CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001600080001-8
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• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 13, 1958
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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WSW
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 16
OCI NO. 0032/58
13 February 1958
DOCUMENT NC). 1~55.
No CHANGE INC 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:,
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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DATEc.RAi4q~r~ HEVIBVER:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS.
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS--
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
25X1
'
He appears to be reluctant
Soviet UN delegate pre-
25X1 to press the issue while the
sides over the Security Council, and has stated public-
ly he would "withdraw his complaint" to the Security
Council if France would accept American mediation.
25X1
EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN UNION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Jordan's King Hussayn and Irpq's Faysal have been
meeting to discuss ways and means of defending their
positions against the pressures developed by the Egyp-
tian-Syrian union. Proclamation of an Iraqi-Jordanian
federation is expected from the meeting. King Saud
did not participate. He and President Chamoun of
Lebanon have notified Hussayn that they cannot delay
recognition of the Egyptian-Syrian union beyond the
21 February plebiscite. Although the USSR has remained
officially silent on the union, TASS has broadcast
25X1 a cautious endorsement.
EAST GERMAN PARTY PURGE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Stalinist East German party boss Walter Ulbricht
has purged three leading Communists and has survived
the most serious challenge thus far to his leadership,
but the opposition has not yet been quelled. The
ousted men had advocated a more moderate approach to
the country's political and economic problems; for
this they were charged with opportunism, revisionism,
and ideological shortsightedness. The Kremlin con-
tinues its support of Ulbricht and the repressive
policies he personifies, probably in the belief that
any relaxation in East Germany would be interpreted
by the peoples of Eastern Europe as a sign of weakness
which could set off a chain reaction of demands for
25X1 further liberalization.
TUNISIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
President Bourguiba has managed to keep the in-
tense Tunisian indignation over the French bombing on
8 February of a border villa a u?:dder control,
AL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
PART I (continued)
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The Indonesian central government's strong rejec-
tion of the 10 February demand of Sumatran dissidents
for the resignation of the Djuanda cabinet appears to
have intensified already existing disunity among the
rebels. The central government may attempt to exploit
this disunity by sending some troops to areas where
foreign economic interests are concentrated. Pres-
ident Sukarno is expected to return to Djakarta by 16
February, and further definite steps probably will a-
wait his arrival. The formation of a new cabinet or
the reshuffle of the present one seems probable.
25X1
PEIPING'S PROPOSAL ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS IN KOREA . . . . . Page 6
Peiping's offer to "break the deadlock" between
East and West in Korea by discussing with the North
Koreans the withdrawal of Chinese forces appears to
be the opening maneuver in a major diplomatic and
propaganda campaign to get UN troops out of South
Korea. Chou En-lai, who has advanced his scheduled
trip to Pyongyang from next spring to this month,
will head the highest Chinese Communist delegation
ever to visit North Korea. While Chou is in Korea,
the Communists may well announce Peiping's willing-
ness to withdraw Chinese forces if the UN forces
25X1 also leave.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CHINESE COMMUNIST CABINET SHAKE-UP . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Chou En-lai's replacement as foreign minister by
Chen Yi is the most noteworthy move in a reshuffle of
the Chinese Communist Government which has abolished
eight cabinet-level organizations "in the interest of
greater efficiency" and affected ten others. Chou
retains the-post of premier, however, and the move
does not indicate he has slipped from his number-three
position in Peiping's hierarchy. Chou's decision to
step down is probably intended to lighten the burden
of routine business and conserve his energy for polit-
ical fence-mendinz with "I the Chinese Communist
25X1 party,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
PART II (continued)
CHEN YI: PEIPING'S NEW FOREIGN MINISTER . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Chen Yi, Peiping's new foreign minister, probably
will be somewhat less competent than his predecessor,
Chou En-lai. Essentially Chen will continue to be--
as he has been for the past four years--a spokesman
for Chou. While Chen is regarded as socially adept,
it is doubtful he has Chou's skill as a negotiator or
25X1 his capacity for work.
KHRUSHCHEV CONGRATULATES SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA . . . . . . Page 3
Khrushchev dominated a large Kremlin reception
given on 8 February by party and government leaders
for outstanding members of the Soviet intelligentsia.
He radiated satisfaction with recent achievements of
Soviet intellectuals in the fields of science, culture,
and education, and implied that "revisionist manifes-
tations" are a thing of the past,.since the intellectuals
have heeded the friendly counsel-of the party. However,
the campaign to isolate and "reform" remaining dissidents
will undoubtedly continue.
STABILITY IN MIDDLE ECHELONS OF.SOVIET PARTY REVEALED .,.... Page 4
Republic party congresses anu regional conferences
held throughout the Soviet Union during January and Feb-
ruary reveal a fairly stable situation in the middle
echelons of the Soviet Communist party. Such changes
as were made in the provincial party leadership were
prompted primarily by economic considerations. The
majority of personnel shifts have taken place in Kazakh-
stan, where the 1957 harvest from the virgin lands failed
25X1 to meet expectations.,
SOVIET RESEARCH IN CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR REACTIONS . . Page 5
25X1
The USSR has for several years been conducting
research on controlling thermonuclear reactions. The
program is in the hands of competent scientists and
technicians who have adequate equipment, facilities,
and financial support. Soviet progress thus far is
probably on a par with that in the West, and the USSR
is likely to reach the goal of harnessing hydrogen
fusion at about the same time as the West. 25X1
YUGOSLAVS AGAIN STRESS ADVANTAGES OF TITO'S COMMUNISM . . Page 6
Apparently as a prelude to the seventh congress
of the Yugoslav Communist party scheduled for April,
Belgrade has again begun to stress the superiority of
the Yugoslav road to socialism. This could exacerbate
ideological differences with Moscow and upset the Yugo-
slav-Soviet modus vivendi.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
PART II (continued)
SOVIET BLOC PLANS FOR ECONOMIC INTEGRATION . . . . . . . . Page 7
The Soviet bloc Council for Mutual Economic Assist-
ance (CEMA) is becoming an important factor in Soviet
bloc economic activity for the first time since its in-
ception in 1949. At a CEMA meeting in December 1957, it
was agreed that members would coordinate their economic
planning for a 15-year period beginning in 1960, leading
ultimately to the development of an integrated bloc
economy. Last December at least eight CEMA conferences
were held dealing with specialization of production and
the use of common industrial standards 25X1
BULGARIAN REGIME REPRESSES UNRULY YOUTHS . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Incidents of "hooliganism," a plague in all the
satellites, flared up in Bulgaria in late January and
evoked severe countermeasures by the regime. Two hooli-
gans are to be shot for,the murder of a young worker,
and thousands of juvenile delinquents have been deported
from Sofia and other Bulgarian cities to "places of work"
in the countryside. The regime apparently is planning a
concentrated effort, possibly involving police terror
tactics, to control its youths.
FLOW OF REFUGEES FROM EAST GERMANY . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The flow of refugees from East Germany continued
at a high level in 1957, when more than 261,000 East
Germans asked for asylum in West Germany. While the
total figure is not a record high, an unprecedented
number of youths of military age escaped, as did large
numbers of persons with skills and training important
to the East German economy. The recent purge in the
East German Communist party leadership and the expected
hardening of domestic policies will probably result in
an increase in the refugee flow unless border controls
are tightened.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
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PART II (continued)
THE ARGENTINE ELECTIONS OF 23 FEBRUARY . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
In Argentina's first presidential campaign since
the overthrow of Peron, Arturo Frondizi, the demagogic
leader of the Intransigent Radical party, now leads
the field of candidates as a result of last-minute sup-
port from Peronista groups and from.the Communists.
This situation is likely to cause unrest and plotting
among ultraconservative military elements. President
Aramburu still appears, however, to have decisive
military backing for his promise to turn over power on
1 May to whatever government is elected on 23 February.
25X1
KENYA . . . . . . . . . . .
25X1
. . . . Page 13
Mounting African agitation for rapid political
advancement has caused a deterioration in the political
and security situation in the British colony of Kenya
in recent weeks. The government, alarmed by rising
tension and a series of disruptive events, has in-
creased its vigilance and taken a number of repressive
countermeasures. The Kenya police commissioner be-
lieves imposition of martial law may eventually become
necessary.
