CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001100090001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 2, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 14, 1957
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved I-ort ease ZUUOIUZJ 14 : GIA-KUI'79-UU921AU UUU9UUU1-Z
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 17
OCI NO. 0058/57
14 February 1957
CCGUMENT NO. _,,,,.,q-
NO CHANGE IN MASS. L7
1 06CLASS FIED
CLASS. (HANGL D o:, ire. i~' 25X1
r.xr t IM
c
REVIE1r;ER:
AU h; p 70;
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA, USAF and DOS
review(s) completed.
SEYIIAN 19 nCN!VES L etwa?^ --.
iptpEOl EtY~"
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100% 0001-2
 Approved For--jease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AW100090001-2
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
 CONFIDENTIAL
Approved For4j&ase 2005/`T ;T _Z DP79-00927 QDi 100090001-2
14 February 1957
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Israel, not wanting to bear the onus for rejecting
the American proposal on the questions of navigation of
the Gulf of Aqaba and withdrawal from Gaza, has delayed
its official reply and thereby succeeded in having Egypt
express its disapproval first. New threats to halt
clearance work on the Suez Canal have come from Cairo;
Egyptian delays already make it doubtful that the UN's
early March date for restoration of canal operations
will be met. Syria has refused to permit repair of the
pipeline from Iraq, allegedly at Nasr's request. In
Jordan, it was announced on 13 February that agreement
had been reached for terminating the Anglo-Jordanian
treaty by 1 March, "if possible." Termination of the
treaty may accelerate developments which could lead to
the collapse of King Hussain's regime.
Soviet foreign minister Shepilov's foreign policy
report to the Supreme Soviet this week reaffirmed the
general lines of Soviet policy laid down at the 20th
party congress a year ago and gave further evidence that
the Soviet leadership hopes to recover the prestige it
lost as a result of the Hungarian uprising. The USSR
also released a series of notes to the Western powers
proposing multilateral approaches to the problems in the
Near East and complained to the UN General Assembly of
"provocative" acts by the United States.
ONFIDENTIAL
5# R T
Page 3
25X1
25X1
i
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 14 February 1957
NOTES AND COMMENTS
THE SUPREME SOVIET MEETING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Supreme Soviet session which ended on 12 February
considered the state budget, economic plans, and foreign
policy. It also approved certain measures to carry out
the 20th party congress program providing for administra-
tive decentralization and for correction of abuses of the
Stalin period. The Soviet leaders apparently feel that
their "liberalization" program is sound despite domestic
political criticism and strains in relations with foreign
Communist parties abroad to which the program gave rise.
REACTIONS TO AMERICAN-SAUDI COMMUNIQU1 . . . . . . . . . Page 2
In Egypt and Syria, the press has ignored King Saud's
statements favoring American policy while playing up other
aspects of his visit. Nasr reportedly believes the king
went too far, too soon, in endorsing American Middle East
proposals. In Iraq and Lebanon, the communique has been
cited as evidence of the failure of Egyptian policies.
King Saud's visit and the American-Saudi communique are
to be discussed at a meeting of Arab leaders in Cairo
scheduled for 23 or, 24 February.
SOVIET BLOC ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE IN EGYPT . . . . . . . . Page 3
Soviet bloc countries are continuing to contract
with Egypt for industrial and military projects and to
supply Egypt with vital imports. A Soviet-Egyptian
agreement aniounged in January calls for a doubling of
1956 trade to $60,000,000 in 1957. It now appears that
the bloc will be the largest purchaser of Egypt's current
cotton crop--about 50 percen
INDIAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The important issues in the Indian national elections--
starting on 24 February--are almost all domestic. The
Congress Party, the only one contesting practically all
the seats in parliament and at state levels, is expected
to emerge with control of the parliament and most state
governments.
SECRET
Approved Fo ease 2005/i (f3Rf DP79-009271100090001-2
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/11 iCIA-RDP79-00927AO01 100090001-2
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For4 ease 2005!?rM RDP79-009271100090001-2
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
25X1
THE NENNI SOCIALIST CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The national congress of the Nenni Socialist party
from 6 to 11 February gave its leader the general policy
backing he sought for achieving independence from the
Communists and reunion with the Democratic Socialists
and re-elected him secretary general. Nenni gained con-
trol of the five-man executive committee, but his sup-
porters are reported outnumbered on the two policy-
making bodies, the directorate and the central committee.
Democratic Socialist leader Saragat has denounced Nenni's
moves, but reunification sentiment in his party may over-
IDEOLOGICAL NONCONFORMITY CONTINUES TO PLAGUE USSR . . . Page 8
Ideological "heresy" and disaffection among various
elements of Soviet society, particularly students, con-
tinue to plague the Soviet regime, although there are
indications that official disapproval and fear of re-
pression may have silenced some outspoken critics of
Soviet policies. While the harsh language employed by
the regime to counter "unhealthy" behavior is often rem-
iniscent'of' the Stalin era, the regime appears reluctant
to resort to any wholesale repressive measures.
25X1
KREMLIN MANEUVERS TO UNDERMINE GOMULKA . . . . . . . Page 9
25X1
25X1
25X1
omu a is cony nced be must act soon to oust Stalinist
officials in the government and apparently intends to
concentrate his efforts on this before turning to the
problem of party factionalism. A ministerial reshuffle
may be announced after the new parliament meets on
20 February.
EAST GERMANY TO CONTINUE HARSH MEASURES . . . . . . . . Page 10
Party first secretary Ulbricht and other leaders of
the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) Party last
week called for loyalty to orthodox Communism and tough
party disciplinary measures to cope with ideological
deviation and opposition to the regime. Opposition was
admitted to have reached dangerous proportions within
the party and among the East German intelligentsia.
