
obviously than under the mar-
riage law. The regime damaged
family cohesion through a va-
riety of practices including
turning children against their
parents, spying into the activ-
ities of all members of a fam-
ily, separating family members
at will, and making party de-
cisions in matters which used
to be the prerogative of the
family head. During this early
period of the regime, women
were encouraged to work in
factories, enterprises, and of-
fices.
Economic Considerations;Communes
In 1957 larger economic
considerations dictated a sharp
reversal in the party line on
women. Concerned in late 1956
and early 1957 over numerous
problems arising from an over-
extended economy, the regime
adopted a more conservative
economic program which, among
other things, contributed to an
already troublesome labor sur-
plus. Women therefore were re-
leased from the factories and
told that their primary respon-
sibility was in the home seeing
that the country's program of
thrift and economy was carried
out in every kitchen.
Beginning early in the
spring of 1958, however, and
once again in response to a
larger economic consideration
--the "giant leap forward"--
the role of women was again re-
versed. The party began in
April to refer to housework as
"dull and trivial', and spoke of
liberating housewives from
"drudgery." These were the
early rumblings of the commune
program.
The party has clearly
stated its purpose in freeing
women for labor in the communes.
A Chinese wife answers her complaining husband:
",..You probably want to have the kind of home you
had in the past, one in which the whole fw ily served
your personal needs--wish basin filled with 4W% water
in the msrntng, your clothing properly washed and pressed,
wash basin again filled with warm water in the evening
so that you could wash your feet, and something tasty
prepared for you at night. :"his kind of life, you would
say, looks something like a home. But what kind of home
is this? It lags far behind the age in which we lips to-
day--of upsurge in every field of endeavor. It is with-
out a whit of sootalist smell!"
The employment of women will
be a "great beginning in the
transformation toward Commu-
nism of the traditional way of
life of the old society." In
other words, female participa
tion in all sorts of occupa-
tions from running mess halls
to building roads will not
only provide additional labor
but will change people's atti-
tudes.
Chinese women now are work-
ing'side by side with men in
industry and agriculture; in
such fields as culture, educa-
tion, medicine, and public
services, they are already or
are gradually working toward
running the show. In a show
of favoritism for women, Pei-
ping this past summer reserved
for female applicants over 80
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.... SECRET.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
31 December 1958
percent of a quota for techni-
cal students. However, within
the party--where women account
for about 10 percent of the
membership--and at the policy-
making level, Chinese women
are unimportant. There is as
yet no Furtseva in China.
It seems likely that in
addition to its avowed purpose
of freeing women from house-
work, Peiping also hoped that
women would be sufficiently
enthusiastic about their new
status and flattered enough
by all the sudden attention to
help push through the commune
program--which the regime
could reasonably have expected
to be unpopular. For all her
subjugation to the male, the
older Chinese woman exerted
tremendous influence and in-
SECRET
directly ran most Chinese fam-
ilies. The Communists had
earlier seized on this tradi-
tion to make Chinese women par-
ty bloc wardens--the eyes of
the party.
The inevitable result of
the emancipation of women in
the communes has been a "giant
leap forward" in the breakup
of traditional family life.
This has not been achieved with-
out apparently serious misgiv-
ings. The party has felt con-
strained to offer assurances
that members of a family will
live together in the communes.
It has not, however, withdrawn
its aim of destroying the "old
feudal patriarchal family," and
probably feels confident that
the commune is the instrument
which will accomplish this.
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