CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001500080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 30, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 5, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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C~
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
RUTH: HR 70-
DA7E: ";~REVIEWER.
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
O DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
COPY NO. 114
OCR NO, 6416/57
5 December 1957
DOCUMENT NO..
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
rrlifrl
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
P=ck
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Communist exploitation of
the anti-Dutch drive in Indo-
nesia apparently is forcing the
government to move faster
against Dutch enterprises than
it had planned. On 2 December
members of the Communist-led
labor federation SOBSI without
government santion occupied or
established harassing surveil-
lance over the Djakarta offices
of at least seven large Dutch
firms. To date, they have re-
linquished only one of them--
KPM, the interisland shipping
firm--to official security forces.
The government has an-
nounced it will take over these
firms, When Prime Minister
Djuanda announced on 3 December
that drastic action would be
taken against the workers if
they undertook to seize the
firms permanently, minor SOBSI
officials allegedly demanded
participation in the companies'
management.
The government has ordered
specific groups of Dutch nation-
als expelled and the closing
of the seven Dutch consulates
outside Djakarta. The departure
of the Dutch will leave a vacu-
um that the government will be
forced to fill by accepting
other foreign assistance. The
combination of leftist influ-
ence in the government and
President Sukarno's intense an-
ti-Dutch feelings, which may be
extended to other Western na-
tions, make it increasingly
likely that Indonesia will turn
to the Sino-Soviet bloc.
In addition to the Soviet
$100,000,000 loan which is
awaiting implementation, the
USSR,
has offered to supply
ships to Indonesia, and has re-
quested permission of the Indo-
nesian government to hold an
atomic exposition in Indonesia
in 1958. The Indonesian gov-
ernment is believed to have ap-
proached the USSR on the pos-
sibility of purchasing rice,
and the second shipment of So-
viet jeeps, under a contract
for the purchase of 4,000, has
just arrived at the port of
Surabaya.
The growing consensus in
Djakarta is that President Su-
karno will react to the at-
tempt on his life by retaliat-
ing against persons and groups
which have opposed his policies.
Such action would be likely to
result in Sukarno's closer as-
sociation with the leftists and
would harden the opposition
of regional leaders.
The national reconstruction
conference, which concluded on
4 December, was regarded by dis-
affected regional leaders as of
little value.
[they w re-
turn to their provinces feeling
it is useless to try to effect
changes in the Djakarta govern-
ment or in Sukarno's policies.
They claim they will concentrate
their efforts on local recon-
struction in an effort to further
develop economic autonomy.
In South Sumatra, where an
anti-Communist army regime has
been in control for the past
year, the Communists again
scored gains in some localities
in the 1 December elections.
These gains appear to be limited
to oil centers where SOBSI-af-
fil ated unions are strong.
F1t
coil
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
With the approach of the
NATO conference in Paris on
16-18 December, Soviet official
spokesmen and propagandists
have stepped up their campaign
to exploit differences between
NATO members and to arouse fears
among Westerners. Moscow's
objective is to generate popu-
lar anxiety which will induce
NATO governments to postpone
any decisions to strengthen
Western unity and defense un-
til Soviet intentions can be
explored in a new round of
high-level East-West talks.
Soviet party chief Khrushchev,
in his 40th anniversary speech
on 6 November, set the theme
with his charge that the Paris
meeting "bodes no good for the
cause of peace."
Moscow's divisive propa-
ganda efforts have centered on a
claimed crisis within the At-
lantic pact community. This
crisis has allegedly been
brought on by "imperialist con-
tradictions" and growing un-
easiness in the West in the
face of the Kremlin's charges
that recent Soviet successes
in the scientific and techni-
cal fields have caused a shift
in the East-West balance of
power.
Soviet propaganda on NATO
since the launching of the
sputniks has tried to picture
the Atlantic alliance as an out-
moded organization which is in-
capable of halting the march
of history and restoring the
past. Considerable effort has
been devoted by using quota-
tions from Western publications,
to demonstrate that there is
a state of nervousness over
possible failure of the Paris
meeting because of a European
loss of confidence in America's
ability to win a war with the
USSR. French reaction to the
Anglo-American shipment of arms
to Tunisia was seized on as
visible proof of the "imperial-
ist contradictions" threatening
the solidarity of the Atlantic
community and was exploited in
broadcasts to the smaller NATO
members to demonstrate that
the United States and Britain
were willing to sacrifice their
alliances with France in order
to oust the French from North
Africa.
Soviet propagandists have
devoted considerable effort to
exploiting latent fears among
Western European nations of a
revenge-seeking West Germany,
rearmed and supported by the
United States. Non-German
audiences have been told that
West Germany has been pressing
for a greater role in the manage-
ment of NATO affairs and that
the question of equipping the
West German army with atomic
rocket weapons will be discussed
at the Paris meeting. German
audiences, on the other hand,
have been warned that the Fed-
eral Republic will become an
atomic powder keg and would be
subjected to immediate and dev-
astating counterblows if "Ger-
man militarists" were to unleash
a war.
Khrushchev, as well as So-
viet commentators, has threatened
the European members of NATO
with destruction in a future
war and predicted that sentiment
in countries with American bases
would turn against NATO as their
peoples realize that "Soviet
counterblows" would follow an
attack on the USSR. In the most
recent such statement, Soviet
Premier Bulganin claimed on 2
December that the NATO meeting
will "put the finishing touches
to new programs in the armaments
race" and "preparations for
war."
S 'C.RRT
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Border tensions between
Israel and Jordan appear to
have eased momentarily as a re-
sult of UN Secretary General
HammarskJold's efforts. An
Israeli truck convoy passed
through Jordanian territory on
5 December to supply the Is-
raeli positions on Mt. Scopus,
and press reports state that
it carried gasoline, the item
disputed by the Jordanians.
The terms of the agreement
achieved by Hammarskjold are
not yet known. It.is very un-
likely that this agreement, ap-
parently resolving the im-
mediate issue, will lead to any
significant progress on other
border problems.
The Syrians seemed last
week to be whipping up another,
if less dangerous, anti-Turkish
campaign. Rallies in many
places in Syria were staged to
lament the loss to Turkey of
Alexandretta, which was ceded
by France during the period of
French mandatory control over
Syria. Turkey continues to
be seriously concerned by what
it regards as the trend in Syr-
ia of becoming a Soviet satel-
lite, but apparently hopes that
moderate elements among the
Arab states may still be able
to force some shift of Syrian
policy. Marshal Bulganin's 25
November warning letter to An-
kara failed to disturb Turkish
leaders any more than the pre-
vious Soviet note.
Egypt's minister of in-
dustry was scheduled to meet on
4 December with the Soviet am-
bassador in Cairo to "prepare
details" for the economic talks
a 40-man Egyptian delegation
expects to carry on in Moscow
as a follow-up to the $178,-
000,000 Soviet-Egyptian line
of credit agreement. According
to the Egyptian announcement,
Cairo intends to "present" to
the USSR 54 projects with an
estimated foreign currency cost
of about $164,000,000--some
$14,000,000 less than the So-
viet Union has agreed to provide,.
The portion of the cost of
these projects to be paid for
in Egyptian currency is about
$123,000,000, and Egyptian
Finance Minister Kaysuni is
reported to be concerned over
where this money will come from,
particularly if, as some of
Nasir's advisers are urging,
the Egyptian Five-Year Plan
(1958-1962) is compressed into
three years. Moreover, these
projects represent only a part
of Egypt's whole plan, for which
the total foreign currency costs
alone are estimated by the
Egyptians at about $430,500,000.
The Soviet agreement would cover
but a little over 40 percent of
this sum. These figures suggest
one of the reasons why spokes-
men for the Nasir regime continue
to insist that the door remains
open for Western aid.
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PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
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NFIDEN11P&
CO
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
NOTES AND COMMENTS
MIKHAIL SUSLOV'S ROLE IN RECENT MOSCOW MEETINGS
Soviet party presidium mem-
ber Suslov's leading role in
the recent Moscow meetings of
Communist party leaders has in-
creased speculation regarding
his personal power and politi-
cal intentions vis-a-vis Khru-
shchev.
Suslov's chief responsibility
for the last several years has
been relations with the satel-
lites and other Communist parties.
His extensive travels and con-
ferences within the Communist
bloc indicate that he was well
qualified to chair the bloc
meeting.