SECRET
iii
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For IJase 2005/0;S RIE- DP79-00927 .100090001-2
14 February 1957
UNEMPLOYMENT IN BULGARIA AND RUMANIA . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
There is serious unemployment in Bulgaria and Rumania
as a result of layoffs in nonagricultural industries and
sizable reductions in government agencies. The two
governments are considering the "temporary" transfer of
some of their unemployed to the Soviet Union, Hungary and
Czechoslovakia, primarily for agricultural work.
E__ 1
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
President Sukarno continues to work energetically
to set up an "advisory council",yin Indonesia. Prime
Minister Ali,faced with continued resistance from non-
Javanese areas, has told parliament that the cabinet will
effect an "integral reshuffle." The cabinet's decision
to reorganize rather than resign is probably intended
both to obstruct Sukarno's plans and to avoid the necessity
of forming a new government just prior to the UN's dis-
cussion of Indonesia's claim to Netherlands New Guinea.
BURMESE COMMUNIST INSURGENTS
PUSH FOR NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Burma Communist Party, one of three Communist
organizations active in Burma, has stepped up its effort
to negotiate a settlement of its nine-year-long insur-
rection. To strengthen its negotiating position, the
party has launched an intensive propaganda campaign and
a series of "prestige" raids on urban centers. The
Burmese government has continued to reject demands of the
Communists for recognition as a legal political party,
but U Nu, who is scheduled to return as prime minister
late this month, ma be willing to work out a settlement.
F_ I
POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN HAITI . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Provisional President Franck Sylvain is faced with
a serious division in the political ranks of the country,
disunity within the army, and an economic crisis. Civil
disturbances are possible.
SECRET
25X1
iv
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001100090001-2
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 SEGRE T
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
25X1
oyalty and the government's stability.
BATISTA'S HOLD OVER CUBA WEAKENING . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
President Batista's continuing failure to check
terrorist and revolutionary activities which began last
November may lead him to adopt increasingly harsh re-
pressive measures, and may undermine the armed forces'
1
NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
North Korea has, with Sino-Soviet bloc aid, success-
fully completed its three-year rehabilitation plan. Most
industries--except the power, chemical and petroleum
industries--have been restored to the 1949 level of out-
put, which was, in most cases, the highest level achieved
under the Communists. The ambitious first Five-Year Plan
(1957-61) calls for the restoration of over-all industrial
production to at least the level reached under the Japa-
nese, but Sino-Soviet bloc assistance will be required
l
to achiev
is
an
e p
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT . . .
Premier Mollet, who is scheduled to visit Washington
late this month, is attempting to strengthen France's
international position by developing c1o ti
s
Page 1
European neighbors and by trying to work
outnew po liti clh is
and economic relations with its African territories. al
Mollet's political future will depend on his ability to
find a solution in North Africa satisfactory to French
rightists and to cope with growing inflationary pressures.
25X1
POLITICAL UNREST IN WEST AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The growth of nationalism among the 60,000,000 peo-
ple in the British and French colonies of West Africa is
leading London and Paris to readjust their relationship
to these areas. Britain, in line with its policy of
developing independent status for its colonies, will
grant independence to the Gold Coast on 6 March; a
change in Nigeria's colonial status is probable in May.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
Approved For Retease 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AA0~1 00090001-2
25X1
 Approved For Rase 2005/02/1$E1 0, i79-00927I4Q 1100090001-2
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
France faces demands in French West Africa, Togo, and the
Cameroons for local autonomy and a new concept of the
French Union in which the overseas areas wou have po-
litical equality with metropolitan France.
GROWING JAPANESE INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST .
. Page 6
Japan has begun a campaign to gain economic and
political influence in the Middle East in line with a
new policy which calls for closer relations with the
Asian-African nations. The Japanese program emphasizes
joint business ventures, technical assistance, good-will
exchanges, and proposals for the development of resources.
The Japanese hope eventually to attain a position of
leadership in the Asian-African bloc.
COMMUNIST CHINA'S POPULATION PROBLEMS . . . . . . Page 7
The Chinese Communists face the problem of how to
feed and clothe a population which is now growing at the
rate of 10,000,000 a year and at the same time devote in-
creasing amounts of the national income to investment.
Peiping's former view that its huge population is its
greatest resource is being replaced by recognition that
the steadily increasing rate of population growth threatens
fulfillment of economic plans. Although the authorities
now endorse birth control, programs under consideration
are probably inadequate to reduce the birth rate in the
next decade.
EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION IN 1956 . . . . . Page 10
The East European Satellites during 1956 produced
a total of 1,600 aircraft, about 19 percent of Soviet
bloc production in numbers but only about 7 percent of
the total by airframe weight. Of the 1,600 planes,
Czechoslovakia pro(juned ly 65 percent and
Poland 25 percent.
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
vi
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For Release /j4
k_00927AQQ ,100090001-2
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14' February 1957
Part I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS
Egypt-Israel
Israel, not wanting to bear
the onus for rejecting the Ameri-
can proposal on the questions
of navigation of the Gulf of
Aqaba and withdrawal from Gaza,
has delayed its official reply
and thereby succeeded in hav-
ing Egypt express its disap-
proval first. Egyptian propa-
ganda media have attacked the
proposal on the ground that it
rewards Israeli aggression.
