CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001200060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 18, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 25, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 16
OCI NO. 1421/57
25 April 1957
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
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w__101 Nowle
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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25 April 1957
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MIDDLE EAST. DEVELOPMENTS
Jordan: Political
Egypt and Syria, together
with antimonarchical Jordanian
nationalist groups inside and
outside of Jordan, have launched
an.all-out attack on King Hus-
sain. Cairo and Damascus radio
broadcasts as well as agent and
fedayeen actions from Syria are
aimed at instigating demonstra-
tions and strikes. Egypt and
Syria hope to develop a situa-
tion in which the king will be
compelled to use force to main-
tain order, thus alienating him
and his loyal troops from the
bulk of the West Jordan and
urban population.
King Hussain met this chal-
lenge on 24-25 April by appoint-
ing a new cabinet, nominally
headed by a Ibrahim Hashim, a
73-year-old elder statesman. The
real leader of the cabinet., how-
ever, is Samir Rifai, deputy
prime minister and foreign min-
ister, a relatively forceful
pro-Western politician
The king has de-
clared martial law throughout
the country, imposed a curfew
in major towns, and decreed the
dissolution of all political
parties.
The latest developments
were precipitated by the. king's
appointment of a council of
army officers to investigate
loyalty in the army, and by his
replacement of nationalist. of-
ficers with Bedouin officers
loyal to the crown. These moves
and the arrest of several
antimonarchical "free officers"
led to the flight of the newly
appointed army chief of staff,
EIS
FIDENTIAt_
CON
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
General Hiyari, to Damascus,
from where he tendered his
resignation. Hiyari subsequent-
ly held a press.conference in
Damascus at which he accused
the "palace" of plotting against
Jordan's independence and lib-
erties "in co-operation with
non-Arab military attaches in
Amman." A Bedouin officer,
Major General Habis Majali, has
been named acting chief of staff.
The leftist-dominated Na-
tional Guidance Committees. in
various towns, representing the
National Socialist, Baath, Na-
tional Bloc (Communist) and
Arab Nationalist Parties, have
denounced "Western imperialist
intrigue" in Jordan, and de-
manded resignation of the Kha-
lidi cabinet, reappointment of
the Nabulsi cabinet, reinstate-
ment of all nationalist army
officers, ousting of the Ameri-
can ambassador and army attache,
and rejection of the American
proposals for the Middle East.
Jordan: Military
The Jordanian Arab Army,
numbering about 25,000, organ-
ized into six brigades, is de-
ployed in three principal areas
--Amman, Maan-Aqaba, and West
Jordan.
Two infantry brigades and
the all-important armored bri-
gade are located in the vicin-
ity of Camp- Zerka about 15 miles
from Amman. The fighting per-
sonnel of these units are large-
ly Bedouins and are believed
mostly loyal to the king. Two
other infantry brigades are in
West Jordan, where two thirds
of Jordan's population live;
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
the political loyalty of these
units and their officers is un-
certain. The artillery brigade
is split among the four in-
fantry brigades.
Additional forces in West
Jordan are 7,600 men of the
frontier corps deployed along
the armistice line, and up to
18,000 men in national guard
units. These force: are an
organized militia
equipped primarily
with small arms.
Their loyalty to the
king is questionable.
Saudi Arabia
has about 3,000
troops in Jordan
west of Amman near
the Jordan River.
An additional 4,000
Saudi troops are de-
ployed adjacent to
the Aqaba area in
northwest Saudi
Arabia.
A Syrian ar-
mored brigade of
3,000 men is located
at Mafraq, north of
Amman near the Syr-
ian border. While
its deployment was
aimed at guarding
against an Israeli
thrust across the
Jordan River, these
forces could support
the antimonarchical
nationalists in West
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:~:lrj Matraq
'Nablus Zerka/
MMANN
-L r~
1J
Beersheba
LI~D
7gaba
miles from Amman. Additional
forces necessary to concen-
trate a 12,000-man division
at 11-3 are reported to have
been alerted for possible move-
menit , Iraqi officials maintain
that their forces will not in-
tervene in Jordan unless re-
quested by Hussain.
The 1,300-man British
force in Jordan is preparing to
O JORDAN
Q SAUDI ARABIA
F-1 IRAQ
SYRIA
ISRAEL
Q UNITED KINGDOM
Brigade
Regiment
" Battalion
Company or Battery
-? ? Platoon
? Infantry
~? Armored
? Armored Cavalry and Recon.
? Antiaircraft Artillery
Field Artillery
SAUDI ARABIA
I
Jordan. The Syrian command on
the Israeli front numbers about
42,000, and some portion of
this force could intervene
rapidly in Jordan.
Iraq has recently concen-
trated about 4,500 men at H-3
pumping station--50-miles from
the Jordanian border and 235
25 APRIL 1957
O MILES 75
evacuate in the next few months
under the terms of the agreement
terminating the Anglo-Jordanian
treaty. The British units, in-
cluding a tank battalion, now
are at Aqaba. A small number
of these troops and their equip-
ment have already been withdrawn.
Israeli army forces num-
ber about 55,000, plus 25,000
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
paramilitary Nahal personnel,
with at least one-year train-
ing, in border settlements. In
its present status of limited
mobilization, Israel has four
of its 23 brigades at full
strength--at Eilat, Beersheba,
Tel Aviv and Haifa. Israel
could mobilize about 200,000
men within 48 hours, however.
On 24 April the American army
attache in Tel Aviv reported
signs of limited mobilization.
Israeli chief of staff Moshe
Dayan is reported to have cut
short his European vacation to
return to Israel on 25 April.
Cairo's amended declara-
tion on the operation of the
Suez Canal, sent to UN Secre-
tary General Hammarskjold for
deposit as an international
instrument, contains some ad-
justments in language but no
essential changes from the
statement issued in March.
Egypt remains the sole author-
ity on the operation of the
canal and the sole collector of
tolls in authorized currencies.
Lip service is paid the
"six principles" of last Octo-
ber in the covering letter from
Egypt to the UN; the Egyptians
balked at including anything
about these principles in the
text of the declaration, since
Nasr said he feared a trap and
asserted that Egypt's interpre-
tation of the principles clearly
differed from that of Britain or
France.
The Egyptians have insisted
that they genuinely recognize
the necessity of establishing
confidence among the users and
the need to work in co-operation
with maritime interests. They
are loath, however, to engage
in any government-to-govern-
went negotiations, on the ground
that such meetings on canal
operations might derogate from
Egyptian sovereignty. Private
commercial interests would al-
so presumably be much easier
to deal with.
Behind Egypt's reluctance
to extend recognition to any
kind of users' association in-
volving government representa-
tion, there almost certainly lies
primarily an implicit commit-
ment that Egypt would enter a
multilateral international con-
ference on the canal only if
the Soviet Union were included.
Meanwhile, the first Brit-
ish- and American-flag vessels
have passed through the canal;
the level of canal operations
has remained low, however, with
fewer than 20 ships per day
making the trip compared to be-
tween 30 and 45 before hostil-
ities. The American report to
the Security Council, scheduled
for :26 April, may well be the
signal for a substantial in-
crease in the use of the canal,
despite the French government's
attempts to maintain a boycott.
With vessels of major mari-
time nations again using the
canal, the Israelis are faced
with a decision as to when, if,
and how they may implement their
claim that Israeli-flag vessels
as well as non-Israeli vessels
headed to or from Israel pass
through the canal on an equal
basis with non-Israeli shipping.
The Egyptian declaration, con-
trary to an impression given
by press reports, does not pro-
vide a means for putting this
question up to the jurisdiction
of the International Court of
Justice. Only differences be-
tween parties to the Constan-
tinople Convention of 1888 are
to be so handled.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
The Israeli press has con-
tinued to exhibit concern that
Israel's interests have been
ignored in the big-power nego-
tiations on the canal problem
and to threaten a dramatic
move to bring these interests
again to world attention.
