CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A002000050001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 28, 1999
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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~ONfiGuVT
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 50
OCI NO, 5645/58
26 November 1958
AUTH: I2 70.
DOCUMENT NO. r
NO QHANGE IN CLASS. 0
0 DECLAS51FIE0
CLASS. CHANGED To.
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
ARCHIVES & RECORDS CEor' ",
LY AFTER USE
7 Pnx __ o
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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UUNHDENTIAL
The Soviet Union may now,
as Chancellor Adenauer has sug-
gested to American Ambassador
Bruce, "be in the process of
altering the original script"
regarding the Berlin problem.
The Kremlin's failure to make
its Berlin proposals on 22 No-
vember as expected may indicate
that it is deliberating which
course to take to exploit West-
ern differences.
Party Secretary Ulbricht
stated in an interview with
the press on 24 November that
the Soviet note on Berlin
would appear before the week
Ulbricht's statements,
made to a British correspond-
ent, seemed particularly de-
signed to exploit what the East
Germans may feel they detect
as willingness on the part of
Britain to grant some recogni-
tion to East Germany in order
to solve the access problem.
West German and West Ber-
lin officials both publicly and
privately have taken a strong
stand against any Western deal-
ings with East Germany, even at
the technical level. Bonn's re-
luctance to consider strong
economic countermeasures against
East Germany have aroused sus-
picions in the British Foreign
Office that the Germans will
not assume their share of the
burden in the Berlin situation.
American officials in London
feel that Bonn's attitude to-
ward countermeasures may prove
a decisive influence on London's
final position when Moscow
turns over its functions to the
East Germans.
The West Germans have
signed another trade agreement
with East Germany which pur-
portedly guarantees that sup-
plies will move unhindered from
West Germany to Berlin.
Ulbricht stated that under the
new situation the Western pow-
ers would have to deal with
East Germany. He assured the
West that all East Germany
really wanted was "normal re-
lations" with the West and
that no hardships would befall
the people of West Berlin.
CONFIDENTIAL
East German Moves
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Gn-
eral Zakharov, Soviet commandant
in Berlin, recently told the
American governor of Spandau
prison that he hoped to lunch
with him there in December, im-
plying that both men will still
be in their present positions
expect
liven control over rail-
roads and roads to Berlin which
are now a Soviet responsibility,
the obligation to ensure flight
safety in the air corridors,
and control over functions re-
lated to Allied mail and tele-
graph traffic with West Ber-
lin. The East Germans foresee
a joint guarantee with West
Germany for West Berlin under
four-power sponsorship, Allied
withdrawal, full sovereignty
for Mayor Brandt's municipal
government, and normal relations
between East Germany and West
Berlin, including an agreement
on currency.
The East Germans have
taken on a few steps prepara-
tory to assuming new controls.
East German police who appeared
at a check point on the Allied
rail-access line on 21 November
may have been learning about
control functions from the Rus-
sians. Probably as a by-prod-
uct of the tensions in Berlin,
three East German police tried
to drag a Western news camera-
man across the sector border
on 23 November.
In general, the hardening
American line and Allied as-
surances that force will be
used if necessary are hav-
ing a favorable effect on
the morale of West Berlin's
populace. Uneasiness in Berlin
business circles has resulted
in some bank withdrawals and
security transfers, but there
has been no panic buying or
large-scale flight of capital.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In the Sudan, the power
structure of the new regime and
the amount of authority wielded
by the regime's leader, General
Abboud, remain unclear.
Although Cairo has openly
praised the Sudanese's Army's
move, its official attitude re-
mains cautious. No moves of
consequence have been made to
improve the Sudan's previously
strained relations with the
UAR, although Abboud has ex-
pressed his intention to do so.
The visit of a Soviet aid mis-
sion to the Sudan has again
been postponed.
Syria-Jordan
Indications of Syrian dis-
satisfaction with the UAR and
of possible new difficulties
for Cairo in the UAR's northern
region continues to be received.
The most potent factors in the
disaffection include implemen-
tation of Nasir's hastily pro-
mulgated land reform program,
replacement of Syrian officials
and military personnel by Egyp-
tians, and the prospect of
further economic dislocation.
The disgruntled elements, how-
ever, appear to be primarily
members of conservative groups
never counted on by Nasir or
the Syrian Baathists for polit-
ical support, and against whose
vested interests the current
reform movement is directed.
A serious challenge to the re-
gime in Syria appears possible
only in the unlikely event
that the dissident conserva-
tive elements are supported by
the army.
Reports of dissatisfaction
in Syria have moved Jordan's
Premier Rifai to express hope
of encouraging Syria to break
from the UAR, and to suggest
that the Syrians could be in-
duced to unite with Jordan un-
der King Husayn. UAR security
measures appear adequate to
maintain control in Syria, how-
ever, and Rifai's proposal,
which could bring down new
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 November 1958
troubles on Jordan, appear pri-
marily a bid for more Western
financial support. Although
Syria has permitted resumption
of overland and air travel to
and from Jordan via Syria, eco-
nomic warfare against Jordan con-
tinues in the form of harassment
of Jordanian commercial vehicles.
Arab-Israeli Situation
Although the Israelis have
halted work on drainage projects
on disputed land in the demili-
tarized zone south of Lake Hula
on the Syrian border, new ex-
changes of fire on 19 and 20
November resulted from Israeli
efforts to set out stakes mark-
ing land in the demilitarized
zone for which Jewish ownership
is claimed. Local observers
described the situation south
of Lake Hula as "seething," and
further local encounters are
expected.
In the Jerusalem area, con-
tinuing Israeli patrolling of
disputed land on Mount Scopus
has drawn repeated Jordanian
protests to the Mixed Armistice
Commission. The Jordanian com-
mander in Jerusalem, however,
is believed under instructions
to maintain quiet along the
frontier and on Mount Scopus.
Ten British-made Hawker
Hunter jet fighters, given to
Jordan under American military
aid, arrived in Amman on 25
November. Two other Hunters
were previously delivered,
overflying Egypt.
FRENCH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS
The sharp losses suffered
by the French Communist party
in the 23 November primary elec-
tions and the virtual disap-
pearance of extreme'rightists
like Pierre Poujade suggest
that the 30 November runoff
will give the nonextremist
forces in the National Assembly
more maneuverability than they
have had since the war. The
expected preponderance of Gaull-
ist deputies and apprehension
over Jacques Soustelle's aims
will probably influence the
Socialists--who will now be
free to quit the government
without threatening the regime
--to go into opposition in the
hope of attracting the weakened
center parties and some of the
disparate elements represented
in Soustelle's New Republic
Union (UNR).
The considerable decline
in the Communist party's (PCF's)
electoral support from a post-
war average of 25 percent to
18.9 percent on 23 November is
the first major break in the
PCF's grip. Many Communist
electoral followers who were
never swayed by the economic
gains made under the Fourth Re-
public seem to see a genuine
hope in De Gaulle.
There is some danger, how-
ever, that the Communists may
now be able to achieve closer
ties with other leftist groups
which will be more susceptible
to popular-front appeals because
of the consolidation of rightist
forces under Soustelle. The PCF
is backing the few independent
left-wing candidates who survived
the 23 November elections.
The bitter Communist de-
nunciations of the Socialist
party as fundamentally no dif-
ferent than the Independents
make extremely unlikely any
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 November 1958
broad rapprochement on the left.
The Socialists will probably
dissociate themselves from the
goverinment coalition, however,
and strive to build a "loyal
opposition," looking'for sup-
port among the reduced forces
of the old center parties and
among those New Republic Union
deputies who are unwilling to
accept Soustelle's full pro-
gram.
De Gaulle's desire to
block a UNR landslide is appar-
ent in the statement by his .
loyal follower Edmond Michelet,
co-founder with Soustelle of
the UNR, that UNR candidates
would withdraw in favor of top
non-Communists in the runoffs
even where the leading candi-
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date was a Socialist. The de-
cision of most UNR candidates
to stay in the race, however,
probably reflects Soustelle's
determination to push for as
large a party as possible.
While the danger of a
Soustelle-dominated assembly
cannot be discounted, he will
not have free rein in the new
assembly, even if the Algerian
deputies form a solid conserva-
tive bloc. He will have to
contend with a strong Independ-
ent contingent and a wide vari-
ety of political views within
the UNR, and above all he may
have to weigh the conse-
quences of an o en break
with De Gaulle.
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CURRENT I C~NFf DENT SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOVIET TACTICS IN GENEVA CONFERENCES
The Soviet bloc delegates
at both Geneva conferences con-
centrated last week on estab-
lishing a record which they hope
will place on the West the onus
for any failure to reach agree-
ment. There were no hints of
any major changes in bloc posi-
tions. In formal meetings and
private conversations with West-
ern delegates, bloc representa-
tives attempted to probe the
firmness of Western views on ma-
jor issues in both meetings.
In the talks on nuclear
test cessation, the Soviet dele-
gate continued to direct his
attack on what Moscow regards
as the most vulnerable points
in the Western position--the
short-term implication of a year-
by-year extension of a test sus-
pension and the linking of a
test-cessation agreement to
progress on other disarmament
measures. In the meeting of 21
November, Soviet delegate Tsarap-
kin tried to test the firmness
of this position by a direct
question to the American dele-
gate.
Tsarapkin contended that a
link to other disarmament ques-
tions would render any cessation
treaty "conditional, purposeless,
and without prospects" and stated
that his delegation was author-
ized to discuss only test cessa-
tion. On 24 November he insisted
that the conference begin the ac-
tual drafting of a test-cessa-
tion agreement. He strongly re-
jected Western requests for So-
viet views on a control organ
and reiterated the standard So-
viet refusal to discuss controls
until the West agrees to a per-
manent cessation. Tsarapkin de-
clared 'that the USSR has
reached the limits of its con-
cessions.
Moscow appears confident
that its demand for an immediate
agreement in principle on a per-
manent test cessation contrasts
favorably with the Western posi-
tion, which makes extension of
a year-by-year suspension con-
ditional not only on satisfacto-
ry progress in installing a con-
trol system, but also on prog-
ress on other disarmament meas-
ures.
Surprise Attack
Soviet bloc moves in the
talks last week on measures to
prevent surprise attack were
aimed at strengthening the bloc's
case that the West is seeking
to evade agreement on "practi-
cal measures" by insisting on
an abstract, technical approach
to the problem. Bloc delegates
charge that the West is inter-
ested only in controls and the
collection of intelligence in-
formation, not on specific meas-
ures. They argue that the bloc
approach is more realistic be-
cause it deals with causes, not
symptoms, of surprise attack.
