CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001600110001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 6, 1958
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CON FLDENIiL
WWI'
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
//~~ P.:V EVVEft
DATE:: yy -
Allitl; Fit770-
NEXT RE`t,,E.^1 DATE:
iJ DECLASSI'FIF.D
CLASS. CHANGED T O:
COPY NO. 14
Oct NO00035/58
6 March 1958
DOCUMENT NO. 1-1-
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. O
I I I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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6 March 1958
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
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Page 3
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . ? . ? . '
The new Iraqi cabinet, composea -
traconserva ves headed by Nuri Said, is a challenge to
pro-Nasir radical nationalists.
Page 4
THE TUNISIAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
President Bourguiba has begun a campaign to focus
world attention on French moves to seal the Algerian-
Tunisian border by creating a "no man's land" on the
Algerian side of the border. Bourguiba's statements re-
flect his deep preoccupation with the problem of the Al-
gerian refugees in Tunisia, and are an effort to recoup
popular support at home, where the public has become rest-
programcrisis.
less with his handling of tearsFrench-Tunisian
other
French Premier Gaillard app
overnment
hi
.
s g
than avoiding action which might endanger
C NFIDE~ t IAL
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PART I (continued)
FRENCH GOVERNMENT PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
French Premier Gaillard's prospects of squeezing
through the military budget debate in the National As-
sembly appear to be improving, but new rightist demands
for a strong stand on North Africa may again jeopardize
his coalition. Gaillard is counting on the approaching
Easter recess which begins 28 March and on local elec-
tions scheduled in late April to discourage the polit-
ical parties from precipitating a crisis 25X1
NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS ON SUMMIT MEETING . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The Soviet Union's latest proposals for a heads-
of-government meeting, particularly as outlined in the
widely publicized letter of 1 March to French Foreign
Minister Pinea+a, are intended to focus the present East-
West exchange on the question of Western willingness to
agree to such a meeting before its composition and agenda
have been determined. Kremlin leaders apparently calcu-
late that their qualified acceptance of a foreign minis-
ters' conference and minor changes in their position on
proposed topics to be discussed at a summit conference
will bring additional pressure on Western governments to
accept Soviet terms on the timing, composition, and
agenda of a top-level meeting.1 -1
NOTES AND COMMENTS
KHRUSHCHEV'S AGRICULTURAL REORGANIZATION MOVES AHEAD . . . Page 1
With party central committee endorsement and publi-
cation of his "theses," Khrushchev's proposal-for trans-
ferring Soviet agricultural machinery from the machine
tractor stations to the collective farms is well on its
way toward final approval at the next Supreme Soviet meet-
ing, probably in April. The "theses" stress that antic-
ipated improvement in efficiency will enable the collec-
tive farms to continue to make progress while buying the
machinery and otherwise. adjusting to the change. A Con-
gress of Collective Farmers will be held in early 1959 to
redefine the collectives' role in Soviet agriculture.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
PART II (continued)
NORTH KOREA RELEASES PASSENGERS OF SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER . Page 2
Pyongyang's release of the passengers of the South
Korean airliner hijacked on 16 February was apparently
prompted in large part by indications that the plane in-
cident was detracting from Chinese Communist and North
Korean "peace" moves. The North Koreans may also have
been influenced by Soviet leaders, who desire to improve
f the pas-
the atmosphere for summit talks. The release o
sengers will probably become another stock item in the
propaganda citing alleged Communist initiatives to ef-
fect a Korean settlement, such as the announcement of
Chinese troop withdrawals from Korea by the end of 1958.
THE LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The internal security of Lebanon is threatened by
President Chamoun's desire to secure a second term.
Chamoun may try to force a constitutional amendment to
permit a second term through the Chamber of Deputies
during the next session, which begins on 18 March. Some
of his opponents have threatened civil war if he should
do so. The chamber is to elect the new president be-
d 1 nd 23 August Chamoun might withdraw
tween 23 u y a
secure the election of an amenable 25X1
d hel
p
from the race an
successor but only under strong pressure.
THIE SITUATION IN MOROCCO . . . . . . . . ? . . ? ? ? . . . Page 3
Internal pressures in Morocco have become so strong
that the government of King Mohamed V seems to be re-
considering the nature of its relations with the West.
The King and Foreign Minister Balafrej feel they must
puruse a new course or run the risk of being supplanted.
As a first step Morocco may exchange ambassadors with
the Soviet Union.
CYPRUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The underground organization EOKA has instructed
Greek Cypriots to prepare for "battle" against the
British by economic boycott and passive resistance.
Greek Cypriots remain divided, however, and tension
between their left and right wings could lead to vio-
lence at any time. Any progress toward a settlement
of the Cyprus issue will be delayed for the immediate
future by the Greek Government crisis.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
PART II (continued)
Page 5
GREEK GOVERNMENT CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . .
The fall of the Greek Government of Prime Minister
K.aramanlis was precipitated by a cabinet controversy
over a new electoral law. Dissatisfaction among some
cabinet ministers over Karamanlis' tendency to disre-
gard the views of his cabinet on major issues had been
growing for some time. King Paul's decision to form
a caretaker government and hold national elections in
April was apparently taken in order to prevent a long
period of political instability.
Page 6
NEW INDIAN AND PAKISTANI BUDGETS . . . . . . . . . . . ? ?
The budgets presented by the Indian and Pakistani
finance ministers for the fiscal year beginning 1 April
indicate that India's economic development program will
continue approximately on schedule but that Pakistan
will fail to implement its more modest program. Indian
defense expenditures are to reach $641,000,000, an in-
crease of $29,000 , 000, while Pakistan's defense expendi-
tures a to reach $184,254,000, an increase of $3,700,-
000. FaL
Pagel
LAOTIAN ELECTION CAMPAIGN OPENS . . . . . . ? . ? ? ? ? ?
About 100 candidates are campaigning for
elec-
Assembly seats at stake in the 4 May
tion, which is the final step in the unification settle-
ment with the Pathet Lao and may be of crucial importance
for .the future of Laotian politics. The two major con-
servative parties, which dominate the government, have
formed a national front and are preparing to use the re-
sources of the government to limit electoral gains by
the left-wing alliance dominated by the Pathet Lao.
Page$
SOUTH KOREAN - JAPANESE RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . ?
Plans for resuming formal negotiations for a settle-
ment of outstanding problems between Japan and South Korea
have been snagged by Seoul's failure to return Japanese
fishermen. This obstacle will delay, but should not
preclude, official talks, which are likely to be thorny
I --I
and protracted.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
PART II (continued)
PEIPING CHARTS BOLD ECONOMIC COURSE . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Communist China's 1958 plan and budget, while still
strongly oriented toward rapid industrialization, provide
for sharply increased spending on agriculture. Most agri-
cultural and industrial targets are ambitious, as Peiping
strives to get the Second Five-Year Plan off with a "giant
leap forward." Attainment of these targets will require
unusually good crop weather and a continuing high level of
nationwide austerity. Previous Soviet economic credits
have apparently been exhausted and China's own net foreign
payments are increasing.
USSR SCIENTIST SUGGESTS PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL ANTARCTIC
BASES . . . . . . . .
Page
11
A Soviet scientist has suggested that countries
having meteorological bases in the Antarctic make an
fort to establish and maintain on a aermanent basis
now
ef-
addi-
tional stations. to function after :the -end of the Inter-
national Geophysical Year in December 1958.
. . Page
12
The adoption last week by the Polish Communist party
of a resolution concerning a new economic program was
another victory for Gomulka over his Stalinist opposition.
Gomulka also engineered the expulsion of a leading Natolin
from the central committee and the government for his at-
tacks on Gomulka's political and economic policies. Go-
mulka's strength has also been enhanced by the Soviet sup-
port implicit in Khrushchev's approval in January of his
internal policies.
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CURRENT INTELLLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
PART II (continued)
BRITISH LABOR DEMANDING NEW MOVES ON DISARMAMENT . . . . . Page 15
The British Trades Union Congress is joining with
the Labor party in a nationwide campaign to demand that
the Macmillan government show more initiative in seek-
ing international. agreement on disarmament and disengage-
ment. The government has already shown itself sensitive
to public opinion on these questions, and its responsive-
ness to new pressures will be affected by its showing in
two pending by-elections. The first of these elections
is scheduled for 13 March in a marginal Glasgow constit-
uency.
PROSPECTS OF THE YDIGORAS REGIME IN GUATEMALA .
Page 15
Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes, who was inaugurated for a
six-year term on 2 March, will have difficulty restoring
political stability in Guatemala. His apparent intention
to follow a middle-of-the-road political course will be
bitterly resented by extreme rightists, who form the core
of his political support. It was apparent even before the
inauguration that he would have difficulty in controlling
the C ~r , in which his followers form a minority
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINE OIL POLICY . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The provisional Aramburu government apparently hopes
to arrange limited foreign participation in Argentina?s oil
industry before President-elect Frondizi takes office on 1
May. In view of the heavy drain of oil imports on Argen-
tina?s limited foreign exchange, Frondizi probably approves
of this moves although during the campaign he opposed any
change in the country's nationalistic oil policy.
USSR SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The election of a single slate of candidates for the
USSR Supreme Soviet will be held on 16 March and provides,
as in the past, an occasion for widespread agitation to
arouse support for the regime. The nomination of candi-
dates for deputies provides an indication of leadership
changes throughout the country, the relative representa-
tion in the Supreme Soviet of the various elements of So-
viet society, and particularly the relative standing of
party presidium members. Khrushchev has received more
than twice as many honorary nominations as President
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
PART III (continued)
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nence within the party.
TENG HSIAO-PING-- PEIPING'S RISING FIGURE
Voroshilov. The nominations of party presidium member
Kirichenko, while slightly less than Voroshilov's, were
on a par with Mikoyan's and exceeded those of Suslov. The
showing of Kirichenko is noteworthy in view of numerous
recent reports; that Suslov had gained increasing promi-
. Page 4
Teng Hsiao-ping, 57-year-old secretary general of
the Chinese Communist party, appears to have risen to
fourth place in the party hierarchy. The only person
to be concurrently a member of the party's three most im-
portant organs,, Teng now is sunervisin-cr they "rentifica-
tion" campaign.
DEVELOPMENTS IN THERYUKYU ISLANDS
outside the Naha urban area.
