CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001600030001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 45
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 8, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 9, 1958
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
NTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 16
OCR NO. 0027/58
9 January 1958
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January 1958
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC MOVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Moscow has followed up its public demands for new
East-West talks with diplomatic overtures to a number
of governments to urge the United States to assent to
negotiations. The Kremlin probably feels that American
acceptance would undercut efforts to strengthen NATO,
while an American rejection would stimulate the view
that the United States is the principal obstacle to a
lessening of tensions between the Communist bloc and
the West. Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki's proposal
for a nuclear-free zone in central Europe is a major
element in the Soviet bloc's present diplomatic offen-
sive and is being given favorable attention in some
West European press and official circles.
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Prime Minister Djuanda in Djakarta has stated a e
expects increased trouble from the provinces, but no
great change in the internal situation while Sukarno is
out of the country. The Indonesian arms purchasing mis-
sion, now in Eastern Europe, is seeking large amounts
of military equipment, including jet fighters, bombers,
transports, helicopters, and trainers. Moscow, mean-
while, is putting "extreme pressure" on the Indonesian
G3vernment to accept arms and ships.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOVIET AGRICULTURE IN 1957 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1958 . . . . Page 1
Soviet agriculture in 1957 was characterized by ap-
proximately average yields in grain--in contrast to last
year's exceptionally high yields--significant gains in
meat and milk production, a disappointing performance in
cotton, and a large increase in sugar beet production.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January 1958
PART II (continued)
These results, together with the absence of crash agricul-
tural programs for 1958, indicate that prospects are poor
for achieving the original Sixth Five-Year Plan grain
goal for 1960. Despite the 1957 increase in milk and
meat production, Khrushchev's goals to equal America's
per capita production in milk by 1958 and t by 1960-
61 are not likely to be met. 25X1
USSR CLAIMS NEW ACHIEVEMENTS IN AVIATION . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Recent Soviet claims, most of which appear to be with-
in Soviet capabilities, have stressed achievements in avia-
tion which have included new world records and announce-
ments of new aircraft developments. These claims are used
to back the present propaganda campaign hasizing Soviet
technological superiority.
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SOVIET ANNOUNCEMENT ON FORCE REDUCTION . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Moscow's announced plan to reduce its armed forces
by 300,000 is intended to strengthen the impression that
steps to enhance NATO's military potent iai are unnecessary,
and to contrast with efforts to strengthen the Western
ALBANIA DEMONSTRATES AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY . . . . . . . Page 5
n stem er, Al-
anian je ig ers orce own a ritish civil airliner
which allegedly violated Albanian territory. In addition
to reflecting a sensitivity to overflights, which Albania
has heretofore been unable to prevent, the incidents demon-
strate that Albania's air defense system, under development
since 1955, has now reached operational status. 25X1
WEST GERMAN VIEWS OF BERLIN ACCESS PROBLEM . . . . . . . . Page 6
West Berlin and Bonn officials are apprehensive over
the East German regime's assumption of greater control
over access to and from West Berlin. Bonn believes in-
fringement of Allied access calls for firm resistance,
particularly since such action may precede increased harass-
ment or blocking of West German traffic to Berlin. A cur-
tailment of interzonal trade would be Bonn's most effective
retaliatory measure. would be instituted only with re-
luctance. F77 I
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9 January 1958
PART II (continued)
ULBRICHT TO FACE OPPOSITION AT EAST GERMAN PARTY PLENUM . Page
Anti-Ulbricht sentiment in high East German Commu-
nist party circles seems to have reached a new peak, with
a showdown possible at the party central committee's 35th
plenary meeting scheduled for late January. The opposi-
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apparently wishes to force First Secretary
U ric to modify his tough economic policies rather than
overthrow him. The group believes the planned norm in-
creases and wage cuts for workers and intensified pressures
on farmers and artisans to join collectives would not in-
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crease productivity and would cause unrest. F
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FURTHER PRESSURE ON THE EAST GERMAN FARMER . . . . . . . . Page 8
The East German regime is putting into effect agri-
cultural measures which will intensify its struggle with
the private farmer and stimulate further defections by
the increasingly scarce agricultural workers, who have
deserted 1,200,000 acres of farmland since the war. In-
creased collectivization, elimination of free produce
markets, and discrimination in the allocation of various
farm necessities will increase state control over the
private farmer, at the cost of reduced agricultural out-
put.
