CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 24, 2008
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 7, 1958
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
so "-&rr
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY NAVY review completed.
COPY NO. 50
OCR NO. 4041/58
7 August 1958
DOS and PACOM review(s) completed.
DOCUMENT NO. 10
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH? 70-
DATE REVIEWER:
CENTRAL INTELLI(tNL
0AREDIA
Aft,- 1 ~ + S
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE JoB
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SINO-SOVIET TACTICS ON EAST-WEST ISSUES . . . . . . . . . Page 1
In his letters of 5 August to the three Western
headsof government, Khrushchev no longer called for
an immediate five-power summit conference on the Mid-
dle East but demanded that this problem be considered
by a special session of the UN General Assembly as
soon as possible. He sought, however, to offset any
negative free world reaction by reaffirming his desire
for summit talks on general East-West problems, as first
proposed last December. This shift in tactics prob-
ably reflects Khrushchev's recognition of the failure
of Soviet efforts to force the United States and Brit-
ain to accept Moscow's terms for five-power talks on
Lebanon and Jordan and his desire for an immediate
world forum in which to denounce American and British
actions in the Middle East before the crisis atmos-
phere dissipates further.
The Chinese Communists had endorsed Khrushchev's
call for "big-power" summit talks on the Middle East
in the communique of 3 August following the Khrushchev-
Mao talks in Peiping. Khrushchev, however, apparent-
ly decided to drop this line after studying the latest
British and American notes. The Chinese Communists on
6 August promptly supported his new proposals for a Gen-
eral Assembly session and a summit conference on general
world problems.
Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung probably coordinated
Sino-Soviet policy on general East-West issues and dis-
cussed intrabloc problems. Peiping is maintaining pres-
sure on the Chinese Nationalists by moving air units in-
to Fukien Province opposite Taiwan. Any Nationalist
counteraction could be used by the Communists as grounds
for insisting on the inclusion of the Taiwan issue on
the agenda of any future summit conference. The Chinese
Communists, however, are unlikely to start major hos-
tilities in the near future, although there is a pos-
sibility of serious air clashes in the area.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
PART I (continued)
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The Lebanese opposition is still using terrorism
and minor military harassment to press for the immediate
resignation of President Chamoun and his pro-Western
cabinet and for the withdrawal of American troops. King
Husayn's position in Jordan is being undermined rapid-
ly, despite increased security precautions, by deteri-
orating economic conditions and growing sentiment that
he should abdicate to permit a rapprochement with the
UAR. Iraqi leaders say they are still studying the
question of Iraq's relation to the Baghdad Pact, but
they probably will withdraw eventually. Nasir is re-
ported to be concerned over continuing problems in
Svr is .
NOTES AND COMMENTS
GENEVA TECHNICAL TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Soviet delegation at Geneva has outlined an in-
spection system for detecting nuclear tests that is much
more comprehensive and detailed than any previously sug-
gested by the USSR but falls short of what the West de-
sires. Moscow appears willing to implement such a system,
and eager to have the conferences end with a wide measure
of agreement. If the experts at Geneva fail to resolve
the major points of difference, the USSR probably expects
that its proposals appear reasonable enough to make a .
strong impression on public opinion and to make it diffi-
cult for the West to insist on a more effective system.
ARISTOV EXERTS RISING INFLUENCE THROUGH RSFSR PARTY
BUREAU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Presidium member Averky Aristov appears to be assum-
ing major responsibility for the direction of the party
bureau for the Russian Republic. The revitalization of
the party apparatus by Khrushchev has added to the im-
portance of the RSFSR bureau, which, through its six de-
partments, oversees the entire range of party activities
in the republic. Long associated with the industrial and
agricultural development of Siberia, Aristov apparently
holds an important but unpublicized role in the top lead-
ership.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
PART II (continued)
SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL CHANGES . . . : . . . . . . . . Page 4
Since Marshal Malinovsky was appointed Soviet de-
fense minister in October 1957 to replace Marshal Zhu-
kov, there; have been a number of changes in military
district and external commands, Eleven of the 18 mil-
itary districts have changed commanders. Most of the
former commanders had served at least three years in
their posts, however, and could be considered due for
reassignment. During the same period headquarters per-
sonnel remained relatively unchanged.
PEIPING CLAIMS SPECTACULAR ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS . . . . . Page 6
Peiping's statistical report for the first half
of the year shows industrial production up 34 percent
over the same period of 1957, construction activity
well over the previous high in 1956, and bumper early
harvests. The leadership professes to believe that
these achievements are but a prelude to oven greater
progress in the second half of the year. It clearly
feels this growth vindicates its "giant leap forward"
economic policies which have been regarded as too haz-
ardous by an unidentified "gloomy clique."
HUNGARIAN REGIME FORCES CONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF WRITERS . Page 7
As a follow-up to the execution of Imre Nagy, the
Kadar regime has intensified its efforts to force Hun-
garian intellectuals to associate themselves with the
regime. The remaining leaders of the intellectual re-
sistance--the highly respected "populist" writers--
have decided on limited cooperation and will begin con-
tributing to regime publications. Concurrently, the
government is reported to have arrested a number of
secondary school students who allegedly had bden in-
fluenced by the writers and had planned a demonstra-
tion following the Nagy execution; it has also Contin-
ued retrials of convicted "counterrevolutionaries,"
some of whom are,intellectuals, who had previously re-
ceived light sentences.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
PART II (continued)
FRENCH REACTION TO DE GAULLE'S DRAFT CONSTITUTION .
The French press and political parties are con-
. . Page 9
cerned over the increased powers of the president and
the reduced powers of the National Assembly provided
for under De Gaulle's draft constitution, just sub-
mitted to a special consultative committee for review.
The public's attitude, however, is "let De Gaulle see
what he can do," and the final draft--although it may
incorporate some changes--will probably be approved by
a large majority.
FINNISH POLITICAL SCENE CONFUSED . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The difficulties delaying formation of a majority
government in Finland may lead to a continuation of
the nonpolitical caretaker government of Reino Kuuskoski,
who, contrary. to usual practice, did not offer his res-
ignation when parliament convened on 29 July. Inclu-
sion of the Communist-front Finnish People's Democratic
League, the largest party in parliament, is still un-
likely.
BOLIVIAN REGIME THREATENED BY POLITICAL INSTABILITY . . . Page 10
The protracted rift between the left and right
wings of the governing Nationalist Revolutionary Move-
ment (MNR) in Bolivia may develop into open conflict
if moderate President Siles carries out his most recent
threat to resign. Former President Paz, titular head
of the party, who returned to Bolivia last May as a
self-styled moderator, has thus far failed to reconcile
the two hostile MNR factions. Siles' resignation would
weaken the US-backed stabilization program in Bolivia.
ARMED FORCES DISAFFECTION THREATENS CUBAN GOVERNMENT . . . Page 11
Cuba's prolonged political crisis and the govern-
ment's inability to put down the Castro rebellion in
Oriente Province have led to an increase in disaffection
among military personnel.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
PART II (continued)
THE HAITIAN POLITICAL SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The government of Haitian President Francois Du-
valier remains extremely vulnerable despite its suc-
cess in putting down an attempted coup by a small
group on 29 July.
13TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENCY . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Lebanese Foreign Minister Charles Malik's position
favoring the landing of American troops in Lebanon has
raised considerable doubts among UN members, particular-
ly Latin American countries, about his suitability for
the presidency of the 13th UN General Assembly. Malik
seemed assured of the office prior to the Middle East
crisis, but now other countries are offering candidates.
NATIONALIST PARTY DEMANDS INDEPENDENCE FOR FRENCH WEST
AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
African nationalists at a regional party congress
on 27 July demanded immediate independence, reflecting
the growing opposition in French Tropical Africa to the
proposed French constitutional amendments. The slogan
of independence is likely to have an electrifying effect
on the Africans and may force the political pace faster
than desired by moderate leaders, who are appreciative of
French West Africa's economic and administrative depend-
ence on France.
IRAQ'S NEW ECONOMIC ORIENTATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The new Iraq Government appears to be abandoning
the conservative approach to economic development fol-
lowed by previous governments. Despite assurances to
the West that the oil industry will remain relatively
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
PART II (continued)
unaffected, the Baghdad government seems to be moving
toward an accommodation with Nasir. Egyptian petroleum
experts reportedly have already been sent to Baghdad,
and the subject of a new pipeline through Syria has
been raised.
RIVAL LEADERS IN PAKISTAN MAKE ELECTION PACT . . . . . . . Page 16
Some improvement in political stability in Paki-
stan may result from the agreement reached on 3 August
between President Mirza and his chief rival, former
Prime Minister Subrawardy, to cooperate in Pakistan's
first national elections, now expected to be held in
February. Under the pact, Mirza would appoint Suhra-
wardy prime minister in the new government but their
agreement will remain subject to the strains of their
continuing competition for power and could be modified
by changing political conditions.
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN INDIA'S KERALA STATE UNDER FIRE Page 17
The Communist government in Kerala State in India
has come under increasing fire as a result of a series
of clashes between state police and non-Communist agi-
tators. While Communist control in Kerala does not ap-
pear seriously endangered, this first challenge to the
Communist regime has strengthened and united the opposi-
tion. Prime Minister Nehru has thus far resisted pres-
sure for the national government to intervene.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
LEBANESE PRESIDENT-ELECT GENERAL FUAD SHIHAB . . . . . . . Page 4
General Fuad Shihab, recently elected president of
Lebanon, was born in 1903 and is a member of the Maronite
Christian branch of one of Lebanon's leading families.
Other Shihabs are Moslems and Druze, which may be a factor
accentuating the general's natural tendency for compromise
in a country in which all political matters are decided
on a sectarian basis. In both the 1952 disorders and the
present crisis, Shihab has maintained a conciliatory at-
titude-toward the antigovernment forces. Believing that
"Nasirism is the wave of the future," the President-elect
probably will soon reach an accommodation with the UAR.
TRENDS IN INDIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
During the past year, developments within the Sino-
Soviet bloc have led India to adopt a more critical at-
titude toward the Communist world. At the same time,
Indo-American relations have improved. Recent events
in the Middle East apparently have not yet significant-
ly altered this situation. India is not likely to de-
viate from its policy of nonalignment or abandon its
opposition to defense pacts and nuclear testing; at the
same time, India will probably retain its questioning
attitude toward the bloc.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
PART III (continued)
PEIPING'S ATTITUDE ON POPULATION GROWTH . . . . . . . Page 11
The Chinese Communists now proclaim that an im-
mense population is their greatest resource and pre-
sents no obstacle to their "giant leap forward" in
economic development. In late 1956 and early 1957,
Peiping began but did not fully develop a propaganda
campaign to popularize birth control. This campaign
was quietly dropped last year when the program for
political liberalism was reversed and optimistic eco-
nomic planning resumed. The present policy contem-
plates the continuation of the current population
growth which would bring China's population from the
present 650,000,000 to 720,000,000 in 1962 and over
810,000.000 in 1967, and to over a billionaround
1975.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SINO-SOVIET TACTICS ON EAST-WEST ISSUES
Khrushchev's Letters
time for preparation of a "new
attack on the Arab peoples."
