CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001600070001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 6, 1958
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE.
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
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p DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
COPY NO. 16
OCR NO. 0031/58
6 February 1958
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
DAT EVIEW ER:
E'
NEXT REVIEW DATE.:
ENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY N)e 11
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE q.
~aB
CONFIDENTIAL
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State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current 'Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
USSR ATTEMPTS TO ISOLATE US ON SUMMIT MEETING ISSUE . . . Page 1
The Soviet Union is making a persistant bid to iso-
late the United States on the issue of a summit meeting
and to convince world public opinion that American "in-
transigence" is the only obsticl1e to heads-of-government
talks. Soviet leaders do not appear seriously interested
in substantive negotiations on major points of difference
with the West at this time, but probably believe Western
rejection of talks on Soviet terms would eventually bring
some Western European governments, acting under strong
popular pressure, to seek independent accommodations with
Moscow. The main objective of the Kremlin leaders at a
summit meeting probably would be to secure a generalized
statement on East-West relations or an "implicit under-
standing" which they could claim represents Western rec-
- ognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe.
EGYPTIAN-SYRIAN UNION PROCLAMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The announcement of Egyptian-Syrian union as the
"United Arab Republic" has caused a' strong reaction
Yemen, however, is seeking
some form of federation with e union. The Israelis are
reacting with more determined and forceful assertions of
their sovereignty over the Israeli-Syrian demilitarized
zones.
BULGANIN"S POLITICAL POSITION IN DOUBT . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Premier Bulganin's position is in doubt, judging
from the manner in which his nomination for election
to the Supreme Soviet is being handled in the Soviet
press. If Bulganin is removed from the premiership,
Anastas Mikoyan, Frol Kozlov, and Khrushchev himself
can be counted among possible successors. A "resigna-
tion for reasons of health" would provide a device
least likely to destroy the diplomatic effectiveness of
his recent letters.
CO TIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
PART I (continued)
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Establishment of a rival Indonesian government
appears to be imminent. Lt. Col. Hussein, head of the
Banteng Council in Central Sumatra, made a lengthy speech
of justification on 6 February. Such a government would
probably seek to undermine the Djakarta government by
subversion and economic sanctions. The new regime would
face problems in maintaining unity among its members and
would have to cope with retaliation by Djakarta,' which
would include economic measures, subversive action, and,
as a last resort, perhaps military attack.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ANTI-WESTERN TREND IN YEMEN .......
. Page 1
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The anti-Western trend in Yemen will probably ac-
celerate now that Crown Prince Badr, principal advocate
of Sino-Soviet bloc aid, has returned from Eastern Europe,
Moscow, and Peiping with new diplomatic, aid, and trade
agreements. Following Badr's return, Yemen apparently
accepted a five-year economic development loan which the
USSR valued at $35,000,000. The Yemeni Government, mean-
while, thwarted a new conspiracy by northern tribesmen
against the Imam on 22 January. The government, by al-
leging the plot was British-supported has exploited it
to reduce Western influence further. 25X1
SPAIN PREPARES MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN WEST AFRICA . . . . . Page 2
Spain may soon initiate a military offensive against
irregular Moroccan Army of Liberation concentrations which
have been in control of much if not most of Spain's West
African territories since early December. France will
probably lend some tangible support,but the precise extent
of its commitments to the operation is unclear. While
such an offensive may succeed in restoring temporarily
some of Madrid's previous authority in the area, the ir-
regulars' mobility and their skill in guerrilla warfare
make a lasting military victory over them unlikely.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
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PART II (continued)
CYPRUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Recent events regarding Cyprus may make it extreme-
ly difficult for Britain to prevent a serious deteriora-
tion of relations with either Athens or Ankara. Follow-
ing Turkey's rejection of British proposals for the is-
land's future, Governor Foot has suggested that he visit
Athens in an attempt to reach an accord with the Greek
Government and Makari nc nn i ntar im mn~cvv~+o~
e rc y can restrain the underground
organization. Meanwhile, a Turkish Cypriot leader has
warned that Turkey may intervene directly if necessary
ensure partition of the island.
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCES IN ISRAEL . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The Israelis regard union of Egypt and Syria as in-
creasing the Arab threat to their security. In this con-
text, the nature of Israel's relationship with the West--
the basic issue which provoked Israel's recent government
crisis--very likely will take on renewed significance as
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a subject of political controversy.
HIGHLIGHTS OF BAGHDAD PACT MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING . . Page 5
At the meeting of the Baghdad Pact Ministerial Coun-
cil in Ankara from 27 to 30 January, a number of contro-
versial issues were raised, including the Israeli, Al-
gerian, and Kashmir problems. Only Iraq's demand that
Israel's borders be readjusted to those specified in the
1947 UN resolution threatened to cause a crisis. The
USSR and other states opposing the pact kept up a con-
tinuous antagonistic propaganda campaign during the meet-
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WORLD REACTION TO THE US EXPLORER . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Soviet comment to date on the successful launching
of the first American earth satellite has acknowledged
the peaceful scientific value of "Explorer," while stress-
ing the continued Soviet lead in rocketry. Elsewhere in
the Sino-Soviet bloc, comment has been deprecating, except
in Poland, where the launching drew words of high praise.
The event was hailed throughout the free world as a great
contribution to world science, and with expressions of hope
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6 February 1958
PART II (continued)
SOVIET ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN 1957 . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The growth rate of the USSR's industrial produc-
tion in 1957 was well above that of the United States
and well above plan, although slightly below the 1956
level. The housing plan, which was ambitious, was over-
fulfilled for the first time in Soviet history, re-
flecting a shift in investment allocations in favor
of the consumer. The nonfulfillment of production
and investment goals in some important industries,
however,- indicates that the attempt to push the
housing, agricultural, defense, and heavy industry
programs simultaneously continues to run into the
problem of competing priorities.
KHRUSHCHEV DOMINATES PAGES OF SOVIET PRESS . . . . . . . . Page 10
Only two years after his denunciation of the Sta-
lin cult, Khrushchev has himself taken over a special
niche in the Soviet press. Although be is not treated
to the kind of adulation Stalin enjoyed in his later
years, there are some signs that a new "cult of per-
sonality" is forming.
MIKHAIL A. MENSHIKOV--NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE US . . Page 11
Mikhail A. Menshikov, former Soviet ambassador to
India, arrived in the United States on 6 February to
assume his new post as ambassador. A latecomer to the
diplomatic corps, Menshikov is a foreign trade special-
ist and is known for his work with the UN Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration. His major aim in Washing-
ton will probably be to stress the need for improved So-
viet-Ameri relations through contacts between top
leaders.
COLLECTIVIZATION IN RUMANIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
The Rumanian regime has stepped up its campaign
to force landowning peasants and agricultural coopera-
tives into collective farms, in a return to its policy
for 100-percent collectivization which was temporarily
suspended following the Hungarian revolt. The present
effort is concentrated on regions east of Bucharest--
Constanta, Iasi, and Galati. Thus far about 45 percent
of the total arable land in Rumania has been collectiv-
ized,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
PART II (continued)
HO CHI MINH'S VISIT TO INDIA AND BURMA . , . . . . . . .
Page
Ho Chi Minh's current state visit to India and
Burma--his first trip outside the Communist bloc since
1946--is aimed at offsetting the favorable impression
which South Vietnam's President Diem made on Indian
officialdom during his tour of India last November.
Ho will seek to halt the decline of North Vietnam's
prestige in Burma which began during the last year and
will probably attempt to get a strong statement from
Nehru on the necessity of maintaining the Internation-
al Control Commission, set up in Vietnam under the 1954
D
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BURMESE PREMIER REJECTS COMMUNIST METHODS . . . . . . . Page 15
Prime Minister U Nu, in an important speech to his
governing party, rejected Communist methods of building
a socialist state and reiterated the party's commitment
to a democratic socialism of the British Labor party
variety. Nu s speech implied no change in Burma's neutral
foreign
oli
p
cy
.
NEW JAPANESE BUDGET RAISES DEFENSE EXPENDITURES . . . . . Page 16
The Japanese Government's national budget for the
fiscal year beginning 1 April increases defense expendi-
tures 19 percent over the previous year and contains a
new appropriation for economic cooperation with South-
east Asia. Increased veterans' pensions are being at-
tacked by the Socialists, but the budget will obably
be approved by the Diet without major changes. 25X1
CONTINUING TENSION IN CUBA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
President Batista's efforts to create political
peace in Cuba in preparation for the general elections
on I June have produced little more than a surface calm.
Revolutionary elements are stepping up their campaign of
terror and have announced plans to sabotage industrial
installations, including those owned by US interests,
as well as sugar cane fields and tobacco warehouses.
