CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001700010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 44
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 13, 1958
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
SEERET'
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY N0. ~~
Q~;~ N0. 0036/58
13 Marcia 1958
nocu~r~r~T ~o.
ova GHA,~IGE iN GLASS. o
D DEGLASSiFiEJ
CLASS. GHAN~ED TO,?' T
NEXT REVIEW DATE: t~~
AUTF~I.~hIR 7Q-aww ~
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
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CONFIDENTIAL
-S,E~ ~
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State Department review completed
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 Approved Fo!lease 2005/04/22 :CIA-RDP79-009211700010001-4
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of `all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CQN~lDENT1AL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 March 1958
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
INDONESIA . . . . e s Page 1
The Indonesian Government, which began military
action against the Central Sumatran dissidents on ?
March, has so far completed several landings on Su-
oratra's east coast and-has occupied the airport and
town at the Caltex oil center of Pakanbaru. An at-
tack an the west coast in the vicinity of Padang may
occur saon. Prospects -for agreement between Presi-
dent-Sukarno and former Vice President Hatta for tbe.
tatter's re-entry into. the government seem largely td
have vanished. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
the USSR have indicated a willingness to su l arms and
other military support to D,lakarta.
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . s . . Page 2
Nash is continuing his campaign against King Saud.
The impact of these developments has been not only to
underorine Saud's international position and prestige, but
to add impetus. to the gradually growing demand far internal
ref arms. Saud's troubles are likely to fu ken the
osition of the Iraqi-Jordanian federation
25X1 n Lebanon, t e ca ne
as een res u e , u ably will not result in
a significant foreign policy shift. In the Sudan, the pro-
- Western party won the tar est bloc of seats in the parlia-
orentary election.
MOSCOW CONTINUES SUMMIT CAMPAIGN . . Page 4
Premier Bulganin's call for an early foreign minis-
- tars' meeting, contained in bis 6 March letter to Presi-
dent Eisenhower and reiterated in Khrushchev's interview
of 14 March, continues Moscow's efforts to focus attention
on procedural arrangeorents for a heads-of-government meet-
ing. In contrast to the USSR's earlier stands which opposed
and then reluctantly accepted a procedural. foreign ministers'
meeting in response to Western "wishes," Khrushchev is now
welcoming such a meeting, apparently in tt~e expectation that
pressure would thus be exerted on the West to forego its
proposals for negotiations to clarify the nature and pur-
pose of summit talks.
' CONFIDENTIAL
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 PART I (continued)
WESTERN EUROPEAN ATTITUDES ON SUMMIT PREPARATIONS . . . Page 5
The latest East-West diplomatic exchanges appear
to have eased popular pressure in Western Europe for
quick acceptance of Soviet requests for summit talks,
The NATO governments agree in principle that present
Soviet conditions are unacceptable but there remain
some Differences of opinion on the basis for acceding
to a meeting. The British Governments under severe
attack from the Labor ition is inclined to relax
Western conditions.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMRiARY
13 March 1958
NOTES AND COMMENTS
NORTH AFRICAN SITUATION
. . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The two dominant North American political orga~aiza-
tions, the Moroccan Istiglal and Tunisian Neo-Destour
parties are planning an early joint conference to dis-
cuss methods- to bring about Algerian independences a
North African federations and evacuation of foreign troops
from North Africa. A federation was endorsed publicly
last week by both the Moroccan King and Tunisian Presi-
dent Bourguiba. In Frances in response to growing da-
mestie pressures for a new approach, Premier Gaillard
has proposed a Western Mediterranean Pact. Internation-
alization of the Algerian question is implicit in his
proposals but Gaillard is sti]tl subject to strong right-
ist pressure to maintain France?s position in Algeria.
The latest French proposals arranged through the good
offices mission are likely to be unacceptable to Bour-
guiba.
