CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001400040001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 29, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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,..
COIVF!_
II
CURRENT
COPY N0. 18
OC~ N0. 3961/57
29 August 1957
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
ec~cun~l~rst I-I:b.
~Q CHAIJGE .v Cl.A . ^
p i~CIASSI~t~D
CLASS. CHhAfGEb TQ~ ~~~""
NEXT REVIEW ~ ATE: -
AU'fH:~ ~ 70-
CENTRAL INTFI I IC~FNC'F arFNrv
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE ~~~~~~~~
p~~l~~~ ~~~~ ~~~~.~ Ua~/
CONFIDENTIAL
State Department review completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 August 195?
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SOVIET MISSILE ANNOUNCEMENT AND DISARMAMENT TACTICS
The Soviet press agency
TASS on 26 August announced
that an intercontinental bal-
listic missile (ICBM) had been
successfully tested to "a huge
distance" in the USSR "in recent
days.'` It had been estimated
that the USSR would be capable,,
in the relatively near future,
of launching an ICBM? TASS also
called attention to a recent
series of nuclear and thermonu-
clear explosions in the USSR.
The most recent Soviet nuclear
test--the first since last April
--took place on 22 August. There
is no evidence that this explo-
sion was associated with the
firing of an IGBM.
The TASS announcement, to-
getheir with Valerian Zorin's
subsequent speeches in the
United Nations Disarmament Sub-
committee in London, seems to
foreshadow a major effort. by
the USSR in the forthcoming UN
General Assembly session to win
support for its proposed,suspen--
sion of nuclear weapons tests
and agreement not to use nuclear
weapons or missiles with nu-
clear warheads.
The TASS announcement in-
cluded the standard charge of
Western obstruction of a dis-
armament agreement, particularly
with respect to cessation of nu-
clear tests. The Soviet pro-
posals of 30 April and ? June
for a partial disarmament agree-
ment called for renunciation
of the use-for military purposes
of both nuclear weapons and
missiles of any-range carrying
nuclear warheads. Moscow prob-
PART I OF
ably believes that its announce-
ment will increase world-wide
support for its proposed bans
on testing and use, placing the
Western powers in an increasing-
ly untenable position.
Far these purposes the
Soviet Union appears eager to
tz?ansfer the discussions from
the subcommittee to ..the General
Assembly, where it is also like-
ly to repeat its proposals of
last year for an expansion of
the Disarmament Commission and
Subcommittee to include coun-
tries such as India which are
sympathetic to its viewpoint.
Zorin's speech of 2? August
included a strong attack on the
subcommittee, because it was
responsive to the demands of
NATO but ignored the views of
other countries. He called for
the inclusion of more states,
representing other geographical
areas and social systems, in
the disarmament talks. Zarin
criticized the secrecy under
which the subcommittee operates
as a Western device to keep
public opinion in ignorance and
to create the false impression
of progress toward agreement.
His remarks recalled Khrushchev's
criticism of the "NATO subcom-
mittee" in July.
Zarin also delivered a
strong attack on the principle
of aerial inspection, which he
said could not prevent a sur-
prise attack, and the specific
zones proposed by the West. He
charged that the plan for in-
spection of the United States,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 August 195?
Canada, and the USSR was an
intelligence-collection scheme
to plan for aggressive war
while the Arctic inspection
plan was useless. He ignored
entirely the Western plan for
inspection in Europe although
the USSR has put same emphasis
on inspection in that area
Soviet statements on aerial in-
spection in the past have alter-
nated betweeh counterproposals
to Western plans and denuncia-
tions of the whole idea.
The American delegate in
London considered Zorin's
speech an indication that the
-USSR was preparing further con-
cessions to meet the West in
a first-step agreement and
believed the harsh-tone of-the
speech was intended to off-
set any impression that these
concessions might be a sign
of weakness. He considered
it possible, however,. that
Moseow may be developing a
propaganda position ~:y:to be
used in the event of~a fail-
ure to reement at
Landon. (Concurred
in by OSI
KHRUSHCHEV RESUMES ATTACK ON
Publication in the USSR
this week of new and more seri-
ous charges against Malenkov
after a period of relative quiet
in the campaign against the
"antiparty" group seems to be
an attempt to create a new gen-
eral-wave of popular indigna-
tion. Reports from Moscow in-
dicate that the current mood
of manq Soviet citizens is one
of depression, cynicism, and
distrust of present party lead-
ers.
By linking Malenkov with
Beria, Khrushchev prob~.bly hopes
to transfer to Malenkov some of
the revulsion Soviet citizens
still feel toward the executed
police chief. The new charges
day the groundwork for possible
further punitive action against
Malenkov and will serve as an
additional warning to any who
might be less than enthusiastic
for Khrushchev's policies.
Malenkov is characterized
as Beria's ''shadow and tool,,"
who 'ivery skillfully" took- ad-
vantage of Stalin's weaknesses
and habits in the last year's
of his life. He is charged
with having incited Stalin to
take action which was deserving
of "stern condemnation." This
is only a short step from ac-
cusing him of responsibility
for the worst excesses of the
latter part of the .Stalin era.
The new attack on Malenkov
was contained in an article
published in the most recent
issue of the ,party journal,
Kommunist. The article is based
on ~ ree unpublished speeches
Khrushchev is reported to have
made between Hay and July of
this year. The speech in which
the charges against Malenkov
were made was probably either
one he gave to the Moseow city
party organization on 2 July
or one he gave to the Moscow
Oblast party organization on 3
July. At these meetings the
"antiparty" activities of the
ousted leaders were explained,
Malenkov was probably
singled out far .attack because
he was Khrushchev's leading
rival and must dangerous oppo-
nent. In the propaganda barrage
following the June plenum he
was treated as the most degen-
erate member of the "antiparty
group," being the only member
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 August i95?
of the. opposition, for instance,
charged with being a chief or-
ganizer of the notorious "Len-
ingrad affair" far which Abakumov
was blamed and executed in 1954.
The diversity of treatment
thus far accorded the members
of the ''antiparty group" sug-
gests that eaoh cake is being
considered separately and that
the fate of the other opponents
is not necessarily wrapped up
with that of Malenkov. But
while the other members of the
group have not`been publicly
accused of misdeeds as serious
as those charged to Malenkov,
further action may vet be taken
a:gains t them.
SYRIAN DEVELOPMENTS
Further dismissals of
Syrian civilian government of-
f icials, especially the key
secretaries general of the
various ministries, appear im-
minent, Akram Iiawrani, Baathist
leader, has voiced the opinion
that the government departments
are "infiltrated" with the
"lackeys of imperialism" who
must be rooted out. It is re-
ported that the Foreign Ministry
will be the first affected.
Concurrent with the beginnings
of the purge, testimony impli-
cating dismissed senior army
officers in a conspiracy against
the state may be released and
a series of "treason" trials
can be expected soon.
While the power relation-
ships in Syria remain unclear,
preliminary indications are that
the recent purge of the neutral
and pro-Western officers hasi
resulted in a sweeping victory
for the leftist, nationalist
officer group known as the "Lit-
tle Revolutionary Command Coun-
cil (RCC)." These officers,
who as military caddis witnessed
the defeat of the Syrian army
by the Israeli ~in 1948, have
as their professed goal the res-
torationof the army's honor.
A necessary requisite far at-
tai#~ment of this objective was
the elimination from the army
of discredited older leaders
who the "Little RCC" felt stood 25X1
in the way of effective army
reform.
The "Little RCC,?' because
of its phobia regarding Israel,
is basically pro-USSR and anti-
Western. It views the USSR as
a source of armaments and as an
ally in its struggle against
Western "imperialism" and Zi~n-
ism. Rather than being pro~-
Communist domestically the group
regards the Communists in much
the same light as other Syrian
political groups. All such
political activities are under
army surveillance, and a prema-
ture bid for power by the local
Communists might be opposed by
the RCC group.. Whether the
"Little RCC" will be able to
cope with Communist infiltration
and imperialism will depend on
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARX
29 August 1957
the extent and manner of the
implementation of agreements
.with the Soviet bloc and the
effectiveness of the local Cam-
munist party cadre.
The USSR is refraining
from any foreign policy initia-
tive that would suggest Soviet
control. ovex'? Syria and is, don-
centrating on propaganda stress-
ing charges that the United
States attempted a coup d'~etat.
It is supporting Syria's claims
that the Syrian-Soviet economic
agreement is a purely internal
affair by leaving official com-
meets on the increasingly close
economic relationship to Syrian
spokesmen.
Neighboring Countries' Reaction
Reaction in neighboring
countries toward events in Syria
remains varied; Lebanon and
Jordan, the two countries most
susceptible to Syrian subver-
sion, continue to await further
developments apprehensively.
Lebanon has tightened border
controls and entries from Syria.
With Jordan's internal situa-
tion precarious, beputy Prime
Minister Samir Rifai has stated
that he believes a federation
of Jordan and Iraq may be the
only political move left by
which pro-Western Arabs can re-
sist the pressure emanating
from the consolidation of a
leftist regime in Syria. Rifai
believes that King Saud's bless-
ing would be necessary before
such a move could be made.
Iraq's palace spokesman,
Crown Prince Abd al-Ilah, re-
turned to Ba~,ghdad on 26 August
from ?Istanbul~ where he had been
consulting with Turkish offi-
cials. The .Baghdad government's
public reaction to Syrian
developments has been relative-
ly weak, however. Up to the
present King Saud has remained
publicly silent
e s coat nuing to
carry out common military plan-
ning with Nasr on the Gulf of
Aqaba problem. The Turks,
while concerned over the pos-
sibili~ty of having a Communist
neighbor to the south, have
maintained a discreet silence
but have been carrying on dis-
cussions with the ,Iraqis and
with King Hussain when he passed
tkarough Istanbul on his way to
Europe.
Although Nasr may well be
concerned over the apparent
leftward shift within Syria and
may be expected to do his utmost
to maintain Egyptian influence
in Syria, the Syrian situation
has not affected the overt Egyp-
tian attitude toward the United
States. Cairo radio continues
to elaborate on charges of Amer-
ican intervention in Syria of -
fairs.