While there have been no
recent reports that the Israelis
are preparing a specific ship
to send to the canal, the Is-
raeli merchant marine has a
number of older vessels avail-
able which it might be willing
to risk in such a maneuver, and
such a vessel could appear at
the canal entrance with little
or no warning if the Israelis
chose,
Aqaba
At the same time, the Is-
raelis' interest in the Aqaba
question has become still more
active as a result of Arab at-
tempts to deny Iranian oil to
Israeli, purchasers. Although
the 'Shah ::of Iran cannot .
legally control:;the sales:
of the international consortium
which markets the vast bulk of
Iranian production, he and the
.Arabs probably can put effective
pressure on its members.
The issue is critical for
Israel inasmuch as the pipe-
line from Eilat to Beersheba is
completed and operating. The
oil discharged at Eilat earlier
this month by the American-flag
tanker Kern Hills has been put
through the pipe.; as.a: .test ? run;
it was expected to arrive at
Beersheba, the present northern
terminus of the 8-inch line,
on 24 April. The Kern Hills
was originally to arrive back
in Eilat from its second trip
to Iran on 30 April; but the
subsequent international com-
plications seem lik ay
its:voyage.
MOSCOW'S COEXISTENCE CAMPAIGN
Public statements by So-
viet leaders last week and
private overtures to Western
diplomats suggest that Moscow
believes it has succeeded in
stabilizing the situation in
Eastern Europe and now is in
a position to return to the
general foreign policy line
laid down at last year's party
congress.
Khrushchev struck the key-
note with his remark at a public
reception on 15 April that "the
Hungarian situation was a rather
sharp affair...but things now
are settling down." In a fare-
well conversation with Ambas-
sador Bohlen on 17-April, Khru-
shchev and Bulganin expressed
optimism in regard to relaxa-
tion of international tension
and improvement of relations
with the West.
Soviet officials have taken
the same line in recent talks
with British and French diplo-
mats. During the new British
ambassador's first call on Bul-
ganirt, the Soviet premier de-
plored the absence of contact
between high-level Soviet and
British leaders. He asserted
that the USSR wishes to return
to the type of relations that
existed at the time of the Bul-
ganin-Khrushchev visit to Lon-
don in April 1956. In a 20
April letter to Prime Minister
Macmillan, Bulganin made a major
bid for a return to the "Geneva.
spirit" in Anglo-Soviet rela-
tions, and asserted that "tran-
sient considerations" should not
prevail over the fundamental
interests of the two countries.
The Soviet ambassador in
Paris;, the counselor of the
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25 April 1957
Soviet embassy and a Pravda
correspondent have al pleaded
for better relations between
the USSR and France.
On l9 April,,the USSR
handed notes to the United
States, Britain,and France call-
ing for a four-power declara-
tion condemning the use of force
in the Middle East. These notes
are intended as a public demon-
stration of the Soviet' interest
in a big-power conference on
Middle East problems and, to-
gether with the release on 23
April of letters exchanged be-
tween Bulganin, Eden and Moilet
before last fall's invasion of
Egypt, are designed to demon-
strate to the Arabs the pro-
Arab content of Soviet policy.
First Deputy Premier Miko-
yan told Ambassador Bohlen on
17 April that the Soviet govern-
ment did not understand why the
United States, Britain and
France were not prepared to
talk over Middle East problems,
and said that he felt if this
were done some areas of common
interest could be found.
Concurrently, Soviet of-
ficials have approached Ameri-
can,. French and British repre-
sentatives individually with
especially tailored proposals
for. discussing Middle East
problems. On 19 April a TASS
representative emphasized to
an American in Western Europe
the need for a top-level Soviet-
American conference on the
Middle East as a prelude to
restored confidence between the
two countries.. Ile added that
"our top people should discuss
measures. to avoid a conflict
in that area.... I keep saying
the Middle East, because there
I believe, we might be able to
go on to other things."
embassy on 19 April of a recent
conversation with a Pravda cor-
respondent in Paris who sought
a closer concurrence of Soviet-
French policy in regard to the
Middle East. He intimated that
the USSR was not overly enthu-
siastic about Nasr and might
even contemplate withdrawing
support from him "under certain
circumstances." He added that
the USSR might take a c-dncilia-
tory line regarding Suez and
Middle East problems generally
if France would show a more un-
derstanding attitude. The French
official revealed that the same
general line had also been taken
recently by the Soviet ambassa-
dor in Paris.
The new British ambassador
in Moscow told Ambassador Bohlen
on 15 April that Gromyko and
Bulganin recently had revealed
the apparent desire of the USSR
for Soviet-British discussions
on the Middle East "at.a respon-
sible level." The ambassador
received the strong impression
that the Soviet government is
most anxious to return to the
state of relations prevailing
after the Geneva conference.
Recent statements by So-
viet leaders indicate that they
feel that any drive aimed at
moderating international ten-
sion and redeveloping a "Geneva
spirit" necessitates a mod-
eration of Soviet-Yugoslav
polemics. However, any conces-
sions to "national Communism"
were precluded by last fall's
events in Eastern Europe, and
the Soviet leaders have very
little room in which to maneuver
with Tito. Any ideological
concessions or even a reinstitu-
tion of large-scale economic
aid would again prove that
being a heretic, and an ob-
stinate one at that, was
profitable.
A high French Foreign Min-
istry official informed the US
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25 April 1957
NOTES AND COMMENTS
.GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS CONTINUE TENSE
Relations between Greece
and Turkey, exacerbated by the
arrival in Athens of Archbishop
Makarios, remain in a state of
high tension. Provocative in-
cidents then were avoided by
extraordinary security precau-
tions by the governments of .
both countries. However, there
are increasing indications that
the Turks may be contemplating
drastic action against the
Greek community in Istanbul.
The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate
of Constantinople is less secure
of continued existence now than
at any time since 1925, when
the patriarch was expelled and
forced to flee to Greece.
The congratulatory invita-
tion of Governor Harriman to
Makarios to visit New York has
raised a new storm in Turkey.
Most Turks do not understand
the American federal system,
and the invitation has been
generally viewed as a statement
of official American policy
favoring the Greek case regard-
ing Cyprus.
Turks,
who formerly thought the United
States supported Turkey's posi-
tion, may now revert to their
basic conviction that the United
States will always back Chris-
tians against Moslems.
The American embassy be-
lieves there is a growing feel-
ing in Ankara that action against
the patriarchate would give
tangible evidence of the inten-
sity of Turkish feeling as well
as satisfy the popular demand
for dramatic action on the part
of the government.
Greek officials are increas-
ingly concerned over the Turkish-
attitude toward the patriarchate,
and fear that its expulsion from
Istanbul would enable the Moscow
patriarchate to assume the lead-
ership of the entire Eastern
Orthodox Church. The American
consul general in Istahbul be-
lieves Athenagoras and his Holy
Synod would resist any move
toward expelling them and might
ask for foreign assistance, pre-
sumably from the World Council
of Churches, the Anglican Com-
munion, and interested govern-
ments.
Makarios probably still
aims at the eventual union of
Cyprus with Greece, although the
Greek government apparently is
trying to influence him to accept
eventually an internationally
guaranteed independent status
for Cyprus. Makarios is
expected soon to go to London,
where the British may invite him
to discuss informally the pros-
pects for negotiations on self-
government for Cyprus between
the British and representatives
of all the island's communities.
Co
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25 April 1957
The deadlock between Dja-
karta and disaffected provinces
continues in Indonesia despite
a drive by government officials
to restore national unity and
to carry out President Sukarno's
concept of government.
Sukarno gave a major ad-
dress on 17 April in Central
Java in which he defended and
further spelled out his ideas
for a national advisory council
and a national planning board.
Sukarno has again offered to
head the advisory council and
personally appoint its members,
who will be both "functional"
and regional representatives.