RIVALRY AMONG NORTH VIETNAMESE LEADERS . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
North Vietnamese Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap
and veteran party theoretician Truong Chinh appear to
be engaged in a power struggle, each heading a faction
in the Hanoi hierarchy. Ho Chi Minh has moved to protect
his position in the party and is probably trying to pre-
vent a serious dispute. Only his presence seems to as-
sure stability. Persistent failures to implement major
policies and reversals of some of them may reflect dis-
agreement among the leaders on how to proceed.
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Peiping has set itself the ambitious goal of sur-
passing the United States economically by the end of
the century. Targets for both the Second Five-Year Plan
(1958-1962) and the 1958 annual plan have recently been
raised, and Peiping has taken the unusual step of sched-
uling the National People's Congress for January instead
of June to consider these matters.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January 1958
PART II (continued)
PEIPING BEGINS EXPULSION OF RIGHTISTS FROM GOVERNMENT
POSTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Peiping's firing of high-level officials in two prov-
inces as "rightists" last week marks the beginning of formal
action against government personnel charged with antiregime
activity. The Chinese Communists have hitherto permitted
such men to continue in office, at least nominally, but the
regime has evidently decided that their usefulness as "liv-
ing textbooks" on the evils of "antisocialist" behavior has
ended. Other leading officials at the provincial level will
probably be dismissed soon, and some members of the central
government are expected to be removed during the National
People's Congress. I
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
In Syria the internal struggle is sharpening between
radical nationalists supported by Egypt and pro-Soviet
groups, with the Communists as their core. An Egyptian
economic delegation is now negotiating in Moscow; an ar-
ticle in a Soviet journal suggests the USSR may be trying
to keep alive the idea that it will assist Egypt's Aswan
high dam project. An Arab oil meeting opening in Cairo
next week is likely to increase pressure for more direct
Arab government participation in the Middle East oil in-
dustry.
AFGHANISTAN TO SEEK FOREIGN GRANTS RATHER THAN LOANS . . . Page 13
Financial difficulties have apparently compelled Af-
ghanistan to seek only grant aid, to the exclusion of loan
aid, which it now receives from both the United States and
the USSR. The USSR is unlikely to offer grant aid but may
offer to ease the terms on its $100,000,000 loan to help
Afghanistan overcome its payment difficulties. The USSR
may also seek to increase its influence by providing eco-
nomic exerts to help solve inflationary problems.
THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Developments in Venezuela since the government crushed
the military revolt on 1-2 January indicate that President
Perez will probably be unable to re-establish complete per-
sonal control over the country. The loyalty of some of the
armed forces is doubtful, and reprisals the government has
taken against militar and civilian elements could touch off
additional violence.
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9 January 1958
PART II (continued)
FRENCH SEEK STRATEGIC NUCLEAR CAPABILITY . . . . . . . . . Page 15
The increasing French desire for advanced weapons,
including hydrogen bombs, may complicate the forthcoming
American-French bilateral talks. These talks are in
response to the American offer at the recent NATO con-
ference to provide IRBM's and to support cooperative de-
velopment of modern weapons for NATO forces. Paris now
wants such arms in order to possess an independent "re-
taliatory" strategic nuclear capability. 25X1
MACMILLAN'S SUGGESTIONS ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS . . . . . . Page 16
Prime Minister Macmillan's cautious support of a
nonaggression pact with the Soviet Union and an eventual
summit meeting has received favorable comment in most
Western European circles. The Kremlin's reaction re-
flects a determination to prevent the West from gaining
credit for moves to reduce international tensions
I
CYPRUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 18
Governor Foot has presented his recommendations for
new moves on Cyprus to the British Cabinet, but no public
announcement on policy is planned until after Parliament
reconvenes on 21 January. EOKA remains passive but
periodically issues warnings of revolt throughout the is-
land unless London meets its demands for Cypriot self-
determination. Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis appears
convinced of the necessity of reaching an accommodation
with Ankara but is pessimistic over the chances of suc-
cess.