25X1
PAKISTAN'S GOVERNMENT COALITION MAY BE THREATENED . . . . Page 14
The budget session of Pakistan's National As-
sembly opening on 17 February may see attempts by
those outside the governing coalition, probably sup-
ported by President Mirza, to break up Prime Minister
Noon's two-month-old government. Noon's government
now appears to have a comfortable margin of supporters,
but loyalties can shift rapidly once the parliamentary
maneuvering begins. F77 I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
PART II (continued)
THE PHILIPPINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Since beginning his new term last December,
Philippine President Garcia has been occupied pri-
marily with pressing economic problems. In the pol-
itical area, he has moved slowly, but an undercurrent
of difficulties with Congress has developed. No firm
steps have been taken to find a solution of out-
standing issues, such as the suspended ne otiations
over American bases. F7 r
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET INDUSTRIAL REORGANI-
ZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Khrushchev-engineered industrial reorgani-
zation, still in its early stages, apparently has not
yet succeeded in significantly paring the number of
Soviet industrial administrators. Many of the hun-
dreds of thousands of such personnel from the abol-
ished ministries have remained in Moscow and other
major cities, and the regional councils of national
economy (sovnarkhozy) are being staffed largely by
local personnel. Identifications to date of top
sovnarkhoz officials show that experienced industrial
managers, rather than party careerists, have received
most of the council chairmanships. A considerably
strengthened regional party apparatus and a revamped
State Planning Commission are combating the problem
AFGHANISTAN'S DEBT TO THE SOVIET BLOC . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Afghanistan probably has committed Soviet bloc
funds amounting to about $54,000,000 since 1954.
Under the Soviet $100,000,000 credit extended in
January 1956,the Afghan Government in 1957 committed
approximately $11,000,000 for construction on three
large undertakings. At least $2,000,000 had been used
for three relatively small construction contracts and
20 project surveys in 1956. The government has also
used about $41,000,000 under several minor bloc cred-
its extended in 1954, the Soviet arms agreement of
1956, and a Czech arms agreement.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
PART III (continued)
OUTLOOK FOR THE WEST INDIES FEDERATION . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The new West Indies Federation formed on 3 January,
which will hold its first parliamentary elections next
month, faces major tests of economic and political sta-
bility before it can attain its ultimate goal of inde-
pendence within the Commonwealth. As a whole, the ten
constituent colonies lack natural resources to support
their 3,000,000 people. Jamaica sees its relative pros-
perity threatened by the planned customs union, and the
sense of common interest is so little developed through-
out the colonies that most prominent politicians refuse
to surrender local office to run for federal posts.
Difficulties in its relations with the United States
are possible as a result of the federation's request
for the US naval base on Trinidad as the site for its
capital.
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA . .
. Page 12
One of the most difficult problems facing the ' Inter-
national Conference on the Law of the Sea, to begin in
Geneva on 24 February under UN sponsorship, will concern
the limit of territorial water over which a state has full
sovereignty. Conflicting interests have long given rise
to numerous disputes in this sphere, most recently in-
volving the waters of the Soviet Union, Indonesia, Iceland,
and the Gulf of Aqaba. The conference at Geneva will also
attempt to draw up agreements on numerous other aspects of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
x':>nch bombing on 8
February of t Ae Tunisian bor-
der village of Sakiet Sidi
Youssef has aroused a storm of
protest throughout the Moslem
and Asian worlds. Heavy empha-
sis is given to the allegation
that the action, which destroyed
three fourths of the village
and resulted in some 70 dead
and over 100 wounded, is a typ-
ical act of colonialist aggres-
sion and to the fact that 17 of
the 25 French aircraft involved
in the air strike were manufac-
tured in' the United States.
The call of Algerian rebel
spokesman Mohamed Yazid for the
closing of American bases
throughout North Africa will
find a ready echo among nation-
alist extremists in Morocco and
to a lesser extent in Libya.
Although some Tunisians
have staged demonstrations and
called for arms to use against
the French, President Bourguiba
has kept the local situation
under control. Precautionary
measures--including the expul-
sion of 150 French residents
from three border provinces
where tension is particularly
high--are being taken to assure
the safety of the 90,000 French
nationals who reside in Tunisia.
At the same time, Tunis has
used the incident to interfere
with France's long-term inter-
ests in the country by asking
Paris to close four of its ten
consulates.
French officials in Tunis
are seeking comfort from the
fact that Bourguiba has not yet
presented a formal demarche to
Paris that all French troops--
some 25,000 army, air, and
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navy personnel which are con-
fined to their bases--be evac-
uated. Since 8 February, how-
ever, Bourguiba has repeatedly
publicly demanded their with-
drawal and in effect has re-
tracted his offer of the Bizerte
base to France which he made
last December.
Despite a reluctance to
press the issue while Soviet
delegate Sobolev presides over
the UN Security Council, Tunisia
has announced it will soon ask
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
for Security Council action.
Bourguiba plans to ask the coun-
cil to order all French forces
to leave Tunisia. He would
withhold his appeal if Paris
would publicly declare an in-
tent to pull its forces out of
Tunisia and begin by removing
its troops now in southern Tuni-
cia _
On 13 February he announce
that he would "withdraw his
complaint to the Security
Council" if France accepted
American mediation.
Premier Gaillard appears
largely concerned with appeas-
ing his rightist support which
insists on a firm stand against
any position implying France is
at fault. He is unlikely to
agree to withdraw from Bizerte.
Paris has offered to negotiate
"all issues" with Bourguiba,
but there is little likelihood
of any major concessions--
particularly through the UN--
at this time. The Tunisian
President, faced with mounting
criticism at home and abroad
that he has been too lenient 25X1
with France, is unlikely to
modify his position. 1 -1
EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN UNION
Talks in Amman between
Jordan's King Hussayn and Iraq's
King Faysal were scheduled to
end on 13 or 14 February with
a proclamation of a "federa-
tion" between their two coun-
tries. The federation, which
the Kings hope will be a. bar-
rier to the pressures develop-
ing against them from the Egyp-
tian-Syrian "United Arab Repub-
lic" (UAR), is to be a much
looser association than the one
between Cairo and Damascus. It
had been hoped that King Saud
might be persuaded to join, but
Saud's attitude remains uncer-
tain except that he has informed
Hussayn that he cannot delay
recognizing the UAR beyond 21
February, the date of the plebi-
scite.to elect Nasir as its
head.
dissidents supported by Egypt
and Syria is still unclear.
A psychological
move which might put more pres-
sure on Zfu.ssayn, especially
where the Palestine refugees
in West Jordan are concerned,
would be the proclamation in
Gaza of a new Palestine govern-
ment which would promptly join
Nasir's United Arab Republic.
The precise nature of the
threat Jordan might face from
Lebanese President Chamoun,
fearful of the emotional and
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13 February 1958
economic attraction of Egyptian-
Syrian union, especially for
Le".canon's Moslem population, has
urged Hussayn to hasten the
federation of Iraq and Jordan
as a counterweight. At the
same time, he too has notified
Hussayn that Lebanon cannot de-
lay recognition of the UAR after
21 February; this may entail
the resignation of strongly
pro-Western Foreign Minister
Malik and probably would signal
the beginning of a trend of
Lebanese policy toward accom-
modation with Cairo and Damas-
cus. Syrian President Quwatli
has already stated cryptically
that the UAR is the best "guar-
antee" of Lebanon's borders,
and has urged Lebanese adherence,
In Cairo, talks have con-
tinued between the Egyptians
and Yemeni representatives
headed by Crown Prince Badr.
Several observers have comment-
ed that the Yemenis obviously
do not know what they are doing,
and Nasir is reported to be
wary of assuming still another
burden in. addition to Syria's
problems.
These problems are probably
very much with the Egyptian
leader, since decisions must
be made soon on the major posts
to be occupied in the new UAR
political and military structure.
Nasir is said to have been sur-
prised by the sudden departure
of Syrian Communist party leader
Bakdash for the USSR, on the
ground that nothing had been
done yet to make him flee. At
least one roundup of local Com-
munists has been reported from
Damascus, however, although the
Communist press there is still.
fighting a kind of rear-guard
propaganda battle against the
temporarily triumphant Baath-
ists.