Soviet Premier Khrushchev
called on 5 August for a special
session of the UN General As-
sembly to discuss the withdraw-
al of Western forces from Leba-
non and Jordan. His letters
to the three Western heads of
government reflect Moscow's de-
sire for an immediate world
forum in which to denounce
American and British actions in
the Middle East before the cri-
sis atmosphere dissipates fur-
ther.
Khrushchev's tactical
shift away from his stand of
a week ago for an immediate
conference on the Middle East
within the Security Council
framework of the Big Four heads
of government, plus Indian
prime Minister Nehru and UN
Secretary General Hammarskjold,
represents at least a temporary
suspension of Moscow's efforts
to exploit the divergence of
Western views on immediate sum-
mit.talks and probably reflects
Moscow's views that the sense
of "extreme emergency" is di-
minishing despite Soviet dip-
lomatic and propaganda attempts
to maintain this atmosphere.
Moscow may feel that Brit-
ish and American recognition
of the new Iraqi Government re-
duces the plausibility of its
allegations that a Western-in-
spired attack on Iraq is im-
minent. However, Moscow is
attempting to keep this fear
alive with reports of addition-
al Western troop movements and
charges that Western recogni-
tion of the new Iraqi Govern-
ment is only a tactic to gain
Although Khrushchev's pre-
vious note on 28 July had not
closed the door to a compromise
formula for a summit meeting
within the UN framework, his
notes of 5 August repeated his
earlier objections to an "or-
dinary" meeting of the Security
Council, which he attacked as
practically a "committee" un-
der American domination with
China represented by a "politi-
cal corpse." On the same day
the Soviet premier stated that
it was "unthinkable" that he
sit at a conference table
with Chiang Kai-shek.
Khrushchev's 5 August let-
ters also renewed the Soviet
call for a summit meeting
on world issues as first
suggested last December.
He urged that it be "com-
posed as we had earlier
proposed"--parity between
Western and bloc countries,
but not including Communist
China.
Soviet UN delegate A. A.
Sobolev in the Security Council
deliberations on the Lebanese
crisis in July had indicated
that Moscow would hold off
pressing for an immediate as-
sembly meeting pending West-
ern response to Soviet pro-
posals for a summit meeting.
Moscow apparently now feels
that General Assembly discus-
sion of recent Western mili-
tary action in the Middle East
will mobilize Arab and Asian
neutralist opposition to West-
ern Middle Eastern policies
and contribute to the appearance
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Op IMMEDIATE INTEREST
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
that Moscow's vigorous diplo-
matic measures protected the
Arab world from further West-
ern intervention.
In the event of a with-
drawal of Western troops from
Lebanon and Jordan, the USSR
could also claim credit for
forcing such a move. Moscow
appears to believe there is
little danger now of an attack
on Iraq or the UAR and probably
is more interested in diplo-
matic and propaganda exploita-
tion of the continued presence
of British and American troops
than in "forcing" their early
withdrawal.
Soviet notes on 1 August
to Italy and Israel protesting
the use of their territory or
air space for facilitating the
movement of troops and military
supplies to Western forces in
Lebanon and Jordan were designed
to keep alive public apprehen-
sion over recent Western mili-
tary moves and to put pressure
on pro-Western elements in these
governments for their "com-
plicity" in Western military ac-
tion in the Middle East. Mos-
cow earlier had protested to the
governments; )6f Turkey, Greece,
West Germany, and Austria in
an attempt to harass Western
defense arrangements by attempt-
ing to exploit each country's
peculiar national interests.
Khrushchev-Mao Talks
Soviet Premier Khrushchev's
talks with Mao Tse-tung in Pei-
ping were the fourth top-level
Sino-Soviet discussions held
since the establishment of the
Chinese Communist regime. The
two partners, who claimed they
reached full agreement, dis-
cussed, according to their joint
communique, the strengthening
of the Moscow-Peiping alliance
and "mutual assistance." The
Chinese and Soviet defense min-
isters were in attendance.
They apparently also co-
ordinated Sino-Soviet views on
East-West issues, summit talks,
and the long-term problem of
cementing bloc unity and com-
bating the threat of "revision-
ism," particularly as embodied
in Tito's heresies. The Chi-
nese Communists endorsed Khru-
shchev's call for "big-power"
summit talks in the communique.
Khrushchev, however, apparent-
ly decided to drop this line
after studying the latest Ameri-
can and British notes, which
arrived in Moscow during his
absence. On 6 August Peiping
promptly supported his new pro-
posals of 5 August.
it is clear that one
of the important reasons for
Khrushchev's visit was the
need to discuss intrabloc re-
lations. Included in the-del-
egations were Boris Ponomarev
and Wang Chia-hsiang, both
leading specialists in bloc
affairs. The communique agreed
that the fight against "revision-
ism," termed the most serious
bloc problem at the moment,
would continue. Tito's heresies
were condemned, and attention
was probably given to the prob-
lem of the future handling of
the potentially divisive poli-
cies of Gomulka and Kadar.
The "mutual assistance"
phase of the conference pre-
sumably centered on military,
and perhaps scientific, sub-
Jects. There was no known
participation by economic
experts.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
an earth satellite will
e launched "in the near future"
from China, and Peiping's
spokesmen have intensified
their call for Chinese achieve-
ments in nuclear, electronic,
and missile fields.
Chinese Communist Moves
Prior to Khrushchev's
visit, Peiping had begun mov-
ing jet fighters to coastal
bases opposite Taiwan and',had
been giving a new emphasis to
its propaganda urging the "lib-
eration" of Taiwan. The Sino-
Soviet chiefs and their defense
ministers almost certainly dis-
cussed the Taiwan question, but
the communique contained no
reference to this or any other
Far East issue, and Peiping has
drastically reduced its propa-
ganda barrage since the talks
ended. Peiping's air moves
along the coast appear to have
been prompted primarily by a
professed concern that the Chi-
nese Nationalists are planning
military action against the
mainland and by the need to
tighten coastal air defenses.
Peiping, with Moscow's
knowledge, may have planned; the
air unit movements, hoping to
provoke Chinese Nationalist re-
action which would contribute
to the atmosphere of crisis
and demonstrate that Far Mgt-
ern tensions are proper sub-
jects for summit discussion
along with other international
issues.
Chinese Military Situation
the Com-
munists are w l1 ng to incur
some military risks to achieve
their objectives
The Communists may
e eve, particularly in view
of the present situation in the
Middle East, that the United
States will restrain the Na-
tionalists.
Despite the Chinese Nation-
alist view that occupation of
these fields is a direct of-
fensive threat to Taiwan, the
move is apparently being
undertaken ostensibly for de-
fensive reasons. No bombers
seem to be involved, and the
deployment falls into a pat-
tern of actions taken recently
to deny the air space over the
Chinese mainland to the Nation-
alists.
The Nationalists are con-
tinuing air patrols over the
strait with protective high
cover and with instructions to
avoid engagement. However, the
aggressiveness of Chinese Com-
munist air patrols conducted
against daily Nationalist recon-
naissance flights since the oc-
cupation of the coastal air-
fields may lead to clashes by
forces of squadron strength. An
air battle on this scale could
develop into an engagement in-
volving Taiwan air space, with-
out either side so intending.
There has been no evidence
of large-scale troop movements
in East China. The ground forces
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
opposite the off shore islands
have not been noticeably aug-
mented. No additional troops
are needed, however, to take
the Matsu Islands near Foochow,
where the Communists already
have a two-to-one superiority.
Attack against the Quemoys,
near Amoy, on the other hand,
would necessitate a troop
build-up as the Nationalist
forces there are about equal
to the Communists. The re-
cently completed Yingtan-Amoy
railroad could permit a rapid,
and perhaps undetected, Commu-
nist build-up in this area.
The Communists could try
to take the offshore. islands by
means short of an outright as-
sault. They have the capability
of interdicting Nationalist sup-
ply lines by air and sea attack
and by shore-based artillery
and rocket fire. They also
could undertake to probe Ameri-
can and Nationalist intentions
through a limited attack against
the lesser islands, Tatan or
Erhtan. An assault against
Taiwan proper seems highly im-
probable at this time because
of the presence of the Seventh
Fleet, the shortage of Communist
landing craft, and insufficient
supply build-ups in mainland
port areas.
There is thus little evi-
dence that the Communists in-
tend to initiate any major hos-
tile action at the present time,
but the possibility of in-
creased air clashes makes the
situation volatile.
Chinese Nationalist Position
At present, there are no
positive indications that the
Chinese Nationalists intend to
take preventive air action
against the Communist-occupied
airfields. However,
25X1
a high-level
conference - a ng with this
subject was held on 5 August
and a decision is expected by
9 August. The conference was
called by Chiang Kai-shek to
decide whether to attack or to
live with a situation in which
Communist air ..superiority. Would
extend over the offshore is-
lands and the entire Taiwan
Strait.
Chiang Kai-shek stated he woul
continue to honor his treaty com-
mitments to the United States,
which require consultation be-
fore ordering air attacks against
mainland targets. However,
Chiang also termed- occupation
of the airfields a "great threat"
and possibly a prelude to an in-
vasion of Taiwan. Chiang probably
would at least inform United
States officials of his inten-
tions and seek the tacit approval
of Washington before ordering
air attacks.
Although genuinely con-
cerned, the Nationalists are
also exploiting the situation
to obtain more American arms.
Chiang already has requested
provision of Sidewinder air-
to-air missiles for his air
force, replacement of his ob-
solete F84G aircraft with newer
F-86F's, a show of force by the
US Seventh Fleet, and permanent
stationing of F-100D's on Tai-
wan. Minister of Defense Yu
Ta-wei has requested Admiral
Smoot to transmit to Presi-
dent Eisenhower a request for
the President to issue a pub-
lic statement to the effect that
he would consider an attack on
Quemoy or Matsu at this time to
be a threat to Taiwan.