JAPAN SEEKS TO REDUCE CONTRIBUTION TO US FORCES . . . . . Page 19
Foreign Minister Fujiyama has requested that the
Japanese contribution toward support of American forces
in Japan be reduced to $56,000,000 for fiscal 1958, in-
stead of to $70,000,000 as stipulated by the terms of an
earlier agreement. The Kishi government believes the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January 1958
PART II (continued)
additional reduction is warranted by the substantial
withdrawal of American troops during 1956-57. It is
under pressure to obtain such a reduction because the
Socialist party, preparing for general elections this
year, is planning to exploit Japanese sensitivities on
any question relating to the presence of American forces
in Japan.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
KHRU SHCHE"." S PARTY MACHINE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
With the downgrading of the Soviet police in 1953,
the reorganization of industrial management in mid-1957,
and the recent exercise of party dominance over the armed
forces, political power in the USSR has become concen-
trated more and more in the party machine, headed by Khru-
shchev. This machine includes the all-union secretariat,
its 20 or so executive departments called the central ap-
paratus, and a highly disciplined hierarchy of subordinate
secretariats and apparatuses (or executive staffs) cor-
responding to the republics, oblasts, and lesser adminis-
trative divisions of the country. Control of the party
machine through the central secretariat has been a primary
factor in Khrushchev's rise to power, and direct influence
in the secretariat may soon become, if it is not already,
the sine qua non for top political stature.
SOVIET TRADE UNIONS REORGANIZED . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Along with the reorganization of industrial manage-
ment, the Soviet trade union structure is being extensive-
ly revamped to facilitate coordination between the trade
unions and the newly formed regional economic councils.
Beginning 1 January, republic, oblast, and krai trade un-
ion councils were to take on added responsibility for fi-
nancial and operational activities of the industrial trade
unions operating within their territoria... jurisdictions.
A central committee resolution adopted in December, in part
empowering factory union committees to participate in draft-
ing production plans, demonstrates the regime's interest in
using the trade unions to stimulate industrial production.
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9 January 1958
PART III (continued)
THE PRE-ELECTION SITUATION IN GUATEMALA . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Campaigning for the 19 January presidential and con-
gressional elections in Guatemala is marked by mounting
partisan bitterness and pub'1.c anticipation of serious
disturbances. It now seems ilcely that none of the three
major presidential candidates will receive a majority,
thus leaving the decision to the present Guatemalan con-
gress, which would probably favor the anti-Communist cen-
ter coalition candidate, Cruz Salazar. The Communist-in-
filtrated Revolutionary party may resort to violence if
it is not declared the winner in the election.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January 1958
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC
Pressure for East-West Talks
Moscow has followed up on
its public demands for new
East-West talks with diplomatic
overtures to a number of govern-
ments to bring pressure on the
United States to assent to
negotiations. The Soviet lead-
ers are trying to capitalize
on the strong sentiment in the
West favoring a new round of
high-level talks. The Kremlin
probably feels that American
acceptance would undercut ef-
forts to strengthen NATO, while
an American rejection would
stimulate the view that the
United States is the princi-
pal obstacle to a lessening of
tensions between the Communist
bloc and ..the West.
Since late December the
Kremlin has engaged in behind-
the-scenes moves--probably on
a widespread scale--to enlist
the support of a number of free
world governments to secure
American agreement to negotia-
Soviet officials have ap-
proached American diplomatic
personnel on several occasions
in efforts to determine Wash-
ington's attitude toward the
proposal in Bulganin's letters
of mid-December for some form
of high-level East-West talks.
On 20 December the Soviet am-
bassador in Rome told the Ameri-
can ambassador there that per-
haps he could "convey some use-
ful message" from the USSR.
Two days later the head
of the USSR's Committee for
Cultural Relations With Foreign-
ers told Ambassador Thompson in
Moscow that East-West problems
could, in the final analysis,
only be resolved by bilateral
Soviet-American negotiations
and pointed out the need for
agreement while President Eisen-
hower and Khrushchev "are still
in office." In trying to sound
out the ambassador, the Soviet
official also expressed the
view that negotiations would be-
come more difficult after NATO
plans to strengthen Western
Europe, particularly West Ger-
many, are being put into effect.