However, Suslov's capabili-
ties extend to a number of fields.
He has been at various times a
responsible official in the
party control commission, first
secretary of party oblast com-
mittees, a leading member of
the North Caucasus military coun-
cil, lecturer in political econ-
omy, chief of the Propaganda and
Agitation Administration of the
party central committee, editor
of Pravda, and head of the cen-
tral committee Department for
Liaison with Foreign Communist
CONFIDEN1tA1.
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
parties. His extensive remarks
at the 20th party congress on
party organizational work indi-
cate he may also have exercised
supervision over party person-
nel work during a period prior
to July 19 55.
Suslov became a secretary
of the party central committee
in 1948; he thus has seniority
on that body over Khrushchev,
who became a secretary in 1949
and first secretary in 1953.
Khrushchev may have arranged
Suslov's transfer from super-
vision of Soviet party person-
nel to full-time responsibility
for foreign Communist parties
to eliminate any opportunity
for Suslov to build up his own
support within the Soviet party.
There have been no indica-
tions from Suslov's speeches
or interviews that he is in dis-
SINO-SOVIET MILITARY
Communist China's 12-man
delegation of top military
leaders concluded its talks
with Soviet officials on 30
November and has returned to
Peiping. Both Moscow and Pei-
ping have avoided explicit com-
ment on the visit, but the
Russians appear to have made
firm commitments for new mili-
tary aid to the Chinese. The
close understandings reached
by Mao Tse-tung and Soviet
leaders during the 40th an-
niversary celebrations in early
November paved the way for this
development.
In a speech made before
the Chinese delegation on 27
November, Soviet Defense Min-
is':er Malinovsky declared Mos-
cow's willingness to "transmit
our experience in the building
up of armed forces to our Chi-
agreement with post-Stalin pol-
icies. At the June central
committee plenum, Suslov re-
portedly took the chair and
directed the meeting against
the "antiparty" group; and the
variety of his activities dur-
ing the late summer and early
fall of this year indicate that
he was probably left in charge,
with Mikoyan, while the other
top leaders were away from
Moscow.
Khrushchev may be present-
ing Suslov to the foreign Com-
munists as a "Stalinist" bogy
man whom he must conciliate.
In this way Khrushchev may
hope to weaken Suslov as a
rival and gain satellite sup-
port for himself personally,
while using Suslov's abilities
to maintain effective So-
viet leadership in the bloc.
TALKS CONCLUDED
nese friends." Premier Bulganin
told the delegation on 30 No-
vember the USSR would continue
to strengthen the "defensive
preparedness" of the Soviet and
Chinese armed forces.
The areas and installations
visited by the Chinese military
group provide no insight into
the specific types of military
equipment that may be involved.
They watched naval maneuvers
at Leningrad and visited local
commands at Minsk, Kiev, Tbilisi,
Vladivostok, and Khabarovsk.
They are not known to have gone
to any installations associated
with missile or nuclear weapons
testing, although they had time
during their Transcaucasus tour
to visit missile centers such
as that at Kapustin Yar.
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PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
Ma inovs y
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told
that
reporters on 29 November
the Chinese "can make all
the
weapons
they want them-
selves. 1
oncurred
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in by ORR and O
SOVIET-JAPANESE TRADE AGREEMENT
Japan and the USSR are
scheduled to sign a trade and
cash payments agreement in To-
kyo on 6 December, the first be-
tween the countries since World
War II. The one-year agreement,
reached after three months of
negotiations during which both
sides compromised on several
points, stipulates a trade tar-
get of approximately $30,000,-
000 each way. They also will
sign a five-year commercial
treaty, an agreement to exchange
trade missions, and an accord
on most-favored-nation treat-
ment.
The trade goal established
in the primary agreement is ap-
proximately ten times larger
than Soviet-Japanese trade in
1956 and thus, although Soviet-
Japanese trade is expanding
this year, the goal may not be
attained the first year. Pres-
sure within Japan for imports
from the USSR is not great and
many businessmen admittedly are
suspicious of trade relations
with the USSR as a result of
past experiences. The Soviet
Union will probably try to im-
plement fully its side of the
agreement in order to sustain
its assertion that the trade
volume can eventually reach
$500,000,000. The one-year
agreement is renewable annually
and new trade goals probably
will be established in the light
of the first year's results.
Accounts are to be settled in
pounds sterling, although Tokyo
granted a Soviet request that
individual barter transactions
be permitted.
The commercial treaty lists
items to be traded by each side.
The list of Japanese exports
includes heavy industrial prod-
ucts, textiles, chemicals, and
sundries, while Soviet exports
include mineral ores, coal,
lumber, and oil. The Soviet
negotiators showed particular
interest in Japanese industrial
and farm machinery, rolling
stock, ships, and iron and steel
products.
The most-favored-nation
provision appears to be one of
principle only, except for cer-
tain tax exemptions. Both na-
tions reserve the right to re-
strict imports from the other
should an imbalance or shortage
of foreign exchange occur, and
the USSR consented to honor
Japan's adherence to COCOM con-
trols.
curred in by ORR
The size of trade missions
to be exchanged has not been re-
vealed, but it has been agreed
that the mission chief and two
deputies on each side would be
accorded full diplomatic priv-
ileges. This agreement may
have an important bearing on
Japanese trade talks with Com-
munist China, which are suspend-
ed over the issue of the size
and privileges of proposed trade
missions. (Con- 25X1
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
Basic internal East German
policy has been recast--prob-
ably with Soviet approval and
at Party First Secretary Ul-
bricht's instigation--in the
direction of a harder course
aimed at the more rapid commu-
nization of the German Democrat-
ic Republic (GDR). The deci-
sion to adopt a tougher line
was probably arrived at during
the Khrushchev-Mikoyan visit
last August. As tougher poli-
cies are implemented, tensions
will probably increase through-
out the country, but the pres-
ence of impressive Soviet mili-
tary strength is likely to prove
sufficient to deter overt anti-
regime demonstrations on a large
scale.
Reports of actions to be
taken at the forthcoming 35th
plenum of the Socialist Unity
(Communist) party (SED), to-
gether with other evidence, in-
dicate that the stepped-up push
toward greater communization
will emphasize further repres-
sion, coupled with drives for
increased production at lower
cost. It has been reported
that work norms in many indus-
tries are to be revised upward
and wages cut. Pressures for
greater agricultural production
are to be combined with an in-
tensification of agricultural
collectivization and efforts to
compel young people to become
farmers. Private craftsmen
and businessmen are to be sub-
jected to pressures aimed at
forcing them into cooperative
production associations.
Other measures to be
stressed in the communization
drive are harsher punishments
for all crimes; further sup-
pression of criticism of Com-
munism; improved political in-
doctrination in educational in-
stitutions and the armed forces,
including an improvement of
teachers' political reliability;
and a general overhaul of the
party apparatus aimed at achiev-
ing greater efficiency. Further-
more, youths will be subjected
to even greater controls, with
the party directing the use of
"free" time and vacations for
productive work.
The re-emphasis on a Sta-
linist approach to East German
problems probably reflects a
determination by the USSR to com-
pel East Germany to make a
greater contribution to bloc
economic self-sufficiency. East
Germany may be expected to re-
pay the credits it has received
from the USSR and catch up on
its lagging export commitments
to the Soviet Union and the
bloc. Since efforts to increase
production by raising work norms
are likely to step up the flow
of refugees to the West, the
regime must impose greater con-
trols on freedom of movement
in order to curb the flight
of sorely needed workers if
higher production goals are to
be met. Fears of impending
restrictions have already re-
sulted in a sharp increase in
the number of refugees--about
1,200 above normal last week.
The Russians have also
probably concluded that even the
limited liberalization following
the Soviet 20th party congress
unleashed too many dissident
forces
and
therefore have de-
cided
that
the only possible
course
is
harsher repression
under
the
Stalinist Ulbricht.
When Ulbricht implements these
tough measures, however, they
are likely to generate tension
which could erupt into at least
isolated instances of disorder.
It was just such measures which
led to the riots of 17 June 1953.
(Concurred in by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
POLES INTERPRET MOSCOW DECLARATION
Polish party leader Go-
mulka's interpretation of the
12-nation Communist declaration
signed in Moscow last month dif-
fers markedly from those of So-
viet and East German party lead-
ers. His comment at a party
activists' meeting on 28 Novem-
ber that the declaration spoke
the languages of 12 parties and
was therefore subject to as many
interpretations suggests that
he intends to continue many of
the policies developed specifi-
cally for Poland since October
19 56 .