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ADENAUER MOVES TO END CDU FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCES Page 2
West German Chancellor Adenauer?s move to resched-
ule the Bundestag foreign policy debates wh~_ch Bundestag
President Gerstenmaier had called offs is aimed at dis-
pelling uncertainty resulting from recent conflicting
foreign policy statements by various government officials.
Adenauers back from a five-week vacations will try to re-
store the authority of much-criticized Foreign Minister
Brentanos but is confronted with an increasingly rebel-
lious Christian Democratic Unions which has been clamor-
in for she reservation of the appearance of flexibility.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
COMMUNIST .BIDS FOR NEGOTIATION OF FAR EASTERN ISSUES Page 3
Seizing on the occasion of the SEATO meetings in
Aianila, the Sino-Soviet bloc has advanced a number of
"peace`' proposals on Asian issues and has mounted a new
propaganda effort to discredit the United States in the
area, The Communists have suggested an atom-free zone
in Asia, a "collective treaty of peace,?' and negotia-
tions on troop reductions in North and South Vietnam,
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YUGOSLAVIA SEEKS ENHANCED INTERNATIONAL PRESTIGE , Page ~
Marshal Tito, stymied for some time in his efforts
to play an inf luential-role in world affairsg hopes by
seeking participation in a summit conference to enhance
his regime?s prestige on the eve of national elections
and a party coa~gr.~ss. Yugoslav participation has been,
a major foreign policy-.objective since January, when
Tito launched the idea of enlar in the talks to include
some unattached states, 25X1
EGYPTIAN LABOR:` , e e a Page S
.President Nasir?s regime faces a continuing prob-
lem of popular resentment toward its labor and economic
policies in Egypt while it devotes a major portion of
its resources and attention to gaining foreign ?'vic-
torieso'? -Nasir has found it necessary to suppress grow-
ing dissatisfaction on the domestic labor front and has
forced the resignation of the pro-Western leader of the
Egyptian General-Federation of Trade Unions 25X1
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EAST GERAiAI+t WORKERS OPPOSE LABOR SPEED-UP a , Page 6
The East German regime?s attempts to secure worker
cooperation in-the revision of work norms are encounter -
ing strong opposition,- Party Secretary Ulbricht, will-
ing to purge some of his ablest lieutenants last month
to promote a harder economic .line, now faces the likeli-
hood of .labor disturbances and further damage to the
East German economy if he pursues the course to which
he is publicly .committed, He may have to acce;t onl
token norm revision as a face-saving deviceo 25X1
USSR CONTINUES REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL PLANNING AND SUPPLY Page 7
Important questions involving the relationship be-
tween central planning .organs and regional councils of
national economy appear to remain unresolved after eight
months of operation under Khrushchev?s revamped indus-
trial administration setup. Articles in the Soviet press
suggest continuing attention is being paid to these ques-
tions, chiefly the coordination of planning and the flow
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 March 1958
PART II (continued)
of materials and supplies. Soviet leaders appear to be
still reviewing their first half-year?s experience with
?he new administrative system- in their attempts to develop
ra;?? '_ '1 solutions to the problem of stimulating local
ynitia~~ive while maintaining centralized planning control.
NORTH KOREA ANNOUNCES FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN , Page 8
North Korea?s-First Five-Year Plan (1957-61) pro-
vides for a continued emphasis on heavy Indus-try and
schedules an annual growth in industrial production of
nearly 22 percent, The plan, published on 3 March 1958
after 14 months of-the plan period had elapsed, sets
goals that appear aut of-reach without considerable ad-
ditional-aid fr?m the rest of the bloc.
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LOCAL-.PARTY LEADERS PURGED IN-EAST CHINA PROVINCE Page I?
The expulsion Pram the Chinese Communist-party on
9 Diarch of four top-level officials in Anhwei Province
continues Peiping's methodical campaign to purge un-
relialfile elements and to tighten discipline in the ranks.
