CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001200040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 23, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL
I/
COPY NO. 16
OCI NO. 1419/57
11 April 1957
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INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
DIA review(s) completed.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 April 1957
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Nasr has made no significant concession on the Suez
Canal issue, and Cairo formally protested on 10 April the
passage of an American-owned oil tanker through the Gulf
of Aqaba to Eilat. Nasr's apprehension of new moves
against him is reflected in reports of Egyptian troop
movements and his orders for a general "alert" of the
government and army. The conflict among the opposing
factions in Syria remains unresolved.
INFLUENCE OF MAKARIOS' RELEASE ON CYPRUS QUESTION . . . Page
The situation in Greece and Turkey is tense in
anticipation of Archbishop Makarios' arrival in Athens
about 15 April. Makarios' presence is :Likely further
to damage Greek-Turkish relations and will not make a
Cyprus settlement any easier. Developments after Makarios'
arrival will depend largely,on whether the Greek public
becomes aroused against Britain, against Turkey, or awning.
the Karamanlis government itself.
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11 April 1957
NOTES AND COMMENTS
WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO BRITISH DEFENSE PLANS . . . Page
Britain's declared intention to slash conventional
military forces and concentrate on nuclear weapons has
intensified doubts in Western Europe about the military
usefulness of the Western alliance. Repercussions have
been especially severe in West Germany, and Chancellor
Adenauer has for the first time stated that Germany
must have atomic weapons. This has aroused new French
apprehensions over German rearmament.
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INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . Page 2
The installation of President Sukarno's 23-member
"extraparliamentary business cabinet" on 9 April tempo-
rarily ends Indonesia's cabinet crisis. Since the new
government is unsatisfactory to the Moslem parties and
elements in the outer islands, it is not likely to bring
an end to national disunity. Tension is mounting in
South Sumatra as a result of the recent abortive cou
by pro-Djakarta army elements. 25X1
THE NEW IRANIAN GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The Iranian government of Prime Minister Manuchehr
Eqbal, formed on 4 April, may provide a more popular
and more efficient administration for the time being
than the cabinet of former prime minister Ala.
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COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT OF KERALA STATE
FACES MAJOR PROBLEMS . Page 5
Like its non-Communist predecessors, the Communist
government of the Indian state of Kerala, which took
office on 5 April, faces political and economic problems
of such magnitude that its success in dealing with them
is by no means assured. Its freedom of action is
limited by the powers of the federal government, and
failure by the local authorities to improve conditions
might lead to a reimposition of President's Rule--
direct administration from New Delhi.
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11 April .1957
TURKEY RECEPTIVE TO WEST GERMAN APPROACHES . . . . . . . Page 6
German prestige in Turkey, traditionally high,
appears to be rising and a reassertion of German economic
influence in the area may follow. Turkey welcomes the
West German overtures.
KHRUSHCHEV AWARDED ORDER OF LENIN . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
The award of a second Hammer and Sickle gold medal,
along with another Order of Lenin, to Nikita Khrushchev
on 8 April 1957 for his "outstanding services in working
out and implementing measures for reclaiming virgin soil
and wastelands" makes him the most highly decorated of
the top Soviet civilian leaders. He now has more of these
decorations than Stalin had. This highlights his primacy
in the Soviet leadership and implies that the other
leaders are solidly behind him as he pushes his industrial
reorganization scheme.
HUNGARIAN REGIME TIGHTENS CONTROLS . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
While Premier Kadar was in the Soviet Union two
weeks ago promising to exterminate all enemies of the
Hungarian regime, his colleagues in Budapest were issuing
far-reaching. decrees designed to facilitate accomplish-
ment of this aim. These included an extension of the ban
on public meetings, a requirement that all personal
identity documents be revalidated within six months, and
a proclamation of complete state control over religious
education and Catholic clerical ppoin1ments.
USSR AND JAPAN CONCLUDE FISHERY TALKS . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The conclusion of the annual Soviet-Japanese
fisheries agreement on 6 April was made possible by
Soviet concessions on two points which had deadlocked
the negotiations. Moscow's compromise was probably
motivated by its desire to improve prospects for a
formal trade agreement with Japan and the wish to avoid
friction so soon after normalizing relations.
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11 April 1957
NEW EMPHASIS ON SOVIET STATE FARMS . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Soviet officials are showing increased interest in
the state farm type of agricultural organization, un-
doubtedly because of the major role these farms played
in the production of a bumper grain crop in 1956. In
contrast to the collective (co-operative) farms, the
state farms are completely state-owned and -operated,
with the workers paid wages instead of sharing in the
income. The eventual transformation of the .collective
farms into a unified system of "socialist" farming is
a long-term goal of Soviet Marxism; however, peasant
opposition and the cost factor will probably preclude
widespread action in the foreseeable future.
INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN HAITI . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
A council of ministers representing five competing
presidential candidates assumed control. of Haiti's
government on 6 April and postponed to mid-June the
national elections previously scheduled) for late April.
The new government will probably prove unstable, and the
army could take over at any. time, although it seems
divided by factional disputes.
CHILEAN RIOTS UNDERCUT ECONOMIC PROGRAM. . . . . . . .
Prospects for the US-sponsored anti-inflation pro-
gram in Chile, relatively successful in its first 15
months, have worsened following the recent riots. De-
spite a congressional grant of extraordinary powers,
President Ibanez faces considerable difficulties in
imposing new sacrifices on the public.
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11 April 1957
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
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STATUS OF THE GOMULKA PROGRAM IN POLAND . . . . . . . . Page 1
Six months after First Secretary Gomulka declared
the validity of the "Polish road" at the Polish Communist
Party's eighth plenum in October 1956, the Warsaw leader-
ship continues to follow the course of national Communism
outlined at that time. Though political concessions
have been made to Soviet suspicions and to internal
factional demands, there has been no important alter-
ation of the basic elements of Gomulka's.domestic policy.
His adherence to a moderate course has brought him into
conflict with both liberal and conservative elements
among Polish Communists so that today he is plagued by
disunity in his party. F_ I
IMPACT OF EASTERN EUROPEAN EVENTS ON INTERNAL
YUGOSLAV POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The Tito regime has shown its sensitivity to the
possible internal effects on Yugoslavia of the events
in Poland last fall, primarily by public reiteration of
plans to elevate living standards and increase popular
participation in the governing processes. As a result
of the relief felt by the people that the regime is
again defying the Kremlin, popular tolerance and even
support for Tito is sufficient to allow Belgrade to
proceed with such plans at a leisurely pace
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 April 1957
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
Egypt
Egyptian president Nasr
is still refusing to agree to
significant modifications in
the proposed Egyptian declara-
tion on the Suez Canal, although
he apparently does not wish at
present to break off talks on
the subject.