Gomulka's interpretation
of the declaration probably was
aimed in part at holding the
allegiance of those elements
within his party who might have
been concerned over his adher-
ence to a document which on the
surface appeared to compromise
the Polish position. Gomulka
told his party that its main
hope of salvation and for con-
tinuance of its new policies--
accepted only "in principle"
by fraternal parties--is first
to prove their validity in Po-
land, making it a prime example
of the development of Communism
via, a "separate road."
He has thus called for a
tightening of discipline in the
party to enable it to take the
leading role in the life of the
country. Though this "leading
role" is required as a basic
principle of Communism, it will
not be "the dogmatic conception
of the leading role of the Com-
munist party," which Gomulka
claimed "inflicted great damage"
on the unity of the Communist
parties in the past.
Indicative of the consider-
able degree of ambiguity of
language that apparently was
necessary in order to satisfy
the various parties before they
signed the 12-nation declaration
are the differences of emphasis
now given to it by the Polish
leader and the USSR. In one of
the first Soviet interpretations
of the declaration, Soviet party
presidium member Furtseva em-
phasized to party activists on
27 November that the agreement
represented recognition of So-
viet leadership of the orbit
Communist parties.
Gomulka, in contrast, placed
most emphasis on the independ-
ence of each party in internal
affairs. Furtseva stressed that
collective settlement had re-
solved all matters in dispute
between Communist parties, while
Gomulka maintained that there
was continuing disagreement
among them.
The dangers of "revision-
ism"--pressure for more liberal
policies--were stressed by Fur-
tseva. Although Gomulka agreed
that "revisionism" presently
constituted the major danger, he
called the document a strong in-
dictment of "dogmatism," i.e.,
Stalinism. Furtseva placed
special significance on common
factors of Communist develop-
ment, while Gomulka. emphasized
the recognition of the impor-
tance of national peculiarities.
Furtseva implied a need for
greater militance in the world
Communist movement, contrasting
sharply with Gomulka's promising
picture of peaceful and inevi-
table development of socialism
in all countries, which suggests
no need for militance in world
Communism, but rather a less
dangerous policy of watchful
waiting.
Gomulka further demonstrated
his differences with Moscow by
his inclusion of Yugoslavia among
the "13 states building Commu-
nism who "belong to the family
of socialist countries." He may
also have been motivated by his
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
reported disillusionment with
Chinese Communist leader Mao.
He probably no longer believes
he can depend on Mao for support
on matters beyond the letter of
the declaration. He stood with
Yugoslavia in strongly condemning
both the Cominform and the Comin-
tern, and set forth two prere-
quisites for any future multi-
party meetings: notification
to participants of subjects for
discussion, and agreement to
participation by independent
vote of the various central
committees.
Gomulka defended Yugoslav
and Polish acceptance of Western
economic aid, specifically de-
claring that the United States
in offering aid did not put
forth any conditions detrimental
to Polish independence. He
warned, however, against those
in the West who tried to demon-
strate that all aid from both
East and West was designed to
promote political dependence.
Varying versions of Polish
broadcasts of the speech to
Eastern and Western audiences
were slanted to emphasize to
the West Poland's adherence to
Communism and to the East its
determination to maintain a cer-
tain degree of independence.
Among Gomulka's deviations
from the Soviet line was his
virtual disclaimer of the pos-
sibility of war between capital-
ist nations. He stated that the
existence of an "enemy" social-
ist camp unified capitalist na-
tions in an anti-Communist bloc.
Gomulka further said war
between East and West would be
a thermonuclear holocaust
which, though it would de-
stroy capitalism, would ob-
literate the achievements of
all nations and make a cemetery
of the entire world. F_~ 25X1
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LARGE INCREASE IN SOVIET RAIL TRACKAGE INDICATED
An unprecedented rise in
the rate of construction will
be necessary if the USSR is to
increase its rail transport net
by 30 percent--about 21,600
miles--in 13 years as predicted
by T. S. Khachaturov, a Soviet
railway expert. He wrote in
the September issue of Economic
Problems that the volume of
transport would double between
1955 and 1970, and that about
1,800 miles of track would have
to be built each year from 1961
through 1970 for a 30-percent
increase in trackage. Only 720
miles a year were scheduled under
the Sixth Five-Year Plan.
Soviet planners may believe
the increases in output of basic
commodities visualized by
Khrushchev for 1972 dictate con-
struction of this scope. The
present electrification and
dieselization program, which
should completely eliminate
steam traction by 1970, will
increase the traffic volume by
permitting the use of faster
and more powerful locomotives.
In addition, the use of heavier
rails, the provision of cars
with greater carrying capacity,
and expansion of the use of
modern signaling systems will
increase the efficiency and
operating capabilities of the
railways. In a recent inter-
view, Khachaturov emphasized
the necessity of a substantial
basic investment program for
the railroads.
No firm plans have been
announced for construction be-
yond 1960, but most of it will
probably be in the eastern and
northern regions. Construction of
of at least two major lines,
the Amur-Yakutsk Railroad and
the Polunochnoye-Labytnangi
Railroad, through remote areas
of permafrost and swampland
has been suggested. The tech-
nical problems related to rail-
road construction over perma-
frost have already been solved
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-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
Originally scheduled for
completion during
Sixth Five-Year Plan
Unofficially suggested for
completion, 1961-1970
feMrr--
_iaa~aruaa
Suggested Railroad Development in Eastern USSR
by the USSR, and completion of
these two lines appears feasi-
ble.
The rate of new track con-
struction has averaged only
about 360 miles per year in
the postwar period. It is es-
timated that between 1,500 and
1,800 miles are under construc-
tion, and Khachaturov estimates
that for the rate of completion
to reach 1,200 to 1,800 miles
annually, it would be necessary
to have 4,800 to 6,000 miles
under construction simultaneous-
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The Laotian government,
moving slowly to carry out its
settlement with the Pathet Lao,
has, however, begun to take
steps to counter an anticipated
increase in Pathet Lao subver-
sion. Premier Souvanna Phouma
and Foreign Minister Phoui are
concerned about relations with
the United States, and want to
visit Washington to explain
Laos' position.
The carrying out of the
settlement accords has started
slowly. The mixed military
commissions that will preside
over the integration of 1,500
Pathet soldiers into the royal
army and the demobilization of
the remainder did not arrive in
the two northern provinces un-
til 3 December. A ceremony
starting the actual turnover
of administration in Sam Neua
Province is scheduled for 10
December. The event, which
will be attended by the premier
and other high-ranking Laotian
officials, has been delayed to
allow time to prepare propaganda
materials designed to have a
maximum psychological impact on
the local population. A similar
ceremony will take place in
Phong Saly Province about ten
days later.
The government will open
three reindoctrination centers
in areas outside the two prov-
inces through which it plans
to process all former Pathets
before they return to their
SF. CRF T
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
home villages. Hard-core Com-
munists will be isolated in
these centers and will be
placed under surveillance after
their release. In addition,
Souvanna has ordered a nation-
wide, anti-Communist propaganda
campaign.
The positive effect of
these developments is somewhat
offset by indications that the
Pathet representatives in the
Laotian cabinet, Prince Souphan-
nouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit,
are already wielding influence
approximating a veto over some
government decisions relating
to the implementation of the
settlement accords.
implementation of the accords.
There are reports that
Hanoi is withdrawing modern
military equipment and most
Vietnamese cadres from Laos.
Many Laotian officials feel
that as many as half of the
Pathet Lao troops will not sur-
render but will stay in "the
bush" or cross into North Viet-
nam. These elements might be
held in reserve in North Vietnam
to ensure against violation of
Communist interests during the
RACIAL ANIMOSITIES THREATEN MALAYA'S POLITICAL STABILITY
Recent demonstrations of
discontent among Malaya's large
Chinese minority indicate that
the postindependence communal
"honeymoon" may be coming to an
end and that further interracial
friction is to be expected. The
strongest indication of this
prospect was the decisive de-
feat of the ruling Alliance
party's candidate by a left-
winger of Ceylonese descent on
23 November in a federal legis-
lative council by-election in
the tin-mining center of Ipoh
in northern Malaya.