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE' WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
MIDDLE EAST DEVELDPMENT S
Lebanese rebels are still
pressing for an immediate po-
litical victory. Throughout
negotiations this week they
have continued to assert they
will not lay down arms until
American troops are withdrawn
and President Chamoun and Prime
Minister Sulh have resigned or
left the country. To obtain
these objectives, they are con-
tinuing sporadic terrorism in
the towns in order to intimi-
date merchants into maintain-
ing the political "strike"
started last May, and are keep-
ing up minor military harass-
ment. Christian Lebanese ap-
parently are most often the
victims of the military activi-
ty, and this has created some
fear of a "massacre" in the
Christian community. A flare-
up of religious fighting could
occur if the Christians become
convinced that a rebel politi-
cal victory would be followed
by further action against them.
General Shihab is groping
for some compromise solution
which will leave all the fac-
tions reasonably satisfied.
The general's real opinions on
all current subjects are ob-
scure since he is obviously try-
ing to be all things to all men.
On their side, Chamoun
and Sami Sulh appear to have
decided to try to stick it out
until Chamoun's term legally
ends on 23 September.
Syria closed its border
with Jordan on 3 August, thus
cutting the latter off economic-
ally from practically all con-
tact with the outside world.
All bulk imports must now come
through the port of Aqaba and
be transported over difficult
terrain. The petroleum situa-
tion in Jordan remains touchy.
The country has not retrieved
some 45 tank trucks caught in
Iraq by the coup there and may
not get them back until POL
previously supplied by Iraq is
paid for. The Amman money
changers have also felt the ef-
fect of isolation, and the value
of the dollar has fallen there
because of their inability to
sell dollar holdings on the
Beirut market.
Iraq
Iraqi leaders still fear
that the British and American
troops threaten their regime.
This fear has probably been en-
couraged by the Egyptian "ex-
perts" who have flocked to
Baghdad. However, a leading
member of the new government in-
quired "unofficially" this week
whether the United States would
be willing to continue to sup-
ply arms to Iraq. The leaders
of the government still contend
they are giving serious study
to the question of Iraq's role
in the Baghdad Pact, but it
seems almost certain that they
will decide to withdraw at the
first opportunity to do so
without unduly offending the
United States and Britain.
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7 August 1958
Saudi Arabia
The Saudi Government, in-
creasingly dominated by Crown
Prince Faysal, is now moving
rapidly to establish close re-
lations with Nasir and to re-
pair the damage done by King
Saud's machinations against
the UAR leader. UAR Vice Pres-
ident Amir arrived in Saudi
Arabia on 6 August,
At the end of the week,
the British reported that Iraq
is holding up food supplies
for Kuwait at the frontier,
possibly as a form.of pressure.
Some unrest seems likely unless
the supplies are restored.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SAY
7 August 1958
NOTES AND COMMENTS
GENEVA" .TECUNICAL TALKS
The Soviet delegation at
Geneva has been outlining a
proposed international inspec-
tion system for detecting nu-
clear tests that is much more
comprehensive and detailed than
the USSR has ever suggested in
years of intermittent disarma-
ment negotiations, but one still
considerably less effective
than the West considers neces-
sary. Moscow appears acttaally
willing to implement such a
system, and eager to have the
conference end with a wide
measure of agreement.! -If
the experts at Geneva fail to
resolve the major points of
difference, the USSR probably
expects that its proposals ap-
pear reasonable enough to make
a strong impression on public
opinion and to make it diffi-
cult for the West to insist
on a more elaborate system.
The Soviet delegation made
a number of concessions to the
West, and agreement was reached
relatively quickly in July on
conclusions concerning the
effectiveness of various detec-
tion methods. This conciliatory
tactic was probably motivated
by a desire to expedite the
conference and to have on the
record a wide measure of agree-
ment on technical details. More-
over, the Soviet delegation be-
lieved that the agreements on
detection methods were of sec-
ondary importance because it
intended to seek an inspection
system that was not strictly
based on these conclusionsre-
garding methods.
The key issue in determin-
iag the size of a control sys-
tem is the problem of detecting
underground tests and distin-
guishing them from earthquakes
by seismic methods. The Soviet
delegation proposed a system
that would have 100 to 110
stations throughout the world.
Although it claimed these could
detect all nuclear explosions
of more than one kiloton, it
has now admitted that they
could not distinguish under-
ground tests of about one kilo-
ton from earthquakes. To do
this, the USSR is relying on
existing seismic stations to
augment those of the inspection
system. A Polish delegate has
hinted, however, that the So-
viet delegation would compro-
mise on a larger figure, approxi-
mately 150 or 200 stations.
The Western delegation,
which has argued that as many
as 650 stations would be theo-
retically necessary to dis-
tinguish between earthquakes
and explosions of one kiloton
or more, has proposed a system
of 170 stations designed to
serve the more limited purpose
of assuring that five-kiloton
underground explosions can be
distinguished from earthquakes.
This proposal appears to have
aroused strong Soviet interest.
Perhaps a more controversial
problem is the use of inspec-
tion teams when detection equip-
ment registers an unidentified
explosion. While the USSR ap-
parently believes such teams
would be used only rarely and
wants ad hoc teams set up on
each occasion, the West antici-
pates a much larger number of
occasions demanding inspection
and wants a number of permament
inspection teams. The West is
relying heavily on inspection
teams to take the place of a
more elaborate system of con-
trol posts. The USSR, which
is probably most sensitive
about mobile inspection, may
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
seek to reduce Western demands
for such teams in return for
concessions on other aspects
of an agreement, such as the
number of stations. In an in-
formal meeting on 6 August, the
Soviet delegation made slight
concessions on some questions
but flatly opposed the Western
proposals for inspection teams.
While the Soviet delegation
has been pressing for agreement
on certain political issues,
such as the nationality of per-
sonnel manning inspection posts
and priority areas of the world
for inspection, it has indicated
informally it will not press for
such settlements in view of West-
ern insistence on avoiding po-
litical issues at Geneva. The
main Soviet aim is still to get
as wide a measure of agreement
there as possible.
Nevertheless, Moscow is
preparing for the possibility
that the conference will end
with some disagreement on the
scope of an inspection system,
at which time it would have to
convince world opinion that its
proposed system was perfectly
adequate. The Soviet announce-
ment that stations in the USSR
had detected 32 American tests
in the Pacific over a three-
month period was designed, as
TASS said, to prove that "any
nuclear explosions may be traced
and recorded with the help of
observation stations which al-
ready exist." In addition, Mos-
cow emphasized that the AEC,
which had only announced 14,
was trying to conceal from world
opinion the intensity of the
American testing program.
Other examples of increas-
ing propaganda on nuclear tests
were a Khrushchev statement re-
iterating that the Geneva con-
ference must lead to a termina-
tion of tests and a Pravda claim
that the United States was break-
ing its promise by continuing
tests after reaching agreement
with the USSR on methods of de-
tection.
Since the Soviet Union
has permitted the Geneva talks
to make considerable progress
in the apparent hope of bring-
ing an end to tests, Moscow
will certainly spare no ef-
fort in the political and
propaganda fields to force
Britain and the United
States to stop tests if
the Geneva conference reaches
agreement or even near agree-
ment. (Concurred in
by OSI
ARISTOV EXERTS RISING INFLUENCE
Khrushchev's program to
revitalize the party and to
rely on it heavily in execut-
ing his sweeping industrial
and agricultural programs has
enhanced the importance of the
central committee's Bureau for
the RSFSR, established in 1956.
The bureau, chaired by Khru-
shchev, is serving increasingly
as an arbitrator of serious
disputes arising in the adminis-
tration of the decentralized
industrial management which
go beyond the ? bounds of
governmental adjudication.
THROUGH RSFSR PARTY BUREAU
A decree of the party cen-
tral committee published this
spring identified several hither-
to undisclosed departments of the
bureau, bringing the known total
to six. It is now clear that
responsibility for day-to-day
central party administration
has been divided between the
RSFSR bureau and its depart-
ments which conduct the affairs
of the Russian Republic and
the departments of the central
committee for the union repub-
.lics.which oversee the af-
fairs of the other 14 union
republics.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
Active leadership of the
bureau had been conducted by
its deputy chairman, Nikolay
Belyaev, until his transfer to
Kazakhstan as party boss in
December 1957. While no re-
placement as deputy chairman
has been announced, there are
good indications that central
committee secretary and presid-
ium member Averky Aristov has
assumed these duties.
Aristov, who has an ad-
vanced engineering education,
is one of the younger generation
of Soviet leaders who combine
political adeptness with eco-
nomic administrative skills.
He has had experience in a wide
variety of central and regional
posts, including stints as par-
ty secretary in the mining and
metallurgical centers of Sverd-
lovsk and Chelyabinsk in the
southern Urals, Krasnoyarsk Kray
in central Siberia, and Khab-
arovsk Kray in the Far East.
At the 19th party congress
in 1952, Aristov was elected to
full membership in the expanded
party presidium and secretariat
of the central committee, but
lost both jobs immediately fol-
lowing Stalin's death. He sub-
sequently regained them, how-
ever, and was reappointed to
the secretariat in July 1955,
and to the presidium in June
1957 following the ouster of
the "antiparty group."
It has recently been re-
vealed that during his term on
the secretariat in 1952 and
1953, Aristov was also head of
the central committee's Depart-
ment for Party, Trade Union,
and Komsomol Organs, where one
of his major duties was over-
seeing personnel appointments.
There is no evidence, however,
that he has special responsi-
bility for appointments now,
beyond enjoying the patronage
perogatives of a central commit-
tee secretary.
Aristov has apparently kept
his ties with those areas where
he once served as party secre-
tary. During the past year he
BUREAU FOR THE RSFSR
CHNRUMI
N. S.KHRUSHCNEV
PROPAGANDA
AND AGITATION
SCIENCE, SCHOOLS,
AND CULTURE
INDUSTRY
AND TRANSPORT
ADMINISTRATIVE, TRADE,
AND FINANCE ORGANS
has made several trips to Sverd-
lovsk and Chelyabinsk to pre-
sent awards and to check on the
work of the sovnarkhoz, and
last fall he flew to the Far
East immediately after the Zhu-
kov ouster to explain the de-
velopment to the Far Eastern
military forces.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
Although little is known
about the distribution of func-
tions among the ten central
committee secretaries, and al-
though the full range of Aris-
tov's activities is still un-
clear, the fact that he is
personally involved in the
agricultural and industrial
development of the vast area
of the RSFSR extending from
the southern Urals to the Pa-
cific marks him as -a man of con-
siderable influence.