There are also new signs of plotting against Batista amone
., ..a _..s __ _
the rni 1 i tnrv th
e
of a hs
-- --i i orsime.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
PART II (continued)
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SUDAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC . . . . . . . Page 1
Sudanese Premier Abdullah Khalil has managed to re-
sist the diplomatic and trade approaches of the -!^-
vviet bloc. A Soviet offer of substantial economic aide
and trade was shelved despite the objections of some mem-
bers of the coalition government, and the recent rise in
cotton sales makes it unlikely the offer will be recon-
sid?:~ in the near future. The success of Communist ef-
fort.- in the Sudan will be determined by the outcome of the
parliamentary elections beginning late this month, the sale
of Sudanese cotton, and the effects of Egyptian foreign
policy on opinion in the Sudan. Khalil appears confident
of his position and intends to stiffen his resistance to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
PART III (continued)
THE SPANISH OPPOSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
An initial step toward eventual replacement of the
Franco regime has been taken in Spain, where Socialists,
Christi=an Democrats, and other opposition groups now are
agreed on restoring the monarchy. This movement, at
present representing only a fraction of the population,
poses no immediate threat to the regime. It is aiming,
however, at a national resistance front which would be
capable of organizing a successor government if contin-
uing adverse economic conditions lead influential mili-
tary, business, and church supporters of the regime to
abandon Franco. F__ I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY StY AF:
6 February 1958
The Soviet Union, in a
display of diplomatic activity
highlighted by Bulganin's
response to President Eisen-
hower, is making a strong bid
to isolate the United States
and to convince world public
opinion that American "intran-
sigence" is the only obstacle
to heads-of-government talks.
The Soviet leaders do not ap-
pear seriously interested in
substantive negotiations on
major points of difference
with the West at this time.
However, they probably believe
they would derive important
political advantages either
from Western rejection of a
summit meeting on Soviet terms
or from Western acceptance of
summit talks preceded by a
minimum of preparation limited
to procedural details and with
discussion based on those
topics which Khrushchev has
termed "ripe for agreement."
In the Soviet view, rejec-
tion would probably lead even-
tually to moves by some Western
European governments in NATO,
acting under strong public
pressures, to seek independent
accommodations with the USSR.
On the other hand, the main
objective of the Kremlin
leaders at a summit meeting
would be to secure a general-
ized statement on East-West
relations or an "implicit
understanding" which they could
claim represents Western rec-
ognition of the status quo in
Eastern Europe.
Bulganin's action in ad-
dressing his 2 February note
only to President Eisenhower,
in contrast to the two previous
USSR ATTEMPTS TO ISOLATE US ON SUMMIT MEETING ISSUE
series of letters which were
sent simultaneously to all
NATO heads or government and
to all UN members, served to
focus world attention on the
Soviet-American dialogue on
summit talks,
This letter attempted to
create the impression that
the President's 12 January
letter was not responsive to
previous Soviet proposals and
that the United States is seek.'-
ing to evade negotiations with
the Soviet Union by posing unac-
ceptable conditions. Bulganin
repeated the standard Soviet
position for refusing to dis-
cuss German reunification and
the status of Eastern Europe,
and suggested that in raising
the subject of Eastern Europe,'
the United States had set it-
self up as "arbiter" of social
and economic regimes through-
out the world.
The Soviet premier-fol-
lowed the line set by party
chief Khrushchev in his 22
January speech at Minsk in
replying to President Eisen-
hower's proposal to use outer
space only for peaceful pur-
poses. Asserting that this
issue must be solved as part
of "the general problem of the
prohibition of nuclear and rocket
weapons," Bulganin stated the
Soviet Union is willing to dis-
cuss the question of controlling
intercontinental inissiles, pro-
vided the Western powers are
prepared to agree to the cessa-
tion of nuclear tests, the
banning of nuclear weapons, and
liquidation of foreign military
bases.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
On the question of prep-
arations for a summit meeting,
Bulganin again rejected a
foreign ministers' conference
and repeated the charge in his
8 January letter that a confer-
ence on this level might create
additional obstacles to a heads-
of -government meeting. He
contended that after agreement
to a summit meeting is reached
in principle, "procedural and
other questions" could be
solved "without special dif-
ficulties'! through regular
diplomatic channels.
During the past week
Moscow has concentrated its
efforts to exploit signs of
Western disunity on the ques-
tion of preparatory steps to
be taken before a meeting on
the heads-of-government level,
Soviet Ambassador Malik told
Acting British Prime
Minister Butler on
28 January that the
USSR is "elastic"
on the composition
and date for a sum-
mit conference.
Khrushchev's state-
ment to the London
Times, published on
ruary, was de-
signed to display
Soviet flexibility
on this point, He
said the Soviet Union
is willing to post-
pone the top-level
meeting if the date
of "within two or
three months"--sug-
gested to the West
in Bulganin's Jan-
uary letters--is
"too - soon. 11
The failure of
Bulganin's 2 February
letter to provide any
further details for
a heads-of-govern-
ment meeting reflects
the Kremlin's confi-
dence that the United States
will eventually be forced by
its European allies, who are
subject to strong popular
pressures, into dropping its
insistence on adequate prepara-
tory work by a foreign ministers'
conference as will as through
diplomatic channels.
The Kremlin appears,
however, to have left a door
open in event the bid for
summit talks with a minimum
of preparations fails. Khru-
shch6v's observation in his 22
January Minsk speech that the
French reply to Bulganin called
for a preparatory foreign min-
isters' conference which would
not discuss "questions of
substance," in contrast to the
American position, suggests
that Moscow might be prepared
to agree--if eventually necessary
COUNTRIES INCLUDED
IN RAPACKI PLAN
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CURRENT TNTFT,T.]?:G1Nr.1, WEF,TCT'. SUM4MARV
6 February 1958
to convoke a heads-of-govern-
ment meeting--to foreign min-
isters' talks limited to such
questions as composition,
agenda, and other procedural
matters,;
Bulganin's 2 February let-
ter repeats the same proposals
suggested as possible summit
agenda subjects in his January
notes. The Soviet bloc has ap-
parently been encouraged by the
public response in the West
to the Rapacki plan for a "nu--
clear.-free zone" in central
EGYPTIAN-SYRIA! UNION PROCLAMATION
The union of Egypt and
Syria, into the "United Arab
Republic" (UAR), declared last
week, remains an amorphous en-
tity despite the list of "prin-
ciples"--"constitutional out-
line"--announced on 5 February.
The long-range success of the
union will be determined very
largely by the content Na.sir
gives it during the transition-
al period when he has practical-
ly absolute powers. Its immedi-
ate psychological impact, how-
ever, is a, victory for the radi-
cal nationalism identified with
Nasir. It has caused a strong
reaction among the Egyptian
dictator's enemies in the other
Arab states,
This is not to say that
enthusiasm for the union is un-
mixed or universal, even in
Egypt and Syria, Commercial
interests in the two countries
are apprehensive; the Syrians
in particular may eventually be
called on to give up their re'.-
atively free enterprise systeri
with its sound currency in favor
of the more regulated Egyptian-
style economy and the weaker
Egyptian pounds A An on for--
e'ign exchange developed last
week in northern. Syrian centers,
and the Syrian pound has lost
about 10 percent of its value
despite efforts of the Centra_
Bank to support it,
The Communist rank and file
in Syria. also appear worried and
resei.tful over the move; some
street fights hive been reported
between Communist and radical
nationalist adherents? Com-
munist party leader iCha.lid Bak-
dash has issued a. lengthy "clari-
fication" of the party's stand,
which does not endorse Egyptian-
Syrian union directly although
it of course claims that the
Communists remain in the van-
Arab unity
The far
seem to be the plae'es w ;e:L e ti.e
maximum sponta.necu3 c,Athus ias
has developed. Yemen's Crown
Prince Badr arrived in Cairo
on 5 February to ta.l-. "com-
plete" union with the Egyptiants.
He is reported to,have asked
that Yemen, while preserving
its economic and domestic
institutions, merge its de-
fense, foreign affairs, "na-
tional economy;" and public
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Europe and on 1 February, after
five days of talks between
Gromyko and Rapacki, the Soviet
Union and Poland declared their
willingness to discuss "an ef-
fective system of controls" as
part of the plan. A high Pol--
ish Foreign Minisltry official
told Ambassador Beam on 3 Febru-
ary that as a result of the
meeting, Poland will undertake
new diplomatic initiatives with-
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pressing the plane
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C;JRRIENT INTELLIGENCE' 'MEEKLY SU..":.tA Y At.
6 February 1958
education with the UAR. Ad-
herence of the medieval Yemeni
monarchy to the "United Arab
Republic" in an obvious at-
tempt to make the best of both
worlds, could result in a net
loss of impact insofar as it
would seem to turn the union
into just another kind of Arab
League? In Kuwait, with its
large proportion of Palestin-
ians and Egyptian teachers,
a sheep was sacrificed in
honor of union in the main
square amid general rejoicing.
All parties meanwhile are
becoming more nervous over new
incidents on the Israeli-Syr-
ian border. The Israelis have
for some time been engaged in
mine-clearing and other opera-
tions in the Israeli-Syrian
demilitarized zones, and have
rejected UN Truce Commission
urgings to limit their activi-
ties there. The Israelis in-
sist on exercising their claim
to sovereignty over the zones,
and are reported to have move6.
troops along the Syrian border,
presumably to be prepared should
the Syrians be provoked into
more clashes. A new incident
on the Israeli-Jordanian border
has also been reported,
The USSR both publicly and
privately continues to treat
the union with reserve. Mikoyan
declined to discuss the union at
a Ceylonese Embassy reception
on 5 February, The Soviet press
and radio continue factual broad-
casts without comment. The
TASS Cairo correspondent con-
tinues to transmit enthusiastic
assessments by the Cairo press,
but Moscow has not retransmit-
ted the material. However,, the
press in Warsaw, Prague, Bucha-
rest, and Tirana have hailed
the new state as the "first
step" toward a union of all
Arab peoples.