Cairo on 10 April also
protested formally to the
United States against the ac-
tion of the American-owned
tanker which last week carried
Iranian crude oil and bunker
fuel through the Tiran Straits
to the Israeli port of Eilat.
The Israelis, who built up
suspense by imposing press
censorship on reports of the
tanker's movements and then
gave the arrival a very large-
scale publicity campaign, were
probably seeking to evoke just
such an Egyptian,reaction in the
hope that-Nasr would embroil.
himself further with the US.
The Egyptians are clearly
apprehensive over possible
moves against them, both on
the diplomatic and the military
fronts. Nasr has ordered a
general alert of the Egyptian
government, civil and military;
symtomatic of the new tension
was Cairo's first practice air
raid drill since hostilities
last falid
Extensive military move-
ments have also been reported.
According to some reports,
troops, including armor, have
recently been moved east of
the Suez Canal. Observation
by American military attaches
suggestS,however, that units
had, probably vacated their
camps to engage in firing prac-
tice in the desert area just
west of the canal. It seems
very doubtful that the Egyptian
army has as yet renewed its
logistic capability to support
large numbers of troops near
the Israeli border in eastern
Sinai, though it might support
limited numbers in the western
part of the peninsula. Egyp-
tian army units around Cairo
also apparently are being dis-
persed as a precautionary meas- 25X1
ure.
Syria
In Syria, the opposing
factions apparently are con-
tinuing to try to organize and
assess their strengths while
the government treads warily
among them.
Martial law, imposed Oast
November when the leftists took
advantage of the hostilities
in Egypt, has been lifted in
four areas where parliamentary
by-elections are scheduled for
4 May. These areas have been
heavily conservative; the re-
sults there would be a good
measure of the leftists' suc-
cess in intimidating the grass-
roots level as well as of high-
level opposition.
Partly perhaps as a cover
for the persisting disunity
in Damascus, Syria's leaders
continue to protest against
alleged Israeli activity along
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 April 1957
the border. The Syrian army
has offered to allow UN truce
observers to stay in its border
positions in order to "prove"
that the Israelis are respon-
sible for the sporadic firing
which has been occurring in
the vicinity of Lake Hula, a
swampy area which the Israelis
plan to drain over vehement and
long-standing Syrian objections.
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In Lebanon, Prime Minister
Sami Solh last week received a
30-1 vote of confidence in his
pro-Western foreign policy.
His pro-Egyptian opponents ap-
pear so discouraged that seven
of them resigned just before
the vote.
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INFLUENCE OF MAKARIOS' RELEASE ON CYPRUS QUESTION
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The situation in Greece
and Turkey is tense in antici-
pation of Archbishop Makarios'
arrival in Athens about 15
April. The American ambassa-
dors in Athens and Ankara agree
that the visit will further
damage Greek-Turkish relations
and will not contribute to a
Cyprus settlement. Develop-
ments after Makarios' arrival
will depend largely on whether
he chooses to arouse the Greek
public against Britain, against
Turkey, or against the Karamanlis
government itself.
Although his immediate in-
tentions are unknown, Makarios
has made repeated public state-
ments since his release indicat-
ing he will renew his campaign
for the union of Cyprus with
Greece--enosise Popular Greek
enthusiasm for Makarios' actions
is assured, while any provoca-
tive statements will produce a
strong Turkish reaction which
might lead to forceful moves,
Ambassador Allen in Athens
reports extreme irritation and
indecision within the Greek
government. Prime Minister
Karamanlis is highly agitated
and working at cross purposes
with his foreign minister, and
there are also reports of dif-
ferences between Karamanlis and
King Paul. Allen expects "tre-
mendous demonstrations" to be
staged for Makarios, who is also
expected to be surrounded imme-
diately by the most extreme
Greek proponents of enosis, as
well as by opposition party
leaders seeking to use Makarios
in their campaign against the
Karamanlis government.
Turkey's position on Cyprus
has hardened significantly since
Britain's release of Makarios
on 20 March. The Turks evi-
dently feel that Cyprus devel-
opments since the UN debate
last February have been against
their interests and now fear
that London's position is sof-
tening. A Turkish aide-memoire
to the US on 4 April and to
the UK on 9 April warned against
any British negotiations with
Makarios in a tone which the
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11 April 1957
American ambassador says is
"more threatening" than any
previously used. The Turkish
note to the British complained
that London lacked "the desire
to work in close and intimate
co-operation with Turkey,"
with the result that Ankara
"is repeatedly confront9d with
surprises and new actions"
injurious to its interests.
The note concluded with a
demand for "tripartite or bi-
lateral" negotiations to ar-
range for the partition of
Cyprus e
A Turkish Foreign Ministry
official told Ambassador Warren
on 6 April that Turkish opinion
was rapidly becoming "unpleas-
ant" toward the British; a
British band concert and parade
scheduled for Ankara had just
been canceled because the Turk-
ish public might consider it
"a mockery," -Ankara has also
given the press, for its guid-
ance, a statement on "Greek in-
sincerity and unfairness." The
Turkish official added that
many deputies are now suggest-
ing that Turkey should have en-
gaged in violence on Cyprus;
he concluded his remarks with
the., statement that if necessary,
Turkey would fight. The Turks
now reject any interim arrange-
ment for Cyprus and insist on
partition.
Britain continues to advo-
cate using NATO's good offices
in the dispute, primarily as a
means of countering criticism.
It apparently intends to take
the initiative in any NATO con-
sideration of Cyprus and pro-
pose an international agreement
providing for "protected inde-
pendence." Governor Harding on
Cyprus said on 2 April--prob-
ably with London's sanction--
that independence for Cyprus
either within the Commonwealth
without option of withdrawing,
or guaranteed by NATO, might be
made the basis of such an inter-
national agreement. He added,
however, that Britain might be
driven to the "very undesirable"
resort of partition.. Neverthe-
less, Britain apparently does
not intend to leave the island
in the near.future. In any
case, it will insist on re-
taining its military bases.