Nasir probably remains
concerned that the USSR not
receive the impression that his
moves are being made at Western
inspiration. Although the USSR
has remained officially silent,
TASS has broadcast a cautious
endorsement. Chinese Communist
Premier Chou En-lai and the
Eastern European press have
given the UAR a warmer welcome.
The USSR therefore probably
is preparing to recognize
the new state soon after Nasir
is formall roclaimed resi-
dent .
Stalinist East German party
boss Walter Ulbricht has purged
three leading Communists and
has survived the most serious
challenge thus far to his lead-
ership, but the opposition has
not yet been quelled. The oust-
ed men had advocated a more
moderate approach to the coun-
try's political and economic
problems; for this they were
charged with opportunism,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
25X1
revisionism, and ideological
shortsightedness. The Kremlin
continues its support of Ul-
bricht and the repressive poli-
cies he personifies, probably
in the belief that any relaxa-
tion in East Germany would be
interpreted by the peoples of
Eastern Europe as a sign of
weakness which could set off a
chain reaction of demands for
further liberalization.
East German domestic poli-
cies will be even harsher as
a result of Ulbricht's victory.
New bard-line policies--which
include an upward revision of
work norms, greater emphasis
on heavy industry at the ex-
pense of consumer goods,
ULBRICHT SUPPORT IN S ED
POLITBURO
PRO-ULBRICHT
Ulbricht
Stoph
Ebert
Neumann
U lbricht
Neumann
Honecker
Mueckenberger
Verner
Froehlich
Grueneberg
OPPOSITION
Schirdewan
Oelssner
Rau
Grotewohl
Pieck*
Matern
Hager
Norden
Schirdewan
PURGED
NEW APPOINTMENTS
*Ineffective because
of illness.
pressures on farmers and inde-
pendent artisans to collecti-
vize, intensified attacks on
the church, and further re-
strictions on personal freedoms--
are likely to heighten popular
unrest. Furthermore, the ex-
pected purge of other persons
suspected of anti-Ulbricht
leanings at all levels of the
Socialist Unity (Communist)
party (SED) will undoubtedly
serve to aggravate existing
tensions within the party.
At the party central com-
mittee's 35th plenum--held
from 3 to 6 February after
three postponements forced by
sharp disagreements with the
party leadership over Ulbricht's
policies--Karl Schirdewan,the
party's number-two man, was
ousted from all his party posts
and from the central committee.
Former leading theoretician
Fred Oelssner was removed from
the politburo, and former State
Security Minister Ernst Woll-
weber was expelled from the
central committee.
Schirdewan, Woll.weber, "and
others" were accused of attempt-
ing to form a faction which
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13 February 1958
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would have changed the party
line, of holding "revisionist"
views and "faulty ideological
interpretations," and of oppos-
ing Ulbricht on fundamental
issues. It was charged that if
their ideas on the Polish and
Hungarian developments in 1956
had been followed, there would
have been "counterrevolutionary
actions which would have had to
be beaten by armed forces."
Woliweber was specifically ac-
cused of neglecting his duties
as state security minister and
of attempting to recruit party
members for the Schirdewan
faction.
Oelssner was absolved of
association with the Schirde-
wan-Woliweber group. He was
charged with favoring an in-
crease of trade with the West
rather than with the bloc, with
opportunistic distorting of the
party's agricultural policy,
and with opposing Ulbricht's
government decentralization
scheme. His crimes also in-
cluded "repeated violations of
the discipline of the polit-
buro and refusal to conform to
the collective /wi117 of the
politburo."
The central committee also
elected loyal Ulbricht adher-
ents to top party posts. Sec-
retariat member Alfred Neumann
was raised from candidate mem-
ber to full member of the polit-
buro, and politburo candidate
Erich Honecker was named to the
party secretariat. Two obscure
party functionaries, first sec-
retaries of district party
organizations, were promoted to
the party secretariat. Erich
Apel, minister for heavy ma-
chine construction, was named
to head an economic commission
of the politburo.
0
unfavorable reactions may
be expected in important
districts where Schirdewan has
many supporters.
Many party functionaries be-
lieve the purge has only started,
and there are indications that
another party meeting will be
held soon, possibly to continue
the purge. Some party officials
believe that others destined to
be purged are Culture Minister
Becher, Deputy Prime Minister
Fritz Selbmann, and Prime Minis-
ter Otto Grotewohi. The govern-
ment announced on 12 February
that Grotewohi had left Berlin
for "a health cure" of several
weeks, touching off rumors that
he has already been purged.
Ulbricht will probably try to
eliminate all opposition elements
before the fifth party congress
scheduled for July, at which time
the entire membership of the cen-
tral committee will be elected
and a new politburo named.
Moscow was probably motivated
in its decision to support Ul-
bricht by a desire to reiterate
to the satellites the importance
of party unity, a theme that has
been emphasized in Kremlin pro-
nouncements for nearly a year,
particularly at the meeting of
Communist leaders in Moscow
last November.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
INDONESIA
The 10 February broadcast
of Lt. Col. Hussein demanding
that the Djuanda cabinet resign
within five days was rejected
the following day by Djakarta.
The Djuanda government further
countered by announcing the dis-
honorable discharge of dissident
Colo-eels Hussein, Djambek, Sim-
bolon, and Lubis. Army Chief
of Staff General Nasution has
personally assumed formal re-
sponsibility for the Central
Sumatran command of Hussein.
0
Lt. Col. Bar Tian in South
Sumatra, who has cooperated ex-
tensively with the dissidents
but has steadily refused to sup-
port the declaration of a rival
government, may assume the role
of intermediary between Central
Sumatra and the Djakarta govern-
ment. Barlian made an appeal
on 13 February from Palembang
for a peaceful settlement and
negotiations "inspired by toler-
ance." His plea followed bel-
ligerent statements from both
Nasution in Djakarta and dis-
sident Colonel Djambek in Padang,
Central Sumatra.
Barlian's statement may al-
so be related to reports that
Djakarta may send limited num-
bers of troops to disaffected
areas where foreign economic in-
texrests are concentrated. Al-
though the government's reported
move probably is intended to en-
sure continued foreign remit-
tances to Djakarta, the presence
of Javanese troops could provoke
isolated incidents, possibly
leading to localized conflict.
A period of political and mili-
tary maneuvering is probable,
however, with all factions hop-
ing to avoid violence.
President Sukarno is ex-
pected to return to Djakarta on
16 February.
Hatta, to whom dissidents
and non-Communists generally have
looked to guide them out of pres-
ent economic and political con-
fusion, has stated he does not
want to participate in a succes-
sor to the D'u nda cabinet.
PEIPING'S PROPOSAL ON TROOP WITHDRAWALS IN KOREA
Peiping's offer of 7 Feb-
ruary to "break the deadlock"
between the East and West in
Korea by discussing with the
North Korean regime the with-
drawal of Chinese troops is in-
tended to put renewed pressure
on the UN command--particularly
the United States--to make cor-
responding withdrawals of forces
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUNZARY
13 February 1958
from the South. The Communists
probably plan to exploit the
Chinese offer in a major diplo-
matic and propaganda campaign
which will stress their initia-
tive in contrast with the Ameri-
can "refusal" to take similar
action with the South Korean
Government,
Peiping has sent copies of
its offer to member governments
of the Neutral Nations Super-
visory Commission and Britain,
which was asked to transmit
them to nations participating
in the UN Command. Chou En-tai
carried the campaign one step
further When he declared at the
National People's Congress on
10 February that Communist China
NORTH KOREAN 333,000
CHINESE COMMUNIST 291,000
TOTAL 624,000
SOUTH KOREAN 613,000
UNITED STATES 55,496
OTHER UNITED NATIONS 5,728
TOTAL 674,224
13 FEBRUARY 1958 80212
will "take the initiative" in
promoting withdrawals.
The Communist campaign was
timed to provide a contrast to
recent combined UN-South Korean
military maneuvers and the in-
troduction of 280-mm. atomic
cannon and rockets in the South.