The Rapacki Plan
Polish Foreign Minister
Rapacki's proposal for a nuclear-
free zone in central Europe is
a major element in the Soviet
bloc's present diplomatic of-
fensive and is being given fa-
vorable attention in some West
European press and official
circles.
Rapacki declared in the UN
General Assembly on 2 October
that, if the two German states
would .aconseht'. to ;ban the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January 1958
production and stockpiling of
nuclear weapons on their terri-
tories, Poland would follow
suit. On the same day, Czecho-
slovakia made a similar commit-
ment. Interest in the proposal
lagged until mid-December when
Soviet Premier Bulganin included
it in his letters to the NATO
powers, expanding on Rapacki's
suggestion to include an agree-
ment by the three nuclear powers
not to deploy nuclear weapons
on German territory. Although
the proposal has been greeted
as a new Communist idea, a
similar suggestion was advanced
by the Warsaw Pact powers in
January 1956 and was formally
proposed by the USSR to the
subcommittee of the UN Disarm-
ament Commission in March 1956.
Several of the Soviet bloc
states have joined in this cam-
paign. Poland appears to be
more flexible than the others
in the terms it proposes. Pol-
ish Deputy Foreign Minister
Naszhowski recently told Amer-
ican Ambassador Bean in Warsaw
that the Rapacki plan was not
intended to embarrass West Ger-
many and would not require Bonn
to recognize or negotiate with
East Germany. On 13 December
Rapacki stated that an agree-
ment between the two German
states would be the most direct
method for establishing a nu-
clear-free zone, but implied
that there were other ways of
attaining it.
In contrast to Polish de-
scriptions of the plan, Soviet,
East German, and Czelch state-
ments have consistently re-
ferred to an agreement between
the two German states as an
essential part of the proposal.
The only exception was Bulgan-
~,n'; , letter to Adenauer of
10 December, which avoided
the question.
In his statement of 13 De-
cember, Rapacki referred to the
need for some method of control
but suggested that this problem
could be settled after agreement
on the principle of a nuclear-
free zone had been reached. The
Polish deputy foreign minister
said recently that controls could
be worked out by the "great
powers" involved.
In addition to the nuclear-
free zone, the USSR has been
stressing such other proposals
as a nonaggression pact between
the NATO and Warsaw Pact coun-
tries, the withdrawal of some
or all foreign troops from Ger-
many, and a. ban on tests on nu-
clear and thermonuclear weapons.
Moscow probably believes the
nuclear-free zone is a particu-
larly useful proposal, however,
because of its Polish sponsor-
ship and because of the present
debate in NATO countries over
establishing nuclear and missile
bases in Western Europe.
West European Reaction
The reactions of Western
European political figures to
the Rapacki plan have been
largely determined by their
previous attitude toward a with-
drawal of Soviet and American
forces, the banning of nuclear
weapons, and toward neutralism
in general. Parties and politi-
cians favoring these ideas have
spoken of the Rapacki plan as
"interesting," "promising," or
"worth looking into." Even
those who have generally sup-
ported the strengthening of
NATO have shown some interest`
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S
9 January 1958
in the plan because they feel
it might represent a Polish
scheme to gain the removal of
Soviet forces and they hope it
could help break the deadlock
in the disarmament negotiations.
In Bonn, the Rapacki plan
has been publicly described as
"under study" because it was
included in Bulganin's letter
to Adenauer which will be an-
swered in mid-January. Ade-
nauer, however, said on 21
December that his government
had already concluded that neu-
tral zones were impractical
and added that "a de-atomized
zone seems to me still more
illusory than a neutral zone."
IThe German Christian
Democrats have consistently op-
posed European security plans
which ignore the unification
question. In contrast, the So-
cial Democrats find that the
Rapacki flan fits in well with
their antinuclear, alliance-
free policy.