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11 April 1957
NOTES AND COMMENTS
WESTERN EUROPEAN REACTION TO BRXTISH DEFENSE PLANS
Britain's intention to
slash conventional military
forces and concentrate on nu-
clear weapons, as. announced in
the defense white paper of 4
April, has intensified doubts
in Western Europe about the
military usefulness of the
Western alliance. Repercus-
sions have been especially se-
vere in West Germany, and Chan-
cellor Adenauer has for the
first time demanded atomic
weapons for Germany.
Many NATO members believe
Britain has unilaterally taken
decisions of fundamental im-
portance to the alliance.
see the British plans as
challenge to the doc-
trine of the contin-
ued importance of.the
NATO "shield" of con-
ventional forces.
Official French dis-
may is reflected in
the semiofficial
press agency charges
that the British are
posing the dilemma of
"total peace or atom-
ic war."
The West Ger-
mans fear that the
shift increases the
likelihood that nu-
clear weapons will be
used in central Eu-
rope, and fear that
the announced Brit-
ish cuts may be the
forerunner of a com-
plete Anglo-American
withdrawal. British
defense minister
S'ndys showed his
sensitivity to this
reaction on 5 April
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by publicly labeling such an
idea "sheer madness."
Even before London's plans
to reduce its military forces
by one half and to abolish con-
scription over the next five
years were revealed, great
doubts had been expressed among
NATO members over the future of
the alliance. Largely on Ade-
nauer's insistence, the seven-
member Western European Union
on 19 March recommended that
NATO conduct a special study of
the capabilities and needs of
the Western defense system.
The North Atlantic Council
(NAC), which has accepted this
recommendation, is exploring
WE SHALL MARCH ON. .
"MY CHANCELLOR SAYS FOOT SOLDIERS ARE NEEDED TOO."
IIAPRIL 57 VIDFCipK MODERN ARMAMENT
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11 April 1957
procedures which will satisfy
Adenauer's desire for an extra-
ordinary study but which will
still be related to the guidance
received from the foreign min-
isters' meeting last December.
The white paper has underlined
the urgency of the study to
Continental NATO members.
German deputy foreign min-
ister Hallstein has also told
NAC that it would be "especially
intolerable if two types of
alliance members were to emerge
--atomic powers and infantry
nations." In a press confer-
ence the day after the publi-
cation of Britain's plans,
Adenauer for the first time
demanded tactical atomic weap-
ons for Germany--and objected
to drawing a distinction be-
tween tactical and strategic
weapons. The implications of
this demand have revived latent 25X1
French apprehensions over Ger-
man rearmament.
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The installation of Presi-
ident Sukarno's 23-minister
"emergency extraparliamentary
business cabinet" on 9 April
temporarily ends Indonesia's
cabinet crisis. The formation
of the government, however, re-
flects Sukarno's increasing
reliance on totalitarian tac-
tics and does not promise an
end to national disunity.
The cabinet was formed
personally by Sukarno, who, in
his negotiations, bypassed
party leadership and dealt with
individuals. In selecting the
members, he apparently tried
to compromise between his own
demands for "national unity"
and "guided democracy" with
demands of the Moslem parties,
the army, and the non-Javanese
areas for an honest, efficient
non-Communist government with
broad geographic representation.
The government is not sat-
isfactory, however, to either
the Moslem parties or elements
in the outer islands. More-
over, while the army in Java
appears to be supporting Sukarno,
regional army commanders are
expected to share openly the
dissatisfaction of local polit-
ica]L leaders. Therefore, the
cabinet's effectiveness prob-
ably will largely be limited
to Java.
There are no known Commu-
nists in the new government,
but four prominent fellow trav-
elers have been appointed, in-
cluding a recipient of the Sta-
lin."peace prize" as minister
of education. None of the six
non-Javanese members has shown
any strong interest in pressing
demands for regional autonomy.
The new prime minister, Raden
Djuanda, is nonparty, non-Communist
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11 April 1957
and non-Javanese and is re-
spected for his honesty and
his technical competence as
an engineer and an economist.
He is not a strong personality,
however, and although he may
disagree with Sukarno on polit-
ical issues, he is unlikely to
resist him.
oreign
is t er S u b a n .r io--a former am-
bassador to Moscow--and Finance
Minister Sutikno, are already
in agreement with those policies
of Sukarno which would affect
their own departments.
These men are likely to
follow the program outlined by
Sukarno and proceed first with
the establishment of a national
advisory council with Communist
participation. Other points in
Sukarno's program include the
restoration of the unitary
state, continuation of the
"struggle" for the return of
West Irian, and "intensifica
tion" of reconstruction activ-
ities.,
Of the Moslem parties, the
Masjumi has expelled one member
who accepted a minor post in
the cabinet; the Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) leadership has an-
nounced, however, that it will
not consider withdrawing the
four party ministers "before
two or three months," and the
decision at that time will de-
pend on the progress made to-
ward settling national problems.
The cabinet's independence
of parliamentary pressures and
Moslem fears of Sukarno's re-
taliatory tactics are likely to
preclude the development of an
effective political opposition
in Djakarta. Some papers in the
capital have already launched
a smear campaign against former
vice president Hatta, the cham-
pion of those opposed to Sukar-
no's concept.
Meanwhile, the situation
in South Sumatra is reported
deteriorating as the result of
an abortive coup by pro-Djakarta
army elements. The local com-
mander is arming civilians to
prevent the establishment of a
"Javanese beachhead," and the
increased possibility of fight-
ing has caused the British to
push plans for the quick evacua-
tion of some 3,000 Europeans
in the area.
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The Iranian government of
Prime Minister Manuchehr Eqbal,
formed on 4 April, may provide
more popular and more efficient
administration for the time
being than the cabinet of for-
mer prime minister Ala.
Eqbal is pro-Western, am-
bitious and an experienced ad-
ministrator. His claim that
he chose his new cabinet minis-
ters for technical ability is
borne out by the previous
careers of the new ministers--
three bankers, three career
government employees, two gen-
erals and one doctor. These
ministers are all between 46
and 56 years of age and
European-educated. A new Min-
istry of Customs and Monopolies
was formed, apparently to give
closer control over these
matters. The Ministry of Jus-
tice, in charge of an acting
minister, will probably be
supervised by Eqbal or the
Shah.
The fact that these cabi-
net members are new on the po-
litical scene and not closely
identified with old-line poli
ticians will probably inspire
some public confidence in the
government. The immediate
lifting of martial law, which
has been in effect in many
parts of the country for the
last 10 years, is a gesture
toward winning public support.
