CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001000100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 20, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 29, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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C D /z/2
CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO. 18
OCR NO. 7263/56
29 November 1956
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
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CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
SYRIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The internal drift to the left in Syria, accompanied
by growing Soviet and Egyptian influence, is increasing
tension between Syria and its neighbors as well as
between Syria and the UK and France.
not to precipitate outside intervention, are maintaining
a facade of constitutional government, while they attempt
to complete their assumption of power.
little warning in an outbreak of hostilities involving
Syria, which would increase the possibility of Soviet
intervention. Internally, the Syrian leftists, trying
SUEZ SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
of the canal will be speeded.
Recent restatements of the British and French
positions on a withdrawal from Port Said present
conditions evidently still unacceptable to Egypt. Nasr
still demands complete and unconditional withdrawal,
while London and Paris seek prior assurances that clearance
YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
force Tito to an open break.
Current Yugoslav-Soviet polemics indicate that
neither side wishes a complete break, yet neither is
willing to retreat from its fundamental position con-
cerning the proper nature of relations between Communist
states. Further Soviet efforts to isolate the European
Satellites from Yugoslav influence are likely. While
the Soviet kidnaping of Hungarian ex-premier Nagy and
the Albanian campaign of vilification against Yugoslavia
have heightened the tension in the Communist world, it
would probably take such action as Soviet economic
pressure on Belgrade or a real showdown with Poland to
Q OENTIAL
T IN
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The combined tensions could result with
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
THE NEW POLISH REGIME . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
The extensive personnel and organizational changes
in the Polish party and government since the accession to
power of First Secretary Gomulka have continued the
liberalizing and streamlining program in progress since
the Soviet 20th party congress last February. The most
important feature of these changes is the replacement of
many Stalinist ministers and party functionaries with
Communists of "liberal" persuasion, known Gomulka sup-
porters, and non-Communists appointed as representatives
of other parties or for their technical competence.
from taking strong action.
POLAND CHALLENGES SOVIET POLICY ON HUNGARY . . . . . . . Page 4
Polish press attacks on Soviet policy toward Hungary
reflect a decision by Poland's leaders not to remain
silent any longer on the Soviet intervention in Hungary
lest they appear to be acquiescing in Moscow's inter-
ference in the internal affairs of a Satellite. They
apparently are prepared for a verbal battle with the
USSR on this issue, but probably believe that more direct
and pressing problems will nrevent the Soviet leaders
more overt direction and control in Hungary.
order in Hungary, has evidently initiated a court
HARSHER POLICIES IN HUNGARY LIKELY . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The Soviet kidnaping of ex-premier Nagy has
eliminated what little chance the Kadar regime might have
had of gaining a popular following. Premier Kadar has
assumed an increasingly harsh and threatening attitude
toward the population, which continues to resist the
regime despite extreme privations. At the same time,
Moscow, increasingly concerned over the failure of
Hungarian authorities and the Soviet military to restore
foreign policy and heads a ministry which has had a
substantial diminution in influence in recent years.
MOLOTOV'S STATUS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP . . . . . . . Page 6
Molotov's appointment on 21 November as minister
of state control does not appear to represent a come-
back. While still a first deputy premier, in his new
position he remains removed from the vital area of
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
the impending economic crisis.
consequences. Mollet probably faces ho immediate parlia-
mentary challenge, however, since few candidates for
the premiership are willing to assume responsibility for
FRENCH PREMIER FACES INCREASED OPPOSITION . . . . . .
The French people still seem to approve Premier
Mollet's original reasons for intervening in Egypt, but
there is growing concern over the developing economic
over access to the city.
NEW SOVIET HARASSMENT OF ALLIED TRAVEL TO BERLIN . . . . Page 7
Soviet authorities in East Germany on the night
of 20-21 November began an attempt to subject Allied
military trains traveling between West Germany and Berlin
to new restrictions, Although the Russians deny they
are challenging Western rights, their recent efforts
may presage an attempt to establish more rigid controls
Page 8
Page 9
air base.