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The Israelis are carrying
on brigade and division maneuvers
in the normal training region
west of Lake Tiberias. This
serves to guard against untoward
developments on the Syrian front,
now commanded by Syrian Colonel
Akram Dayri, an impetuous of -
f icer formerly in -command of the
Syrian military police. Dayri
has a number of young officers
under his command who will be
even less restrained from creat-
ing incidents than their pred-
ecessors. Chief of Staff Bizri
has agreed with the United Na-
tions Truce Supervisory Organiza-
tion to station observers on
the Syrian side of the demarca-
tion line, and this ma,v help
kee t e er calm.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENGE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 August 195?
SOVIET-SYRIAN EGONO~IIG RELATIONS
A three-man mission led
by the chairman of Syria's eco-
nomic development board is in
Moscow to negotiate details- of
the preliminary Soviet-Syrian
economic aid agreement reached
in early August. In the earlier
Moscow discussions, the Soviet
Union made its first firm offer
to undertake a long-term eco-
nomic development program in a
Middle Eastern country.
Carrying out of the aid
agreement would permit the-USSR
to exert substantial influence
over the Syrian economy, not
only by determining the direc-
tion and pace of economic de-
velopment through the provision
of machinery and Soviet special-
ists, but also by requiring
Syria to commit a significant
share of its exports for along
period.
In the preliminary aid
agreement, Moscow indicated
willingness to supply equip-
ment and technical assistance
for the extension of Latakia
harbor, construction of a
Euphrates River dam for power
acrd irrigation, and of roads and
railways, and a build-up of
Syrian industries .as soon as
preliminary surveys are made.
The aid, reportedly amount-
ing to well over $100,000,000,
is to be repaid over a 12-year
period at 2.5-percent interest.
To increase the attractiveness
of the deal, the USSR has of -
fered to purchase 200,000 tons
of wheat (worth about $15,000,
000) or other Syrian commodities.
Half of the returns from these
sales is to be applied as pay-
ment under the economic aid
agreement and half is to be
made in foreign currency.
'phis offer suggests that
the USSR, a net exporter of
grain, is willing to purchase
any Syrian export item, prob-
ably on a long-term basis, to
convince Syria it can earn suffi-
cient credits to meet its pay-
ments obligations arising fram
the economic aid and earlier
arms deals. Without such an
agreement Syria would find it
financially difficult to com-
mit itself to Soviet aid far
its economic development plan.
An intensified shift away
fram Western partners in Syria's
trade pattern may have been an
additional aim of the Soviet
offer. Nearly 50 percent of
Syria's mayor export crop, cot-
ton, was sold to the bloc dur-
ing the last marketing year.
During this same period, however,
Soviet purchases from Syria were
small and accounted for only
3 percent of Syrian cotton ex-
ports.
The USSR apparently intends
to use the Syrian agreement as
a basis for promoting further
Soviet-sponsored economic de-
velopment programs in the Mid-
dle East. Moscow has offered
within the past week to provide
the Sudan with large-scale eco-
nomic assistance and to pro-
vide Iran with "unlimited cred-
it at 2 percent" for heavy in-
dustrial development.
(Prepared by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ~SUMMA~i.Y
29 August 1957
NOTES AND COMMENTS
KADAR REGIME UNEASY OVER UN DEBATE
On the eve of the United.
Nations General Assembly ses-~
sion, the Kadar regime is ~aki.ng
.renewed efforts to establish
firm control in Hungary and dis-
pel rumors of a more liberal
political line, because con-
cessions might encourage dissi-
dent domestic elements. Kadar
fears Hungarian popular re-
action to possible General
Assembly condemnation, and the
Kremlin is concerned over the
effects of such condemnation on
its own international prestige.
In recent weeks the regime
has attempted to reinforce in -
ternal stability by mass ar-
rests of potential opposition
leaders among youths, workers,
and the population at large,
and has simultaneously conduc~G-
ed a widespread purge of work-
ers'; organizations--including
the trade union council--to
eliminate elements identified
with the suspect workers' coun-
cils. Although the arrest
wave ended last week, the re-
gime has not yet released any
significant number of those
arrested and is continuing to
mete-out heavy sentences--often
death--to persons labeled
"counterrevolutionaries," Pre-
mier-Kadar himself on 20 Aug-
ust defiantly ,justified the
arrests with the declaration
that some people thought not
enough ''enemies" had been
arrested.
It is likely that Kra:dar?
will eventually resign as pre-
mier, but will .continue to
maintain top authority as par-
ty first secretary, thereby
conforming to current bloc
practice. In this event, his
most probable successor would
be First Deputy Premier Ferenc
Muennich, with Minister of
State Gyo~gq Marosan another
passibility. Neither would be
an improvement over Kadar.
Muennich, once considered a
distinguished Communist with
some reputation for moderation,
is associated in his role as
minister of armed and security
forces with the merciless re-
pression of insurgent elements
following the uprising. Mar-
osan, a former social demo-
crat with pronounced demagogic
gifts, has shown himself will-
ing to defend any cause on be-
half of the Kremlin.
There appears to be little
possibility that Imre Nagy will
be rehabilitated as Hungarian
premier, despite recent rumors
to that effect. He remains a
symbol of national resistance
to Kremlin domination and his
rehabilitation might encour-
age-.dangerous anti-Soviet pas-
sions among-the populace.
The Hungarian regime will
use every tactic, possibly in-
cluding show trials, to coun-
ter the US speCial.eommittee
report on Hungary and to sup-
port its own contention that
-the November uprising was en-
gineered by the United States
and Britain. This might in-
clude a trial of Colonel Pal
Maleter, minister of defense
during the uprising, who re-
portedly has been subjected
to interrogation since his
arrest by Soviet officials on
3 November. A recent uncon-
firmed press report states
that Maleter had broken under
torture and signed a confes-
sion .that he.was'.in.~:coritact
with American and British offi-
cials during the revolution and
specifically that he passed
information to the British
military attach.
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CURRENm INTELLIGEAiCE WEEKLY t~~J~M~RY
' 29 August 1957
Wh#,le enforcing a rigorous
line at home, the Hiungarian re-
game is mal~ing a major effort
to influence uncommitted coun-
tries ~.n ~1s:a anc~ Africa to
support its positiob at the
General Ass?mbly. A special
mission headed by Deputy For-
eign Minister Karoly Sxarka is
now touring South Asia, where
it .has interviewed Prime Min-
isters Nehru of Tndia and $an-
daranaika of Ceylon with lit-
tle success. .When the H-xn-
:.garians, :attempted to make propa-
ganda capita`1 out of Nehru's
statements by claiming he was
opposed. ~?,~ UbT discussion of
t3~e subject, defense Minister
V. K. i~riehna ~ienon made a
public-statement to the effect
that I~tdia "will not and can-
not object" to such a discus-
siono In Ceylon--one of the
five countries whose represent-
atives. prepared the UN report
condemning Hungary--Bandaranaike
told the 'visitors-that he
thought the Hungarians should
"welcome",a discussion and re-
marked that Hungarian opposi-
tion to the debate would prej-
udice :warp 'pea'bY~c opioandn
against Hungary.
BTJLC~ARIA SEEKS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH NEST
Recent statements by Bul-
garian Premier Anton Yugov and
specific actions by his govern-
ment indicate that the drive
for better relations with the
West--initiated in the spring
of 1956 but suspended six
months later--has been resumed.
Probably prompted by the re-
emphasis on peaceful coexist-
ence in Soviet foreign policy,
these renewed overtures may
indicate greater willingness
than in any previous period
to compromise on specific is-
sues. that. have.heretaf?re iso-
lated Bulgaria from tt~e -free
world.
Yugov told a leftist Greek
parla.amentary deputy on 20
August that Bulgaria has ap-
pointed a commission to ne-
gotiate a "fina:l solution" of
the remaining difficulties ~'
with Greece. As evidence of
improving relations between
the two countries, he painted
nut the sharp increase in trade
--from $974,000 in 1955 to
about $4,000,000 in 1956--and
the opening of hn exchange
point an the Greek-Bulgarian
frontier, all communications
and trade having previously
gone through Turkey, The major
obstacle to improved relations
has been the $45,000,000 World
War II reparations debt owed
Greece. Although the Bul-
garians acknowledge this debt,
in previous negotiations they
have offered only $2,000,000
as an initial payment against
a Greek demand fvr $6,000,000.
In a move to improve re-
lations with I~+rael, the Bul-
garian government has offered
to day 5I6,4~0 lava ($8,235) to
the family of each person
killed when Bulgat?ian antiair-
craf t guns ~ s~kiot down an Israel i
airlins~r in ~tzlp 1955.. The
recipents'~vauld include Ameri-
can, British, and Austrian na-
tiQnals. '$ulg-aria has refused,
however,' ty abknowledge re-
sponsibility for the incident
and has not met the Israeli de-
mand that those responsible be
punished.
In a press interview on
29 July, Yt~g'ov expressed- wi11-
ingness to rajestablish diplo-
matic relations with the United
States, broken off in 1950 at
the .height of the cold war as
a result of~espionage charges
leveled against American Min-
ister Heath in connection with
the Kastov trial--Bulgaria s
"Titoist" affair. The charges
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CURRENT. INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMhARY
29 August 1957
are a d?ad letter in any caste
since K?stov was rehabilitated
in 19 56. Travel restrictions
an Western diplomatic person-
nel, the other issue leading
to a break in American-Bulgarian
relations, were relaxed'some
time ago,
Yugov stated on 24 August
t-hat differences on "some
ideological questions" did not
constitute an obstacle to the
establishment of friendship
and collaboration between the
Bulgarian and Yugoslav. peoples.
Although the party and govern-
mental shake-up of 11-12 July
in Bulgaria appeared to be a
defeat for those elements de-
siring closer relations with
Yugoslavia, the Bulgarians have
since relaxed harder restric-
tions on twa separate occasions
to permit Yugoslavs to attend.
fairs and celebrations in Bul-
garia. Continued Bulgarian
press polemics, however, demon-
strate that Sofia is unlikely
to modify its hostile attitude
toward Yugoslav ideological
pronouncements for the sake of
a ranbroehement mith Belgrade.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY :SU~~Ry
29 August 1957
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FRANCE`6 PROJECTED
Premier Bourges-Maunoury
plans to obtain cabinet agree-
ment on a new basic statute
for Algeria early in September
for subsequent presentation to
the National Assembly, possibly
at a special sessiono As now
drafted, the plan, which provides
for a federal regime for Algeria,
gives primary attention to mol-
lifying domestic opposition to
Algerian independence and seems
only secondarily designed to
establish a strong French posi-
tion for the UN session this
fall.