Rumors are circulating as usual
that the cabinet is even more
pro-British than the previous
one;
The American
embassy reports that the British
embassy has expressed its "com-
plete satisfaction" with the
new ministers.
The most important factor
determining the new government.'s
chances of success is the atti-
tude of the Shah. If he is
willing to withdraw from the
day-to-day supervision of gov-
ernment operations and permit
Egbal and the cabinet to admin-
ister the government, some prog-
ress in economic and social
development programs probably
can be made. The Shah is re-
ported planning to remain
abroad for three months after
his visit to Spain in late May.
He will depend entirely on Eqbal
and General Bakhtiar, chief of
SAVAK--the. new national security
organization--to maintain
orderly government.
The Eqbal-Bakhtiar combina-
tion is probably strong enough,
if its principals so desire,
eventually to relegate the Shah
to a purely ceremonial position.
The monarch's long-standing sus-
picion of strong men in influ-
ential positions may re-emerge,
however, and result in'the same
type of ineffective Iranian
government as in the past.
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11 April 1957
COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT OF KERALA STATE FACES MAJOR PROBLEMS
Like its predecessors, the
new Communist government of the
Indian state of Kerala, which
took office on 5 April, faces
political and economic problems
of such magnitude that its suc-
cess in dealing with them is by
no means assured. Its freedom
of action is limited by the
powers of the federal govern-
ment, and failure by the local
authorities to improve condi-
tions might lead to a reimposi-
tion of President's Rule--
direct administration from New
Delhi.
The Communist Party, with
the support of five independ-
ents,, commands only a two-man
majority in the state assembly
of 127 members. The Congress
and Praja Socialist Parties and
the Moslem League have all indi-
cated their unwillingness to
join a Communist-dominated co-
alition, The Communist cabi-
net, which includes representa-
tives of trade unions, peasants,
lawyers, educators, writers,
and women's groups, is not
highly experienced in adminis-
trative matters.
Chief Minister Namboodiri-
pad can be expected to capital-
ize fully on the-advantages en-
joyed by a government in power
in exercising police powers and
utilizing official machinery to
furt;tier Communist aims. He will
also be aided by the fact that
the Congress Party government
in New Delhi cannot overtly
discourage his efforts to pro-
vide good government and eco-
nomi+c progress.
In its first efforts to
attract popular support, the
Communist administration has
proposed a number of measures
which can be carried out
quickly. These include nation-
alization of foreign-owned tea
and rubber plantations in Ke-
rala,, commutation of death
sentences, and release of po-
litical prisoners. It already
finds itself in difficulty with
the central government, which
has taken the position that its
approval must be obtained for
nationalization.
Hampered in these first
efforts to impress the local
population, the Communists
will undoubtedly soon find that
they are faced with long-range
problems which only hard work
and large-scale assistance
from New Delhi can amelio-
rate.
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11 April 1957
Kerala is India's most
thickly populated state, with
907 persons per square mile as
compared to the Indian average
of 281 in 1951. Its population
is growing at almost twice the
rate for India as a whole. This
population has outgrown its food
production capabilities, and Ke-
rala is a deficit state to which
the Indian government must annu-
ally contribute sizable food
supplies.
Kerala has relatively lit-
tle organized industry, despite
the availability of cheap sources
of power, inexpensive. navi-
gation, and a large labor supply.
Its position as the most back-
ward state in South India is the
result of a limited capital sup-
ply, chronic labor difficulties
which have discouraged private
investment, and limited indus-
trial raw materials. This
paucity of industry makes it
impossible for the state to ab-
sorb its increasing working
force, one fourth of which is
unemployed and another fourth
only partially employed. The
national government is unwill-
ing to give Kerala a dispropor-
tionate share of Five-Year Plan
funds. Since Kerala is the most
literate state in India--45
percent as against the Indian
ave:rage:of close to 20 percent--
the population is keenly aware
of its troubles and impatient
at the slowness of economic
progress.
With the best possible will,
the new Communist government
will find it hard to make head-
way against these problems.
Neither land reform nor emigra-
tion is likely to ease materi-
ally the population pressure on
the land. Recently reported
efforts to attract private cap-
ital to Kerala, apparently as
an alternative to government-
controlled industries, seem
likely to receive only modest
response. By achieving some su-
perficial successes in.elimi-
nating corruption, improving
administration, and attacking
minor problems, however, the
Communist regime may be able to
retain power for some time if it
does not come into outright con-
flict with the national govern-
ment in New Delhi.
25X1
German prestige in Turkey,
traditionally high, appears to
be rising and a reassertion of
German influence in the area
may follow. Turkey is respond-
ing with great interest to West
German overtures.
A visit planned by Presi-
dent Heuss to Turkey and recent
visits by high-level West Ger-
man military and political
figures--including Chancellor
Adenauer and a West German mili-
tary mission headed by Defense
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11 April 1957
Minister Strauss--demonstrate
West Germany's economic and
diplomatic interest in Turkey.
In late March, the Turks
gave Strauss the "red carpet"
treatment--an honor parade,
inspection trips to Izmir,
Istanbul, and Bursa, and tours
highlighting Turkey's military
and industrial capacity.
Strauss spoke of Turkey's bril-
liant future and affirmed that
Turkish-Germa# co-operation will
bring this future rapidly closer.
He assured Prime Minister Men-
deres that "your desires will
be met to the, best of our abil-
ity" and that "Turkish-German
friendship will become firmer
and everlasting." Menderes had
earlier told the West German
delegation that it is in the
interest of both countries "to,
march hand in hand...good times
and bad."
West Germany has also in-
dicated that it is "extremely
interested" in bolstering its
investments in the Middle East,
especially in Turkey. A pur-
chase of $175,000,000 worth of
Turkish-manufactured munitions
is under way.
Part of this sum is ear-
marked to pay Turkey's long-
standing commercial arrears to
West Germany, which are over
$60,000,000. Turkey is sched-
uled to begin to fill the ammu-
nition contract this month to
be continued over a four-year
period. The contract also in-
volves sizable West German con-
struction projects designed to
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enhance Turkeys defense pro-
duction capabilities.
A joint Turkish-West Ger-
man firm has already been cre-
ated in Turkey, with 51 percent
West German capital, to enlarge
the munitions plant at Kirik-
kale, about 50 miles east of
Ankara, to produce high-quality
steel and alloys for both ci-
vilian and military needs.
After inspecting Turkish muni-
tions plants in late 1956, a
West German mission concluded
that Turkey would be able to
produce ammunition in the volume
called for by the contract.