The victorious candidate,
D. R. Seenivasagam, a London-
educated lawyer who is secre-
tary general of the People's
Progressive party, openly ex-
ploited Chinese fears of Malay
domination. His efforts were
greatly facilitated by the re-
cently initiated government pro-
gram to eliminate Communist ag-
itators in Chinese schools. The
resulting protests by Chinese
students led to riots and dem-
onstrations in several key Ma-
layan cities, the temporary
closing of ten schools, expul-
sion of some 70 students, and
the arrest of more than 30.
There is little doubt that these
government actions are inter-
preted by a large portion of
the Chinese population as a
threat to Chinese culture rather
than suppression of Communist
activities.
The election results and
student riots probably will
lead to the development of an
irresponsible and increasingly
potent left-wing opposition in
Malaya which will place a heavy
strain on the delicately balanced
Malay-Chinese political co-
operation within the Alliance
party.
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These events, besides caus-
ing Chinese discontent, appear
to have aroused latent Malay
animosity toward the Chinese.
Prime Minister Abdul Rahman
was booed for the first time
in his political career by Chi-
nese youths during an Ipbh cam-
paign rally. Malay resentment
over this disrespect almost led
to physical attacks on the Chi-
nese. Malay opposition leaders
are already seeking to exploit
anti-Chinese sentiment by claim-
ing that the United Malay Na-
tional Organization, the Malay
party in the Alliance, has fol-
lowed a dangerous course by co-
operating with the Chinese.
If, as now seems possible,
racial friction leads to Alli-
ance defeats in the Penang city
council elections on 7 December
and the Batu Pahat legislative
council by-election on 14 Decem-
ber, a trend toward a polariza-
tion of communal interests may
be established which could lead
to political instability.
Intensification of racial
strife will also greatly compli-
cate the efforts of a Malay-
dominated police and civil serv-
ice to control subversion among
Malaya's 2,500,000 Chinese at
a time when the Communists seem
ready to abandon their armed
rebellion in order to concen=-
trate on "peaceful" subversion.
The narrow victory won by
the New Zealand Labor party in
the parliamentary elections on
30 November probably resulted
from its successful exploita-
tion of the weaknesses in the
nation's economy and from its
promises of increased tax and
welfare benefits. The final
composition of the 80-man par-
liament, after a special elec-
tion postponed in one constit-
uency until January, is expected
to be 41 to 39, in contrast to
the outgoing National party's
margin of 10 seats. After the
election of a parliamentary
speaker, who votes only in case
of a tie, the Labor government
is expected to hold a voting
margin of only one seat.
Despite current prosperity,
the National party government
was under heavy criticism for
continued price increases, a
credit squeeze, difficulties in
marketing agricultural exports,
and a drain on exchange reserves
caused by heavy private imports.
Labor party promises, however,
of lower interest rates, housing
loans, agricultural subsidies,
expanded welfare payments, and
an early special session of par-
liament to enact a sizable tax
rebate may increase inflationary
pressures and production costs.
it is probable, therefore, that
eventual imposition of price
controls and increased import
restrictions may aggravate the
country's economic difficulties.
In the field of foreign
policy, both the National and
Labor parties have given bipar-
tisan support to close defensive
cooperation with the United
States and to regional defense
commitments. The Labor party,
however, may be expected to in-
troduce some modifications in
the present foreign policy. It
has called for the suspension
of nuclear weapons tests by all
nuclear powers and urges empha-
sis on the social and economic
rather than the military aspects
of SEATO.
Labor has long demonstrated
an affinity for stronger ties
with Britain in foreign policy
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of elderly but energetic Walter
Nash, the prime minister-des-
ignate, who is expected to
assume responsibility for
external affairs or finance.
Aside from Nash, party lead-
ership is not impressive. It
has been weakened by ill-
nesses of his two ranking dep-
uties and by some policy
and personality differences
among other prominent sub-
ordinates.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
and trade relations, although
it hopes to expand markets in
Asia. In this respect, Labor
advocates recognition of Com-
munist China and its admission
to the UN. An early step in
this direction, however, may be
deferred by a desire not to of-
fend the United States, and by
strong opposition from the coun-
try's major trade federation.
The government is likely
to be dominated by the views
BRAZIL'S COMMUNIST PARTY SEEKING LEGAL STATUS
The Brazilian Communist
party--one of the largest and
most influential Communist par-
ties in the western hemisphere--
has launched a bold campaign to
overcome the effects of internal
dissension and, at-the same time,
to regain its pre-1947 status
as a legal party in time to ex-
ert greater influence on the
1958 congressional elections.
In recent weeks the campaign
has been aided significantly
by the psychological impact of
Societ scientific achievements
and by the Soviet bloc's well-
publicized offers of trade and
economic aid to the government.
The Communist party has
not yet made a formal appeal
for a reversal of the 1947 elec-
toral court ruling that renders
it illegal. It is apparently
concentrating on a preliminary
effort to soften public opin-
ion and to entrench its medium-
level leaders in overt politi-
cal organizations. Internally,
the presidium has been purged
by Secretary General Luiz Carlos
Prestes, who has publicly blamed
the deposed members for his own
unsuccessful authoritarian
policies.
Prestes published a
statement on 9 November assert-
ing that the party has been in
error in advocating the violent
overthrow of the government.
Actually, the official party
line has for years advocated
united-front tactics, but this
fact has not been highlighted
for the public.
In another move apparently
calculated to demonstrate will-
ingness to work within the law,
Prestes' lawyers have announced
that he will come out of hiding
to answer two long-standing se-
dition charges, provided the
courts withdraw an order for his
arrest. The party treasurer and
a number of central committee
members have already appeared
in court and are now free to
work openly. Many lesser known
leaders are devoting full time
to organizing nationalist fronts
in an effort to capture leader-
ship of the growing ranks of
leftist "superpatriots."
Public response to the cam-
paign has probably been dampened
somewhat by the unexpectedly
strong anti-Communist speech de-
livered by War Minister Lott on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
27 November, the anniversary of
the 1935 Communist uprising in
Brazil. State political organ-
izations will probably continue
to solicit Communist electoral
support, however, as they have
already done in Sao Paulo, and
a number of influential congress-
men have taken the position
that Communist party legality
is desirable since open activi-
ty is preferable to secret ma-
neuvering.
POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
In Central America, where
political instability is chron-
ic, the situation at present is
most critical in Guatemala,
where Communists are in a posi-
tion to make important gains.
Honduras appears about to emerge
from a turbulent three years
during which constitutional gov-
ernment has been in abeyance.
Costa Rica is in the midst of a
bitter election campaign. The
governments of Nicaragua and
El Salvador at present are rela-
tively stable.
The Communist-infiltrated
Revolutionary party of Guatemala
may win the 19 January national
elections unless the divided
anti-Communist political parties
join forces. There are at least
ten .anti-Communist parties
grouped behind four ambitious
presidential candidates. Any
one of several groups now plot-
ting the forcible seizure of
power may attempt a coup before
election day. Each claims sup-
port in the faction-ridden army.
An attempted coup might spark
new and serious disorders.
Political stability in Hon-
duras will depend largely on
continuation of the present ac-
commodation between two strong
personalities: President-elect
Ramon Villeda Morales, leader
of the majority Liberal party,
and Colonel Oswaldo Lopez, dom-
inant member of the outgoing
junta. Villeda is scheduled to
be inaugurated on 21 December,
when a new constitution also
goes into effect. The consti-
tution provides for a chief of
the armed forces who will be
virtually independent of presi-
dential authority--a concession
Villeda felt compelled to make
to the politically important
military to assure his inaugura-
tion. The new post will prob-
ably be held by Colonel Lopez.
The chief of the armed
forces will have considerable
influence, if not control, over
civil government. As long as
he and the President work to-
gether, the military will be a
strong force inhibiting the vio-
lent political rivalries which
have weakened the country in
the past.
In Costa Rica, three presi-
dential candidates are contest-
ing the 2 February election to
determine President Jose Figue-
res' successor. The campaigning
is becoming so bitter that it
may prove a real test of the
Costa Rican tradition of order-
ly democratic government.