The government seems ready
to propose a f ederal plan which
would offer a double safeguard
for FranceQs position. Algeria
would be divided into semi-
autonomous terx?itories9 in two
of which--Algiers and Oran--
voters of European extraction
would be numerous enough to
dominate and could be expected
to block the emergence of a
strong central government in
Algeria. Paris would retain
control of foreign affairs,
military matters, and finances,
and would decide disputes be-
tween territories.
Some provision will prob-
ably be made for a central A1-
ALGERIAN STATUTE
gerian executive and legisla-
ture, but with little real
authority, A leader of one of
the small center parties urges
federal powers for such a cen-
tral government, but the leader
of .the Independent and Peasant
party opposes any authoritative
all-Algerian governmental bodies
because they might generate
new pressure for independence.
~dinister for Algeria Robert
Lacoste, who has persuaded the
cabinet the. settlers might
otherwise be pushed to revolt,
insists on the necessity for
the widest possible decentrali-
zation of the machinery of gov-
ernment.
The French cabinet, which
hopes to hammer out a complete
plan at a meeting early in
September, has reportedly agreed
some provision should be offered
for subsequent revision, pre-
sumably to make the statute mare
palatable bath to Algerian na-
tionalists and to international
opinion. T}~e proposal now un-
der consideration would permit
each territory to decide after
two years on the powers it
wishes to delegate to the cen-
tral assembly in Algiers. Two
years later--a maximum of four
years from the setting up of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY'SU1dY
29 August 19 57
territorial assemblies--the
federal assembly representing
Algeria could ~.wor.k,. out ~a ; .,.
permanent statute for Algeria
with .the French National As-
sembly. The elections setting
.the timetable in motion--those
for the regional legislatures
--will be held only-when and
if the areas are officially
declared to be a f ed.
SPANISH-M?ROCCAN DIFFERENCES OVER IFNI
Mounting Moroccan pressure
against Spain's Atlantic coast
enclave of Ifni h~,s been net
with strong Spanish counter-
measures in the past three
months. In apparent anticipa-
tion of an early demand by
Rabat for cession of -the ter-
ritory, Spain held high-level
conversations with France on
24 August to seek a common at-
titude on relations with Moroc-
co.
Moroccan nationalist agita-
tion in Ifni has resulted in
violence on several occasions
since mid-June, and the Moroc-
can government Maas protested
the countermeasures taken by
the Spanish police. Moroccan
Foreign Minister Balafre,~ re-
portedly introduced the ques-
tion of Ifni in midrJune ec6-
nomic negotiations in Madrid,
and on 'ZO ,:August Rabat recalled
its ambassador from Madrid for
consultation, possibly with
the intention of issuing in-
structions tv negotiate for
The Ifni garrison, which
reportedly numbered 2;500 men
in early July, is being rein-
forced, and the Spanish embassy
in Rabat believes the troops
will use force to block possi-
ble attempts at infiltration
by el?ments of the extralegal ~~
Moroccan Army of Liberation
-This reportedly numbers between
2,500 and 3,000 in the southern
Morocco area and is said by the
Spaniards to be patrolling the
border in place of the Moroccan
police.
Last week end, the Spanish
foreign minister and the French
under .secretary of state for
foreign affairs met at San
Sebastian to examine the two
countries' common interests in
Morocco as well as other parts
of North Africa. Immediately
prior to the meeting, a Spanish
F~eigh Ministry official in-
f ormed..the American. embassy
that the.. Ifni matter was sure
to be a 'ihot potato," and an
.officer of~ , the French em-
bassy in Madrid told his
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKL3CSUMbARY
29 August 1957
American colleagues that
France would officially
support Spain's position on
UNREST
Small-scale rioting in Ac-
cra and turmoil in, newly rode-
pendent Ghana's National Assem-
bly last week are symptomatic
of growing opposition to the
government of Prime Minister
Nkruxnah and his Convention
People's party (CPP). These
incidents, occurring against
a background of continuing eon-
flict between modern and tradi-
tional patterns of society, may
be followed by further minor
violence in the near future.
SECRET
Ifni to safeguard its own
position, in its West African
colonies.
IN GHANA
However, disturbances on a
nationwide scale are probably
not imminent, and the CPP re-
gime, which enjoys,a large and
well-disciplined majority in
the legislature, appears to be
in no danger for the present.
Although the specific cause
of the recent disorders in Accra
is somewhat obscure, widespread
disillusionment over the fruits
of independence, especially in
the economic sphere, is appar-
ently fundamental
to the present un-
easiness in Ghana.
Thee also appears
to be genuine ,fear
in some quarters--
especially among
elements. of the op-
position National
Liberation Movement
(NLM)--that the Nkru-
mah government is
headed toward dicta-
torship. Its insist-
ence an placing..-
Nkrumah"s image on
stamps and coins,
its alleged unwill=
ingness to consult
the opposition, and
its recent deporta-
tion of a prominent
anti-Nkrumah journal-
ist and two opposi=
tion party leaders
all point in this
direction., in the
view of NLM leaders.
Their fears were fur-
ther aggravated by
the government's hasty
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 August 195?
enactment last week of legis-
lation to permit the ogster of
the two politicians by mi'niste-~
r is1 arcde~ from which no appeal
could be tal~en.
Ahtigovernment agitation
has also developed among-the
Ga tribesmen, who live in the
Accra area and formerly support-
ed the CPP. Their principal
complaint is that the govern-
ment is alienating to non-Ga
"strangers" tribal lands which
they cl~.im should be reserved
for the future use of Ga peo-
ple. As yet there is no open
connection between the Ga and
the NLM but such an alliance
may develop soon. Meanwhile,
there is evirlenc~e~ s~g~sting~
that the government may have
already launched a get-tough
policy aimed at crushing the
Ga oppositian before such a
merger, which could conceiv-
ably increase the possibility
"of eventual civil war,, can be
effected.
A head-on clash between
the government and Ghana's
tribal chiefs is alas an -early
passibility. The latter have
long been unhappy about the
gradual but steady shrinkage
of their traditional position
of authority. Controversial
government bills to establish
regional commissioners--who
would be powerful agents of the
central government in the five
regions of Ghana--now being ad-
vanced in the assembly are like-
ly to provoke strenuous protests
both within and outside the leg-
islature. Already the council
of paramount chiefs in southern
Ghapa, a group which has gener-
ally supported the government,
has passed a resolution of "no
confidence" in the minister of
local government and invited
chiefs in the northern and
Ashanti regions to a joint meet-
ing to "discuss the preseni:
trend of irs."
OPPOSITION TO COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT IN INDIA'S KERALA STATE
The Communist government
in India's Kerala State was
confronted far the first time,
between 18 and 26 August, with
organized popular oppositian to
its policies, Sentiment
against actions of the four-
manth-old Communist ministry
has been building up among
several sections of Kerala's
populace during recent weeks.
Congress party and Catholic
leaders exploited this dis-
satisfaction to stage large-
scale protest demonstrations.
Two issues primarily have
stimulated opposition protests:
the Communists` attempt to ex-
tend their governmental control
over Kerala's private schools
and their apparent condoning of
"lawless" activities by labor
groups,
The education bill now
under debate in the state
assembly is the most controver-
si.a measure introduced by the
Communist government. It would
give the administration wide
powers of supervision ove~~ staite-
aided private schools in Kerala,
control over the appointment
and payment of teachers, and
the right to take over the
administration of any school it
decides is mismanaged. The
bill has been widely attacked
as a Communist scheme to dis-
place the traditional educational
system with Marxist indoctrina-
tion. The bill is bitterly op-
posed by the powerful Catholic
elements in Kerala, which own
approximately two thirds of the
state's unusually well-developed
educational facilities.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 August 1957
The Communist rega~me has
also come under considerable
attack both within Kerala and
elsewhere in-India for its poli-
cy of limiting law enforcement
in labor disputes. Wides~laread
reports of "terroristic" activi-
ties by Communist..-dominated
labor groups, particularly
directed toward foreign managers
of the state's many large plan-
tations, have followed the
governments order restricting
the state police from inter-
vening in disputes between
labor and management.
The much-publicized pro-
test march on the state capital
staged by Congress party and
CatholYc leaders on 26 August
T
m pp ren y result-
ed in only minor incidents which
the government forces were able
to control without great diffi-
culty..
The size and strength of
this popular opposition in
Kerala has not been reliably
reported. The Communist
position does not appear to be
threatened seriously as yet,
although the ministry seems to
have been sufficiently impressed
with the extent of the protest
25X1
sentiment to make some minor
modifications of the education
bill prior to the 26 August
demonstration. While Communist
leaders are unlikely to alter
their basic ob,~ectives in
Kerala, continuing public op-
position may force them to plaice
even further emphasis on con-
ciliatory tactics rather ..than ~n
policies openly designed to ex-
tend Communist ontr
state . 25X1
President Siles is appar-
ently consolidating his recent
victories over the leftist group
which has opposed Bolivia's~?US-
backed economic stabilization
program. Both in congress and
in the powerful national labor
confederation, Siles has de-
feated the forces of Juan Ledad.n,
long Bolivia's most powerful ?
lobar leader.
Lechin's attacks on the
program last spring apparently
impelled Siles to drive for
dominance. At a 17 May meeting
of the government party's nation-
al political committee, Siles,
reportedly by threatening to
resign, gained party authori-
zation to reorganize his cabs-
net and the party's national
Committee without prior approval
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C~'R?RENT I1~ELLIGENCE WEEKLY E'~F.Y
2J Aug~us+t 1957
of the Bolivian Lobar Central
(COB), dominated by Lechin.
Silas then instituted an in-
tensive program of taking the
economic stabilization issue
directly to the people.
Silas' opposition to the
COB call far a general strike
on 1 July not only prevented
the strike and saved the eco-
nomic program but also split
the lobar central into pro-
Siles and pro-Lechin factions.