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BULGANIN'S POLITICAL POSITION IN DOUBT
Premier Bulganin?s politi-
cal stature may have suffered
severely, judging from the man-
ner in which his nomination
for election to the Supreme So-
viet is being handled in the
Soviet press,
According to the American
Embassy in Moscow, he was not
listed among the Soviet leaders
proposed for candidacy in the
firs-, round of nominations re-
ported in the press on 2 Feb-
ruary, Presidium member Shver-
nik was nominated in the Moscow
electoral district which elected
Bulganin in 1954, When the
press on 4 February included
him in listing the nominations
of all presidium members, the
treatment given Bulganin was
plainly perfunctory. Pravda
alone, among the central press,
noted his nomination and then
only for one district each in
the Ukraine and Latvia. Pravda
and Izvestia editorials on 2
February made special note of
the nominations of seven other
presidium members, and editorials
in army and
agricultural news-
papers
on
4
February mentioned
14 of
the
15
presidium members,
excluding Bulganin,
While nomination and elec-
tion to the Supreme Soviet is
pro forma in the case of pre-
sidium members, the number of
districts which offer them
nominations and press reportage
of the proceedings usually pro-
vide a carefully contrived re-
flection of hierarchical rank.
Bulganin was said to have
wavered in his support of Khru-
sbchev during last June's bat-
tle in the presidium, and there
were indications soon there-
after that his political posi-
tion was shaky, Although he
had seemed to recover some of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUD1tARY
6 February 1958
his lost prestige more recent-
ly; these latest signs may
foreshadow his imminent down-
grading and removal from the
premiership.
Such a step would presum-
ably be staged in a manner least
likely to destroy the effective-
ness of the diplomatic maneu-
vers with which Bulganin has
been closely involved by his
series of letters to foreign
governments. A "resignation
for reasons of health" might
provide the most convenient de-
vice.
If Bulganin is demoted
from the premiership, his re-
placement would almost certain-
ly be one of the 14 remaining
full members of the
party presidium. Many
of these can probably
be counted out either
because they are rel-
atively unknown out-
side party ranks or
because they lack
adequate government-
al experience. There
is probably no such
thing as a logical
successor--Bulganin
himself was a dark-
horse in succeeding
Malenkov in 1955.
But on a list of pos-
sible successors
three names would
stand out--Anastas
Mikoyan, Frol Kozlov, and Khru-
shchev.
Though Mikoyan?s Armenian
origin may be a disadvantage to
him where the premier?s post is
concerned, he has had more ex-
perience in the Council of Min-
isters than any other Soviet
leader and, in public, has seemed
to work well in tandem with Khru-
shchev. Kozlov, a younger man,
was appointed chairman of the
Russian Republic Council of Min-
isters last December--a move
conceivably intended to groom
him for Bulganin's post.
A further possibility is
Khrushchev himself. He has long
since moved into the area of pol-
icy-making which formally be-
longs to the premier and his as-
sumption of the post would hard-
ly alter the existing political
facts. Such a likelihood is,
however, lessened by the fact
that in taking the premiership
Khrushchev would assume a large
administrative and ceremonial
burden, he would be without the
kind of foil which he seems to
favor, and he would effectively
destroy the remaining vests es
of group rule.
I I
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
Establishment of a rival
Indonesian government appears
to be imminent. Lt. Col.
Hussein, head of the Banteng
Council in Central Sumatra, made
a lengthy speech of justifica-
tion on 6 February. The an-
nouncement follows by several
days a warning given President
Sukarno that unless he agreed
to eliminate pro-Communist ele-
ments from the Djakarta govern-
ment, the dissidents would pro-
ceed with their plans to pro-
claim an anti-Communist rival
government. Sukarno is still
in Japan, although he is planning
to cut short his vacation there.
Presumably, the dissident
cabinet would be staffed as pre-
viously announced with Sjafrud-
din, a leader of the Masjumi
and former governor of the Bank
of Indonesia, as prime minister.
The foreign minister is ex-
pected to be Col. Simbolon, who
sparked the dissident movement
in Sumatra. According to these
plans, other ministerial posts
would be held by Masjumi lead-
ers who have gone to Sumatra :.n
recent weeks and by various dis-
sident commanders from Sumatra
and North Celebes who have
defied the Djakarta government
for more than a year. The dis-
sidents face the problem of main-
taining unity among themselves.
They have already had some dif-
ficulty in effecting compromises
between conservatives and activ-
ists and probably will encounter
regional jealousies.
The Djakarta government
can he expected to retaliate
by intensifying its efforts to
sow disunity among the dissidents
and to retain the loyalty of
those military and civilian
elements still not committed to
the anti-Djakarta groups. It
will also make greater efforts
to obstruct barter trade from
the dissident areas to foreign
ports. Almost certainly Dja-
karta would cut off budgetary
support to defiant areas in the
hope that the necessary economic
adjustments would cause the
dissident movement to collapse
shortly.
Communist labor organiza-
tions in Central and South Su-
matra. undoubtedly will try to
create trouble for the local
administrations, although in
doing so their leaders probably
face arrest and imprisonment by
the anti-Communist military com-
manders in both areas. The Com-
munists are well entrenched in
oil and agricultural laborers'
organizations throughout Sumatra.
Sukarno and his supporters
might also resort to more force-
ful retaliation, including a
limited naval blockade, air
strikes, raids, and subversion.
In these efforts, the government
on Java will have important
assets in the form of the sub--
stantial Javanese population in
South Sumatra, the Communists
who are strong in the oil and
estate labor unions, and mili-
tary units scattered about Su-
matra which are still loyal
to Djakarta.
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CONFIDENTIAL
SAUDIA ARABIA SULTANATE OF MUSC 0 AND OMAN L MILES 200
+~+/iO\Najran 24438
6 February 1958
NOTES AND COMMENTS
ANTI-WESTERN TREND IN YEMEN
The anti-Western trend in
Yemen will probably accelerate
now that Crown Prince Badr,
principal advocate of Sino-So-
viet bloc aid, has returned
from an extended visit to East-
ern Europe, Moscow, and Pei-
ping with new diplomatic, aid,
and trade agreements. Shortly
after Badr's return to Yemen,
the Yemeni charge in Cairo an-
nounced that Yemen and the
USSR had signed "a number of
economic and trade agreements"
during the two-week visit of
Soviet Ambassador Kiselev, who
resides in Cairo, and a party
of 27 Soviet experts o If the
charge's announcement is cor-
rect, the agreements presum-
ably include a previously of-
fered five-year economic de-
velopment loan, which the USSR
valued at $35,000,000.
Agreement may also have'
been reached on establishment
of a resident Soviet diplomatic
mission. The proposals offered
by the Soviet ambassador are
reported to have included an
aerial survey of "natural Yemen,"
i.e., southern Arabia including
British-controlled Aden Protec-
torate. The American consul in
Aden, who has been on a trip
to Yemen, reported that a So-
viet photo team would leave for
a tour of Yemen's border areas
on 27 January.
......... Protectorate boundary / FEBRUARY 1958
- - Indefinite boundary AT
YEMEN \
o Shibam
RAN A'-0 0 \'-J EASTERN ADEN PROTECTORA
(U.K.) SsIif SANA Narih
Hodeida
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
l.7
/mow-J^
Ti_ _!-Dhaia ...,...,....,-,.-,.r
~, r?5 ADEN PROTECTORATE
e2
FRENCH ~endeb
SOMAULAND
ADEN COLONY
(U.K.)
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
The Yemeni Government,
meanwhile, thwarted a new con-
spiracy by northern tribesmen
against the Imam on 22 January.
The plot, which does not ap-
pear to have been well devel-
oped, is said to have been sup-
ported by a group of Yemeni
patricians and merchants who
opposed Crown Prince Badr's
claim to the succession. Rumors
in the bazaar that the plotters
were supported by Britain and
the United States may reflect
a Yemeni Government effort to
exploit the incident to reduce
Western influence in Yemen
further, and justify turning to
the USSR for more aid against
"imperialism." Yemen also used
the incident to request the re-
call of the British charge.
Yemen's relations with
Britain may be expected to de-
teriorate further, with more
serious attacks along the Aden
Protectorate frontier, and
spreading subversion within the
SPAIN PREPARES MILITARY CAMPAIGN IN WEST AFRICA
Spain may soon initiate a
military offensive against ir-
regular Moroccan Army of Libera-
tion concentrations in the Ifni
enclave, Spain's Southern Moroc-
co protectorate, and Spanish
Sahara. France will probably
lend some tangible support, but
the precise extent of its com-
mitments is unclear. The ir-
regulars--a mixture of profes-
sional guerrillas from Morocco
and dissident local tribesmen
--have controlled much if not
most of Spain's West African
territories since early Decem-
ber, when they forced a Spanish
withdrawal to five coastal de-
fense perimeters.
frequent incursions by the
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CTDRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAI?1
6 February 1958
guerrillas into Mauritania and
western Algeria and fear the
consequences should Spanish
power disappear entirely from
the area, France's participa-
tion is likely to be limited.