Young President Somoza of
Nicaragua is enjoying wider pop-
larity than did his authoritar-
ian father, who was assassi-
nated last year. The government
is concerned, however, at the in-
creased activity in recent weeks
of die-hard anti-Somoza exiles
in neighboring countries, al-
though the threat does not ap-
pear serious at the moment.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Sharp fighting between
Moroccan Army of Liberation
irregulars--probably a mixture
of disaffected local tribesmen
and professional guerrillas
from Morocco--and Spanish
forces continues in Ifni.
Spain is reinforcing its West
African garrison, but appears
to be having considerable dif-
ficulty suppressing the in-
surgents, who some Spanish
officials claim are Communist-
influenced.
Rabat and Madrid have pre-
sented contradictory, exag-
gerated accounts of develop-
ments in and around the en-
clave since violence erupted
there on 23 November. Madrid
acknowledged this week that
fighting had spread to the
Saguia el Hamra area of Spanish
Sahara.
Spanish officials appeared
seriously concerned last week
about Spain's ability to cope
with the guerrillas. Spanish
Army Minister Barroso is re-
ported to have said on 27 No-
vember that the situation in
Spain's West African possessions
was "grave and disagreeable."
Total Spanish troop
strength in the area is be-
lieved slightly in excess of
8,000 men, about half of whom
are in the enclave and the re-
mainder in Spanish Sahara.
Another 1,600 to 1,800 soldiers
are reported en route to the
region--though these troops
may be headed for the Canary
Islands, where Spain's strate-
gic reserve has been depleted
by recent transfers to the
mainland. In addition, most
of Spain's active naval fleet
and approximately 40 Spanish
military aircraft, including
fighters and bombers, are re-
ported engaged in the current
operation.
The strength of the in-
surgents is believed to be
greater than the 1,000 to 1,200
men originally reported. Although
Spanish officials believe the
guerrillas are influenced if not
controlled by highly placed ex-
tremists in Morocco's dominant
Istiglal party, Madrid has so
far refrained from precipitat-
ing a major political crisis
over the affair.
The Moroccan government
has formally protested alleged
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
Spanish violations of Moroccan
territory, but Rabat officials
--including Crown Prince Moulay
Hassan, who is acting as regent
UN DEBATE ON
Although France regards as
"totally unacceptable" any UN
resolution which would inject
Tunisia and Morocco into the
Algerian situation as negotia-
tors, this year's General As-
sembly may call for such nego-
tiations without naming the two
North African nations. A num-
ber of UN members consider the
offer of good offices by Tunisia
and Morocco the best chance for
a solution to the problem.
The Arabs decided at a 2
December caucus that they could
not support a resolution "with-
out substance," such as last
year's, which merely expressed
the General Assembly's hope
that a peaceful, democratic,
and just solution could be
found. They believe that even a
moderate resolution should call
on the parties to negotiate and
contain some reference to self-
determination. Japan and other
moderate members of the Asian-
African bloc have been attempt-
ing to negotiate a compromise
resolution which would be ac-
while his father, Mohamed V.
is in the United States--have
appeared anxious to avoid a
rupture with Madrid.
ceptable to France and yet sat-
isfy some of the demands of the
more volatile members of the
bloc. The Arab states have
attacked the basic statute which
was endorsed by the French Na-
tional Assembly on 29 November
as perpetuating French sover-
eignty and control and closing
the door to the evolution of
Algerian institutions.
French Foreign Minister
Pineau's moderate opening state-
ment in the UN on 27 November
reaffirmed France's readiness
to negotiate a cease-fire with-
out political preconditions.
France would probably be able
to accept a slightly stronger
resolution this year. Outright
French rejection of conciliatory
efforts might result in immediate
retaliation by the Arabs and
would negate all attempts by
several UN members to keep the
Algerian debate as mild as pos-
sible in order to avoid a French
walkout of the UN.
ITALIAN GENERAL LABOR CONFEDERATION ELECTS NEW HEAD
The election on 3 December
of hard-line Communist Agostino
Novella to the post of secretary
general of the Italian General
Labor Confederation (CGIL) will
result in efforts by the Italian
Communist party (PCI) to in
crease its control over the labor
organization. At the same time,
however, creation of the new post
of deputy secretary get:: moral for
Nenni Socialist Fernando Santi
reflects the Communist party's
recognition of the need to make
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
some compromise with the Nenni
Socialists as well as with those
rank-and-file Communists in the
CGIL who want to stress labor
rather than political interests.
Novella, 52, has been a
member of the PCI central com-
mittee for several years and is
considered primarily a party
man. He is reported to have
acted as a party "watchdog"
over his predecessor as secre-
tary general, the late Giuseppe
Di Vittorio, who is understood
to have accused him of blind
obedience to the party in labor
matters. Novella. has had many
years' experience in organizing
metal and shipyard workers. He
left the CGIL secretariat in
June 1955 to take over and re-
organize the metalworkers' fed-
eration, which had made a poor
showing in the Fiat shop-steward
elections. It is possible he
was forced out of the secretar-
iat at that time by Di Vittorio,
who objected to subordinating
the CGIL to the party. Novella
is an excellent orator and a
good organizer, but he has nei-
ther the prestige nor the pop-
ularity of Di Vittorio.
Novella's political orien-
tation may make it difficult
for him to adapt himself and
the CGIL to bargaining at the
plant rather than the national
level. Such an adaptation is
a pressing need in view of the
success of the free Italian
labor organizations in this
respect and the declining mem-
bership and shop-steward
strength of the CGIL.
Santi, 55, an Italian So-
cialist party deputy and a close
associate of Nenni, has held
important posts in the CGI1
since 1945 and has been a mem-
ber of the secretariat for sev-
eral years.
of the new post for him suggests
that the Communists, even at
the risk of divergencies be-
tween the new chiefs, realize
they must take more account of
legitimate labor objectives--
pushed by the Nenni Socialists--
in order to avoid risking ac-
celerated membership losses or
even splitting the CGIL.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
GAILLARD FACES BUDGET BATTLE
French Premier Gaillard ap-
pears determined to reduce the
1958 budget deficit some $830,-
000,000 below the estimated 1957
deficit despite growing Social-
ist unrest over the effects of
his austerity program. Unless
the National Assembly approves
the 1958 budget by the end of
December, the government will be
forced to operate on a month-
to-month basis, and France will
be faced with new problems in
securing badly needed external
aid.
Gaillard's threefold anti-
inflation program--to keep the
budget at a maximum of about
$12.5 billion (at the new ex-
change rate of 420 francs to
the dollar); to maintain price
stability; and to restore equi-
librium to France's balance of
payments through increased ex-
ports--will require extensive
sacrifices from the French pub-
lic which in general remains
unaware of the country's criti-
cal economic situation.
Drastic cuts in even very
important services are sched-
uled and many subsidies have
already been curtailed.
Premier Gaillard was forced
to call for a second vote of
confidence on his tax proposals
and special powers by the Na-
tional Assembly's threat to
follow the lead of the hostile
Council of the Republic in
amending the proposed bill. Even
with a new endorsement by the
deputies on 5 December, his
program can again be delayed
by the council, which can hold
up application of the measures
for a maximum of 100 days.
Gaillard is seeking an addition-
al $28,520,000 in budget econo-
mies, but growing Socialist un-
rest over the effects his pro
gram has already had in raising
food prices and cutting welfare
services threatens the govern-
ment. In any case, assembly op-
position to belt-tightening will
become increasingly evident as
the effects of the austerity
program become evident.
A major difficulty in bal-
ancing the budget is the con-
tinuing drain of more than $1
billion yearly for military
operations in Algeria. Nuclear
research and development costs
are probably another important
expense. Other inflationary
factors are expanded credit,
which would be politically dif-
ficult to curtail, and pressure
for wage increases. New rises
in food and raw material prices
went into effect on 2 December,
boosting the price index to the
point at which wage hikes are
mandatory, and there'is growing
skepticism that the government
will be able to stop at the
relatively small price conces-
sions.
The price rises may under-
cut the government's stepped-
up export campaign, which in
any event will not immediately
increase France's foreign ex-
change holdings. While the
government is expected to be
able to meet the $50,000,000
due this month for the servic-
ing of existing external debts
as well as its,-EPU obligations
for November, it will probably
have to seek about $500,000,000
in January. If France fails
to justify its EPU loan appli-
cation by detailed financial
reform plans, it will be faced
with the alternatives of post-
poning payment on imports
or dipping into the last re-
maining $576,000,000 worth of
gold in the Bank of France.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
Iceland's trade with the
Soviet bloc continued to in-
crease during the first nine
months of 1957. Assurances of
loans from the United States
and West Germany have momentar-
ily eased pressure on the gov-
ernment to accept Soviet offers
of assistance, but plans for ex-
tensive modernization of the
fishing fleet may make the So-
viet offers tempting again.