Consequently, when the nation-
al congress opened in early
August, new labor adherents of
Silas combined with his moder-
ate supporters to accept a
resignation which leftist Vice
President Nuflo Chavez--a Lech-
in adherent--had offered in
pique and had sought to re-
call. The pro-Silas c~ongres-~
siona'l m~josi.~y had previously
ousted Lechin as president of
the Senate, in which office he
was legally next in line of
succession to the presidency.
They elected moderate Federico
Alvarez Plata to the post.
Opposition activity in Cuba
has subsided since the failure
of a general strike attempt
early this month, and President
Batista has moved to tighten
his hold over the island. The
tenuous ,nat~~are=of his position
is underscored, however, by?
continuing political tension
and rumors of increasing subver-
sion within the armed farces;" "
Sabotage activities a+re
likely to increase with the
anticipated restoration of con-
stitutional guarantees an or be-
fore 15 September.
In the COB itself, where
a Lechin slate had won virtually
every post in elections last
June, the pro-Silas opposition
gained sufficient strength by
23 August to force the resig-
nation of all officials except
Lechin, The recent record of
the successful group suggests
that a reconstituted COB will
provide Silas with effective
cooperation, at least 'tempo-
ra~'11y:.
Silas, however, has de-
pended to a considerable ex-
tent for each of these major
victories an Juan Sanjines,
formerly known as a Communist
and now as a Communist sympa-
thizer. Sanjines, as leader of
the key railway federation, was
the most important single la-
bor leader opposing the 1 July
general strike and probably the
chief figure in the drive to re-
and congressional.
constitute the COB. His power
in congress was shown by his
recent election as president of
the lower house, Should he turn
against Silas, it would endanger
the latter'?s support, both labor
A high-level shake-up of
the military command in Oriente
Province preceded a new drive
against Fidel Castro's rebels
in 'the Sierra ~aestra.
The government has clamped e~en-
sarship on accounts of the ac-
tion. Despite claims that the
army, which reportedly is try-
ing aerial-bombardment, will
shortly wipe put the rebel men-
ace, it is doubtful that the
current campaign will be any
more successful than previous
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..:QURR~~1'I' INTELLIGENCE WEET~LY'SiTM1~ARI'
29 August .195?
all-out extermination drives.
Government efforts to woo the
largely antiadministration pop-
ulace of Oriente have failed
to halt the moral and l~igistic
support for the rebels.
The government coalition
has continued preparations for
presidential elections in June
1958, and an electoral la.w,
which has passed both houses of
congress, is: awaiting exebuti~e
approval.. Opposition groups
SOVIET LAWS TO COMBAT
The RSFSR, the_largest:ot;
the'.Soviet`..republics,. has.pub-
lished for discussion a draft
law against "antisocial and
parasitical elements," First
proposed this spring in the
Baltic republics, the decree
has since been suggested with
only minor variations in all
the other republics except the
Ukraine, 73el.ar.us~saY.a , and Mol-
davia. Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan have already put such
a law into effect.
The law empowers general
meetings of citizens of oil-~
loges or city blocks to sentence
to a term of exile of two to
five-years "-able-bodied adults
who lead an antisocial, para-
sitical life, who maliciously
evade socially useful works or
who live on unearned income."
The draft legislation specifies
that a simple majority vote is
required to adopt a sentence of
exile. The decision must then
be submitted for confirmation
to the executive committee of
the district or city soviet of
working people's deputies. The
punishment specified is defined
as "obligatory engagement in
work at a place of exile," with
unauthorized departure punish-
able under the existing crim-~
inal codes.
appear to be preparing to boy-
cott the elections, but so far
have failed to .agree on a com-
mon course of action.
Some basis for political
stability is provided by Cuba's
record-breaking economic pros-
perity, by Batista's strong
hold over the powerful labor
movement, and by the continued
lovalty e~ tnr~ mi l i +ary figures.
"PARASITICAL ELEMENTS"
The use of citizens' as-
semblies to pass sentences is
apparently an attempt to en-
courage public condemnation of
persons who-avoid productive
work or who support themselves
through shady dealings such as
speculation. One of the great
stumbling blocks in combating
.such problems in the past has
been public apathy.
Many Soviet citizens-have
apparently been struck by the
decree's complete disregard of
the judicial process. In public
discussion, the law has met with
an unusual amount of criticism
and suggestions for changes.
One of .the most often reiterated
suggestions is that the citizens'
assemblies should be empowered
merely to ferret out and discuss
cases of parasitical behavior
in their midst and that their
findings should then be turned
over to the courts for handling.
It has also been pointed out
that the law is too vague, does
not provide for appeal, and con-
f licts with existing criminal
codes. One person dismissed it
summarily as being completely
unconstitutional. In the two
republics where it has been
passed, however, no change has
been made from the original
draft version.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 August 195?
While it is probable that
the decree is viewed primarily
as a deterrent and a means to
stir up public censure, its
potential for causing the per-
secution of a great nt~m~er of
individuals seems greats One
Soviet citizen commented in a
published letter that the law
could be usefully applied a?
gainst school graduates who
wait for over three months to
get a 3 ob.
Only a few cases of the
law's application have been
reported thus far. In one in-
stance a collective farmer was
exiled for five years because
he had "avoided communal labor
for a lang time." Another
farmer "who had not earned a
single workday in a year and
a half" requested a light sen-
tence on the grounds that he
was willing to reform, so the
collective gave him a one-year
trial period. The latter case
appears to be an illustration
of what the regime hopes the
plish.
FURTHER EXPANSION OF NEW LANDS IN THE USSR PROPOSED
Soviet party secretary and
presidium member Belyayev in
a full-page Pravda article on
24 August at a~`cke3 Malenkov's
views on the grain program and
--obviously speaking on behalf
of Khrushchev--suggested the
possibility of reclaiming an
additional 30,000,000 to 37,-
000,000-acres of new land in
the-RSFSR in the next. two years.
This expansion would double the
new lands area in the RSFSR,
which contains about 40 percent
of the 89,000,000 acres re-
claimed thus far in the new
lands program.
With the grain crap this
year in danger of falling 10-
15 percent below last year's,
Khrushchev apparently considers
a good offensive his best de-
fense against possible charges
that his agricultural policies
have failed. He apparently is
willing to take the risks in-
volved in a further expansion
of grain production into virgin
lands to bolster prospects for
realizing his goals of catching
up with the United States in per
capita production of meat, but-
ter, and milk. An expansion of
the magnitude suggested would
contribute toward these goals
but would fall short of enabling
the livestock goals to be met.
Nevertheless, this proposal is
the first which could contrib-
ute~ significantly toward
achieving these goals.
Belyayev suggested that
the yearly grain production
from the new areas would amount
to about 10,000,000 to 15,000,-
000 tons, which would be roughly
10 percent higher than the long-
run average to be expected from
the present grain area. The
yield possibilities suggested
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CURRENT INTELLICsEN'f;E WEEKLY S~TM~IARY
29 August 1957
by Belyayev ar? somewhat aaDOre
atnodest ttnan thos? predicted by
Khr~astnckne~r for the anew lauds,
but a~?e still ~a~ceroptiim$stic
for tlne ~irea in tine long rann.
The pr~eliaaninary mature of
Belyayev ? s pmoposal is am~,de
clear by his statement that
according to "tentative ?stim
i~~,tes of local orgaaniz~,tioans"
it is possible to reclaiun this
aa~caunt o? land in the Urals
and Siberia.
Belyayev said that Siberia
is a particanlan?ly desirable
aat??a ian which to easpaand agri-
cul.tural prodanction -since it
has la~?~e a~aoaunts of easily re?
claimed lands is less sub,~ect
to drought than other are~.sa
is ne~~? large irndnastrial cenm
tars;;?vhas relatively good trans?
portation facilitiesg arad has
amachinery sand eacperienced cadres
available?
NEW LANDS, 1956
Main area ~ Secondary areas
- Selected railroad
The yields in the Siberian
portioaa of ttn? new lands are on
the average thigher than in
Kazakhstane and tine haraeaful ef?
f acts of rainy weather during
harvestirng array b? somewhat al?
leviated by the tw??stage ~aethod
of h~.rvestixng suggested by
Belyayev? On the other hand9
it is probable that any-land
reclaimed in tine future would
be of poorer quality than that
b~?ought into cultivation in
these areas in tine initial new
lands programs
On b~ilancee it is probable
that the long~r~an yields in the
p~?oposed a~?e~, of recla~aation
will approxiamate ttnose estia~mated
for th? original new lands ~.~?eas9
rime to tern- bushels of grain per
acre. Tine country-wide average
is approxi~uatel 12 bushels per
ac~?e ? l~u?epared by 25X1
ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WTEKLX S.UM~:~,R;'Y
29 August 195?
USSR EXPECTS TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT IN INDUSTRIAL DIAMONDS
Nerov diamond discoveries in
the Yakutsk ASSR allegedly make
it "quite feasible" for the
USSR to become self-sufficient
in industrial diamonds possibly
during the Sixth Five-Year Plan.
According to an article in the
June issue of Voprosy Ekonomiki,
Soviet annual iamon require-
ments will reach six million
carats in 1960,. with the rest
of the "socialist camp"_requir-
ing an additional one to three
million carats, all of which
will presumably be available in
the USSR. Production sufficient
to meet such requirements would
be equal to about half the 1956
world output.
The wide publicity in 1956
accorded the extensive diamond
discoveries in the Yakutsk ASSR
indicated that the USSR hoped
eventually to be able to dis-
pense with imports of African
diamonds obtained in circumven-
tion of Western strategic trade
controls. The 1956 publicity,
however, indicated that
Industrial Diamond Production in the USSR
Placer deposit * Nimberlite deposit
(Based on a map from the Soviet magazine PRIRODA)
total production of
7,000,000 to 9,000,000
carats seems to be
based bn the assump-
tion that the other
reported. kimberlite
deposits will actually
prove to contain suf-
ficient quantities of
bort, gemstone, or
industrial diamonds
to warrant serious
exploitation.
In addition to
problems of location
and climate in exploit-
ing the Yakutsk diamond
fields, the deposits
are so far removed from
civilization as to re-
quire the establishment
of settlements before
extensive prospecting
can be undertaken.