In a private talk with
the chief American delegate on
21 November, Soviet delegate
Kuznetsov probed the American
position that the talks should
be confined to nonpolitical,
technical problems. He said
the USSR believes it is impossi-
ble to agree on a complete sys-
tem at this time, in view of
the mutual hostility and suspi-
cion, but he claimed that Moscow
hopes for a gradual introduction
of measures which would reduce
the danger of surprise attack.
Kuznetsov stated that the
USSR is willing to accept ground
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
observers and limited aerial
photography, but only if these
are accompanied by "practical
measures." He advocated a step-
by-step approach, with controls
broadened as disarmament meas-
ures are implemented. He spe-
cifically noted that the lack
of agreement on banning nuclear
weapons sets limits on measures
for preventing surprise attack.
This line reflects Moscow's
earlier notes, which insisted
that surprise-attack talks would
be useful only if they resulted
in recommendations "in combina-
tion with definite steps in the
sphere of disarmament."
The chief American delegate
believes that if the talks make
no progress, Kuznetsov may soon
abruptly suggest a recess of
the conference. Kuznetsov said
on 21 November that the Western
position during the week of 24
November would determine whether
any real progress in the next
two weeks is possible. This
statement suggests that Moscow
may be preparing for an early
break off.. The Soviet note of
15 September stated that the
talks should be concluded with-
in four or five weeks.
(Concurred in by OSI)
IMPACT OF TAIWAN STRAIT CRISIS ON CHINESE NATIONALISTS
The recent offshore islands
crisis has led the Chinese Na-
tionalist Government to adopt
a more realistic attitude toward
its goal of recovering the China
mainland and may result in more
emphasis on the development of
the Taiwan economy. Defensive-
ly, Nationalist military capa-
bilities have improved since
the start of the Taiwan crisis;
Chiang Kai-shek's leadership
has not been seriously threat-
ened; and the present National-
ist leaders have shown no in-
clination to negotiate with the
Chinese Communists.
As a result of the Taiwan
Strait crisis, Taipei now clear-
ly recognizes its dependence on
the United States for both po-
litical and military support.
Throughout the crisis, except
in a few instances, Nationalist
military leaders remained re-
sponsive to United States mili-
tary advice and requests, and
they attempted few military op-
erations without prior consul-
tation.
The Nationalists also real-
ize more clearly the impossibil-
ity of a counterattack on the
mainland under present circum-
stances. The Chiang-Dulles com-
muniqud, in which the National-
ists tacitly recognized this
fact, was criticized both in
Taiwan and abroad among those
Chinese who favor the National-
ists, but its critics in many
cases were forced to accept the
truth of many of the communiqud's
statements.
While the Nationalists can-
not officially abandon the "coun-
terattack" as a hope and a slo-
gan, acceptance of the return
to the mainland as at best a long-
term goal should have a salutary
effect on Taiwan. Supporters
of the communiqud among "liber-
al" Chinese Nationalists declared
that the government should hence-
forth pay less attention to re-
covery of the mainland and con-
centrate on the economic devel-
opment of Taiwan. The fact that
Taipei on 20 November adopted a
single exchange-rate system--a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
reform long needed to spur ex-
ports--suggests a desire for
such development. Initially,
the exchange-rate reform will
produce a loss of revenue to
the government at a time when
additional funds are sorely need-
ed to meet the expenditures
necessitated'by the strait cri-
sis.
It seems unlikely that any
Nationalist official of high
rank has been tempted by renewed
Chinese Communist negotiation
offers or defection proposals.
The native Taiwanese ap-
peared to be quite indifferent
to the fate of the offshore
islands and, in fact, opposed
to their retention by the National-
ist Government. Nevertheless,
these differences did not pose
serious problems for Nationalist
security forces and have not
appreciably increased the exist-
ing antipathy between the Tai-
wanese and mainlander groups.
The Taiwanese troops on the off-
shore islands performed well.
Militarily, the Nationalist
troops proved effective, and
morale was maintained even under
the heavist periods of Chinese
Communist fire. The Nationalist
Air Force lost only one aircraft
in combat and may have shot down
as many as 30 Communist fighters.
The Nationalist Navy, however,
performed poorly in the initial
stages of the Communist attempt
to interdict Chinmen Island,
and the Nationalist high command
proved itself incapable of plan-
ning without extensive American"
coaching. Nevertheless, the
Nationalist military demonstrated
ability to operate capably when
provided with ample United 25X1
States aid and advice, and this
has strengthened the presti e
and morale of the forces.
Peiping's growing pique with
New Delhi was expressed specif-
ically--if unofficially--at the
recent Tashkent Writers' Con-
ference when.a group of Chinese
Communist authors bitterly crit-
icized Indian foreign policy.
From Peiping's point of
view, India is a major rival.
Both are emergent powers strug-
gling from agrarian poverty to
build an integrated economy on
an industrial basis. Peiping's
aspiration to Asian leadership
through the example of Commu-
nism is basically threatened by
the possibility of India's suc-
cess under a democratic form of
government.
Although India has con-
sistently played the role of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
champion to Peiping's inter-
national objectives, there have
long been indications New Delhi
harbored latent suspicion of
its northern neighbor's long-
range intentions. Communist
China's unqualified support for
Soviet intervention in Hungary
and for the ensuing execution
of Nagy served to heighten this
apprehension,,..as':did:thesevere
repression of those who ventured
to criticize the Peiping regime
when encouraged to do so by Mao
Tse-tung.
Communist China's feud with
Yugoslavia and its resort to
force in the Taiwan
Strait have also
alarmed many Indians.
In addition, Commu-
nist China has si-
phoned off a large
part of the tradi-
tional trade between
India and Tibet and
is making serious
inroads on India's
textile markets in
Southeast Asia.
As the Indians
became less vocal in
their support of Com-
munist China's .for.-
eign policy goals,
Peiping reacted with
increasing coolness.
This has been most noticeable in
the Tibetan area, where inter-
ests and influence of the two
nations overlap. Conscious
of Indian sensitivity over the
northern borders, Peiping never-
theless continues to print maps
showing Tibetan boundaries well
inside India and procrastinates
on any settlement of the dis-
puted regions along the Him-
alayan frontier.
The reported capture of
an Indian'patrol in Kashmir
by the Chinese and a.clash with
Chinese troops in Assam during
October in which three Indian
soldiers were wounded testify
to Communist China's.willing-
ness to engage in minor skir-
mishes with India.
Well aware of Nehru's in-
fluence in Tibet, the Chinese
Communists in late summer dis-
couraged his plans to visit
that country. When Nehru
traveled to Bhutan instead,
Chinese officials delayed his
visa to transit a.small corner
of Tibet, refused to allow en-
try of two radios carried by
the party, and forced the prime
minister, through a "trans-
portation mix-up," to drop ten
people from his entourage.
Annoyed by New Delhi's re-
luctance to join enthusiastical-
ly in the Peiping chorus on the
Taiwan Strait and by this year's
less aggressive Indian support
in the United Nations, Peiping's
unofficial attitude toward India
will probably continue to be
assertive and less cooperative
on such questions as the border
settlement. Despite this pol-
icy, Communist China probably
will avoid major unpleasantness
with New Delhi and is likely
to maintain the appearance of
good will, though with less
fervor than in the past.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Prime Minister Kishi's mis-
handling of the controversial
bill to strengthen police powers
and his submission, following
strong public criticism, to So-
cialist demands that the bill be
shelved are stimulating renewed
factionalism in the government
party.
The government's attempts
to railroad the bill through the
Diet precipitated a 17-day par-
liamentary crisis, incited
severe public and press denun-
ciation of Kishi, and forced him,
over strong objections from im-
portant elements in his own
party, to shelve the bill, at
least until the regular session
of the Diet beginning in Decem-
ber. Kishi has stated that he
will determine the trend of pub-
lic opinion before deciding
whether or not to submit an
amended version at that time.
The tenuous unity which had
prevailed in the ruling Liberal-
Democratic party since Kishi was
elected prime minister early in
1957 appears to have been broken
in this crisis. Ichiro Kono,
strong man of the former Hato-
yama government, was especially
opposed to compromise with the
Socialists and seems intent on
perpetuating conservative dis-
cord in order to undermine Kishi
and enhance his own power within
the conservative party.
The prestige of the conserv-
atives has been damaged momen-
tarily in this crisis, but long-
term public attitudes toward
Japan's two major political
parties probably will not be
altered. A challenge to Kishi
for the presidency of the rul-
ing party in the spring of 1959
could result from this crisis,
however. In addition, Kishi's.
ability to maintain a firm line
against closer relations with
Communist China under present
circumstances could be undercut
by conservative elements who
desire efforts toward a rap-
prochement with Peiping.
The crisis could also
cause complications for Kishi's
policy of close cooperation with
the United States. The Social-
ists, flushed with their success
in opposing the police measure,
now are planning measures to
block Diet ratification of a
revised security treaty with the
United States which is under
negotiation. In an effort to
gain public support, the Social-
ists are asserting with some
success that passage of the po-
lice bill is the price that the
Kishi government has had to pay
to gain American agreement to
revise the security treaty.
TENSION CONTINUES BETWEEN PHILIPPINE POLITICIANS AND ARMED FORCES
Tension between politicians
and top Philippine defense offi-
cials is continuing despite Pres-
ident Garcia's public posture
that the issue of alleged mili-
tary plotting against his admin-
istration is closed. Pro-Garcia
congressmen still appear deter--
mined to force the early removal
of Defense Secretary Vargas and
to staff the military command
with politically loyal officers.
On 15 November, Congressman
Bartolome Cabangbang, who is
close to Garcia and reportedly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
aspires to become defense secre-
tary, made public portions of a
memorandum to the President pur-
porting to "document" planning
for a military coup and a public
build-up of Vargas.
Cabangbang and other con-
gressmen have demanded a thor-
ough investigation of the alleg-
ed plot and recommended that
present defense and intelligence
service officials be replaced,
that units of the Philippine's
one regular army division be
dispersed, and that the 10,000-
man constabulary be separated
from the general staff and placed
under a revived department of
interior. The congressmen's de-
mands suggest that if there is
not a major reshuffle of the de-
fense leadership prior to the
January session of Congress, they
may make a serious effort to cut
defense appropriations, with
little concern for the recent
military reorganization which
emphasizes divisional training.
The congressional attacks
lend substance to claims by the
military that Garcia politicians
are aiming at Nacionalista party
control of the armed forces to
assure that the increasingly un-
popular Garcia administration
does not face election defeat.
As a result, discontent in armed
forces circles may be growing
and serious planning for mili-
tary counteraction could be stim-
ulated.