Iceland's increasing eco-
nomic dependence on the Soviet
bloc is shown by recently re-
ported foreign trade figures.
During the first nine months
of 1957, the bloc absorbed 36
percent of Iceland's exports
and supplied 34.2 percent of
its imports, as contrasted with
30 and 26.4 percent respectively
for 1956. The rise reflects the
inability of Iceland to market
its fish elsewhere, in consid-
erable part because of its re-
luctance to undertake the dras-
tic economic reforms necessary
to make prices more competitive.
East Germany has delivered
several of the 17 fishing ves-
sels which it has contracted
to build for Iceland. Payments
are being arranged from credits
in the bilateral trade account
between the two countries. The
government is reportedly also
arranging to purchase 15 ad-
ditional large trawlers abroad
through foreign loans.
Pressure on Reykjavik to
negotiate Soviet offers of
loans and assistance amounting
to over $25,000,000 has eased
as a result of the assurances
Iceland received early in No-
vember of American and West Ger-
man loans totaling $5,000,000
and $2,000,000 respectively.
These loans will enable the
government to continue its am-
bitious domestic economic de-
velopment program without re-
sorting to deficit financing.
The Communists have inten-
sified their agitation against
the US-manned base at Keflavik.
Their press has hinted that they
might withdraw from the coali-
tion with the Progressives and
Social Democrats. It is more
likely a chauvinistic maneuver
to influence the January munic-
ipal elections, since the Com-
ICELAND'S TRADE WITH THE SOVIET BLOC
RRCENT of Toni TRADE
1956 1957
(JAN- SEPT
70725
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munists, at their re-
cent party congress,
called on the govern-
ment to implement the
parliamentary resolu-
tion of March 1956 for
the withdrawal of Amer-
ican forces but appar-
ently made no threat
to resign.
Communist crit-
icis m has, however,
caused Foreign Minis-
ter Gudmundsson to
request the activation
of the joint US-Iceland
:Defense Standing Group
agreed upon by both
,zountries in the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARN
6 December 1956 exchange of
letters, to "study defense
needs in the light of the de-
velopment of world conditions,
and make recommendations to
the governments how to meet
these problems."
(Concurred in by ORR)
LEADERS OF EURATOM AND COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES TO MEET
Government leaders of
France, West Germany, Italy,
and the three Benelux countries
who will be in Paris for the
mid-December NATO meetings are
expected to find time on the
side to name the top personnel
and select a location for the
new EURATOM and European Com-
mon Market institutions. Aside
from the immediate importance
of these decisions for the for-
ina.l inauguration of the two
projects on 1 January, many
"pro-Europeans" believe the
location of these organizations
will prove to be the future
capital of a federated Europe.
Of the 30-odd positions
to be filled, the most impor-
tant are the 14 in the EURATOM
and Common Market commissions
and their chairmen. These com-
missions share "executive au-
thority" with the councils and
exercise major discretionary
and advisory powers. The vi-
tality of EURATOM and the Com-
mon Market will accordingly
depend to a considerable degree
on finding men of stature for
these posts while at the same
time satisfying the national
aspirations of the member coun-
tries.
Behind -the-scenes negotia-
tions have probably already
narrowed the choices for at
least the top positions. Thus
the recent resignation of Rene
Mayer from the presidency of
the Coal-Steel Community (CSC)
has paved the way for the ap-
pointment of a German national
to that post, a Frenchman to
the chairmanship of EURATOM,
and someone from the Benelux
countries to preside over the
Common Market. Italy will pre-
sumably be content with leading
positions in the court and as-
sembly which will eventually
serve all three organizations.
Such an arrangement would have
the advantage of denying to
France "leadership" in the Com-
mon Market--where it is the
nation considered most likely
to be obstructive--while allay-
ing possible fears of German
"leadership" of EURATOM.
The choice of headquarters
has narrowed to Brussels, Stras-
bourg, Paris, Luxembourg, and
Milan--in that probable order
of preference. Britain, with
an eye to developing ties with
the Common Market through its
projected European free trade
area, and possibly influencing
its development, has pressed
the six member nations to lo-
cate the Common Market institu-
tions in Paris because the OEEC
is already located there. 'There
is some tendency to divide the
various institutions among the
member countries. It seems
likely, however, that all of
the new institutions, as well
as those of the CSC, will be
centered in one place--perhaps
in a specially created "federal
district" as proposed by Jean
Monnet's influential Action
Committee for a United States
of Europe.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
EUROPEAN VIEW OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
Western European govern-
ments consider the NATO meetings
from 16 to 18 December of criti-
cal importance in clarifying
the alliance's military role
and testing its political co-
hesiveness. They believe this
first meeting of heads of gov-
ernments of the NATO members
should lead to closer collabora-
tion in science and in the tech-
nology of weapons production.
France, West Germany, and others
may be expected, however, to
continue developing their own
modern weapons and will probably
continue to lag on their NATO
force commitments.
The forthcoming meeting
has aroused high public inter-
est. This interest was stimu-
lated by the original Eisen-
hower-Macmillan communiqud of
25 October promising support
of greater scientific collabo-
ration in NATO, and has been
sustained in subsequent weeks
by the unusually large number
of visits by various European
cabinet members to other capi-
tals. Some European statesmen
fear public expectations may
be too high. They emphasize
that the session must do more
than show the NATO members'
good intentions, or the hostile
reaction will leave the alli-
ance worse off than if there
had been no meeting at all.
NATO's Mission
Continued military cutbacks
testify to most members' belief
that Soviet aggression in Europe
Is improbable for years ahead.
Also, deep doubts prevail on
the role of nuclear weapons in
the defense of Europe. Opinion
polls reflect the public's gen-
eral dismay at the possible use
of nuclear weapons; in France,
Italy, and West Germany, a ma-
jority of the respondents con-
sider nuclear energy more a
"curse" than a "boon" to human-
ity. This attitude is reflected
in the government's requests to
share in the decision on when
to retaliate with nuclear weap-
ons against a Soviet attack.
As the types of nuclear
weapons expand, uncertainty
grows among European leaders
as to whether a graduated
deterrent is. possible by draw-
ing a distinction between tacti-
cal and strategic nuclear weap-
ons. American political and
military analyst Kissinger's
"Nuclear Weapons and Foreign
Policy" has been widely read
by British officials, and con-
cern over its possible reflec-
tion of an American intention to
fight a. limited defensive war in
Europe has probably contributed
to the British request for a new
special review of NATO's mission.
Of the varied topics cov-
ered by the Paris meeting's
broad and generalized agenda,
European leaders seem concerned
primarily over two major ques-
tions: how NATO's defense mis-
sion should be carried out; and
the problem of cohesion in the
alliance.
Cohesion of the Alliance
Concern over the cohesion
of the alliance looms large as
a consequence of this anticipa-
tion of no early aggression in
Europe and of some members'
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
preoccupation with matters out-
side the North Atlantic Treaty
area. West Germany, with few
outside commitments, speaks most
vigorously for those who would
extend the machinery for con-
sultation among members on all
disputes throughout the world.
Britain and others with non-
European interests continue'to
balk at any such commitment,
however.
lieve that European bargaining
power with the United States is
now at its height.
Emphasis on Technology
Another persistent charge
--that an exclusive Anglo-Amer-
ican "directorate" exists--has
been voiced anew in France,
where the special relationship
between London and Washington
has long been viewed with dis-
trust. The American NATO mis-
sion notes that this suspicion
is also shared by other NATO
The rapid advance in de-
veloping destructive, long-range
weapons has renewed anxieties
regarding the permanence of the
American commitment in Europe.
In Britain, for example, some
people have expressed the fear
that with the continental United
States within range of Soviet
nuclear assault, Washington may
be less willing to risk war to
defend Europe. A complementary
fear is that the United States
will have less interest in main-
taining troops or missile bases
in Europe when it develops its
own ICBM's.
German Defense Minister
Strauss, because of this con-
sideration, is said to have set
1961 as a target date for con-
tinental Europe to have its own
nuclear weapons capability.