On 2 April it was announced
that Aristov had delivered the
major address at a conference
of regional officials called by
the RSFSR bureau to discuss
spring sowing. This is a func-
tion that former Deputy Chair-
man Belyaev performed in the
spring of 1956 and 1957.
Aristov still appears as
one of the lesser stars on the
pages of Pravda and Izvestia,
but this is probably more r-
cause of the nature of his work
than his position and authority
within the top leadership.
SOVIET MILITARY PERSONNEL CHANGES
Since Marshal Malinovsky
was appointed Soviet defense
minister in October 1957 to re-
place Marshal Zhukov,there have
been a number of changes in
military district and external
commands, but the headquarters
command staff inherited from
Zhukov has remained remarkably
stable.
Eleven out of the 18 mili-
tary districts have changed
commanders. The Soviet Group
of Forces, Germany, the North-
ern Group of Forces in Poland,
and the Pacific Fleet also have
new commanders. With two ex-
ceptions, all of the former com-
manders had served at least
three years in their posts and
were probably due for reassign-
ment under normal procedures.
Six of the former military dis-
trict commanders have not as
yet been identified in new
positions, and the identity of
the present commander of one
military district has not been
established. ILLEGIB
Colonel General (tank
troops) A. L. Getman, who was
recently appointed commander of
the Carpathian Military District,
was a commander of tank units
during World War II. There is
scant information on his ac-
tivities since the wart -fir
F y e was i eartitled
as commander of Soviet troops
in Rumania. He apparently re-
ceived his present appointment
in June of this year.
Admiral V. A. Fokin, be-
fore his recent appointment as
commander of the Pacific Fleet,
had been chief of the Main Naval
Staff in Moscow since 1953.
During World War II he held
commands in the Northern Fleet
and the Caspian Sea area. In
the spring of 1944 he was
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7 August 1958
involved in supervis-
ing the transfer of
American and British
ships to the USSR
and visited both the
United States and
Great Britain. Most
who have had contact
with Fokin consider
him an able seagoing
commander.
Army General
K. N. Galitski., an
outstanding field
commander during
World War II, is the
new commander of the
Transcaucasus Mili-
tary District. He
Baltic
Belorussian
Carpathian
Far East
Kiev
Leningrad
Moscow
North Caucasus
Northern
Odessa
Siberian
South Urals
Tranebalkal
Transcaucasus
Turkestan
Urals
Volga
Voronezh
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany
Northern Group of Forces, Poland
Pacific Fleet
served from 1946 to 1952 as com-
mander of the Carpathian Mili-
tary District and from 1952 to
1955 as commander of the Odessa
Military District. From 1955
to 1957, he commanded the North-
ern Group of Forces in Poland.
Army General M. V. Zakharov
was appointed commander of the
Group of Soviet Forces, Germany,
in November 1957 when the for-
mer commander, Marshal Grechko,
was recalled to Moscow to be-
come chief of the Soviet ground
forces. During World War II,
Zakharov proved himself an out-
standing staff officer, winning
General of the Army P. L Batov
Marshal S. K. Timoshenko
Colonel General A. L. Getman
Colonel General V. A. Penkovakl
Marshal V. L Chuikov
General of the Army N. L Krylov
Marshal K. S. Moskalenko
Colonel General I. A.' Pliyev
Colonel General A. T. Stuchenko
Colonel General L A. Radstevski
Colonel General P. K. Koshevoi
Colonel General Ya. G. Kreyzer
General of the Army K. N. Galitski
General of the Army I. L Fedyuninski
Colonel General D. D. Lelyushenko
Colonel General V. N. Komarov
Colonel General A. L Andreyev
General of the Army M. V. Zakharov
Colonel General G. L Khetagurov
Admiral V. A. Fokin
numerous decorations while
serving as chief of staff to
such field commanders as Konev
and Malinovsky. From 1945 to
1949 Zakharov was head of the
Voroshilov Military Academy.
He was next appointed deputy
chief of the Armed Forces Gen-
eral Staff, where he served un-
til 1954, when he was made com-
mander of the Leningrad Military
District. He retained this posi-
tion until his recent appoint-
ment as commander in East Germany.
In the Ministry of Defense,
Marshal Grechko was appointed
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7 August 1958
commander of the ground forces
to fill the vacancy left by
Malinovsky. The only major
change since was the replacement
of Colonel General Zheltov by
Colonel General Golikov as
head of the Main Political
Directorate. This change did
not constitute a demotion for
Zheltov as he was subsequently
appointed chief of the Adminis-
trative Department of the party
central committee.
PEIPING CLAIMS SPECTACULAR ECONOMIC ACHIEVEMENTS
The leadership in Peiping
clearly feels that the State
Statistical Bureau's report show-
ing an "unprecedentedly rapid"
economic growth during the first
half of 1958 vindicates its
judgment that the Chinese econ-
omy was ready for a "giant leap
forward" in economic develop-
ment. The official People's
Dail says the report complete-
ly validates the views of the
"gloomy clique," which has held
that the year's final accounts
would justify the view that the
"leap" policies were overly
hazardous.
"Some people" had held, the
daily says, that the larger the
industrial base, the slower the
rate of growth, but the "facts"
released in the statistical re-
port show that they are com-
pletely wrong. The report dis-
closes that the total value of
industrial production was 34
percent above the same period
last year, as compared with a
15-percent increase called for
in the official plan and a 33-
percent increase pledged under
the regime's leap forward pro-
gram. No firm figures were
given for the output of individ-
ual industrial items, but the
percentage increases indicated
seem within the range of possi-
bility. Investment in new con-
struction, according to the re-
port, was more than 40 percent
above the midyear level of the
record construction year of 1956.
"Some people," the daily
goes on, had held that agricul-
tural production could not be
increased more than about 5 per-
cent a year, but the "facts"
prove them wrong. The statisti-
cal report claims that the win-
ter grain and early summer crops
already harvested or about to
be harvested recorded a remark-
able 69-percent increase over
the same crops last year. The
claimed increase in these early
crops is some 11,000,000 tons
greater than Peiping's estimate
of the total increase in food
grains achieved during the en-
tire period of the First Five-
Year Plan (1953-1957). Wheat,
formerly a low-yield crop, is
said to have become a high-yield
crop, and the harvest this year
will top that of the United
States for the first time in
history.
These claims may be ex-
aggerated, but Peiping probably
did achieve substantial produc-
tion increases through more in-
tensive cultivation of these
early crops, improved water con-
trol measures, and an extensive
application of fertilizer--a
claimed 48.5 tons per acre, com-
posed mainly of mud and organic
fertilizers.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUV ARY
7 August 1958
These statistics claim
phenomenal progress and remain
to be substantiated. The tone
of the People's Daily commentary
on the report suggests that the
"gloomy clique" has been further
isolated and that. Peiping may
move against the as yet uniden-
tified individuals in it. The
leadership, which has shown
occasional misgivings about
the "leap" program now seems
satisfied that the pace
achieved during the first half
of the year can be sustained
(Prepared by
during the second half. 25X1
ORR)
HUNGARIAN REGIME FORCES CONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF WRITERS
As a follow-up to the ex-
ecution of Imre Nagy, the Kadar
regime has intensified its ef-
forts to force the Hungarian
intellectuals to associate them-
selves with the regime. As a
result, the remaining leaders
of the intellectual resistance
--the highly respected "populist"
writers--have decided to co-
operate with reservations and
to begin contributing to regime
publications. Concurrently,
the government is reported to
have arrested a number of sec-
ondary school students who al-
legedly had been influenced by
the writers and planned a demon-
stration following the Nagy ex-
ecution; it has also continued
retrials of convicted "counter-
revolutionaries," some of whom
are intellectuals, who had pre-
viously received light sentences.
gime is reliably reported to
have begun the trial of Istvan
Bibo, a close associate of the
"populists" for his part in the
Nagy government.
The regime, however, was
careful to give the writers a
face-saving device. At the
same time that the press was
bitterly attacking them, culture-
boss Gyula Kallai sent letters
to the four leaders of the
"populists"--Laszlo Nemeth,
Aron Tamasi, Peter Veres,and
Gyula Illyes--outlining the
party's cultural policy and
asking for their comments on it.
This was followed by an offer
granting the "populists" the
right--at least ostensibly--to
publish anything they wished in
certain periodicals. A similar 25X1
offer was also made to Laszlo
Lajtha, a leading composerr_as
The decision to increase
pressure on the "populist" writ-
ers apparently was reached at a
central committee meeting on 6
June and was followed in late
June by an extremely detailed
attack in Social Review, party
ideological months?n paral-
lel press attacks, the "popu
lists" were accused of such
crimes as preparing the ideo-
logical foundation for the 1956
revolt, anti-Semitism, bourgeois
nationalism, opposing collec-
tivization, and corrupting Hun-
garian youth, any one of which
would be justification for po-
lice action. Finally, the re-
sociated with this group.
Also, in the week of 21
July,'the regime brought 130
convicted "counterrevolution-
aries" up for retrial before
the Supreme Court, including
Communist intellectuals Jozsef
Gali and Gyula Obersovszky, who
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7 August 1958
were given rather light prison
sentences last year after Euro-
pean intellectuals intervened
on their behalf. The regime is
reported to have demanded the
death penalty for Obersovszky
at least.
The regime probably hopes
that a capitulation of recalci-
trant writers would pave the
way for the capitulation of the
technical intelligentsia, also
under pressure to cooperate in
return for forgiveness for past
"mistakes."? In this case, how-
ever, the regime is handicapped
by a severe shortage of tech-
nically trained persons in Hun-
gary, since many fled to the
West during the 1956 revolt,
and it must attempt to salvage
as many of those remaining as
possible.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
FRENCH REACTION TO DE GAULLE'S DRAFT CONSTITUTION
The French press and polit-
ical parties are concerned over
the increased powers of the
president and the reduced powers
of the National Assembly pro-
vided for under De Gaulle's
constitution just submitted to
a special consultative committee
for review. The public's atti-
tude, however, is "let De Gaulle
see what he can do," and the
final draft--though it may in-
corporate some:-changes--Will
probably be approved by a large
majority.
The draft attempts to over-
come chronic French governmental
instability by increasing the
power of the executive at the
expense of Parliament. Presi-
dential authority would extend
to appointing the premier and
dissolving the assembly, nego-
tiating treaties, assuming full
control in emergencies, and
calling for referenda to break
deadlocks between the government
and Parliament.
The National Assembly's
legislative powers are restrict-
ed to "major" fields, and:
it can no longer eas
ily overthrow governments...