Anti-American elements in the Ryukyu Islands, par-
ticularly on Okinawa, have made election gains by ex-
ploiting the discontent with American land acquisition and
compensation policies and nationalistic sentiment for re-
version of the islands to Japan. Their activity has pro-
moted increasing resentment among the native population
toward the American administration. Elections for the
Ryukyuan legislature on 16 March probably will demonstrate
the extent to which the leftists can extend their influence
Page 7
EGYPTIAN SCHOOLTEACHERS IN AFRICA AND NEAR EAST . . . . . Page 10
Egyptian schoolteachers have been major agents in the
Nasir regime's large-scale cultural and political penetra-
tion effort in Africa and the Near East. Some 2,500 are
employed in more than a dozen countries in the area, with
their ostensible role of teaching in many cases subordi-
nated to a Cairo-directed program of preaching Nasir-type
radical nationalism and promoting the Egyptian line among
students and youth organizations. Some host governments
have objected to their obvious engagement in political and
subversive action.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
A new round of trouble with
Nasir is probably the basic rea-
son for the change in the Iraqi
cabinet, which after several
false starts finally took place
on 3 March. Nuri Said's resump-
tion of the premiership, with
a cabinet of stalwart ultracon-
servatives, is an indication of
the Iraqi Government's deter-
mination to pursue a strong line
and is a challenge to Nasir's
radical nationalism, which views
Nuri as the "imperialist agent"
pax excellence. The composition
of the cabinet is also, however,
an indication of the scarcity
of Iraqi leadership, which Nuri
himself has described as "a
small pack of cards which has
to be shuffled often."
The new Iraqi cabinet has
created some dismay in Jordan,
where Nuri is regarded as de-
termined to assert Iraq's posi-
tion as the dominant partner in
the federation. There is also
a belief in Amman, supported
by a statement by an Iraqi diplo-
mat there, that Jordan's Deputy
Prime Minister Rifai, who has
been the. actual director of
cabinet policy, is looked on
with disfavor by Nuri and
other Iraqis. Near East
press speculation on a change
in the Jordanian cabinet
has in fact followed on the
heels of the shift in Iraq.
THE TUNISIAN SITUATION
Tunisian Presient Bour-
guiba has begun a campaign to
focus world attention on the
French proposal to seal the
Algerian-Tunisian border by
creating a "no man's land" on
the Algerian side of the border.
Bourguiba's statements reflect
his deep preoccupation with the
problem of the Algerian refugees
in Tunisia and are an effort to
recoup popular support at home,
where the public has become
restive as a result of his han-
dling of the French-Tunisian
crisis.
In a radio address on 27
February, Bourguiba appealed
for world support against Frances
"scorched earth" policy along
the Algerian frontier, and simul-
taneously filed a new complaint
with the UN Security Council
charging that France is forcibly
evicting 250,000 inhabitants
from the zone. He has also sent
letters to various chiefs of
state pointing out the disas-
trous consequences of such a
French policy. Tunisian offi-
cials assert that 7,000 Algerian
refugees have fled to Tunisia.
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with recent weeks and that their
care, along with that of 60,000
previous refugees, overtaxes
local resources. An Interna-
tional Red Cross representative
who visited the border area in
Tunisia and interviewed some of
the refugees is personally con-
vinced of the "general authen-
ticity, if exaggeration" of the
reports of "barbarism" by French
paratroopers, which is said to
include random executions and
wholesale destruction of prop-
erty.
French officials in Algeria
state that only about 980 square
miles of border area will be
evacuated and that no more than
5,000 families will be moved
to nearby fortified towns.
These officials foresee a line
of strong points parallel to
the Tunisian border and three
to five miles from it with a
"no man's land" between them
and the border.
The American ambassador in
Tunis says Bourguiba's refusal
to comment on the good-offices
mission in his 27 February
speech has created a public
opinion problem with his peo-
ple, who are used to being told
how to react to important sit-
uations. The Tunisian populace
is showing growing impatience
and suspicion of the mission,
according to the two most in-
fluential French-language news-
papers in Tunisia, one of which
comments that the "silence,
mystery, and slowness of Ameri-
can secret diplomacy are lead-
ing to confusion."
The Tunisian Government is
also concerned about the activ-
ity of followers of Salah ben
Youssef, exiled rival of Bour-
guiba, who were discovered plot-
ting the assassination of Bour-
guibae It has arrested some 41
persons and strengthened the
forces guarding the President.
Tunis has vigorously protested
the alleged Egyptian involve-
ment in the assassination plot.
In Paris, the National As-
sembly is reported in a "bad
humor" over Premier Gaillard's
North African policies and par-
ticularly over the possibility
that American-British good of-
fices might "internationalize"
the Algerian situation. Gail-
lard appears to have no program
beyond avoiding any action
which might endanger his govern-
ment.
A surprise French diplo-
matic move may be foreshadowed
in a "personal" suggestion made
to Ambassador Lodge by France's
UN Security Council representa-
tive that NATO might be a bet-
ter forum than the UN for "in-
ternationalizing" the Algerian
problem. The French official
envisioned the admission of
Tunisia and Morocco to NATO as
part of this solution.
French Premier Gaillard's
prospects of squeezing through
the currently explosive mili-
tary budget debate in the Na-
tional Assembly appear to be
improving, but new rightist de-
mands for a strong stand on North
Africa may again jeopardize his
coalition. Gaillard is counting
on the approaching Easter recess,
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which begins 28 March, and on
local elections scheduled for
late April, to discourage the
political parties from precipi-
tating a crisis.
Rightists, who last week
threatened to topple Gaillard
unless he sent heavy reinforce-
ments to Algeria, now appear
willing to accept his promise
to augment forces there by
28,000 men, to be financed if
possible by German troop sup-
port payments but otherwise
from further cuts in portions
of the military budget not con-
nected with Algeria. They are
expected to demand, however,
that the government take a
strong position toward Tunisia
and to call for action against
"defeatists" in France.
This hardening of the
rightist position is reflected
in recent calls for an "effec-
tive government" or the return
of General de Gaulle by Sou-
stelle and other Gaullists,
Dissident Radical leader Morice,
and Independent leader Duchet.
Popular Republican Bidault,
who has moved increasingly
toward the right, has joined in
this clamor.
Any concession by Gaillard
to the demands of the rightists
can be expected to alienate his
Socialist and Popular Republican
support, large elements of which
are already uneasy over their as-
sociation with his government.
His chances of surviving these
difficulties are enhanced, how-
ever, by the approach of the
Easter recess and the elections
scheduled for the next two months.
Moreover, the threat of a crisis
over constitutional reform, to
be debated again next week, ap-
pears reduced in view of com-
promises reportedly reached by
party representatives.
Nevertheless, the progres-
sive general deterioration of
Gaillard's coalition could still
lead him to "choose to fall" on
the constitutional reform issue.
In any event the continuing at-
trition of his coalition places
him increasingly at the mercy
of the 200 more or less consist-
ent opponents on any issue in
the assembly.
The Soviet Union's new pro- I of a foreign ministers' con-
posals for a heads-of-govern-
ment meeting, particularly as
outlined in the widely publi-
cized letter of 1 March to
French Foreign Minister Pineau,
are intended to focus the pres-
ent East-West exchange on the
question of Western willingness
to agree to such a meeting be-
fore its composition and agenda
have been determined. Kremlin
leaders apparently calculate
that their qualified acceptance
ference and minor changes in
their position on proposed top-
ics to be discussed at a summit
conference will bring additional
pressure on Western governments
to accept Soviet terms on the
timing, composition, and agenda
of a top-level meeting.
The Soviet proposal for a
foreign ministers' conference,
first embodied in the aide-mem-
oire presented to Ambassador
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Thompson on 28 February, was in-
tended to appear responsive to
President Eisenhower's letter
of 15 February to Premier Bul-
ganin. Moscow agreed to such a
meeting if it were "strictly
limited" to organizing the pro-
cedural details of a top-level
meeting and if "firm agreement"
were first reached on the date
for a summit meeting.
Gromyko urged immediate
diplomatic exchanges to deter-
mine the composition, date, and
place of a foreign ministers'
session and to establish the
date for a heads-of-government
meeting. He proposed that the
foreign ministers convene in
April at Geneva and that the
heads of government meet in
June.
The USSR appears to be
flexible, however, on the tim-
ing and location of a summit
conference. Soviet Ambassador
Smirnov in Bonn recently told
a Western journalist that the
Soviet leaders are ready to come
to Geneva "at any time," men-
tioning July as an acceptable
date.
The Soviet aide-memoire to
the United States, extending
Bulganin's earlier proposals
for the composition of a summit
meeting, called for either par-
ticipation by all NATO coun-
tries and Warsaw pact states,
plus six neutral powers, or--
in a more limited meeting--the
United States, Britain, France,
and Italy from the West, the
USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Rumania from the Soviet
bloc, plus Yugoslavia, Sweden,
and Austria. A Soviet Foreign
Ministry official informed the
Italian Erhbassy in Moscow on 3
March that the Soviet Union
wanted neutralist states repre-
sented at summit talks, but be-
lieved their participation at a
foreign ministers' meeting was
not essential.
The note to France explis-
itly,, stated that the partici-
pants of both a foreign minis-
ters' and a summit conference
should be on a "parity basis."
This underscores the importance
which Moscow attaches to equal
representation of Soviet bloc
and Western states, particularly
as a means of illustrating So-
viet assertions that the "balance
of world forces" has shifted
away from the West, and of
claiming Western recognition of
the status quo in Eastern Eu-
rope.
The note to the United
States repeated the nine-point
agenda for summit talks put
forth in Bulganin's January and
February letters, and added a
new item entitled "Conclusion
of a German Peace Treaty." The
Soviet Government suggested
that when the heads of govern-
ment discuss this item, both
East and West German represent-
atives should attend the con-
ference. The note stated, how-
ever, that these negotiations
should not embrace the subject
of German reunification, and it
repeated the Soviet view that
this issue could be dealt with
only by the two German states.
The aide-memoire also of-
fered to discuss the use of
outer space for peaceful pur-
poses, as suggested in the Presi-
dent's letters to Bulganin, pro-
vided the United States is will-
ing to consider the "liquidation
of foreign military bases." The
Soviet position, first laid down
by Khrushchev at Minsk on 22
January, has been to link the
question of the use of outer
space with an agreement on ces-
sation of nuclear tests and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
banning of nuclear weapons,
as well as the foreign base
issue.