The Israeli attitude was
forecast by remarks by Israeli
foreign minister Meir, as re-
ported by the Canadian foreign
minister, to the effect that the
gulf question could be worked
out if the American proposal
were formalized by a declara-
M IT RRANEAN
5&4 ISRAE
CO 51 IAL
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001100090001-2
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 4
tion in the UN General Assembly,
but that Israel had no inten-
tion of withdrawing its civil
administration from Gaza. The
Israelis---and Britain and
France--are clearly hoping to
extract still better offers from
the United States, meanwhile
playing for time in the belief
that sentiment in the UN is
swinging further in their favor.
Israel's principal politi-
cal parties have staged mass
rallies to support the govern-
ment's stand, and high Israeli
officials have made sure that
reports that the government was
engaged in heavy budget cutting
in anticipation of UN sanctions
came to the attention of the
American embassy, moves obviously
designed to impress foreign
 Approved For Wase 2005/~ 1 C1 RDP79-00927AQ,.1100090001-2
14 February 1957
observers with Israel's deter-
mination to stand fast.
Egypt-Suez
Israel's stand-pat atti-
tuderhas produced another spate
of *hreats from Cairo to halt
clearance work on the canal.
All Sabri, one of Nasr's prin-
cipal advisers and spokesmen,
argued last week that such ac-
tion might be the only politi-
cally feasible alternative to
Egypt's undertaking some kind
of military action to oust the
Israelis. He asserted that once
the canal is cleared, the Egyp-
tian public would demand such
action, since it would otherwise
appear that Israel's aggression
had been rewarded and that Egypt
had yielded to pressure.
On 13 February General
Wheeler, the chief of the UN
salvage operations, announced
that unless his workers were
allowed by Egypt to start
clearance of the tug Edgar
Bonnet "pretty soon," he would
have to revise the 10 March
deadline for clearing the canal
for ships up to 10,000 tons.
It has been estimated that it
will take.10 to 15 days to
clear the tug from the channel
after work has been started.
London, meanwhile, ;
me
belidve; ie is c e i erely
accepting support from a few
suspected local Communists
,
and the American embassy notes
an increasing similarity be-
tween his actions and Communist
tactics.
The army apparently was
split over the Constitutional
issue, and Cantave's political
maneuvering has resulted in
the disaffection of many in-
fluential officers. The con-
sensus in Port-au-Prince is
that the assembly's action was
a power play engineered pri-
marily by Jumelle and Cantave,
who also served under Magloire.
The American embassy com-
ments that unrest in Haiti is
likely to continue at least
until a permanent president
and a new senate are elected;
it as yet sees no strong man
or combination of strong men
with sufficient power or appeal
to maintain continuous order.
SECRET
Approved For Rel ~s~20055/0022/14: CA-RDP 79-00927AO01100090001-2
TTY Page 14 of 16
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/r4FWRDP79-009,Z,W01100090001-2
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 ;February 1957
BATISTA'S HOLD OVER CUBA WEAKENING
The weakness of Cuban
president Batista's regime has
become apparent in its inabil-
ity to halt terrorist and
revolutionary activity in spite
of the prolonged suspension of
constitutional guarantees and
the use of extreme repressive
measures. An opposition leg-
islator has predicted that
Batista will be ousted before
June if present trends con-
tinue and other sources have
warned of new attempts against
the government.
Terrorism has persisted
throughout the island since
the revolutionary outbreak of
30 November 1956 in the south-
eastern city of Santiago d
Cuba and the small invasions
of Oriente Province on 2 Dec~m-
ber. Fidel Castro's 1126 of
July" movement probably is
responsible for the terrorism,
although Communists may also
be taking part.
In an effort to restore
order, the government on 15
January extended to the entire
island a 45-day suspension of
constitutional guarantees pre-
viously imposed on four of the
six provinces. )3y, late Decem-
ber, the generally Correct be-
havior of the army and police
had given way to some harsh
repressive measures.
Under these circumstances,
expressions of popular di.s-
content have increased, and
indications of additional
opposition have developed.
Antipathy toward the regime,
already strong in Oriente,
reportedly has spread to the
Havana area, Where police and
military interrogations are
increasingly marked by bru-
tality. The revolutionary
movement seems to be getting
some support from respected
.civic and political figures,
As well as from opposition
elements which had previously
held aloof. These elements
reportedly include a group of
about 1,000 in the Havana area.
Batista's support in the
armed forces may also have
decreased in the past month.
A significant portion of the
military is reported reluctant
to continue or increase re-
pressive measures, and others
are hesitant to engage insur-
rectionists in Oriente.
Many recent reports in-
dicate that Fidel Castro is
alive and commanding a small
group of revolutionaries,
numbering between an estimated
30 and 400, in Oriente's Sierra
Maestra mountains, protected
and fed by elements of the
local. population. He may be
able to count on 1,000 or more
other followers. A special
government force is apparently
making an all-out effort to
neutralize this force, which
includes remnants of the in-
vading group an lumber of
local recruits.
NORTH KOREAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
North Korea., with Sino-
Soviet bloc aid, has success-
fully completed its three-year
rehabilitation plan. Most
industries--except the power,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001100090001,-2 r
N3TE.?`.': AND Co"+,1MJt.~i'~TS I. age 15 of
PART I 1
chemical and petroleum in-
dustries--have been restored
to the 1940 level of output,
which was, in most cases, the
highest level achieved under
25X1
 SECRET
Approved For F Jse 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A0~01)00090001-2
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
the Communists. The ambitious
first Five-Year Plan (1957-61)
calls for the restoration of
over-all industrial production
in the area to at least the
level reached under the Japa-
nese, but Sino-Soviet bloc as-
sistance will be required to
achieve plan goals.