Military leaders also may
be alarmed that cuts in defense
appropriations could jeopardize
their request for additional
American military aid which re-
quires adequate Philippine budg-
etary support. Chief of Staff
Arellano is said to be consider-
ing resigning in order to drama-
tize the armed forces' case.
Rumors that American offi-
cials were involved in planning
a take-over by the Philippine
military could foreshadow an
attempt to make the United
States a scapegoat in the pres-
ent political situation. Such
charges would probably gain wide
acceptance among Filipinos who
still tend to associate the
United States with any Major
development in their country,
and could result in an increas-
ingly uncompromising position
by the Garcia administratiocon-
cerning American bases.
Chief Minister Lim Yew
Hock's program for countering
the growing strength of the Com-
munist-influenced People's Ac
tion party (PAP) in Singapore
finally appears to be making
progress. After many months of
negotiations, the Singapore
People's Alliance (SPA) has been
formed and appears to have ob-
tained the support of the strong-
est elements in the Labor Front,
Liberal Socialists, and Workers
parties. The SPA promises to
become the only moderate party
of any consequence in Singapore,
although skeletal Labor Front
and Liberal Socialist parties
will probably continue to exist.
Despite the signs of grow-
ing unity among Singapore mod-
erates, there probably is insuf-
ficient time for the SPA to
create an effective grass-roots
organization capable of defeating
the PAP in the general elections
early next year. Probably the
most the SPA can hope for at
this stage is to elect enough
candidates to develop an effec-
tive parliamentary opposition.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Lim is apparently planning
several moves which he hopes
will embarrass and weaken the
PAP. The recent 18-14 vote
against a PAP motion in the city
council to hold new council
elections suggests that Lim's
behind-the-Scenes efforts to
unify the non-PAP members in
order to unseat PAP Mayor Ong
Eng Guan next month may be
Lim tends to rely too
much on such peripheral projects
at the expense of bringing his
considerable talents to bear on
developing an effective party
organization.
Lim- may?,make limited changes
in his cabinet at the 3 December
meeting of the Legislative As-
sembly in order to reflect the
broader base of the .SPA. The'
most significant shift reported
is Lim's plan to take over the
Ministry of Education from the
controversial Chew Swee Kee.
This move would foreshadow a
campaign by Lim to gain student
support for the SPA in order to
counteract the significant role
students have played in a ent
PAP electoral vi e
The political situation in I continue to decline, a scramble
Thailand is marked by increas-
ing uncertainty. Marshal Sarit's
recent detention of widely pop-
ular Air Marshal Dawee and
several others on an ill-founded
suspicion of coup plotting il-
lustrates his increasingly
capricious behavior. There is
a possibility that his followers
in the military group may even-
tually band together in self de-
fense in an attempt, to depose him.
Sarit's poor health may
become an increasingly impor-
tant factor, both in the dis-
charge of his heavy duties and
in the incentive it provides
some of his ambitious followers'
to lay plans for future power.
for power among his present mil-
itary followers would be likely
to ensue which would seriously
threaten Thailand's precarious
political stability.
Any probable successor to
Sarit would most likely continue
Thailand's pro-Western,orienta-
tion, but with varying degrees
of wholeheartedness. Lt. Gen.
Prapat,
interior m n ster m e Thanom
government, is frequently men-
tioned as Sarit's most likely
successor. He in particular
might give a more nationalist
bent to Thai foreign policy
within the limits of an essen-
tially pro-Western alignment.
Prapat disavows any early am,-
bition for full power, however,
and might content himself with
biding his time while permitting
Thanom or Major General Krit
Punnakan, both of whom are
moderates and strongly pro-West-
ern, to struggle with the
serious immediate problems
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
which would result from Sarit's
sudden departure.
GHANA AND GUINEA TO FORM CONFEDERATION
The decision of Ghana and
Guinea on 23 November to form a
confederation will stimulate
nationalism in West Africa and,
if effectively implemented,
furnish the nucleus for a possi-
ble future West African federa-
tion of over 60,000,000 people.
Although both prime ministers
have agreed to adopt a common
flag and to harmonize their de-
fense, foreign, and economic
policies, a confederation would
have to permit both states wide
autonomy in internal affairs.
Ghana and Guinea lack a common
language, similar political
traditions, and tribal ties,
while their national leaders,
Kwame Nkrumah and Sekou Toure,
have been considered rivals for
influence among nationalists'. in
West Africa.
Confederation will not
take place until Ghana becomes
a republic, expected to occur
after Queen Elizabeth's visit
in October 1959. The delay
will permit both states to com-
plete parliamentary approval
of the new arrangement, to draw
up a constitution, and enable
Guinea to clarify its interna-
tional status.
Ghana's Prime Minister
Nkrumah can be expected to take
full propaganda advantage of
this popular nationalist move at
the conference of African na-
tionalist organizations to begin
in Accra on 5 December. In addi-
tion, he now may be able to ex-
pand his influence in the French-
speaking areas of West Africa.
Sekou Toure has returned to
Conakry with a promise from
Ghana of economic credits total-
ing $28,000,000 at a time when
his country feels acutely the
massive withdrawal of French
administrators, technicians,
and economic assistance. Toure
also has received a token of in-
ternational friendship at a time
when Premier de Gaulle of France
has indicated continued intran-
sigence toward Guinea.
The agreement may serve
Western interests, in the short
run at least, by aligning Guinea
with a state which is at least
not anti-Western. This may
counter Communist gains in Cona-
kry resulting from prompt bloc
recognition and from the visit
of East German and Czech eco-
nomic delegations.
A confederation of the two
states'is likely, however, to
raise international problems.
Nationalists in several of the
dependent West African terri-
tories will be stimulated in
their activity while antigovern-
ment agitation may be encouraged
in Liberia and the Ivory Coast,
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25X1
25X1
whose present leaders are opposed
to the' concept of,federation:
Furthermore, the position of the
two states within the British
and French spheres of influence--
both economic and political--
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
GUINEA
RIO MUN
Trust
Territory
FRENCH ,
QUATORIA
AFRICA
UAR
(EGYPT)
SUDAN10
B E L 0 1 A N A
CONGO:
FEDERATION OF
RHODESIA ANDI
WAIVISBAAI
(U. of So. Africa)
Mandate
SOUTH-
WEST
AFRICA
RUANDA-
URUNDI
OF BASUTOLAND
SOUTH AFRICA
African nationalism will
receive another strong psycho-
logical boost when representa-
tives from nationalist organiza-
tions in most independent and
dependent African territories
meet in Accra, Ghana's capital,
between 5 and 12 December. This
nongovernmental gathering--hailed
by its promoters as the sixth in
a series of "pan-African" con-
gresses staged heretofore out-
SECRET
Colony,
Protectorate,
etc.
raises problems.
BR.
CAMEROONS'-:';
NIGERIA
AFRICA
ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS
United Kingdom
France
Belgium
Portugal
Spain
Italy
Union of
South Africa
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
side Africa--appears certain to
be appreciably more inflammatory
and more stridently neutralist
than was the meeting of eight
independent African states held
last April, also under the aegis
of Ghana's ambitious Prime Min-
ister Nkrumah.
Invitations to the meeting
have been extended to all "pro-
gressive" organizations with the
aim of assembling some 500 "of-
ficial" delegates representing
100 such groups. "Fraternal"
delegates, drawn from among in-
dividuals and organizations out-
side Africa, and "observers,"
have also been invited. Appar-
ently no invitation went to any
Communist party, trade union,
or similar organization in any
Communist country, but bids may
have been extended to indivi-
duals in such areas.
Nkrumah indicated last sum-
mer that the conference would
prepare a "blueprint" to guide
the "struggle for independence"
in the dependent territories.
Other proposed topics of
discussion include: the de-
mands of Africans in multira-
cial territories for land, vot-
ing equality, and implementa-
Tribal unrest in outlying
areas in Morocco, attacks against
the ruling Istiglal party, and
increasing incidents of hooligan-
ism seem to have precipitated
the resignation, reported on 25
tion of the UN Human Rights
Declaration.; the problems cre-
ated by "existing artificial
frontiers"; and the "amalgama-
tion or federation" of indepen-
dent African states. Delegates
from dependent areas reportedly
will be urged to adopt a pas-
sive resistance plan--presumably
including economic boycotts--
toward the colonial powers.
The nongovernmental charac-
ter of the conference and the
fact that the great majority of
the participants will represent
movements still struggling to
throw off colonial rule will play
into the hands of nationalist
and pro-Communist extremists at
the meeting. Furthermore, many
prominent moderate nationalists
from places like Nigeria, French
West Africa, and Liberia will
probably not attend, partly to
avoid identification with what
they believe will be minority
positions. Nasir's UAR, on the
other hand, appears to be ready-
ing a strong delegation, and the
Cairo-based Afro-Asian Solidarity
Secretariat has announced plans
to send a five-member delegation,
including nationals of the USSR
and Communist China.
ern "imperialism. c'
as a backdrop for its regular
propaganda attacks against West-
Moscow, which has reported-
ly requested invitations for two
Soviet observers, has already
begun to exploit the conference 25X1
November, of Premier Ahmed Balafrej.
The long-standing government cri-
sis was intensified last week
when Vice Premier Bouabid with-
drew from the government. Boua-
bid is the leader of Istiglal's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE-WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 November 1958
left wing, which has persisted
in its attempts to wrest the
army and security forces from
the King's direct
control.
Tribal unrest
culminated in several
bombings at widely
separated locations
during the national
holidays from 16 to 18
November. The most
flagrant bombing oc-
curred on 18 November
at Khemisset, about
60 miles east of Ra-
bat where one person
was killed and more
than 100 injured. On
the same day the King
in his traditional
Feast of the Throne--
state of the union--
message, expressed
grave displeasure and
concern over the pro-
longed discord and
they may hope to force him. to
take a stronger stand in curb-
ing the party's political power.
Ceuta
0 CANARY ISLANDS
elilla ""`~
I=P,
Oujda
6f `W1
JNO
Py
t ^ ? ~ ` J ~ ? * A LG ERIA
-_-__----71 ' Tindouf
GIBRALTAR
(U.K.)
SPANISH SAHARA
appealed for national unity and
self-discipline.