Under the West German plan,
Turkish ammunition plants are
to 'be greatly enlarged and im-
proved with German assistance.
New facilities will be built by
the Krupp organization. The
joint Turkish West German firm
will construct the new installa-
tions, purchase capital equip-
ment, and secure the necessary
raw materials.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY,
11 April
KHRUSHCHEV AWARDED
The award of a second Ham-
mer and Sickle gold medal, along
with another Order of Lenin, to
Nikita Khrushchev on 8 April
for his "outstanding services
in working out and implementing
measures for reclaiming virgin
soil and wastelands" makes him
the most highly decorated of
the top Soviet civilian leaders.
It highlights his
primacy in the Soviet
leadership and im-
plies that the col-
lective is solidly
b
hi
d hi
e n m a e
s h
pushe
reorg
just
Khrus
ing a
agric
at Vo
"Some
ORDER OF LENIN
which will, of course, adopt
the corresponding decisions."
The Order of Lenin and
the Hammer and Sickle medal,
which carries the title "Hero
of Socialist Labor," are the
highest civilian awards of the
Soviet state. Since becoming
party first secretary in Sep-
MOST IMPORTANT CIVILIAN AWARDS
OF TOP SOVIET LEADERS
2
KRUSHCHEV 5 --
s his industrial
VOROSHILOV 6----
anization scheme.
KAGANOVICH 5
MOLOTOV 5
MALENKOV 3
The award came
1
MIKOYAN 3
five days after
SABUROV 3
hehev, address-
BULGANIN 2
KIRICHENKO 1
conf erence of
PERVUKHIN 1
ultural workers
SUSLOV 1
ronezh
had s
id
1
STALIN 3
,
a
:
comrades have
formed the wrong view
that there is no
0
25X1
sense in rewarding party workers,
because to do so runs counter
to Communist belief. This is
wrong. To advance and create
an abundance of products, it
is necessary to encourage all
those who, by their efforts,
promote increased production
in our socialist state. If
you, comrades, consider that
the system of awards deserves
attention I shall, on my return
to Moscow, report your views
to the central committee of
the party and to the government,
tember 1953, Khrushchev has
received two Order of Lenin
awards--in addition to the
three he had received earlier--
and two Hammer and Sickle med-
als. Stalin received only three
Order of Lenin awards and one
Hammer and Sickle medal, but
was also awarded the wartime
Victory Medal and the mili-
tary award,, the Gold Star Med- 25X1
al of the "Hero of the Soviet
Union."
HUNGARIAN REGIME TIGHTENS CONTROLS
While Premier Kadar was in
the Soviet Union two weeks ago
promising to exterminate all
enemies of the Hungarian regime,
his colleagues in Budapest were
issuing far-reaching decrees
designed to accomplish this aim.
These included an extension of
the ban on public meetings, a
requirement that all personal
identity documents be revalidated
within six months, and a proc-
lamation of complete state con-
trol over religious education
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 April 1957
and Catholic clerical appoint-
ments.
Persons failing to reval-
idate their identity documents
will be subject to arrest. Re-
registration will permit deter-
mination of the number of es-
capees and army deserters, and
will presumably provide data
necessary for any systematic
deportations. It may also be
aimed at refugees whom the re-
gime has accused of re-enter-
ing Hungary as "espionage
agents."
The deportation decree
permits banishment on short
notice of any persons considered
dangerous to the state and places
such persons under police sur-
veillance for as long as two
years. The decree presumably
is intended to help the regime
dispose of enemies against whom
formal charges are difficult to
find, and will probably be used
as a general weapon of intimi-
dation.
In its campaign against
the church, the regime has re-
imposed controls over school
classes in religion, and now
requires government approval
of all ecclesiastical appoint-
ments, transfers and suspen-
sions retroactive to 1 October
1956. The latter requirement
will permit the ouster of
clerics who replaced the re-
gime-approved "peace priests"
during the revolution, and it
could lead to invalidation of
the Pope's appointment of the
vicar general at Esztergom in
October.
The government reportedly
has already arrested three
prominent Catholic clergymen,
including the outspokenly anti-
Communist bishop of Vac and one
of Cardinal Mindszenty's former
secretaries, and it has alleged-
ly replaced with government
"commissioners" all Catholic
bishops who had contact with
Mindszenty during his brief
period of freedom. A showdown
between,church and state may
come soon if the regime carries
out its alleged threat to im-
prison the head of the bench of
Catholic bishops, who has thus
far refused to compromise with
the regime.
25X1
USSR AND JAPAN CONCLUDE F][SHERY TALKS
The USSR and Japan signed
a fishery agreement on 6 April
after Soviet ambassador Tevosyan
had informed Prime Minister
Kishi that the USSR was pre-
pared to withdraw two condi-
tions which had deadlocked the
negotiations.
Moscow's decision was
probably motivated by its desire
to improve prospects for a
formal trade agreement with
Japan, and also probably by
a desire to avoid friction so
soon after normalization of
relations. It continues to
put out trade feelers for Japa-
nese heavy machinery, including
COCOM embargoed goods, and is
likely now to resume its over-
tures for reciprocal trade agree-
ments and the establishment of
.air and sea routes.
Moscow's tactics since
the fishery negotiations began
on 14 February indicate that
preservation of fish resources
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11 April 1957'
for the rapidly expanding So-
viet Far Eastern fishing in-
dustry is a major Soviet con-
cern. The Russians had insisted
on describing the agreed 120,-
000-metric-ton catch limit as
"exceptional" in order to al-
low them to revert next year to
their desired quota of from
80,000 to 100,000 tons.
In the final agreement,
however, they referred to the
1957 quota as being one "partic-
ularly for this year." Moscow
also agreed that the 1957 catch
in the Sea of Okhotsk should be
13 , 000 tons--only 3,000 tons less
than the Japanese catch per-
mitted by the USSR in the area
last-year.
Soviet negotiatiors re-
served coastal fishing areas
for exclusive Russian use by
attaining Japanese consent not
to fish within 20 nautical miles
of the Kuril Islands south of
the 48th parallel, and within
40 nautical miles of other So-
viet territories. This restric-
tion would conserve important
coastal salmon stocks for So-
viet fishermen. The agreement
is regarded by Japanese fishery
interests as at least a tempo-
rary diplomatic victory since
it will increase their allowable
catch by 6,000 tons over 1956.