Official announcements
for 1956 claim overfulfill-
ment in most sectors. Nonfer-
rous mineral production, which
has received a relatively high
portion of capital investment
and which will provide im-
portant exports to help finance
the Five-Year Plan, exceeded
the 1356 goal. Shortfalls were
admitted, however, in the all-
important coal industry and in
the fishing industry. Certain
other commodities--notably
rolled steel and particular
types of lumber used in con-
struction--lagged behind sched-
ale.
The capital construction
outlay of 26.3 billion won
($219)000,000 at the nominal
exchange rate) was only 83
percent of plan. Material
shortages that developed during
1356 and the chronic scarcity
of trained manpower are probably
largely responsible for failure
to meet this goal.
Success of the rehabilita-
tion program was directly de-
pendent on Sino-Soviet bloc aid,
which totaled over $600,000,000
for the 1954-56 period, The
Soviet aid program expired in
1956 and only about $130,000,-
000 worth of Chinese and Satel-
lite aid is now scheduled for
delivery during the Five-Year
Plan. Additional bloc aid has
not been mentioned in connection
with the Five-Year Plan, and
there are other indications of
greater dependence on domestic
resources in the future.
The present paucity of
domestic resources suitable for
export will make it exceedingly
difficult for North Korea to
finance the plan. Nonferrous
minerals and chemicals, po-
tentially the regime's best ex-
port products, will require ex-
tensive and expensive develop-
ment before they can be exported
in the necessary quantities.
The vagueness of recent offi-
cial references to the Five-Year
Plan strengthens the view that
the regime has doubts about the
feasibility of the plan with-
out additional outside help.
Food crop production
reached the 1356 target after
a sizable downward revision in
the middle of the three-year
plan. Cotton and hemp produc-
tion lagged badly: this will
impede scheduled increases in
production of textiles, a large
portion of which must now be im-
ported. At the end of 1356, the
number of agricultural co-
operatives stood at 16,000, in-
cluding 81 percent of the peas-
ant households and 78 percent
of total farmland,
The development of heavy
industry is to continue to re-
ceive priority and in 1357 the
value of production in state-
operated and co-operative es-
tablishments is to increase 22
percent. Grain production will
increase by only 2.5 percent,
rail transportation by 2.3 per-
cent. The regime's concern for
maintaining production incen-
tives has been reflected in wage
boosts, in reduction of certain
agricultural taxes, and in
rather vague promises of improve-
ments in living conditin,,s
SECRET
25X1
PART I I Approved For Re1ea"Ap5/R 4, LI 19-00927A001100090001-2
Page 16 of 16
 Approved For R pease 2 YWC0927"1100090001-2
,"w wiON
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY 'SUMMARY
14 February 1957
THE PRESENT POSITION OF THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT
Having already survived
longer than most observers orig-
inally expected, Premier Mollet's
government has in recent weeks
somewhat improved its domestic
position, Encouraged by the
support it received from the
United States and other Western
nations in the UN debate on
Algeria, the government is now
making efforts to improve
France's international position
by developing closer ties with
its European neighbors through
the common market and EURATOM.
Simultaneously it is trying to
worl? out new political and
economic relations with the
African territories,
The success of these
policies will depend in part
on the government's ability to
stem inflationary pressures
and to retain rightist political
support. Mollet's visit to
Washington on 26 and 27 February
may substantially assist him in
this effort.
The left-of-center govern-
ment, which formally represents
only a little over a third of
the seats in the National As-
sembly, has endured for over a
year largely because it has
followed essentially rightist
policies in Algeria and because
the right itself has been unable
to muster an alternative govern-
ment, The Paris by-election
of 27 January, although primarily
a victory for the moderate right,
also strengthened Mollet's
position, since the candidates
criticizing his Algerian policy
all fared poorly and Pierre
Poujade, on the extreme right,
suffered a crushing defeat.
Rumors of a threat to the Fourth
Republic, which had been on the
rise for some months previous,
have since fallen off,
Mollet has also profited
from the good reception in
the UN of Foreign Minister
Pineau's presentation of France's
case on Algeria, as well as
from the failure of large-scale
violence to materialize in
Algeria. American support in
the UN debate not only strength-
ened the government's standing
with the French public but also
reduced somewhat the residual
bitterness felt toward the
United States over the Suez
question,
The UN itself continues
to be a favorite target for
the nationalism which has been
aroused even among the moderate
parties by the pressure of
events since Suez. Basically,
this feeling seems to reflect
an intensified fear over France's
declining power position,
European Integration
Frustration over the failure
of its Suez policy has helped
impel France to seek closer re-
lations with its European allies,
particularly through EURATOM
and the common market. In the
preliminary assembly debates
on the common market concluded
on 23 January, Mollet won a
larger majority for the proposal
QQWaWAI
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001100090001-2
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 11
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A 00090001-2
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957'
than had been anticipated, Both
the proposed treaties can prob-
ably obtain approval in the as-
sembly, although business,
military and agricultural in-
terests appear to be gearing
up for a second and stronger
parliamentary attack. France's
concern over protecting its
agricultural interests and
the desire to retain some free-
dom in the field of atomic arm-
ament have resulted in the
elimination of some of the
supranational features in both
integration schemes.