Moscow has also continued
to press the Rapacki plan for
a nuclear-free zone in central
Europe. In replying on 3 March
to the Polish demarche of 14
February on this subject, the
Soviet Government again endorsed
Poland's efforts to make the
scheme more attractive to the
West.
SECRET
According to the Italian
ambassador in Moscow, Gromyko
recently told the Swiss ambas-
sador that the Soviet Government
would like Italy to be included
in a nuclear-free zone. Gromyko
also reportedly queried the
Swedish ambassador regarding the
possible inclusion of Scandina-
via in such a scheme, but dropped
the subject when the Swedish of-
ficial suggested that the area
should include Soviet territor
as well.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
KRHUSHCHEV'S AGRICULTURAL REORGANIZATION MOVES AHEAD
Khrushchev's proposal for
transferring Soviet agricultural
machinery from the machine trac-
tor stations (MTS) to the col-
lective farms is well on its
way toward final approval. The
party central committee, which
convened on 25-26 February, ap-
parently endorsed the plan in
short order and a full outline
of the proposal--the Khrushchev
"theses"--has been published in
the Soviet press. A nationwide
discussion of the theses is now
to take place, after which they
will be submitted to the next
session of the Supreme Soviet--
probably in April--for formal
approval.
The MTS reorganization,
another major economic program
sponsored by Khrushchev, attests
once again to his personal ini-
tiative and pervasive authority
over the Soviet scene. Unlike
his "new lands" program and his
industrial reorganization, how-
ever, the MTS proposals have
little chance of backfiring dur-
ing their implementation and
thus, in comparison, the pros-
pects for future opposition on
the MTS changes along are les-
sened.
Nevertheless, there were
some suggestions of high-level
disagreement over the proposal.
Ambassador Thompson has received
information from a source be-
lieved to be reliable confirming
that several members of the par-
ty presidium were highly annoyed
at Khrushchev for raising the
MTS question in public before
it had been discussed in the
presidium. The theses admit
only that some comrades, chief-
ly economists," had doubts about
the change because they believed
that state farms and not collec-
tives should be emphasized during
the transition to Communism. In
any case, central committee ap-
proval probably gives Khrushchev
a club against any rear-guard
opponents.
Khrushchev has given some
principles concerning the "new
look" in collective farming.
Future sales of new machines to
the collectives, like other sales
by industry, will be priced to
return profits to industry.
Grain procured by the state, in-
cluding deliveries as payments
in kind formerly made to MTS's
by collectives, will henceforth
be greater because of improved
efficiency of the collectives.
These considerations portend
no easy path for the collectives,
especially since the former MTS
system was subsidized, but Khru-
shchev expects that the greater
efficiencies realized under the
new system will enable the col-
lectives to continue their pros-
perous development.
The collectives must pay
for the machinery now held by
the MST's with due allowance for
depreciation, and Khrushchev
has given an estimate of the to-
tal value.. I stut'-d: :hat the "in-
divisibie funds" of the collec-
tives, which among other things
finance investment, have risen
to a figure adequate to finance
acquisition of present MTS ma-
chinery.
The MTS machinery will be
paid for over a period of time
and will be transferred in stages.
Leading collective farms with
substantial funds will obtain
machinery this year, while others
with less funds will phase into
the new pattern within two or
three years, or in some instances
after a longer period.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
To formalize the new rela-
tionship further, and perhaps
to overhaul the collective farms
in other ways, a third All-Un-
ion Congress of Collective Farm-
ers is to be held in early
NORTH KOREA RELEASES PASSENGERS OF SOUTH KOREAN AIRLINER
Pyongyang's release of the
passengers of the South Korean
airliner hijacked on 16 February
was apparently prompted in large
part by indications. that the
plane incident was detracting
from Communist "peace" moves.
Propaganda broadcasts from Pei-
ping and Pyongyang had earlier
reflected Communist discomfiture
at the unfavorable publicity
generated by the kidnaping. The
United States was charged with
trying to exploit the incident
"to escape from its embarrass-
ment" over Communist China's
"epochal" announcement of plans
to withdraw Chinese troops from
Korea.
In releasing the passengers,
the North Koreans may also have
been influenced by Moscow, which
transmitted the American and
West German notes on the matter
to Pyongyang. The North Korean
leaders are among Moscow's most
loyal puppets, and would have
responded quickly to any Soviet
advice urging a quick settlement
in order to improve the atmos-
phere for summit talks.
The hostage value of the
kidnaped passengers was rapidly
reduced by the South Korean gov-
ernment *s flat 'refusal to enter
into "direct contacts" with
Pyongyang. The South Korean Red
Cross official's action in sign-
ing receipts for the 22 Koreans
was an insignificant accommoda-
tion to the North Koreans. In
SECRET
25X1
backing down on their demand
for direct contacts, the North
Koreans attempted to create the
impression that the United States
and West Germany agreed to a
government-to-government ar-
rangement on releasing the two
American pilots and the two Ger-
man nationals. Pyongyang's For-
eign Ministry statement on 1
March specified that its deci-
sion to release the passengers
was made in response to the ini-
tiative of the American and West
German governments in their notes
to Moscow on the plane incident.
Both the United States and
West Germany accepted Pyongyang's
proposal. that government repre-
sentatives be present at Panmun-
jom when the passengers were
freed. Pyongyang is striving
to keep alive the concept that
contacts with officials of West-
ern governments implies some
sort of-recognition of North
Korea as one of two legitimate
Korean states.
ful settlement.
The release of the passen-
gers will probably become another
stock item in the propaganda
citing alleged Communist initia-
tives to effect a Korean settle-
ment, such as the announcement
on 19 February that Chinese Com-
munist troops will be pulled out
of North Korea by the end of
1958. Broadcasts from Peiping
and Pyongyang are contrasting
South Korean intransigence with
Communist proposals for a peace-
1959. The second congress,
held in 1935, produced the mod-
el collective farm statutes
still in effect.
(Prepared by OR
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
THE LEBANESE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
The internal security of
Lebanon is threatened by Presi-
dent Chamoun's desire to secure
a second term. To do so, he
must have a constitutional
clause which now forbids his
succession amended during the
forthcoming session of the Cham-
ber of Deputies, which begins
on 18 March and ends on 31 May.
While a second term is not un-
precedented--Chamoun's political
enemy, former President al-Khuri,
was re-elected in 1948--some of
Chamoun's opponents have threat-
ened civil war should he force
through the admendment.
Chamoun probably has the
required two-thirds majority to
pass such an admendment before
the chamber's election of a
president scheduled to take
place between 23 July and 23
August. However, the mere in-
troduction of the amendment
probably would have immediate
re ercussions
a development m t in
the overthrow of the government
in much the same way that Presi-
dent al-Khuri was deposed in
1952. The accession to power
of an anti-Western, pro-Egyptian
government would probably follow.
Chamoun actually began prep-
arations for his re-election
last June when he used his in-
fluence to elect a Chamber of
Deputies which would favor his
candidacy. By so doing, he
squeezed out many prominent po-
litical opponents and upset the
delicate balance of the religious
communities, on which the polit-
ical stability of Lebanon de-
pends.
The traditional balance
between Moslems and Christians
has been further upset by Cha-
moun's outspoken pro-Western
policy. The Greek Orthodox
Lebanese, with their traditional
affinity for Russia, have suc-
cumbed in part to the pro-Soviet
policies of Egypt and Syria,
while the Maronites are split
because of a feud between Cha-
moun and the influential Maronite
Patriarch, a relative of ex-
President al-Khuri. The patri-
arch has been making concilia-
tory gestures and public state-
ments to the Moslems which have
put him in the position of op-
posing the President in domestic
as well as in international af-
fairs.
take this course.
Chamoun might withdraw from
the race and help secure the
election of a successor who
would be amenable to his poli-
cies but who would appear less
openly pro-Western. There are
several possibilities, including
nonpolitical General Shihab, com-
mander of the army, and Jawad
Bulus, an old political figure
who has the advantage of not
having taken sides in the quar-
rels of the political clans but
supports the government's for-
eign policy. Chamoun's person-
ality and ambition are such,
however, that only strong pres-
sure is likely to persuade him to
THE SITUATION IN MOROCCO
The government of King Mo-
hamed V may he reconsidering the
nature of its relations with the
West. This policy has failed
to secure tangible results in
the eyes of the Moroccan public,
and the King and his ministers
apparently will have to take
greater cognizance of internal
pressures and developments
throughout North Africa or run
the risk of being supplanted.
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INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
The belief is growing that
the United States is financing
and equipping a possible "colo-
nialist" adventure in North Af-
rica. Considerable credence
is given to Soviet and Cairo
propaganda emphasizing French
use of American equipment during
the 8 February bombing of the
Tunisian border village of
Sakiet Sidi Youssef. Last week
the government requested the
United States to prevent fur-
ther use of American bases as
entry points for French mate-
riel. Actually, American bases
are increasingly considered a
handicap to the government's
freedom of action in foreign
affairs.
The government also resents
what it believes to be Paris'
control over American economic
aid to Morocco, an impression
confirmed in its eyes by the
contrast between the apparent
speed and quantity of American
aid to France and the si"w prog-
ress of the aid program in
Morocco. The American policy
of supplementing rather than
supplanting French economic aid
to Morocco is not comprehended
by a government which has only
an American offer of $20,000,-
000 to meet a $100,000,000 de-
velopment budget because France
failed to provide expected
funds.
As a result of these mount-
ing anti-Western feelings, the
King and Foreign Minister
Balafrej, both of whom have
opposed close relations with
the USSR, are reported to be
considering an early exchange
of ambassadors with Moscow.
Both the King and Balafrej may
hope that the opening of a
Soviet embassy in North Africa
might jolt the West into more
25X1
conciliatory gestures toward
North Africa.
All Greek Cypriots were
instructed to prepare for "bat-
tle" against the British by
economic boycott and passive re-
sistance in a pamphlet distrib-
uted on 2 March and signed by
Colonel Grivas, leader of the
underground organization EOKA.
Although the pamphlet empha-
sized nonviolence rather than
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
renewal of all-out terrorism,
Grivas did not renounce entire-
ly the use of armed force. In
line with this new policy, there
have been mass resignations
from office by Greek Cypriot
village leaders. These moves
may be followed by a Greek
Cypriot boycott of all British
goods, refusal to pay taxes,
and nonassociation with British
nationals on Cyprus.