SEc~~~~`,
development of these diamond
fields was not scheduled to
begin until late in the Sixth
Five-Yeat Plan in view of dif-
ficulties of climate and ter-
rain. Apparently not foresee-
ing the possibilities for de-
velopment of the Yakutsk dia-
mond industry, the USSR had in
1955 subsidized the Indian
Parana diamond mines,. from which
it evidently-expected to obtain
up to 25 percent of its require-
ments.
Soviet diamond output at
present is based largely on
placer deposits in Nyurba Raion
and on the "Mir" kimberlite
diamond deposit. Although five
other deposits are known to
exist, only the "Mir" is known
to be under de~relopment, and
is believed to be the only one
which has been sufficiently
prospected to permit a reason-
ably accurate estimate of the
industrial diamond content.
Soviet expectation of a
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU~[1~ARY
29 August 1957
The "Udachnaya" deposit is
somewhat over 1,000 kilometers
from river ports and in the
tundra beyond the polar circle
where. the ground is frozen the
year round, The "Mir" deposit
and placer mines, where the
only known attempt at mining
diamonds on a commercial scale
has been made, are in a some-
what more favorable location.
A settlement has been built
about one and a half kilometers
from the diamond deposit near
Nyurba, and construction of a
40,000-50,000-kilowatt thermal
electric over station has been
proposed (Prepared 25X1
by ORR)
PEIPING TIGHTENS SQUEEZE ON CONSUMER
Peiping's decision on 16
August to reduce the cotton
textile ration for the next
ration year (September 1957 to
August 1958) by more than one
third is the most severe of
several recent steps designed
to impose increased austerity
on the Chinese consumer. In
addition to the ration cut, the
authorities have launched an
intensive effort to convince
both the rural and-urban popu-
lace of the necessity- for further
reductions in food consumption
and have sharply narrowed the
permissible scope of the "free
markets,"
These measures indicate
that Peiping is prepared to de-
press consumer welfare below
current low levels in order to
fulfill plans which call for a
slight increase in investment
in 1958. The authorities are
apparently convinced that they
can-keep. any resultant discon-
tent within manageable limits.
In the ration year begin-
ning 1 September, the Chinese
consumer will receive only
19-21 feet of cotton cloth, the
most important textile in China.
This is only slightly over half
the amount available to the
Indian consumer. When the pre-
vious ration year began last
September, the Chinese consumer
wa.s promised an average of 29
feet, but a disappointing cot-
ton crop in 1956 forced the
regime to cut back the ration
for the second part of the ra-
tion year by 50 percent. The
result was that an average of
only 24 feet was actually issued
during-the -year.
Certain special privileges
given under the past ration
COTTON CLOTH FOR CIVILIAN USE
IN COMMUNIST CHINA
..........~ .,~ e,.._~ 149
1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958
IESTIMATEI
systems have also been reduced
or eliminated. The differen-
tial in the ration between large
cities and the countryside-is
to be reduced, while the prefer-
- ential ration accorded students,
workers and party and government
cadres is to be eliminated. Army
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ~UM~1RY
29 August 1957
officers, however, retain their
favored position.
Peiping bases its new ra-
tion on the hope that an "av-
erage" cotton crop between 1,-
350,000 and 1,500,-000 tans will
be harvested this-year. How-
ever,-the total acreage planted
to cotton this year is some one
million acres less than in 1956,
and a half million more acres
have reportedly been abandoned
because of "excessive rainfall
and floods." Thus, the out-
look for a crop equal to last
'year's is bleak, and the ra-
tion may have to be cut even
further, Actually, the cotton
textile outlook over the next
few years is almost as bleak,
and Peiping now says that it
will place new emphasis on the
creation of a synthetic-fiber
industry beginning in 1958.
Meanwhile, the Ministry of
Food has said that the food
rationing system must be tight-
ened further, and the official
People's Daily has flatly de-
c a-T r~~ha~'rgrain sales can
be reduced." This drive to
scale down the amount of food
consumed while insisting on in-
creased deliveries of food by
the peasants is an attempt to
build up reserves which were
badly run down last year and
to improve the regime's shaky
financial position.
Moreover, the scope of
"free markets," instituted less.,
than a pear ago with a view to
simplifying the market by mak-
ing it easier for producers of
selected commodities to reach
their consumers, has been severe-
ly curtailed. A State Council
directive of 17 August pro-
hibits a wide range of products
defined as coming under the
state's centralized purchasing
program from entering the "free
markets" until all the state's
demands have been met. Only
minor products such as poultry,
fresh eggs, spices, a few marine
products, and some relatively
unimportant native medicines
can henceforth be handled, un-
der strict state supervision,
in the remaining "free markets,"
and any of these products may
ortages develop.
Prepared by ORR) 25X1
REPORTS ON MAO TSE-TUNG'S POSSIBLE RETIREMENT
There have been unconfirmed
reports in recent weeks that
some Chinese Communist leaders
are in disagreement with poli-
cies imposed by Mao Tse-tong,
and a rumor that Mao himself
wishes to retire to a-scholarly
life.. However, most of Mao~s
lieutenants would probably op-
pose his withdrawal during the
present "time of troubles:''
Mao is vulnerable to the
charge of having acted impetu-
ously in the socialization of
agriculture in 1955-56, in the
"liberalization" campaign of
1956-57, and possibly in eco-
nomic planning for 1956. He
personally reversed the party's
cautious course on socializa-
tion, was clearly the sponsor
of the "hundred flowers" policy,
and may have insisted on more
ambitious economic planning
than his more conservative econ-
omists advised. These decisions
contributed heavily to the seri-
ous eCOriom1C and political prob-
lem now confronting the regime.
The Chinese Communist press
has recently been quoting un-
favorable remarks about Mao by
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29 August 195?
"rightist" figures. One non-
communist is said to have de-
scribed Mao as "impetuous" and
"not thoughtful." A long-time
.Communist party member is
quoted as advising Mao not to
"assume-the air of a benevolent
god," and as declaring that he
had "begun to doubt that Chair-
man Mao had made no mistakes."
Although the aim in publishing
such remarks-was presumably to
emphasize .the. depratrity of tie
rightists, many party members
may regard these views as hav-
ing some merit. Moreover, these
views may reflect some comments
made at ar near the top of the
party.
There is a rumor current
that Mao has expressed a wish
to resign in the near future in
order to work aut a design for
the development of China over
the next century, Regarding
himself as a philosopher and
-poet, Mao, who will be 64 in
December, may indeed desire a
less demanding role in public
life. If he actually has ex-
pressed a wish to retire, party
'leaders who want him to with-
draw may encourage him to do so,
an action-they would otherwise
probably not. dare to take. The
party constitution adopted last
fall-authorizes the party cenw
tral committee to appoint "one
honorary chairman"--clearly a.
provision for Mao.
However, the gravity of
the regime's current problems
makes it seem improbable that
Mao will step down at this
time. Most of his lieutenants
would probably calculate that
his resignation during a ".time
of troubles''' would considerably
increase those troubles. The
party membership and the popu-
lace in general have long been
encouraged to believe that only
Mao's leadership could have
brought the party through its
problems to its triumphs of
the past decade. A declining
emphasis on the need for Mao's
personal leadership would be
expected to precede his retire-
ment.
PLANS FOR NATIONAL CONFERENCE IN INDONESIA
Indonesian Prime Minister
D~uanda has called a national
round-table conference to be
held in Djakarta from 10 to 15
September to resolve outstand-
ing issues between the central
government and the dissident.
provinces. It is not yet cer-
twin, however, whether all im-
portant dissident leaders will
attend. Although Sumatran
leaders have approved the idea,
they have stated they would
prefer that the conference be
held in "neutral territory"
such as Borneo.
The success or failure of
the conference may well deter-
mine whether Indonesian unity
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29 August 1957
is to be restored or whether
the current trend toward frag-
mentation will be accelerated,
The agenda apparently will cover
all matters in dispute between
the provinces and the central
government. Taking priority
will be a discussion of the
restoration of the Sukarno-Hatter
partnership, which in Djuanda?s
opinion is the greatest single
need of the country, He has
told the American ambassador he
believes that if this discus=
s ior~ fails , the conference wi 11
have failed and the nation?s
situation will speedily become
more critical.
Djuaa~da is encouraged by
the fact that both Hatter, who
is popular in the provinces,
and President Sukarno ?have
agreed to attend the conferr~,ce
SECRET
as "supreme advisers." Hatter
is postponing his departure for
Communist China until 19 Septem-
ber in order to participate.
Despite his willingness to
be present, Sukarno in a 24 Au-
gust address?demonstrated again
that he still stands at cross
purposes with Hatter and with
provincial leaders .in their de-
mands for greater political and
economic regional-autonomy. He
spelled out the aims of his con-
cept of "guided democracy" as
the establishment of a "free,
independent, fully united, uni-
tary Indonesian Republic" and
the realization of "a society
~~' ~~a~tice aaa4~ prosperity, in
other words, socialism." He
also lass recently reiterated
his denunciation of provincial
leaders as "selfish adven? r-
ors . " 25X1
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e~~ ~~ a~r~T~~~
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 Aug~s:t~,19~7
PATTERNS .AND PERSPECTIVES
The Soviet stand at the
London disarmament talks this
year has been characterized, as
Secretary Dulles has said, by
''somewhat more realism and less
bombast" than in the past. The
USSR has made a number of im-
portant concessions in the talks,
but the tactics of the Soviet
negotiators and a number of
statements by Khrushchev suggest
that Moscow does not expect any
disarmament agreement to be con-
cluded in the near future and
that many of its proposals and
statements are designed mainly
for immediate propaganda ad-
vantage.
During the Stalin era the
Soviet leadership did not seem
to appreciate the full implica-
tions of the atomic age, but did
recognize that as long as the
-USSR lacked atomic weapons it
was in an unequal bargaining
position with the West, and it
studiously avoided serious nego-
tiations on disarmament. The
Soviet stand from 1945 until
1954 was shrewdly conceived as
propaganda to prevent the United
States from using its atomic
bombs as an instrument of the
cold war. Moscow consistently
demanded the immddiate prohibi-
tion and destruction of atomic
weapons, offered only vague sug-
gestions for control measures
to enforce this,-and proposed
a flat one-third cut in all
armed forces without revealing
the size of its own.