Peiping is apparently moving
with some urgency. Premier Chou
En-lai's trip to North Korea,
originally planned for April or
May, was advanced to mid-Feb-
ruary, probably after conclu-
sion of the National People's
Congress now meeting in Peiping.
Chou's entourage will include
Foreign Minister Chen Yi and
Chief of Staff Su Yu, the high-
est-level Chinese delegation
ever to visit North Korea.
At Pyongyang, Chou may an-
nounce an agreement on Chinese
withdrawal in a, formulation made
contingent on parallel departure
of UN forces. Chou could also
announce token withdrawals of
Chinese forces to support Pei-
ping's gesture of "initiative."
In view of current Communist
propaganda calling for "simul-
taneous" withdrawal of UN and
Chinese forces, it seems un-
likely Chou will announce uni-
lateral withdrawal of all Chi-
nese troops.
The Communists seem to be-
lieve that the withdrawal of
some Chinese troops from North
Korea would not turn the mili-
tary balance in favor of the
South Koreans, Since 1953 the
North Korean Army, with consid-
erable Soviet aid, has steadily
improved its capability. Al-
though the army totals 333,000
as against 613,000 South Korean
troops, it has overwhelming
firepower, superiority in heavy
artillery, and its air force in-
cludes 445 jet fighters and 75
IL-28 jet light bombers, com-
pared with South Korea's 80 jet
fighter-bombers. If called on
to offset any imbalance in'
forces, the Chinese could move
down from Manchuria at least
250,000 troops within 8 to 14
days.
In the South, President
Rhee might regard UN and Chi-
nese Communist withdrawals as
increasing his own freedom of
action, but would seek to pre-
vent UN withdrawals until he
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13 February 1958
receives "modern" weapons.
Last summer, Rhee advocated
withdrawal of all foreign
troops because "they keep us
divided," but his statement
was apparently not intended to
imply a basic change in South
Korean policy, which insists
that UN troop withdrawals
should follow the withdrawal
of all Chinese forces and the
holding of UN-supervised elec-
tions in the North.
The launching of the Com-
munist campaign comes at a
SECRET
time when Moscow is pressing
the West for a summit confer-
ence. The Russians themselves
have not sought to include a
Far East item on the agenda
for such a conference. How-
ever, the reopening of the Ko-
rean problem by Peiping pro-
vides the USSR with a bargain-
ing point in its efforts to
get the West to modify its de-
mands for inclusion of the Ger-
man issue and the status
of the Eastern European satel-
lites in summit talks.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 3 ' Eli
13 February 1958
NOTES AND COMMENTS
CHINESE COMMUNIST CABINET SHAKE-UP
Chou En-lai's resignation
as foreign minister, a post he
had held concurrently with the
premiership since 1949, is the
most noteworthy move in a re-
shuffle of the Chinese Commu-
nist Government which has abol-
ished eight cabinet-level or-
ganizations and affected ten
others. Chou's decision to
lighten his burden--which he
hinted at as long ago as Novem-
ber 1956--does not indicate he
has slipped from his position
as number-three man in the Pei-
ping hierarchy. Rather, it may
mean he foresees the development
of a more fluid situation in
Peiping and is taking precau-
tions.
Chou's move appears de-
signed primarily to relieve the
pressure under which he has been
operating for the past nine
years and to conserve his ener-
gy for political fence-mending
inside the Chinese Communist par-
ty. Chou,who reportedly works
an average 14-hour day and has
sometimes been ill, probably
has been forced to slight party
affairs for several years.
With Mao Tse-tung aging,
Chou now may want more time
available for work in his party
job as a member of the polit-
buro standing committee, the
core of party power. Chou may
mean to ensure that he gets a
"proper" share in any division
of powers with Liu Shao-chi and
Teng Hsiao-ping--who rank re-
spectively just before and just
after Chou among Mao's chief
lieutenants.
The present drive to
"streamline" the governmental
machinery may have been a factor
in the timing of Chou's move.
The bureaucracy is an important
buttress to his power, and Chou
would almost certainly prefer
to keep the job of tinkering
with it in his own hands, More
than 800,000 middle- and low-
level functionaries have already
been reassigned or downgraded.
Cabinet-level changes announced
on 11 February at the National
People's Congress have abolished
the National Construction Com-
mission, a special-purpose body
responsible for coordinating
the construction plans and ac-
tivities of all industrial min-
istries, and done away with sev-
en ministries by consolidating
their operations in the inter-
est of greater efficiency. The
status of some cabinet officials
is in doubt, including that of
some party men with standing
at and near the central commit-
tee level.
There are no indications
that Chou's status has suffered.
Chou has apparently been on the
right side--i.e., Mao's side--
in major policy disputes in the
party during the past year. The
resignation--announced as being
on Chou's initiative--came the
day after he delivered a major
foreign policy speech at the
National People's Congress on
10 February. The new foreign
minister, Chen Yi, was probably
his personal choice for the job.
Moreover, Chou retains his post
as premier and thus directs
the Foreign Ministry.
It is expected that Chinese
Communist foreign policy will
follow the line set by Chou in
his 10 February speech, during
which he affirmed Peiping's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
confidence that political and
scientific advances by the bloc
have brought-it "supremacy"
over the West and promised con-
tinued close alignment with
Moscow. Chou pledged to con-
tinue Peiping's efforts to ex-
CHEN YI: PEIPING'S
Marshal Chen Yi, Peiping's
new foreign minister, probably
will be somewhat less competent
than his predecessor, Chou En-
lai. Chen in this post will
continue to be a spokesman for
Chou.
Chen, now about 57, was
close to Chou in the early days
of the Chinese Communist move-
ment. He rose as a military
leader under Mao Tse-tung, and
was also associated with Liu
Shao-chi, now Mao's first lieu-
tenant. Chen made his reputa-
tion in operations against the
Japanese and the Chinese Nation-
alists in the period 1938-1949,
although some military observ-
ers have suspected that most
of the credit belonged to his
deputy, Su Yu, now chief of
staff.
With the Communist occupa-
tion of Shanghai in 1949, Chen
became mayor of that city, while
retaining his posts as command-
er of the Third Field Army and
second secretary of the party's
East China Bureau. He became
first secretary of that bureau
in 1952 and visited the USSR
in the same year.
With the dissolution of
the field armies in 1954, Chen
was brought to Peiping as a
vice premier under Chou. Since
that time, Chen has appeared to
be'primarily a utility man for
Chou, acting for him in a varie-
ty of foreign and domestic mat-
ters. He visited Eastern Europe
in 1954, accompanied Chou to
pand its influence through Asia
and the Middle East, violently
rejected the "two Chinas" con-
cept, and offered to take the
"initiative" in the removal of
foreign troops from Korea.
NEW FOREIGN MINISTER
Bandung in 1955, and gave his
first major address on inter-
national relations at the Chi-
nese Communist party's eighth
congress in September 1956. He
was named to the party polit-
buro at that time.
Chen was ill in late 1956
and the early part of 1957, but
has been active since then. Dur-
ing his convalescence, he pro-
duced an article on the history
of Communist-Nationalist co-
operation. One factor in Chen's
appointment as foreign minister
may be a belief that Chen would
be more suitable than Chou for
renewed overtures to the National-
ists on the status of Taiwan.
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"no 7
13 February 1958
Chen may be less doctri-
nai.re than most other Chinese
ers regard him as unreliable.
Indeed, Peiping may hope to ex-
ploit this feature of Chen's
reputation, together with his
Communist leaders. Twice in
1957 he published articles sug-
gesting that it had been--and
still was--hard for him to mas-
ter the Communist world view.
However, Chen's appointment to
the foreign minister's post
would seem to dispose of any
suspicion that other party lead-
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social assets, in dealing with
Western officials.
Khrushchev dominated a
large Kremlin reception given
on 8 February by party and gov-
ernment leaders for outstanding
members of the Soviet intelli-
gentsia. He radiated satisfac-
tion with recent achievements
of Soviet intellectuals in the
fields of science, culture, and
education, and implied that
"revisionist manifestations"
are a thing of the past since
"It is true that individual writers had cer-
tain hesitations. During frank talks at the previ-
ous reception (in ! y 1957), we advised these com-
rades to sweep aside false conceptions, to think
critically about the fabrications of revisionists,
and to examine life more deeply in order to under-
stand the Soviet reality and its natural laws. . . .