Although reference to
future closure of the Sea of
Okhotsk to Japanese fleets was
omitted from the agreement as
a "concession," Soviet officials
have informed Japan that the sea
will be permanently closed by
1959 at the latest and have 25X1
specifically reserved the right
to discuss the question in next
year's negotiations.
The major role played by
state farms in the new lands
area in attaining a bumper grain
crop in 1956 has apparently
revived interest among Soviet
officials in this type of ag-
ricultural organization.
Although state farms seem
to have been consistently un-
economical to operate, they
represent, from the ideological
standpoint, "the highest form
of organization of Socialist
agricul,ture," because in con-
trast to the more widely devel-
oped collective (co-operative)
farms, they are completely
state-owned and -operated, with
the workers paid wages instead
of sharing in the income. The
eventual transformation of the
collective farms into a uni-
fied system of "state" farming
has been a long-term goal of
Soviet Marxism, but the regime's
continuing unwillingness to
pay the price--the cost factor
and the possibility of strong
peasant opposition--to effect
this change has prevented the
achievement of the goal.
A long party and govern-
ment appeal published in the
press on 27 March and addressed
to all workers in the state
farm system emphasized the im-
portant role of state farms in
increasing agricultural output
and attempted to show that
state farm grain production,
"especially in 1956," was more
economical than collective farm
production. In contrast to a
similar appeal published in
January directed to all agri-
cultural personnel, this one
was addressed only to state
f ar:n workers.
Minister of State Farms
Benediktov has been particular-
ly active recently in emphasiz-
ing the new importance of his
farm organizations. He has
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11 April 1957
indicated that the state farm
system is to be expanded further
around urban areas and also in
the new lands area by convert-
ing various large "economically
weak" collective farms and the
machine tractor stations serv-
ing them into state farms.
Party boss Khrushchev has
also been stressing the impor-
tance of state farms. During
his meetings last month with
agricultural workers in the
North Caucasus, he emphasized
that many state farms are de-
livering to the state more grain,,
sugar beets and cotton per acre
than collective farms, in some
cases. at a lower cost.
tion in the foreseeable future.
ably preclude widespread ac-
farms into larger ones will
continue--a move that will
bring them closer to state
farms in size. In addition,
Khrushchev's recommendation
for a new incentive wage sys-
tem for all agricultural work-
ers might bring the pay scales
of collective farmers closer
to those of state farmers,
and further narrow the dif-
ferences which now exist be-
tween the two systems.
Nevertheless, the long-
standing deterrents to full-
scale conversion of collec-
tive farms remain and prob- 25X1
Khrushchev also indicated
that the merging of collective
INSTABILITY CONTINUES IN HAITI
A council of 11 ministers
representing five competing
presidential candidates as-
sumed control of Haiti's gov-
ernment on 6 April, taking
over from the military regime
of army chief of staff General
Leon Cantave, which had ruled
since the ouster of provisional
president Sylvain on 2 April.
Presidential and senatorial
elections, originally planned
for 28 April, have been post-
poned to mid-June, and the new
president is scheduled to take
over from the council on 5 July.
In view of the past record
The role of the army, how-
ever, traditionally the.key to
the situation, is in'doubt.
Chief of Staff Cantave apparent-
ly maintained a "hands off at-
titude in the selection of a
provisional government, pos-
sibly because his own status
within the army is uncertain.
He may have been involved in
a bomb plot at the time-of'
Sylvvain's resignation, and
should this be proved, younger
army officers might try to
force Cantave's resignation as
army chief by instigating
another strike.
of conflict and mutual mistrust
Haiti's future remains
among the presidential candi-
uncertain. Should the present
dates, it is unlikely that
their representatives on the
i
government-by-council continue,
the result may be confusion
counc
l will be able to work
t
and a virtual impasse in the
ogether harmoniously and ef-
fectively. The American em-
bassy in Port-au-Prince be-
elections. Should the govern-
ment; fall, the probable immedi-
ate solution would be rule by 25X1
lieves the council may soon be
l
d
the, army3:!Which'is :itself split
rep
ace
, possibly by a mili-
b ,,factional :di
tary junta.
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
11 April 19 5 17
CHILEAN RIOTS UNDERCUT ECONOMIC PROGRAM
Prospects for the US-backed
anti-inflation program in Chile,
relatively successful in its
first 15 months, have worsened
following the recent serious
riots. Despite a probable con-
gressional grant of extra-
ordinary powers, President
Ibanez faces considerable dif-
ficulties in imposing new sac-
rifices: on the public.
Apparently shocked by the
riots in which Communists
played an important role and
which reportedly resulted in
167 deaths between 29 March
and 5 April, the Chilean con-
gress seems likely to grant
Ibanez powers for 60 days to
restrict personal and press
freedom.
Nevertheless, the.resent-
ment revealed by the rioting
poses serious problems for
Chile's anti-inflation program.
Basic to the government's prob-
lem in carrying out the anti-
inflation plan elaborated by
the American investment firm
of Klein-Saks is a general
feeling in Chile that wage
earners have borne a dispropor-
tionate share of sacrifice.
Limitation of wage increases to
75 percent of the cost-of-living
increase was imposed on wage
earners, who had made only a
2-percent gain in real income
SECRET
since 1940, although the aver-
age increase for all working
persons was 27 percent, accord-
ing to government statistics.
The government has been
forced to rescind the transit
fare increases, without which
the transit system cannot oper-
ate profitably. Promulgation
of a 113-percent increase in
sugar prices--which had been
decided before the riots--
would now be politically dan-
gerous. Continuance of the
sugar subsidy would cost the
government some $25,000,000
this year at a time when its
income is already below budget
estimates as a result of fall-
ing prices for copper, Chile's
chief export and principal
source of government revenue.
Pre-riot plans to increase
the dollar rate of the Chilean
peso in order to maximize cop-
per revenues may now be politi-
cally risky since the increase
would also raise the price of
imported consumer goods. The
government is seeking an Ameri-
can loan to ease prospective
economic strains, but may also
be forced to increase taxes
on the wealthy, despite the
fact that these elements have
thus far provided the chief
support for its program.
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CURRENT INTELLIGEN%Ph KLY SUMMARY
11 April 1957'
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
STATUS OF THE GOMULKA
Six months after First
Secretary Gomulka declared
..the validity of the "Polish
road" at the Polish Communist-
Party's eighth plenum in Octo-
ber 1956, the Warsaw leadership
continues to follow the course
of national Communism outlined
at that time. Though conces-
sions have been made to Soviet
suspicions and to internal fac-
tional demands, there has been
no important alteration of the
basic elements of Gomulka's
policy.