The national planning board,
as explained by Sukarno, would
be a vast new bureaucracy which
could absorb the energies and
criticisms of provincial lead-
ers.
Prime Minister Djuanda is
touring Central and South Suma-
tra for talks with provincial
officials, which he hopes will
lay the basis for a reconcilia-
tion with Djakarta. The minis-
ter of the newly formed Depart-
ment of Regional Affairs has
told the press that the prov-
inces do indeed have legitimate
economic grievances and that
the return of former vice presi-
dent Hatta to the government is
a "psychological necessity."
The army chief of staff,
General Nasution, will preside
at a three-day national con-
ference in Djakarta beginning on
26 April which will include
both military and civil offi-
cials from disaffected areas
and will discuss measures to
be taken under the state of
war and siege. Meanwhile, he
has designated his deputy chief
of staff, ' Colonel Subroto--who
is highly regarded in the dis-
affected areas and who may have
obstructed some of Nasution's
reorganizational efforts--as
head of a military mission to
Peiping. He appears also to
be :Laying plans for a counter-
coup in East Indonesia which,
if successful, would restore
at 'Least half that area to
Djakarta's direct administration.
The non-Javanese provinces--
particularly Sumatra--show no
sign of surrendering to Dja-
Kart:a. On the eve of Djuanda's
visit to Sumatra, Central Suma-
tran leaders were commemorating
their 20 December coup and had
sent; congratulations to other
disaffected provinces. Presi-
dent Sukarno, who heretofore has
not been directly blamed for the
errors of Djakarta, now has been
charged by the Central Sumatran
governing council with the chief
responsibility for the "totally
unacceptable" new cabinet. Lt.
Col. Hussein, who controls Cen-
tral Sumatra and who ignored the
last army conference in Djakarta,
will attend the 26 April meeting.
His chief objective, however,
reportedly is to contact disaf-
fected commanders from Borneo
and East Indonesia, who will also
be present.
Britain and Yemen have
agreed to a meeting of local
representatives on 9 May at
Mukeiras on the Aden-Yemen bor-
der to discuss restoration of
peaceful conditions, but these
talks are not likely to do
much to solve the long-standing
border dispute.
Britain, suspicious of
Yeme'ri aims, has already rein-
forced its troops in Aden with
an armored car squadron and
apparently does not expect to
achieve more than a detente by
these talks. Though London had
indicated in January that it
hoped to go on from cease-fire
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
talks to a discus-
sion of frontier de-
marcations, the head
of the British dele-
gation said on 18
April that Britain
would refuse to con-
sider a broad set-
tlement before the
Yemenis cease both
hostilities along
the border and prov-
ocations of dissi-
dence within the
protectorate.
25 April 1957
Protectorate boundary
-- Indefinite boundary
SAUDIA ARABIA ,ePt
YEMEN Shibam
-Sallf SANAe Hanb~,5e, ~ EAS'1'EATADEN PROTECTORATE
~lodrada mhan
Yerim Muhalla
.t. Qatabay.
P
/ ?Ma
FRENCH
MA. LAND
DEN PROTECTORATE
j"
ADEN COLONY
Although maintaining that
economic and political progress
is impossible before internal
security is achieved, British
officials in Aden have made
plans for pilot agricultural
schemes and for encouraging
the development of a national-
ist group, which they hope will
co-operate with them in resist-
ing Yemeni encroachments.
Yemen's agreement to talks
.following months of equivoca-
tion is apparently inspired
by the vigorous British mili-
tary reaction to Yemeni at-
tacks along the frontier and
not by any change in the Imam's
~!^ IID PR~7
SULTANATE OF MUSCAT
AND OMAN
aim to gain control of all of
Aden.
The British anticipate
more expert Yemeni raiding in-
to the protectorate and expect
that disturbances may be or-
ganized to give the impression
that the protectorate peoples
themselves are struggling
against British domination. A
British official in Aden told
the American consulate there
that he believes the more con-
ciliatory tone of the latest
Yemeni note results from a
realization that Yemen's bor-
der attacks and its territorial
claims to all of Aden have in-
creased the reliance of some
protector,te rulers on the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
IRANIAN-SOVIET ECONOMIC RELATIONS
A three-year trade agree-
ment was signed between Iran
and the USSR on 18 April and
discussions have been held on
a civil air agreement and on
offers of economic assistance.
The Iranians have thus far not
agreed to any Soviet assistance
offers, despite the economic
advantages to be gained,
The new trade agreement
calls for yearly increases in
the volume of exchange covering
a wider range of goods than
under earlier agreements. Iran
is to export lead and zinc ores,
and several agricultural prod-
ucts. The USSR reportedly is
to "considerably expand" deliv-
eries of industrial equipment,
agricultural machinery, rolled
ferrous metal, chemicals and
other commodities.
In further discussion, Iran
reportedly agreed "in principle"
to the establishment of direct
air service from Tehran to Mos-
cow, but rejected specific So-
viet proposals. Details are to
be worked out in the near future.
While Tehran also is reported
to have rejected conditions for
the construction of hydroelec-
tric projects and expanding
facilities of the Iranian-Soviet
railroad, both projects are to
be subjects of further discus-
sions.,
Moscow has intensified ef-
forts to gain Iranian approval
for Soviet aid on these projects,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
first proposed during the
Shah's visit to the USSR in the
summer of 1956. Other projects
for which the USSR has offered
assistance are steel mills,
the development of rail facili-
ties in Julfa on the USSR-
Iranian border, and port in-
stallations in Pahlevi on the
Caspian Sea. Soviet negotia-
tors claim the enlargement of
the capacity of both ports of
entry would facilitate han-
dling of increased Iranian
Soviet exchanges of goods, as
well as the transit of goods
between Iran and Europe. Te-
hran may not be able to delay
indefinitely acceptance of
Soviet assistance for some of
these projects which require
joint development.
Soviet uneasiness over
the prospect of American
economic assistance to Poland
became apparent on 19 April
in an emphatic statement by
Khrushchev that Western "aid"
to Poland was designed to split
the bloc and place Poland "in
bondage to capitalist coun-
tries." He declared further
that the bloc would furnish
assistance to its own members,
probably to encourage Poland
to tie its economy more closely
to the bloc and to counteract
the impact of an American loan.
The strong position taken
by Khrushchev may mean that
the Kremlin will try to keep
Poland from accepting further
Western credits, although it
will probably not interfere
with current negotiations with
the United States.
Soviet fears that Western
assistance to Poland threatens
the stability of the Soviet
position in East Germany
The USSR and Iran have been
negotiating a transit agreement
which would provide for the
transit across Soviet territory
of goods to and from Europe.
The Iranians have objected to
the presently prohibitive Soviet
railroad rates and the Soviet
conditions giving preferential
rates to European countries hav-
ing commercial agreements with
the USSR. Soviet negotiators
will probably ask for reciprocal
rights which the Iranians feel
they could not refuse. While
Tehran will strive to maintain
regular relations with the USSR,
Iranian officials continue to be
influenced by American advice
and will proceed with caution
on :individual Soviet proposals.
(Prepared by ORR)
WESTERN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
permeate Khrushchev's threat to
the West: "Don't test us as you
did in Hungary and try another
putsch in East Germany. If
you start we will rap your
knuckles."
Basic Soviet suspicions of
Western economic influence,
aroused by the Marshall Plan
in 1.947, caused Molotov to can-
cel abruptly Czech and Polish
plans to accept Western aid
at that time. These suspicions
were demonstrated again recently
by Khrushchev's remark that Tito
was not receiving credits from
the West "because of his blue
eyes"--a remark which closely
parallels his comment last
week. to Polish premier Cyrankie-
wicz that the latter was being
wooed as a bride, but not
because he was young.