On the other hand, Britain's
new interest in a Continental
free trade area tends to satisfy
long-held French desires for
closer ties across the channel,
and further strengthens hope
for a viable European community.
Relations With Africa
As indicated by Pineau's
UN speech on Algeria in which
he stressed the "Eurafrica"
concept, France is also explor-
ing the possibilities of closer
European economic ties with
African areas. Pineau's success
at the UN can be expected to
strengthen Mollet's hand against
rightists and colons, who are
increasingly concerned over his
offer of free elections for
Algeria. The premier probably
hopes the still vague possibil-
ity of applying European capital
to the exploitation of Saharan
mineral wealth will make an in-
crease in Algerian political
autonomy more palatable in
France.
Mollet has also taken steps
to satisfy growing nationalism
in Black Africa. Internal
autonomy has been granted to the
UN trust territory of Togo and
grants of autonomy are near
completion for the overseas
territories composing French
Black Africa. (Also see Part
III, p. 3.) It is hoped in
Paris that the proposed federal
solution will not only appease
native feelings there but
contribute toward an Algerian
settlement and make a favorable
impression on world opinion.
Paris seems to have given
up any hopes, however, of con-
ciliating Arab opinion in the
Middle East in the immediate
future. It has continued to
strengthen its ties with Israel--
apparently with the intent of
using that country as an agent
to block as much as possible
any further enhancement of Egypt's
position.
Military Retrenchment
Even before the news of
the impending British military
cuts in Germany, France was
inclined to discount the Soviet
threat to Europe and to seek
ways of reducing its own
military expenditures. Under
way already is a move to re-
duce the financial outlay for
conventional weapons and to
revamp France's military
establishment along lines of
fewer and smaller divisions
with atomic and more guided
missile strength.
Plans are also under way
to abandon the French air base
in Laos--important though this
is for SEATO's military poten-
tial and France's position in
the area--apparently in order
to concentrate limited re-
sources on areas more closely
related to France's primary
national interests.
Economic Problems
The French economic situa-
tion, aggravated by Algerian
and Suez expenses, continues
precarious, with a new in-
flationary spiral threatening,
:France's trade deficit for 1956
jumped $934,000,000 over 1955,
and the rate of deterioration
of its European Payments Union
account appears to have increased
again, with preliminary figures
for January showing a $70,500,000
loss. Finance Minister Remadier
has forecast a balance-of-payments
crisis by September.
SECRET
pproved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
PART II PATTERNS ANL PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 11
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927001100090001-2
:..r SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
The estimated $3 billion
budget deficit for 1957 is ex-
pected to be enlarged by the
tapering off of anticipated
industrial expansion. There is
some fear also that new wage
hikes resulting from the rise
in the cost-of-living index may
increase the drift toward in-
flation. During the past few
weeks, labor has appeared more
restive, and.wage demands have
resulted in sporadic strikes
among civil servants, utility
workers, and airline personnel..
The Communists, striving to re-
gain the prestige lost as a
result of their stand on Hungary
and Suez, are making a special
effort to exploit this labor
unrest.
Parliamentary Difficulties
Despite his present high
degree of public support, Mollet
may shortly face a new threat
in the assembly. Both the
rightists and the Popular,
Republicans continue to be
restive over his offer of free
elections in Algeria and his
economic policies. The premier
faces a call for a financial
debate on 15 February and an
Algerian debate as soon as
the UN discussions of the sub-
ject are concluded. At the
same time, there is pressure
within the Social Republicans
for withdrawal of their two
representatives from Mollet's
minority government.
Against these -)arliamen-
tary threats, Mollet probably
will try to wring the maximum
political advantage from his
visit to Washington.
I
25X1
POLITICAL UNREST IN WEST AFRICA
The growth of nationalism
among the 60,000,000 people in
the British and French colonies
of West Africa is leading London
and Paris to readjust their re-
lationships to these areas.
Britain, in line with its pol-
icy of developing independent
status for its colonies, will
grant independence to the Gold
Coast on 6 March; a change in
Nigeria's colonial status is
probable in May. France faces
demands in French West Africa,
Togo, and the Cameroons for
local autonomy and a new con-
cept of the French Union in
which the overseas areas would
have political equality with
metropolitan France.
Gold Coast--Ghana
In preparing the Gold Coast
(Ghana) to assume independence
on 6 March, Britain has suc-
cessfully channeled. the nation-
alist forces, under the leader-
ship of Prime Minister Nkrumah,
into co-operation with London.
Following serious riots in
Accra, the capital, in 1950,
Britain began a rapid transfer
of responsibility to the local
government. Although this pol-
icy eased relations between
London and the local government,
the quick transition from tradi-
tional tribal authority to con-
trol by a political party has
produced strong opposition from
the hinterland leaders, who dis-
trust parties and dominance of
the government by residents of
the coastal areas. Threats of
secession and civil war if con-
stitutional guarantees do not
safeguard chieftain authority
and extensive regional powers
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
PART III, PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 11
 SECRET
14 February 1957
BELGIAN
CONGO
poned until May be-
cause of the govern-
ment crisis in the
eastern region. There,
regional prime mih-
ister Azikiwe, who
has been charged with
financial irregular:;
ities,has called as-
sembly elections for
mid-March to secure
a vote of confidence,
His program of immedi-
ate self-government
for all of Nigeria
will probably receive
overwhelming support
in the eastern region
and may increase his
stature at London in
May as the leading
Nigerian spokesman,
appear less serious now because
the chiefs are reported to have
lost much of their popular
support.