In other provinces additional local party leaders, es-
pecially those connected with the courts and public se-
curity organs are er ected to b? ex gilled in the next
few months, 25X1
JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FACES PROBLEM ON TRADE ACCORDS WITH
PEIPING a e . . . . Page 11
The recemt signing in Peiping of controversial trade
accords--one a one-year pact for $10?,000,OUO in trAade
each way and the other a five-year pact for $28U,O00,?OO--
confronts-the Kishi government with a major policy de-
cision regarding Communist China. Although the trade
agreement and memorandum for exchanging trade missions
were negotiated by private Japanese interests, they re-
quire official approval, which if granted would establish
quasi-diplomatic relations between Tokyo and Peiping,
Tokyo will probably be forced to make COncessiOns in an
attempt to satisfy strop n Japan for increased
trade with China,
SHAKE-UP EXPECTED IN CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT ~ Page 12
Revelation of the Kuomintang?s profiteering from ma-
nipulgtion of foreign exchange controls will add to pres-
sures for a~shake-up in the economic sections of the Chinese
Nationalist Government. An intention to abolish certain
government agencies-has already been announced. and a cabi_
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CURRENTcINTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 March 1958
PART II (continued)
PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT FACES NEW THREATS IN PROVINCIAL
ASSEMBLIES .
. Page 12
Pakistani Prime Minister Noon?s Republican govern-
ment, having successfully survived the budget session of
the Natioxnal Assembly, faces new threats in East and
West Palos-tan provincial assembly meetings. Political
realignments in the West Pakistan. Assembly could threat-
en the balance of power in Karachi, but attacks on Noon's
supporters in East Pakistan seem less likel to be simi-
larly effective.
SUSPENSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES IN CUBA ~ Page 13
Cuban President Batista?s 45-day suspension of con-
stitutional guarantees on 12 March may provoke the most
serious threat to 1~3~s regime since the abortive naval-
- uprising at Cienfuegos last September.- Since electoral
campaigning is impassible during the period of suspen-
sion, the 1 June general elections will have to be ost-
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poised, possibly until November. 25X1
DIFFICULTIES MOUNT FOR PERWIAN GOVERNMENT Page 14
Serious rioting in Lima on ? March highlights the
mounting difficulties which beset Peruvian President
Prado's 2O-me~nth-old attempt at derrocratic government.
The economic stability .which has prevailed in Peru in
recent years is threatened by worsening economic con-
ditions which are reflected in the acceleratin de-
preciation 4f the Peruvian currency. 25X1
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC DISCONTENT GROWING IN ERITREA .
Growing economic and political discontent in Eri-
trea--federated with Ethiopia in 1952--is re-elected
by the popular support for a general strike called on
l0 March.; Political bppo~ition to Ethiopian domina-
tion has been growing within the past six months, and
there have been several anti-Ethiopian demonstrations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KHF~USHCHEVYS AGRICULTURAL. REORGANIZATION , Page 1
Khrushchev?a forthcoming reorganization of the ma-
chine tractor stations by the transfer of the ownership
of agricultural machinery to collective farms will be
the mast extensive organizational change in Soviet sacial-
ized agriculture since its establishment in the 1930?s.
Some net gain in efficiency will probably result as cross-
purposes and duplications of effort under the old system
are eliminated. The plan seems out of reach from attack
on political. grounds alone, having been approved by the
party central committee, but map still be sub ected to
foot-dragging-and sniping, 25X1
NEW EFFORT TO BRIDGE. SOCIALIST-COMMUNIST GAP IN FRANCE Page 4
The recent creation of the Union of the Socialist
Left may be the most important postwar effort to unify
a number of here,tofare scattered elements of the French
far left and to ally them with the French Communist par-
ty. The new organization may be exploited by the Commis-
mists ~n their drive for unity of all left-wing parties.
Long-standiag differences among the union?s members will
probably limit it's effectiveness, but its announced poli-
ties have a strong potential appeal to left-wing opinion
in ,France, particularly on North Africa, missile bases,
INDIA?S CONGRESS PARTY ONE YEAR AFTER NATIONAL ELECTIONS Page ?