There are indications that Lon-
don, Bonn, and others may be-
Europeans are emphasizing
scientific and technological
development as the most fruit-
ful area for cooperative efforts,
particularly because of recent
Soviet advances in this field.
European opinion has welcomed
signs that Washington intends
to seek relaxation of legisla-
tive restrictions on American
participation in such programs,
especially those involving nu-
clear energy. There is con-
siderable support for a pooling
of basic research facilities,
plus much closer coordination
and exchange of information on
developments of military appli-
cation.
Possibilities for extended
scientific and technological
cooperation are enhanced by the
absence of the deep-seated dif-
ferences among Europeans that
hamper progress in other endeav-
ors. In the past year France
and Germany have achieved the
closest collaboration in the
development of modern weapons--
and it is possible that their
present public arrangements re-
garding missiles may even ex-
tend into nuclear weapon'de-
velopment. Other, more limited,
bilateral arrangements among
Britain, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, and Italy may pave
the way for closer ties, and the
seven-member Western European
Union offers a framework for
their multilateral extension if
NATO-wide collaboration fails
to develop.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 December 1957
The current NATO annual re-
view of defense plans shows a
general picture of further lags,
withdrawals, and cutbacks on the
part of most members in the cen-
tral and northern European area.
Renewed interest in some manner
of military integration along
the pattern of the abortive Eu-
ropean Defense Community is evi-
dent, especially in Germany and
Italy. London appears to have
had second thoughts about its
plans of last spring to build
a nuclear deterrent of its own
at the expense of conventional
forces.
Nonmilitary Cooperation
Several members, notably
Italy and France, have empha-
sized the need for greater co-
operation in nonmilitary fields.
They urge the alliance to en-
courage greater economic aid to
underdeveloped areas to combat
Soviet gains. The foreign min-
isters of both France and Italy
have lent their names to plans
to aid such areas, for which
they probably will seek support
at the forthcoming meeting.
However, they appear to respect
the view endorsed at the December
1956 foreign ministers' meeting
that NATO should not become an
"operating agency" for economic
aid. Most members urge greater
use of the OEEC to consider eco-
nomic problems within the alli-
ance.
Many members have noted
that the meetings will be
closely watched outside the
NATO area by those anticipat-
ing a Western "response" to
Soviet advances. They believe
the conference's concluding
communique must both show
neutral nations the alliance
seeks more than a narrow mili-
tary alliance and give evi-
dence of sufficient decisive-
ness to provide hope to those
seeking defense against So-
viet aggression.
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SOVIET GROUND FORCE WEAPONS
Observations of new and
improved weapons at the October
Revolution Day parade this year
confirm information previously
received that the Soviet ground
forces are continuing to improve
their conventional armament at
the same time they are supple-
menting their arsenal with a
family of tactical support mis-
siles. The new weapons,appar-
ently the results of an inten-
sive research and development
program which began in 1950,
have greater firepower than
those they supplant and give to
the units armed with them an im-
pressive degree of battlefield mo-
bility. These developments are
in line with Soviet tactical
doctrine, which is designed to
meet the demands of nuclear as
well as conventional warfare.
Artillery
Soviet tactical doctrine
regards missiles and nuclear
weapons as a supplement to,
rather than a substitute for,
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Integration of the new mis-
siles and rockets with conven-
tional pieces, mortars, and rock-
et launchers would provide flex-
ible fire support at greater
depths, as well as area satura-
tion through massed fire.
New field artillery pieces
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
conventional fire support. Con-
ventional artillery pieces and
truck-mounted rocket launchers
shared honors at the recent
parade with new short- and medi-
um-range missiles believed cap-
able of carrying nuclear war-
heads. Two "Honest John-type"
artillery rockets which appear
to satisfy two separate range
requirements of up to 75 miles,
one mounted on a tracked am-
phibious tank chassis, were fol-
lowed in the parade by two me-
dium-range tactical missiles
with probable ranges of 150-200
and 350 miles. These weapons
are believed to be
available to combat
units.
Several models
of rocket launchers
--one mounted on a
tracked vehicle--and
two models of a self -
propelled "atomic
cannon" mounted on a
lengthened heavy tank
chassis, were seen
for the first time in
the parade and pro-
vide further evidence
of Soviet emphasis
on mobility. One of
the heavy guns was a convention-
al 12- to 14-inch type and prob-
ably has atomic capability. The
other was of similar caliber,
apparently without a recoil
mechanism, and probably fires
a jet- or rocket-assisted round.
began appearing in
1954 when a 130-mm
"corps gun," an adapta-
tion of a proven naval
piece, was shown. The
following year a 203-
mm gun howitzer, a
152-mm howitzer, and
a 122-mm field gun ap-
peared. All of these
weapons displayed im-
proved roadability
and replaced weapons
of similar caliber.
In 1953, 160-mm
and 240-mm towed heavy
mortars appeared, as
well as the first of a series
of three new truck-mounted rock-
et launchers firing spin-stabil-
ized rounds and ranging in size
from a 16-round, 140-mm model to
a 12-round,240-mm model. Dis-
played this year at the parade
were a 13-ton truck mounting
two banks of three new rockets
approximately 10 inches in di-
ameter and 17 feet long and a
12-tube,240-mm rocket launcher
mounted on a tractor.
In the antitank field, a
57-mm, self-propelled antitank
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
gun, probably air-transportable,
appeared in the para.de. A modi-
fied version of the 85-mm divi-
sional gun M-1945--an antitank
gun which can be propelled by
a small motorcycle engine--also
has been observed in the last
year.
As for antiaircraft artil-
lery, a new self -propelled dual
57-mm gun that would provide
mobile antiaircraft protection
for tactical units was displayed
this month. Mounted on a modi-
fied T-54 tank chassis, the
weapon is equippped with light
armor protection for the crew
compartment. The 57-mm towed
antiaircraft gun, first observed
in 1950,has replaced the 37-mm
model in forward areas, and the
100-mm towed antiaircraft gun
has replaced the 85-mm model
in antiaircraft artillery divi-
sions guarding static installa-
tions. The 122-mm towed heavy
antiaircraft gun, first observed
in 1955, is being used tempo-
rarily to supplement missiles
in the defense of strategic
targets. A surface-to-air two-
stage missile shown in the re-
cent parade completes the Soviet
weapons system for antiaircraft
defense.
Since 1945 the ground
forces also have been supplied
with a family of high-speed
tracked prime movers capable of
handling the entire range of
Soviet towed artillery. These
prime movers--one of which has
been observed towing a 100-mm
gun--are being adapted for tow-
ing and mounting both rockets
and missiles.
A new heavy tank and the
T-54 medium tank were publicly
displayed in Moscow for the
first time this year. The new
tank is probably the oft-re-
ported T-10, replacement for the
JS-3 tank now being observed in
limited numbers in the hands of
Soviet troops in East Germany.
Approximately 5,000 of the T-10
tanks, powered by a new 12-
cylinder diesel engine, are be-
lieved to have been produced to
date. The T-54 medium tank is
rapidly replacing the T-34 in
Soviet units and is now being
issued to satellite armies. A
new assault gun mounting a 122-
mm piece on the T-54 tank chassis
is also being issued.
New wheeled armored vehi-
cles placed in general use since
1950 include six- and four-
wheeled armored personnel car-
riers.
Amphibious
In line with Soviet tacti-
cal doctrine, which calls for
rapid movement and dispersion
to avoid troop concentrations,
a complete family of amphibious
vehicles has been produced rang-
ing from a jeep to a tank. For
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
several years in succession, a
new type amphibious tank has
been issued to reconnaissance
elements. The amphibious, ar-
mored, full-tracked personnel
carrier observed in this year's
parade will provide close ar-
mored infantry support in any
type terrain which can be trav-
ersed by Soviet tanks. The
amphibious jeep appears to be
an exact copy of an American
model, and an amphibious six-
wheel truck is similar to the
American DUKW. One full-tracked
amphibian has been observed;
several others have been re-
ported.
Bridging equipment has been
improved to keep pace with the
additional armor and heavy weap-
ons in the hands of Soviet
troops. In use is a heavy steel
pontoon bridge with a capacity
of 100 tons that can span any
river. Several types of assault
bridging for spanning short
gaps have been observed in East
Germany in the ,past several
years.