The Poles have sought to
quiet Soviet fears with re-
peated protestations that they
need American assistance only
to cope with "specific
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
problems--the normalization
of economic relations between
Poland and the United States"
and have denied that there are
any political overtones in
the negotiations. This is in
line with Gomulka's statement
on 11 January that Poland
"would accept a loan from any
country provided the conditions
under which the loan is granted
are exclusively of a business
nature."
Recent grants of credit
by Satellite countries to
Poland, presumably made at the
instance of the Kremlin, ap-
pear to have been timed to
offset the impact of American
aid and to tighten Poland's
economic ties with the bloc.
Poland signed a mutually ad-
vantageous agreement with East
Germany on 17 April which calls
for a long-term East German
credit of $100,000,000, at 1,5
percent, to cover manufacturing
costs of brown coal mining
equipment.
It has also signed a long-
term credit agreement with
Czechoslovakia under which
Warsaw is to receive $27,500,000
worth of machinery and indus-
trial installations. The
credits give further substance
to Khrushchev's position that
bloc members can find the as-
sistance they need within the
family and would do better to
seek it there. (Con- 25X1
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SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS
Soviet leaders made a
number of conciliatory gestures
toward Yugoslavia during talks
with Albanian leaders last
week. On 15 April, Khrushchev,
using Tito's own formula for
improving relations, said that
the Soviet government and party
wanted to concentrate not on
differences but on "what brings
the people of our two countries
together in the struggle for
socialism."
Numerous statements by
Khrushchev also continue to
make plain that economic aid
and even high-level trade
depend on"fraternal" relations
with Moscow. He has said that
the USSR extended aid to Yugo-
slavia and Poland only so they
would not "have to rely on the
capitalists.."
Yugoslav leaders in speeches
on 18 April to the executive
committee of the Yugoslav mass
people's organization clearly
showed that they rejected the
Soviet gestures of good will.
President Tito specifically
noted that while Khrushchev's
statements stressing the need
to improve relations had
"aroused a spark of hope" of
a change in the Soviet attitude,
they had been contradicted by
statements of other Soviet
leaders which directly attacked
the Yugoslav position. Neither
he nor Vice President Rankovic
mentioned the possibility of
developing good "party" rela-.
tions in the future, discussing
only their hopes for an eventual
improvement in relations be-.
tween the two states.
While Tito is intent on
preventing a complete break
between Yugoslavia and the
Eastern European Satellites, he
will undoubtedly insist on a
real. change in Soviet attitude
toward Yugoslavia and the Satel-
lites before any reconciliation
can take place. The Yugoslavs
are hoping to prove both abroad
and to their own party ranks
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25 April 19;57
that it is they who are the
real Communists and who showed
good faith in trying to deal
with the Kremlin, which in
turn has shown bad faith and
"Stalinist tendencies."
In view of this attitude
and the lack of any real
compromise on the Soviet side,
the most the recent Soviet
actions may presage-is a slowing
down or cessation of what has
been a continuous process of
degeneration in public of the
relations between Yugoslavia
and the Soviet bloc.
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BULGARIAN REGIME ATTEMPTS
The Bulgarian regime is
engaged in a program of mass
deportations from Sofia and
expulsions of students from
universities on a scale not
equaled since the Stalin era.
These terror tactics seen to
be aimed at preventing the
formation of dissident grow s
in a restive population. P
ear an panac are w esprea
and the terror tactics have
created a feeling that "no one
is safe."
Persons rounded up for de-
portation by the militia in the
early morning hours reportedly
include formerly "secure" ele-
ments, such as tram drivers and
railwaymen, as well as anti-Com-
munist and former bourgeois
families. Ten thousand persons
reportedly will be affected by
30 April. It is believed that
those evicted are merely put on
trains headed north and barred
from the country's major cities.
some party
members any officers are
among those being sent away.
party members, having
to the city in recent years,
are being sent to rural areas
where they can provide politi-
cal direction and prevent
possible resistance. The army
transfers are reportedly in-
tended to pare down an over-
staffed headquarters.
Expulsions of students,
which began after the Hungarian
.
SECR# (Concurred in ty
TO STEM POPULAR DISCONTENT
revolution, reportedly have
reached a total of several
hundred and even involved some
students suspected only because
of bourgeois parentage.
Intellectual discontent
has been admitted by the leader
of Sofia's party organization,
who recently called for a
"decisive attack" on disorder
in the party's ranks. lie crit-
icized particularly the party's
intellectuals, university pro-
fessors and cultural officials.
The Bulgarian population
has become restive because of
economic deficiencies, the most
serious of which is widespread
unemployment, particularly in
To ease unemployment, the
government is recruiting workers
for jobs in other bloc coun-
tries, primarily the USSR, which
is offering three-year contracts
with "good pay and working condi-
tions." Many women who have
accepted will reportedly do ag-
ricultural work in Turkestan.
For the longer haul, a
Soviet-Bulgarian. declaration
in February announced that Dul-
garia would import Soviet raw
materials and semifinished
goods to be finished by local
industry. Further, the country's
agricultural emphasis will be
shifted to crops such as fruits
and vegetables which have a
hi her labor input
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25 April 1957
PEIPING WELCOMES JAPANESE SOCIALIST DELEGATION
Peiping's lavish treatment
of the Japanese Socialist dele-
gation visiting Communist China
since 12 April marks a new ef-
fort to put increased strain
on ties between Tokyo and Wash-
ington. The mission is certain
to intensify pressures in Ja-
pan for diplomatic relations
with Peiping.
A joint statement issued
on 22 April declared that the
"time is now ripe" for a Sino-
Japanese peace treaty, called
for increased cultural, techni-
cal and economic interchange,
and urged that existing unof-
ficial agreements between the
two nations be converted to
official ones "as soon as pos-
sible."
Mao told his visitors that
Communist China was ready to
consider conclusion of a non-
aggression pact with Tokyo when
Japan "becomes completely in-
dependent from the United
States." He declared that dip-
lomatic relations between Ja-
pan and Communist China should
be restored "at the earliest
possible date."
Peiping apparently will
not press for terms which Tokyo
could reject as unrealistic at
this time. The Chinese Commu-
nists indicated they were not
demanding immediate abrogation
of Japan's security treaty with
the United States as a condi-
tion for a Sino-Japanese pact,
nor were they calling for a
rupture of diplomatic relations
between Tokyo and Taipei. Pei-
ping's stress on the need for
Japanese "independence" and
closer ties with mainland China
appears intended to advance
the Chinese Communist campaign
for closer de facto relations
with Japan by exploiting the
present trend of Japanese pub-
lic opinion.
Conservative Japanese lead-
ers are concerned that the So-
cialists might monopolize pub-
lic attention on this popular
issue. To offset possible So-
cialist gains in this regard,
the Kishi government has rushed
preparations to send a Diet
repatriation delegation to Pei-
ping to investigate the status
of approximately 40,000 missing
Japanese nationals.
Minister of International
Trade and Industry Mizuta has
publicly stated the government
intends to grant "considerable
convenience" to the Chinese
Communists in permitting them
to establish a trade mission
in Tokyo. This will probably
include Japan's waiving of
fingerprint requirements and
the granting of some diplomatic
privileges.
Mizuta also indicated the
Japanese government would sub-
sidize the establishment of a
quasi-official trade mission in
Peiping. In addition he noted
that the government planned to
give "positive" guidance in
the coming private trade talks
with Peiping.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
Chou En-lai's 15 April
statement to the Socialist mis-
sion on the status of Taiwan in
relation to the restoration of
Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties
was widely reported in the
Japanese press. Most papers
noted that Peiping appeared
more "realistic" than in the
past. Mao Tse-tung's offer
to conclude a nonaggression
pact with Tokyo when Japan
becomes "completely independ-
ent" will stimulate additional
pressure for Japan to pursue a
more independent course in
foreign relations.