French Premier Gaillard
and Foreign Minister Pineau
have publicly taken a negative
stand on the Rapacki plan, which
the French ambassador in Warsaw
has been instructed to reject
"firmly." Some French officials
believe, however, that the idea
of a "thinned-out zone" in cen-
tral Europe is gaining headway
in France. The Belgian Foreign
Minister opposes the plan be-
cause its geographic scope is
too limited; he prefers Western
disarmament proposals for in-
spection "from the Atlantic to
the Urals."
While the Rapacki plan it-
self has attracted little at-
tention in Britain, public de-
bate there has recently revealed
considerable support, particu-
larly in the Labor party, for
a zone of limited armaments in
central Europe. In the 8 Jan-
uary meeting of the North At-
lantic Council, the UK, sup-
ported by other countries, in-
sisted that in the replies to
the Bulganin letters the Rapacki
plan be mentioned as under study.
Most influential independent
papers have warned that the
stationing of IRBM's in Germany
would tend to freeze the present
stalemate.
On 2 January Prime Minister
Nehru of India endorsed the
Rapacki plan as well as Yugo-
slav President Tito's call for
an East-West summit conference.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S Ry
9 January 1958
Prime Minister Djuanda in
Djakarta continues to insist
that although he expects in-
creased trouble from the prov-
inces,, no great change in the
internal situation will occur
while President Sukarno is out
of the country. He neverthe-
less called a, cabinet meeting
on 6 January, immediately after
Sukarno left on his trip, at
which the principal announced
topic was trade relations with
the outlying provinces. It is
possible that a greater effort
to placate the dissident lead-
ers may have been discussed.
Former Vice President Hatta,
who has severely criticized the
Djuanda cabinet, has stated he
will not participate in any gov-
ernment reorganization while
the President is out of the
country. Hatta is believed
planning to go to Sumatra soon
and probably will add his voice
to those counseling moderation.
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Both Djuanda. and Hatta,
however, are concerned that
right-wing religious and youth
groups in Java may'attempt vio-
lent action during the next few
weeks. An incident of grenade-
throwing occurred in Djakarta
on 7 January, possibly he be-
ginning of isolated acts of
terrorism by these groups. No
drastic overt Communist move
is expected during Sukarno's
absence, except possibly in de-
fense of the present govern-
ment.
The Indonesian arms pur-
chasing mission now in Eastern
Europe is seeking heavy infantry
weapons for the army, a variety
of medium and small vessels for
the navy, and over a. hundred
Soviet-type aircraft, including
jet fighters, bombers, trans-
ports, helicopers, and trainers.
The Soviet Government on
6 January made a. firm offer
of arms and ships to Indo-
nesia, going beyond previous
vague expressions of support by
Soviet officials. Premier
Djuanda told the American a.mbas-
sa.dor on 7 January of "extreme
pressure" from the USSR to ac-
cept this aid. The USSR is able
to provide arms on short notice,
and bloc vessels are able to meet
Indonesia's overseas shipping
needs. The USSR can be expected
to offer this assistance on rea-
sonable terms.
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CONEU k TIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMItiRy
9 January 1958
Soviet agriculture in 1957
was characterized by approximate-
ly average yields in grain--in
contrast to last year's ex-
ceptionally high yields, sig-
nificant gains in meat and milk
production, a disappointing per-
formance in cotton, and a large
increase in sugar beet produc-
tion. These results, together
with the absence of crash agri-
cultural programs for 1958, in-
dicate that prospects are poor
for achieving the original
Sixth Five-Year Plan grain goal
for 1960. Despite the 1957 in-
creases in milk and meat pro-
duction, Khrushchev's goals
to equal American per capita
production in milk by 1958 and
in meat by 1960-61 are not
likely to be met.
Khrushchev, in a speech to
the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet
on 24 December, indicated that
the 1957 grain harvest was lower
than the record harvest of
1956. He said the country
'procured" approximately as
much grain as during 1955, a
year with a harvest well below
that of 1956. This reference
to procurement suggests that
total grain output is below
even that of 1955, since the
New Lands made a greater con-
tribution to total output in
1957 than in 1955, and the rate
of state procurement in the
?env Lands is relatively higher
in the other major grain-
producing areas.