"It is pleasant to note that our writers have
correctly understood the contents of that talk and
have taken an active part in the struggle of the
party against any manifestations of revisionism. The
writers have rallied still closer around the Comru-
nist party."
the intellectuals have heeded
the counsel of the party. How-
ever, the campaign to isolate
and "reform" the remaining dis-
sidents will undoubtedly con-
tinue.
The opening address at the
reception was delivered by par-
ty secretary Suslov, who ap-
parently bears at least partial
responsibility for the regime's
ideological and cultural policy.
Following Khrushchev's speech,
toasts were offered to specific
sectors of the intelligentsia
by Bulganin, Pospelov, Mikoyan,
Suslov, and Voroshilov. The
toasts were accepted by leading
intellectuals representing their
fields, each of whom expressed
gratitude for, in the words of
composer Dmitri Shostakovich,
"the daily fatherly, attentive,
and true guidance" of the party
and government.
In contrast with his talks
to writers and artists during
the past spring and summer, when
he remonstrated with them for
works produced during 1956 and
early 1957 which "blackened"
Soviet society, Khrushchev men-
tioned the intellectual waver-
ings of last year only in pass-
ing.. For the scientists, who--
Khrushchev says--made the Rus-
sian word "sputnik" part of the
world vocabulary, there is noth-
ing but praise.
Khrushchev congratulated
the Soviet intelligentsia for
its "high ideological maturity"
and its ability to profit from
party criticism. He called for
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13. February 1958
greater attention to contempo-
rary themes, especially in the-
ater repertoires, and reaffirmed
the need for an "optimistic ap-
proach" to art, i.e., "socialist
realism."
Although Khrushchev and
the top leadership apparently
feel confident enough at this
time to talk only of successes,
daily criticism and correction
of recalcitrants will continue
to be carried on by reliable
editors of cultural and profes-
sional journals and lesser par-
ty spokesmen. In this way, rath-
er than by a general edict,
the regime continues to restrain
intellectuals, from interpreting
too freely the post-Stalin re-
laxation in cultural policy.
F__ I
STABILITY IN MIDDLE ECHELONS OF SOVIET PARTY REVEALED
Republic party congresses
and regional conferences held
throughout the Soviet Union dur-
ing January and February reveal
a fairly stable situation in the
middle echelons of the Soviet
Communist party. Such changes
as were made in the provincial
party leadership were prompted
primarily by economic considera-
tions. The majority of person-
nel shifts have taken place in
Kazakhstan, where the 1957 har-
vest from the virgin lands
failed to meet expectations.
Regular biennial Communist
party congresses were'held dur-
ing January and February in the
Soviet republics of Latvia,
Estonia, Lithuania, "Armenia,
Moldavia, Turkmenistan, Tad-
zhikistan, Azerbaydzhan, and
Georgia. The average rate of
turnover among members of the
republic central committees was
approximately 25 percent--about
normal for a two-year period--
and apparently all party bosses
--first secretaries--of these
republics have been re-elected.
The only significant per-
sonnel shifts which figured in
the party congresses occurred
in the agricultural republics
of Moldavia and Turkmenistan,
where top government leaders
were removed, apparently as a
result of economic shortcomings.
In Moldavia, Gerasim Rud, a
candidate member of the all-
union party central committee
was replaced as premier and
dropped from the party bureau
just prior to the congress. He
was replaced by Aleksandr
Diorditsa, a deputy Premier and
former minister of finance.
Balysh Ovezov was similarly re-
placed as premier on the eve of
the Turkmen party congress, at
which he was severely criticized
and dropped from the bureau of
the central committee. His suc-
cessor is Dzhuma Karayev, for-
mer party first secretary of
Tashauz Oblast in the Turkmen
Republic.
In lieu of republic con-
gresses in the larger Soviet
republics--the RSFSR, the U-
kraine, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Belorussia, and Kirgiziya--
some 60 party conferences have
thus far been held in the oblast
and territorial subdivisions of
these republics. With the ex-
ception of Kazakhstan, there was
no indication that Moscow was
seriously dissatisfied with the
direction of local party affairs.
The conferences produced a normal
amount of turnover in the party
committees and were followed by
the re-election of the local
leadership.
In Kazakhstan, a gener-
al overhaul of local party
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CURRENT' INTELLIGENCE' WEEKLY SURY
13 February-.1958
organizations has thus far re-
sulted in shifts of seven ob-
last party first secretaries.
Such changes were to be expected
in view of the replacement un-
der criticism in December of
Kazakh party leader Yakovlev
by Nikolay Belyayev, one of
Khrushchev's top lieutenants on
the Soviet party presidium and
an agricultural specialist. The
changes in Kazakhstan were at-
tributed to the republic's.fail-
ure to meet the 1957 economic
goals-levied on it by Moscow.
The Kazakh Gosplan chairman
stated at a recent session of
the republic Supreme Soviet
that in the previous year the
republic had not fulfilled its
grain delivery plan, a failure
not entirely caused, he said,
by unfavorable weather condi-
tions. He added that where
good organization existed and
leaders showed concern, har-
vests had not been too bad.
SOVIET RESEARCH IN CONTROLLED THERMONUCLEAR REACTIONS
Soviet scientists have for
several years been conducting
research on controlling thermo-
nuclear, reactions. Technical re-
ports released by the USSR and
statements made by Soviet sci-
entists indicate that the pro-
gram is probably comparable to,
and possibly more extensive
than, that in the United States,
and that the Russians have made
significant progress in this
field.
The first information on
the Soviet program came from the
Soviet physicist I. V. Kurchatov.
In a lecture at Harwell, Eng-
land, in April 1956, he described
experiments involving the study
of high current discharges in
gases,, ,and gave the result of,
these `experiment s.' He said-the
research was based on a study of
.the so-called "pinch effect,"
or contraction of ionized gas
(plasma) under the influence of
self--induced magnetic fields.
He said also that a temperature
of about .1,000,000 degrees cen-
tigrade had been obtained and
neutrons observed. Statements
by Soviet scientists later in
1956 and early 1957 revealed
that at that time they considered
this approach at a dead end,
probably because of an inherent
instability in the "pinch
effect."
Western scientists, at an
international meeting at Venice
in mid-1957, reported stabilized
"pinches" and the methods for
obtaining them. These methods
permitted American?and British
scientists to obtain their re-
cently annouhced successes in
their controlled thermonuclear
reaction research. These revela-
tions certainly provided the
Russians with information which
would have permitted them to re-
orient their work on the '"pinch."
Thus the Soviet program is
probably'following a pattern.
very much like that of the United
States. American '..scientists,
having studied Soviet techniYca'1
reports and having talked with
Soviet scientists, have con-
cluded that the Soviet program
is in the hands of competent
scientists and technicians who
have adequate equipment, facili-
ties, and financial support.
Soviet progress thus far is prob-
ably on a par with that in the
West, and the USSR is likely
to reach the goal of harnessing
hydrogen fusion at about the
same time as the West.
(Prepared by OSI)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
YUGOSLAVS AGAIN STRESS ADVANTAGES OF TITO'S COMMUNISM
Recent Yugoslav emphasis
on the advantages of President
Tito's road to socialism draws
attention once again to the
ideological differences between
Belgrade and Moscow and could
upset their modus vivendi.
Since the Hungarian uprising
in 195f, Yugoslavia had been
relatively quiet on this sub-
ject. The USSR has stepped up
its campaign against "revision-
ism" and "opportunism," but has
refrained from any direct
counterattack against Yugoslav
theories which would doubtless
result in disruptive polemics.
The new Yugoslav "sales
campaign" is undoubtedly in-
tended for the most part as a
prelude to the seventh con-
gress of the League of Yugoslav
Communists scheduled for April.
Advance statements indicate
that Tito'will make a major
effort to publicize his unique
system of workers' self-manage-
ment and government, and there
is little reason to believe
that the Yugoslavs contemplate
any significant concessions
to make their ideology more
compatible with the Soviet
brand. Vice President Colako-
vic stated in the Yugoslav
party's theoretical journal
Komunist on 1 January that
only th Yugoslavs and the
Chinese "have been courageous
enough to march along unpaved
roads." He added that the
lessons of Hungary prove that
certain Communists "should
change their attitudes and
judgments," and that dogmatism
and not revisionism, as claimed
by the USSR, is the paramount
danger to socialism.