His adherence to a "middle
way" has brought Gomulka into
conflict with both liberal and
conservative elements among
Polish Communists so that to-
day he is plagued by serious
disunity in his party..What
he lacks in party support, he
has gained in popular backing,
though public favor may be
ephemeral.
In addition to the pur-
suance of the "Polish road,"
Gomulka's October program
called for greater freedom of
the press, separation of party
and state, .a more popularly
based legislature with increased
powers, agricultural reforms,
and more realistic pricing and
marketing policies.
Soviet-Polish Relations
In the face of polemic at-
tacks from the Soviet and Satel-
lite press, the Poles have con-
tinued to hold firm to Gomulka's
basic premise of last October
that "the roads of achieving
this goal (socialism) can be
and are different" and that
"the model of socialism can al-
so vary." The regime constant-
ly reminds the Polish people
of the deleterious effects of
blindly imitating Stalinist
models.
PROGRAM IN POLAND
The following of the "Pol-
ish road," Gomulka declared in
October, "should be based on
mutual confidence and equality
of rights." Steps in this di-
rection were taken with the
signing of the Soviet-Polish
agreements on the status of
troops and on the repatriation
of 'Poles in the USSR.
The threat of the Soviet
""pre,sence" continues to hang
over the Polish nation, al-
though Soviet domination of the
Polish armed forces and the
security apparatus has been
greatly diminished. The USSR
continues to maintain approxi-
mately 35,000 troops in two
divisions in Poland as well as
the array of Soviet forces along
both Polish borders.
The USSR also has an eco-
nomic hold on Poland, since the
Poles remain dependent on the
bloc for both raw materials and
equipment. In addition, ter-
ritorial factors affect the So-
viet position vis-a-vis Poland,
which, surrounded by Communist
territory, has only a single
outlet to the West via the
Baltic.
Liberalization
Concerning liberalization
in the party, Gomulka has said
the ""party must above all be
united and of one mind"; but he
has also accepted the "right to
maintain one's own views while
observing the principle that
majority decisions are binding
on all party members." Gomulka
remains a confirmed Communist,
and his moves toward "democrati-
zation" have been made entirely
within this framework,
In granting some measure
of freedom of expression, Gomulka
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11 April-1957
encouraged the very forces that
have led to disunity, so that
today the Polish party is split
by deep factional cleavages.
Disunited and shaken by inter-
nal differences, the party ap-
paratus on the lower levels is
only now being brought under
control by Gomulka. Some dis-
tricts evidently still remain
beyond his control,
While Gomulka made no
provisions for church relations
in his plenum speech, broad
concessions'.in return for some
support by the Polish episcopate
has been from the start a basic
facet of his program. Today
the Polish church enjoys free-
doms unprecedented in a Commu-
nist society, a factor which
has weighed heavily in winning
popular support for Gomulka..but
which has alienated the more
orthodox Communists.
When Gomu],ka postulated in
October the principle of free-
dom of the press, he demanded
that "each criticism should be
creative and just, that it should
help to overcome the difficul~'
ties of the present period in-
stead of increasing them."
His curbing of the liberal
journalists has been in keeping
with this requirement. The
actual problem was a distortion
by the journalists of Gomulka's
essentially Communist interpre-
tation of press freedom, He
was unable to curb "irresponsi-
ble" journalism; the party press
was for a long time unquestion-
ably in danger of slipping out
of his control. By replacing
some editors and increasing
censorship, Gomulka was able to
restore a measure of control.
The Party and the State
Gomulka's policy of estab-.
lishing "a clear demarcation
between the jurisdiction" of
the party and the state has to
all appearances remained un-
changed. Functional responsi-
bilities of the central com-
mittee departments are being.
curtailed and transferred to
appropriate ministries. While
the extent to which state and
party responsibilities will be
separated cannot yet be deter-
mined, Gomulka's politburo will
unquestionably continue to be
the supreme authority.
Parliament and Elections
Gomulka's reforms are most
prominent in the parliamentary
fie]Ld, and the new Sejm (parlia-
ment) elected on 21 February ap-
pears destined to meet the
standards for Polish parliamen-
tarianism established in Octo-
ber. Its restoration to the
constitutional role of "supreme
organ of state authority" must,
however, be viewed in the light
of the Communist majority of
delegates. Nonetheless, some
of the reforms promised by
Gomulka have gone far to change
Polish parliamentary life. The
promised increase in the sessions
of parliament has already been
effected, and the use of com-
mittees for all legislative
work has given the Sejm an au-
thoritative purpose in contrast
to its former rubber-stamp func-
tion.
Most important, the "large-
scale control over the work of
the government" promised by
Gomulka appears to have been
established with the restoration
of the Supreme Chamber of Con-
trol to replace the Ministry of
State Control and the subordina-
tion of this new body to the Sejm.
A further innovation is the for-
mation of "party clubs" in the
Sejm, a means of ensuring more
individual responsiveness to the
policies of the various parties.
Gomulka's limited election
reform permitting. the voters to
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U April 1957
choose between selected National
Front candidates was put into
practice in January and undoubt-
edly will set the pattern for
the future.
Agricultural Policies
Gomulka's agricultural
policies are the most far-reach-
ing of his economic reforms,
and the reaction of the Polish
peasantry to his invitation to
abandon unprofitable collective
farms. has been so enthusiastic
that scarcely 20 percent of
the collectives remain. and these
are generally the least efficient.
The restoration of co-operative
land to the peasants, coupled
with an abandonment or reduc-
tion 'of some compulsory deliv-
eries and greatly increased
state payments for farm pro-
duce, has reinforced. the tren-
chant individualism of the Pol-
ish peasant and permitted the
highest degree of autonomy in
the Polish countryside, since
1948.
To provide a further in-
centive and manifestation of
the freer development of the
countryside and the unity of
governmental policy, the re-
gime offered the peasant the
right to purchase land. Land
taxes are to be reduced, favor-
ing larger private farms, and
restrictions on ownership, leas-
ing,purchasing, and sale of land
are to be removed. The free
sale of land could be a major
incentive to the raising of out-
put.