In geria, o e re e
French security orces have stepped up their operations.
In Morocco, the nationalist trade union has deferred a
strike of American-employed workers at the Port Lyautey
THE NEXT JAPANESE GOVERNMENT . .
the withdrawal of American troops.
Japan security treaty, possibly including a date for
The ruling Liberal-Democratic Party is scheduled to
elect a new president at its national convention on
12 December and his name will be submitted to the Diet
on 20 December for approval to succeed Hatoyama as prime
minister. The leading candidates are party secretary
general Kishi, International Trade and Industry minister
Ishibashi, and Executive Board chairman Ishii. Kishi
has assured Ambassador Allison that any new government
would co-operate with the United States in foreign
policy, but probably would seek a revision of the US-
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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SOUTH KOREAN ARMY LEADERS ARRESTED . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
The arrest of seven high-ranking South Korean army
officers in connection with the assassination in January
of CIC chief "Snake" Kim is expected to increase the
already existing factionalism and anxiety among South
Korean army leaders. The arrests appear to be connected
with Army Chief of Staff Yi Hyong-kun's attempts to dis-
credit his principal rival, Joint Chiefs of Staff chair- 25X1
CHOU EN-LAI' S TRIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
On the first leg of his good-will tour through Asia,
Chou En-lai has sought to counter the effects of recent
developments in East Europe and has gone out of his way
to reassure North Vietnam that Peiping rejects "great-
nation chauvinism." In Cambodia, where Prince Sihanouk
ordered a "hero's welcome" for him, Chou's remarks re-
flected the Chinese Communist effort to widen the gap
between the Asian-African states and the West by stressing
"anticolonialism." Although Chou apparently impressed
the Overseas Chinese in Cambodia, Siha '
remains wary of Peiping's intentions. 25X1
The purge of the Argentine army command which began
on 22 November results from new pressure from the
"gorillas," one of two military groups struggling for
dominance of the regime. The immediate objectives of the
"gorillas" apparently include delaying the elections
now scheduled for late 1957 in order to reduce the
presidential prospects of Arturo Frondizi, the Radical
Party d building up the navy's strength.
ARGENTINE ARMY COMMAND SHIFTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
Iceland, influenced by the Hungarian developments
and desiring American financial assistance, shelved the
question of an American troop withdrawal in the recent
negotiations, but is trying to ensure that when the
base question again arises, it will be discussed bilater-
ally with the United States rather than be referred first
to the North Atlantic Council for recommendation, as
ICELAND'S NEW ATTITUDE ON THE KEFLAVIK BASE . . . . . . Page 14
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
WESTERN EUROPE'S PETROLEUM POSITION . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
Petroleum supplies now in sight for Western Europe
over the next six months are estimated by OEEC experts
at no more than 50 percent of normal, with an additional
25 percent expected from arrangements still to be formally
worked out with Saudi Arabia via Tapline and with western
hemisphere sources. Reported Soviet offers of additional
supplies are unlikely to change Europe's over-all petroleum
position significantly. Restrictions on consumption have
now been introduced by most countries individually, but
on a less drastic scale than that contemplated by OEEC
plans. The shortages have already aggravated Britain's
and France's serious dollar problems. 25X1
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION . . . . Page 1
The Hungarian rebellion has confronted the Austrian
government with major problems--controlling its eastern
frontiers, preventing prorebel activities on Austrian
soil, and caring for the enormous influx of refugees.
Despite overwhelming Austrian sympathy for the rebel
cause, the government has generally performed these
tasks with circumspection, and the Soviet Union has not
seriously criticized Austria's neutral conduct. A pro-
longed crisis in Soviet-Hungarian relations, however,
could make the maintenance of Austrian neutrality much 25X1
Page 3
The antigovernment Indonesian army elements led by
former deputy chief of staff Lubis have been substantially
weakened by the recent army crisis. An attempt at a.coup
in the near future is possible but would seem to have
little chance of success. Continued factionalism in the
army may be exploited by political elements.