Grivas apparently decided
to emphasize a campaign of pas-
sive resistance following a re-
quest from Archbishop Makarios
that violence not be renewed.
Passive resistance would be in
accord with the recommendations
of many influential Greeks and
Greek Cypriots who believe that
only the Turks would benefit
from renewed terrorist attacks
by EOKA at this time. They
prefer to wait for a British
Labor government, which they
feel would be more sympathetic
to Cypriot self-determination,
to take office.
GREEK GOVERNMENT
Tension between left- and
right-wing Greek Cypriots re-
mains high, and further inter-
necine violence could erupt at
any time. Left-wing leaders
continue to demand a voice in
island affairs through represen-
tation on the Cypriot Ethnarchy
Council. Right-wing nationalists
have replied with threats and
at least one attempt on the 25X1
life of a leftist leader.
No significant advance
on a Cyprus issue is likely
prior to the Greek national
elections, now expected in lat,
April.
The resignation of Greek
Prime Minister Constantine
Karamanlis on 2 March and the
King's subsequent decision to
call national elections fol-
lowed a controversy within the
cabinet over a new electoral
law. Dissatisfaction among
cabinet ministers over Kara-
manlis' tendency to disregard
the views of his cabinet on
major issues, however, has
been growing for some time and
was probably a major cause of
the resignations of Minister
of Trade and Industry Panagio-
tis Papaligouras and Minister
of Public Works George Rallis
on 27 February, moves which
precipitated the crisis.
Following their resigna-
tions, Papaligouras and Rallis
were joined by former Deputy
Premier Andreas Apostolides and
12 other National Radical Union
(ERE) deputies in presenting a
statement withdrawing support
from the prime minister. Kara-
manlis replied by expelling the
15 dissidents from the party,
but, since his parliamentary
support was reduced to a minor-
ity in the 300-member Chamber
of Deputies, he simultaneously
submitted his resignation to
the King.
King Paul, in turn, con-
ferred with Karamanlis and the
leaders of the opposition par-
ties regarding the selection
of a new premier and the desira-
bility of holding immediate
national elections. While there
was strong sentiment, notably
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among leaders of the Liberals,
second largest party in Greece,
in favor of an interim govern-
ment and elections in the fall,
the King decided to appoint a
caretaker government and to
hold national elections as
soon as practicable. In this,
he had the support of Karaman-
lis, who again controls a ma-
jority in the Chamber of Depu-
ties following the return of
two of the dissidents and the
defection of a Liberal to the
ERE on 4 March.
Constantine Georgacopoulos,
nonpolitical head of the Greek
Red Cross, has been designated
premier with the tasks of
steering Karamanlis' new elec-
toral law through the Chamber
of Deputies, dissolving that
body, and holding national
elections. The new electoral
law, providing for modified
proportional representation,
reportedly has the support of
both the ERE and the Liberals
and its passage appears likely,
although possibly in amended
form. The constitution provides
that elections must be held with-
in 45 days from the date the
chamber is dissolved--indicat-
ing elections in late April.
Elections held under either
the existing or any presently
proposed electoral law will
favor larger parties and will
tend to force smaller ones into
electoral coalitions. Already
intense political maneuvering
has begun in Greece and new
parties or coalitions will prob-
ably emerge. The Communist-
front United Democratic Left,
to ensure representation in the
new chamber and to secure greater
respectability in Greece, will
probably try to create an elec-
toral front with center parties,
similar to one formed for the
elections of 1956. During the
electoral campaign, Communists,
fellow travelers, neutralists,
and political opportunists can
be expected to exploit the two
major foreign policy issues in
Greece today--Cyprus and the in-
bases in Greece.
stallation of American missile
25X1
The budgets presented by
the Indian and Pakistani finance
ministers for the fiscal year
beginning 1 April indicate that
India's economic development
program will continue approxi-
mately on schedule but that
Pakistan will fail to implement
its more modest program. In-
dia's defense expenditures are
to reach $641,000,000, an in-
crease of $29,000,000, and Pak-
istan's are to reach $184,254,-
000, an increase of only
$3,700,000.
Total Indian economic de-
velopment expenditures for 1958
are scheduled at $2.135 billion
compared with actual expendi-
tures of $1.407 billion and
$1.775 billion during the first
two years of the Second Five-
Year Plan (1956-61). Administra-
tive difficulties probably will
cause some shortfall in actual
expenditures, but the latter
should be sufficient to enable
India to reach most of the goals
of its five-year plan. Most of
the increased expenditures
scheduled are to be financed by
a $400,000,000 increase in for-
eign aid, as the government de-
cided to increase taxes by only
$13,000,000 over last year's
$200,000,000 tax increase.
Pakistan's new budget calls
for a reduction of economic
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development expenditures from
$337,491,000 during the current
fiscal year to $303,030,000
during the fiscal year begin-
ning 1 April. This is less
than 60 percent of the amount
called for during the coming
fiscal year by the first Five-
Year Plan (1955-60), and indi-
cates that the plan will fall
substantially short of its rel-
atively modest goals.
Although the government
did not accept the recommenda-
tion of the Pakistani National.
Economic Council that it in-
crease taxes sharply to provide
more funds for economic develop-
ment, the budget does call for
a $21,000,000 rise in taxes to
reduce deficit spending. Even
this small increase has provoked
strong reactions in both Parlia-
ment and the press, however, and
the government may be forced to
back down, as it did last year.
The decline in development
allocations will mean that no
new major projects will be
started, which will make it im-
possible to bring expenditures
in East Pakistan up to the level
of those in West Pakistan, where
most of the projects already
under construction are located.
This will add to the friction
between the two parts of the
country, and probably will fur-
ther weaken the present coali-
tion government, which depends
on East Pakistan's support.
Campaigning for Laos' 4
May elections officially opened
this week, with about 100 can-
didates registered for the 21
National Assembly seats at
stake. The elections, held to
expand the present assembly to
59 seats, are the final step in
the unification settlement with
the Pathet Lao and will be the
first test of the voter appeal
of the Communist-front group.
The campaign is of critical
importance for the two conserv-
ative parties, which now dom-
inate the royal government,
and for the Pathet Lao, which
has surrendered its territorial
base and army in a switch to
legal and semilegal political
tactics.
The two major conservative
parties--the Nationalists and
Independents, which together
now control over 70 percent of
the seats in the legislature--
have formed a "national front"
for the campaign, They have
established a joint committee
charged with allocating campaign
support and reducing the present
total of 53 conservative candi-
dates to 21 in order to avoid
splitting the vote. Whether
the committee will succeed in
persuading all of the 32 weakest
conservative candidates to drop
out of the race is problematical,
but the committee in any event
will facilitate effective use
of the resources available to
the conservatives, which include
the services of the army, police,
provincial administration, and
"civic action teams."
Primary competition for the
conservatives will come from the
left-wing electoral front formed
by the Laotian Patriotic Front--
the Pathet Lao party--and the
National Union party. This
front is presenting a single
candidate for each of the 21
seats and, therefore, is already
assured that its support will
not be split. Thirteen of the
candidates are former Pathet Lao
leaders, including such top-
level personalities as Prince
Souphannouvong, Phoumi Vongvichit,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Nouhak Phoumsavan, and Kayson
Fasan; the remainder are Na-
tional Union supporters.
The small but well-en-
trenched Democratic party has
revealed that it has entered
into an electoral alliance with
the left-wing front. Its co-
operation is presumably some-
what in the nature of a nonag-
gression pact, since it is
running an independent slate
of five candidates. This de-
velopment is a setback for the
conservatives, who were hopeful
of winning Democratic support.
An all-out struggle appears
to be developing for the seats
in the two former Pathet Lao-
held provinces of Sam Neua and
Phong Saly, with both sides
sensitive to the symbolic im-
pact of a victory there. The
Pathet Lao, realizing that a
defeat would be interpreted as
a repudiation of three and a
half years of Pathet administra-
tion, reportedly has opened a
headquarters of its front organ-
ization in every village in Sam
Neua Province and is threatening
reprisals against individuals
favorably disposed to the gov-
ernment. Despite the Laotian
Army's occupation of the prov-
ince since 19 January, the
civil administration remains
predominantly in the hands of
former Pathet functionaries.
A strong left-wing showing
in the elections probably would
increase pressure on the govern-
ment for adoption of a pro-Com-
munist neutrality, allow the
left to pose as the "wave of the
future," possibly lead to in-
creased Pathet representation in
a new cabinet, and improve Pathet
prospects for the general elec-
tions in 1959.1 -1
SOUTH KOREAN - JAPANESE RELATIONS
Plans for resuming formal
negotiations for a settlement
of outstanding problems between
Japan and South Korea have been
snagged by Seoul's failure to
return all Japanese fishermen.
This obstacle will delay, but
should not preclude, official
talks, which are likely to be
thorny and protracted.
Tokyo on 27 February de-
cided to postpone negotiations
to normalize relations with
Seoul scheduled for 1 March be-
cause not all eligible Japanese
fishermen held at Pusan had been
returned. The Japanese believe
Seoul is holding 400 of some
900 detainees as hostages to
strengthen the South Korean
bargaining position.
Japanese suspension of the
negotiations was accompanied by
indications of increasing irri-
tation over South Korean bad
faith. Tokyo, however, announced
its willingness to begin negotia-
tions if South Korea would give
firm assurance that all Japanese
fishermen eligible for repatriation
would be returned soon.
The Japanese, meanwhile, are
continuing the repatriation of
Korean illegal entrants. They
also hope that a compromise can
be worked out permitting some
90 Korean detainees who wish re-
patriation to North Korea to be
released in Japan. Seoul has
been insistent that these people
be returned forcibly to South
Korea.
Seoul appears to have been
considerably disturbed by Tokyo's
action. The Foreign Ministry
realizes that failure to honor
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the Korean commitment to repa-
triate all Japanese fishermen
damaged the nation's prestige.
Nevertheless, the Rhee govern-
ment has not as yet indicated
when all the remaining fisher-
men will be returned, although
some apparently are scheduled
for repatriation in the near
future.
When formal negotiations
are resumed, serious substan-
tive disputes could cause a
new deadlock at any time.
While an apparent understanding
has been reached between the
two countries on property
claims, the problems of the re-
turn of Korean art treasures
and the status of Korean resi-
dents in Japan remain.