Since 1954 the Soviet Un-
ion apparently has felt close
enough to atomic equality to
enter the disarmament negotia-
tions with proposals increasing-
ly.-realistic and flexible. The
Soviet leaders also seem to
realize the unprecedented devas-
tation that would follow a nu-
clear war,- and this has height-
ened their interest, if not in
a general disarmament agreement,
then at least in measures to
prevent the use of nuclear weap-
ons in warfare. Furthermore,
the enormous and increasing cost
of nuclear weapons and missiles
has provided the USSR as well as
the West with an incentive to
put some- limits on the arms race.
About one seventh of the
Soviet economy's total output,
measured in rubles, is devoted
to military purposes. While
defense costs will continue to
rise, the total economy probably.
will grow at about the same rate,
so these expenditures need not
become an increasingly heavy
burden. Nevertheless, Khrut
shchev's new commitments to
higher living standards and his
continued obsession with over-
taking the United States in per
capita production, plus the dif-
faculties encountered in main-
taining the growth of raw mate-
rials industries in 1956-57,
must impress on ..the Soviet lead-
ers the desirability, although
not-the necessity, of shifting
resources from defense to other
purposes.
The increasing need for
civilian labor can be met in
part by reductions in military
manpower; .cuts in this field do
not greatly weaken the USSR's
military position relative to
the West and therefore can be
undertaken unilaterally. Uni-
lateral reductions in military
production,:, however, if they
were big enough to help solve
economic problems, could weaken
the Soviet position. Diversions
of pr?duction from defense to
the civilian economy, therefore,
depend on an agreement with the
West.
The technical complexities
of the nuclear age are a serious
obstacle to a disarmament ac-
cord~ since they make control
measures difficult and in some
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WEEKLY ~iTARMARY
29 August 195?
t7C~AN `.\~P~, }
~ /x ~ ,
,., ~/
The Soviet. leaders appear
to believe that some of these
goals can be achieved either
without a disarmament agreement
or with a limited agreement
tailored to a considerable ex-
tent to conform with Soviet
views. Which method Moscow uses
depends on the success of Soviet
efforts to weaken-the Western
defense system without a. dis-
armament agreement or on the
willingness of the West to meet
Soviet terms.
The Soviet leaders probably
consider, however, that a formal
signed agreement has certain ad-
vantages~. For example,-it would
be the surest way to gain a
mutual pledge not to use atomic
weapons. The main disadvantage
of a formal agreement from Mos-
cow's viewpoint is that to gain
the limitations on atomic war-
fare and elimination of foreign.
rwLnN~ For details of fh.
proposals coverin
sW&~ ~ Europe, see oche
map.
_ f
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cases impossible. The differ-
ences between the Soviet and
Western blocs in the combination
of forces, armaments, bases, and
alliances relied on for security
have also accentuated disagree-
mentin disarmament negotiations.
Disarmament
In Sovi~'~or~gn Policy
The Soviet Union is trying
to strengthen its security and
increase its influence outside
the orbit by seeking the removal
of American power and influence
- from Europe, the liquidation of
foreign bases from the Soviet
periphery, and the inhibition
of the American nuclear deterrent.
Achievement of the last-named
goal would lessen the danger
that small wars and revolutions,
possibly resulting from Soviet
maneuvers, might expand into
major nuclear wars.
AERIAL INSPECTION PROPOSALS
I
!TRYi::. i~l HINA~ a.,r,.,,C r_~r,r r, (?
bases, at least some
unwelcome concessions,
in the field of in-
spection and contro l
would be necessary.
In the current. London
talks., particularly
since its 30 April
proposal, the Soviet
delegation has empha-~-
.sized..the advantages
of a partial agree-
ment, probably con-
sidering this the only
chance to gain some
aims without major
concessions to the
West.
Moscow realizes
that the Western gov-
ernments are under
some popular pressure
to come. to an agree-
ment but may have over-
estimated this pres-
sure,- Several re-
treats by the Western
powers from offers
previously made have
strengthened recurring
Soviet doubts that the
Western powers are
willing to sign any
disarmament agreement.
Several times during
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEI+CLY SUMMARY.
29 August ].95?
the current negot'ia-
tion5 Soviet of f icials
have expressed con-
cern to Americans
that France and Brit=
ain were blocking are
agreement between the
United States and the
USSR.
In May 1956;
Khrushehev told French
off icials that the
Soviet leaders had
-come to the conclu-
lion that there was
no possibility of a
disarmament agreement
because of the atti-
tude of the United
States, and that the
USSR had decided to
proceed unilaterally
in the disarmament
field with the expee-
cation that sooner
or 3ater other coun~
-tries would have to
fol-low suit. Khrushchev was re-
(erring particularly to .Soviet
announcements that in 19.55 and
19.56 the iJSSR would reduce .its
military. manpower by 1,840,004,
a move designed to induce the
West-to make even greater cut-
backs in-its defense establish
menu : ` The -heavy Sav~ie prop-
agenda eampagn~against nuclear
and thermonuclear tests ~.nd the
sharp diplomatic-campaign against
_the :setting up :of nuclear-
equipped units in; Europe were
part of the continuous effort
to play up a distinction before
world opinion between conven-
tional and "inhuman" nuclear
weapons. In a broader sense,
the entire Soviet peaceful-co-
existence policy is designed to
persuade the 'West to solve.se-
rious budgetary problems by
cutting back defense outlays.
The content and. the timing
of specific Soviet offers on"
disarmament have often appeared
to be determined by more my
media.ta tactical. interests:, The
first sign of Soviet fleai:bility
on disarmament in the post,-
USSR aerial inspection
Proposed zone of
US aerial inspection
;a~.,, y
SYRI~
bfE!?ITERRANEAN SEA
~ ISAAe 70 ~~ -
LIIIYA.,, FC;YPT~~ - - ..,
Stalin period appeared in a -Sep-
tember 1954 proposal, timed
to coincide-with the crucial
London meeting of the Western
foreign: ministers to devise a
substitute for the EDC treaty,
gust defeated in the French
assembly. Soviet e.riclorsement
of an aerial inspection plan
for Europe was first revealed
in a proposal on l7 November
1956, designed to 'show that
the Soviet intervention in Hun-
gary did not indicate a return
tp Stalinist policies:
Sov~t disarmament moves
often have the tactical aim of
placing t2ie blame on the West
for .the failure'to data of the
negotiations tQ:pro'duce any
signed a,greemert. Thus the
Soviet emphasis on the simple
issue of atomic test suspen-
sion is largely du;e to real-
i2ation that world opinion
favors an end to tests and .the
+ealculation that the West is
unlikely to agree to a test
suspension standing by itself.
The Soviet statement on 26 Au-
gust claiming that the USSR had
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUI6~MARY
29 August
successfully tested an intercon-
tinental missile was probably
timed to increase support for
-the Soviet nuclear test ban
proposal at the forthcoming UN
General Assembly session.
Aspects of Disarmament
The disarmament negotia-
tions in the UN subcommittee
this year have involved five
separate categories of issues--
control of nuclear weapons,
prevention of surprise attack,
cutting; .conventional forces,
eliminating troops and bases on
foreign soil, and establishing
political preconditions--each
of which needs to be examined
separately to show the reasons
for the Soviet position and the
changes in that position during
the London talks.
In sum,-the Soviet Union
has been trying to impose polit-
ical and moral limitations on
~Yestern use of nuclear weapons
as a deterrent and-to eliminate
or reduce Western military..
forces and bases in Europe and
elsewhere on the Soviet periph-
ery. The- primary Western ob-
jective of removing the dangers
of surprise attack has been an-
swered with reluctant conces-
lions and a deep-seated disc
trust of the control and inspec-
tion measures which the West
considers essential both for
preventing surprise attack and
for ending nuclear tests and
future production of nuclear
weapons..
Nuclear Weapons: The So-
viet n crest n sarmament is
centered primarily on the ques-
tion of nuclear weapons because
they constitute the main deter-
rent on which the United States
relies. Moscow's foreign policy
is considerably inhibited'be,-
cause of danger that through'
miscalculation, small conf licts
might be expanded into a nuclear
Armageddon. Through the years
the Russians have proposed pro-
hibitions on atomic weapons,
and the West has suggested
systems of inspection and con-
trol. Moscow has also shown
some concern over the possibil-
ity that other nations may de-
velop atomic weapons, particular-
ly a nation such as West Ger-
many, thereby increasing the
explosive risks of small wars.
For many years Soviet dis-
armament proposals centered on
a demand for the prohibition and
elimination of atomic weapons.
Soviet responses to Western de-
mands for control mechanisms
were vague and feeble. Grad-
ually both sides came to real-
ize that it was impossible to
detect secret stockpiles of nu-
clear materials and weapons
which had been accumulating in
the United States, the United
Kingdom, and the USSR; the USSR
frankly admitted this in its
proposals of 10 May 1955. Al-
though Moscow continues to de-
scribe its long-range goal as
the complete prohibition of nu-
clear and thermonuclear .? weapons,
with a cessation of their produc-
tion and the destruction of
stockpiles, its recent proposals
for a partial agreement call
only for a statement that the
parties will seek to achieve
this in the _fL`t.ture. Zorin has
said privately that he realized
the elimination of all nuclear
weapons was impossible in a
limited agreement. This change
in line ref lects a new realism
in Soviet negotiations, a real-
ization that it is counterpro-
ductiveto demand an agreement
that cannot be enforced. It
also ref lects the continuing
fundamental Soviet hostility to
those control and inspection
measures which might be practical.
One step the USSR has long
proposed as a means; of deal-
ing with this problem is the
signing of an unconditional
pledge not to use atomic weap-
ons. Soviet officials have
made it clear they have no illu-
sions that such a pledge would
prevent their use in an all-out
war between the United States
and the USSR, but. they believe
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU1~~fARH
29 August-195?.
it would be effective in pre-
venting use of nuclear weapons
in a limited war. The USSR also
expects it would destroy the
confidence of the free world in
the military strength of the
Western alliance systems. In
the current disarmament session,
Moscow has been insisting on
this pledge as one element in
a partial agreement and has re-
jected the Western counterpro-
posal that such a ban exempt
situations of individual or
collective self-defense.