Paris is known to be anxious
to minimize friction along the
Moroccan-Algerian border and
to avoid arousing the Moroc-
cans, whom some French offi-
cials apparently still hope to
use as a channel to the Algeri-
an rebels. In addi-
tion, all-out French
involvement might
have repercussions
in the National As-
sembly.
Any direct French
action will thus
probably be restrict-
ed to stepped-up
patrol activities in
border areas and to
limited "hot pur-
suit" forays into
Spanish Sahara. In
any event, French
forces will almost
certainly not be
used in the protec-
torate--where France
recognizes the sov-
ereignty of Moroc-
France has an estimated
4,000 to 5,000 men in Mauri-
tania, and there are believed
to be at least 2,000 to 3,000
additional troops available
in the extreme western triangle;
of Algeria
Estimates of Army of Liber-
ation strength still vary x re-
ly
about 7,
armed guerrillas throughout the
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Spain, although hampered
by bad weather and logistical
problems, has recently rein-
forced its West African gar-
rison and now has an estiinated
7,000 men in Ifni and another
8,000 troops dispersed among
the four strong points in
Southern Morocco and Spanish
Sahara. Forty bombers and
transports, which have given
Spain unchallenged air control,
may soon be augmented by about
a dozen vintage German fighters.
Major elements of the active
Spanish fleet continue to be
deployed in West African waters.
Ifni - Spanish Sahara area ap-
pears reasonable
orate. The guerrillas' mobility
and ability to lose their identi-
ty among local tribesmen and,
where practicable, to melt
across Moroccan frontiers, make
the ultimate success of any
military operation against
them highly problematical.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
Recent events regarding
Cyprus may make it extremely
difficult for Britain to pre-
vent a serious deterioration of
relations with either Athens
or Ankara. While it is prob-
able that Britain would, of
necessity, choose to side with
Turkey in case the issue is
forced to a decision, London
will undoubtedly continue try-
ing to placate both allies by
strenuous diplomatic efforts.
Turkey's recent rejection
of British proposals for Cyprus,
advanced while Foreign Minister
Lloyd was in Ankara, exempli-
fies the intransigent demand
of the Turks for partition.
Following the Turkish action,
Governor Foot proposed that he
visit Athens in an attempt to
secure the agreement of Arch-
bishop Makarios and the Greek
Government for proposals de-
signed to bring Makarios back
to Cyprus and to proceed to-
ward a form of self-government.
Due to the current situation,
London's long-awaited -policy
statement on Cyprus, which may
be delivered next week, prob-
ably will be noncommittal and
lacking in details,
Violence might still be
prevented if the. Cypriot Eth
narchy would and could convince
the leader of EOKA to restrain
his followers. Some members of
the ethnarchy, aware that a
large segment of world opinion
favors self-determination for
Cyprus and that the British
Labor party is on record as
favoring its eventual implemen-
tation, may consider that a
program of violence would be
detrimental to their cause. In
addition, Greek Cypriot right-
wing leaders would be either
eliminated or so restricted in
their activities that Communists
might increase their influence
on the island. For these rea-
sons, the ethnarchy may be con-
sidering the substitution of
some form of passive resistance
for an all-out EOKA campaign
of terrorism.
Meanwhile, the Turkish
Cypriot underground organiza-
tion has called for a campaign
of passive resistance and non-
cooperation with the British
but has warned that further vio-
lence will be met with force.
The leader of the "Cyprus is
Turkish" party, Fazil Kuchuk,
on returning to Nicosia from
Ankara, emphasized the identity
of interest of Ankara and the
Turks on Cyprus and declared
that if the Turkish minority
proved inadequate for securing
partition, Turkey "is ready to
step in to help _UT .?IF
FOREIGN POLICY DIFFERENCES IN ISRAEL
The Israelis regard union
of Egypt and Syria as increas-
ing the Arab threat to their
security. In this context, the
nature of Israel's relationship
with the West--the basic issue
which provoked the country's
government crisis in late Decem-
ber--will assume renewed signif -
ica.nce as a political issue.
This issue remained unresolved
after the crisis, since the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE SUk,, 6lt.tlY
6 February 1958
"new" government has the same
membership as the last, and the
members of the coalition who
oppose Prime Minister Ben-Gur-
ion's policy of closer associa-
tion with Western powers have
not altered their fundamental
views. The controversy may be
silenced publicly for the time
being, but Egyptian-Syrian union
may bring it into the open again.
Achdut Haavoda and Mapam,
the left-wing labor parties in
the 'coalition, have long advo-
cated neutrality in the conflict
between East and West, partly
because of their ideological
affinity for the Soviet "home-
land of socialism" and partly
because of their distrust of
the capitalist West. The fact
that Achdut Haavoda was bold
enough last December to jeop-
ardize the government by publi-
cizing a planned "arms purchas-
ing" mission to West Germany
is indicative of the strength
of neutralist sentiment in
Israel.
Since the Middle East now
is a major theater of the East-
West conflict, the validity of
neutralism has increased in the
eyes of its Israeli adherents.
They reason that while formerly
Israel had only to contend with
a relatively weak, divided Arab
world, the situation has changed
as the USSR has been providing
large-scale support to Syria
and Egypt--support which prob-
ably will continue following
their union. The neutralists
argue that Israel does not en-
joy comparable strong bucking
from the West; therefore an
"independent" foreign policy
should be adopted in order to
propitiate the USSR and possi-
bly improve Israel's relations
with the Arabs.
Ben-Gurion, on the other
hand, advocates closer relations
with the West to counter Soviet
influence among the Arabs--a
policy of meeting strength with
strength, Accordingly, he has
sought a guarantee of Israel's
security through overtures to
the United States and other
NATO countries and has achieved
a close working relationship
with France. On the economic
level, similar approaches have
been made, such as the Israeli
statement recently circulated
to all delegates to the Organ-
ization of European Economic
Cooperation asking for "grad-
ual integration of Israel into
existing or emerging European
organizations for economic
cooperation."
While this policy very
likely will be continued by the
present government, Ben-Gurion
also realizes Israel cannot
speak up very bcldlyto Moscow-_
as shown by Israel's very mild
reply to the Bulganin note of
last December. As a result both
of this realization and of the
recent crisis, Ben-Gurion may
become more secretive than ever
about his diplomatic moves to-
ward the Nest, which may in turn
lead to increased criticism from
HIGHLIGHTS OF BAGHDAD PACT MINISTERIAL COUNCIL MEETING
All delegations at the
meeting of the Baghdad Pact
Ministerial Council which con-
vened in Ankara from 27 to 30
January apparently were satis-
fied with its modest achieve-
ments. Their satisfaction may
have resulted from the atten-
dance of the high-ranking Amer-
ican observer delegation, which
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
BAGHDAD PACT ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
COUNCIL DEPUTIES
Liaison
Committee
Liaison Committee
Drafting Group
Combined Military
Planning Staff
Military Secretariat
Public Relations
Working Group
Economic
Committee
Countersubversion
Committee
Permanent Subcommittees
Agriculture
Trade
Health
Communications
Ad Hoc Working Groups
Budget & Administration
Committee
Secre1tarene1
Public Relations I Political & Administrative
Division I Division
made strong statements support-
ing the pact.
At the meeting, the Com-
bined Military Planning Organ-
ization was redesignated the
Combined Military Planning :,taff,
which may lead eventually to a
joint command. The new staff,
to be headed by Turkish General
Ekrem Akalin, will not have
troops under its command, but a
staff exercise will be held in
the near future.
The Military Committee
has directed the staff to re-
view what the extent of the
pact area's involvement would
be in the event of a global war,
to make a reconnaissance of
defensive areas, to appraise
the effects of nuclear attacks,
to determine land force require-
Economic
Division
r------J
C ountersub-
version Office
Security
Organization
ments, and to study the types
and nationality of needed units.
A number of controversial
issues were raised during the
meeting, including problems
concerning Israel, Algeria, and
Kashmir. However, only Iraq's
insistence that an official
stand be taken favoring the re-
turn of Israel to the borders
recommended by the 1947 UN res-
olution threatened a crisis.
After considerable opposition
developed, Iraq reluctantly
withdrew its recommendation.
Iran's earlier threat to
withdraw from the pact has been
headed off, temporarily at
least, by the Shah's satisfac-
tion over the outcome of the
meeting. He apparently is con-
vinced that Iran achieved its
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6 February 1958
objectives and that approval
was given for expansion of its
military forces.
The delegations were dis-
turbed by the prospect of the
Syrian-Egyptian union. They
feared, however, that attempts
by pact members to oppose union
would only assure its success
and possibly cause Syria and
Egypt to secure more backing
from the USSR.
Moscow sought in advance
to undercut the meeting by pro-
testing to Pakistan on 23 Janu-
ary against the alleged estab-
lishment of American missile
bases there and offering "dis-
interested" economic aid if
Pakistan would change its poli-
cy toward the Baghdad Pact and
SEATO. The USSR also promised
Iran a "new" program of econom-
Communist World Reaction
Soviet propaganda media
promptly reported the success-
ful launching of the American
"Explorer," but comment has been
light and the subject has been
treated routinely in newscasts.
The authors of initial comments,
like those of Moscow's early
commentaries on Sputnik I, are
mostly scientists.
Soviet comment has acknowl-
edged the peaceful scientific
value of the earth satellite,
while stressing the continued
Soviet lead in rocketry. It has
sought to give the impression
of graciously welcoming the
American achievement and peace-
ful competition, but congratu-
lated the United States scien-
tists in a patronizing manner.