The most serious test for
the government is likely to be
delayed until Nkrumah has lost
the unifying issue of independ-
ence and. has to face the econom.-
is problems resulting from a
drop in-world cocoa prices.
Nigeria
Deep historical and reli-
gious antipathies among the
three major regions in Nigeria,
and a great difference in the
level of development between
the backward Moslem north and
the more advanced Christian
influenced south make national
government for Nigeria a diffi-
cult problem.
The emirs of the north
rely on London for protection
and distrust the southern poli-
ticians, who have pressed for
early self-government. London
had promised self-govern_iaent
in 1956 for any region desiring
it, but the conference to dis-
cuss arrangements has been post-
France is confronted with
the problem of yielding enough
powers to the overseas territo-
ries in time to forestall de-
mands for complete independence,
as in North Africa, and yet not
surrendering too much authority,
thereby encouraging autonomy
and the destruction of French
influence in the remainder of
the colonial empire.
The basic reform law enacted
by the French assembly in early
1956 was conceived to increase
local autonomy and extend suf-
frage.while preserving Paris'
paramount position within the
highly centralized French Union.
Events are justifying some of
the fears of pressure caused by
African political ambitions.
Many local politicians now de-
mand territorial prime ministers
and cabinets responsible to
local legislatures, as well as
a new federal concept of the
French Union in which the over-
seas areas and metropolitan
France would be equals.
French Togoland--Togo
Togo was selected to be a
model for French reforms in
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 11
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-0092742 100090001-2
ftwomw 6D
[TRVA
x
FRENCH WEST AFRICA / J
NIGERIA
GOLD j ? `)
cons; ?Rf FClTTATC)RTAT.
AFRICA )
/
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927-A 100090001-2
dw o)
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
August 1956 when Paris felt it
necessary to change the UN trust
territory's status following
London's announcement in 1954
that it could not continue to
administer British Togoland
when the Gold Coast became
independent. Togo then became
an "autonomous republic" with
its own prime minister and
control over many functions of
local government. However,
Paris retained control over
foreign affairs, defense,
justice, customs and currency.
In an election in October
1956, boycotted by the opposi-
tion in southern Togo, the
voters overwhelmingly ratified
the new status and asked for
termination of the trusteeship.
The United Nations refused to
terminate the trusteeship be-
cause of the "unsupervised"
nature of the election and
doubts that self-government
was actually granted. The UN
decided to send a survey mission
which is to report back during
the next session.
French West Africa
Politicians in French West
Africa and the Cameroons, rec-
ognizing the advantages of
Togo's new status, are demand-
ing a status no less favorable.
Many leaders in Dakar insist
on an independent state of
French West Africa associated
with France in a federal union.
The African demands are given
added importance by the trend
toward the amalgamation of small,
weak parties into three major
groups.
A similar movement is
taking place among the labor
unions. Almost all the impor-
tant local organizations have
agreed in principle to merge
into a single organization
called the "General Union of the
Workers of Black Africa." The
founders believe this will be-
come a foundation of political
unity in French Black Africa,
French officials in the
Cameroons believe that popular
unrest has reached such a point
that total independence will
have to be granted soon.
Political agitation has
increased greatly since the
riots of May 1955, which were
fomented by a Communist-in-
fluenced nationalist group
since outlawed. While the
chiefs of the Moslem north
have generally remained loyal
to France, extremists have en-
larged their following in many
urban areas of the south.
Moderates, including the
Moslem delegates, won a majority
of the assembly seats in the
December 1956 territorial assem-
bly elections, and they ap-
parently are prepared to accept
local self-government. However,
independence has become such a
psychological obsession among
the vocal extremist minority
that any solution offered by
Paris falling short of this
goal will be immediately attacked
by the extremists, who waged
virtual guerrilla warfare a-
gainst the French during the
recent election campaign. The
reported French offer of a
status similar to Togo will not
restore political stability in
the Cameroons; instead it may
provide a stimulus for more
extreme nationalism.
SECRET
25X1
25X1
PAR I' I I IApproved For Releesef,l /R2/jtnc 2i~,~ff~ ,001100090001-age 5 of 11
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AA0001100090001-2
SECRET'
14 February 1957
Japan has begun a cam-
paign to gain economic and
political influence in the
Middle East in line with a new
policy which calls for closer
relations with the Asian-Afri-
can nations as the first step
in assuming eventual leader-
ship of the Asian-African
bloc.
:change of Visits
Japan's program to promote
good will in the Middle East
in recent months has included
a visit by the brother of the
emperor to Iran and Iraq, and
a tour by an influential Diet
member as the personal repre-
sentative of the prime minis-
ter. The Japanese minister
to Iraq also toured the area
to stimulate economic co-opera-
tion, and a political advisory
group is to be sent soon to
Ethiopia.
Economic Activities
Japanese economic activi-
ty in the Middle East has been
relatively limited in the past
and investment in the area is
negligible. Nevertheless, the
Japanese regard the region as
a potentially valuable market
and profitable sphere for eco-
nomic development. A Foreign
Ministry official has indicated
Tokyo government and economic
circles are extremely interested
in participating with the United
States in Middle Eastern techni-
cal aid projects.
Japanese technicians are
in Afghanistan assisting in de-
velopment of the Kabul water
supply and road projects and
in the ceramic and sericulture
industries. Two joint fishing
companies, one with Iran and
one with Lebanon and Syria, are
expected to be in'operation soon.