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V
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The internal drift to the
left in Syria, accompanied by
growing Soviet and Egyptian
influence, is increasing ten-
sion between Syria and its
neighbors as well as between
Syria and the UK and France.
naissance attempts in Syria--
most recently, submarines
suspected of being British
or French have been sighted
near Latakia.
The French government is
extremely perturbed over the
Soviet arms build-up and the
internal situation in Syria,
the internal situation in Jor-
dan, and the increasingly ex-
posed,position of Lebanon. On
21 November, Ambassador Dillon
in Paris reported that while
French military action in Syria
was unlikely, clandestine sup-
port of a Syrian coup remained
"quite conceivable." Dillon
felt any Syrian attack or other
pressures on Lebanon would find
partisans in the Mollet govern-
ment for an Anglo-French mili-
tary riposte.
combined tensions could result
with little warning in an out-
break of hostilities involving
Syria; which would increase
the possibility of Soviet inter-
vention. Internally, the Syrian
leftists, trying not to pre-
cipitate outside intervention,
are maintaining a facade of
constitutional government,
while they attempt to complete
their assumption of power.
British French Concern
The possibil-
ity of active British inter-
vention cannot be discounted
if the situation in Syria
continues to deteriorate. The
Foreign Office has denied
Syrian charges that British,
French, and Israeli troops are
being concentrated on the
Syrian border, but there have
been persistent reports of
British and French recon-
Foreign Ministry spokes-
men told Dillon on 23 November
they believed the Syrian situa-
tion might take a "decisive
turn" within a week or ten days.
The cabinet was considering the
situation urgently and was pre-
pared to assist Lebanon with
arms if necessary.
Turkey
Turkey also continues to
voice serious concern over de-
velopments in Syria. It has
been a vigorous advocate of
strong action to reverse the
leftist trend and has recently
moved additional troops to the
Syrian border. Turkey would
probably co-operate in any
joint military action in Syria,
but is unlikely to take
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Tel Aviv?
unilateral military action.
Turkish officials are in London
to flscuss, according to the
?Tess, the deteriorating Syrian
situation.
Iraq's long-standing con-
cern over Syrian developments
has now been heightened by Syr-
ian sabotage of the Iraqi pipe
lines and the resultant loss of
revenue, the possibility that
an outright leftist government
would further threaten Iraqi oil,
and reports of the increasing
iuiid-up of Soviet arms and
personnel.
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
?'? IRAQ
ISRAEL: ? ?'.?~ '1
Alexandria ?
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Iraq
SUEZ
CANAL
SECRET
SYRIA
Amman .0-**'?~??~.,
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Auj1JORDAN`
` ?.
1L..i
SINAI
EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA
RED
SEA
SECRET
CYPRUS
LEBANON
Beirut
The temptation to take
action in Syria t:;dy be counter-
balanced, however, by the
internal situation in Iraq.
Hostility against Britain re-
mains high, and the Nuri Said
government is shaky. Serious
demonstrations have occurred
and more are reportedly in the
offing. Iraq, though anxious
about Syria, would probably be
reluctant to move more troops
out of the country at the pres-
ent time unless the demand
for action were crucial, or
could be sold to the Iraqi pub-
lic-as an anti-Soviet move.
0 100
200 300
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SE
ried out from Syria and Jor-
dan. The Israeli delegate at
the UN told Ambassador Lodge
on 26 November that his coun-
try was considering asking
the General Assembly to take
action in Syria to forestall
an outbreak of hostilities.
Syrian Leftists
Israel
Tension on Israel's bor-
der with Syria and Jordan has
been momentarily reduced as a
consequence of the withdrawal
of heavy Israeli troop con-
centrations on 21-23 November.
With the Egyptian threat
temporarily removed, Israel
has reduced its active forces
to about 100,000 men. It re-
mains capable, however, of
remobilizing within 24 hours.