Given widest publicity have been
the congratulatory telegram from
the Soviet Academy of Sciences
and a commentary by Soviet scien-
is aid which would vanish "any-
thing you want" without strings.
The USSR devoted a large
volume of propaganda to the
meeting. Moscow, along with
other states opposing the pact,.
sought to intensify opposition
sentiment in the area by charg-
ing that the Ankara meeting was
an American attempt to force
rocket and nuclear bases on
pact members and by alleg that
the meeting revealed splits
among pact members. The USSR
continues to emphasize that the
peoples of the area and the
Moslem holy places are endan-
gered by Western military ties
in contrast to conditions which
would arise if the Soviet pro-
posal for making the Middle
East a "zone of dace " were
adopted.
tist Blagonravov pointing out
that the Explorer is of "very
inconsiderable" size as compared
with the sputniks, and that the
American launching was a less
momentous event than its Soviet
precursor.
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Presidium member A. I.
Mikoyan made the first comment
by a member of the Soviet hier-
archy on the subject while at-
tending a Ceylonese Embassy re-
ception. While noting he w-
"pleased" by the American achieve-
ment, he chided that "of course
we waited some time for this
event to take place. But it
finally happened. That is good,
It's peaceful competition, you
know." Mikoyan made it clear
that Russia will send up "sev-
eral more" sputniks.
With the exception of Po-
land, Eastern European comment
has been generally deprecating,
stressing that the Explorer was
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
launched four months after the
first sputnik, that it is tech-
nically inferior to the Soviet
satellites, and that ,it was de-
signed by a former Nazi. The
Polish press, howeve;, had words
of high praise for the American
achievement, saying the Ameri-
cans "deserve full credit for
having managed to convert a
military missile into a satel-
lite rocket within a few months:'
One'Polish scientist was quoted
aaying: "This is a far more
important thing,(Sdientifically)
than the other one up there--a
useless piece of metal with a
dead dog in it." Polish Premier
Cyrankiewicz also hailed the
launching as a "fine scientific
achievement."
Peiping's propaganda re-
action has been the most caustic
so far. People's Dail edito_
rially called the Ex_ plovers--
launched by "relatively back-
ward" American racketeers--a
far cry from the Soviet sputniks
and pointed to the fact that it
was launched by "only a medium-
range rocket" unlike the Soviet
ICBM.
Non-Communist reaction was
almost unanimously favorable.
"Relief and satisfaction" sum
up the public and official re-
action in Western Europe. The
three powers most concerned with
possible summit talks stressed
the achievement in the perspec-
tive of its probable influence
on such talks. The British For-
eign Office is "delighted," and
the press saw increased prob-
ability of early summit talks.
French diplomatic officials
called the Explorer an element
favorable to an international
detente and also to convocation
of a summit conference.
Both the West German Gov-
ernment an0.. the opposition
hailed the Explorer. The Chris-
tian Democrats believe the United
States can now meet the Soviet
Union on equal terms, and mili-
tary circles were quoted as re-
lieved at the restoration of the
military equilibrium. Opposi-
tion Socialists said that neither
East nor West can draw decisively
ahead in the arms race and called
for new disarmament negotiations.
Asian-African response to
the launching has been both lim-
ited and delayed. Comment to
date has generally expressed
satisfaction and the hope that
the scientific advances will
help lead to a lessening of in-
ternational tensions. All
Japanese papers, while admitting
the smaller size of the Explorer,
praised its quality and pre-
dicted that America, would over-
take the Russians. They feared,
however, the development of a
"space race"and called for sum-
mit talks. Indonesian Foreign
Minister Subandrio congratulated
the United States and expressed
hope that both America and
Russia, will use their scientific
knowledge for humanitarian pur-
poses.
Australian Prime Minister
Menzies declared that the launch-
ing "now greatly strengthened"
President Eisenhower's proposals
for peaceful use of investiga-
tions of outer space, and the
press called the launching a
"decisive move in the cold war,"
declaring that "it is in the
psychological sphere that the
American satellites will be most
felt and welcome."
In both Syria and Egypt the
launching took second place to
the proclamation of a "United
Arab Republic." In both coun-
tries, though, the American suc-
cess was noted but invidious com-
parisons with the Russian sat-
ellites were emphasized.
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The growth rate of the
USSR's industrial production
in 1957, according to a report
of the Central Statistical Ad-
ministration, was well above
that of the United States and
well above plan, although
slightly below the 1956 level.
The rousing plan, which was
ambitious, was overfulfilled
for the first time in Soviet
history, reflecting a shift in
investment allocations in favor
of the consumer. The -nonfulfill-
ment of production and invest-
ment goals in some important
industries, however, indicates
that the attempt to push the
housing, agricultural, defense,
and heavy industry programs
simultaneously continues to
run into the problem of com-
peting priorities.
The announced rate of in-
crease in total industrial pro-
duction was 10 percent in 1957
as compared with 10,7 in 1956,
Growth rates in most instances
were below 1956 rates and be-
USSR: OUTPUT IN SELECTED BASIC INDUSTRIES
COAL
MILLION METRIC TONS
1950 '55 '56 '57 '60
ACTUAL ORIGINAL
GOAL
ROLLED STEEL
MILLION METRIC TONS
35.3 37
1950 '55 '56 '57 '60
ACTUAL ORIGINAL
GOAL
ELECTRIC POWER CRUDE OIL
BILLION KILOWATT HOURS 320 MILLION METRIC TONS
low the rates necessary to en-
sure achievement of original
1960 goals. The rate of in-
crease of national income, in-
fluenced by a fall in agricul-
tural production from the un-
usually high level of 1956,
dropped from 12 percent in 1956
to 6 percent in 1957.
Progress in meeting planned
output goals in heavy in-
dustry was uneven, with short-
falls reported in electric pow-
er, natural gas, pig iron, and
crude steel, but with overful-?
fillment in coal, petroleum,
finished steel, cement, and
mineral fertilizers. The over-
all success of the 1957 plan
was achieved in part merely by
setting more modest levels for
the year's goals, in contrast
to the very high levels set in
previous years.
Total capital investment,
which increased 12 percent in
1957 in contrast to an initial
planned goal of only 8 percent,
1950 '55 '56 '57 '60
ACTUAL ORIGINAL
GOAL
CEMENT
MILLION METRIC TONS
22.524.9128'-9
1950 '55 '56 '57 '60
ACTUAL ORIGINAL
GOAL
SECRE 7
1950 '55 '56 '57 '60
ACTUAL ORIGINAL
GOAL
CRUDE STEEL
MILLION METRIC TONS 68.3
45.3 48
1950 '55 '56 '57 '60
ACTUAL ORIGINAL
GOAL
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was still considerably below
the announced 17-percent in-
crease in investment in 1956.
The investment plans for com-
pletion of new production cApac-
in the coil mining, iron
ore mining, cement, and ferrous
metallurgical industries were
underfulfilled. These indus-
tries, in which plans for new
capacity also were
not met in 1956, were
cited by Pervukhin
in early 1557 .as
being bottlenecks.
Shortfalls- in these
areas are in sharp
contrast to the suc-
cess in meeting the
ambitious housing in-
vestment program and
the modest plan for
increasing over-all
non-housing construc-
tion.
The increase in
the number of workers
and employees in 19,57
equaled the 1956 in-
Soviet comparison of 1957
agricultural production with
the relatively poor performance
of 1953 in the official plan
report indicates Soviet dis-
appointment over 1957 achieve-
ments. The total grain harvest
--26 percent above the 1953
level--produced no increase
over 1955 in the amount of grain
REPORTED
1951- 55 I1956 1957
...-.. G- 1957 I PLAN
GROSS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
13.1
10.7
10.0
7.1
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY
7.0
6.9
6.5
5.4
COAL
8.4
10.0
7.9
6.3
ELECTRIC POWER
13.3
13.0
9.1
9.9
ROLLED STEEL
11.1
7.0
5.8
3.9
CRUDE STEEL
10.7
7.0
4.9
6.0
CEMENT
14.1
11.1
16.0
12.4
CRUDE OIL
13.3
18.0
17.3
15.7
crease, but industrial labor
productivity, although above
plan, rose only 6.5 percent in
1957 as compared with 8 per-
cent in 1955 and 7 percent in
1956. A rise in the rate dur-
ing the second half of 1957
suggests the possibility of fur-
ther improvement under` the new-
managerial- 'organization and as
thereorganization'of the wage
structure?continues.
25X1
procured by the state. Meat
production increased at a some-
what higher rate than in 1956,
but the increase in milk pro-
duction was slightly less than
in 1956. Neither grew at a
rate which would guarantee ful-
fillment of the Khrushchev meat
and milk goals.
(Prepared by ORR
25X1
Only two years after his
denunciation of the Stalin
cult, Khrushchev has himself
taken over a special niche in
the Soviet press, At no time
since he became first secretary
of the party in 1953 have his
activities and pronouncements
commanded so much attention in
Soviet propaganda as in recent
months. Habitually sensitive
to the realities of political
power, the press expends little
effort on maintaining the ap-
pearances of "collective leader-
ship."