The controversial "ghee
line," which unilaterally es-
tablishes South Korean terri-
torial waters as much as 60
miles offshore, also will be
a major obstacle to any settle-
ment. South Korea is continuing
to seize Japanese fishing boats
caught inside this line. Japan
is willing to conclude a fish-
eries conservation agreement to
settle the issue, but Korea has
not as yet shown any willing-
ness to accept such a compro-
mise.
Communist China's 1958
plan and budget, recently made
public, disclose a bold eco-
nomic program still strongly
oriented toward rapid indus._
trialization. They do provide,
however, for sharply
increased spending
on agriculture, which
the leadership feels
needs a stimulant if
ambitious investment
plans are to be con--
tinued. The leader-
ship aims to cut non-
productive spending
to the bone by re-
ducing administrative
overhead and by par-
ing the defense out-
lay by 10 percent,
in order to sustain
record levels of
spending both in cap-
ital construction and
CHEMICAL
FERTILIZER
in agriculture.
According to the
1958 plan, the total
value of industrial
production is to go
up by nearly 15 per-
cent, slightly under
the average yearly rate of 16.5
percent achieved during the
First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957)
but well above the modest 6 per-
cent planned last year. Heavy
industry is to increase by 18.8
COMMUNIST CHINA:
OUTPUT AND TARGETS FOR SELECTED ITEMS
MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS EXCEPT AS NOTED
1952
1957
PLAN
1957
RESULTS
1958
PLAN
1962
PLAN
ELECTRIC POWER
(BILLIONS OF KWH)
7.3
15.9
19.0
22.5
44.0
COAL
64.0
112.9
128.5
150.7
230.0
CRUDE OIL
0.44
2.01
1.45
1.55
LE 5 S T S-6
STEEL
1.35
4.12
5.24
6.25
12.0
CEMENT
2.9
6.0
6.7
7.6
12.5
0.19
0.5
0.75
1.20
5-7
FOOD GRAINS
154.0
181.0
185.0
196.0
240.0
COTTON
1.3
1.64
1.64
1.75
2.15
HOGS
(MILLIONS OF HEAD)
138.0
130.0
150.0
220.0
SECRET
25X1
PART II Approved For ReleasV0QQ 0( : O T-00927A0016001100QJh*e 9 of 18
 Other Aerenues 2.650
Credits, Loans, and Insurence-z
San and Customs laxes-
Industrial and--
Commercial saxes
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ali
SECRET ,
REVENUES
5.271
4x
7.138l
- t:
8.846
F~7
11.058
106- lax
41%
12A80
F
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
COMMUNIST CHINA
BUDGET REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES
1950-1958
BILLIONS OF DOLLARS
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 19d58
percent, almost twice the rate
of light industry. Investment
in capital construction is
scheduled to increase by almost
18 percent and will reach record
levels. Almost twice as many
major construction projects
will be undertaken as last year,
and industrial building will
concentrate on the fuels,
power, and other industries
which support agriculture.
Peiping plans a 6-percent
increase this year in the total
value of agricultural output,
almost double the average an-
nual rate achieved during the
First Five-Year Plan. Agricul-
tural plans in the past have
been notably unrealistic and
seldom achieved. The leader-
ship has apparently been con-
vinced by the experience of the
Other Expenditures--
i dministtatien-
Social, culturaL-
and Ederahonal
last ive years that agricul-
tural output must be increased 25X1
more rapidly and that additional
funds must be found to support
this sector of the economy.
A 40-percent increase in
expen.itures is scheduled for
agriculture and related fields.
The $1.2 billion--9 percent of
total outlay--which Peiping in-
tends to spend on agriculture
is only a fraction less than
the $1.22 billion which it plans
to take from it in the form of
direct taxes. Larger spending
programs for agriculture will
be required in the future if
the Chinese Communists go ahead
with their plans to mechanize
agriculture. In the interim,
despite the increased budgetary
outlay, primary reliance for
meeting investment goals will
SECRET
EXPENDITURES
6.824
Foreign Aid and Dlher- 7
Debt Retirement
8.735
MI.
11%II
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 119 58
Buet
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PART II
 Approved For Release 2005/02/17 : CIA-RDP79-009201600110001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
be placed on programs involving
extensive use of manpower and on
capital accumulated by the peas-
ants themselves.
Peiping evidently feels
capable of launching this bold
economic course without Soviet
credits. Despite reports that
Mao Tse-tung had succeeded in
obtaining new economic loans in
Moscow last November, the 1958
budget, unlike previous budgets,
gives no evidence of any for-
eign loans. The slightly more
than $2 billion which the USSR
has loaned to Peiping since
1949 has been exhausted. On
the other hand, debt service
payments on these loans will
increase approximately 10 per-
cent this year to $310,000,000,
and at the same time China's
economic aid to neighboring
countries will roughly equal
USSR SCIENTIST SUGGESTS PERMANENT
At a meeting of the Special
Committee of Antarctic Research
of the International Council of
Scientific Unions at The Hague
on 3-5 February 1958, Soviet
delegate M. M. Somov, suggested
that an international effort
be undertaken to construct ad-
ditional meteorological sta-
tions in Antarctica for use
after the end of the Interna-
tional Geophysical Year (IGY)
in December 1958.. Following
this initiative, other delegates
at the conference suggested a
total of 12 new stations, of
which seven were coastal and
five in the interior, located
to provido a more desirable
meteorological network.
Somov, who is head of the
staff of the Soviet "Complex
last year's $184,000,000. Thus
China's net foreign payments
this year will amount to approx-
imately 3.7 percent of its total
budgetary outlay.
The. apparent termination
of Soviet economic credits,
which in any case paid for only
2.6 percent of total imports
during the First Five-Year Plan,
will not greatly affect
Peiping's economic or political
orientation toward the bloc.
China will remain heavily de-
pendent on deliveries from the
USSR for completion of the re-
maining 99 of the 156 key
Chinese industrialization proj-
ects.. The country's foreign
trade, which is to reach $4.47
billion this year, will still
be Principally with the bloc.
(P~,tep-ared by 25X1
OR R
INTERNATIONAL ANTARCTIC BASES
Antarctic Expedition," expressed
doubts in Moscow on 20 February
that the Soviet Union would com-
plete its Antarctic IGY work by
the end of 1958 and spoke in
favor of "some sort of permanent
international scientific sta-
tion" in the area.
Somov's remarks are an at-
tempt to make more palatable
the Soviet intention to remain
and expand post-IGY activities
in the Antarctic. Presumably
under cover of this expanded
program, the USSR is reportedly
planning to establish a perma-
nent zone containing both perma-
nent and emergency stations.
There has been no official
Soviet reaction yet to the re-
cent article in the British
.SECRET
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 18
 CHATH,kM
IS.
z
ANTARCTICA
A Existing Soviet station
Proposed Soviet station
Existing US station
Additional stations proposed by
Special Committee on Antarctic Research
0 Interior station (5), location schematized
XCoastal station (7), location schematized
MACQUARIE I.
_Nel
X I Pioderska
azis Mirn
< y o o Dan.
Sea 0
I A
0 80 70 60
110 ]00
\\\ SOUTH
?? SANDWICH
Is.
e'+
FII~CNNER N~~ o \ ` ,
/CE SHE F
SO TH
PL
Sovetskaya
(original objectival
st'
SOUTH SHETLAND S
aid/p
? t. ARGEN'T'INA,
IERRA
DEL
FUEGO
DSOUTH
GEORGIA
l~ Ricn
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
Daily Telegraph revealing that
gri is government is formu-
lating a plan for international
control of the Antarctic. The
USSR is trying not to jeopardize
The resolution adopted
last week by the 11th plenum
the central committee of the
Polish .United.'.Workers'. patty,
which, called for several measures
in connection with a new econom-
ic. program, was another vic-
tory for Gomulka over his Sta-
POLISH CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM
linist opposition. The measures
included the transfer of man-
power from industries suffering
from overemployment, increased
retirement pensions, higher rents,
and tighter control over worker
absenteeism.
SECRET
the friendly relations developed
during IGY and the concurrent
flow of,valuable geophysical
and geographical data.
(Prepared by ORR)
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
Although there has been
some improvement in living
standards in 1957--largely
through drawing on short-term
foreign credits and using do-
mestic goods reserves--Gomulka
to date has made little head-
way in solving the country's
serious economic problems.
The regime has repeatedly stat-
ed. that there will be no wage
increases in 1958, and that an
effort will be made to balance
Poland's unfavorable trade.po-
sition. Polish economic ex-
perts take the view that the
only feasible way to raise the
living standard is through in-
creased productivity.
Higher worker productivity
was the aim behind politburo
economic expert Jedrychowski's
proposal, reiterated at the
plenum, to dismiss superfluous
workers in industry. Approxi-
mately 200,900 _ndustrial work-
ers and administrative officers
would lose their jobs in the
reshuffle and an attempt would
be made to channel the released
manpower into other employment,
such as that on state farms,
and to other areas, particularly
the thinly populated former
German territories. The rais-
ing of the minimum old-age pen-
sion will probably free addi
tional jobs for the surplus
labor force. About 150,000
pensioners supplement their
present benefits by working.
The prospect of increased
unemployment resulting from
the labor transfers and the
raising of the extremely low
rents on housing--which will
spur popular unrest--touched
off a bitter attack on Gomulka
by Deputy Minister of Labor and
Social Welfare Klosiewicz, who
was promptly expelled from his
government post and from the
central committee.
Trade union chief during
Poland's Stalinist era, Klosie-
wicz is a prominent member of
the Natolin_. faction which
challenged Gomulka's refusal
to acknowledge at the central
committee's May 1957 plenum
the leading role of the Soviet
party in bloc affairs. He ap-
parently took the opportunity
last week to air the old griev-
ance,, stating that Gomulka
was reluctant to acknowledge
at the November conference of
bloc party leaders in Moscow,
the leading role played by the
Soviet party. Klosiewicz also
criticized Gomulka's "soft"
treatment of revisionism in the
party, accusing the first sec-
retary of expelling a few
"little fish'' while allowing
the big ones to retain their
party positions:.':
The plenum approved, how-
ever, the Polish delegation's
role at the Moscow conference
as being consistent with the
party's political line.