Komunist continued Yugo-
slav efforts to proselytize
within the bloc, declaring on
SECRET
10 January that only a system
of workers' self-management
as practiced in Yugoslavia is
conducive to the Communist ideal
of the gradual withering away
of the state. In a major
speech launching the campaign
for the election of deputies
to the Yugoslav National Assem-
bly in March, Vice President
Vukmanovic-Tempo declared that
Yugoslavia's "socialist democ-
racy...surpasses by far all
the social systems which have
made their appearance in his-
tory."
In effect denouncing the
"rules" set forth in the 12-
party declaration of the
Soviet bloc issued last Novem-
ber in Moscow, but not signed
by Yugoslavia, Vukmanovic in-
sisted that the Belgrade and
Moscow declarations of 1955
and 1956 alone form the basis
for relations between socialist
states. In that portion of
his speech dealing with Bel-
grade's relations with Eastern
Europe, Vukmanovic reaffirmed
his government's right to
examine critically Moscow's re-
lations with its satellites.
Moscow probably is dis-
turbed by Yugoslavia's revival
of praise for its contributions
to socialism. The Soviet leaders
reacted to Tito's efforts in
1956 to sell his system in the
satellites with a secret letter
to the satellite parties de-
nouncing Yugoslavia as a model
for socialism. No compromise
seems possible at this time
on fundamental ideological dif-
ferences, but Soviet leaders
may decide that another effort
is warranted to discuss dif-
ferences with Tito through bi-
lateral talks prior to his
congress.
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13 February 1958
The Soviet bloc Council
for Mutual Economic Assistance
(CEMA) is becoming an important
factor in Soviet bloc economic
activity for the first time
since its inception in 1949.
At a CEMA meeting in December
1957, it was agreed that mem-
bers would coordinate their
economic planning for a 15-
year period beginning in 1960,
leading ultimately to the de-
velopment of an integrated
bloc economy. Last December
at least eight CEMA conferences
were held dealing with speciali-
zation of production and the
use of common industrial stand-
ards.
These developments are in
contrast to the past Soviet
practice of emphasizing bilat-
eral relations with the satel-
li.tes. The function of CEMA
has:been limited by the USSR
to a partial coordination of
trade within the bloc, which
led chiefly to a shift of East
European trade from the West
to the USSR. Soviet reluctance
to provide the satellites with
the economic data necessary for
joint planning has discouraged
integration, as have.Soviet
demands on the satel-
lites for raw materi-
als.. Furthermore,
individual satellite
efforts to speed
industrialization
have led to unbal-
anced national
economic growth and
to much duplication
of effort which of.;.
ten worked against
cooperation within
the bloc.
CEMA now is to
ensure an increasing
bloc-wide division
of labor to--make the
most efficient use
of resources. The
ultimate goal is a "unified
socialist economy to surpass
the most developed countries
in the per capita output of
goods." Moreover, increased
specialization of production
within the bloc would lead to
increased interdependence,
making it more difficult for
countries such as Poland to
pursue independent policies
at variance with those of the
USSR.
One of the more signifi-
cant developments concerning
internal bloc specialization
and standardization has'been
the direct cooperation between
ministries of the Eastern European
countries undertaken in late
.1957. Polish and Czech person-
nel responsible for shipping,
land transport, mining, chemi-
cals, and heavy machinery now
work together to reach solu-
tions to common problems arising
in these fields. Under a Polish-
Czech pact reached in December,
some industrial enterprises will
be jointly constructed.
Soviet bloc trade rela-
tions with the non-Communist
world are being coordinated
MEMBERS OF COUNCIL FOR MUTUAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE (CEMA)
* Coal Industry -Poland
14 Petroleum Industry -Rumania
Y Ferrous Metals)
13 FEBRUARY 1958
24866
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HEADQUARTERS OF MAJOR
FUNCTIONAL SUBCOMMITTEES
OF CEMA=
Agriculture -Bulgaria
0_ Machine Industry -Czech.
Chemical Industry -East Germ.
Nonferrous
Metals
Machine Tools
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
to change "the path of isolated
efforts to achieve temporary
advantages in prices and cred-
its." The December meeting
of CEMA reportedly discussed
the establishment of an inter-
national trade bank for the
Soviet bloc. Early last year
it was announced that the So-
viet State Bank had assumed
responsibility for handling
trade balances within the bloc
arising from a new trade system
permitting commercial deliveries
in addition to the existing bi-
lateral barter trade agreements.
The cash balances derived from
this trade are to be settled
through the Soviet State Bank
and presumably under the new
system could be spent in any
bloc country where goods in
excess of commitments under
trade agreements are avail-
able. (Pre-
pared by ORR)
BULGARIAN REGIME REPRESSES UNRULY YOUTHS
Incidents of "hooliganism,"
a plague in all satellite re-
gimes, flared up in Bulgaria
in late January and evoked se-
vere countermeasures by the re-
gime. Two hooligans hero con-
demned to death on 5 February
for the murder of a young work-
er. Other repressive measures
are reported to have included
the deportation of thousands of
juvenile delinquents from Sofia
and other Bulgarian cities
early this month to.state farms
and other "places of work" in
the countryside.
The hooligans are youths
who refuse to concern them-
selves with politics or perform
what the regime considers "so-
cially useful labor." They
emulate the dress and habits of
Western "cats" and normally
engage in petty crime. Their
existence in numbers in the
bloc reflects the failure of
Communism to capture the in-
terests and loyalty of many of
its youths. In Bulgaria, this
failure is probably aggravated
by low living standards--among
the lowest in the satellites--
and a chronic unemployment prob-
lem.
The last knows outbreak of
hooliganism in Bulgaria occurred
in September 1957 when police
attempts to restrain avid "rock
'n rollers" demonstrating their
approval of a Czech jazz band
resulted in a near riot. All
bands were ordered henceforth
to clear their repertoires with
a special committee.
The problem of hooliganism
was serious enough to be de-
bated by the Bulgarian National
Assembly on the day the two
hooligans were sentenced to
death. Juvenile delinquency,
according to the assembly, can
be prevented primarily through
"labor and the Communist educa-
tion of young children," the
same ineffectual policy that
has been followed. However,
since it was decided during
the session to set up special
commissions in all districts
"for the struggle against
juvenile delinquency," it would
appear that the Bulgarian re-
gime plans, through better or-
ganization, to make a more con-
centrated effort to control
youth than in the past.
It will probably use
police terror tactics as in
the past to try to bring its
youths into line.
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13 February 1958
FLOW OF REFUGEES FROM EAST GERMANY
The flight of refugees
from East Germany continued at
a high level during 1957, when
more than 261,000 East Germans
asked for asylum in West Ger-
many. This total, although
smaller than the 1956 figure,
contained an unprecedented num-
ber of youths of military age
EAST GERMAN REFUGEES TO WEST GERMANY
SECRET
living conditions. The propor-
tion of military-age personnel
in the refugee total rose from
22.1 percent in 1956 to 26,1
percent in 1957, a figure well.
above the 1955 record when re-
cruitment of "volunteers" for
the East German Army was in-
creased by the use of strong-
arm methods.
69,329
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957
Note: Figures include only those entering through
normal West German refugee channels.
(18-25) and a large number of
persons with skills and training
important to the East German
economy. It does not
include those refu-
gees who escaped--in
mounting numbers to-
ward the end of 1957
--and joined rela-
tives or husbands
without going through
West German refugee
channels. Intensi-
fication of hard-
line domes tic poli-
cies following the
current purge will
probably result in an
increase in the flow
of refugees unless
border controls are
tightened.
The continuing
flight of personnel
from East Germany has
damaged the East Ger-
man economy and may
prompt implementation
of measures to inhib-
it the flow. Premier
Grotewohi and other
party officials have
stated that, notwith-
standing a lack of
agricultural machin-
ery and fertilizer,
"one of the most seri-
ous problems which has
had a direct effect on
lower yields is the
manpower shortage."