Lethargy and factionalism continue to be the
main weaknesses of Nehru?s Congress party and detract
-from the popularity-the party might otherwise obtain
for its .noteworthy achievements in expanding India?s
economy and extending Indian influence in intbrnation-
al affairs, Despite pleas made by party leaders over
the past two-years to rejuvenate provincial party ar-
ganizations, almost no progress has been made, and the
hard-working opposition parties are steadil;r makin in-
roads into Congress territory.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART III (continued)
INTENSIFIED S?V~IET ECONOMIC INTEREST IN SQUTH AMERICA Page 10
The Soviet Union in recent months has appeared in-
tent on exercising a direct influence in South America,
primarily through increased economic activity. Soviet
moves in South America, to date principally designed
to exploit the area's intensified economic problems,
have been far less extensive than in the Middle East or
Asia, but-they probably are forerunners of an expanded
campaiga. Soviet objectives in South America are to
weaken the influence of the United States, expand diplo-
matic and commercial relations, and. lay the groundwork
for eventual Soviet- oli i and ideological gains. ?~~,,
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COI~FIDE~ITIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM1dARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Military action by the
Djakarta government to subdue
the Central Sumatran dissidents
-began on 7 March with landings
on the east coast island of
Bengkalis. Other landings on
10 March secured the ea.>3t coast
points. of Pakning, Dumai., and
Selat Paridjang, thus giving the
government cantrgl.of the ap-
proa.ches to the Siak River. On
12 March, following the bombing
of the airfield at Pakanbaru,
the Caltex oil center, para-
troops occupied both the air-
f ield and the town. Coincident
with these operations was the
movement of a.n additional force
up the Sia,k River toward Pakan-
baru.
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.SECRET,
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
northern Bihar--a state where
previously they had been rela-
tively weak, The Congress party
also lost a key parliamentary
by-election last-month in east-
ern Bombay to a United Maha-
rashtra Committee candidate.
His victory indicated invasion
of a strongly Congress-oriented
area by the opposition linguis-
tic forces of southern Bombay.
Continued stagnation in the
Congress party's machinery and
further inroads made by ogposi-
tion groups into the party's
territory could, by the time
of the 1962 national elections,
destroy much of the potential
value being created for the
Congress by its notable economic
and international achievements.
INTENSIFIED SOVIET ECONOMIC INTEREST IN SOUTH AMERICA
The Soviet Union in recent
months has appeared intent on
exercising a direct influence
in South America, primarily
through increased economic ac-
tivity. Soviet activities in
South America to date,primarily
designed to exploit the area's
intensified economic problems,
have been far less extensive
than in the Middle East or Asia,
but they probably are forerun-
ners of an expanded campaign,
Khrushc~iev, in interviews with
Mexican and Brazilian newsmen
in December and February in
which he publicized Moscow's
interest in closer economic and
political relations, said that
i;i~e possibilities of increasing
the Soviet Union's trade with
Latin America "remain untapped
to a great degree."
Soviet objectives in South
America. are to weaken the in-
fluence of the United States,
expand diplomatic and commer-
cial relations, and lay the
groundwork for eventual Soviet
political and ideological gains
Apparently in the belief that
bald efforts might arouse South
American apprehensions, and .
provoke US countermeasures,
Moscow has approached the area
cautiously and has concentrated
its efforts in those states
where the surplus of foreign
exchange commodities presents
a situation conducive to suc-
cessful Soviet exploitation,
Although regarded by Mos-
cow as a colonial or semicolo-
nial area, South America has
not received the same priority
in Soviet foreign policy as
other countries in that cate-
gory because its location, its
strong economic and cultural
bonds with the free world, and
its defense pacts with the
United States have led it to
resist Soviet overtures. In
early 1956, Foreign Minister
Shepilov described these coun-
tries as "raw material and
agrarian appendages of the
powerful American monopolies."