Moreover, the Senate"s pow-
ers would altost equal those!
of the assembly, and, for the
first time in modern French
history, there would be a con-
stitutional court which would
have wide powers to pass on
legislation.
The provisions on relations
with France's overseas posses-
sions are purposely vague. The
Algerian settlers read in them
a promise of integration of Al-
geria into France, but West
African nationalists are already
protesting the omission of an
option for independence.
Press reaction to the draft
has so far been cautious, but
fear is evidenced that the new
constitution might permit the
rise of a "strong man." Le
Monde sees "a presidentialmon-
arrc y in the decor of a parlia-
mentary republic," and expresses
concern about the period after
De Gaulle. Andre Siegfried
writes in Le Figaro that none
of the consTi u oval provisions
should give rise to any basic
objections except in the case
of the very limited legislative
functions, although the power
of the president to "take meas-
ures required by circumstances"
is described as scarcely accept-
able and contrary to a century
of liberal tradition.
The political parties are
similarly critical of the "in-
ordinate power for the president
and the straight jacket around
the assembly," and will probably
sharpen.their attacks. Both the
Socialists and Radicals have ex-
pressed fears the draft contains
"grave dangers for the republic."
Nevertheless, disgust with the
Fourth Republic, faith in De
Gaulle, and fear of a coup
d'etat if the constitution is
rejected combine to make pas-
sage of the final version a
virtual certainty. The Septem-
ber-October referendum will be
more a plebiscite for or against
De Gaulle than a measure of the
merits of the proposed constitu-
tion.
FINNISH POLITICAL SCENE CONFUSED
The difficulties preventing usual practice, did not offer
formation of a majority govern- his resignation-when parliament
ment in Finland may lead to a convened on 29 July. Inclusion
continuation of the nonpolitical of the Communist-front Finnish
caretaker regime of 'Reino People's Democratic League (SKDL)
Kuuskoski, who, contrary to is still unlikely.
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SKDL, as the largest party
in parliament, was given the
customary first chance at form-
ing a majority government. It
failed, as did the Social Demo-
crats and the Conservatives.
President Kekkonen on 7 August
asked the Agrarians, Social
Democrats, and the Social Demo-
cratic Opposition together to
try to form a majority govern-
ment.
The ultimate possibility
of a coalition cabinet with
FINNISH DIET
1958 QUADRENNIAL ELECTIONS
SKDL participation depends on
the willingness of the Agrarians
and the dissident Social Demo-
crats to enter into such an ar-
rangement. This has not been
ruled out by dissident Social
Democratic leader Aare Simonen
and by some Agrarians, but the
latter party is divided over the
question, since some of its dep-
uties strongly oppose cabinet
collaboration with the SKDL.
Without their support such a
coalition would lack a majority.
The possibility of a certain
amount of collaboration in par-
liament among the SKDL, the
Agrarians, and the dissident
Social Democrats was, however,
demonstrated on 29 July when
the three parties joined forces
to elect an Agrarian speaker
and a Communist first vice
speaker.
Inability of the various
parties to reach an agreement
could lead to a pro-
tracted continuation
of the caretaker 25X1
Kuuskoski regime. The
Agrarians are not dis-
pleased with his per-
formance.
Formation of an
effective, democratic
majority government
depends on abatement
of the bitter animosi-
ties between the
Agrarians and the So-
cial Democrats and
within the litter party:itself.
Failure to form an effec-
tive government capable of deal-
ing with the formidable economic
problems, principally unemploy-
ment and marginal farming, by
an economically sound program
of economic expansion and in-
dustrialization will benefit
the Communists.
BOLIVIAN REGIME THREATENED BY POLITICAL INSTABILITY
The protracted rift between
the left and right wings of the
governing Nationalist Revolu-
tionary Movement (MNR) in Boliv-
ia may develop into open con-
flict if moderate President
Siles carries out his most re-
cent threat to resign. Former
President Paz, titular head of
the party, who returned to Bo-
livia last May as a self-styled
moderator, has thus far failed
to reconcile the two hostile
MNR factions. In the event
Siles resigns, as he has threat-
ened to do several times in the
past 18 months, support for the
US-backed stabilization program
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY B Y
7 August 1958
in Bolivia will probably be con-
siderably weakened.
Bolivia's present political
crisis is focused on the compo-
sition of the cabinet. The
leftist MNR element, headed by
labor leader Juan Lechin,,has
demanded the removal of some of
Sales' reliable moderate and
rightist supporters. Probably
to back up his demands, Lechin
has threatened to call a strike
of the powerful mine workers'
union, which he largely controls.
Meanwhile, Paz has insisted that
Siles appoint a cabinet with an
equal number of rightists and
leftists. Siles, however, has
rejected both demands and has
reportedly threatened to resign
on 6 August in favor of Alvarez
Plata, Senate president and MNR
national political committee
chairman. Formerly considered
a backer of Sales, Alvarez now
is believed to have drifted into
the ranks of Lechin's leftist
followers.
Neither Paz nor Lechin has
indicated any willingness to
assume the presidency, although
Paz, who left Bolivia on 4 Au-
gust, may be seeking to rule
the country from behind the
scenes through Alvarez.
Sales advised American Am-
bassador Bonsai on 2 August
that prior to taking an indefi-
nite leave of absence shortly
after 6 August, he will organize
a new cabinet favorable to the
US-backed stabilization program
begun in late 1956. This sug-
gests he may be wavering in his
decision to resign and that a
solution to the MNR internal
conflict may be found short of
his retirement. The possibili-
ty exists, however, that the
deep split in the MNR could pro-
voke a concomitant division
among the army, police, and mi-
litia and result in serious vio-
lence.
ARMED FORCES DISAFFECTION THREATENS CUBAN GOVERNMENT
The Cuban armed forces are
increasingly restive because of
the government's inability to
quell the Castro rebellion in
Oriente Province or to resolve
the ptolonged political crisis,
a fact which could impair Pres-
ident Batista's chances of main-
taining himself in power. The
military has traditionally been
the bulwark of the Batista re-
gime.
Disaffection among enlisted
men has been marked in Oriente
Province, where troops fighting
the Castro rebels have been
forced to cope with unfamiliar
terrain and guerrilla tactics
and many officers have flagrant-
ly engaged in graft. Increased
and apparently relatively suc-
cessful rebel activity during
recent weeks has contributed
to the demoralization of the
army.
The inability of the armed
forces to put down the Castro
rebellion could serve to con-
vince some high-ranking military
elements of the need to oust
Batista in order to restore
peace.
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7 August 1958
The government of Haitian
President Francois Duvalier re-
mains extremely vulnerable, de-
spite its success in putting
down an attempted coup by a
small group on 29 July. Oppo-
sition leaders are undoubtedly
still planning moves against
the overnmen
army remains in doubt. Weak and
divided as a result of Duvalier's
purges of senior officers, the
army is no longer the traditional
stabilizing influence in Haitian
politics.
The political climate has
grown steadily more turbulent
since Duvalier assumed office
last October.
Concerned for its security
in the face of reports of "im-
minent" land and sea attacks,
the government has requested
the United States to establish
air and possibly sea patrols
along the Haitian coast and to
supply the government with arms.
Duvalier's control over
the political situation seems
precarious at best. His great-
est support comes from his
armed secret police and other
civilian partisans. Although
Army Chief of Staff Flambert
apparently proved his loyalty
by leading the government's
counterattack on 29 July, it
was the secret police rather
than the army which crushed the
rebels. The loyalty of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
:7 August'1958
13TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PRESIDENCY
Lebanese Foreign Minister
Charles Malik's position on fa-
voring the landing of American
troops in Lebanon has raised
considerable doubts among UN
members about his suitability
for the presidency of the 13th
General Assembly which opens on
16 September. Although prior
to the crisis Malik seemed as-
sured of the office--usually
bestowed by a substantial ma-
jority as an accolade for pre-
vious UN activities--Middle
Eastern events have encouraged
other countries to offer candi-
dates to the detriment of Malik's
chances.
When Malik withdrew his
candidacy at last year's Gen-
eral Assembly in favor of Munro
of New Zealand, UN members gen-
erally conceded that the office
should go to him in 1958. Al-
though this session begins be-
fore President Chamoun and his
foreign minister are scheduled
to leave office, Malik's close
association with the old regime
has led some UN members to
question whether he would be
"representative" of the new Leba-
nese Government. Many members
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
doubt that incoming president
Shihab would even appoint Malik
as a UN delegate.
Reports from Beirut, how-
ever, indicate that Shihab might
regard the election of Malik
as assembly president and the
appointment of Chamoun as chief
delegate as a convenient means
of getting both men out of Leb-
anon. Even if the Shihab gov-
ernment should send Malik to
the UN, support for him person-
ally has seriously declined.
many Latin American delegations
would not vote for Malik be-
cause "he had dome out in
favor of foreign interven-
tion."
Yugoslav Foreign Minister
Koca Popovic's announcement of
his candidacy on 1 August could
seriously encroach on support
for Malik. On 8 July the Yugo-
slav UN delegate told Ambassador
Lodge that Belgrade believes it
can draw more support than Malik.
The Yugoslavs see this as an
ideal time to demonstrate the
number of their friends in the
present struggle with the USSR.
They believe they would gain
backing from the West, Asia,
Africa, and Latin America.
Czechoslovakia has offi-
cially announced the candidacy
of its chief UN representative,
Jiri Nosek. Unless a serious
deadlock develops between Malik
and Popovic,however, election of
any satellite representative to
the presidency seems unlikely.
NATIONALIST PARTY DEMANDS INDEPENDENCE FOR FRENCH WEST AFRICA
African nationalists at a
regional party congress on 27
July demanded immediate inde-
pendence, reflecting the grow-
ing opposition in French Tropi-
cal Africa to the proposed
French constitutional amendments.
The slogan of independence is
likely to have electrifying ef-
fect on the Africans and may.
force the political pace faster
than desired y moderate
leaders, who. appreciate.-
French West Africa's economic
and administrative dependence
on France.
The major nationalist par-
ties in French West Africa--the
African Democratic Rally (RDA),
which controls the government
of four of the eight territories,
and the Party of the African Re-
groupment (PRA), which dominates
three--oppose the proposed amend-
ments to the French constitution
because they do not recognize
the "right to independence" for
dependent territories under a
federal system. The voters in
the autumn referendum will have
the following alternatives for
which to express a preference:
retention of the present coloni-
al status, integration with
metropolitan France as depart-
ments, or association in a fed-
eral system.
Many Paris officials are
resigned to early independence
in Tropical Africa but fear the
effect that an independence
clause would have on Algeria.