Prime Minister Kishi has
declared that now is not the
time to recognize the Peiping
regime. Both he and his govern-
ment, however, insist that
special restrictions on trade
with Communist China must be
eliminated and he will press
strongly for an equalization
of the emba oc
nations.
COMMUNIST CHINA STRESSES SMALL LOCAL INDUSTRIES
Communist: China.'?s economic
policy makers appear to have
concluded on the basis of their
recent economic difficulties
that it is not wise, at least
for the next few years, to con-
centrate too heavily on large,
complex industrial installations.
Instead they are trying to stim-
ulate efforts to restore and
create large numbers of small-
scale facilities featuring a
simpler technology and a greater
geographical dispersion. In
adopting this course, Peiping
has not, however, abandoned its
,dtive. for rapid industrializa-
tion. Construction of large-
scale industrial projects is to
continue within certain limita-
tions.
The Ministry of Metallurgi-
cal Industry announced on 4
April that during the Second
and Third Five-Year Plans (1958-
1967)., small- and medium-sized
metallurgical plants are to be
emphasized in order to stretch
construction funds, obtain
quick financial and physical
returns and improve the
geographical balance of the
overconcentrated metallurgical
industry. The ministry noted
that capital investment in the
three big iron and steel plants
at Anshan, Paotow and Wuhan
will be limited so that more
small and medium plants can be
built.
Some of the rolling equip-
ment formerly earmarked for
Anshan will go to equip small
plants in other places. Plans
still call for the large-scale
development of the three centers
and they will certainly continue
to supply the overwhelming
majority of China's iron and
steel needs. The new local
plants are probably designed
to relieve the large inte-
grated complexes of the need
to supply small-scale local
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
industrial needs for the simpler
forms of steel mill products.
The State Council, in an
effort to relieve the coal
shortage, directed on 12 April
that small coal pits be restored
and new ones opened. Under
the directive, counties, cities
and agricultural producer co-
operatives may operate small
collieries to meet their own
needs. On 22 April, the National
Economic Commission decided to
invest this year about $16,000,-
000 in small plants designed to
produce 400,000 tons of pig
iron per year and $24,000,000
in smaller coal pits producing
4,200,000 tons of coal.
Chinese industry has been
hampered by shortages of money
and raw materials and by trans-
port tie-ups, aggravated by
the speed-up in the construction
program in 1956. Building small
installations in more locali-
ties will probably ease some
shortages and give limited re-
lief to the overloaded trans-
portation system. The less
complicated facilities will
save money and reduce the need
for importing equipment and tech-
nical assistance from the rest
of the bloc. Latent local pro-
ductive potential can be tapped
and some surplus manno ab-
sorbed. (Pre- 25X1
pared by ORR
PEIPING CONCERNED OVER DECLINE IN POPULAR MORALE
Signs of a decline in the
morale of the populace in Com-
munist China
are reflected in
ineseommunist statements.
The seriousness with which
Peiping views the ebbing en-
thusiasm is indicated by an
intensive political indoctrina-
tion campaign, begun. on Mao
Tse-tung's personal initiative.
stated that "almost everyone"
feels he is not eating as
much or as well as he would
like. Other consumer goods
are also in short supply, and
Peiping has found it necessary
to promise that light industry
will. this year be allocated a
slightly increased proportion
of investment funds, although
heavy industry will still re-
ceive priority.
Commenting on popular at-
titudes in China, the second-
ranking officer of the Dutch
embassy in Peiping recently
reported a "lack of enthusiasm"
and slow working habits among
urban workers. The departing
counselor of the British em-
bassy in Peiping has reported
a "hardening of outlook" in
the past year. People now
show a tendency, he said, to
make "more critical judgments"
of the Communists.
The British official cited
the tight food supply and a
general rise in prices as major
grievances in the cities. He
In the countryside, the
peasants have been making.criti-
cal comparisons between urban
and rural consumption levels.
in the Wenchow area on the East
China coast are unenthusiastic
about working hard in the absence
of incentives. The attitude
expressed was "Why should we
work hard if we don't get the
benefits of our work?" Openly
critical of the Communists, the
peasants are nevertheless not
carrying their disaffection to
the point of active resistance.
Peiping has intensified
its efforts to reassure the
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25 April 1957
peasants, but apparently with-
out much success. The Commu-
nists-acknowledge that land-
lords, rich peasants, and some
middle peasants are "grumbling"
about their decreased incomes'
after joining the collectives.
They further admit that peasant
living standards are much below
urban levels. But they insist
that the incomes of workers
and peasants generally have
been rising at "more or less"
the same rate.
In the universities, the
"unhealthy tendencies" first
admitted by Peiping last fall
have come in for renewed cen-
sure. The press has cited
cases of students who defy
school regulations, decline
to participate in political
activities, are addicted to
dancing, and fail to make the
proper distinction between
"friends" and "enemies" in their
discussion of developments in
Hungary.
The signs of alienation of
the populace from the party have
occasioned two major addresses
by Mao Tse-tung in recent months
on the subject of "contradic-'
tions" between the people and
the leadership. Peiping's view
is apparently that the situation
is a matter of some concern, but
that it has not yet,'reached
proportions requiring the re-
turn to a new terror. Commu-
nists are warned against antago-
nizing the people by "commandism"
and bureaucratic practices.
The "confused" populace is to
be reindoctrinated along the line
that people and leaders under
Communism have an identity
rather than a conflict of in-
terests. For'the moment at
least, the propaganda organs
rather than the public security
apparatus of the state are to
bear the brunt of the contest
against Doyular disaffection.
Leaders of the comparative-
ly wealthy Overseas Chinese
community of over 300,000 per-
sons in the Philippines, tradi-
tionally an important source
of election campaign funds, are
reported determined to obtain
maximum benefits from their con-
tributions this year. With a
large number of politicians
entering the presidential race,
Chinese financial backing may
have an important bearing on
both the party nominations and
the outcome of the November
voting.
Early in the present cam-
paign, leaders of the Federation
of Chinese Chambers of Commerce
allegedly agreed to co-ordinate
their contributions with the
Chinese Nationalist ambassador
in Manila in order to exercise
greater control over funds and
to promote a solution of out-
standing differences with the
Philippine government.
the Chinese ho e
obtain written guarantees
from President Garcia, whom
they regard as the most accept-
able among the likely presi-
dential nominees. In particu-
lar, they seek repeal of the
retail trade nationalization
law, which was aimed-primarily
at the economically powerful
Chinese merchants and has point-
ed up the weakness of the Chi-
nese Nationalist government in
defending Overseas Chinesein-
terests.
Another goal is a grant of
permanent Philippine residence
for some 2,400 Chinese refugees
from the mainland whose temporary
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
visas have expired and whom Na-
tionalist authorities maintain
cannot be absorbed on Taiwan.
President Garcia is reported
amenable to a solution but,
like preceding Philippine admin-
istrators, is fearful that gen-
erous treatment would expose
him to charges of accepting Chi-
nese bribes.
Other prominent candidates
are actively seeking Chinese
backing--at least financially,
Manila's Mayor Lacson, who hopes
to win a presidential nomina-
tion, is publicly charging that
top government leaders are in-
volved in graft from the Chi-
nese, presumably in the hope of
attracting Chinese support away
from Garcia and to himself,
Lacson has also announced that
the first plank of his platform
is repeal of the retail trade
law,
Another approach to the
Chinese reportedly has been
made by Senator Jose Laurel on
behalf of the vice-presidential
candidacy of his son, the Speak-
er of the House. The senator
apparently has indicated that
he can head off an unfavorable
Supreme Court ruling on the con-
stitutionality of the retail
trade law.
As the competition for
nominations intensifies, such
contacts can be expected to in-
crease. Under the circumstances,
the Chinese appear to be in a
much better position to get suf-
ficient returns for their money
than they were during the last
presidential election, when the
election of the late Ramon Mag-
saysay was practipa.3]v a.