The reorganization of the
state machine stations so they
will be based on "principles
of full profitability" and
"reserved for bringing assist-
aance to 'co-operative and indi-
vidual farmsteads" is in prog-
ress and is scheduled to be
completed about 1 July. Ma-
chines are being made available
to private as well as collective
farms, and some small stations
have been disbanded, the ma-
chinery being sold to individual
peasants and co-operative groups.
Gomulka's condemnation of
the "policy of.so-called re-
stricting of the kulak," which
was "ruining kulak farms" rather
than preventing. exploitation of
the poor peasant by the kul.ak,
was a fundamental departure in
agricultural policy. Agricul-
ture! Minister Ochab stated in
a recent speech that "conditions
are now favorable to develop-
ment of wealthier peasants,"
and the Polish youth daily,
Sztandar Mlodych,,on 11 Febru-
ary commented hat the "mere
fact that a rich peasant will
become the owner of machinery
which he will use to obtain
greater crops is nothing to
worry about in. a country which
has thousands of hectares of
fallow land and has to import
grain from abroad."
Industry
By restoring some of the
tenets of free enterprise,
Gomul,ka has permitted deviations
in the structure of industry..
which could lead to even greater
deviations from the socialist
principles which have strictly
guided Polish industry in the
past.
Small private concerns--
retall and artisan shops, res-
taurants, hotels--have been
encouraged to open and. have
been given material aid. On
26 January,Trybuna Ludu de-
scribed,a proposa to establish
.a "state social" shipbuilding
company in Szczeezin, financed
partly by the sale of stock
shares abroad, Similarly, the
first "government-private" enter-
prise, a construction firm, was
recently formed--the profits to
be paid to private and govern-
mental stockholders.[ i
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IMPACT OF EASTERN EUROPEAN EVENTS ON INTERNAL YUGOSLAV POLICY
The Tito regime has shown
its sensitivity to the possible
internal effects on Yugoslavia
of the Polish and Hungarian
developments of last fall,
primarily by frequent and strong
emphasis on plans to elevate
living standards and increase
popular participation in the.
governing processes.
Reflecting his concern
over the possible impact of
Hungarian events on the in-
ternal Yugoslav situation,
President Tito, in his Pula
speech on 11 November, declared
that "today more than ever be-
fore unity of people and party
is necessary." He admitted
some popular dissatisfaction and
announced that improvement of
living standards was to be a
"top priority" objective of the
regime.
When the National Assembly
convened late in November to
consider the draft 1957 Social
Plan--the Yugoslav term for an
annual economic prospectus--
the debate proceeded with a
freedom of discussion and crit-
icism unique for that body.
More than 70 deputies, including
many relatively unknown members,
took part in the debates, which
covered the full range of eco-
nomic affairs. Although it was
Vice President Kardelj's formu-
lations which supplied the basis
for the revisions made in the
Social Plan, the debates ap-
peared to be at least in part
a genuine expression of popular
views.
Modifications which re
suited included an increase in
consumer goods. investment at
the expense of heavy industry,
substantial enlargement of con-
sumer goods imports, restora-
tion of cuts in social'insurance
payments and of federal sub-
sidies to the'republics, and
amendments to the pay system
eventually calling for wage in-
creases. Proposals, but not
specific plans, were also made
to increase the funds available
to enterprise workers' councils
and to local governmental units.
The press gave heavy play to
the revisions as being more
conducive to higher living
standards than the orginal draft,
under which living standards
would have shown little change.
In the last two months,
however, Belgrade's statements
have indicated that the regime
is taking a more realistic look
at its capabilities for raising
living standards in this way.
It appears that implementation
of some of the economic promises
and of further decentralization
of authority in the economy will
be only partially and slowly
fulfilled.
In speaking to the assembly,
Kardelj also indicated that the
Yugoslav leadership had not over-
looked the lesson inherent in
the shallowness of the Hungarian
Communist Party's popular roots.
He definitively restated Yugo-
slavia's ideological objectives,
interpreting the Hungarian rev-
olution as proof of the correct-
nes,s of Yugoslavia's decentral
ized, workers' council-commune
brand of Communism.. Condemning
the complete subordination of
the individual interest to the
collective interest, he admitted
many shortcomings.. in the cur-
rent practices of "workers'
self-management" and called for
a greater role for the populace
in handling the affairs of the
communes and workers' councils.
While the Yugoslav press
has carried Polish reports that
the "Polish road" is more liberal
than that followed in Yugoslavia,
the Tito regime has done little
toward political liberalization.
The already politically ostra --
cized ex-vice president, Milovan
DJilas, encouraged by events in
Poland and Hungary, made the
only significant effort publicly
to criticize the regime per se,
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and his prompt condemnation and
imprisonment were indisputable
evidence to the populace that
such liberties would not be
tolerated in Yugoslavia. There
likewise has been no rapproche-
ment with the Catholic Church,
nor does such appear at all
likely in view of the "separa='.
tist" tendencies of the church
in Croatia and Slovenia and
the progress which church lead-
ers admit the regime is making
in its slow, quiet campaign
against religious influence.
The regime does, however,
seeem aware of the need to ap-
pear politically moderate.
Communist Party and government
officials have reportedly adopt=
ed a less arrogant attitude to-
ward the people, and the Yugo-
slav secret police--relatively
unobtrusive but extremely ef-
fective--have displayed in many
areas a less arbitrary attitude.
Plans to reconstitute "volun
tary" youth brigades have been
abandoned, allegedly to release
funds for investment in consumer
goods industries. Implicit in
these manifestations of official
concern has been a desire to
encourage a more favorable
popular disposition toward the
authorities and avoid demonstra-
tions of discontent.
The Communist Party itself
has become acutely aware of the
need to strengthen its member-
ship and correct the apathy that
has developed in,its lower eche-.
loins. Regime leaders are holding
small semipublic meetings to ex-
pound the line; the party has
created a special weekly publi
cation to present its views at
local levels; a major conference
has been called to analyze and
improve the role of the workers'
councils; and plans are being
drawn up for a party congress
in November--the first in five
years. This congress will un-
doubtedly acknowledge the. lessons
learned, particularly from the
Hungarian revolution.
It thus appears that the
Tito regime's realization that
it must develop more popular
support has so far been limited
largely to words. But some
action to revitalize its "democ-
ratized" brand of Communism--
development of which has been
on dead center for the last
few years--will probably materi-
alize. Meanwhile, as a result
of the relief felt by the peo-
ple that the regime is again
defying the Kremlin, popular
tolerance and even support for
TithD is sufficient to allow
Belgrade to proceed with such
action at a leisurely pace.
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