The bombing at Khemisset
and most other terrorist inci-
dents--except the assassination
of a French attorney in Rabat
on 23 November and the destruc-
tion of a radio antenna at Oujda
on 24 November, which are attrib-
uted to extremist French ele-
ments---are believed to have been
inspired by the illegal Popular
Movement. This group is led by
persons who have been close to
the King and who are believed to
have been encouraged by him to
form a political organization
to oppose the Istiglal. The
movement's leaders have been
partly aroused by the belief
that Istiqlal has been making
progress toward curtailing royal
prerogatives. Their defiance
suggests impatience with the King's
temporizing with Istiqlal, and
One result of the dissi-
dents' campaign has been to
unite the King more closely
with his Istiglal-dominated
government in an effort to put
down the defiance of central
authority. He pointed out in
his throne speech that dissen-
sion was prejudicial to national
prestige and interest, a theme
Istiglal had already expressed
in more partisan terms.
On the other hand, the King
revealed that he is about to pro-
mulgate the long-promised code of
civil and political liberties de-
manded by the Popular Movement.
Such a code, by permitting the
opposition to carry on political
activities, would challenge the
almost monopolistic political
position of the Istiglal party.
Aware of this possibility, some
of Istiglal's leaders now may be
prepared to compromise with the
King.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY'SUMARY
THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF EAST GERMANY
The increase in East Ger-
man industrial production at
the end of the third quarter
points to a rate of growth of
about 10 percent for the year.
This would be a substantial
overfulfillment of the indus-
trial plan, which called for a
7-percent increase. In late
1957, economic problems caused
a downward revision of. the
goals for the Five-Year Plan
(1956-60) from 55 to 34 percent
above 1955 production levels.
These goals have since been
raised to about 42 percent.
EAST GERMAN
GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
(ANNOUNCED PERCENTAGE INCREASE OVIM
PREVIOUS YEAR)
The high production rate
this year results largely from
overfulfillment in the produc-
tion of finished and processed
goods, especially in the light-
engineering and food industries.
Increases in output of basic in-
dustrial goods are small, and
no overfulfillment is likely.
The bulk of this year's rise
apparently resulted from in-
creased shipments of industrial
raw materials from the USSR,
which for the first time per-
mitted the full use of East Ger-
many's industrial capacity. A
corresponding increase is un-
likely next year.
Favorable weather has pro-
vided East Germany with a good
harvest, permitting food in-
dustries to maintain output at
a high rate, which has obviated
any serious consequences from
the end of food rationing in
May.
One of East Germany's most
serious problems continues to
be the flight of refugees to
the West--a ceaseless drain of
intellectual and productive
power. The rate of flight has
been running well below last
year's average of 22,000 ex-
capees per month, but current
refugee totals contain a high
number of scientists, scholars,
physicians, engineers, and tech-
nicians.
Large sums of money are
being spent to expand the Baltic
port of Rostock to take over
the handling of almost 2,000,000
tons of trade cargo now trans-
iting the West German port of
Hamburg. In support of this
program, a new waterway connect-
ing Rostock with the Elbe River
is to be started in 1959. Ac-
cording to party Secretary Ul-
bricht, the prime motive for
this construction is the saving
of foreign exchange now being
expended in Hamburg, but it is
also probable that another con-
sideration is the reduction in
East German vulnerability to
West German retaliation for
harassment of the supply lines
to West Berlin. Should the
port of Hamburg be closed to
East German cargoes, East Ger-
man trade could use the Polish
Baltic ports after a temporary
disruption of trade.
The modest increase of 7 per-
cent in foreign trade turnover
probably conceals an imbalance,
especially with Western coun-
tries. For example, East
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
German exports to West Germany
are lagging by about $25,000,-
000 behind imports from that
country.
Limiting factors in inter-
zonal trade, which annually ac-
counts for about 12 percent of
total East German trade--about
$200,000,000--are the East'Ger-
men inability to offer a wider
variety of goods and a lack of
West German demand for those
goods which are available. Al-
though coal and steel are fore-
most among East Germany's imports
from West Germany, a wide variety
of other products are imported as
well, and these two items consti-
tute only 4 and 10 percent, re-
spectively,-of total East German
coal and steel imports. Thus
West German exports are not vital.
to East Germany's economy. The
bloc accounts for about 75 per-
cent of East Germany's trade.
(Prepared by ORR) 25X1
CHANGES IN OUTER MONGOLIAN LEADERSHIP
Prime Minister Yunzha
Tsedenbal was named party first
secretary of the Mongolian Peo-
ple's Revolutionary party at
a recent plenary session of the
central committee. He succeeds
Dordj Damba, who was demoted
to second secretary "at his own
request." Thus, Tsedenbal at
42 has once again assumed lead-
ership over outer
Mongolian party and
government affairs.
This places him in a
dual-power role sim-
ilar to that occu-
pied by Soviet Pre-
mier Khrushchev, with
whom he conferred
in Moscow late last
month.
Two other mem-
bers of the nine-man
politburo were down-
graded in order to
facilitate Tsedenbal's
new appointment. Party
second secretary Su-
runzhab was appointed
first vice chairman
of the Council of Ministers, and
Ulan Bator party boss Damdin was
also demoted.
Tsedenbal became premier in
May 1952, and for two years head-
ed both state and party struc-
tures. In 1954 he relinquish-
_ed his party post"to'Damba, ap-
parently in an attempt to con-
form to the then current Soviet
emphasis on collective leader-
ship. At the Outer Mongolian
party congress last March,Damba
harshly attacked Choibalsan,
Stalin-like leader of Mongolia
from 1932 until. his death in
1952, and charged that the cult
of personality had led to fla-
grant violations of "revolutiop-
ary legality" and a downgrading
of:the role of the party.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUIMUY
The Soviet news agency
TASS has commented that the new
appointments were made for "bet-
ter centralization of leader-
ship" in the Soviet Union's old-
est satellite. Thus it appears
that Outer Mongolia, which
faithfully followed Moscow's re-
evaluation of Stalin following
the 20th party congress four
years ago, is continuing to
conform not only with the line
set by the USSR, but in many
respects to its pattern of lead-
ership changes as well.
NETHERLANDS COALITION DIFFICULTIES
The Netherland's quadripar-
tite coalition government, formed
in 1956, has recently been show-
ing signs of increased insta-
bility which could result in a
cabinet crisis before the sched-
uled 1960 national elections.
The American Embassy in '..The
Hague anticipates that, in view
of this possibility, the gov-
ernment will henceforth be com-
pelled to move "quite gingerly"
on foreign as well as domestic
policy issues and would be vir-
tually stalemated for months if
a crisis should occur.
The public is increasingly
dissatisfied with the succession
of postwar multiparty govern-
ments which have been difficult
to form and rigid in policy, and
which have largely eliminated
any real opposition. The pres-
ent difficulties, however, are
largely the result of efforts
of the Labor party, leader of
the governing coalition, to de-
velop political issues which
might improve its chances of
recouping its waning political
strength. Labor parliamentary
leader Burger has brought mat-
ters to a head by declaring that
his party no longer feels obliged
to support the government pro-
gram, even though the leader of
the Labor party is Prime Minis-
ter Drees.
Last spring's provincial
and municipal elections pointed
to an eventual eclipse of the
two small Protestant parties in
the present national coalition
and the emergence of only three
main groups: Catholic, Labor,
and Liberal. A coa-
lition government of
Catholics and one of
the other two groups
could well result
from new elections.
P
Dutch domestic
and foreign policy
would not be greatly
changed by a new cabi-
net. A new two-party
government would per-
haps be able to fol-
low a more flexible
policy on the Nether-
25X1
la~3ds New Guinea question, which
has been deadlocked for years
because of interparty bickering.
New elections, on the other
hand, might adversely affect
the size of the Netherlands com-
mitment to NATO, since there'is
some agitation for a reduction
in the level of Dutch defense
expenditures and some public 25X1
criticism that the Netherlands
contributes more than its pro-
portionate share to NATO.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 November 1958
BRAZIL'S ECONOMIC STABILIZATION EFFORTS
Brazilian President Kubit-
schek's order of 18 November
imposing emergency price con-
trols on various basic commodi-
ties and services will probably
do little to stop agitation
over the rising cost of living.
It may even have prejudiced
chances for congressional enact-
ment of the government's basic
economic stabilization program
by diverting public attention
to a subsidiary question.
The emergency measures
were apparently a response to
riots in five state capitals
protesting the cost
of living, beginning
with a riot on 30
October in Sao Paulo
over bus fares. Some
observers believe the
riots were planned
and led by Com-
munists and have nct-
ed that in four of
the cities demon-
strators highlighted
the steep increase
in the price of gas-
oline, attributing
this to US oil com-
panies.
The government has hoped
the problem would be solved by
its monetary stabilization pro-
gram, which contains provisions
for reducing the amount of cur-
rency in circulation through
credit restrictions, taxes, and
budget cuts. This program is
now in serious trouble in Con-
gress, however, with many con-
gressmen representing special
interest groups attempting to
scuttle whichever provisions
are most onerous to their backers.
A political scare engendered
carlicr this month by War Min-
The gasoline
price increase actually results
from the government's import
austerity program and from its
first move toward eliminating
multiple exchange rates. Food
prices apparently have spurted
because of an especially severe
drought in the northeastern dust
bowl and the general inflation-
ary trend. Last year, the in-
crease in the cost of living
was held to about 10 to 12
percent, but this year it has
resumed its former 25-percent
rate of climb.
ister Lott's renewed troubles
with the air force and the oppo-
sition press apparently tempo-
rarily reunified the government
bloc, which has been split on
some basic issues, and also
sobered some of Kubitschek's
freewheeling opponents; however,
chances for congressional action
on basic remedial legislation
before the session ends on 15
December are probably no better
than even, and a special session
appears likely.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 November 1958
Interest and tension in
the Venezuelan local and na-
tional elections scheduled for
7 December center primarily on
what may be a close race among
three presidential candidates.
Former junta President Admiral
Larrazabal, already nominated
by two other parties, on 17 No-
vember authorized the Communists
to register him as their candi-
date. The Communist vote, which
may be as high as 8 percent of
the total, could be a determin-
ing factor. Larrazabal's tie
with the Communists could stimu-
late further military plotting,
rumors of which have circulated
with increasing frequency in
recent weeks.
Larrazabal, who resigned
from the junta on 14 November
to accept the nomination of the
Democratic Republican Union party
and of a minor party, is ex-
pected to win a substantial por-
tion of the sizable independent
vote as well. The other candi-
dates are Romulo Betancourt,
chief of Democratic Action (AD),
Venezuela's largest party, and
Rafael Caldera, chief of the
Christian democratic COPEI,
probably the secona strongest
party. The military, formerly
the dominant political element,
has long been hostile to the AD.
The three major parties are
left-of-center reformist in do-
mestic policy and apparently in-
cline toward a renewal of rela-
tions with one or more Soviet
bloc countries. They agreed in
late October to establish a coa-
lition government regardless of
the presidential victor and to
avoid acrimony in the campaign--
a provision which may be diffi-
cult to enforce among the various
labor and student groups which
support them.