The substantial 1957 in-
crease in meat and milk pro-
duction over 1956 resulted
from an increase in fodder
available from the record 1956
harvest and an early spring in
1957 with the resultant good
pasture. The plan for sugar beet
procurement was overfulfilled,
a bright spot, but the cotton
crop did not meet its goal, and
quality is low because of poor
weather.
The policy since Stalin's
death of giving higi priority to agri-
culture continues in the 1958, plan
for the Soviet economy. Capital
investment planned for state
agriculture is two billion
rubles ($500,000,000 at the
official rate) higher than that
planned for 1957, and machinery
inputs to agriculture also show
an increase. The transfer of
N. I. Belyayev, a secretary of
the party central committee, to
first party secretary in Kazakh
SSR in December was probably
aimed at least in part at boost-
ing agriculture production there.
Earlier, in the fall of 1957,
he had called for a further
expansion of the New Lands pro-
gram by 30-37,000,000 acres in
areas adjacent to Kazakh SSR.
He will undoubtedly push con-
version to the two-stage har-
vesting technique in gathering
next year's grain harvest.
Despite planned further ex-
pansion of cultivated acreage
in the USSR in the next several
years, the 1958 plan calls for
no increase in grain acreage.
Kuzmin spoke of a planned in-
crease of 12,400,000 acres of
grain in 1958, but he was ap-
parently comparing 1958
(planned) sown area with 1957
harvested area. For meat pro-
duction n 1958, the rate of
increase may be lower than that
attained in 1957 because of the
10* to 15-percent decline in
the 1957 grain harvest.
An organizational measure
being adopted was mentioned by
V. Matskevich, Soviet agricul-
ture minister, on 8 January at
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January 1958
USSR: PRODUCTION OF SELECTED AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
MILLION METRIC TONS
9-10
MILK 70-72
61
1 1
6.2
3
4
3
95
.
4
0
.
.
1955
1
956
1957
1958
1960
1967-6
9
1955
1
956
1957
1958
1958*
1960
EST. PLAN GOAL GOAL
EST. PLAN GOAL
Figures believed overstated in comparable
US terms by about 10 percent.
115x
SUGAR BEETS
MEAT AND FAT
(SLAUGHTER WEIGHT)
1955 1956 1957 1960 1955 1956 1957 1958 1960 1972
EST. GOAL EST. PLAN GOAL GOAL
x Estimated amount of grain *Miount necessary to produce 9-10,000,000
actually available in view of tons of sugar, as envisaged by Khrushchev.
abnormal ly high postharvest
losses in 1956. Official
Soviet harvest figure was
124,000,000 tons.
1955 1956 1957 1960 1960-61*
EST. GOAL
Based on figures believed overstated
in comparable US terms by as much as
40--50 percent.
an agricultural conference, un-
der which the country would be
divided into 39 agricultural
zones on the basis of climate
and soil conditions. This geo-
graphic approach is somewhat
reminiscent of last year's
launching of the reorganization
of industry on a geographic
basis. Although little is known
of the specifics involved, one
of the primary tasks of the re-
gions reportedly will be to
stimulate the programs for
catching up with the United
States.
A 12-percent increase in
milk production planned for
1c58, if achieved, would put
total Soviet milk production in
1958 still about 10,000,000
tons short of the necessary 70-
72,000,000 tons needed to catch
up with the United States in
per capita production in 1958,
even if Soviet milk statistics
are accepted. These statistics
appear to overestimate produc-
tion in comparable American
terms. Matskevich stated at the
same conference that the USSR
will catch up with the United
States in total milk production
in 1958. In so doing he tacitly
admitted that Khrushchev's orig-
inal goal of overtaking the
United States in per capita
milk production in~958 would
have to be reached later.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January-1958
Butter along with meat and
milk was designated by Khrush-
chev in the race to overtake the
United States in per capita out-
put. It is quite possible that
the USSR per capita production
already exceeds that of the
United States if household pro-
duction of butter is included.
Khrushchev's original compari-
son gave Soviet commercial pro-
duction Of butter only. While
the USSR may attempt to publi-
cize this "victory," possibly
to divert attention from the
failure to achieve meat and milk
output goals, it should be
remembered that the United States
has in addition a per capita
production of margarine almost
equal to that of butter. Ameri-
can butter consumption has
dropped sharply in the postwar
period.