A joint Lebanon-Japan sericul-
ture enterprise reportedly is
a success, and recent trade
talks with Yemen have resulted
in a satisfactory agreement,
The Iranian oil company
has proposed to Japanese oil
firms a plan for the construc-
tion and operation of oil tank-
ers by Japan. Other reported
proposals include Japanese con-
struction of a railroad in Is-
rael, and participation in de-
veloping the Euphrates River
in Syria.
Among visitors to Japan
have been Emperor Haile Se-
lassie of Ethiopia, and dele-
gations from the Turkish and
Iraqi parliaments. A visit by
King Saud is planned for late
spring and the Japanese hope
President Nasr will come this
summer.
Japanese businessmen have
taken advantage of the Suez cri-
sis to expand into British Mid-
dle Eastern markets. Exports
to Egypt, with the exception of
steel and steel products, have
been placed on a deferred pay-
ment basis, and Japan hopes to
overcome its adverse balance of
trade with Egypt,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001100090001-2
PART III PATTE:.RNS AND PEaSPECTIVES Page 6 of 11
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A`011100090001-2
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
The Saudi Arabian director
of petroleum:, affairs has indi-
cated his country is consider-
ing a policy for the develop-
ment of its own petroleum in-
dustry and that'he believes
Japan might be interested in an
agreement on petroleum develop-
ment. He also observed that
Saudi Arabia desired its own
fleet of tankers, which could
be built at the lowest cost in
Japan. As Japan imports a
large part of its crude oil
COMMUNIST CHINA'S POPULATION PROBLEMS
The Chinese Communists
face the problem of how to
feed and clothe a population
which is growing at the rate
of 10,000,000 a year and, at
the same time, devote increas-
ing amounts of the national in-
come to investment. Peiping's
former view that its huge popu-
lation is its greatest resource
is being replaced by recogni-
tion that the steadily increas-
ing rate of population growth
threatens fulfillment of eco-
nomic plans. Although the
authorities now endorse -birth
control, the programs under
consideration are not believed
adequate to reduce the birth
rate in the next decade.
Chinese Population Data
China's first general cen-
sus, in 1953-54, showed a popu-
lation of 583,000,000. Sub-
sequent investigations by the
Chinese revealed that this pop-
ulation might be growing at a
rate of 2 percent per year.
This estimated rate was based
on a 5-percent sample, heavily
biased in favor of urban areas.
Further, the questionnaire
method was probably used and
experience with other pre-
dominantly illiterate popula-
tions has shown that this
method is susceptible to con
siderable error. The growth
rate estimated from this sample
was probably too high; the
actual rate at the present time
is believed to be nearer 1.5
percent per year.
A population growth rate
is in effect the difference
between the birth and the death
rate. In China, warfare and
PROJECTED POPULATION GROWTHS
OF COMMUNIST CHINA
requirements from Saudi sources,
Tokyo presumably will respond
favorably to approaches on
these proposals.
Saudi Arabia in mid-1956
requested Japan to bid on a
contract for the supply of mil-
itary vehicles,, and other Mid-
dle Eastern nations have made
offers to purchase arms. Japan,
however, has not revised its
policy of not selling arms to
these nations.
600;
1956 '57 '58 '59 '60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68
25X1
25X1
banditry, along with associated
refugee movements and disruption
of food supplies, kept death
rates high through the 1930's
and 1940's. The decline in the
death rate, which began after
the nation was pacified in 1950,
will continue only as famine
and disease are better con-
trolled.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 11
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A00 100090001-2
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
The Communists have man-
aged the distribution of the
food supply in a relatively
efficient and equitable manner.
The battle against disease,
however, is still largely in
the planning stage. The death
rate will probably continue
to move slowly downward, but
no precipitate drop is fore-
seen.
On the other hand, China's
birth rate will probably remain
high for some time to come,
with the result that the rate
of natural increase in the pop-
ulation will move steadily up-
ward, and may actually reach
the 2 percent figure in the
1970's. Even now, the popula-
tion is growing at a rate of
about 10,000,000 a year.
This growth raises very
serious problems for Chinese
planners, both in supplying
food and in providing employ-
ment.
Food Supply
With a population living
close to the subsistence level,
food supply remains a matter of
concern, despite Chinese propa-
ganda to the contrary. Any
disruption in the food supply
could cause a serious crisis.
Conversely, a stabilized food
supply could contribute to a
significant decline in both
disease and death rates.
New investment scheduled
for agriculture in the Second
Five-Year Plan will probably
increase food production more
rapidly than the population
will grow, provided there are
no major natural disasters.
The margin gained may be whit-
tled away, however, by higher
consumption levels and by raised
food export quotas.
Employment Problems
Persistent underemploy-
ment, low productivity, low
living standards in the agri-
cultural labor force, and the
effects of flood and famine
have contributed to high death
rates and migration out of
stricken areas. After 1950, the
industrialization program lured
POPULATION
LABOR FORCE
NONAGRICULTURAL
LABOR FORCE
62 (END OF SECOND 5-YEAR PLAN)
n~,nnnn-i.nrn?+ R T !nl,lll?T , lll.n!?nrn,~n+~++++++nnemm~ns
m~~~
. SECRET
(FROM 1952)
!Ili; !?!!!nli,lil !
I; a ~;; i! l i i!n+i+! 1!!
large numbers off
the land into the
cities. A consider-
able portion of these
joined those who lost
jobs in commercial
and service functions
following the gov-
ernment's campaigns
against private
business to swell the
ranks of the urban un-
employed.