Small Arms and Transport
The rugged and effective
family of infantry arms used
during World War II has been re-
placed by an impressive series
of new and improved pistols,
semiautomatic carbines, subma-
chine guns, antitank launchers,
and 82-mm and 107-mm towed, re-
coilless, antitank weapons.
Three small arms fire a stand-
ardized 7.62-mm rimless car-
tridge.
In the motor transport
field, the USSR has made a signi-
ficant improvement in standard-
izing cargo vehicles and adapt-
ing them for use as prime movers,
personnel carriers, and such
special-purpose vehicles as am-
bulances, mobile repair trucks,
and signal vans.
AFGHAN EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN A BALANCED FOREIGN POLICY
Afghan King Zahir Shah will
return the visit of Pakistani
President Mirza by going to
Karachi on 10 December, in the
latest of a series of state
visits by Afghan leaders.
Zahir's scheduled trip is prob-
ably intended to demonstrate
further the general Afghan-
Pakistani rapprochement which
began during the spring of this
year. The Afghan government
apparently wishes to emphasize
that while its relations with
the USSR have expanded, it wants
to maintain a balanced foreign
policy by strengthening its
relations with nonbloc coun-
tries.
The Afghan government has
expanded its international con-
tacts and tried since Prime
Minister Daud assumed office in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1953 to institute progressively
more vigorous developmental
policies, largely predicated
on foreign aid. The program of
Soviet-assisted economic devel-
opment begun in 1954 expanded
rapidly following the signing
of the $100,000,000 loan agree-
ment in January 1956. Many
projects were agreed on by the
Afghans, preliminary surveys
were made, and cost estimates
were submitted by the USSR to
the Afghan government.
In many cases the Afghans
eventually found that the es-
timated cost of a project was
much higher than had been an-
ticipated on the basis of es-
timates submitted previously
by free world companies. Be-
cause of the high costs, the
Afghan government proceeded
more cautiously and contracted
for engineering surveys only
for those projects in which it
was most interested, apparently
feeling partly compensated for
the high costs by the long-term
credits and low interest rates
under the terms of the loan
agreement. Projects on which
construction has begun have
been mainly confined to oil
storage depots, transportation
development, and airfields, all
in the northern part of the
country. Little construction
was in evidence during the 1957
summer building period.
In spite of the relatively
slow implementation of projects
under the $100,000,000 loan
agreement, Afghanistan's econom-
ic relations with the Soviet
bloc have continued to expand.
A large part of a $5,000,000
Czech loan extended in Septem-
ber 1954 has now been committed
under construction contracts.
Trade agreements have been con-
cluded with the USSR, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and Communist
China.
The Afghan government also
accepted further Soviet economic
assistance under the terms of
the oil exploration agreement
announced on 30 July of this
year, at the conclusion of Zahir's
visit to the USSR. Afghan ex-
ports have been increasingly
obligated to the bloc to pay
for imports received under the
terms of the trade agreements
and to service credits covering
both economic and military as-
sistance. These obligations
will continue.
More rapid progress has
been maintained in implementing
the program of Soviet military
assistance to Afghanistan.
Enough modern weapons to com-
pletely re-equip Afghanistan's
64,000-man military and gen-
darmerie establishment probably
have been delivered. A Soviet
military mission has been train-
ing a cadre of Afghan officers
in the use of these weapons, and
the officers are expected to
train Afghan troops to use them
in the near future. The Afghan
army may also be reorganized along
Soviet lines.
Soviet influence in the
Afghan army probably constitutes
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the greatest potential danger
to the Afghan government and
raises the possibility of a
coup by Soviet-oriented of-
ficers, as occurred in Syria.
The royal family, which domi-
nates the government, is sup-
ported mainly by the Pathan
tribes. Yet, because of the
strength of these tribes, the
government does not attempt to
draft their young men into the
army, and Afghan enlisted men
are therefore drawn from mi-
nority peoples such as the
Uzbeks and Tadjiks. In the past,
these troops have not been as
effective fighters as the Pathan
tribesmen, but as they acquire
modern weapons and learn how to
use them they may be able to op-
pose the Pathans effectively.
These troops will be commanded
to an increasing degree by So-
viet-trained officers.
Though Afghan relations
with the Soviet bloc are ap-
parently very friendly, they
may be dictated primarily by
Afghan respect for Soviet
strength and by the Afghan gov-
ernment's desire to secure eco-
nomic and military aid from
bloc countries. Afghanistan
has nevertheless remained suf-
ficiently free of bloc influence
to endorse the American Middle
East doctrine when it was the
primary Communist propaganda
target in the Middle East. It
is notable that no joint com-
munique issued by the Afghan
government and a bloc govern-
ment has attacked colonialism
or the Baghdad pact.
The expansion of Afghan
relations with the Soviet bloc,
which began when Prince Daud
came to power, has been part of
a general growth of Afghani-
stan's international contacts.
The expansion of relations
with the free world now appears
to be regarded by Kabul as
necessary not only for the de-
velopment of Afghanistan but
also to offset expanding rela-
tions with the bloc.
In addition to securing
foreign aid programs and working
to develop the national economy,
the Afghan government in the
past several years has estab-
lished diplomatic relations with
several additional countries,
participated increasingly in
the special organizations of
the United Nations, taken an
active part in General Assembly
debate, sent delegations to
international conferences, dis-
patched and welcomed cultural
and trade delegations and state
visitors, and concluded air
and trade agreements.
Afghanistan has secured
some military training for its
officers from free world coun-
tries. Turkey has long main-
tained a training mission in
Afghanistan and recently wel-
comed about 25 officers to Tur-
key for training. About 15
Afghans have been receiving
pilot training in India, and a
few officers are studying in
American military academies.
Relations with the free
world are much more extensive
in the economic sphere than in
other fields. There is con-
siderable West German business
interest and activity in Afghan-
istan and some from Japan and
India. American economic rela-
tions, however, provide the most
substantial competition to simi-
lar Soviet contacts.
Pan-American World Airways
has assumed the management of
the Afghan Ariana Airline and
is helping it acquire interna-
tional routes, possibly through
the Middle East to West Germany.
Fairchild Aerial Surveys is map-
ping most of Afghanistan. ICA
is providing considerable tech-
nical assistance and has under-
taken to build an international
airport at Kandahar. Caltex
is actively negotiating for a
gasoline distributorship in
eastern Afghanistan. Kabul is
pressing the American govern-
ment to help build a railroad
in the south to connect with
the Pakistani railroad system.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
All these activities are ap-
parently valued by the Afghans
as they tend to offset Soviet
economic activity in addition
to furthering the development
of the country.
Afghan-Pakistani Rapprochement
A desire to improve Afghan-
Pakistani relations, which had
suffered following the Push-
toonistan crisis of 1955, was
evidenced in Pakistani Presi-
dent Mirza's visit to Kabul in
August 1956 and by Afghan Prime
Minister Daud's visit to Karachi
the following November.
The Afghans, probably mo-
tivated mainly by a desire to
balance their expanded rela-
tions with the USSR, moved to
improve relations with Pakistan
early this year. In April, Daud
announced the reversal of Ka-
bul's Kashmir policy, which now
supports Pakistan's demand for
a plebiscite. At the same time,
the Pushtoonistan propaganda
campaign was permitted to slack-
en. The Afghans began to in-
crease their use of transit
facilities through Pakistan,
and, following a visit to Kabul
by Pakistani Prime Minister
Suhrawardy, an air agreement
was signed on 23 June by the
two countries. Significant
was Kabul's forebearance fol-
lowing a report that Suhrawardy
had made disparaging remarks
about autonomy for Pushtoonistan
during a radio interview in Los
Angeles. The two countries
have again exchanged both am-
bassadors and consuls; they had
been withdrawn in 1955.
The forthcoming state visit
by King Zahir to Karachi will be
regarded as further evidence of
the continuing improvement of
relations between the two neigh-
bors. Though the King has be-
come increasingly prominent in
Afghan policy affairs, he will
probably not conduct negotiations
on specific problems which would
involve Afghan concessions in
exchange for Pakistani conces-
sions. Discussions will prob-
ably remain on a general level
and produce a joint statement
of good will, possibly including
a declaration of intent to nego-
tiate further on specific prob-
lems, such as transit develop-
ment, trade, and the Pushtooni-
stan dispute.
SECRET
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 9
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500080001-8
 Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500080001-8
Approved For Release 2007/10/23: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01500080001-8