Larrazabal alleged he made
no commitments to the Venezuelan
Communist party (PCV)--apparently
to reassure the major parties,
which have opposed including
Communists in a coalition. He
also proclaimed his stanch Ca-
tholicism--a statement designed
to mollify the church hierarchy,
which recently threatened to ex-
communicate Catholics who vote
for Communists. Nevertheless,
his acceptance of PCV support
will enhance the prestige of the
party, which already has con-
siderable influence in press,
labor, and student circles. His
move.will also help the PCV in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the legislative elections and
in penetrating government de-
partments, at least at the
lower and middle echelons, if
be wins.
Dissident military ele-
ments, who may indirectly sup-
port Caldera, the weakest of
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 17 of 17
the candidates, are not believed
to be well organized and are not
likely to attempt a coup, at
least until after the election.
Any widespread violence during
the campaign or provocative
civilian action against the mili-
tary, however, might lead to in-
tervention by the armed forces.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUXnRY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
LAND REFORM IN THE UAR AND IRAQ
Effective enforcement of
long-standing land-reform laws
in the UAR and Iraq has come
only after revolutions which
have deprived the major land-
holders of their power. Nasir's
program in Egypt, begun in 1952,
is now complete, and the new
governments of the UAR's Syrian
region and of Iraq have promul-
gated new land-reform laws. Both
Baghdad and Damascus have had
such laws for many years, but
previous regimes, which drew
TOTAL
AGRICULTURAL
LANDS
MILLION ACRES
TO BE DISTRIBUTED
UNDER LAND
REFORM LAW
81117 3E 26 NOVEMBER 1958
their support largely from the
landowning class, failed to
give them more than lip service.
Egypt's program was car-
ried out with little effective
opposition and a minimum of so-
cial change. In Iraq, however,
the primitive nature of the
agricultural community and a
dearth of administrative ma-
chinery presage a transitional
period beset with problems. The
peculiar nature of much of the
large-scale farming in Syria,
involving the urban merchant-
farmer, would tend to require
gradual implementation of the
law there if sharp drops in agri-
cultural production are to be
avoided.
Egypt
The goals of the Egyptian
Agrarian Reform Law of 9 Septem-
ber 1952 were completed this
year, and all land owned by in-
dividuals in excess of 207.6
acres has been seized and dis-
tributed to new owners. About
586,470 acres, or almost 10 per-
cent of Egypt's agricultural
land, were redistributed. By
1960 the government plans to dis-
tribute an additional 207,600
acres now held in trust by reli-
gious institutions.
EGYPT: ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION
OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS
PLANNED
1958-1960
TOTAL: 6,209,000 ACRES
Although the Nasir regime's
land-reform program has created
about 80,000 new landowners, it
has not significantly increased
agricultural production. The
new owners, with comparatively
small plots, cannot improve the
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 17
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efficiency with which
the large estates were
operated. The new
holdings average be-
acres, compared with
about 20 acres of ir-
rigated land under
the reform program in
Syria and 37 acres in
Iraq.
Implementation
of the reform program
in Egypt was a much
simpler task than it
is likely to be in
either Syria or Iraq,
since landholdings
were concentrated in
a relatively few large
estates. About 0.1
EGYPT: POPULATION PRESSURE ON LAND
1897 1910 1920
26 NOVEMBER 1958
percent of the landowners held
about 20 percent of the land,
and another 3 percent of the
landowners held an additional
56 percent. In addition, vir-
tually all of the land had al-
ready been under cultivation
and was of relatively good
quality. In Syria and Iraq,
however, large tracts of the
land affected have not been
worked for centuries or are far
removed from population and
transportation centers.
Implications for the long
run are also substantially dif-
ferent in the three countries.
Egypt's economic survival is
a race against time, especially
in the agricultural field; the
cultivated acreage per capita
was about 0.53 acre in 1897, as
compared with 0.23 acre in 1958.
In Syria and Iraq, on the other
hand, cultivated acreage has ac-
tually increased faster than
population. Moreover, in Iraq
at least, large additions to
the cultivated area will be
forthcoming in the near future
as large-scale irrigation proj-
ects are completed. While the
Aswan High Dam scheme is ex-
pected to add about 1,300,000
acres, Egyptian per-capita
acreage will continue to de-
cline in the face of a rapidly
expanding population.
Iraq
The Agrarian Reform Law
announced on 30 September prom-
ises to change the character of
Iraq by completely breaking the
power of the landowning sheiks
who have been the backbone of
previous regimes. However, prog-
ress is likely to be slow and
some failures seem certain as
the regime faces the almost in-
surmountable problem of the ig-
norance of the peasants, on
whom the success of the program
ultimately depends. Decades of
oppression by feudal sheiks have
produced a cultural level in
some cases approaching the neo-
lithic. Confusion over interpre-
tation of recent agricultural
decrees has already resulted in
some cases of violence between
the peasants and landowners.
Economic conditions in Iraq
are unique in the Arab world.
With a relative abundance of
agricultural land--about 15,815,-
000 acres--and hundreds of thous-
ands of new acres resulting from
the development program, the
country is faced with a surplus
of land and a shortage of labor.
With its large and constantly
increasing: oil revenues, the
regime should have adequate
capital. to carry out- the
land-reform 'program. ? .
SECRET
PER CAPITA
CULTIVATED
ACREAGE
.8
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUNKARY
Statistics on landholding
in Iraq are limited and some-
what unreliable but clearly in-
dicate the dominance of the
large landowner. Official sta-
tistics list 104 holdings larger
than 12,000 . acres but fail to
show the existence of many es-
tates of more than 100,000 acres.
Two landowners reportedly have
holdings in excess of 600,000
acres.
The terms of the new law,
similar to that of Egypt, pro-
hibit landholdings in excess of
about 620 acres of irrigated
land and about 1,240 acres of
rain-fed land. The state will
compensate owners of confiscated
land with 20-year bonds carrying
a 3-percent interest rate. The
government's hopes that distri-
bution can be carried out in
the next five years are probably
optimistic.
Those entitled to land un-
der the law are adult Iraqi cit-
izens who are farmers and who
already own holdings smaller
than called for by the distribu-
tion scheme.
Some 2,823 holdings have
about 7,654,000 acres--out of a
total of about 16,000,000--in
excess of the new maximum which
thus will be available for dis-
tribution.
IRAQ: ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION
OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS
TO BE RETAINED
BY LARGE
LANDOWNERS
2,135,000
ACRES i
13.5% i/
Distribution of the acquired
lands to each individual will be
no less than 18.6 nor more than
37.2 acres of irrigated land and
no less than 37.2 nor more than
74.4 acres of rain-fed land.
According to the 1952-53
agricultural census, about 1,400,-
000 menwomen, and children make
up the agricultural labor force,
out of a rural population of
4,800,000 to 5,200,000. Since
about 33 percent of the agricul-
tural labor force is already
working its own holdings, the
acreage freed for distribution
under the land reform apparently
will be adequate to furnish land
for all members of the agricul-
tural labor force.
Syria
The land-reform law cover-
ing the Syrian region, announced
by Nasir on 27 September 1958,
threatens to end the private-
enterprise system which has in-
creased Syria's agricultural
production about 35 percent
since the end of World War II--
while per-capita production in
Egypt has been declining. Large-
scale farming in Syria is sub-
stantially different from that
in Iraq or Egypt. In those
countries the large landowners
farm their own lands; in Syria,
however, city merchants, espe-
cially in the Jazirah region in
northeast Syria, rent lands from
the landowning sheiks on a sea,
sonal basis. These merchants
then provide the machinery, la-
bor, and seed for large-scale
mechanized operations.
Almost half--about 9,600,-
000 acres--of Syria's total
19,500,000 acres is used for
agriculture. About 8,400,000
acres are used for dry farming--
half of which is fallow land--
and about 1,200,000 acres have
some form of irrigation. Under
the reform law, all but the
State domain, estimated to be
about 3,300,000 acres, is pri-
vately owned and will be subject
to distribution. A large por-
tion of the state lands has been
exploited by merchant-farmers.
6,044,000 ACRES I ,/ V
TO BE DISTRIBUTED
7,653,000 ACRES ?
48.3%
P,Pp.
TOTAL 15,832,000
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
It thus seems likely that
large-scale farming involving
extensive use of machinery will
be adversely affected and that
agricultural output will decline
as small farmers take over.
Distribution of farm products
may also be affected, since the
merchant-farmers handle the sale
of the output. The central gov-
ernment will also have to pro-
vide services hitherto performed
by the merchant-farmers such as
providing seed, fertilizer, and
general financing.
The terms of the reform
law prohibit ownership of more
than about 198 acres of irri-
gated land or 741 acres of un-
irrigated land,or some combina-
tion of the two. The landowner
may give land to his wife and
children to a maximum total of
about 400 acres. As in Iraq, the
land will be seized over a five-
year period, but, unlike the
landlords in Iraq, those in
Syria will pay, beginning 1 Jan-
uary 1959, a "utilization fee"
to the state on the surplus land
they possess over the per-
missible maximum. The fee
amounts to three quarters of
the average rent. Payment for
expropriated land will be with
40-year state bonds with an an-
nual interest of 1.5 percent.
Only Syrians are entitled
to land under the law; even
Egyptians are excluded at the
present time. Those receiving
land must also be farmers,
holders of agricultural certif-
icates, or Bedouins included in
settlement programs. Land will
be distributed so that each
farmer will receive no more
than about 20 acres of irri-
gated or more than about 74
acres of unirrigated land.
Statistics on landholdings
in Syria are unreliable, but it
appears that about 6,700,000
acres will be available for re-
distribution. Since the agri-
cultural population is about
2,000,000 persons and the total
agricultural land available is
about 9,600,000 acres, it is
likely that almost all Syrian
farmers will be able to own
land under the present distribu-
tion scheme.
Implementation of the law
has been slowed down as the
Damascus government has become
aware of the problem of main-
SYRIA: ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION
OF AGRICULTURAL LANDS
LANDHOLDINGS
WITHIN LEGAL MAXIMUM
2,795,000ACRES
29.5%
TO BE EXPROPRIATED
FROM LARGE tANDOWN
3,405,400 ACRD
35.5%
STATE DOMAIN
ti
3,300AOO ACRES
34.7%
AVAI1Ae~'E FQR
TOTAL: 9,500,000 ACRES
26 NOVEMBER 1958
taining the level of agricul-
tural production. Land sei-
zures have been halted "to en-
sure against the decrease in the
level of the yield." The prob-
lem is not a lack of ability
to deal with the few large
landowners but of how to mo-
bilize the peasants in order
to avoid a major drop in pro-
duction. While there have
been isolated cases of peas-
ant violence, as some have
attempted to occupy land before
execution of the law, the sit-
uation generally is quiet.