It is probable that in 1958
there will be a continuation of
the expansion in the state farm
sector of agriculture through
the conversion of so-called
"economically weak" collective
farms into state farms, a pro-
gram allegedly aimed at in-
creasing efficiency and produc-
tion. (Prepared
by OR
USSR CLAIMS NEW ACHIEVEMENTS IN AVIATION
Recent Soviet claims, most
of which appear to be within
Soviet capabilities, have
stressed achievements in avia-
tion which have included new
world records and announcements
of new aircraft developments.
These claimSrare being used to
back the present propaganda
campaign emphasizing Soviet
technological superiority.
Soviet claims to a new
speed record were advanced in
an article in the l4 December
issue of Soviet Aviation which
stated thaw jet-11-9E-ter had
attained a speed of 1,242 miles
per hour during a test flight.
This announcement followed by
two days the official estab-
lishment of a new world record
of 1,207.6 miles per hour set
by an American Voodoo fighter-
bomber. The description of the
Soviet aircraft suggests the
FITTER, first observed in the
1956 air show, which is esti-
mated to have a maximum speed
of 1,300 miles per hour at an
optimum altitude of 35,000
feet.
A Moscow broadcast of 27
December reiterated statements
originally made on 30 October
that the HOOK (MI-6) had broken
a world record for helicopters
previously held by the United
States. The October announce-
ment credited the aircraft with
lifting 26,463 pounds to an
altitude of 7,870 feet, surpass-
ing last year's American record
of lifting 13,250 pounds to
7,000 feet. Analysis of the
HOOK's capabilities indicates
that the helicopter probably is
capable of such a feat.
The military newspaper Red
Star stated on 27 December
SECRET
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January 1958
that a Soviet air force pilot
had flown a fighter at 62,680
feet and "then climbed still
higher." The item said this
was a "standard flight of a
squadron commander in a series-
produced aircraft of an opera-
tional unit," not an experimen-
tal flight. The flight may
have been performed by a FARM-
ER (MIG-19), which is estimated
to have a service ceiling of
62,200 feet on an optimum mis-
sion, and probably could exceed
this in a maximum altitude at-
tempt.
Red Star on 28 December
carried-a p otograph of a jet
fighter--probably a MIG-19--
being launched from a catapult.
Mounted under the afterfuselage
was a "starting rocket"--ap-
The Soviet Union announced
on 6 January that its armed for-
ces will be further reduced by
300,000 men, and that 41,000
are to be withdrawn from East
Germany and 17,000 from Hungary.
The announcement of the
unilateral cut, like similar
earlier announcements, is in-
tended to contrast Moscow's
"peaceful intentions" with West-
ern rearmament plans. It is
timed to encourage Western Euro-
pean sentiment for giving prior-
ity to negotiations with the
USSR over steps to strengthen
NATO's military potential.
parently a JATO or RATO bottle
--which could be jettisoned
after take-off. The article
stated that airstrips were not
needed for such aircraft, which
can be hauled anywhere by
trailer truck. Successful de-
velopment of such a "zero-launch-
ing" system would increase So-
viet air-defense capabilities.
TASS announced on 26 Decem-
ber that the USSR is test-flying
a machine called the "Turbolet"
capable of vertical landings
and take-offs. The description
in Red Star indicates this to
be TTie o met version of the
"flying bedstead" first observed
during preparations for last
summer's
ON FORCE REDUCTION
The announcement of specif-
ic force cutbacks in East Ger-
many and Hungary probably is
designed to gain support for
Soviet and Polish suggestions
concerning a central European
zone which would have reduced
forces with no nuclear weapons.
The reductions to be made in
these countries would not affect
Soviet security interests there.
Presently the USSR has 380,000
personnel in East Germany and
about 70,000 in Hungary. Re-
ductions in these countries,
however, may be particularly
effective for propaganda pur-
poses.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
9 January 1958
In two other statements
since August 1955, the Soviet
Union has announced reductions
of military manpower totaling
about 1,800,000 men. While
there is no confirmation that
the cut has been this great,
there is evidence of some re-
ductions of force from the
Korean peak. Current Soviet
strength, including security
forces, is estimated at about
4,600,000.