-
gone conclusion.
COMMUNIST REPRESENTATION IN THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT
The Indian Communist Party
doubled its percentage of the
popular vote in the recent na-
tional elections and increased
its representation in parliament
and in eight of the 13 state
assemblies. However, the party
is not in a position to affect
the nature of legislation ex-
cept in Kerala State, where it
controls the government, and
possibly in Orissa State, where
it holds the balance of power
between the Congress Party and
the rightist Ganatantra Parishad
party.
Although the Communists
enlarged their representation
both in parliament-and in the
states in the 1957 elections,
their gain in seats does not
correspond to the increase in
the popular vote. The party
and its allies now hold 29 out
of 488 parliamentary seats for
which elections have been held,
a gain of roughly 25 percent
over the 1952 total of 23. The
present Communist parliamen-
tary group is probably a more
cohesive one, however, since 27
are apparently Communist Party
members, whereas in 1952 only
16 belonged to the party.
A comparison of the Commu-
nist position in the 13 state
assemblies immediately before
and after the 1957 elections in-
dicates that the .party lost
seats in Andhra, Madras, and the
Punjab, maintained its position
in Mysore and Rajasthan, and
gained strength in the remaining
eight states, Kerala is the
only state where the party has
a firm foothold. In. two of
these eight states, Uttar Pradesh
and Madhya Pradesh, the party is
represented for the first time.
In West Bengal and Bombay,
the Communists scored significant
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
COMMUNIST STRENGTH IN INDIAN STATE ASSEMBLIES
STATES
ASSEMBLY
SEATS 1957
COMMUNIST REPRESENTATIVES
1952* NOV 1956 1957
GAINED
STRENGTH
KERALA
127
7
37
60
WEST
BENGAL
252
28
27
46
BOMBAY
396
1
1
18
UTTAR
PRADESH
430
0
0
9
BIHAR
318
0
1
7
ASSAM
108
1
1
MADHYA
288
0
0
2
PRADESH
ORISSA
140
7
7
9
MAINTAINED
STRENGTH
MYSORE
208
0
1
1
RAJASTHAN
176
0
1
1
LOST
STRENGTH
ANDHRA
105
42
52
22
MADRAS
205
14
13
At
PUNJAB
154
6
8
6
TOTALS
2907
106
149
185
*Figures have been adjusted to correspond to the areas
included in the new states created on 1 November 1956.
gains of 19 and 17 seats re-
spectively. As a result, the
party will have a stronger voice
in the assemblies of these two
states, and will probably con-
stitute a troublesome element.
In Orissa, where the re-
cently formed Congress Party
government does not control a
majority, the Communists and
independents hold
the balance of power.
Communists else-
where in India will
probably capitalize
propaganda-wise on
their positions in
these states, and
they may thereby gain
some respectability
and prestige through-
out the country. ix-
cept in Kerala and
Orissa, however, the
Communists do not
possess sufficient
strength to influence
the nature of legis-
lation a
The government
of India is aware of
the problem it faces
in Kerala, and will
probably take discreet
but firm steps to dis-
credit the Communists
and return the Con-
gress Party to a dom-
inant position, Mad-
havan Nair, one of the
three Congress general
secretaries, is going. to resign
his ;party position in order to
devote full time to the job of
revitalizing the state party
machine, The USSR is not likely
to be of any direct help to the
Kerala Communists because of its
probable desire not to antago-
nize the Indian government at
this time..
INCREASING COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN PERUVIAN AND BOLIVIAN LABOR
The mineworkers", congress
meeting in Peru from 25 to 30
April and the second congress
of the Bolivian Workers' Central
scheduled for 1 June will be
key tests of strength for the
pro-Communist labor forces in
Peru and Bolivia, Communists
in both countries are expected
to play up the co-operation of
non-Communist labor leaders with
the governments as.a major
factor in the non-Communists'-
failure to make gains for labor.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
Communist influence appears
to be increasing among organized
labor in Peru primarily because
the Communists' chief opponents
in the labor field--the leftist
but non-Communist APRA--have
been prevented by political con-
siderations from pressing for
labor gains. Early this year
the Communists recaptured two
key labor bases which APRA had
won in 1956 and gained another
federation long controlled by
APRA. The Communists have re-
portedly succeeded in a recent
attempt to organize miners at
Toquepala in southern Peru,
where American companies are in-
vesting $200,000,000 in new cop-
per exploitation, and they ap-
pear to be having considerable
success at the American-owned
mines in central congress.
The miners' congress spon-
sored by ORIT, the inter-Amer-
ican anti-Communist labor organ-
ization, and recently-scheduled
for 25 April, may provide a test
of Communist and APRA influence
among the miners. The Commu-'
nits will probably exploit
APRA's commitment to oppose vis-
its by congress delegates to
certain American-owned mining
installations where housing is
substandard and to prevent crit-
icism of health conditions at
mines and smelters.
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Bolivia
In Bolivia, Juan Lechin,
long Bolivia's dominant labor
leader and a key figure in the
government party, is apparently
losing influence. He is re-
ported discouraged because he
realizes that support of the
government's anti-inflation
program is essential even
though it sharply curtails his
maneuvering for patronage and
labor gains.
The government party form-
erly controlled 94 of the 104
labor unions in La Paz, but
reportedly lost control of 20
of these to orthodox Communists
or Trotskyites in recent months.
An extreme leftist secretary
general gained control of the
railway federation, and third
largest labor group in Bolivia,
in April.
A key test of pro-Com-
munist strength in Bolivian
labor will come at the second
national congress of the Bo-
livian Workers' Central on 18
May, Any marked decline in
Juan Lechin's dominance is
likely to result in irrespon-
sible agitation by the Workers'
Central--the most powerful
pressure group in Bolivia.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
THE STABILITY OF THE EAST GERMAN GOVERNMENT
Discontent among intel-
lectuals, students, farmers and
workers in East Germany con-
tinues to be the most serious
.problem facing the East German
Communists. The survival of
the present leadership depends
on support from the USSR, and
this support in turn hinges on
the regime's ability to hold
in check the various dissident
elements. Stalinist party boss
Walter Ulbricht is determined
to take tough measures, which
will probably be successful in
the absence of a leader around
whom critics of. the regime
could gather.
Party Factionalism
Although there are some
differences on specific policy
questions among the party lead-
ership, as well as widespread
opposition sentiment through-
out the country, there is no
German Gomulka with the con-
victions, will or following to
challenge successfully the
Stalinist Ulbricht for control
of the party.
Most reports of differences
within the Socialist Unity (Com-
munist) Party (SED) leadership
indicate that the disputes have
been concerned largely with
matters of economic policy.
Economic technicians like Deputy
Premiers Heinrich Rau, Fritz
Selbmann, and Fred Oelssner
have frequently found them-
selves in conflict with the
group interested primarily in
maintaining the purity of Com-
munist Soviet-style ideology.
The creation on 11 April of an
economic council to co-ordinate
the direction of the country's
economy appears to be a victory
for the economists, who frequent-
ly oppose Ulbricht on practical
grounds.
Although Ulbricht is un-
popular, both inside and out-
side the party, the opposition
has no hard-core group; it lacks
cohesion and its composition
appears to shift depending on
.the issues involved.
Ferment Among Intellectuals
A ferment of new and liberal
ideas among intellectuals and
students has grown steadily
since de-Stalinization began
following the Soviet 20th party
congress in Moscow in February
1956. It increased sharply
after the "Polish October" and
the Hungarian revolutions, when
most intellectuals, along with
other elements of the popula-
tion, rejected the SED's ex-
planations of those events.