There reportedly has been, how-
ever, a large-scale flight of
capital which is attributed to
the land-reform law as well as
the impending complete economic
integration of Syria with Egypt.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
SOVIET POLICY TOWARD JAPAN
Objectives
The USSR's immediate aim
in Japan, according to a Russian
diplomat in Tokyo, is to pre-
vent that country's "further
growth as an American military
base" by convincing the Japanese
that this is against their best
interests; the long-term goal
is the withdrawal of American
forces from Japan and Okinawa.
This succinct statement of Mos-
cow's objectives also reflects
the Soviet view that the pres-
ence of "American imperialism,"
rather than opposition from
domestic elements, is the "main
enemy" to the growth of "progres-
sive" forces in Japan, and the
USSR's awareness of the value
of Japan as a base during the
Korean war.
In the years immediately
following World War II, the
USSR pursued its objectives in
Japan mainly as a victor nation
dealing with a defeated bellig-
erent. After the free world
concluded peace treaties re-
storing Japanese sovereignty,
however, Moscow by late 1952
began to shift its policy when
it became clear this approach
could not achieve the far-reach-
ing concessions it previously
demanded as the price of normal
relations and a peace treaty.
Moscow also saw that it
was necessary to develop addi-
tional means of external influ-
ence if those elements favoring
Japanese neutralism were to
gain strength. Soviet leaders
hoped to re-establish diplomatic
ties and conclude an advanta-
geous peace treaty through step-
by-step manipulation of unset-
tled postwar problems. Moscow
had to threaten to restrict
drastically Japanese fishing,
however, before it was able to
secure Tokyo's agreement to the
Joint Declaration in October
1956 which, in lieu of a peace
treaty, restored diplomatic
relations without significant
Soviet territorial concessions.
At the same time the USSR
and Japan concluded a 10-year
fishing pact with catch quotas
to be negotiated annually. The
Soviet Government also agreed
not to block Japan's admission
to the United Nations and to
return all Japanese war prison-
ers still held in the Soviet
Union; it also pledged to re-
turn Shikotan and the Habomai
Islands upon conclusion of a
peace treaty.
Current Policy
Soviet policy following
the normalization of relations
has concentrated on laying the
groundwork for future political
gains by expanding relations
with Japan in a wide variety of
economic and cultural areas and
attempting to stimulate domestic
pressures in Japan for a polit-
ical and economic rapprochement
with the Communist bloc.
Moscow is attempting to
arouse dissatisfaction with
Japan's present status and to
strengthen neutralist and left-
ist elements by propaganda, ex-
changes of delegations, and per-
sonal interviews with high So-
viet authorities. At the same
time, through harsh negotiating
tactics, diplomatic warnings,
and political warfare moves,
the USSR has tried to discredit
the pro-Western Kishi government
and to point up the "danger" of
Japan's present ties with the
United States.
Soviet propaganda has con-
centrated on arousing resentment
over incidents involving Amer-
ican military personnel, and
has made crude attempts to play
on the Japanese public's deep-
rooted fear of almost any type
of nuclear activity.
The increasing importance
of Japan in Soviet eyes is re-
flected by recent diplomatic
appointments. N. T. Fedorenko,
the new ambassador, was a deputy
foreign minister prior to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
assuming his post in Tokyo in
September; he is regarded as
one of the Soviet Government's
top experts on China and the
Far East. The Kremlin also ap-
pointed as minister-counselor
S. P. Suzdalev, a former ambas-
sador to North Korea and coun-
selor in Washington, who served
in Japan from 1940 to 1944 and
from 1946 to 1948.
Territorial Issue
tain that the Kuril
Island chain was
awarded to the USSR by
the Yalta and Potsdam
Agreements, and that
Tokyo confirmed this
status in 1951 by
signing the San Fran-
cisco Treaty renounc-
ing its claim to the
islands. Japanese
counterclaims are
based on Soviet fail-
ure to sign the San
Francisco Treaty, the
fact that Japan was
not a party to the
Yalta Agreement, and
assertions that at
least the southern
Kurils are historical-
ly a part of Japan.
Possession of the
Kurils strengthens the
Soviet case that the
Sea of Okhotsk is "a
SR
Id on)
SECRET
Russian lake," while
airfields and radar
installations on Kun-
ashiri and Etorofu
bolster the Soviet air
defense system and
help restrict access
to the area. The So-
viet press has reported
that the southern
Kurils are receiving
resettlers for "perma-
nent residence" from
other parts of the So-
viet Union in accord-
ance with development
plans.
It seems unlikely
that the USSR will offer to re-
turn the islands--which Foreign
Minister Gromyko described last
year as "part of the territory
of the USSR"--as long as there
is a strongly pro-Western govern-
ment in Tokyo. Such an offer
cannot be discounted, however,
as a means of creating pressure
on the American position in the
Ry,:: etyu Islands.
Negotiations for a formal
peace treaty between the USSR
and Japan remain stalled over
prewar
boundary
1'J ETOROFV
Kuril Islands
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
the territorial issue, but So-
viet officials have consistent-
ly reaffirmed their desire for
a treaty, in the apparent hope
that constant pressure will
eventually undermine Kishi's
position. The Kishi government
refuses to enter treaty nego-
tiations unless the USSR first
recognizes Japan's "just claim
and title" to Kunashiri and
Etorofu or to conclude a peace
treaty which does not return
them.
Ambassador Fedorenko's
tough tactics since his arrival
suggest that Moscow believes
domestic pressures will either
force the Kishi government to
seek peace treaty negotiations
or bring about its replacement
by another conservative, but
more nationalistic, regime which
would be more willing to "read-
just" Japan's status.
Moscow's recent propaganda
has coupled a hint of new con-
cessions with its stiffer offi-
cial attitude, apparently in an
effort to soften Tokyo's stand
and keep the issue before the
Japanese public. Radio Moscow
stated on 26 September that
through a peace treaty "the way
is open for Japan" to have the
Habomais and Shikotan, as well
as to be able to "fish in Soviet
waters around some island of
the Kurils." A Soviet conces-
sion on the question of improved
fishing rights for the Japanese
in the Kurils would hold out the
appeal of immediate benefits to
Tokyo, yet would avoid a ter-
ritorial commitment.
The Fishery Issue
The USSR's tactics during
the fishery negotiations in
1957 and 1958 were characterized
by attempts to bargain Soviet
control of fishery resources for
concessions on political issues.
During the 1957 talks,
Khrushchev attempted to make any
agreement on a fishing quota
contingent on trade treaty nego-
tiations, and Moscow served
notice that by 1959 the Sea of
Okhotsk would be permanently
closed to foreign salmon fish-
ing. Tokyo remained firm on the
trade treaty question, however,
and refused to include a refer-
ence to termination of Okhotsk
Sea fishing in the formal
too
60
U
120 140 16
S R
o Yakutsk
0 1 0 160 140
rovideni
ALASKA
Cop. Navorm
A
tsla!`6~
Ulan de
o U
oW
unashiri
adivnstok okkaido
P A C I F I C 0 C E A N
CHINA
SEA OF
40
JAPAN JAPAN
...: KOREA
Area prohibited to Japanese salmon fishing as of 1959
..
? Fishing area open to Japanese only under restrictions
defined by Soviet-Japanese fishery treaty of 1956
EAST
CHINA o
26 NOVEMBER 1958
SEA
0 NAUTICAL MILES 1000
24887
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
agreement. Soviet negotiators
yielded on these points but
gained Japanese agreement to a
quota of 120,000 tons for 1957
as an "exception," further
limited the Japanese catch in
the Sea of Okhotsk, and re-
served the right to bring up
again the question of a com-
plete ban on Japanese fishing
in that area.
The 1958 fishery negotia-
tions, which opened in January,
were soon deadlocked by the
USSR's stiff and uncompromising
demands for drastic curbs on
Japanese fishing. Moscow said
it would not discuss Tokyo's
demand for a guarantee against
Soviet seizure of Japanese fish-
ing boats unless the Kishi gov-
ernment agreed to enter peace
treaty negotiations. The Kremlin
expected this stand would break
down Kishi's adamant position
on the territorial question and
lead to further concessions on
the peace treaty issue, or, as
a minimum, gain substantial
Japanese concessions on the
fishing issue.
Prime Minister Kishi re-
fused, however, to link peace
treaty negotiations with a
"safe-fishing" guarantee, de-
spite domestic Japanese pres-
sure which was stimulated by
frequent seizures. of fishing
craft off the Habomais and
Shikotan. Moscow maintained
its demands for a Japanese com-
mitment on treaty discussions
until April, but then signed
an agreement when Tokyo ac-
quiesced in a ban on all
Okhotsk salmon fishing begin-
ning in 1959.
Prior to the Japanese elec-
tions in May 1958, Moscow and
Peiping attempted to discredit
Prime Minister Kishi in the
eyes of the Japanese electorate.
Soviet and Chinese Communist
spokesmen made vigorous person-
al attacks on Kishi, apparently
in the belief that his replace-
ment--even by another Liberal-
Democratic prime minister--would
represent a step toward Com-
munist objectives.
During the campaign, Pei-
ping, uninhibited by formal
relations with Tokyo, heaped
invective on Kishi in an effort
to convince the Japanese that
his continuation as prime min-
ister would be an insurmountable
obstacle to any improvement in
Sino-Japanese relations. Com-
munist China also refused to
renew its private trade pact
with Japanese industry, thus
stopping all Sino-Japanese com-
merce, and began extensive sei-
zures of Japanese fishing boats
off the Chinese coast.
Soviet propaganda, described
by the American Embassy as in
effect electioneering for the
Socialists, sought to fan popu-
lar anxiety over nuclear war
and to scare the public into
demanding that Japan reduce its
ties with the United States.
Although the USSR did sign the
annual fishery agreement in
April, following Japanese con-
cessions, Moscow continued its
efforts to discredit the orienta-
tion of the Kishi government by
a series of high-level letters
and official notes, as well as
by radiobroadcasts to Japanese
listeners.
A Soviet note on 15 May
stated that the USSR could not
be "indifferent" to the introduc-
tion of nuclear weapons and
their means of delivery into
Japan, and on 21 May Khrushchev
warned that Japan could be eas-
ily drawn into an atomic war,
contrary to the people's wishes.