Israel is apprehensive
over the leftist trends in
Syria and Jordan, and over the
possible arrival of additional
Soviet military assistance to
those countries. Syria con-
tinues to report a large number
of reconnaissance overflights
by Israeli aircraft, in addi-
tion to others by the British
and French.. Another major
factor in the continuing ten-
sion is the very high level of
sabotage and terrorist activity.
in Israel, which is being car-
Syrian leftists continue
to move steadily toward a com-
plete assumption of power.
There reportedly is "open con-
flict" within the nationalist
coalition government of Pre-
mier Asali, which appears about
to be replaced or to be so re-
shuffled that leftists will
dominate the cabinet. Former
prime minister Khalid al-Azm
is expected to head a new cabi-
net, or to take a prominent
role. Arrests of opposition
elements--rightist and Druze--
continue to be reported.
Leftist elements led by
Akram Hawrani, leader of the
leftist Arab Socialist Resur-
rection Party (ASRP), and Syr-
ian Communist Party leader
Khalid Bakhdash attempted to
force the government's downfall
on 22 November. ASRP Foreign
Minister Bitar reportedly has
called for a military takeover.
While Premier Asali ridi-
culed reports of wholesale ar-
rests of parliamentary deputies
and army officers, he admitted
to Ambassador Moose that four
deputies and some army officers
have been arrested and that a
warrant is out for the Druze
leader, Emir Hassan al-Atrash.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
The embassy has learned from
other sources that 10 to 15
minor Druze leaders have also
been taken into custody.
According to press reports
of 28 November, Shepilov said
in Copenhagen that he had "in-
contestable information" that
Britain, France and Israel in-
tended to attack Syria, Lebanon,
Egypt and other Middle East
countries. It was not clear
from Shepilov's inclusion of
gling to the Druze tribes in near the northern Lebanese-Syr-
southern Syria. ian border, allegedly because
Aviv, and evidence of arms smug- al troops have been stationed
don, Paris, Ankara, and Tel Damascus reports that addition-
be' designed in part to dis-
credit Iraqi prime minister
Nuri Said further and to facil-
itate the leftist assumption
of power by magnifying the
danger of outside intervention.
Egypt.whether he was referring
to events before the invasion
of Egypt or meant a present
threat.
up in Syria emanating from Lon- The American embassy in
Fear of Coup
The Syrian leftist-
nationalist civilian and army
group appears apprehensive
that its moves may precipitate
an Iraqi-sponsored coup in con-
junction with rightist elements
in Syria, supported by Britain,
France, Turkey, and Israel. The
group's suspicions have been
heightened by the intensive
press reporting of the leftist
drift and mounting Soviet build-
The Syrian radio and press
are engaged in a vitriolic cam-
paign charging Iraq with the
smuggling and with promoting
rebellion. Moscow's radio and
press have echoed the Syrian
charges of Iraqi-Western plot-
ting. The campaign appears to
British and French vessels were
sighted off the Syrian coast.
Syria has also increased its
defensive positions along the
Damascus-Beirut road. Syrian
youth groups, estimated to be
at least 6,000 strong, are con-
tinuing their training in street
fighting . 25X1
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CURRENT IYNTELLIOtNCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1953
Recent restatements of the
British and French positions
on a withdrawal from Port Said
present conditions evidently
still unacceptable to Egypt.
So far only a token withdrawal
of one British battalion has
taken place. Press reports on
27 November of further with-
drawals probably refer to rear
elements of the same battalion.
An estimated 20,000 allied
forces remain in Egypt. Of
these, British forces comprise
an estimated 13,300. Total
British forces in the eastern
Mediterranean area remain at
the build-up level of ap-
proximately 62,500.
France retains approxi-
mately 6,500 troops in Egypt
and another 6,500 on Cyprus.
Elements of a mechanized
division, a tank battalion,
and other support units appear to
be returning to France from the
eastern. Mediterrnanean, how-
ever.