Khrushchev's conspicuous
place in Soviet publications
seems to derive, for the most
part, from his expanded role as
principal policy spokesman for
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the regime rather than from a
contrived propaganda build-up-
It falls well short of the
sanctified eminence enjoyed by
Stalin in his later years.
Nevertheless, there are some
signs--notably in the recent
attempt by the party journal
Kommunist to.magkif y Khru-
s ichev'spart in the World War
II victory at Stalingrad--of
an incipient "cult of person-
ality" forming around the party
chief
Because of the volume of
Khrushchev?s pronouncements
and his increasingly close iden-
tification with major policy
positions--whether in agricul-
tural organization or litera-
ture--the phrase "as Comrade
Khrushchev has pointed out"
occurs with growing regularity
in the soviet press. In his
frequent excursions outside the
Soviet capital, he manages to
publicize himself and his
familiarity with local prob-
lems, as Stalin never did,
while also receiving with no
apparent pangs of modesty the
honors due a powerful figure.
During his visit to Kiev
last December, where he domi-
nated an anniversary session
of the Ukrainian Supreme So-
viet, it was reported that
flowers were scattered in his
path, and at Minsk, in January,
he seems to have thrown him-
self grandly into the part of
"father of his people," On
that occasion, he opened his
speech by answering questions
addressed to him on a variety
of local problems, taking the
tone of a stern but equitable
patron of lesser folk.
Khrushchev has stolen much
of the public play from Bul-
ganin and his other Presidium
colleagues. He has made in-
creased use of the interview
technique in recent months as
a means of launching and sus-
taining a propaganda campaign
and possibly also as a means
of signifying his personal
authority. Since last June he
has granted 12 such interviews
to foreign newspaper representa-
tives, while Bulganin has given
two and other Presidium members
have given none.
The once-familiar Khru-
shchev-Bulganin public relations
team last functioned in Czecho-
slovakia in July 1957. On sub-
sequent trips into Eastern
Europe, Khrushchev was either
accompanied by Mikoyan or
traveled alone, as was appar-
ently the case in the recent
visit to Poland. Bulganin's
name has, however, appeared
often in the Soviet press in
recent weeks in connection with
the series of notes sent to
foreign governments, which, in
accordance with protocol, car-
ried his signature as premier.
Otherwise, in formal interviews
and off-the-cuff statements to
foreign newsmen, Khrushchev has
taken the lead in the effort
to build pressure for a summit
conference.
The announcement in Moscow
on 21 January that "a collection
of Nikita Khrushchev's speeches
last year on the foreign policy
of the USSR and international
relations has been issued in
a mass edition" would appear to
give a clear picture of where
the real authority in foreign
policy lies.
MIKHAIL A. MENSHIKOV--NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE US
Mikhail A. Menshikov, for-
mer Soviet ambassador to India,
,arrived in the United States on
6 February to assume his new
duties as ambassador. A late-
comer to the diplomatic corps,
SECRET
Menshikov is a foreign trade
specialist and is known in the
United States for his work with
the UN Relief and Rehabilitation
Administration. His major aim
in Washington will probably be
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VAMW
6 February 1958
to stress the need for improved
Soviet-American relations
through contacts between top
leaders.
For his first diplomatic
assignment, Menshikov;was sent
to New Delhi in 1953, shortly
after the death of Stalin
dike his predecessor
25X1
25X6
25X6
Georgiy Zarubin, Menshikov is
a candidate member of the cen-
tral committee, having been
elected at the 20th party con-
gress in February 1956, He
impressed Ambassador Thompson
favorabl but as inferior in
to his predecessor. ILLEGIB
His long association with Miko-
yan, however, may give him more
influence in Moscow than Zaru-
bin enjoyed,
Once established in Wash-
ington, Menshikov will probably
push the Soviet campaign for
high-level bilateral meetings.
During a conversation with Am-
bassador Thompson, Menshikov
stressed the need for improvec'
Soviet-American relations through
contacts between top leaders,
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6 February 1958
In a return to policies
for 100-percent collectiviza-
tion which were temporarily
suspended following the Hungar-
ian revolt, the Rumanian regime
has stepped up its campaign to
force landowning peasants and
agricultural cooperatives into
collective farms. The present
effort is concentrated on re-
gions east of Bucharest--Con-
stanta, Iasi, and Galati. The
regime is emphasizing the level
of collectivization attained
and the total land area incor-
porated into the "socialist
sector," rather than the number
of families involved,
The areas of Constant a,
Iasi, and Galati in eastern Ru-
mania have always been con-
sidered as a sort of "New Lands"
by the regime. The terrain,
moveover, is such as
itself to the forma-
tion of large col-
lective farms, which
probably accounts for
the drive being
pushed there. After
the postwar distribu
tion of estates, the
average landholdings
there were larger
than those throughout
the rest of the coun-
try. The climate is
poor and the crop
yield has been low
even in years of ex-
ceptionally good har
vest, as in 1957.
The peasants in
Constanta, were among
the first to pool
their properties in
1948 and 1949, and
were the first to
form agricultural co-
operatives or asso-
ciations, There is
considerable dis -
to lend
parity in other areas of Ru-
mania both as to the amount of
land collectivized and the pres-
sure being brought to bear by
the regime. In mountainous
Transylvania, for instance,
little or no effort has been ap-
plied, particularly in the pres-
ent drive. About 45 percent of
the total arable land in Ru- 25X1
mania has been collectivized.
easants are
e and that
in at least two instances the
regime has found it necessary
to use troops to suppress armed
uprisings. While the eossib.l-
ity that such resistance has
developed cannot be ruled out,
the peasants in these districts
have remained fairly passive in
the past, preferring obstruc-
tionist tactics to violence.
Area where co lIectivization
campaign is being pushed
6 FEBRUARY i9 se
O MILES 100
TRAnrs t N/A
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A
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CURRJNT INTLLLIGENC' 11TLtiKLl' SUMMARY
6 February 1958
In the present campaign,
peasants have been forced to
sign declarations that they
support the regime's agricultur-
al policy--failure to do so be-
ing tantamount to political
disloyalty--and that they are
willing to assist in its imple-
mentation. Armed with these
statements, the regime has pro-
ceeded to socialize the land
according to its own timetable.
An estimated 30,000-40,000
agitators have engaged in a
door-to-door campaign to elicit
the peasants' "voluntary con-
sent."
In July 1957, Constanta
was alleged to be fully "co-
operativized," and on 20 Octo-
ber,the press announced it had
been completely collectivized,
thus becoming the first sizable
area outside the USSR to be
fully patterned after the Soviet
model,
The regime's decision to
force 100-percent collectiviza-
tion at this time under the
pretext, presumably, of provid-
ing a "rational" scheme of land
utilization with the free con-
sent of the peasants may have
been prompted by last year's
record harvest. In addition,
urban areas apparently are bene-
fiting from a more than adequate
food supply, The renewed drive
may portend a nationwide cam-
paign, but there are as yet no
indications of any intention
by the regime to widen it ap-
preciably early in 1958 or to 25X1
reintroduce any system of com-
pulsory grain deliveries
I
Ho Chi Minh's current state
visit to India and Burma is his
first trip outside the Commu-
nist bloc since negotiating
with the French in 1946. The
North Vietnamese President and
party boss will try to offset
the favorable impression which
South Vietnam's President Diem
reportedly made on Indian offi-
cialdom during his tour of India
last November, and he will seek
to halt the decline of North
Vietnam's prestige in Burma
which began during the last
year.
North's dictatorial methods
and economic failures have low-
25X1
Both Nehru and U Nu visited
Hanoi after the French defeat;
and, although neither India nor
Burma extended diplomatic recog-
nition to North Vietnam, both
governments seemingly acted on
the premise that--Communist or
not--Ho Chi Minh was the legit-
imate heir to the Vietnamese
nationalist movement. Diems
success in South Vietnam and
an increasing awareness of the
not is determined to keep the
commission alive as a symbol
of the validity of the 1954
Geneva Agreements. Both Hanoi
and Moscow apparently regard
the agreements as a moderately
effective propaganda weapon to
inhibit a major military build-
up in the South. France has
withdrawn its financial support
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6 February 1958
of the ICC, and the UK has also
indicated its desire to cut back
its contribution to ICC operat-
ing funds. In addition, Canada
apparently intends to reduce
its commission personnel when
headquarters are moved from
Hanoi to Saigon in March. Ho
will almost certainly ask Nehru
to resist these Western a.t-
tempts to reduce the size of the
ICC. He will also request
India. and Burma to support
Hanoi's demand that the Geneva
Agreements be implemented.
Nehru is likely to be noncom-
mittal.
Diem's recent decision to
call off his own visit to Burma
this month rather than arrive
close on the heels of Ho's tour
seems to have piqued Rangoon
officals. Nevertheless, Ho
will encounter in Rangoon an
attitude which views Diem's
administration in an increas-
ingly favorable light. Ran-
goon's decision last December
to allow both South and North
Vietnam to establish consulates
general there was actually more
of a victory for Saigon, which
had no representation in Burma,
than for Hanoi, which has main-
tained a quasi-official mission
in Rangoon since 1947.
The presence in Ho's en-
tourage of his ministers of cul-
ture and commerce suggests his
intention to carry on discus-
sions in these fields. Ho will
probably stress Hanoi's accept-
ance of "peaceful coexistence"
among states of different ideol-
ogies,` emphasizing the "common
Asian outlook" which the North
shares with Burma and India.