Since February 1956 the
USSR has emphasized the immedi-
ate suspension of nuclear and
thermonuclear tests independent
of other aspects of the disarma-
ment question. Moscow now
proposes that it precede even
a ,partial agreement in line with
Khrushchev's assertion that it
is the one question that can be
solved even before mutual trust
is established-among the great
powers.
The Soviet Union modified
its earlier proposals for a com-
plete ban with its 14 June 1957
plan fora two- or three-year
suspension of tests,. to be
checked by control hosts in the
.Soviet Union, Britain, '.the
United States, and the Pacific.
Ocean area. The .USSR has ob-
jected to linking a suspension
with other issues, such as the
ban on production of f issionable
material for weapons purposes
proposed by the West. The
Russians appear to be trying tv
make the test issue the central
one in the current negotiations
in order to confront the West
with a simple, clear-cut, popu-
lar offer which it believes will
be rejected, with a resulting
world-wide. propaganda gain for
Moscow.
The l4 June Soviet proposal
.was not put forward until~So-
viet negotiators had ascertained
the likelihood of Western re-
jection. The advantages to the
USSR of concluding an agreement
on test suspensi;on, the
prevention of ..nuclear weap-
ons development by .,-other_
nations, and the official recogni-
tion of a distinction between
nuclear and conventional weap-
ons are offset by the present
technical lag of the Soviet.
Union behind the United States
in nuclear weapons development.
Therefore, while the Soviet Un-
ion may eventually desire a ba.n
on tests, its primary purpose
in emphasizing this in the cur-
rent negotiations is probably
to gain propaganda advantage.
The West has proposed, as
part of a partial agreement and
prerequisite to 'a test suspen-
sion, an agreement:~for the
cessation of nuclear weapons
production and_.an inspection
system to ensure that future
production of fissionable ma-
terials would go exclusively
for nonweapons purposes. It has
also proposed'that subsequently
agreed and roughly equal amounts
of fissionable materials be
transferred by the United States
and the USSR (and smaller amounts
by Britain) from existing weap-
ons to an internationally super -
vised.stockple for nonweapons
purposes. The Soviet Union
has apposed these plans, with .
Zorin stating privately that a
ban on production must be tied
to an unconditional pledge to
ban use and to seek complete
prohibition-and elimination.
The Soviet coolness to
that form of control which the
West believes is possible to
enforce--the ban ~on future pro-
duction of nuclear materials
for weapons--is a symptom of
the long-standing Soviet hostil-
ity? to control. recently ~ex-
pressed by Khrushchev, Speaking
on 13 June in Finland, he said
that controls will not prevent
a state from preparing for ag-
gression. "To advocate control
is one thing, but to admit
foreign controllers to one's
factories and plants and air-
fields and arsenals is another."
Surprise Attack: The unre-
liabi ~.ty . o any possible
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CURRENT .INTELLIGENCE MEEKLY 53UAR~
29 August 1957
inspection procedures to check
on existing atomic-weapon stock-
piles has led the West to put
increasing emphasis on measures
to prevent surprise attack.
The Western theory is that sur-
prise is essential for the suc-
cess of aggression today, that
effective inspection procedures
can largely remove the surprise-
element, ~,nd that if this were
done both sides could take the
risks of major reductions in~
their defense establish menu.
'The West is mare concerned
than the USSR about the danger
of a surprise attack and the
West has a greater interest in
sending inspectors into the
large forbidden areas of the
USSR. The West has taken most
of the initiative for adopting
measures against surprise at-
tack, and the Soviet counter-
proposals have been offered to
demonstrate Moscow's willing-
ness to negotiate., There re-
mains considerable doubt that
the U5SR would be willing to
make the radical changes in its
closed society that its own
inspection proposals would re-
quire. It has put a, greater-
emphasis on ground inspection,.
.while the West has stressed
aerial inspection.
The USSR::took the lead in
its 10 May 1955 plan in pro-
posing the establishment of
control posts at large ports
rail junctions, major highways,
and airf fields to prevent sur-
prise attack by reporting on
military concentrations. On
its latest pr4~osal for :a par-
tial agreement., the establish-.
went of control posts at airs
fields is postponed until the
later stages.
The inspection area would
include Europe, .the eastern
border of the United States,
and the western fringe of the
USSR, and could include areas
covered by aerial inspection.
The principal difference in
Western-ground inspection plans
is the inclusion of airf fields
in the early stagesiand the
additional use of mobile in-
spection teams.
The more controversial is-
sue is the aerial inspection
proposed by President'Eisen-
howe.r at the summit conference
in July;, 1955 and emphasized by
the Western powers since then.
The Soviet leaders immediately
reacted coldly to the proposal
publicly and privately, making
it clear ?that they felt it was
designed for espionage purposes
and would contribute nothing
to a disarmament solution.
' When the USSR offered its
first specific plan for aerial
inspection in November 1956, it
emphasized that it still con-
sidered the step unnecessary..
but was offering a plan to meet
Western insistence. Khrushchev
said on 13 June of this year,
"We have stated from the very
beginning that those 'open skies'
offer nothing, and that this
proposal (President Eisenhower's)
can only increase the suspicions
felt by one power toward another."
This attitude lends an air of
unreality and insincerity to
the specific aerial. inspection
schemes offered by the USSR..
The USSR seems primarily
interested in a European zone,
while the West, concerned about
the political problems in Europe,
wants to make a zone there con-
ditional on acceptance of one
of its other two proposed zones.
One of these encompasses all of
the USSR, the United States,
.Canada, and Alaska; the other is
limited to the Arctic, Alaska,
and Kamchatka. Outside of
Europe the Soviet Union has pro-
posed a zone including the
eastern part of the USSR and
the western United States, areas
of roughly equal size but un-
equal in industrial and strate-
gic importance,
Conventional Forces: In
the ear y postwar negotiations.
the Western powers sought to
counter Soviet demands.'for the
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CURRENT INTELLIGEDI'CE WEEKLY BUI-~M~R'~
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prohibition of nuclear weapons
(a monopoly.. of the West with
plans for reductions in man,
power (in which the USSR was
.predominant), starting with: the
provision of accurate informa-
tion about the size of all
forces . The USSR ?red unreal-
istic and. unverifiable ,proposals
for an all-round one-third cut
in forces. In May 1955, the USSR
accepted a British-French pro-
posal to set the maximum force
level of the United States, the
USSR, and China at 1,500,.000
each and of Bri'tfi.in and France
at 650,?00 eacb, with the reduc-
tions to be accomplished by
stages phased into steps toward
nuclear disarmament.
In the present circum-
stances the .Soviet Union believes
that such extensive cuts would
greatly weaken the overseas
commitments of the Western pow-
ers, particularly the United
States, The USSR has already
announced cuts of 1,840.,000 in
its: military forces since Au-
gust 1955, and has carried out
at least some of them, and it
may contemplate further cuts in
the future as newer weapons
create budgetary problems.
Thereforer the So~tiet Uhian
would like the Western powers
to sign an agreement committing
them to make equivalent cuts.
In the current negotiations
the USSR has accepted a Western
compromise 1'or a reduction of
forces to 2, 500.,000 each for tlae
United States and.-the USSR and
750,000 each for Britain and
France in the first stage, with
cuts of the great powers to 2,-
180,000 and 1,fiOO,OOO and pro-
portionate British and French
cuts in the second and third
stages. However, the West has
made these- further cuts cond3,-
tional on progress in the imple-
mentation of he wholedisarma-
ment agreement and on progress
in-the settlement of political
issues. Zori~i only recently
emphasized that the partial
agreement must includ"e firm az~d
unconditional grovisions for
these further cuts.
Tl~e tJS-3R had proposed .that
these manpower reductions be
accompanied by a 15-percent cut
in arma~ents and budgets, while
the West graposed 10 percent.
During the current negotiations
the USSR has stated that it has
no objection in principle to an
alternative Western plan far an
exchange of lists of the arma-
ments to be reduced. and their
deposit in an internationally
supervised stockpile, but the
details of-such a scheme have
still not been worked out.
Troops and-Bases on Foreign
'Soil: A ma or aim o~ oviet
policy is to gain the removal
o American forces from Europe
and other areas peripheral to
the USSR. As part of the disarma-
ment: negotiations,the USSR has
.sought to achieve this by pro-
posing not only sharp reduc-
tiions in total troop;: strength
but also a cut in forces in
Germany and all of Europe and
an elimination of foreign bases.
The West has never accepted the
European force cuts and base
liquidation as a legitimate par t
of a disarmament agreement..
The USSR has made a number
of these proposals in the past,
each with several variations,
designed as part of a European
security plan, a disarmament
package., or as steps that could
be taken independently "to
lessen international tension."
Khrushchev has several times
talked vaguely about the with-
drawal of all foreign troops
and bases, .particularly from
Europe. This area illustrates
very well the Soviet technique
of seeking the same objectives
:both within and outsf de the
disarmament negotiations.
The current Soviet proposal
for a partial disarmament agree-
ment proVa:des that an agreement
be reached on-the liquidation
of s?dme foreign bases wi-thin one
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 3U~ARY
29 August 1957
or two years, that the four
powers make a one-third cut in
their forces in Germany, that
the total military forces of the
four powers stationed on the
territories of member states of
NATO and the Warsaw pact be re-
duced, and that the location of
atomic weapons on foreign soil,
and particularly in Germany, be
banned. Zorin recently made
it clear that the USSR still in-
sists that these provisions be
included in a partial agreement.
Political Preconditions:
The West has emphas ze t at
no comprehensive disarmament
agreement is possible without
political settlements, and as-
serted in the Berlin declara-
tion of 29 July that this must
include German unification.
In the current negotiations on
a partial agreement it has in-
sisted on progress toward polit-
ical settlements before the
second and third stages of mili-
tary force reductions.
Although Zorin said private-
ly in April that a partial agree-
ment including the reduction of
troops and bases abroad would
ease international tension and
be followed by negotiations on
political issues, he has re-
mained adamant in public and
private statements against in-
cluding any reference to polit-
ical settlements in.a partial
disarmament agreement. Fie
has continued to question the
Western delegates on the pre-
cise nature of-the political
re demanding.