UN emergency forces now
total approximately 4,200
troops from Canada, Colombia,
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden,
and Yugoslavia. About 1,400 are
already in Egypt--a company of
190 Norwegians at Port Said and
the rest at Abu Suweir airfield
near Ismailia awaiting rede-
ployment. Secretary General
Hammarskjold has offers of
troops from 15 other UN members.
Plans privately proposed
by British and French spokesmen
for settling the Suez issue now
play down the need for the
"effective" UN forces on which
they still insist publicly.
Foreign Minister Pineau has
informed the American UN
delegation of a plan calling
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for an Egyptian authority
charged with daily operation
of the canal and an association
of users to collect and dis-
tribute the tolls. Clearance
of the canal and its future
development would be inter-
nationally financed, perhaps
through the International Bank.
British statements now
stress the need to clear the
canal as soon as possible.
Foreign Secretary Lloyd told
Secretary General Hammarskjold
.that withdrawal of French and
British troops should come at
the end of a four-week period
for establishing the United
Nations international emergency
force, with clearance of the
canal to begin immediately, ac-
cording to Hammarskjold. Lloyd
said he would give a definite
date on withdrawal when satisfied
the clearing operation was in
order. This presumably referred
to the view that all "available"
equipment should be used.
British and French equipment
now at the canal, or on the way
there, is believed sufficient
to perform the entire clearing
operation without further addi-
tions.
London has already an-
nounced clearance of the channel
at Port Said for vessels under
10,000 tons and 25-foot draft.
Obstacles remaining in the
Egyptian-controlled four fifths
of the canal include sunken
ships north and south of
Lake Timsah, the center section
of the Firdan highway bridge,
and at least two other ships,
plus an undetermined number of
dredges, cranes and barges near
the southern entrance at Suez.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
Egyptian Position
Nasr continues to inzist
on complete and unconditional.
withdrawal of British, French.,
and Israeli troops. He remains
intensely suspicious.of their
intentions, and there are no
indications that he is prepared
to accept anything, such as
the French plan on toll col-
lection, that might impinge
on Egypt's sovereignty. He
appears to be uncertain exactly
how to proceed toward a settle-
ment, but to feel he now has
the upper hand, especially in
view of renewed criticism of
the three powers by the UN
resolutions of 24 November.
Egyptian press reports
intimate that the dispute
might be returned to the UN
Security Council, which could
use the 12 October agreement
on six broad principles to
govern the settlement. Refer-
ence to the six principles has
appeared in British statements
as well.
Aside from insisting that
Israel remove all troops from
Egyptian soil, Nasr has made
it clear he expects the Israelis
to leave the Gaza strip. There
remains the possibility that
Nasr might work for a general
Arab-Israeli settlement if he
believed the deal advantageous,
despite the unfavorable climate
for such an approach now.
Nasr seems aware that his
position in Egypt and in the
Arab world is far from secure.
On the whole he has been mov-
ing cautiously in his relations
with other Arab states. He
appears interested in improving
his relations with the United
States, both in an effort to
re-establish his prestige and
to balance the expanded Soviet
position in Egypt. Despite
hints that he plans to limit
ties with the USSR, Egyptian-
Soviet diplomatic co-operation
remains close,especially in
the UN.
On 26 November the Soviet
bloc voted against the resolu-
tion to finance the UN Emer-
gency Force out of the UN capi-
tal fund. Deputy Foreign
Minister Kuznetsov told the
General Assembly that the USSR
would not accept any financial
responsibility for the cost of
the force or of salvage work
on the canal. He insisted that,
the "aggressors" bear the en-
tire cost and continued to play
on Arab suspicions that Britain,
France and Israel would refuse
to withdraw all their forces
from Egypt.
Political pressures on
Acting Prime Minister Butler
remain high. The UN resolu- 25X1
tions of 24 November fanned the 25X1
flames of anti-American and
anti-UN sentiment.
The resolu-
tio:noffered by some 125 right-
wing Conservative members of
Parliament supported Foreign
Secretary Lloyd's efforts and,
though sharp in tone, offered
only a general warning to the
cabinet against an early un-
conditional withdrawal from
Port Said.