BURMESE PREMIER REJECTS COMMUNIST METHODS
Burma's Prime Minister U
Nu, in his four-hour address on
29 January to the Third National
Congress of the governing Anti-
Fascist People's Freedom League
(AFPFL), repudiated Marxism as
the league's guiding political.
philosoply, In his a.na,ly. ;
s i s
ve,lopment. :anal philosophic
"state capitalism," he re-
jected dialectical materialism
as incompatible with Buddhism
and stated that the AFPFL "ap-
proves only some parts" of
Ma.rxian economic doctrine. In
pledging that the AFPFL would
build -a socialist state only
through democratic means, Nu
warned of the necessity of
guarding against an excessive
c'oncentra.tion of power leading
to totalitarianism, thus by im-
plication at least strongly
condemning Marxian Communism.
U Nu's speech is of con-
siderable significance in reg-
istering in a definitive and
colorful fashion the AFPFL's
commitment to a democratic so-
cialism of the British Labor
party variety. It points up the
degree to which Burma's leaders
have, in ten years since in-
dependence, abandoned their
rigidly doctrinaire socialism,
which in some instances was
scarcely distinguishable from
Communism,
The Burmese prime minister's
address suggests a, deliberate
effort by the AFPFL to distin-
guish itself ideologically from
the Communist-led National United
Front (NUF), the only opposi-
tion group with prospects of de-
feating the AFPFL at the polls
in the foreseeable future, The
NUP will probably be increasing-
ly attacked by AFPFL speakers
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6 February 1958
as the party of Communist
"stooges" who would seek to build
a socialist state in Burma by
totalitarian methods.
The AFPFL executive commit-
tee reportedly approved Nu's
speech in draft after extensive
and detailed consideration.
While apparently in accord on
ideology, the continuation of
factionalism stemming from
rivalry for power among the top
NEW JAPANESE BUDGET RAISES DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
The Japanese Government
has approved and sent to the
Diet for final endorsement a
national budget for the fiscal
year beginning 1 April which
is economically sound and re
m4rkably free of "'political" ap-
propriations despite the pros-
JAPANESE BUDGETS
FOR FISCAL YEARS 1957 AND 1958
(MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
UNCLASSIFIED
1957
1958
DEFENSE
391
406
SOCIAL SECURITY
321
332
EDUCATION
375
403
PENSIONS
286
300
REPARATIONS
61
66
PUBLIC WORKS
455
453
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
519
622
OTHER
752
1,062
TOTAL
3,160
3,644
SURPLUS
121
277
(ANTICIPAT
AFPFL leaders is suggested by
Deputy Prime Minister Ba Swe's
emotional opening speech to the
congress in which he pledged to
"fight" if necessary those "who
are creating the splits" in AFPFL
ranks. Ba Swe's statement tends
to confirm rumors of another
bitter dispute between U Nu and
Deputy Prime Minister Kyaw Nyein,
this time over the appointment
of a secretary general for the
AFPFL.
payments crisis; some reduction
of corporation taxes, but not
of personal income taxes; in-
creased expenditures for defense
and for veterans' pensions; and
a new appropriation for eco-
nomic cooperation with South-
east Asia.
While the total budget of
$3.64 billion is 15 percent
larger than that of the previous
year, a substantial surplus
exists and actual expenditures
will be only slightly higher be-
cause sizable amounts are to be
set aside for debt retirement
and for a special contingency
reserve. An exception to the
tight money policy, which Japan
initiated in 1957, is the estab-
lishment of a fund to aid small
businesses hard hit by their in-
ability to obtain credit. Ex-
penditures for social welfare,
education, and local government
are greater than last year.
The $333,000,000 appropri-
ated for defense is about 19
percent more than last year.
In addition, the Japanese Gov-
ernment will make available
$73,000,000 in yen currency and
facilities assistance for Am-
erican forces in Japan. The
defense appropriation, approxi-
mately 11,2 percent of the total
budget, will permit a 10,000-man
pect of general elections dur-
ing the year. Its major fea-'tures are a continuation of the
tight money policy to deal with
the international balance-of-
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6 February 1958
build-up of the Ground Self-
Defense Force as well as small
increa.ses for the air and naval
forces.
A unique feature of the
1958 budget is an appropriation
of approximately $14,000,000
for economic cooperation with
Southeast Asia, a program which
Japan has long espoused but has
not taken practical steps to
implement.
The press and public opin-
ion in general have joined the
Socialists in criticizing the
increase in veterans' pensions,
which amount to 6.5 percent of
total. appropriations. The So--
cialists claim that the pensions
and defense expenditures, in
effect, constitute a. "rearma-
ment budget."
Despite Socialist criticism,
the budget is expected to be
passed by the Diet substantially
unchanged, a.fter which Prime
Minister Kishi probably will
turn his attention to setting
a date for general elections.
Although many conservatives
have pressured for politically
attractive appropriations to
win votes, early indications
are that the budget will not 25X1
be a, significant factor in the
elections.
CONTINUING TENS7ON IN CUBA
President Batist"'s ef-
forts to create political peace
in Cuba. in prepara.tion for the
general elections on 1 June
have produced little more than
a surface calm. Revolutionary
elements are stepping up their
campaign of terror and have an-
nounced plans to sabotage indus-
trial. installations, including
those owned by US interests, as
well as sugar cane fields and
tobacco warehouses, There are
also new signs of plotting
against Batista among the
tary, the principal bulwark of
his regime.
Apparently realizing that
an attempt to retain the presi-
dency after the end of his con-
stitutiona.l term in February
1959 would be met by determined,
if not violent, opposition,
Batista last November authorized
the reorganization of the mili-
tary to allow a retired presi-
dent to assume the position of
general in chief of the a.rmed
forces.
This bid for absolute pow-
er via. the milita.ry is thinly
veiled, and general opposition
to the plan may become marked
as elections approach. In re--
shuffling officer assignments
on 29 January in order to put
the new defense law into opera-
tion, Batista appointed a ruth-
less and extremely unpopular
officer as army chief of staff.
This appointment, coupled with
increasing police brutalities
in dealing with both military
personnel and civilians, may pro-
voke open manifestations of 25X1
discontent within the army,
Preparations for elections
are progressing in the relative-
ly free atmosphere provided by
Batista's restoration of con-
stitutional guarantees on 25
January. The nomination of
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6 February 1958
Prime Minister Andres Rivero
Aguero by Batista's Progressive
Action party on 3 February was
tantamount to his designation
as presidential candidate for
the government coalition, Two
opposition parties have named
presidential candidates, and
a third is expected to declare
its candidate before long.
There is little chance for the
divided opposition to offer
more than a token challenge
to the government candidate.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SUDAN'S RELATIONS WITH
Sudanese Premier Abdull*b
Khalil has resisted the diplo.-
matic and trade approaches of
the Sino-Soviet bloc. A Soviet
offer of substantial economic
aid and trade--the.major bloc
initiative thus fax--was sub-
mitted last August amid a near
crisis over cotton surpluses.
The offer was shelved despite
the objections of some members
of the coalition government,
and the recent rise in cotton
sales to Western nations makes
it unlikely the offer will be
reconsidered in the near future.
THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC
aimed at the local Communists.
However, the Sudanese Communists,
who have been particularly suc-
cessful in the labor movement,
are well organized and benefit
from the sometimes parallel
activities of pro-Egyptian ele-
ments in the Sudan.
The parliamentary elections
to be held from 27 February to
8 March appear to promise the
return of the present pro-West-
ern coalition with Khalil re-
maining in control, but a slight
shift in favor of opposition
elements could result in a weak-
er coalition more susceptible
to bloc approaches.
Sino-Soviet Bloc Approaches
Since attaining independ-
ence on 1 January 1956, the
Sudan has exchanged diplomatic
recognition with all the bloc
countries except East Germany
and Communist China. It re-
buffed East German approaches,
in line with Arab League policy,
but leftist and pro-Egyptian
elements have maintained con-
stant pressure for recognition
of the Peiping regime.
25X1
During the first half of 1957,
trade with the bloc amounted to
only 2,2 percent of the Sudan's
total trade,
The Sudan's improved eco-
nomic outlook has apparently
given Khalil enough1confidence
to stiffen his opposition to
bloc activities in his country
and to the activities of local.
Communists. He has protested
to the Soviet ambassador about
the activities of Soviet diplo-
matic personnel in the Sudan,
is adamant in his opposition to
recognition of East Germany and
Communist China, and apparently
plans restrictive legislation
The USSR has accelerated
cultural contacts at all levels
since it established diplomatic
relations in March 1956. Su-
danese students have been a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February. 1958
special target of bloc offers,
and more than 40 are receiving
expensespaid educations$i n
bloc countries. Approximately
60 Sudanese youths attended
the World Federation of Demo-
cratic Youth (WFDY) festival
in Moscow in the summer of
19 57 .
Communist China's cultural
efforts have been limited to
sending an entertainment and
artistic group in the spring of
1956 and founding a Sudanese-
Chinese friendship society in
Khartoum in January 1957. Trade
discussions have had little ef-
fective results, the latest
ending with an innocuous com-
muniquG on 9 January.