According to an unconfirmed
press report, De Gaulle favors
conditional independence for
France's Tropical African pos-
sessions in a-loose federation
in which Paris would handle for-
eign affairs. Such an offer
would appeal to moderate na-
tionalist leaders but may not
satisfy extremists who have
gained strength recently.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
IFN[ /?
. ALGERIA
SPANISH
SAHARA
the congress' decision
and presented the
resolution to De Gaulle
on 29 July.
influence the strong
left wing of the more
moderate African Demo-
( cratic Rally to de-
157- VOLTA FRENCI-I a tougher position
PORT. RENCH
NEA GUINEA E 7/-"by
?~ CAM Y~EQUATO with France. ResiSt-
oRV /yy1
ih
rt -f
A
SIERRA
LEONE
-1 k' Houphouet-Boigny, mod-
LIBERIA' COAST \ AMEROUN PNG~" SHARI
`~ J T__~/ ~?. ~e ^..1 erate leader of the
RDA who was virtually
O,2 BELGIAN repudiated by his par-
( CONGO t
in 1957
mi
ht lead
y
g
:
,
to a splintering of
At the PRA congress at
Cotonou on 27 July the student-
labor union elements assumed
control and secured a unanimous
resolution demanding immediate
independence and the creation
of a constituent assembly to ar-
range the regrouping'of the 12
territories of French West and
Equatorial Africa to form a new
state which would be linked with
France in a confederation of
"free and equal peoples." The
moderate leader of the party,
Leopold Senghor, acquiesced in
Brazzaville the RDA and the -; pa-- --
litical'eclipse of
Houphouet-Boigny.
A tougher nationalist at-
titude is already apparent in
the 30 July statement of the
PRA premier of Senegal. He de-
nounced as "pre-Cotonou and
outdated" the recent French re-
form whereby an elected African
rather than the French governor
presides over the territorial
council, which in turn is re-
sponsible to the local le isla-
ture. 25X1
IRAQ'S NEW ECONOMIC ORIENTATION
The conservative approach
to Iraq's economic development
program followed by prerevolu-
tionary governments is being
abandoned by the new Iraqi re-
gime. The Development Board,
the chief instrument for chan-
neling 70 percent of oil reve-
nues into economic projects, is
being overhauled, and members
appointed by former governments
have been dismissed. The posi-
tion of Western consultants to
the board is in doubt.
Large numbers of Egyptian
economic specialists, who quick-
ly responded to Baghdad's re-
quests for assistance shortly
after the revolt, are now in a
position to exert influence on
the expenditure of oil revenues
set aside for development. These
funds are presently accumulating
at about $150,000,000 per year.
Based on the precedent of the
Egyptian revolution, these ad-
visers can be expected to press
for a large-scale redistribution
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU10111ART
7 August 1958
of land--a move which would
greatly enhance popular support
for the present government.
The new government's policy
toward the oil industry is com-
ing into sharper focus. Despite
public assurances that the gov-
ernment is favorably inclined
toward maintaining the status
quo before the revolt, consid-
erable departure from existing
arrangements probably will oc-
cur. Baghdad is seeking sup-
port and guidance from Nasir
on economic matters, and Egyp-
tian petroleum experts have al-
ready arrived in Baghdad.
Pressure on the Iraq Pe-
troleum Company (IPC) to build
a new pipeline through Syria
will probably begin soon, since
Baghdad apparently sought agree-
ment with Nasir for permission
to build such a line. The IPC
concession, which covers almost
all of Iraq, may be reduced sub-
stantially and the released
areas opened to other companies,
probably on the pattern of the
75/25 profit split and joint-
management scheme recently con-
cluded in Iran. Demands that
IPC alter its existing 50/50
profit split, which had been
put forward by the former gov-
ernment,, probably will be pressed
with more vigor by the new gov-
ernment. It is also likely
that Iraq will attempt to get
large retroactive p4yments from
the oil companies.
Iraq's attitude toward eco-
nomic relations with the Commu-
nist bloc countries may be pat-
terned after those adopted by
Cairo. Baghdad's statement to
Peiping that Iraq "will estah-
lish political, commercial, andt
economic relations with all na-
tions of the world without any
discrimination" suggests the
government would not be adverse
to supplying petroleum to Com-
munist China and the Soviet Far
East. Presently oil for these
areas is supplied chiefly from
the western USSR and shipped,
at high cost, by way of the
Trans-Siberian Railroad.
(Concurred in by ORR)
Some improvement in polit-
ical stability in Pakistan may
result from' the agreement
reached on 3 August between
President Mirza and his chief
rival, former Prime Minister
Suhrawardy, to cooperate in the
forthcoming national elections.
It also lessens the possibility
that the elections, expected to
be held in February, will again
be postponed.
The two dominant political
personalities apparently agreed
to work together to try to elect
Republican party and Awami League
candidates to the national and
provincial assemblies who would
then under the agreement elect
Mirza as president. Mirza would
PART II
name Suhrawardy prime minister,
heading a.:coalition of the two
parties which dominate the po-
litical scene in West Pakistan
and East Pakistan respectively.
Suhrawardy undertook to continue
to support the present govern-
ment of Republican Prime Minis-
ter Noon until the elections,
under the condition that an
Awami League ministry be restored
in East Pakistan following the
expiration of President's Rule
in the province on 24 August.
The statements made by Mirza
since he returned from the Bagh-
dad Pact talks in Ankara and
Tehran to the effect that he in-
tends to function as a "consti-
tutional president" from now-on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
must be treated with reserve,
however. His pact with Suhra-
wardy, moreover, will be sub-
ject to the strain of their con-
tinuing competition for power
and could be modified by chang-
ing political conditions.
Mirza's willingness to re-
sume his cooperation with Suhra-
wardy, whom he ousted from of-
fice in October 1957, may be
prompted by his shock over de-
velopments in Iraq and also by
increasing signs that his sup-
port among the Pakistani Army
and other influential groups
is waning. In considering the
alternatives open to him to
protect his future position,
Mirza may have been persuaded
by these trends that his in-
terests would be better served
by cooperating with Suhrawardy,
who is capable of effectively
defending the government's
pro-Western foreign policy,
than by attempting to assume
a more dictatorial role.
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN INDIA'S KERALA STATE UNDER FIRE
The Communist government
in India's Kerala State has
come under increasing fire as
a result of a series of clashes
between state police and non-
Communist demonstrators. While
Communist control in Kerala
does not appear to be serious-
ly endangered, this first effec-
tive challenge to the Communist
regime has served to strengthen
and unite the non-Communist
opposition. Prime Minister
Nehru has thus far resisted
pressure for the national gov-
ernment to intervene.
Recurring incidents and.
strikes during recent weeks
involving opposition agitators
have resulted in police action
in which seven people have been
killed and a large number in-
jured. There have also been a
number of political murders,
apparently aimed at terrorizing
the opposition. Reliable sources
report that anti-Communist sen-
timent among large sections of
the public in Kerala has sharply
increased as a result of the
continuing agitation.
The police firing has
drawn protests from a top lead-
er of the all-India Communist
party as well as from Congress
party officials. S.A. Dange,
leader of the Communist group
in the national Parliament,
stated on 27 July that the party
would inquire into the Communist
government's action in Kerala
with regard to the maintenance
of law and order, and instruct
it to avoid such violent in-
cidents in the future or be
asked to resign.
Dange on 3 August invited
the two main Socialist parties
in Kerala to join the Communists,
who have only a bare majority
in the state assembly, in form-
ing a united-front government.
It is not yet clear whether
Dange's statements reflect the
official view of the party,
which formally adopted a "peace-
ful" approach to power in April.
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7 August 1958
The Kerala Socialists, who have
been actively cooperating with
the Congress party in opposition
to the Communist ministry, are
unlikely to be interested in
Dange's proposal.
There has been growing con-
cern in New Delhi recently
over the Communists' new tac-
tics of violence and intimida-
tion in Kerala, particularly
over references by Chief Minis-
ter Namboodiripad to the possi-
bility of "civil war" in the
event Congress leaders form a
front with other opposition
parties. New Delhi's apparent
unwillingness to intervene con-
stitutionally in Kerala prob-
ably stems in part from its re-
luctance to undercut efforts
toward organizing a united op-
position. Local Congress and
Socialist politicians are likely
to continue to foment disturb-
ances, possibly in an effort
to force the national govern-
ment to establish emergency
President's Rule as a step to-
ward ousting the Communists.
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?.August 1958
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At a time when Lebanon is
faced with its most critical
problems since World War II,
the country's politicians have
turned to a military man, Gen-
eral Fuad Shihab, who insists
he is no politician, to lead
the country.
Shihab, born in 1903, is
a member of the Ma-
ronite Christian
branch of one of Leb-
anon's leading fami-
lies. Other Shihabs
are Moslems and
Druze, a fact which
may accentuate the
general's natural
tendency for compro-
mise in a country in
which all political
matters are decided
on a sectarian basis.
French-educated,Shi-
hab received his mil-
itary training in
the French Levant
Army when Lebanon
was under French man-
date. After receiv-
Free French and British troops
in the Beirut sector. In 1945
he was appointed commander in
chief of the Lebanese Army by
President Bishara al-Khuri.
When the Palestine War
broke out in 1948, General Shi-
hab remonstrated against engag-
ing his inadequately armed forces,
but followed orders.
Within .a few days
Lebanese forces were
pushed back into Leb-
anon. After reorgan-
izing his forces, the
general asked to be
sent to the front
again, but no orders
were forthcoming. The
Palestine fiasco re-
sulted in the organi-
zation of an opposi-
tion to President
Khuri led by Saeb
Salam.
ing his commission in 1923, he
was sent to France for further
training.
In 1936 he married the
daughter of a French officer
and again returned to France
in 1939 to attend the French
War College. When World
War II threatened, he was as-
signed to General Weygand's
staff in Syria; he commanded
Vichy forces fighting against
In 1951 and 1952
disturbances multi-
plied, and riots and
strikes soon threat-
ened the state's security. Gen-
eral Shihab was given "full re-
sponsibility for security of
the nation" and was ordered to
arrest the opposition leaders.
He refused to do so, however,
stating that he could not guar-
antee the president's safety,
and suggested that Khuri resign.
Shihab's excuse was that
there was "insubordination"
in the army which he could not
control.
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7 August 1958
Khuri resigned on 18 Sep-
tem>ber 1952, whereupon the press
.! lxd certain elements of the pub-
lic called on Shihab to assume
the presidency. He refused,
saying that he was not inter-
ested in a political career.