The UN secretary general
has told American representatives
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
he plans to establish the UN
Emergency Force in two stages--
the first being the stationing
of 1,800 men, mostly Scandi-
navian, at Port Said. The
second stage involves moving
a force of about 4,200 men to
the armistice lines, "ulti-
mately" ending up on Israel's
borders. Hammerskjold believes
that a 6,000-man force is needed,
of which 4,200 are now avail-
able.
To finance the UN force,
Hammarskjold plans to use reg-
ular UN procedures, such as
loans. Insistence by the USSR,
Egypt, some Latin Americans,
and most Arabs that the "ag-
gressors" should bear the
entire expense will make it
difficult to have the General
SECRET
Assembly allocate costs among
UN members.
On clearing the canal,
Hammarskjold said the UN would
take the reponsibility and
underwriteany loans, but that
that final payment should
probably come from canal tolls.
He is optimistic about the with-
drawal of British and French
troops and Egypt's consent to
clearance operations begin-
ning the following day. He
recognizes that "many people"
believe the Egyptian position
on clearing the canal is un-
reasonable, but feels that, as
an executive of the General
Assembly, he must act in ac-
cordance with assembly direc-
tives which gave clear yriority
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Pace 7 of 7
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IV1tt'-L ~..
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
YUGOSLAV-SOVIET RELATIONS
The nature of the current
Yugoslav-Soviet polemics indi-
cates that neither side wishes
a complete break, yet neither
is willing to retreat from its
fundamental position concerning
the proper nature of relations
between Communist states.
Further Soviet efforts to iso-
late the Eastern European
Satellites from Yugoslav in-
fluence are likely. The So-
viet kidnaping of Hungarian
ex-premier Nagy--in viola-
tion of an agreement between
the Tito and Kadar governments--
and the apparently Soviet-spon-
sored Albanian campaign of
vilification against Yugo-
slavia have heightened the
tension in the Communist world.
However, it would probably
take such action as Soviet
economic pressure on Belgrade,
or a real showdown with Poland,
to force Tito to an open break.
Both the Borba editorial
on 27 November,--a-n-&-the Pravda
editorial which touched it off
are couched in relatively re-
strained terms. Each side has
stated the need for sincere and
equal discussion of the dif-
ferences, but accuses the other
of unfair criticism.
aid from the capitalist West,
and say they are proud they
have maintained their socialist
system, despite pressure from
two sides.
Borba's editorial avoided
mention of the Nagy kidnaping,,
possibly awaiting Soviet reac-
tion to the Yugoslav protest
note. The Yugoslavs may have
released Nagy to test Soviet
intentions toward Belgrade
and toward building a more
moderate regime in Budapest.
The propaganda war between
Belgrade and Tirana over Yugo-
slav ideas on "many roads to
socialism" has now been made
more violent by the Albanian
execution of three known pro-
Titoists.
Yugoslav Attitude
The fundamental reason for
Yugoslav reluctance to see rela-
tions with Moscow deteriorate
is Belgrade's desire to help
what it considers "good" Com-
munism prevail in the Communist
world. Of secondary importance
is the Yugoslav desire to
continue building its economy
with Soviet bloc as well as
Western aid.
Borba repeated the Yugo-
slav accusation that the "so-
cialist camp" is nothing but a
cover-up for the idea of the
hegemony of the "leading coun-
try." It also reiterated that
Stalinist excesses in the So-
viet bloc arose not only from
the cult of Stalin's person-
ality but from the basic--and
as yet unchanged--bureaucratic
system, whose leaders are
divorced from the working
masses and disregard their
aspirations.