Talks have taken place in land are said to be subject to
Europe. during the past few- I adjustment.
months between Israeli officials
and-representatives of the Pales-
tine- refugees. The Arabs in-
volved probably represent a
refugee group interested in
making a settlement for assets
still under Israeli control;
Arab governments reportedly
have not participated. While
such talks have accurred in the
past without results of major
significance, some refugees
and certain Arab officials may
be adapting a more flexible
attitude than they have main-
tained in the past.
At present, a United Na-
tions group is completing a
survey of the lands and pro-
perties in Israel formerly
held by refugees. Completion
of the survey will provide a
basis far determining who would
be entitled to receive compen-
sation and how much. About
642,000 acres of former Arab
Integration and Resettlement
Some refugees--mostly mem-
bers of the professional, land-
owning, or skilled-labor classes--
have been integrated into the
society and economy of-the Arab
states. In Lebanon, substantial
numbers of Arab Christian ref-
ugees have been absorbed; many
of them have found employment in
F3eirut, Tripoli, and Sidon.
These who have become thus estab-
lished are unlikely. to favor re-
turning to Israel.
Small-scale refugee migra-
tions to Iraq have occurred in
the past and have lately been
reported again. Although Iraq
is underpopulated and in need of
peasant farm labor, the problems
of refugee resettlement there :.
are acute. Numerous feudal
landlords still control much of
the farm lands. A substantial
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CURRENT `INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 August 1957
inf iux of Palestinian labor
would require a great social,
and perhaps political, upheaval
ref a scope beyond any now in
sight. Moreover, the living
standard of the Iraqi .peasant
is even lower than that of the
Arab refugees, and the younger
refugees, who presumably would
farm the bulk of potential emi-
grants, have not been 'c lose to
the soil and are not the hard-
working f ellahin of pre~Israel
days in Palestine.
The Arab governments have
opposed any schemes for .reset-
tl,~.ng on,the grounds that to do
so would be a renunciation of
repatriation as the ultimate
goal. The nearly one million
29 AUGUST 1957
MILES 100
zz4,ooo
USX
displaced Arabs themselves, for
-the most part, are adamant in
refusing to consider any solu-
tion to the problem other than
repatriation. They consider
"resettlement" virtually a for-
bidden word. As a result, the
$200,000,000 resettlement fund
of the UN Relief and Works
Agency (UNRWA) remains largely
unspent, although UNRWA's man-
date expires in 1960 with scant
possibility of renewal. This
fact may in time prove the most
effective stimulus to new plans,
since the alternative is for
the refugees to become charges
of the host governments.
scope of the Problem
SAUDf ~~ '~
r ~ #.~.
521,000
a6X
L~6anR..r!)""'^~-S~ria J"Jordan
SECRET
Note: Total registered Arab Refugees
as of May 1957=949,000
As of 31 May
there were 949,407
refugees. registered
-with UNRWA. They are
distributed geograph-
ically among the Gaza
strip (224,000), Jor-
dan (521,000), Lebanon
(109,000), and Syria
(95, 000) .
Refugees may con-
stitute as much as 75
percent of the total
population of Gaza;
in Jordan they number
36 percent of the
people, and in Lebanon
and Syria the percent-
ages are 7,3 and 2.3
respectively.
About 43 percent
or '410, 000 of the
refugees are from one
to 15 years old, and
an estimated 225,000
of this number were
born as refugees.
Each year roughly 25,-
000 more refugee
,births than deaths
occur.
There are 368,-
394 persons living
in UNRWA camps. While
considerable housing
has been provided,
14,000 tents remain
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.CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY`'SUMMAR~
2~ August. 195?
in use.. The vast majority of
the 'refugees do not benefit
from UNRWA facilities but live
in squalor outside the camps.
Some still dwell in caves in
the hills of Palestine.
UNRWA provides food, educa-
tion, and medical care to ap-
proximately 845,000. Various
voluntary agencies, both reli-
gious and secular, contribute
additional services, mostly
supplementing those provided
by the UN agency. Assistance
toward self-support is also
part of the UN relief program.
However, work opportunities
are especially scarce in Jordan
and the Gaza. strip, where most
of the refugees live, and most
of the available opportunities
are skilled fobs for which the
majority are unsuited.
Although unemployed and
living in generally deplorable
conditions, the average refugee
is provided with-care and serv-
ices which In some cases are
better than those available to
.many nonrefugee Arabs, In spite
of this, refugees consider the
relief services insufficientt
They regard the UN as largely
responsible for their plight
and the relief measures as a
debt owed them by the world at
large.
Politics and Leadership
From the refugee point of
view, the problem demands a
political rather than an econom-
ic solution. Hence,-the refu-
gees have rejected all measures
for resettlement :~aad ~~~have
exerted constant pros-sure on
.the host governments toward
achieving the-goal of'repatria-
tion.
On an East-West scale the
refugees, far from being neu-
tralist, are almost completely
-anti-Western. Their antipathy
stems from a belief t;~at the
West "created" the archenemy
Israel which now occupies their
former homelands. Such senti-
ment in .Jordan, where refugees
constitute over one-third of
the electorate, kept. that state
from ,joining the Baghdad pact
in 1955. Before King .Hussain
consolidated control last spring,
refugee influence was the mayor
factor intimidating pro-Western
voices and encouraging Jordan's
politicians to follow the Egyp-
tian and Syrian lead toward
closer relations with the Soviet
bloc .
The frustration of the dis-
placed Arabs makes them highly
susceptible to exploitation by
extremist politicians both in-
side and outside their ranks.
Indeed, an extremist position
has almost been a requirement
for achieving leadership among
the group. There are known to
be some moderates, possibly even
a considerable number, but
their views, if expressed at
all, have so far had little
chance of being heard.
With leadership in the
hands of extremists, no offec-
tive organization has developed
and no individual leader appears
to be o~ more than local si,gnif-
iCanc~: Some refugee land-
owners have organized, and other
groups of limited scope exist.
The dispersion of refugees among
58 camps.in four countries vir-
tually precludes a centralized
refugee organization. Even
within the states, refugee
opinion apparently is exerted
most effectively beyond the
confines of the camps through
nonrefugee politicians.
Both Egyptian and Communist
influence on the refugees is
strong. Many of Egypt's
fedayeen commandos have been
recruited from the camps in
Gaza and Jordan, where Nasr is
a hero. .Jordanian elections in
October 1956 revealed a definite
pro-Egyptian bias on the part of
educated Palestinian Arabs.
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CURRENT 'INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ~ RY
29 August 1957
These in turn are leaders of
the workers and peasant farmers,
the f ellahin.
Communism has made most
headway among the young. Raised
in a camp atmosphex^e free from
effective parental control and
the inhibitions of a stable
village social structure, the
young people are ready prey
for leftist indoctrination. A
group of Communist teachers has
operated within- the-camp school
system in Jordan . Student
strikes there are believed to
have been Communist inspired.
Mohammedanism reportedly
has assumed a radical colora-
tion among refugees. pne ob-
server believes that-Islam is
returning progressively to the
fanaticism which characterized
it in medieval times.
Present Government Attitudes
"Justice" for the refugees
remains a potent shibboleth
around which to rally Arab
unity. In the face of recent
Egyptian charges that the Jor-
danian and Iraqi governments
were "betraging" the refugees
by allegedly negotiating with
Isr~.el, the accused governments
found it necessary to reaffirm
their opposition to anything
but repatriation for the dis-
placed Arabs.- Yet,--while of -
ficial Arab attitudes toward
the problem are. publicly uni-
form, deviations occasionally
have been indicated,- Iraq
considered a suitable area for
refugee absorption, at times
has seemed inhibited only by
Arab League injunctions against
refugee emigration. Privately,
the Iraqi attitude-has been
one of willingness to accept
those refugees who might come
to Iraq but to resist any
forced or imposed resettlement.
In Lebanon, any possible
integration of refugees is com-
plicated by the delicate bal-
ante between Moslems and Arab
Christians there. In 1955,
the Lebanese foreign minister
indicated a readiness, within
the framework of a peace settle-
ment, to accept all of the
16,500 Christian refugees in
Lebanon and a proportionately
smaller number of Moslems, No
Lebanese politician would be
willing to espouse this view
openly under present conditions.
On 19 July, a Syrian of -
ficial, summarizing his country's
attitude toward the general
problem of Palestine, told an
American representative that
settlement of the Arab refugee
problem is dependent on adoption
and enforcement of a policy of
preventing further Jewish im-
migration into Israel. If
such immigration is halted, he
asserted, Israel will not need
to expand to take care of the
large future population on
which it counts.- The question
of the Arab then allegedly
could be settled by the Near
Eastern countries themselves.
These remarks are noteworthy
.because of .the acknowledgment
of a solution short of total
repatriation.
Israel itself has revealed
an altered attitude toward the
refugees. The Israeli minister
to 'Washington advised the US
State Department on 25 May that
Israel's policy was changing in
two significant respects: -the
Israelis no longer feel it is
.essential to bring about a set-
tlement through the UN, and they
no longer insist that the refu-
gee problem has to be resolved
as part of an over-all.-peace
settlement. However, Israel
still does not show any willing-
ness to undert~.ke serious com-
mitments in resolving the prob-.
lem, and there is some question
as to how far any Israeli cabi-
net could go in the event
serious ro osals ld
arise.
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V
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ~UMIYIARY
29 August 195?
TREND TnWARD POLITICAL CHANGE IN BRITISH EAST AFRICA
A fast-growing political ~ the government, it pleased no
consciousness among the Afri-
cans of British East Africa--
Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, and
Zanzibar--has .led to demands
both for more African participa-
tion in present colonial govern-
ments and for early self-rule.
This trend is ref lected in
the attention being given in
London to the development of a
long-range policy for Africa.
The desirability of locating a
large military base in Kenya
increases the British government's
concern for stability in East.
Africa.
Kenya
The problem of
nationalist agitation
is particularly preset
ing in Kenya where it
might lead to a new
outbreak of racial
conflict. Many fac-
tors which contrib-.
uted to the rise of
Mau Mau terrorism in
].952 still. exist:
'the area is still
dominated by the
small European minor-
ity, several tribes
which need more land
resent the reserva-
tion of the White
Highlands for Europe-
ans, traditional
African tribal and
social structures
have lost much of
NYASALAND t