The Soviet premier pledged not
to use nuclear weapons against
Japan, "provided Japan, including
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Okinawa,...would refrain from
arming itself with nuclear weap-
ons or importing such weapons
from abroad."
The bloc efforts, however,
were generally regarded by the
Japanese electorate as foreign
interference and probably helped
to contribute to the Liberal-
Democratic victory.
Since the election Peiping
has not eased its pressure on
the Kishi government. The Chi-
nese regime apparently remains
confident that the lure of an
extensive mainland market, as
well as its attempts since
midsummer to have pro-Communist
Overseas Chinese boycott Japa-
nese goods, will cause Kishi
to relax his opposition to at
least unofficial ties with Pei-
ping. Moscow has continued to
play up nuclear issues affect-
ing Japan, and in a note on 16
September sought to link Japan
with American "aggression"
against Communist China in the
Taiwan Strait area. Fedorenko
apparently accompanied Khru-
shchev to Peiping in late Au-
gust and may have discussed
policy toward Japan at that
time.
Expansion of Soviet Ties
The USSR has to date con-
cluded trade-and-payments,
shipping, and travel agreements
with Japan; it is pushing for
civil air and cultural agree-
ments, and the second annual
trade treaty negotiations are
now under way. The Kremlin
hopes to utilize increased con-
tacts of various types in order
to display its growing indus-
trial and technological power
for prestige value and political
effect and indirectly to height-
en Japanese consciousness of
Soviet military strength.
Trade promotion activities
are an important part of Soviet
policy in Japan. Commerce be-
tween the USSR and Japan will
probably reach $45,000,000 in
1958 and,although still less
than one percent of Japan's
total foreign trade, will be
double the 1957 volume. This
should help to support Moscow's
claim that a peaceful extension
of relations and a great expan-
sion of trade are possible.
Moscow alleges that while
lack of a peace treaty is the
major obstacle to an all-out
trade increase, the Kishi gov-
ernment's policy "to sell more
and buy less" is the immediate
hindrance. Soviet officials
have assiduously baited Japa-
nese business circles with state-
ments that two-way trade turn-
over could reach $500,000,000
annually, and they have fired
the imagination of Japanese in-
dustry by hinting at the
prospect of Japanese participa-
tion in the economic development
of Siberia.
Moscow has seized the in-
itiative in cultural relations
with Japan with a broad program
designed to bolster Soviet pol-
icy in other fields. The im-
mediate aim of the Soviet cam-
paign is to utilize expanded
cultural activities, including
visits by top-flight Soviet
artists, to increase Japanese
awareness of Soviet artistic
achievements and allay tradi-
tional Japanese suspicions of
the Soviet Union.
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The 40th anniversary of
the All-Union Leninist Communist
League of Youth--Komsomol--was
celebrated with great fanfare
throughout the USSR last month.
During these 40 years the Kom-
somol has gradually been trans-
formed from an elite group of
dedicated and politically in-
fluential young people into a
party-dominated mass organiza-
tion which controls the majori-
ty of Soviet youths.
The Komsomol has a vital
role in Soviet society. It is
the training ground for future
party members, and on it large-
ly rests the regime's hopes of
raising new generations of po-
litically indoctrinated citi-
zens, passionately devoted to
Communism. By means of the Kom-
somol, the regime seeks to mold
the lives of Soviet youths and
to harness their energy to the
service of the state.
Komsomol members are ex-
pected to master Marxism-Lenin-
ism, be models of "socialist be-
havior" at all times, and en-
thusiastically carry out the
party's assignments, no matter
how difficult or distasteful
they might be. In practice,
however, the Komsomol has far
from measured up to these ideals.
The regime's emphasis on
close party control, its efforts
to bring as many young people
as possible under this control,
and its fear of allowing any
genuine rank-and-file initiative
or independence has transformed
the Komsomol into a gigantic
lifeless bureaucracy.
While it is a formidable
vehicle for the control and mo-
bilization of Soviet youths, its
former esprit de corps has been
dissipated, and its ability to
inspire the enthusiasm and posi-
tive loyalty of its membership
has been severely impaired. For
most Soviet youths, membership
in the Komsomol is now just
another obligation to the state.
The patriotism and constructive
energy found in the majority of
these people probably prevail
more in spite of, rather than
because of, the efforts of the
Komsomol.
Organization Structure
Organizationally the Kom-
somol is closely modeled on the
hierarchy of the Communist par-
ty. The chain of command leads
from the All-Union Komsomol sec-
retariat with its central ap-
paratus, through various levels
of regional committees, down to
the vast network of primary units
in schools, factories, farms,
and military units.
The party is guaranteed
close control over the Komsomol
in matters of policy, planning,
and administration. The Kom-
somol statutes specify that sec-
retaries of city and district
committees and above must be at
least candidate members of the
party. At the primary level
large Komsomol units are usual-
ly run by full-time professional
workers aspiring to careers in
the party.
The effect of this oppres-
sive party-dominated bureaucra-
cy on the internal life of the
Komsomol has been described best
by party and Komsomol members
themselves. The year following
the 1956 party congress was, as
in other areas of political life,
a time of ferment and soul-
searching within the Komsomol.
Disgruntled young people aired
their complaints, and officials
candidly admitted there was an
advanced state of malaise within
the youth organization. "I only
scoffed at our Komsomol members
breeding more bureaucracy than
their elder brethren," confessed
one party member.
Elaborating on this, a
league member complained that
there are so ''few rank-and-file
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
members at Komsomol conferences
that "they are simply embar-
rassed in the presence of the
overwhelming mass of profes-
sional Komsomol workers who
know all the ritual, speak well,
and employ quotations." Some
Komsomol members made the he-
retical suggestion that the
only remedy lay in freeing the
Komsomol from party control.
While the doctrine of Kom-
somol subordination to the par-
ty was strongly reaffirmed, a
few specific measures were tak-
en in 1957 to increase the au-
thority and independence of pri-
mary organizations. A Komsomol
decree'in February of that year
recommended that local secre-
taries no longer be endorsed
by district or city Komsomol
committees.
Red tape was to be sharply
cut, and Komsomol units in large
industrial organizations, which
had formerly been managed by
Komsomol central committee or-
ganizers, were turned over to
local supervision. Another de-
cree probably issued about the
same time called for replacing
full-time professional Komsomol
workers at the primary level
with volunteer members working
after hours.
These measures had little
chance of effecting any revital-
ization of the Komsomol, how-
ever, since the regime, having
succeeded by the summer of 1957
in silencing outward signs of
ferment, retreated to a policy
of orthodoxy. More party super-
vision, more indoctrination,and
more manual labor were the reme-
dies prescribed at the Komsomol
congress in April 1958. The
earlier administrative reforms
went virtually unmentioned.
Party control was graphically
illustrated by the fact that
735 of the 1,236 delegates to
the congress were party members.
Mass Membership Policy
The policy of converting
the Komsomol into a mass organ-
ization encompassing virtually
all Soviet youths is, like the
policy of close party control,
at the root of the Komsomol's
present-day ills. Designed to
extend the regime's control,
this policy has resulted in a
serious decline in the quality
of membership. The Komsomol
ranks rose from approximately
9,000,000 members in 1949 to
an all-time high in late 1955
of nearly 20,000,000, which
represented well over half of
all Soviet youths of Komsomol
age (14-26). There is no long-
er any pretense of selectivity
in admitting new members. Mem-
bership is often virtually com-
pulsory' and in some instances
entire groups are automatically
enrolled as they arrive at the
minimum age.
A significant drop in mem-
bership, however, began to take
place, apparently starting in
1956. In July 1957 the total
membership was given as only
18,500,000, and it is no higher
today. A number of factors ac-
count for this decrease. The
wartime deficit in births first
began to affect'.the Komsomol
ranks in 1956. Furthermore,
new Komsomol cards were issued
at this time, and membership
lists were checked and put in
order. Cases where members had
been registered in more than
one place were cleared up, and
over-age members were weeded
out.
Another factor may have
been the deliberate attempts
by local Komsomol groups to
limit their size, despite strong
official disapproval. The un-
popularity of the mass admis-
sion policy was clearly revealed
in late 1956 and early 1957.
Activist members, fretting under
the task of indoctrinating and
re-educating their many apathetic
and straying members, complained
that the Komsomol was nothing
more than a "corrective house."
One member, insisting
that the Komsomol's authority
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
had "immeasurably declined,"
suggested that "surgery" was
the only cure for its "serious
ills." With this solution ap-
parently in mind, one Komsomol
group drew up a list of people
to be expelled for "insufficient
enthusiasm and passivity," a
black list which comprised one
fifth the group's membership.
Komsomol Secretary Shelepin's
admonition at the youth congress
in April against "attempts arti-
ficially to impede the desire
of young people to join the Kom-
somol" suggests that such at-
tempts had in fact been made
with some success.
Composition of Membership
Given the regime's emphasis
on mass membership, it is not
surprising that in many cases
the decision to join is auto-
matic. This is even more under-
standable when it is realized
that the Komsomol has a near
monopoly over every area of
youth activity. In order to
play on a team, go to a dance,
or share a hobby, it is usually
necessary to be a member of the
Komsomol. More important, mem-
bership is the best and often
the only road to a successful
professional or party career.
It is now a prerequisite for ad-
mission to virtually all high-
er educational institutions.
Membership is highest in
well-organized urban areas. The
Komsomol has been much less suc-
cessful in recruiting members
in the national minorities areas,
where anti-Russian sentiment
prevails, and in rural areas,
where it is hindered by peasant
apathy and an inability to offer
sufficient incentives for join-
ing.
The adverse effects of the
regime's unwillingness to allow
the Komsomol any latitude for
independent thought or action
can be seen in almost all phases
of Komsomol life. The regime's
aim is to bring up, through po-
litical indoctrination, each
generation not only versed in
but fanatically devoted to Com-
munist ideology. While there
is little doubt as to the re-
gime's success in the first in-
stance, its fear of open discus-
sion or inquiry into matters of
doctrine and policy has reduced
political education to a mechani-
cal process of interminable lec-
tures lifted from Pravda--cer-
tainly not a stimulating process.
As one Komsomol member put it,
"All know in advance they will
be bored. Nothing can be done
about it. It's the custom."
Although the Komsomol is
called on to carry out many eco-
nomic and political tasks in
support of the party program,
the Komsomol is virtually ex-
cluded from any voice in politi-
cal affairs. This has led the
older rank-and-file members to
complain of the "childishness"
of such Komsomol duties as "col-
lection of scrap, or patronage
of a calf." Many members who
have long outgrown Komsomol ac-
tivities remain in the league
as a disgruntled element. The
regime is unwilling either to
give them more responsibility
or to relinquish control over
them by allowing them to leave
the league.