While a resurgence of
antirevisionist propaganda has
been evident in the Soviet Union,
the latest Natolin challenge
was probably not inspired by
Moscow. Khrushchev's confidence
in Gomulka's efforts to improve
the socialist economy as ex-
pressed in his January speech
at Minsk and the initiative
allowed Poland in promulgating
the Rapacki plan indicate that
some rapprochement has probably
been reached between the two
leaders. While Gomulka's re-
tention of his position still
ultimately hinges on the out-
come of his economic program,
the prompt rebuff of Klosiewicz
and the committee's backing of
Gomulka's economic and political
positions testify to Gomulka's
continued strength in the party.
(Concurred in by
t
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
BRITISH LABOR DEMANDING NEW MOVES ON DISARMAMENT
The British Trades Union
Congress (TUC) is joining with
the Labor party in a nationwide
campaign to demand that the
Macmillan government show more
initiative in seeking interna-
tional agreement on disarmament
and disengagement. The govern-
ment has already shown itself
sensitive to public opinion on
these questions and its respon-
siveness to new pressures will
be affected by its showing in
two pending by-elections.
This is the first time the
influential TUC has joined the
Labor party in seeking public
support on foreign policy is-
sues. The joint stand on for-
eign policy appears essentially
the same as that approved by the
parliamentary Labor party, after
considerable debate, last spring.
The joint draft endorses the
Gaitskell plan for a neutral
zone in central Europe and calls
for a unilateral British sus-
pension of thermonuclear testing
for a limited period and a dis-
armament agreement in several
stages beginning with an inter-
national agreement on test sus-
pension.
Meanwhile, some 70 Labor
MP's are demanding that Britain
unilaterally renounce the use
and production of nuclear weap-
ons and allow no missile bases
on its territory. No prominent
party leaders are represented
in the group, but it comprises
about a quarter of the party's
parliamentary representation
and has received support from
Labor's official press organ,
the Daily Herald.
In recent months the Mac-
millan government has repeatedly
tried to regain popularity by
conciliatory gestures in foreign
policy. It will closely watch
the results of the two forthcom-
ing by-elections in judging how
much it needs to yield to Labor
demands. In the first of these,
on 13 March, in the Glasgow con-
stituency of Kelvingrove, which
it won by less than 3,000 votes
in the 1955 general elections,
the government will campaign
under relatively favorable con-
ditions--a strong Conservative
candidate, no Liberal party com-
petition, and a Labor vote split
by the candidacy of an independ-
ent Labor Party member
25X1
PROSPECTS OF THE YDIGORAS REGIME IN GUATEMALA
Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes,
who was inaugurated for a six-
year term in the presidency on
2 March, will have difficulty
restoring political stability
in Guatemala. His apparent in-
tention to follow a middle-of-
the-road political course will
be ?bitterly resented by extreme
rightists, who form the core of
his organized political support.
It was apparent even before the
inauguration that he would have
difficulty controlling the Con-
gress, in which his followers
form a minority.
The plurality Ydigoras won
in the 19 January election re-
sulted more from his personal
appeal than from having a well-
defined program or effective
political machine. His follow-
ers range from extreme conserva-
tives to moderate leftists. He
has gone to considerable lengths
since the election to allay the
fear of many that he might re-
sort to repressive dictatorship.
His cabinet appointments and
his preinaugural statements sug-
gest that he will attempt to a-
dopt moderate political policies.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
In rejecting the authori-
tarian policies advocated by
those who 'form''the oldest,
wealthiest, and most cohesive
group of his supporters, Ydi-
goras stands to lose much of the
organized support he has here-
tofore enjoyed. He clearly
hopes to gain in its stead the
backing of unorganized but po-
tent forces from the middle and
lower classes and of elements
from the moderate and leftist
parties which supported his op-
ponents in the election. His
cabinet appointments were ob-
viously calculated to accomplish
this end. Carlos Garcia Bauer,
his foreign minister, is a mod-
erate lefts-,t. One other minis-
ter was a supporter of Ydigoras'
moderate opponent in the elec-
tion.
A four-month-old dispute
between the American-owned In-
ternational Railways of Central
America and the railway workers'
union, the strongest union in
Guatemala, is expected to test
Ydigoras' policy in the impor-
tant field of labor relations.
A crippling strike is a possi-
bility.
The Guatemalan Army, which
lacks effective leadership and
is not united, is not expected
to be an immediate threat to
Ydigoras. The President has
many enemies among the officers,
however, and any marked de-
cline in his popular support
is likely to result in mil-
itary plots to oust him.
NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN ARGENTINE OIL POLICY
The provisional Aramburu
regime has reopened the politi-
cally explosive question of for-
eign participation in Argentina's
largely state-owned oil industry
and has hinted that it will try
to implement the so-called
Yadarola oil development plan
before President-elect Frondizi
takes office on 1 May. During
the election campaign, Frondizi
strongly opposed any change in
the country's nationalistic oil
policy, but he apparently ap-
proves of the provisional gov-
ernment's effort to reshape
public opinion on the subject.
Following private talks
with Frondizi last week, Aram-
buru's minister of commerce and
industry held two "educational"
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SECRET Nwaw
ARGENTINA: OIL PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
MILLIONS OF BARRELS
press conferences in which he
said that the Argentine State
Oil Fields Administration does
not have the funds to undertake
a development program adequate
to meet Argentina's growing
needs. He said Argentina is
"going broke" because of oil
imports while it has "vast"
proved reserves of its own. He
also disclosed the details of
the Yadarola plan, which was
announced but not described in
January by Argentina's ambas-
sador to Washington.
Under the plan,
the government would
retain ownership of
the oil but would
contract with private
foreign companies for 1300
exploration and pro-
duction. The compa-
nies would make an-
nual payments for
the privilege of ex-
ploring and would be
reimbursed only if
they succeed in get-
ting oil above ground.
The most controver-
sial part of the plan
is a provision for
the companies to be
paid in oil, since
nationalist opinion
strongly objects to
SECRET
1957
(ESTIMATE )
any foreign company
being allowed to dis-
pose of Argentine re-
sources.
Frondizi's tacit
approval of the plan
apparently stems from
his recognition of the
role oil imports have
played in Argentina's
mounting trade deficit.
The state oil fields,
with a minor assist
from private compa-
nies operating tiny,
pre-1935 concessions,
supply over 35 per-
cent of Argentina's
needs, but supplemen-
tary imports cost an estimated
$270,000,000 in 1957 and ac-
counted for nearly 80 percent
of the country's trade deficit.
To conserve dwindling dollar
and sterling reserves, Argen-
tina has been seeking large
quantities of Soviet bloc crude
oil but has been unable to sign
any contracts to date.
Frondizi will probably be
evasive in commenting publicly
on the Yadarola plan until he
assesses public reaction. Since
the abortive constitutent
ARGENTINA: FOREIGN TRADE
MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
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assembly showed itself over-
whelmingly opposed to foreign
investment in oil and other
natural resources last summer,
few public figures have faced
the oil issue realistically.
Frondizi told newsmen on 4 March
study it.
that he would not engage in any
new "theoretical" discussions
of oil development but that if
any foreign company has a spe-
cific proposal not in conflict
with state control of Argentine
resources, he would be glad to
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3 E~t~.1 iAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
USSR SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS
According to the Soviet
constitution, the Supreme Soviet
is the highest governmental body
in the USSR. The approximately
1,380 Supreme Soviet seats are
divided between two houses, both
elected directly: the Soviet of
the Union and the Soviet of Na-
tionalities. Although both
houses have the same powers,
the Soviet of the Union,
larger by approximately 100
deputies, is generally consid-
ered to carry more prestige.
The Supreme Soviet is re-
quired by law to meet twice a
year, and the sessions normally
last a week or so. Between
sessions, its affairs are
handled by its Presidium. The
chairman of the Presidium, at
present K. E. Voroshilov, is
the titular head of state.
In practice, all important
policy decisions in the
USSR are made by the presidium
of the central committee of
the Communist party and by
the Council of Ministers, which
is nominally subordinate to
the Supreme Soviet.
The Supreme Soviet
and its Presidium
routinely ratif y
these decisions.
Election Mechanics
Elections to
the Supreme Soviet
are held every
four years on a date
designated by its
Presidium, which this
year falls on 16
March. The USSR
was divided into 1,-
364 election dis-
tricts by the Su-
preme Soviet Pre-
sidium as announced
on 5 January. Sep-
arate districts are
established for
the Soviet of the Union and
the Soviet of Nationalities.
A number of districts are
to be established for Soviet
military personnel outside the
USSR on the basis of one dis-
trict for every 100,000 serv-
icemen. In the 1954 election,
eight of these districts were
established, and each elects
two deputies: one to the So-
viet of the Union and one to the
Soviet of Nationalities.
From 1 to 9 February nomi-
nation meetings were held by
factories, schools, collective
farms, youth organizations, and
similar groups within each elec-
tion district. An individual from
each district is designated through
party channels before these meet-
ings are held, ensuring the unan-
imous support of the regime's
choice. A general district meet-
ing composed of delegates from
the various preliminary meetings
then formally nominates the
unanimously supported candidate.
POSITION OF USSR
SUPREME SOVIET
USSR
PROCURATOR
GENERAL
PRESIDIUM OF SUPREME SOVIET
Chairman
Secretary
15 Vice Chairmen
15 Members
imuiimimmiiimiiiuiiiiimimumimmumu)m11)1 uiliiiuuuiuuu111111i1111I!iuiiii1111 II uiiim
SOVIET OF THE UNION SOVIET OF NATIONALITIES
(about 740 deputies) (about 640 deputies)
One deputy for every 300,070 citizens
USSR SUPREME SOVIET
(about 1,380 deputies)
25 deputies per union republic
11 deputies per autonomous republic
5 deputies per autonomous region
1 deputy per national area
USSR COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS
PARTY PRESIDIUM,*
CENTRAL COMMITTEE,
SECRETARIAT, AND APPARATUS
USSR
SUPREME COURT
*A11 members of the party presidium except Pervukhin are members of the Supreme Soviet.
?Pervukhin's status on the party presidium is in doubt.
CQ4JFJIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The procedure is complicat-
ed by the multitudinous "honor-
ary" nominations of top party
leaders, at least one of whom
is nominated in nearly every
electoral district. The elec-
tion law provides that a pros-
pective candidate may be nomi-
nated in any number of districts
but may be registered as a can-
didate in only one. According-
ly, on 8 February, by means of
an open circular letter, each
full and candidate member of
the party presidium (except
Pervukhin who was not designated
as a candidate) withdrew from
all but one of the election dis-
tricts in which he had been
nominated and, as in 1954, sec-
ond candidates were on hand to
accept the nominations declined
by the top leaders. Consequent-
ly, the Soviet elector will be
presented with only one candi-
date for each office when he
votes on 16 March.