Urban employment
opportunities are not
expected to increase
greatly in the course
of the first two five-
year plans. In 1952
there were reportedly
21,000,000 "workers
and employees," which
presumably included
all wage and salary
workers in both the
private and the so-
cialized sectors of
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 0 of 11
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00901100090001-2
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCJ WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
the economy. This category is
to expand to 25,000,000 in 1957
and 31,500,000 in 1962.
Although this is an average
annual increase of 5 percent,
the absolute number of new
jobs--10,500,000--compares with
an expected net growth in pop-
ulation in the 10-year period
of over 80,000,000 people.
Thus, out of an average of
approximately 3,000,000 to 4,-
000,000 people expected to enter
the labor force annually be-
tween 1952 and 1962, there are
plans to hire only 1,000,000 a
year as workers and employees.
Most of the remaining presumably
will be added each year to the
already overcrowded agricultural
labor force.
Government Programs
The Chinese government has
attempted to halt migration
from rural to industrial areas.
Strict enforcement of this ban
apparently has slowed the move-
ment, but unemployment has been
so acute in a number of major
cities that efforts have been
made to evacuate people. These
have been none too successful
because of a general lack of
planning and a scarcity of both
housing and employment opportu-
ni.ties.in rural'areas..
Projects for large-scale
relocation of the population,
notably to the northeast and
northwest, have had uclore elabo-
rate planning, but ambitious
goals for this program have
been steadily scaled down as
the obstacles and the costs
have become more apparent. Mi-
gration to virgin areas in 1956,
for example, totaled 725,000
people, which represents only
a little more than 0.1 percent
of the total population. With-
out heavy capital investment
in marginal agricultural lands
or in extensive water conserv-
ancy projects, it seems extreme-
ly unlikely that s.euch progress
can be made.
Birth Control
The Chinese Communists
are now attempting to solve
some of their problems by
encouraging birth control.
Official support is being given
not only to contraceptive
practices but to sterilization
and postponement of marriage,
ESTIMATED POPULATION GROWTH
MILLIONS
11,
TCsA~lik!!!
T 144 l U
4-11-Al I-AH+H
t H41
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975
70122 3
DbAATTARW55idelity has been
maintained by rationalizing
birth control as necessary for
the health of mothers and chil-
dren. At the same time, the
Chinese have violently attacked
Maithusian theories, although
the Chinese demographic situa
tion demonstrates the validity
of some of these concepts,
The program backing the
birth control policy is still
in the preparatory stages.
With the endorsement of Chou
En-lai himself, the Ministry of
Public Health is engaged in
research on fertility control
and is planning a campaign to
spread information on birth
control techniques.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
1 ATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 9 of 11
PART I I I
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
14 February 1957
Despite occasional lapses
into primitive folklore--such
as swallowing live tadpoles
to prevent conception--most of
the information on birth con-
trol has been modern and scien-
tific. However, it is doubtful
that China's largely illiterate
and superstitious'peasantry can
be taught effectively to use
these techniques except through
an intensive and prolonged
indoctrination period. In the
shorter run, the program can be
effective only if Peiping employs
Draconian measures such as wide-
spread abortion or mass steri-
lizationomeasures which could be
successful in China's closely
25X1
controlled society.
(Prepared by ORR)
EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION IN 1956
The East European Satel-
lites, during 1956, produced
a total of 1,600 aircraft,
according to US air force esti-
mates. This is about 19 per-
cent of Soviet bloc production
in numbers of aircraft but
only about 7 percent of the
total by airframe weight. Of
the 1,600 planes,Czechoslovakia
accounted for approximately 65
percent and Poland approximate-
ly 25 percent.
1954-55. Demand for the ob-
solescent MIG-15, which remains
the standard Satellite fighter,
stems in part from the needs
of newly organized air force
units in East Germany and Albania.
Production of the CRATE
(IL-14) piston transport at
the Avia plant in Prague reached
15 by late January. The planned
production rate may be consider-
able in view of the prospective
EUROPEAN SATELLITE AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
PISTON AIRCRAFT
1953
1955
The large Vodochody
plant in Czechoslovakia pro-
duced 40 to 50 FAGOT (MIG-15)
jet fighters and MIDGET (U-MIG-
15) jet trainers per month in
1956, compared with an esti-
mated 60 to '70 per month in
needs of the Satellite
and Soviet air forces
and civil airlines.
The East Germans
assembled five IL-14's
in 1956 from parts
and assemblies provided
by the USSR. Despite
the halfheartedness of
Soviet assistance and
perennial shortages of
materials and trained
personnel, series pro-
duction of this air-
craft probably will be
undertaken at the new
facilities in Dresden in 1957
in accordance with East Germany's
present Five-Year Plan.
In Poland, MIG-15's are
being produced at a plant at
Mielec at a rate of 26 to 30
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 10 of 11
 SECRET
14 February 1957
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AAO 1100090001-2
per month. A small quantity
of HARE (MI-1) helicopters
were assembled at the Lublin/
Swidnik plant during 1956, prob-
ably from Soviet components.
Series production of helicop-
ters'is expected in 1957.
Despite rumors to the
contrary, Czechoslovakia and
Poland have not begun to pro-
duce FRESCO (MIG-17) jet
fighters and BEAGLE (IL-28) jet
light bombers, although several
Satellite air forces are now
receiving these types from the
USSR.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927A001100090001-2
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 11
 25X1 Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2
Approved For Release 2005/02/14: CIA-RDP79-00927AO01100090001-2