In February 1958, Khrush-
chev said that Soviet trade
with other Latin American coun-
tries could equal the nearly
$180,000,000 level achieved
with Argentina in the last four
years, "but for this it is
necessary to have favorable
conditions, that is, normal
diplomatic and trade relations."
In-all of Latin America, the
USSR has diplomatic missions
only in Argentina, Mexico, and
Uruguay, The satellites main-
tain diplomatic or consular
representation in these coun-
tries and also in Bolivia,
Brazil, and Colombia. Moscow
has not made the conclusion of
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CiJRRLNT INTELLIGENUL' IvEEIC.LY SUMMAFtx
economic agreements conditional
on the establishment of dipla-
~natic relations, but has used
hints of attractive offers to
stimulate interest in diplomatic
relations,
The USSR has attempted to
exploit the situations of coun-
tries where certain state-ovJned
industries are unable to obtain
~~Yestern credits on satisfactory
terms,
I~hrushchev took the occa-
sion of an interview with two
Brazilian newsmen last November
to I~ublicize Moscow's interest
in resum~.ng commercial and dip-
lomatic relations with Brazil,
Just previously Soviet delegates
in the UN had approached the
Brazilian representative with a
request for renewed diplomatic
ties.
The USSR had made no direct
.overtures to Brazil,.
app~.rently awaiting
the government's re-
sponse to Khrush-
chev's bid and to
satellite trade of-
fers, which appeared
simultaneously with
a campaign by local
Communists and Na-
~tion::ilists for re-
establishing commer-
cial and diplomatic
relations with the
USSR. Poland is
supplying
Brazil
VJlth
,?p3aa,
~i)~, Odd
worth
of
steel rails
and
has
sold. at
least
.two
merchant
ships and, allegedly,
has offered to con-
struct a steel plant
using some Soviet
c~uipment and fi-
na.ncing. The Brazil-
ian press, reflect-
ing widespread con-
cern over falling
coffee .prices and
~t;ile related foreign
exchange crisis, has
given heavy play to both zeal
and imagined trade opportuni-
ties with the bloc,
Hn extenaive and apparently
sobering anti-Communist carri-
paign by the Foreign Ministry
appears to have dimmed the
possibility of Brazil's renewing
diplomatic relations with the
USSR, but there is still con-
siderable pressure from the Con-
gress and the press. for explor-
ing trade opportunities with
the bloc, Official studies an
the use~tulness of such trade
are under way, and the Foreign
Ministry, possibly foreseeing
the likelihood of formal trade
ties, has been discussing ways
o= tightening the country's
presently inadequate security
measures.
Argentina
Soviet Deputy Minister of
:Ct'oreign 'a~'rade aiuzr~~in on 1$
Junui~ry received in Moscow an
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-USSR Diplomatic Mission
0 Satellite Diplomatic Mission
p Satellite Consulate
Soviet Bloc Trade Agreements
~ and Arrangements
? Soviet Bloc Culturol Societies
Mote: Polish minister resident in Meaico has
been accredited to Haiti, Honduras,
Ricaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, and
Ecuador.
g,3
24931
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU1~iMARY
offensive in Uruguay has been
intensified, and that the USSR
has played a major role in this
effort. In January, the Soviet
commercial attache in Uruguay
was reported to have offered a
barter agreement by which the
USSR would supply trucks and ma-
chinery in exchange for meat--
of_which there is a shortage
for export.. The Soviet' of-
rails, and
locozno.tives,
anc~ that ~
f icials. stated.. on 18 January,
an additional
. contract
of;
however, that extension of So-
$3,000,000
to
$4,000,000
awaited
viet trade was dependent on
signature.
MOSCOW is
now
Uruguayan acceptance of Soviet
Argentine government trade dele-
gation seeking to purchase elec-
tronic and petroleum equipment
with the approximately $20,000,-
000 it had accrued under bilat-
eral-trade agreemen~cs with the
bloc. On 29 January TABS an-
nounced that the U5SR would
supply Argentina with $5,000,000
worth of Soviet goods, includ-
ing mining equipment, steel
studying Argentine offers to
purchase $30, 000, 000 to $,40,000,-
000 worth of goods, including
fuel oil.