Later, when pressed by Prime
Minister Karame to sign a de-
fense pact with Syria, he re-
fused to consider it because he
believed it would be dangerous
to be allied to a weak Syria.
The general first clashed
with President Chamoun in the
summer of 1955 when unruly
tribes in northern Lebanon car-
ried out widespread smuggling
activities--mostly hashish and
arms--and were robbing travelers.
The President ordered Shihab to
send troops to the area to re-
store order, which Shihab re-
fused to do on the ground that
it was a police problem. Shihab
reached an accommodation with
the chief tribal leader and
promised to secure government
assistance for the dissident
tribes. Shihab won much acclaim
from the residents of that area
for his attitude, and Chamoun
was forced to rescind the order.
During the present Lebanese
rebellion, General Shihab's re-
luctance to utilize the army's
full resources against the oppo-
sition stemmed in part from a
dislike of President Chamoun
and a fear that his "brittle"
instrument would shatter if or-
dered to strike hard because of
the political divisions within
it. Throughout the rebellion
Shihab has maintained contact
with rebel leaders and has
reached understandings which he
claimed would ward off sectarian
warfare.
This policy has preserved
some of his popularity among
moderate opposition elements,
but at the same time has weakened
the position of pro-Chamoun ele-
ments. This attitude apparently
has convinced the opposition
that he is a man who can be in-
duced to compromise to their ad-
vantage, and it has resulted in
Shihab's having made almost no
influential political enemies.
Shihab warned American of-
ficers against Syrian-Egyptian
unity and the threat to- Near
Eastern peace that it would
bring. He also has expressed
concern over the rise of Soviet
prestige in the Middle East at
the expense of the United States.
Although critical of Amer-
ican policy in the Middle East,
Shihab has been friendly toward
the United States. He has crit-
icized American policy for not
doing "something positive" about
the Palestine situation and has
claimed that only the US could
influence Israel to a compromise
which would "save Arab face."
More recently Shihab has
said he believes that Nasirism
is the "wave of the future,"
and, because of his political
outlook and personality, may
well lead Lebanon out of the
Western camp into the UAR sphere
of influence. Nasir in fact
recommended Shihab as a "com-
promise"candidate for the presi-
dency some two months ago.
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7 August 1958
TRENDS IN INDIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
During the past year, de-
velopments within the Sino-So-
viet bloc have led India to
adopt a more critical attitude
toward the Communist world. At
the same time, India's relations
with the United States have im-
proved. Recent events in the
Middle East, including the land-
ing of American troops in Leb-
anon, produced a more restrained
reaction from Prime Minister
Nehru and his government than
might have been expected, and
American relations with India
apparently have not deteriorated
significantly to date. This
does not mean that Nehru is
likely to alter his basic policy
of nonalignment with the two
power blocs or that he will
abandon his opposition to de-
fense pacts and nuclear tests.
It does suggest, however, that
Nehru will probably remain cau-
tious in his tactical approaches
toward the Sino-Soviet bloc.
Relations with Moscow
New Delhi's assessment of
the USSR's position in world
Doubts as to the prospect
for continued liberalization
within the bloc were soon en-
gendered by the harsh treatment
accorded the Yugoslav Communist
party by Moscow and Peiping.
In his first such direct state-
ment, Nehru condemned the ideo-
logical rigidity of 'interna-
tional Communism and re-
proached both Moscow and Pei-
ping for the retreat from
liberalization and the "hun-
dred flowers" thesis. He
cited the attacks on Tito
as an example of interference
in the'internal-affairs of an-
other country.
affairs has been conditioned
by three major developments dur-
ing the first half of 1958: par-
ty chief Khrushchev's assump-
tion of the Soviet premiership,
the bloc campaign against Tito,
and the execution of Imre Nagy.
The Indian press--probably re-
flecting official reaction--
recognized Khrushchev's move
as a resumption of one-lean
rule, but observed that a re-
turn to "undiluted Stalinism"
was unlikely.
-khatewr you do, you must not forget national
interest. To think always in terms of the nation and
act in the interest of the ration is the real sign of
maturity and Yiedom.m
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MEMBERS OF SEATO
SINO-SOVIET BLOC
7 AUGUST 1958
The execution of the Hun-
garian rebel leaders also had
a strong impact throughout India.
In contrast to the hesitant and
mixed reaction to the 1956 up-
rising, there was an immediate
public outcry against the ac-
tion. This was followed by a
prolonged and nearly universal
condemnation. Official reaction,
as in 1956, lagged somewhat be-
hind the outraged response of
the press and public. Party
and government statements--al-
though guarded and generalized--
were clearly critical, how-
ever.
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Nehru's deputy, Home Af-
fairs Minister Pant, in two pub-
lic speeches condemned the "mur-
der" of Nagy in the strongest
terms yet applied by top Indian
officials to bloc affairs.
Amplifying an earlier
statement of 23 June, Nehru
told a press conference on 3
July he was "shocked and wor-
ried" by the development, but
hedged his comments, apparently
to avoid unduly offending Mos-
mind as to how far the prin-
ciples are being acted on by
people who talk about them.
This constitutes his first pub-
lic admission that the prin-
ciples may not in practice be
honored by the Communist coun-
RStalintam is once again alive. Countries which
had given people freedom are taking it back. The urge
for i deperdenee in 9angary and Poland has been thwart-
ed. Me slogan of Plot a hundred flowers bloom' is now
dead.... Communists in ihdia also recently pledged to
adopt peaceUi methods, but what we have seen *how*
that they--Communtats all over the world--have swerved
from that path. The most recent saawpie was the murder
of M. lhw Fogy. m
major part of India's foreign
policy tactics has turned on
Nehru's conviction that an im-
portant relaxation of controls
was under way inside the Soviet
realm and should be encouraged
by withdrawing outside pres-
sures, this revision of Nehru's
own assessment could have pro-
found effects on India's inter-
national policies.
Another indication that
Nehru was reappraising the basis
of his foreign policy came in
his comments during a press con-
ference in early July on the
validity of the Five Principles
of peaceful coexistence, of
which noninterference in inter-
nal affairs is the cardinal
point. Nehru confessed that
a question had arisen in his
tries which so frequently es-
pouse them.
The fact that Moscow did
not move troops into the Middle
East to counter Western inter-
vention was received in New
Delhi with approval and relief..
Khrushchev's proposal for a
summit meeting on the crisis
accorded with Nehru's frequent
appeal for top-level negotia-
tions and gained his immediate
support. Soviet insistence on
Nehru's participation in the
summit talks also impressed New
Delhi. Nehru was reported to
be keenly disappointed, however,
that Moscow refused his request
to support the Japanese UN res-
olution on Lebanon.
Relations with Peiping
While reaction in India
to recent bloc developments
has been focused largely on
Soviet responsibility, the role
played by neighboring Commu-
nist China has not gone un-
noticed. Peiping's stand on
the Yugoslav and Hungarian is-
sues has, in fact, come as a
revelation to large segments
of Indian opinion,, official
and unofficial, and may have
more significant implications
in the long run than the reac-
tion against Moscow.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE .WEEKLY SUI NARY
7 August 1958
Indian policy has been
based largely on the assumption
that China, as a sort of com-
rade in the Asian nationalist
movement, could not be consid-
ered an integral part of the
Sino-Soviet bloc. Russian Com-
munism and Chinese Communism
have appeared to most Indians
as two quite different phenomena..
Similarly, New Delhi has not
considered Peiping subject to
the doctrinaire outlook associ-
ated with Moscow or identified
with the more repugnant aspects
of Stalinism.
Mao's experiment with the
"hundred-flowers" concept, os-
tensibly allowing a freer in-
tellectual atmosphere, confirmed
many Indians' view-that Pei-
ping's approach to Communism
was not identical with that of
Moscow. Its subsequent shift
to a crackdown on intellectual
dissidents had relatively lit-
tle impact on Indian attitudes,
however.
On the other hand, Pei-
ping's unqualified support--at
times even leadership--of the
bloc's recent attack on Tito
and its endorsement of the Hun-
garian executions came as a
considerable shock to many In-
dians, and Chinese prestige in
India has been damaged. Offi-
cials in New' Delhi--including the
prime minister--will probably
feel it necessary to revise
their estimates of Peiping's
position in the Communist world,
as well as in Asia.
Relations With the US
A gradual improvement in
New Delhi's relations with Wash-
ington began toward the end of
1955. It was enhanced by the
American stand on the Suez cri-
sis in 1956, by Nehru'.s personal
talks with President Eisenhower
in December of that year, and
by stepped-up American economic
assistance to India in 1958.
Official and public opin-
ion in India has been strongly
critical of Western interven-
tion in the Middle East, con-
tending that Arab nationalism
is a force that cannot be con-
tained by the West with armed
force. To attempt to do so,
in Nehru's privately expressed
view, merely provides the USSR
with propaganda capital. In-
dia's official reaction, how-
ever, has been restrained, in
contrast to the bitter denuncia-
tion in 1956 of the British-
French intervention in Suez.
New Delhi's more reasonable at-
titude is illustrated by Nehru's
reportedly pleased reaction to
President Eisenhower's letter
explaining US motives and by
the general readiness among of-
ficial circles to credit US
good intentions.
This reaction is consistent
with a noticeable shift in In-
dian attitudes during the past
year toward a more sympathetic
position vis-a-vis the United
States. During this period,
Indian officials--from Nehru
on down--softened their criticism
of US policies and showed a
greater responsiveness to Amer-
ican arguments, both in New
Delhi and at the United Nations.
A major--though probably
not decisive--factor in the es-
tablishment of closer relations
has been India's increasing de-
pendence on the United States
for essential economic assist-
ance. By 1957 it had become
clear to New Delhi that the ful-
fillment of even the "hard core"
of the Second Five-Year Plan
(1956-6l)--on which the polit-
ical and economic future of
India hang--would be impossible
without substantial aid in the
form of foreign exchange. It
was equally clear that the only
acceptable source for most of
this vital assistance was the
United States. Aid on such a
scale from Moscow apparently
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7 August 1958
was ruled out by New Delhi for
political reasons--nor was it
certain that the bloc would be
willing to provide it.
By May 19 58 it had become
apparent that India faced a far
more severe financial crisis
than originally anticipated, and
the need for greatly increased
foreign assistance during the
remaining three years of the
plan period was emphasized.
Relations with Neutralist Leaders
Indications of a sharper
Indian awareness of cold-war
realities are also evident in
New Delhi's reaction to recent
developments in the Middle East
and Southeast Asia, even though
its traditional policy of non-
alignment and mediation has
been consistently maintained.