Thus the 30th plenary
meeting of the SED central com-
mittee held from 30 January to
1 February 1957 placed primary
emphasis on overcoming the
ideological deviations which
admittedly had reached dangerous
proportions in high party circles.
as well as among the intelli-
gentsia. References by party
officials to "certain experi-
ments in Poland" and "differences
of opinion" with the Polish
Communist Party substantiate
reports that SED leaders regard
Poland as a major source of
heretical and deviationist ideas
in East Germany. The "Yugo-
slav example" and the thesis of
a "special German path" to so-
cialism, both of which have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 19 5S7
considerable appeal to some
East German Communists, were
also attacked and categorically
rejected by the party leader-
ship.
The trial in March of Pro-
fessor Wolfgang Harich of Hum-
boldt University was an obvious
attempt by the regime to intimi-
date East German intellectuals
and liberals. The court stated
on 9 March that Harich and his
associates were imprisoned for
active conspiracy against the
state; in fact they were im-
prisoned for holding ideologi-
cal views of their own which
differed from those of the party
leadership. The entire affair
may boomerang, however, since
it provides dissident groups
with a martyr and a focus which
they have hitherto lacked.
In a long memorandum to
party members written before
his arrest last November, Harich
disclosed radical reformist
ideas the East German intel-
lectuals espoused and the pro-
found bitterness and resentment
they held toward the regime.
Although professing loyalty to
Marxism-Leninism and disclaiming
any intention to become rene-
gades, the Harich group pro-
claimed its complete alienation
from the Ulbricht leadership
and its intention to liberate
East German Communism from "Sta-
linism and dogmatism and to re-
store its basis of humanist non-
dogmatic thought."
Experience had shown him,
Harich declared, that reform of
the SED was impossible without
the overthrow of the Ulbricht
leadership. He had attempted
without success to present his
ideas for party reform to party
leaders in the hope of effect-
ing the development of democ
racy within the SED in an open,
legal fashion, "But we are
ready also to use the method of
faction and conspiracy if forced
to it," Harich declared.
Harich denied that the
"transition to socialism" is
a monopoly of the Communists
and asserted that only the So-
cial Democratic Party could
bring socialism to West Germany.
He also charged the Soviet Union
with exploiting the "People's
Democracies" and said that its
political system is an impedi-
ment to further progress through-
out the Soviet bloc.
Farmers and Workers Restive
The restiveness of workers
and farmers is also a matter of
serious concern to the regime..
Here) the problem is largely
economic. Workers' hours are
long, wages are low, food prices
are high, and consumer goods
are scarce; farmers' delivery
quotas are high, prices for
produce are low, and the pres-
sures for collectivization are
highly unpopular.
The regime has been forced
to cut back its economic goals
for 1957, and critical shortages
of coal, coke, iron ore, non-
ferrous metals, and foodstuffs
jeopardize the fulfillment of
even the reduced plans. Although
the Soviet Union has promised
to shore up the shaky East Ger-
man economy, party and govern-
ment, officials have warned that
significant economic improve-
ments must not be expected this
year. The end of food ration-
ing, promised for the spring
of 1957, almost certainly will
not be realized.
Security Forces
The regime is continuing
its efforts to create effec-
tive, reliable armed and secu-
rity, forces capable of control
ling dissident elements and sup-
pressing any outbreaks of anti-
regime violence. East German
forces, themselves of question-
able reliability, would not
alone be able to maintain the
regime in power. They should
be able to do so, however, with
the support of Soviet troops
stationed in the country.
The regime has intensified
its efforts to develop the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY,"
25 April 1957
armed workers' militia (Kampf-
gruppen) into an effective
force which would be called
out first to deal with domestic
uprisings, strikes, or riots.
Operating directly under party
control, the Kampfgruppen have
recently held maneuvers and tac-
tical exercises emphasizing
street fighting in'several East
German cities, including East
Berlin. In the Kampfgruppen,
too, however, reliability is a
major problem,
Church-State Relations
Relations between the Ger-
man Evangelical Church and the
(Concurred in by ORR)
STATUS OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE
Last year, through a com-
bination of good weather and the
yields obtained from the new
lands program, the USSR achieved
a record-breaking harvest. It has
not, however, solved its basic
agricultural problems--low
yields per acre, underdeveloped
government continue to deterio-
rate. While there are indica-
tions that the regime would like
to establish a separate East
German church and has created
a State Secretariat for Church
Affairs to handle church matters,
it is faced with the task of
finding a churchman willing to
head a puppet church. Further-
more, a split of the German
church would destroy one of the
remaining links between East
and West Germany and would be
extremely unpopular in both
parts'of the divided country.
animal husbandry and excessive
manpower requirements. Current
Soviet plans have the effect
of placing agriculture in
direct competition with industry
for manpower and investment
funds, and thereby impeding
Soviet industrial growth. Per
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
capita agricultural production
over the next few years probably
will improve but slightly.
Programs After Stalin
During the quarter century
preceding Stalin's death, Soviet
agriculture remained virtually
stagnant while industry grew
rapidly. In 1953, agriculture
still suffered from low yields
and insufficient machinery, and
absorbed a large, relatively un-
skilled labor force. The na-
tional diet remained monotonous,
and contained little meat, milk
and fruit. Finally recognizing
the critical imbalance in the
economy, the post-Stalin regime
in its first months raised the
priority of agriculture in the
economy.
The new leaders enlarged
the sown area of the country
about 25 percent, primarily by
developing virgin lands in Si-
beria and Kazakhstan. Even be-
fore completing this operation
the government launched a pro-
gram to multiply more than six
times the area in corn. These
programs were aimed at-greatly
increasing supplies of feed for
livestock, while maintaining a
satisfactory level of grain pro-
duction for bread.
To raise efficiency in
production, the new regime has
provided greater incentives to
agricultural workers. Between
1952 and 1956 state payments
for agricultural products in-
creased two and one-half times.
The total cash income of the
peasants for labor performed on
the collective farms more than
doubled during this time, and
peasant income from private
plots appears to have remained
stable. Benefits for state
farmers have also grown con-
siderably.
These post-Stalin programs
and their supporting industrial
and construction activities have
been expensive, with the result
that agriculture has received
a bigger share of state invest-
ments since 1953. This modi-
SECRET
fication of the traditional in-
vestment pattern is to continue
through 1960. The programs are
also costly in terms of man-
power, which is becoming tighter
in industry. From 1954 through
1956 the agricultural labor
force actually increased in
number, reversing the trend of
many years.
Organizational changes
undertaken since 1953 have been
largely in the management field
and have had little effect on
the basic agrarian structure,
although the state's control
over the peasant has increased
somewhat. Broad supervisory
powers over collective farms
have been conferred on Machine
Tractor Stations, strengthening
their position as "the command
posts of the party in the coun-
trysidee" At least one third
of the collective farms have re-
ceived new managers who, for
the most part,, are party mem-
bers, from the cities. Some of
the detailed planning, such as
deciding the local crop planting
pattern, has been shifted from
Moscow to regional jurisdictions
and even to farms themselves.
It is doubtful if this has ap-
preciably improved agricultural
administration.
Present Situation
In 1956 the vastly ex-
panded sown area, together with
extremely favorable weather in
the new lands areas, led to a
record-breaking grain harvest
USSR PER CAPITA PRODUCTION OF
SELECTED AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS
200
ES-
CORN
GRAIN
MEAT
AGRI
UITU
0
.
R
UTPU
00
400
IN
300
0
19
50 19
53 19
54 1955 19
56 .1 1
25APRIL 1957
70415 2
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
estimated at l15,000,-
000 tons, or 12 per-
cent more than in
1955. Milk produc-
tion increased by 17
percent, but the ad-
vance in meat produc-
tion was negligible.
Production of other
field crops went up
only modestly.