The Election "Campaign"
The two-month period pre-
ceding the election is one of
intense agitation to arouse the
patriotism of the people and
to "get out the vote" in order
to display monolithic unity
and enthusiasm for the regime
and its policies. The entire
Soviet population is mobilized
for the campaign by hundreds
of thousands of citizens en-
listed as agitators, or elected
in late January to the district
and precinct election commis-
sions. If the election runs
true to form, something over
99.9 percent of eligible voters
will turn out to vote for the
"Communist and nonparty bloc"
candidates.
The campaign is climaxed
a week before the elections by
meetings of candidates with
their constituents. At this
time the top leaders make well-
publicized speeches.
Political Weather Vane
Apart from serving as a
vehicle for the expression of
policy statements by party lead-
ers, the elections disclose per-
sonnel changes and help to in-
dicate the relative political
importance of top officials.
While usually about half of the
Supreme Soviet deputies are out-
standing workers and peasants
whose selection may be left to
the discretion of local leaders
supervised by regional party
committees, the remaining 50
percent of the deputies reads
like a Soviet Who's Who. The
selection of these nominees
and their election district is
carefully regulated and coordi-
nated by higher party bodies.
Although knowledge of the actual
behind-the-scenes nomination
procedure for the Supreme So-
viet is limited, it appears
to be carefully controlled by
the secretariat of the party
central committee.
The "honorary" nominations
of top party leaders, as reported
by the Soviet press, reflect
the political standing of party
chieftains. In March 1954, for
example, a tabulation of the
number of nominations of top
Soviet leaders revealed a dis-
crepancy with the official
hierarchical listings of the
time. Whereas Molotov was of-
ficially listed second to Malen-
kov, followed by Khrushchev in
third place, a, listing based on
the number of nominations pub-
lished in the press showed
Khrushchev second to Malenkov
and ahead of Molotov. Subse-
quent events revealed that in
general these 1954 nomination
listings reflected the power
situation more accurately than
did the official hierarchical
listing.
A similar compilation this
year may be even more indicative,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
since all presidium members'
names have been listed alpha-
betically since mid-1954.
Judging by the number of
"honorary" nominations as re-
ported in both the central and
regional press, Khrushchev is
clearly set apart from other
resi.diumt members. He received
well over twice as many nomina-
tions as Voroshilov, his nearest
competitor in this strictly con-
trolled popularity contest.
This performance compares well
with that of Stalin in 1950,
when the central press reported
that he received twice as many
nominations as Molotov, who
then stood next in line.
RANKING OF PARTY PRESIDIUM MEMBERS
By number of nominations
to USSR Supreme Soviet
1950 1954 1958
Stalin Malenkov Khrushchev
Molotov Khrushchev Voroshilov
Malenkov Molotov Kirichenko
Mikoyan
Berta Voroshilov
Suslov
Mikoyan Kaganovich
Voroshilov Bulganin Shvernik
Khrushchev Mikoyan Brezhnev
Kaganovich Ignatov
Andreyev
Bulganin
Kosygin
Pervukhin Aristov
Saburov Furtseva
Mukhitdinov
Kuusinen
Kozlov
Belyayev
Bulganin
Honors accorded Voroshilov
reflect his position as chair-
man of the USSR Supreme Soviet
Presidium and his status as an
"Old Bolshevik" rather than his
actual political strength.
Party presidium member Kirichen-
ko, while slightly behind Voro-
shilov, fared extremely well,
running nearly on a par with
Mikoyan and ahead of Suslov.
While the "honorary" nominations
make it clear that there is at
present no obvious successor
to Khrushchev, the showing of
Kirichenko is noteworthy, es-
pecially in view of numerous re-
ports during the last five months
that Suslov had gained increas-
ing prominence within the party
presidium. The treatment given
Premier.Bulganin, who received
the least number of honorary
nominations of any full member
of the party presidium and who
was finally registered in the
relatively little-known Maykop
election district in the North
Caucasus, may portend his res-
ignation as premier. The ab-
sence of Mikhail Pervukhin from
the nomination lists was an
indication of a change in his
job status and this was confirmed
recently by his appointment as
ambassador to East Germany.
Party presidium members
Kozlov and Belyayev stand at the
bottom of the list with Bulganin.
In Belyayev's case this probably
indicates at least a temporary
diminution of his party prestige
as a result of his transfer from
the post of secretary of the
central committee to first secre-
tary of Kazakhstan. As for Koz-
lov, it suggests, contrary to
recent speculation, that he is
not being built up in prepara-
tion for replacing Bulganin as
premier.
The registration lists of
candidates, now being published,
to date have not revealed any
hitherto unannounced personnel
changes among the secondary eche-
lons of government and party
leaders with the exception of
the replacement of party first
secretaries in Mari Oblast and
the Komi Autonomous Republic.
Some names are conspicuously
absent from this year's roster
of prospective deputies. The
Soviet press has announced that
the denounced Malenkov, Molotov,
Kaganovich, and Shepilov have
"lost the support of the people"
and hence will not be nominated.
Former presidium members M. Z.
Saburov and Marshal Zhukov have
also been passed over.
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The final listings of can-
didates will show changes in
the relative representation of
the various branches of the
state administration--for ex-
ample, military, secret police,
government, party, and indus-
trial administration. This
may be of particular value in
Teng Hsiao-ping, secretary
general of the Chinese Communist
party, appears to have risen to
fourth place in the party hier-
archy. Merely a regional lead-
er until 1952, he is now the
only person to be concurrently
a member of the party's three
most important organs--the po-
litburo, the polit-
buro's standing com-
mittee, and the sec-
retariat. Teng now
is supervising Pei-
ping's stern "recti-
fication" campaign,
and has been associ-
ated with hard lines
in other domestic and
foreign matters. He
appears to have pow-
erful patrons in Mao
Tse-tung and Liu
Shao-chi and an im-
pressive circle of
proteges of his own.
If he avoids antago-
nizing other party
leaders, Teng has
some prospect of eventually be-
coming the party's dominant
figure.
SECRET
indicating the effect of the
industrial reorganization on
the political position of the
former administrative and min-
isterial personnel who have
been transferred from Moscow
to leading positions in the
regional economic councils.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RYUKYU ISLANDS
The United States' adminis-
tration of the Ryukyu Islands
has been plagued by anti-Ameri-
can elements who have made elec-
tion gains by exploiting the
discontent with American land
acquisition and compensation
policies and the nationalistic
sentiment for reversion of the
islands to Japan. Their activ-
ity has promoted increasing re-
sentment among the Ryukyuans to-
ward the American administration.
Although the Ryukyus were
governed as an integral part of
Japan before 1945, they were
treated as a separate territory
in the Japanese peace treaty of
1951, under which the United
States exercises full control
of the Ryukyus but recognizes
Japan's residual sovereignty.
The Amami island group immedi-
ately north of Okinawa and tra-
ditionally considered part of
the prefecture of the southern
Japanese home island of Kyushu,
on 24 December 1953 reverted,
by an American concession, to
Japanese control.
The administration of the
Ryukyus is based on an execu-
tive order of President Eisen-
hower issued on 5 June 1957.
The order includes a provision
for a unicameral legislature of
29 members directly elected
every two years. The legisla-
ture's powers are nominal, how-
ever, and the American high com-
missioner exercises complete
authority over the islands. He
can promulgate laws, veto acts
of the legislature, and remove
any official. The commissioner
exercised his power in late No-
vember 1957 when he revised
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 March 1958
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6 MARCH
Miles
24923
USSR
SEX S?
RKORE
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Q'O
EAST
v
CHINA SEA y
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MAMI
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OKINAWA y
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local autonomy laws to permit
the Naha city assembly to oust
pro-Communist Mayor Kamejiro
Senaga.
The Japanese Government
officially accepts the present
status of the Ryukyus while un-
officially pressing, as a max-
imum demand,for administrative
control with America retention
of base rights and, as a mini-
mum, control of education. To
embarrass the government of
Prime Minister Kishi, Japan's
opposition Socialist party
is publicly demanding return of
the Ryukyus. This in turn has
forced Kishi to take a public
position on major problems of
Okinawan administration in op-
position to American policies,
and publicly to press for Jap-
anese administrative rights.
Economic Problems
The economy of the Ryukyus,
which is principally dependent
on agriculture and the American
bases, is beset by growing pop-
ulation pressure on meager land
resources. The total land area
of 921 square miles is smaller
than the state of Rhode Island.
With 1,200 persons per square
mile, the Ryukyus are among the
most densely populated areas in
the world. The requisition of
20 percent of the arable land
for military bases, housing,
and other facilities has dis-
possessed over 50,000 families,
placing a strain on the local
economy, which is incapable of
providing nonagricultural jobs
for the displaced landowners.
Compensation of dispossessed
landowners and labor practices
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PACIFIC OCEAN
'aP
TAIWAN /
R
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APAN
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applicable to Ryukyuans employed
on the military bases have been
chronic problems of the American
administration.
The Ryukyuans' deep attach-
ment for ancestral holdings and
the prestige value of landown-
ership in an agrarian economy
attaches social and religious
significance to the land requi-
sitioning program. This com-
bination of factors has led to
strenuous opposition to American
proposals of lump-sum settle-
ments for indefinite occupation
of land held by the military.
Instead, the Ryukyuans are de-
manding payment of a yearly
rental which would be periodi-
cally renegotiated. They main-
tain that this procedure would
more equitably compensate for
the loss of the land without
implying surrender of ownership
rights.
The labor problem, affect-
ing over 51,000 Ryukyuan em-
ployees at military bases, stems
from dissatisfaction with wage
RYUKYU ISLANDS LEGISLATURE
RYUKYUS DEMOCRATIC
PARTY
rates, which are substantially
below those prevailing in the
local economy for comparable
work. The Ryukyuans resent as
racial discrimination the wage
differentials between Ryukyuan
workers and the larger number
foreign workmen, but the
Ryukyuan believes he has since
gained in experience and train-
ing.