Since Soviet military ex-
penditures for 1958 are rough-
ly the same level as for the
last two years, a reduction of
forces could indicate increased
emphasis on other phases of
the military program. Khrush-
chev has said that the USSR's
scientific advances have created
conO4 +i.ons favorable for the
cutback. A Supreme Soviet de-
cree on 21 December explicitly
called for maintaining the armed
forces at a proper level to en-
sure the defense interests of
the Soviet Union.
Reductions could be ac-
complished by reducing the terms
of service and by the early
release of some personnel or
by decreasing the annual ca.ll-
up. An efficient reserve and 25X1
mobilization system also miti-
gates the effect of any cut.
ALBANIA DEMONSTRATES AN AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY
nish it with air bases that
would facilitate strikes against
American bases in North Africa.
n
31 December, anlan fight-
ers forced down a British civil
airliner which allegedly vio-
lated Albanian territory. In
addition to demonstrating a
sensitivity to overflights,
which Albania has heretofore
been unable to prevent, the in-
cidents demonstrate that Al-
bania's air defense system has
now reached operational status.
While Albania's capabili-
ties for expanding its air
force will remain limited by
a. lack of suitable airfields,
this strategically located
bloc country could be providing
the USSR with additional early-
warning coverage and could fur-
SECRET
Until 1955, when jet fight-
ers were observed over Tirana.
for the first time, the Al-
banian Air Force had existed in
name only. It is presently
estimated to have two real' 't-s
of FAGOTS MG-15's), based
at Berat/Kucove airfield, which
has a 6,600-foot concrete run--
way, completed in 1953. The
recent completion of the esti-
mated 9,200-foot runway at
Preze suggests plans for increas-
ing air strength. There are
only five airfields in Albania
with hard-surface runways; three
of these runways are over 6,000
feet long.
Albanian pilots have re-
portedly received training in
the USSR, and Soviet advisers
25X1
and instructors are at present
assigned to the force.Fi_
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`"'.' SECRE T
11
9 January 1958
WEST GERMAN VIEWS OF BERLIN ACCESS PROBLEM
West Berlin and Bonn offi-
cials are apprehensive over the
possibilities of the East German
regime's assumption of greater
control over access to West
Berlin. Bonn believes infringe-
ment of Allied access calls for
firm resistance, particularly
since such action may precede
increased harassment or blocking
of West German traffic to Berlin..',
A curtailment of interzonal
trade would be Bonn's most ef-
fective retaliatory measure, but
there would be some reluctance
to adopt such a policy.
Several top Bonn officials
have urged American officials
to consider turning back Allied
military trains rather than sub-
mit to control by East German
officials, if they replace
Soviet guards at East Zone check-
points. These officials point
out that acceptance of East
German control would have ex-
tremely unfavorable public re-
percussions in West Germany and
Berlin and would strengthen the
Soviet concept of "two Germanies. " .
Bonn fears that any con-
cessions to the East German
regime might lead to a new
campaign of'harassment of West
German traffic to Berlin, aimed
at forcing Bonn to negotiate
with the East German government.
Bonn's objective is to maintain
the supply of essential goods to
Berlin, since West Germany pro-
vides almost 90 percent of West
Berlin's imports. While West
German officials do not expect
a major blockade at this time,
increased interference would cut
into West Berlin's stockpiling
program and eventually place
Berlin in a precarious situation.
In the past Bonn has pre-
ferred to remain in the back-
ground in disputes involving the
four powers over access to Berlin,
in order not to jeoparaize the
four-power status of Berlin. In
the event of East German inter-
ference with West German traffic,
however, Bonn would probably be
forced to consider retaliatory
measures. The most effective
move would be to stop iron and
steel shipments to the East Zone,
but the East Germans could re-
taliate by cutting off vital
deliveries of brown coal bri-
quettes. Bonn expects to re-
ceive 4,000,000 tons of brown
coal from East Germany during
1958, about a fourth of which
goes to West Berlin.
e-
WEST GERMANY- BERLIN
COMMUNICATION ROUTES
West German = Autobahn -Highway East German
checkpoints: -.--