The seriousness of
this problem is revealed in a
subsequent statement by Grote-
wohl that East Germany could
BREAKDOWN OF EAST GERMAN REFUGEES
BY OCCUPATION
1956
1957
61, 594
31,476
28,688
26,283
15,748
13,679
8,583
5,568
INDUSTRY & HANDICRAFT 59,509
TRADE & TRANSPORT 33,451
UNSKILLED WORKERS 27,797
HOUSEWIVES 34,510
AGRICULTURE 17,431
HOUSEHOLD & HEALTH SERVICES 13,147
ADMINISTRATION & JURISPRUDENCE 9,808
TECHNICAL PROFESSIONS 5,536
ARTS
NONWORKERS
(PENSIONERS, CHILDREN, & STUDENTS)
Since 1949 about 2,000,000
refugees have abandoned jobs,
homes, and often their families
in East Germany to escape op-
pression or to search for better
SECRET
only increase its food supply,
now rationed, by increasing pro-
duction and not by'increasing
nonfood exports. Grain imports
in 1957 exceeded the domestic
supply of grain available for
sale.
3,908 3,667
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM1[ARy
13 February 1958
Probably the most damaging
effect of the refugee flow on
East German industry has been
the loss of technicians. Al-
though the number is small, it
is a serious deterrent to an
economy striving to increase
productivity through mechaniza-
tion and the adoption of mod-
ern techniques.
(Prepared by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ]J , 7
13 February 1958
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THE ARGENTINE ELECTIONS OF 23 FEBRUARY
In Argentina's first presi-
dential campaign since the
overthrow of Peron, Arturo
Frondizi, demagogic candidate
of the Intransigent Radical
party, appears to have pulled
into the lead. The multiparty
campaign will also result in
the election of a new congress.
Frondizi's lead results pri-
marily from last-minute support
by Peronista groups and by the
Communist party. This align-
ment is likely to lead to un-
rest and plotting among ultra-
conservative military elements.
Provisional President Aramburu
still appears, however, to have
decisive military support for
his promise to hold the elec-
tions as scheduled on 23 Febru-
ary and to turn over power to
the elected government on 1
May.
Frondizi's principal op-
ponent, the more moderate
Ricardo Balbin of the Popular
Radical party, was the favorite
in the race until early Febru-
ary. On the basis of the
party's showing in the July
1x57 constituent assembly elec-
tions, the Popular Radicals
held a substantial lead in the
federal capital and the popu-
lous provinces of Buenos Aires,
Cordoba, and Santa Fe, and
were thus expected to control
the needed absolute majority
in the electoral college which
will be convened on 17 March.
The strength of the Communists
and Peronistas is also concen-
trated in these provinces,
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however, and their support for
Frondizi there would probably
put him in control of the
majority.
The Peronistas are still
squabbling among themselves,
but as little as 25 percent of
their voting strength would as-
sure Frondizi of victory and,
under the present electoral
system, would give his party
over half the seats in the
new congress.
Balbin's chief hope now
is that segments of the smaller
moderate parties will abandon
their own presidential candi-
dates and vote for him as a
reaction to the extremist sup-
port for Frondizi. Both Balbin
and Frondizi are running on
nationalistic platforms, but
Balbin is considered personally
more moderate and more friendly
to the United States as well
as being anti-Peronista.
Peron's manifesto of 4
February in which he instructed
his followers to vote "in an
appropriate manner against the
tyranny" has been widely inter-
preted as a tacit endorsement
of Frondizi in contrast to the
order last July for Peronistas
to cast blank ballots.
Despite Frondizi's denials,
many sources believe Peron's
statement reflects a secret
agreement by which Frondizi
would be obliged to permit
legalization of the Peronista
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party and reintegration of pro-
Peronistas into the armed for-
ces. While most government
and political leaders probably
do not believe the opportunis-
tic Frondizi would fully honor
an agreement with Peron or
anyone else, his election
would probably lead to a period
of uncertainty as to whether
the conservative i itar would
attempt a coup.
Prospects for stability
and orderly constitutional
evolution in the British colony
of Kenya have recently deteri-
orated as a result of increased
African agitation for a larger
voice in the government.
Spearheading the drive on
the political level are the
eight elected African members
of the Legislative Council who,
since their election last March,
have refused to associate them-
selves with Kenya's quasi-
executive organ. Their minimum
price for cooperation, they in-
sist, is that 15 more elective
African, seats be added to the
58-member multiracial council.
Their position appears to have
received widespread support
from the politically conscious
minority among the colony's
approximately 6,000,000 Afri-
cans.
In an effort to compromise
the issue and avert a consti-
tutional impasse, Britain last
November scrapped the Lyttleton
plan--implemented in 1954 and
supposedly untouchable until
1960--and announced that six
new elected African members
would be added to the council.
However, the African leaders--
whose most articulate spokes-
man is Kenya Federation of
Labor chief Tom Mboya--unani-
mously condemned the new British
proposals which included other
features apparently designed
in part to strengthen London's
influence locally. Neverthe-
less, the African leaders have
not so far encouraged a boy-
cott of the elections for the
new council constituencies
scheduled for March.
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Rising tension in the
Nairobi area and the develop-
ment of serious disorders at a
23 January meeting organized by
Mboya have prompted the Kenya
administration to prohibit
Africans from holding public
political gatherings in the
capital. Africans have also
been barred from carrying weap-
ons after dark, and the Kenya
police commissioner believes
it may eventually become neces-
sary to impose martial law.
Licenses to make political
speeches have been obligatory
for some time, and colony-wide
African parties have not been
permitted for several years.
Since mid-January the
government has discovered and
suppressed two new subversive
African secret societies with
anti-European objectives and
ritualistic characteristics
similar to those associated with
the recently defeated Mau Mau.
Although the new movements
have apparently not become wide-
spread like the Mau Mau, they
are centered in the Kikuyu
tribe--Kenya's largest--and
another closely related tribe.
Kenya officials, apprehen-
sive that the African drive for
rapid political advancement
might remove all chances for
orderly development, are trying
to facilitate the election
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU1LARY
13 February 1958
next month of moderate Afri-
cans, who they hope may chal-
lenge the present intransigent
leadership of the nationalist
movement. They would particu-
larly like to secure the elec-
tion of tractable Kikuyus--re-
garded as natural rivals of
the Luo tribesmen whose in-
fluence now predominates among
elected African council mem-
bers--but this strategem ap-
pears unlikely to succeed. One
of the most prominent Kikuyu
candidates has recently de-
clared his support of Mboya's
aims and indicated his belief
that the expanded African bloc
in the council will present a
solidly united front.
PAKISTAN'S GOVERNMENT COALITION MAY BE THREATENED
The budget session of
Pakistan's National Assembly
opening on 17 February may see
attempts by those outside the
coalition, probably supported
by President Mirza, to break
up Prime Minister Noon's two-
month-old government. In addi-
tion, the budget itself will
have special importance this
year as a test of the govern-
ment's ability to deal effec-
tively with the deteriorating
economic situation.
Noon's six-party coalition
was formed in mid-December af-
ter his Republican party caused
the fall of former Prime Minis-
ter Chundrigar's government
by withdrawing from the Repub-
lican-Moslem League coalition.
Despite the strong opposition
of Mirza, original patron of
the Republican party, the Repub-
licans formed a new coalition
with nearly all groups then in
opposition and assumed office
with a relatively safe majority
in the National Assembly.
Political maneuvering in recent
weeks reflects Mirza's desire
to replace the present govern-
ment, probably by promoting
defections from the Republican
party to the Moslem League,
with one he can control to suit
his own political interests.
Mirza's scheming against
the coalition apparently is
motivated primarily by fear of
H. S. Suhrawardy, powerful
leader of the Awami League who
was ousted as prime minister in
October. Suhrawardy exerts a
controlling in'Lluence over
Noon's government by providing
essential support without al-
lowing his party to join the
cabinet. If national elections
are held under this government
next November as promised,
Suhrawardy probably would emerge
with dominant political strength.
He would then be in a position
to throw his support to some
candidate other than Mirza
in the parliamentary voting for
president.