The income derived from
military bases and expenditures
by thousands of Americans sta-
tioned on the islands have re-
sulted in a new high level of
living for the majority of the
Ryukyuans. However, an unfavor-
able comparison with the stand-
ard of American residents is
frequently made.
Political Situation
Prior to the election of
pro-Communist Senaga as mayor
of Naha, the capital city of
the Ryukyus, in 1956 the polit-
ical scene was relatively
quiet, with the conservatives,
who generally favor American
administration of the islands,
controlling most elective of-
fices. The growing leftist
trend in local elections and
increased agitation for a change
in the administrative policy,
however, has focused attention
on the 16 March elections to
the Ryukyuan legislature, which
are expected to show the degree
to which the strength of the
conservatives has been eroded
by the leftists.
There are no basic differ-
ences between the official plat-
form and policies of the conserv-
ative Ryukyus Democratic party
(RDP) and the moderate left-of-
center Socialist Masses party
(SMP). Consequently, the abil-
ity of either to maintain the
support of its members is based
on personal loyalty to the party
and its leaders rather than on
party policy, Both parties;vig-
orously compete, however, for
control of Ryukyuan politics and
particularly of the legislature.
of Filipino, Japanese, and Amer- ! Of these two parties, the
ican skilled and semiskilled I SMP is more aggressive and bet-
workmen. These wage differen- ; ter organized, with a number of
tials were originally established; able speakers. The RDP, on the
in recognition of the difference other hand, tends to be a
in the skill o- Ryukyuan and j poorly disciplined group of
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individualists of perhaps great-
er sincerity but less political
acumen. The death in October
1956 of the US-appointed Ryu-,
kyuan chief executive, Shuhei
Higa, who was president of the
"'IDP, left the party without ef-
fective leadership and increased
the internal factional struggle.
The subsequent appointment of
Jugo Thoma, an independent, as
chief executive presaged a de-
cline in conservative strength.
A new leftist political
grouping, the Liaison Council
for the Protection of Democracy
(LCPD), which developed during
the recent Naha election con-
tests, has registered as a polit-
ical party and will run candi-
dates for the legislature. This
party unites left-wing elements
of the SMP and the pro-Communist
Okinawa People's party (OPP) and
is designed to camouflage the
Communist -`.es of the leftist
candidates.
organized an Okinawa Socialist
party. In the legislative cam-
paign, Kaneshi is remaining
aloof instead of entering candi-
dates to challenge the estab-
lished political order with his
recently developed strength.
He will probably attempt to or-
ganize the elected leftists
after the voting. Independents
of various political coloration
will run on local issues to cap-
italize on personal loyalties,
and are expected to hold the
balance of power in the legisla-
ture.
The Ryukyuans consider them-
selves Japanese as a result of
their long history as an inte-
gral part of Japan. Continued
cultural ties since World War
II have made the eventual rever-
sion to Japan a basic feature
of Ryukyuan attitudes. The is-
lands have neither the economic
base nor the nationalistic senti-
ment necessary for creation of a
separate state.
The OPP won only one seat
and obtained only 6 percent of
the total vote in the 1956 leg-
islative election. The LCPD,
however, has demonstrated high-
ly efficient electioneering tech-
niques in the Naha area, where
traditional political patterns
have broken down, and the party
probably will be able to expand
its influence outside the urban
area.
Leftist Saichi Kaneshi, who
was elected mayor of Naha by a
coalition of leftist Socialists
and Communists on 12 January, has
The Japanese press has im-
plied that Okinawa could become
another Cyprus. Such a. develop-
ment does not appear likely in
the near future, particularly
since the Ryukyuans are not in-
clined to take violent action
against those in authority.
Nevertheless, failure to satisfy
Ryukyuan grievances and to min-
imize pressures for reversion
could jeopardize relations with
Japan and undermine American
prestige in the Far East.
EGYPTIAN SCHOOLTEACHERS IN AFRICA AND NEAR EAST
Major agents in the Nasir
regime's large-scale cultural
and political penetration effort
in Africa and the Near East have
been Egyptian schoolteachers.
Some 2,500 of them are employed
in more than a. dozen countries
in the area, with their ostensi-
ble role of teaching in many
cases subordinated to a Cairo-
directed program of preaching
the Nasir-type radical
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
nationalism. Nasir has exploit-
ed the urgent need for low-sal-
aried, Arabic-speaking teachers
in these countries, for which
Egypt is the only qualified
source.
Some host governments have
objected to their obvious engage-
ment in political and subversive
action; in other countries, they
have found opportunities for pro-
moting the Egyptian line among
students and youth organizations,
apparently with significant ef-
fect. The growing ultranation,?
alist and anti-imperialist move-
ments throughout Africa and the
Near East have assuredly re-
ceived appreciable assistance
from these Egyptian teachers.
Egypt has long had an edu-
cation program in the Sudan,
stemming from the period when
Britain controlled both coun-
tries. The high level of Egyp-
tian influence in the Sudan
during the Anglo-Egyptian con-
dominium has diminished consid-
erably since Sudanese independ-
ence in 1956, but Egypt's assets
there remain formidable.
There are more than 20 Egyp-
tian schools, with an enrollment
of about 9,000, as well as a.
branch of Cairo University in
Khartoum, with approximately 800
students. In addition, hundreds
of adults study at the "Popular
University," which is sponsored
by Egypt, and more than 1,000
Sudanese are studying in Egypt
on scholarships provided by the
Nasir regime. The American
Embassy in Khartoum estimates
that there are well over 300
Egyptian teachers in the Sudan.
The large amount of pro-Egyptian
feeling among the Sudanese at-
tests to the effectiveness of
the program, although many Suda-
nese recognize Egypt's use of
this educational program for
political purposes.
Ethiopia, Somalia, North Africa
In both Ethiopia and Somalia,
Egypt's penetration effort has
been resisted. Addis Ababa. de-
clared one of Egypt's estimated
12 teachers there persona non
grata in November 1957 because
of his involvement in political
activities against the govern-
ment. In Somalia, the propaganda
activities of Egyptian teachers
0 Targets of Egyptian Cultural Penetration
I EGYPT
RCH 1958
24924
r R.Ci f
/MAL.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
led to the expulsion of four of
them in the fall of 1957. Over
50 remain and these have taken
a new "good-will" approach,
bolstered by Egypt's construc-
tion of a new school and hospi-
tal which are scheduled for com-
pletion in Mogadiscio before
1960.
Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya
have also been penetration tar-
gets. Tunisia, however, reject-
ed an Egyptian offer of 400
teachers made last November, the
Tunisian ambassdor in Cairo
stating that such teachers "gen-
erally become involved in sub-
versive activities." In Morocco
there are 14 Egyptian teachers
on the staff of the Egyptian
Lycde in Rabat, with another 66
spread throughout the country,
mostly in the major population
centers.
In Libya, schools during
the 1956-57 academic year em-
ployed about 400 Egyptians. The
Libyan Government, fully aware
of the propaganda, effort of these
teachers, attempted to find re-
placements in Lebanon during the
summer of 1957. However, Leba-
nese qualified to teach are gen-
erally able to find employment
in more attractive or better-
paying areas, and the Libyan ef-
fort to replace the undesirable
Egyptians was largely unsuccess-
ful.
Hundreds of Nasir's aca-
demic minions are posted through-
out the Asian part of the Arab
world. The chairman of the
Egyptian education mission to
Saudi Arabia. stated in the sum-
mer of 1957, probably with ex-
aggeration,that 500 were sent
to the kingdom during 1956-57,
while another 600 were employed
there under private contracts.
He estimated that during 1957-
58 the number would be increased
by about 100 in each category.
I
Iraq, aware of the danger
from Egyptian teachers, refused
to admit 120 replacements for
those who finished their duties
and were returning home in Octo-
ber 1957. Egyptian newspapers
claimed the Iraqi reluctance
to accept replacements was dic-
tated by the United States
through the Baghdad Pact. There
are at present about 185 Egyp-
tians teaching in Iraq.
In the Persian Gulf states
of Kuwait and Bahrein, Egyptian
teachers have been extremely
active in radical-nationalist
agitation. Nearly 400 are em-
ployed in Kuwait, in addition
to a large number of former
Palestinians who probably are
sympathetic toward the Egyptian
line. Kuwait's total teacher
population is about 1,500, but
the American consul believes the
influence of the Egyptians re-
mains disproportionate to their
numbers.
Just prior to its union
with Egypt on 1 February, Syria
was employing over 500 Egyptian
teachers, according to an offi-
cial in the Ministry of Educa-
tion, with the majority of them
in secondary schools. Syrian
sentiment favoring the Egyptian
cause has been most prevalent
and overt among students, en-
couraged by the teachings of the
Egyptians.
Lebanon, with its relative-
ly high-level educational facil-
ities, has not needed to rely
heavily on Egyptian assistance.
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6 March 1958
Egypt, however, is financing the
construction of a new university
in Beirut which, as a Moslem in-
stitution and a branch of the
University of Cairo, will com-
pete with the American Universi-
ty and the French-sponsored Uni-
versity of St. Joseph.
In Jordan there are only a
negligible number of Egyptians.
The government has maintained
tight restrictions since the
Nasir-backed coup attempt in
April 1957.
Evaluation
In such states as Jordan,
where the government is openly
hostile to Nasir, or where the
need 42or assistance is not
pressing, as in Lebanon, the
Egyptian educational offensive
has little potential. However,
other countries of Africa and
the Near East, seeking the im-
provement of their growing pop-
ulations and lacking adequately
trained nationals, must accept
foreign instructors, and Egypt
is at present the best-prepared
and the most anxious provider.
The magnitude of the Egyptian
effort is largely reflected by
the number of teachers employed,
but this provides a. criterion
of only questionable reliability.
The teachers' influence may be
greater in areas like Syria,
where their numbers are small
relative to the total teaching
body but where historical or
present developments make their
students especially receptive
to their guidance.
The attempts made by such
governments as those of Libya,
Iraq, Tunisia, and Jordan to
forbid the entry of Egyptian
teachers or to decrease their
number indicates an official
conviction that they do possess
a noteworthy subversive poten-
tial as well as an official
sense of helplessness to cope
with the situation. These teach-
ers' presence throughout the
area will undoubtedly continue
to be used by Nasir as a foreign
policy instrument fostering at-
titudes favorable to Egypt and
undermining the popular bases
of those governments not pledg-
ing allegiance to his objec-
tives.
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