The Yugoslavs blame the
USSR for forcing them to take
The basic Yugoslav line
now is that while "Stalinist"
thinking has gained the upper
hand in Moscow, eventually
more moderate views will pre-
vail. Tito would probably
become thoroughly disillusioned
and be likely to declare the
party agreement of last June
a "dead letter" if, for ex-
ample, the Soviet leaders
finally decide that the Gomulka
regime must be brought back
into line by extreme pressures
or outright intervention.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY. STSINARY
29 November 1956
On the sensitive ques-
tion of economic relations,
there were hints in the Pravda
article, particularly in s
obvious linking of comments on
the chronic Yugoslav grain
shortage and Belgrade's re-
liance on capitalist aid, that
Moscow. may be less generous
in the future. Negotiations
for a Yugoslav-Soviet trade
agreement for 1957 are sched-
uled for this month. If the
Yugoslavs conclude from these
negotiations, or from Soviet-
imposed difficulties in im-
plementing previous credit
agreements, that Moscow is
trying to use an economic
lever to make Tito relent on
his pressure for Satellite in-
dependence, a violent Yugo-
slav reaction would probably
follow.
Short of these Soviet
actions, however, it is likely
that Soviet-Yugoslav party
relations will be strained with
heavy propaganda exchanges, but
that efforts will be made on
both sides to maintain reason-
able governmental relations.
road for others to follow, even
though the Yugoslav system
suffered from ideological
weakness, the failure to so-
cialize agriculture, and econom-
ic failures::, that. shade depend-
ence.on:.,Western aid necessary.
The Soviet-Yugoslav recon-
ciliation has been and remains
a,key element in Moscow's cam-
paign to prove to the world
that Soviet foreign policy has
changed fundamentally in the
post-Stalin period. While
paying lip service to Tito's
"different roads to socialism"-
principle, Moscow has tried
to offset the danger that
growing Yugoslav influence
would have an unsettling effect
in the Satellites by carefully
controlling the pace of Satel-
lite "liberalization" and seek-
ing to integrate Yugoslavia
more closely into the Communist
camp.
Soviet Attitude
The Pravda editorial of
23 November reflects the di-
lemma of current Soviet policy
toward Yugoslavia, and a re-
appraisal of those relations
forced on Soviet leaders by
the events in the satellites.
Therecent events in.Po-
land and (Hungary have forced
the Soviet leaders to give top
priority;to maintaining maximum
control in the Satellites, how-
ever seriously its actions might
affect relations with Belgrade.
The kidnaping'of Nagy is an
example of how this policy
works in'practice. Further-,
more, instead of trying to draw
Yugoslavia closer to the-bloc,
Moscow must -for the present-
concentrate on the opposite
aim of isolating the other
Eastern European countries
from Belgrade and discrediting
Yugoslavia as an example for
the Satellites to follow.
The seriousness of the
problem in the case of Poland
is illustrated by the Polish.
press endorsement--after the
Pravda editorial--of many of
Ti 's views on Hungary, its
condemnation of zigzagging So-
viet?policy, and its call for
increased, Polish-Yugoslav co
operation. With control of
the Satellites as its foremost
objective, Moscow is walking 25X1
a tightrope in its relations
with Yugoslavia.
SECRET
On the one hand, Pravda's
moderate language and its ap-
peal for a "dispassionate,
comrade-like exchange of views"
indicates that Moscow is trying
to avoid a fundamental split
with Belgrade which would be
reminiscent of the 1948 break.
On the other hand, Pravda was
very critical of Tim"dog-
matic" interference in the
affairs of other Communist
.parties, calling it an attempt
to undermine the unity of the
Communist world. Pravda tried
to discredit Tito with charges
that he was trying to set up
the Yugoslav road to socialism
as the best, or even the only,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Virtually stripped of any
chance of gaining a popular
following by the Soviet kid-
naping of ex-premier Nagy,
Hungarian premier Kadar has as-
sumed an increasingly harsh and
threatening attitude toward the
population, which continues to
resist the regime, despite ex-
treme privations.
At the same time, Moscow,
increasingly concerned about
the failure of Hungarian au-
thorities and the Soviet mili-
tary to restore order in Hungary
has evidently initiated a course
of more overt direction and
control in Hungary. Soviet
deputy premier Malenkov, ac-
cording to press reports, ar-
rived in Budapest on 23 No-
vember, possibly to oversee the
application of more severe
policies in Hungary.