Noon's government cannot
be unseated easily, since it
appears to have a comfortable
margin of supporters united by
their opposition to the Moslem
League and its negotiations
with Mirza. Loyalties can
shift rapidly, however, once the
parliamentary maneuvering be-
gins. The absence of Suhrawardy,
who will be in Europe for medi-
cal treatment until late March,
is likely to weaken the coali-
tion's unity.
Should the present govern-
ment fall, Mirza would be in a
position to claim that all
political parties have failed to
provide stable leadership and
that his only alternative is
resort to authoritarian rule.
There is some evidence, however,
that he no longer commands the
general support necessary for
such a move.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU
13 February 1958
Since beginning his second
term in December, Philippine
President Garcia has been pre-
occupied largely with economic
problems. His administration's
major actions have been emer-
gency measures to meet growing
inflationary pressures, the
rapid decline of the country's
foreign exchange reserves, and
the prospects of a serious rice
shortage resulting from drought
and speculation. An austerity
program, involving some slow-
down of economic development,
has been launched through cred-
it and import cuts, reduced
government spending, and curbs
of illegal foreign exchange
transactions. Whether the
program can be enforced is
still uncertain. The probable
need to increase rice imports
has aggravated economic diffi-
culties.
The Philippines may hope
eventually to resolve its
economic problems through a
currency stabilization loan
from the United States. Garcia
may be contemplating early peso
devaluation to precede such
a request. So far, Garcia
has sought only a loan to con-
struct a steel mill and indi-
cated he may seek a loan for
economic development, allow-
ing use of foreign exchange
earnings for more immediate
needs.
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have been foreshadowed by the
anti-Garcia flavor of disputes
over organization of the lower
house in the first week of the
new congressional session. Al-
though Garcia apparently hoped
to include Vice President Maca-
pagal, a member of the opposition
Liberal party, in his cabinet,
both the Liberals and adminis-
tration Nacionalistas have op-
posed such a development, and
Macapagal has already moved to
assert opposition leadership.
Although Garcia has ex-
pressed his intention to reopen
talks with the United States
on military bases on the diplo-
matic level, such a move has
been delayed by his failure to
name a permanent foreign af-
fairs secretary. Garcia's
attitude toward a final bases
settlement, moreover, remains
uncertain in view of his hesi-
tation to dissolve the Philip-
pine panel which handled the
suspended 1956 talks, and by
recent indications that he will
elevate Under Secretary of
Justice Jesus Barrera to the
cabinet. As a member of the
panel, Barrera proved the major
obstacle to an acceptable re-
vision of terms governing juris-
diction over American military
personnel, and, as secretary of
justice, he would be in a posi-
tion to cause trouble on this
question.
In the political field,
Garcia has moved slowly. He
has yet to fill several cabinet
posts and, when he does so,
apparently intends to rely
heavily on consultations with
the Council of Leaders, a con-
gressional advisory body. Pos-
sible difficulties with Congress
SECRET
the bases question
and threats of a more neutralist
orientation may be used to pres-
sure the United States for
greater financial concessions.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 February 1958
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
PERSONNEL PROBLEMS IN THE SOVIET INDUSTRIAL REORGANIZATION
The Khrushchev-engineered
industrial reorganization in
the USSR, still in its early
stages, apparently has not yet
succeeded in significantly
paring the number of economic
administrative personnel. Many
of the hundreds of thousands
of administrators from the
abolished ministries have re-
mained in Moscow and other ma-
jor cities and 104 regional
councils of national economy
(sovnarkhozy) are being staffed
largely by local personnel.
Identifications to date of top
sovnarkhoz officials show that
experienced industrial man-
agers, rather than party ca-
reerists, have received most
of the council chairmanships.
While the reorganization may
ameliorate some administrative
difficulties stemming from the
overcentralization of the econ-
omy, it heightens the problem
of "localism" which the regime
is combating through a strength-
ened party apparatus and a re-
vamped State Planning Commis-
sion - (Gosplan) .
U S
Moscow Chelyobins?
Co
Personnel Problems
There is abundant evidence
that most employees of the abol-
ished ministries have been loath
to leave Moscow, where decisions
are made and promotions doled
out. itccording to a statement
in late October by the first
deputy chairman of the Moscow
City Soviet, very few officials
of the former ministries had
left Moscow and he did not ex-
pect many to do so. Apparently
many of the administrators who
did have to leave for the prov-
inces have left their families
in Moscow and will attempt to
return to the capital at the
first opportunity.
Of 20 former USSR minis-
ters whose present positions
have been identified, 11 have
remained in Moscow as ministers
of the Russian Republic (RSFSR)
or as deputy chairmen of the
USSR and RSFSR Gosplans, and
only four have appointed sov-
narkhoz chairmen. Of the few
former deputy USSR ministers
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU;TURY
13 February 1958
Present Positions of 25 Former USSR Ministers
Officials of USSR Gosplan
Officials of Russian, Ukraine,
and Kazakh Republic Gosplans
Present Positions of 54 Former USSR Deputy Ministers
(Only about 20 percent of former USSR deputy
ministers have been identified in new jobs.)
Sovnarkhoz Chairmen 22
Sovnarkhoz Deputy Chairmen 10
Officials of USSR and Russian, Ukraine,
Kazakh, and Turkmen Republic Gos-
plans __ -->.;_
Head of Moscow Regional Building
Directorate . _ _
21
1
(SS of the 104 sovnarkhoz chairmen
have been identified by name and 73
of these by former position. Of the
SS identified, only two are members
and three candidate members of the
party central committee. )
USSR Deputy Ministers 22
Republic Ministers 21
Heads 9
USSR Ministers 4
nomic AdministrativePosts _ .._ 6
Party Posts 5
(These 52 constitute a small percentage of
the Sovnarkhoz deputy chairmen.)
USSR Deputy Ministers
Plant, Trust, and Combine
Heads
Other Economic Adminis
whose present jobs are known,
nine have been assigned jobs
in Moscow and 22 have become
chairmen and deputy chairmen
of sovnarkhozy. Many of these
ministers and deputy ministers
have suffered a diminution of
prestige.
Throughout the late summer
and fall there have been nu-
merous complaints in-the,'press
about staffing difficulties in
the sovnarkhozy. As late as
13 October, four months after
the reorganization was to have
been accomplished, the Kirov
Sovnarkhoz had yet to fill 73
jobs. This derived in part
fro)n the dearth of former,min-
isterial personnel available
for these particular positions.
The chairmen of the Ivanovo
Sovnarkhoz in June stated that
only 15 of the 650 staff mem-
bers of the sovnarkhoz had
come from Moscow. Only 18 out
of an expected 83 Moscow spe-
cialists had arrived in the
Kemerovo Sovnarkhoz.
Aside from the reluctance
of people to leave the capital
cities, another factor in the
staffing picture has been the
resistance of provincial of-
ficials to persons from the
central industrial apparatus
who are not familiar with local
conditions. Officials in the
city of Chelyabinsk recently
at moe
of the ex-ministry people would
be useless in the sovnarkhozy
since they have been two far
removed from the conditions oar
industrial work to be of much
immediate use.
Most sovnarkhoz staffs
have been filled by local
people, not only ,administrative
personnel ' but' in some cases
specialists and engineers pre-
viously directly involved in
production. The chairman of
the Zaporozhye Sovnarkhoz,
complaining about withdrawing
engineers from producti.on,wrote
in Party Life: "We attempted
to take as-few specialists as
possible from enterprises; un-
fortunately, we did not suc-
ceed." Thus it would appear
that the number ofISoviet in-
dustrial administrative per-
sonnel,has not been substantial-.
ly..reduced.
. The Central Statistical
Administration itself reported
on 27 January that only 56,000
employees of the former minis-
tries, departments, and other
administrative organizations
had been freed to. work di-
ret t1y in industry.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY-SUMMARY
13 February. 1958
Sovnarkhozy Problems
From the virulent press
criticism of the past several
months, it is apparent that
methods of bureaucratic opera-
tion have not been entirely
eliminated. One of the major
advantages cited for the new
system was that it would allow
economic administrators to keep
direct tab on plant operations
and make on-the-spot decisions,
but some administrators app