Any display of independence
in tackling even the most in-
nocuous tasks is frowned on by
the regime. There was a case
of a group of young Komsomol
members who decided to do good
deeds around their neighborhood--
run errands for the sick and as-
sist the aged. When the Komso-
mol leaders learned of their ac-
tivities they were held under
suspicion of forming an "under-
ground ring." A higher commit-
tee, informed of the case, took
the local Komsomol leaders to
task, not so much for their ludi-
crous action but for not having
been aware and in control of
the members' activities at all
times.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Watch and Ward Society
Komsomol members are often
given the right to meddle in
the lives of other members and
Soviet citizens at large. No
area of a Komsomol member's life
is free from scrutiny. They
are called on in meetings to
discuss and pass judgment on
their fellow members, whether
laziness on the job, failure
at school, or marital problem
is involved. Such group pres-
sure is often tactless, inex-
pert, and frequently vindictive,
and has led many members to ex-
press serious doubt about the
entire procedure.
The Komsomol is called on
not only to mold and discipline
its own members, but to bring
its influence to bear on socie-
ty at large. The so-called Kom-
somol light cavalry brigades
are one of the main weapons in
this assignment. Established
several years ago in communities
throughout the USSR, these bri-
gades patrol the streets and
public gathering places to com-
bat disorderly conduct. Of late
their special target has been
the "stylagi," delinquents who
ape extreme Western manners and
dress.
Soviet press reports leave
the impression that these bri-
gades have been largely ineffec-
tive in curbing delinquency.
What good they have been able
to achieve has been at least
partly offset by overzealous
persecution of individuals. One
instance involved a young man
who angrily reported to a Soviet
newspaper that on returning
tired and disheveled from six
weeks of work on the virgin
lands, he was hauled in by a
Komsomol brigade, subjected to
police-type harassment, and sum-
marily treated to a head shave.
Manpower Pool
One of the Komsomol's prin-
cipal services is to provide a
labor-recruitment agency for
the more arduous and unpopular
economic projects. In recent
years Komsomol members have con-
tributed a large share of the
manpower for the virgin lands
program, and thousands now are
being directed to industrial
sites in eastern Siberia. In
mobilizing youths for these
projects, the Komsomol has great
persuasive as well as coercive
capabilities. Its entire propa-
ganda machine is utilized to
surround these projects with an
aura of adventure and romance
and to instill in young people
a feeling of pride by emphasiz-
ing their role in "gigantic na-
ture-transforming" projects.
At the same time, partici-
pation is looked on as obliga-
tory for good Komsomol members,
and the pressure to comply is
such that few can afford not
to volunteer. Komsomol members
who leave their jobs in the
virgin lands because of hard-
ships are publicly branded as
"cowards" and "traitors" and
subjected to various adminis-
trative sanctions.
In recent years the Komso-
mol has been increasingly empha-
sized as being a mobile labor
force geared to leap in wherever
needed by the party, and it bears
the stamp of Khrushchev's prac-
tical "workingman's" approach
to problems. Behind this ap-
proach is the belief that physi-
cal labor, combined with a few
material incentives and a good
dose of idealistic propaganda,
makes the best of all possible
forms of indoctrination.
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Recent natural gas and pe-
troleum discoveries in India
have raised hopes there that
the country's heavy dependence
on petroleum imports can be re-
duced. While the commercial
significance of the new dis-
coveries is not yet known, they
have already resulted in in-
creased prestige for the Indian
Oil and Natural Gas Commission,
which is in charge of the oper-
ations, and for Rumania and the
Soviet Union, which have fur-
nished equipment and technical
assistance.
While India is
well endowed with most
of the natural re-
sources necessary to
develop a modern in-
dustrial state, its
lack of known petro-
leum resources has
been a major handi-
cap. Its only pro-
ducing field until
recently was the Dig-
boi field in Assam,
which produced less
than 7 percent of the
country's needs in
1951, the year India
embarked on its First
1952
1953
1954
provide at least 19,000,000
barrels a year or about 40 per-
cent of India's present re-
quirements, the recognition
that the area's production is
unlikely to meet the country's
growing needs has caused the
government to expand its role
in the petroleum industry.
India's socialist leaders
have always deplored the fact
that virtually alLof the coun-
try's petroleum production, im-
ports, and distribution are
controlled by Western-owned oil
companies. They recognized,
however, when they came to pow-
PETROLEUM PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND TRADE
( THOUSAND BARRELS )
CRUDE
OIL
REFINED
PRODUCTS
1,910
1,805
29,051
25,912
1,952
1,890
30,808
29,115
2,219
2,687
32,788
30,820
2,457
22,794
36,328
40,167
1,292
2,901
29,238
39,728
48,418
2,681
3,240
33,613
48,000(Esi)
60,000cmra
3,400(EsT.)
Five-Year Plan (1951-56). Ex-
ploration during the past sev-
eral years by the British-owned
Assam Oil Company--which oper-
ates the Digboi field and a re-
finery nearby with a capacity
of 8,700 barrels a day--resulted
in additional discoveries in
Assam at Nahorkatiya, Hugrijan,
and Moran. With: these new
fields, the company was able to
increase production by 70 per-
cent between 1951 and 1957.
India's consumption of pe-
troleum products has increased
rapidly, however, and 1957 pro-
duction met only slightly more
than 7 percent of the country's
needs. While present indica-
tions are that the Assam fields
in a few years will be able to
er, that they had little choice
but to cooperate with the oil
companies, at least for a num-
ber of years. The government
therefore granted additional
drilling rights to the Assam
Oil Company--which led to the
discovery of the new fields--
and to the Standard Vacuum com-
pany in the.Bengal Basin =which
has had no success to.date.
The government also of-
fered the three major distrib-
utors substantial concessions
--including guarantees against
nationalization for 25 years--
in order to induce them to
build refineries. The compa-
nies accepted the offer, and
Burmah-Shell and Standard
Vacuum built refineries at
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26 November 1958
Bombay with capacities of 41,-
000 and 25,000 barrels a day.
The California-Texas Company,
the third company, built a re-
finery with a capacity of 14,-
000 barrels a day at Visakha-
patnam.
Construction of these
three refineries resulted in
an increase in the annual out-
put of refined petroleum prod-
ucts from 1,780,000 barrels in
1952 to 33,613,000 barrels in
1957. Their construction also
enabled India, which has ex-
ported virtually no petroleum
products previously, to export
3,233,000 barrels in 1957.
INDIA
Existing refinery A Recent gas strike
Planned refinery * Recent oil strike
0 Oil field Planned pipeline
When the Second Five-Year
Plan (1956-6l)--with its in-
creased emphasis on industrial-
ization--was being drafted, the
government realized that a much
more vigorous search for oil
was necessary in view of the
rising foreign exchange costs
of India's rapidly growing pe-
troleum requirements. The cost
of petroleum imports, which was
over $200,000,000 in 1957, is
expected to increase to over
$1 billion in 1976, according
to New Delhi's calculations.
Since India's traditional ex-
ports, such as tea, jute, and
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cotton textiles show little
promise of expanding signifi-
cantly, such a sharp increase
in the cost of petroleum im-
ports would be very difficult
to finance and could retard
the country's economic prog-
ress.
The government in 1955-56
was confident of its ability to
push rapid economic development
in view of the successful out-
come of the first plan, and de-
cided to reserve most of the new
exploration to itself rather
than invite foreign oil compa
nies to participate. It set up
the oil and Natural Gas Commis-
sion in the Ministry of Mines
and Fuels to undertake surveys
and exploration. The ministry
secured assistance from Canada,
West Germany, Rumania, and the
USSR, with the bloc countries.
providing most of the help.
There now are 110 Russian
and 16 Rumanian petroleum tech-
nicians in India. Besides per-
forming survey and drilling op-
erations, they are training
Indians in these functions. In
addition, both countries have
provided scholarships for In-
dian students to study petro-
leum technology in their coun-
tries, although most Indian
students in this field continue
to go to Western countries for
their training.
The first well drilled by
the Rumanian-assisted drilling
group struck what the Indian
Government described as a "con-
siderable volume" of natural
gas at 2,700 feet at Jawala Mukhi
in the Punjab in May .1958.
While no estimate of the com-
mercial significance of this
discovery is yet available, the
fact that the first well drilled
was successful raised Indian
hopes and Rumanian prestige.
India's hopes--and Soviet
prestige--were raised still
higher when a Soviet-assisted
drilling team struck oil near
Cambay in Bombay State at 5,563
feet on 8 September 1958, with
the first well drilled in this
area. The crude oil discovered
has a heavy wax base resembling
that of Digboi rather than the
asphalt-base type found in the
Persian Gulf area. Indian ge-
ologists working at the site be-
lieve the well will produce
1,200-1,500 barrels a day, and
that they have tapped an oil
pool of approximately nine
square miles.
The news of the Cambay
strike was followed by the an-
nouncement early in November
that in the same general area
oil had been struck at 600 feet
near Baroda, about 50 miles
east of Lunej. There is no de-
tailed information available
on the importance of this strike
in Bombay State. Despite its
stringent financial position,
the government has recently
raised the allocations available
to the Oil and Natural Gas Com-
mission from $24,000,000 to
$42,000,000 for the period 1956-
61.
Enabled to carry out its
own oil exploration by bloc as-
sistance, New Delhi now has
also accepted a Rumanian offer
to finance a state-owned refin-
ery at Gauhati, Assam, which
will produce 15,500 barrels a
day. The government report-
edly is considering a Soviet
offer to finance a state-owned
refinery at Barauni, Bihar,
producing 41,000 barrels a day,
although India's financial dif-
ficulties may cause the govern-
ment to postpone construction
of this refinery for several
years.
The petroleum policies of
the Indian Government, as well
as the rate of India's economic
progress, may well depend on
the commercial significance of
the discoveries by the state-
controlled drilling program.
If oil is found in commercial
quantities, one of the major
weaknesses of the Indian
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economy will be at least par-
tially eliminated, and the gov-
ernment will continue to expand
its role in the petroleum field.
It may eventually attempt to
take over the Western oil com-
panies now operating in India.
New Delhi has already stated
that it will retain control of
the distribution of petroleum
products of the state-owned re-
fineries, which will create in-
creasing difficulties for West-
ern firms.
If the present program does
not significantly increase pro-
duction, however, India probably
will have to turn to Western oil
companies for a large-scale ex-
ploration program, unless it is
willing to abandon its hope of
reducing the country's growing
dependence on etroleum imports.
by ORR
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