Nehru's relations with
Yugoslavia, the UAR, and Indo-
nesia show that he continues
to place a high premium on the
strengthening of nations which
are not aligned with either ma-
jor bloc in the hope that more
independeAt leadership will
prevent the division of the
world into two warring camps.
At the same time, Nehru main-
tains his opposition to the
formation of any new "bloc,"
preferring to extend the "area
of peace," i.e., nonalignment.
Fearing that his presence
would be interpreted as formal-
izing a new relationship, Nehru
has resisted suggestions for a
"neutralist summit meeting"
with Tito, Nasir, and Sukarno,
and has limited his support of
these leaders largely to behind-
the-scenes efforts.
Indian officials' bias in
favor of the UAR's position on
issues in the Middle East was
strengthened as a result of
Western intervention. Nasir's
leadership of Asian nationalism
in the Middle East, opposing
the Baghdad Pact of which Paki-
stan is a member, will probably
earn him continued support from
New Delhi, even though Nehru
has misgivings about Cairo's
expansionist objectives.
Nehru's reaction to the
events in Indonesia demon-
strated fear that a Communist
take-over might occur in this
strategic area flanking the
Indian subcontinent, either
through internal dissension
or through foreign intervention.
Early in May, New Delhi appealed
privately to the United States
for support of a Sukarno-Hatta
realignment as the best hope
of preventing Communist gains.
Prospects
Nehru is not likely to
abandon his long-established
policy of nonalignment. He
will almost certainly continuo
to oppose US policy on such
issues as regional military
pacts and cessation of nuclear
testing, and refrain from tak-
ing a more positive stand
against bloc actions in the
interest of promoting his maid
objective of an East-West rap-
prochement.
However, the considerable
alienation of Indian good
will toward Moscow and Pei-
ping in the wake of the Yugo-
slav and Hungarian develop-
ments, combined with India's
growing need for American eco-
nomic assistance, has almost
certainly left its mark on
New Delhi's foreign relations.
The result could be a tac-
it moderation of India's
previous policies.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
PEIPING'S ATTITUDE ON POPULATION GROWTH
The Chinese Communists now
proclaim that an immense popu-
lation is their greatest re-
source and presents no obstacle
to their "giant leap forward"
in economic development. In
late 1956 and early 1957, Pei-
ping began but did not fully
develop a propaganda campaign
to popularize birth control.
This campaign was quietly
dropped last year when the pro-
gram for political liberalism
was reversed and optimistic
economic planning resumed. The
present policy contemplates
the continuation of the cur-
rent population growth which
would bring China's population
from the present 650,000,000
to 720,000,000 in 1962 and over
810, 000, 000 in 1967, and to
pass the billion mark around,
1975.
Tse-tung himself said private-
ly that he would like to limit
the population to 700,000,000.
Initial public discussion
of the subject was entrusted
to non-Communists, one of whom
suggested in 1954 that the re-
gime set a ceiling on the pop-
ulation and maintain it through
birth control. He argued this
was necessary to protect the
health of babies and mothers.
The Ministry of Health, he
said, had drawn up measures on
contraception and birth con-
trol in July 1954 but had not
publicized them. The ministry
did begin a program of popular-
izing birth-control methods
shortly thereafter, but the
party gave it no public support
at the time.
Population Growth
As in all peasant economies,
birth rates in China have been
traditionally high. After the
Chinese Communists came to
power in 1949, death rates, be-
ing more susceptible to con-
trol, fell sharply as hostili-
ties ceased, the economy was
stabilized, and elementary pub-
lic health programs were inaug-
urated. Birth rates remained
high and the rate of population
growth increased steadily be-
tween 1950 and 1957, when it
reached around 2.5 percent per
year. China's population is in-
creasing now at a rate of some
16,000,000 annually.
Population Policy
Before it took its first
national census in 1954, Pei-
ping had no population policy.
When the results of the census
disclosed, however, that the
country's population--580,000,-
000--was far larger than es-
timated, a number of Chinese
leaders, both inside and out-
side the party, began to advo-
cate population control. Mao
It was only after the eco-
nomic setbacks of 1956 that the
party leadership publicly iden-
tified itself with birth con-
trol, admitting the economic
necessity for promoting it.
Speaking for the party central
committee, Premier Chou En-lai
reported in the fall of 1956 `:
that the Ministry of Health had
been ordered to publicize a
birth-control program. The of-
ficial press asserted that a
"moderate degree" of birth con-
trol was needed in order to
raise living standards.
By the spring of 1957,
birth control had become a ma-
jor topic, official and pub-
lic. A session of the China
People's Political Consultative
Conference in March was told
that the nation needed a birth-
control program to overcome
employment problems, shortages
of investment funds, and other
economic difficulties. It was
also told that legal restraints
on induced abortion and steril-
ization were being, eased--a
policy which; immediately ran
into heavy opposition.
In the same period, a re-
search committee was set up to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
7 August 1958
look into the various means of
limiting the birth rate, and
clinics were established in
many parts of the country to
educate people in the practice
of birth control. Articles
began to appear in the press
to instruct those interested
in the approved techniques.
After the publication in
June 1957 of a revised version
of Mao Tse-tung's ' "contradic-
tions" speech, the subject of
birth control was played down,
and public discussion encouraged
to follow, with only minor
modifications, the line set
forth in that speech. Mao
chided those who thought that
"the fewer people and the small-
er their world the better." He
declared that China's 600,000,-
000 people were an asset, even
though the figure did give rise
to some "difficulties." He
made no statement advocating
birth control, as he reportedly
had in his original speech.
The shift in approach was
dramatized when several promi-
nent, but non-Communist, demo-
graphers, and sociologists were
denounced as "rightists" in
the second half of 1957 for
having taken the "Malthusian"
stand that China's huge popula-
tion definitely limited the
rate of economic growth. They
were charged with using the
population question to sow
doubts about the possibility
of building China into a strong
socialist power and about the
ability of China's socialist
economy to meet the needs for
producer and essential consumer
goods.
Reassessing its economic
potentialities, Peiping decided
by late 1957 that the pace of
economic development could be
stepped up and that the time
was ripe for a "giant leap for-
ward." New economic programs
were grafted onto existing
plans with a view to making a
virtue out of the necessity of
supporting this immense man-
power.
Most importantly, some
phases of industrial, commercial,
and financial activities were
shifted from Peiping to the low-
er administrative levels, a large
number of small and medium-sized
plants were constructed through-
out the country, and the vast
underemployed rural manpower--
bolstered by additions from the
cities--was put to work on stag-
gering numbers of water conserv-
ancy projects. In essence, Pei-
ping's hopes for marked produc-
tion increases in the new pro-
gram rest on the success of more
intensive exploitation of labor.
Propaganda support of this
"leap forward" program has re-
quired that Peiping take an op-
timistic public stand that China's
huge population can, in Liu Shao-
chi's phrase, do "anything within
the realm of human possibility."
In its extreme form this propa-
ganda asserts that the rapid
growth of population presents
no problems which cannot', be
solved through increased pro-
duction: "The greater the pop-
ulation, the better off we will
be, because man is the most fun-
damental productive force."
As the "leap forward" prol
gram has progressed, Peiping in
fact has argued that a serious
labor shortage has developed
requiring immediate solution.
Liu Shao-chi has contended that
the argument has been "blown
sky high" that a big population
impedes accumulation of capital
and that China's agriculture
cannot make quick progress.
Peiping's present line on the
population question is probably
best summed up in a recent
People's Daily assertion, "We
are not promo ers of regress
who worry about China's popula-
tion....We are revolutionaries
...and promoters of progress."
Population Prospects
The present de-emphasis
of the question does not mean
that the regime has dropped
the idea of controlling
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7 August 1958
ILLEGIB
population growth. Even when
virtually denying the existence
of a problem, Peiping usually
keeps the door open for a 're-
versal of its stand. The writ-
er of a 6 June article in the
People's Daily on population
closed iti a -warning against
"unrestricted and blind" pop-
ulation growth. "Planned in-
crease of population," he said,
is demanded in a planned econ-
omy.
Peiping will probably suc-
ceed to some extent in breaking
down the traditions which en-
courage high rates of reproduc-
tion in China, by reducing the
social and economic value of
large families through such de-
vices as paying the collectiv.
ized peasant only for his labor,
regardless of the size of his
family and abolishing special
family allowances for urban
workers. It is likely; that
the birth-control clinics are
still operating and that re-
search into the various birth-
control techniques is continu-
ing against the day when a dif-
ferent program on birth con-
trol may be needed.
Among the techniques be-
ing studied are delayed marriage,
contraception, induced abortion,
and sterilization. Delayed
marriage, the least expensive
expedient, is encouraged in
speeches. Peiping has given
principal attention to contra-
ception. A tardy realization
that it was not in a position
to produce enough of the neces-
sary equipment at prices with-
in the reach of the average Chi-
nese probably contributed to
the withering away of the 1956-
57 birth-control campaign. A
plant capable of turning out
100,000,000 contraceptive de-
vices a year is being built in
Shanghai, but even when the
problems of production and dis-
tributionare solved, there will
remain the problem of persuad-
ing millions of Chinese to
change their mores, in an area
not easily susceptible to coer-
cion. The development of an
inexpensive oral contraceptive
would simplify and facilitate
acceptance of contraception,
and development of such a meth-
od may have high priority in
Peiping's research.
Peiping is aware that
legalization of induced abor-
tion and sterilization in 1948
enabled Japan to reduce birth
rates at a dramatic and unpre-
cedented pace. In the ten
years which followed, Japan's
birth rate was cut in half,
from 35 per thousand to 17.
Japan shifted to these measures
only after others had failed.
There may be a similar sequence
of events in China. Peiping
did ease legal restrictions on
the two operations in March
1957, but at present the nation
lacks sufficient qualified medi-
cal personnel to promote a suc-
cessful program based on them.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUVMARY
7 August 1958
During the present Five-
Year Plan (1958-1962), China ? s
rate of population growth will
probably remain fairly steady
at the 2.5-percent rate at-
tained in 1957. Birth rates
in urban areas may, in the lat-
ter part of the period, show a
slight tendency to drop. But
since only 15 percent of the
total population lives in
cities, the over-all decline
will be minimal and will
be offset by a further
slight decrease in the
death rate.
by ORR
There is no assurance that
the present muted program will
continue through the period of
the present plan. Economic
failures would probably re-
kindle a sense of urgency over
the population problem and
might encourage the regime to
undertake strong measures--in-
cluding sterilization and abor-
tion. (Prepared
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