In the last few
months, the results
of 1956 have been
lauded far and wide,
medals have been
SECRET
=T _APRICULTURAL MACHINERY DATA
-APPLICABLE ACREAGE
` XMGE`PER MACHINE
TOTAL GRAIN COMBINES (15 FT UNITS)
' Wff `Agtr ACftkG
~#J E I PFR MS HINE
1955
U S I USSR
4,300,000
410,000,000
95
1,338,000
460,000,000
344
502,000
131,000,000
261
660,000
82,000,000
124
342,000
290,000,000
848
3,100
45,000,000
14,516
3,400
290,000,000
85,000
-1962 =
USSR (ESTIMATE)
2,995,000
495,000,000
165
1,240,000
306,000,000
247
160,000
69,000,000
431
291,000
306,000,000
1,050
awarded to many workers and
Khrushchev has been awarded
highest honors as originator of
the successful new lands pro-
gram. The government hopes
this year's crop will be as
good as that in 1956 and that
there will be a great increase
in livestock products. Speeches
at a series of recent regional
agricultural conferences have
not set forth any new agricul-
tural programs, but have ex- .
pressed confidence in existing
policies and organizations.
Looking Ahead
The regime probably will
not be satisfied, however, with
future prospects if it is look-
ing at realities rather than
the wholly unrealistic 1960
targets. The substantial ad-
vances in 1956 will probably be
followed by slower production
gains in the next few years and
almost certainly by some years
in which production will be be-
low 1956.. Grain production
should tend to level off, al-
though meat and milk production
should rise. Agricultural out-
put may rise by roughly 30 per-
cent from 1955 to 1960, well
below the 1960 goal of 70 per-
cent, although these figures
are not strictly comparable.
In per capita terms, output
wil]L improve but slightly.
The means of achieving this
rise will continue to be quite
costly both in men and money.
With the new lands expansion
program practically completed,
the regime is now relying on
further incentives, on large
capital investments, and on or-
ganizational measures to in-
crease yields and to improve
aninal husbandry. To pay for
this, investments in the Sixth
Five-Year Plan are to be double
that of the previous plan.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that
significant reductions in the
size of the agricultural labor
LABO - FORC 1956
MILLIONS OF WORKERS)
AGRICIJLTIJRAL _ [E NONAGRICULTURAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 19,157
force can be made from now
through 1960.
Agriculture and the Economy
The meeting in May of the
Supreme Soviet apparently will
dwell on the proposed reor-
ganization of industry aimed
at solving the problem of the
lowered industrial growth rate--
a problem to which agriculture
holds several important keys.
Incentive programs for urban
workers rely heavily on con-
sumer goods based on agricul-
ROLE OF COLLECTIVE AND STATE X, FARMS
USSR
FACREAGE AND _DELIVERIES (,z OF TOTAL
GRAIN
STATE -_
:: LABOR FORCE
(MILLIONS OF WORKERS)
25 APRIL 1957
1955 1956
tural products.
Furthermore, the
tightened general
labor situation over
the next decade puts
a premium on releas-
ing farm labor for
,industrial use. The
raised priority of
agriculture, both in
terms of investment
and retained manpower,
will continue, as at
present, to place im-
pediments to indus-
trial growth.
Since so many
agricultural measures
have already been
taken by the post-
Stalin regime, its
freedom of maneuver is
now more restricted.
Drastic changes in
the organization of
the countryside might
appear profitable to
the leadership as a
means of stimulating
production. However,
the regime will have
its hands full with
industrial reorganiza-
tions for some time to
come. It will probably
not attempt any large-
scale agricultural
shake-up, such as wide-
spread conversion of
collective farms to
state farms, which
might stir up peasant
opposition. Khru-
shchev has stated that
the central apparatus
of the Ministries of
Agriculture and State
Farms will be great-
ly reduced but not
abolished in the sched-
uled general reor-
ganization.
(Prepared byORR)
SECRET
INPL VIDUA L
COLLECTIVE
FARMERS
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In 1949 it reached a peak
registered membership of 108,-
000 and received a high of
approximately 3,000,000 votes,
10 percent of the total, while
functioning primarily as a
parliamentary party. In 1950,
it was criticized by the Comin-
form journal for lacking a
revolutionary spirit and a
covert apparatus. Subsequent
outbreaks of party-instigated
violence prompted American
occupation authorities in May
1950 to bar central committee
members from political activity.
Most of them went into hiding,
directing the underground move-
ment for the next five years
while a proxy committee main-
tained leadership of overt
party activities.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY.
25 April 1957
DISSENSION IN THE JAPANESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Personal rivalries among
top leaders, disputes about
tactics, and general confusion
and resentment over Moscow's
direction have created serious
dissension within the Japanese
Communist Party. Party leaders
acknowledge that there is
growing indifference among
members toward party activities,
and supporters of expelled
central committeeman Shigeo
Shida reportedly are working
to establish a "Racial Com-
munist Party." A major split
seems unlikely in the near
future, however, and the recent
re-establishment of the Soviet
diplomatic staff in Tokyo prob-
ably will be followed by meas-
ures designed to strengthen
the party's organization and
effectiveness.
Since its founding in 1922,
the party has been hampered by
factional struggle and by
numerous revisions of policy
which, since 1950 alone, have
resulted in shifts from parlia-
mentary to violent tactics
and back again.
The.party has existed
legally only since 1945, having,
been suppressed by the Japanese
government prior to that time.
It was during this five-
year period, and particularly
from 1950 to 1952, that Shigeo
Shida became a dominant leader
in the underground,. directing
a major portion of the violent
activities in which the party
engaged. It was during this
period also that struggles for
party leadership were intensi-
fied and several top officials
expelled.
The international Communist
shift from violent to peaceful
tactics in 1955 had a devastat-
ing effect from which the Japa-
nese party has not yet recovered.
Underground leaders surfaced
and the policy advocated by
Shida was denounced as "extreme
left-wing adventurism." Leaders
who supported the new peace
line and several of Shida's
purged rivals who were restored
to party rank increased their
power positions at Shida's
expense.
During 1956, it became
evident that Shida, although
he had severed contacts with
parity headquarters, was
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25 April 1957
endeavoring to recover his lost
strength, promoting a movement
against the "collective leader-
ship" of Sanzo Nozaka, Yoshio
Shiga and Kenji Miyamoto..
Much of Shida's strength is
believed to have been drawn
from the regional party levels
and below.. The central com-
mittee, with.the twofold pur-
pose of stopping this move-
ment and of gaining more popu-
lar support by disclaiming
the tactics of violence with
which Shida was identified,
expelled him from the party
in September 1956.
Effects of Soviet Policies
Perhaps more widespread
in its effect on the party as
a whole is the confusion,.re-
sentment and indifference to
party activities which the
twists in Soviet government and
party policies have engendered,
SECRET
particularly among rank-and-
file Japanese members. The
practice of the party collec-
tive leadership to accept,
without satisfactory explana-
tion and.guidance, the Soviet
position on reversion to peace-
ful tactics, the return of the
southern Kuril Islands to Japan,
and the suppression of the
Hungarian revolt has weakened
internal discipline and caused
considerable criticism of party
leaders.
Those rank-and-file members
who are dissatisfied with Mos-
cow's direction, but who also
would not support Shida's move-
ment for a separate party, ap-
pear to be disorganized and
leaderless and therefore not
in a position to challenge
seriously the party leadership.
While the present membership
of the party is estimated at
80,000 to 90,000, the number
of reliable party workers prob-
ably is considerably less.
The seventh national con-
vention of the party, the first
to be held since 1947, is ten=
tAtivelyscheduled. to be con-
vened this summer. It has been
postponed several times since
early 1956, probably because
of the desire by party leaders
to avoid an open challenge to
their control and policy. These
leaders, especially Kenji Miya-
moto, may now feel strong
enough to weather the conven-
tion and successfully overcome
any challenge without seriously
dividing the party.
Activities of the recently
re-established Soviet diplomatic
mission in Tokyo suggest the
mission will provide increased
direction, discipline and
financing for the party in an
effort to transform it into the
type of disciplined, properly
by Moscow.
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