The Soviet Embassy in Bue-
nos Aires announced to the press
on 9 January that Soviet com-
mercial organizations could fur-
nish Latin American countries
with diverse industrial equip-
ment for petroleum and power
industries. The release fur-
ther stated that if proper under-
standing were reached, the USSR
could provide complete instal-
lations for companies and help
in the preparation of Latin
~imerican specialists without
requiring that any rights in
the administration of those
enterprises or participation in
profits be granted.
The USSR sent an impressive
exhibit of oil equipment and
other machinery and 40 techni-
cians to the 50th anniversary
exposition of the Argentine
state oil monopoly in January.
It is reported that 29 of the
technicians plan to remain in
Argentina, ostensibly to sell
equipment, although Argentine
efforts to buy such equipment
in Moscow were unsuccessful.
Uruguay
Uruguay's vocal opposition
to US trade policies. and its
deteriorating economic situa-
tion have made it an easy tar-
get for bloc penetration. Re-
cently, there have been indica-
tions that the bloc e~~onomic
oil bids submitted in early
December through an Uruguayan
firm. Soviet oil has been re-
jected in the past because it
did not meet local specifica-
tions.
It is possible that the
USSR made its not altogether
attractive offers solely to
draw attention to recent effort s
by American oil companies to
collect overdue oil payments
and recent closures of US-owned.
meat packing plants in Monte-
video, and to encourage Uruguay
to ratify a trade treaty signed
with the Soviet Union in 1956.
The USSR, largest single
buyer of Uruguayan wool, stated
in January that all future wool
purchases would be made direct-
ly through the Soviet Legation
in Montevideo rather than as
previously through third coun-
tries. The new procedure,
which does not promise an in-
crease in Soviet purchases,
would give the USSR greater in-
fluence in the country by forc-
ing it to accept Soviet terms
of payment.
Colombia
The first outward sign of
success for the newly intensi-
fied Soviet economic efforts in
Colombia is the government's
agreement to purchase 20,000
tons of Syrian wheat through
Soviet trade representatives
in exchange far coffee. During
semiofficial Soviet-Colombian
trade negotiations in January,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARI~
Soviet commercial agents pro-
posed that the USSR install a
permanent trade representative
in Bogota, an offer rejected
by the Colombian foreign minis-
ter.,., and participate in the
Colombian Machinery Fair,
Declining copper prices
have prompted Chile to revise
its long-standing policy of re-
fusing to export copper to the
Communist bloc. In the past
two months,. it has been nego-
tiating sales to the bloc ex-
pected to total more than $20,-
000,000, It has indirectly
sold 1,500 tons to the USSR,
and is considering selling it
an additional 10 300 tons.
25X1
The cessation of US stock-
piling and recent Soviet tin
sales in the free world have
contributed to a critical soft-
ness in tin prices which threat-
ens the Bolivian economy. Two
Bolivian Communist party offi~
cials recently returned from
MpSCOW claiming that the USSR
was ready, if the Bolivian Gov-
ernment requested, to supply
smelting plants and technicians
for all classes of minerals, as
well as petroleum equipment '
with long-term payments. Com-
munist-dominated labor groups
have attempted to increase the
impact by demanding that the
government accept .the alleged
offer.
Other Communist activities
in South America help to advance
Soviet economic and political
objectives, Local ~;ommunist
propaganda has pictured the USSR
as a great potential market for
the growing list of depressed
South American raw materials and
as a country eager to supply
industrial equipment on easy
credit terms. Although the gov-
ernments of same of the coun-
tries appear to be making use
of this propaganda to call US
attention to their foreign ex-
change problem, the apparently
Soviet-inspired internal agi-
tation, in combination with fu-
ture attractive bloc offers,
could persuade the governments
at least to ex lore the possi-
bilities. (COncurxed 25X1
in by ORR)
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