RIBM9ndr
BELGIAN
CONGO
RI IANI IA-I IRUND
6 FEBRUARY 1959
J MILES 500
24430
The immediate goal of the
Communists in the Sudan is to
establish a common front with
any elements in opposition to
the present government coali-
tion in an effort to weaken or
defeat it. The Communists in-
tend to fight against Khalil's
announced plan to strengthen
constitutional restrictions on
subversive activities. They
are also campaigning for in-
creased trade with the bloc,
labor union cooperation with
the Egyptian-dominated Arab
Confederation of Labor Unions
linked with the WFTU, and a
general adoption of the "posi-
tive-neutralist" line of Egypt.
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6 February 1958
While Prime Minister Khalil
has been cool to most Sino-So-
viet approaches, the impact of
propaganda activities combined
with indecisiveness'among mem-
bers of the cabinet have made
the government generally in-
effective in combating the
publicity accompanying these
approaches, Now relieved some-
what of the concern over the
economic situation and confident
of winning the parliamentary
elections, Khalil says he in-
tends to crack down on subver-
sive activities and counter
neutralist and pro-Soviet pres-
sures. Current negotiations for
American aid are apparently ex-
pected to bolster this new in-
itiative, and several steps,
such as rejection of the Soviet
economic offer, the protest to
the Soviet ambassador, and the
planning of antisubversive leg-
islation, have been taken since
November 19 57 ,
The Outlook
The effectiveness of Sino-
Soviet bloc and internal Com-
munist offensives in the Sudan
in the near future will be deter-
mined by the outcome of the
parliamentary elections, the
sale of Sudanese cotton, and
the course of Egyptian foreign
policy. At present, any indi-
cation by the Sudanese that
they would reconsider bloc as-
sistance apparently would be
met by a reaffirmation of So-
viet willingness to extend eco-
nomic aid.
The retention of authority
by Premier Khalil, which now
appears the probable outcome
of the elections, may not be
sufficient in itself to main-
tain the Sudan?s present pro-
Western orientation. Only a
striking victory of pro-Western
candidates would ensure a maxi-
mum effort by the government to
resist all Communist efforts at
subversion. The more likely
partial victory may result in
only half measures to control
internal subversion and a con-
tinuation of pressures favoring
the bloc. If the Sudanese one-
crop economy is faced with a
poor cotton market and does not
receive compensating assistance
from Western sources, Communist
pressures would probably become
irresis-.ible.
In addition, any marked
change in Egyptian foreign policy
would probably have a significant
effect on the course followed
by the Sudan. Egyptian success
in "positive neutralism" will
continue to encourage those
Sudanese desiring a closer align-
ment with the bloc, while a de-
cided shift by Egypt toward
either East or West would prob-
ably be followed by a .similar 25X1
shift in
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6 February 1958
Elements of the thus far
ineffectual and divided opposi-
tion to the Franco regime in
Spain have recently undertaken
to unite all non-Communist op-
ponents of Franco into a na-
tional resistance front prepared
to organize a successor govern-
ment. A wide range of politi-
cal opponents, including Social-
ists and Christian Democrats,
are reported agreed on restora-
tion of the monarchy if con-
tinuing adverse economic condi-
tions should lead influential
military, business, and church
supporters of the regime to
abandon Franco.
supporters, Disturbances re-
portedly planned for late 1957
did not materialize, however;
Giron may have pressed a more
moderate position to advance
his efforts at collaboration
with more conservative opposi-
tion groups.
Giron's followers have the
benefit of organizational ex-
perience and more extensive
contact with the populace than
other opposition groups. If
the economic situation continues
to deteriorate, he is likely to
win large numbers of new adher-
ents among dissident Falangists.
No immediate threat to the
stability of the Franco regime
is yet discernible in the mild
ferment developing among all
foes of the status quo. Or-
ganized political opposition
is not permitted, and even the
most optimistic estimates of
the number of active opponents
within Spain run to only a few
thousand for any of the politi-
cally oriented groups outside
Franco's Falange. It is never-
theless noteworthy that some
steps have been taken to bring
together in support of a provi-
sional restoration of the mon-
archy many disparate parties
ranging from the Socialists to
the Monarchists and including
dissident Falangists, Christian
Democrats, and Functionalists.
Falange Dissidents
The extent and organiza-
tion of the opposition to Franco
which has emerged within Spain's
only legal political organiza-
tion, the Falange, is still un-
clear. Former Labor Minister
Jose Giron is reported to have
assumed leadership of certain
left-wing dissidents who accuse
Franco of increasing conserva-
tism. Sporadic distribution
of "revolutionary action" leaf-
lets in mid-1957 and a brief
demonstration in Madrid on 29
October are attributed to Giron's
Dionisio Ridruejo, a prom-
inent writer who has broken with
the Falange, is trying to unite
Socialists and dissident Falan-
gists in a social democratic
group called the Socialist Party
of Democratic Action (PSAD),
Ridruejo has considerable in-
tellectual and organizational
capabilities and is popular.
His willingness to accept res-
toration of the monarchy is re-
jected, however, by the Barcelona
PSAD and also by the traditional
Socialist party (PSOE), which
was a major force in the 1931-
39 republic.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
Functionalists
The impetus for the hove
to unite the opposition in sup-
port of a monarchy may have
developed from Ridruejo's ties
with the Association for the
Functional Unity of Europe, or-
ganized in 1955 by Enrique
Tierno Galvan,.;a professor of
political law at the University
of Salamanca. The Functional-
ists have the ostensible pur-
pose of promoting European unity,
but their real program is the
replacement of Franco by a con-
stitutional monarchy. Their
members are, for the most part,
young diplomats, intellectuals,
and students, and they have ap-
parently made no effort to de-
velop a mass base.
Ridruejo reportedly joined
the Functionalists in the spring
of 1956, and he may have suc-
ceeded in attracting many of
Tierno Galvan's liberal follow-
ers into his own Socialist party.
A century-old split in mon-
a:rchist ranks was apparently
healed recently when leaders of
the Carlist faction reportedly
agreed to back Don Juan de Bor-
bon, son of the late Alfonso
XIII. The monarchists' politi-
cal views range from reaction-
ary authoritarianism to parlia-
mentary liberalism.
Active liberal monarchists
are few in number, but they have
useful contacts in upper social
strata, and in some church and
military circles. Their promise
of a liberal, constitutional
monarchy has been effective in
winning other opposition groups
to the idea of at least a tem-
porary restoration.
The authoritarian monarch-
ists have been less active in
the opposition since February
1957 when members of Opus Dei,
the Catholic lay organization
with similar views, joined the
Franco cabinet.
Christian Democrats
Two Christian Democratic
groups parallel the division
among the monarchists. The
Spanish Confederation of Inde-
pendent Rightists (CEDA) is led
by Jose Rodriguez Soler and
represents essentially conserva-
tive landowning interests. Un-
der the still influential Jose
Maria Gil Robles, it opposed
the economic and social reforms
of 1931-33 and it remains
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CURR.F,NT INTELJ.,IGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 February 1958
skeptical of the applicability
of Western parliamentary democ-
racy to Spain. It apparently
fears, however, that the ending
of the Franco regime would leave
landowning groups without in-
stitutional representation and
thus has adopted the loose term
"Christian Democratic" to de-
scribe itself in an evident at-
tempt to find fields of common
agreement with the other op-
position forces.
The other main Christian
Democratic group, the recently
organized Christian Democratic
Union (UDC), is led by Manuel
Gimenez Fernandez, minister of
agriculture during the 1931-39
republic and now a law professor
at the University of Seville.
The UDC members are a young
intellectual group oriented
toward the Christian Democratic
parties of the other Western
European countries, The UDC a.p-
parently is having difficulty in
bringing under its direction
several semiautonomous liberal
Christian Democratic groups.
Gimenez has probably impeded
these efforts by instructing
UDC members to recognize the-
reactionary Gil Robles as over-
all leader of the Christian
Democrats. In his eagerness tc
speed collaboration with other
opposition groups, Gimenez has
conferred with Spanish Commu-
nists and recommended their in-
clusion in the post-Franco pro-
visional cabinet.
the PCE ever be allowed to
operate legally within Spain.
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The Spanish Communist par-
ty (PCE) has retained a skeletal
apparatus and perhaps 5,000-
10,000 members in Spain since
the civil war, PCE Secretary
General Dolores Ibarruri, who
is referred to by the few par-
ty dissidents as a "Stalinist,"
continues to have Moscow's po-
litical and, presumably, fi-
nancial backing, and her lead-
ership appears secure for the
present. Her age and unpop-
ularity, however, may bring
about her replacement should
Other Groups
The exiled anarchist Na-
tional Confederation of Labor
(CNT) was a powerful force be-
fore the civil war and probably
still has a considerable number
of supporters within Spain, al-
though
only
9,000 of
its
esti-
mated
21,000
members
are
in the
country. Recent CNT publica-
tions stress the theme "neither
Franco nor king."
Many other exile groups,
including Basque and Catalan
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6 February 1958
separatists and the Republican
government-in-exile in Paris,
do not appear to be playing
particularly active or impor-
tant roles in the present ef -
:Forts toward a united opposi-
tion. Basque and Catalan na-
tionalism contributes to anti-
Franco sentiment, but within
Spain it is apparently no longer
expressed by organized groups
as it was before the civil war.
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