Soviet Policy
Although adopting inter-
mittently hard and soft policies
--the one to crush passive re-
sistance, the-other to shore up
the puppet regime--Soviet policy
appears for the moment to be
based on a realization that no
effective and popular Hungarian
regime can be established in
the near future. Soviet action
against Nagy and a number of
his followers, whose restoration
is still being demanded by most
worker groups, reveals that the
USSR has given up, for the pres-
ent, the idea of developing
Kadar as a powerful national
Communist leader similar to
Gomulka in Poland. Apparently,
however, the Kadar regime will
be retained as the instrument
of soviet policy in Hungary for
the time being.
Some well-informed observ-
ers feel that a continued fail-
ure by the Hungarian government
to end the strike may result in
the virtual elimination of
Hungary as a nation. While
this may be somewhat extreme,
the failure to restore order to
Hungary poses an increasingly
serious problem to the Soviet
hierarchy.
Worker Resistance
Passive resistance by
Hungarian workers continues more
than a month after the beginning
of the revolution on 23 October
despite all efforts by the Radar
regime to break down or win over
the rebellious population.
Workers' councils which have
been created throughout the
country have, by the regime's
own admission, become "more or
less master of the situation."
These organizations continue to
press their demands for economic
and political liberalization--
including the return to power
of Imre Nagy. Efforts to place
old-line Communists in charge
of these councils have met with
protests even from the Com-
munist Party newspaper.
A number of the worker and
revolutionary councils have
modified their strike calls--
although retaining their right
to strike--in an effort to en-
courage some form of return to
economic normalcy. Some workers
--by no means a majority--have
returned to their factories, but
few have engaged in productive
effort and all factories suffer
from a lack of fuel, power and
raw materials.
The spirit of the Hungarian
worker still has not been broken,
and strikes during the past week
emphatically revealed worker
unity and strength. A call for
a 48-hour general strike on 21
and 22 November was highly ef-
fective and a one-hour ''stay-at-
home" protest by the Budapest
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
citizens on 23 November was also
a "big success," These moves
boosted the morale of the popu-
lation and probably jarred the
regime.
Regime Policies
The regime--its repeated
appeals to the workers and its
pledges to implement most worker
demands having failed to achieve
the desired response--has threat-
ened to adopt a significantly
tougher domestic policy. This
line was spelled out by Premier
Kadar in a nationwide radio
speech on 26 November. Kadar
made scant reference to his
alleged dedication to wide-
sweeping economic and political
concessions. Instead, he ques-
tioned the correctness of cer-
tain worker demands, hedged on
amnesty pledges, and deferred
any government overhaul until
after order has been restored
and then only with the inclu-
sion of those "light-minded" par-
ties and individuals dedicated
to building socialism.
Kadar said that the round-
ing up of "criminals" was in
progress and that all counter-
revolutionaries must be "hunted
down and rendered harmless."
Press reports indicate that
several rebellious leaders, in-
cluding at least one Communist
writer known for his "nation-
alist" policies, have already
been arrested as a result of
this new wave of terror.
Kadar's open attack on
Nagy, and his allegation that
many people in offices and fac-
tories were "fascist Horthyite"
and antidemocratic, presage a
possible purge of the revo-
lutionary and workers' councils
established during the past
month. In addition, the appoint-
ment of government commissioners
to supervise productive efforts
at a number of plants provides
the Kadar regime with a new
method to exert control over
the workers' councils.
The Kadar regime has also
made two recent moves which may
affect its relations with the
United States. On 24 November,
the regime accused the American
legation in Budapest of using
a radio transmitter "against
all international law," and on
the following day issued a pub-
lic condemnation of Cardinal
Mindszenty, who is in asylum in
the legation. These actions may
be preparatory to a campaign of
pressure against the legation,
designed to o ustod of
the cardinal.
POLAND CHALLENGES SOVIET POLICY ON HUNGARY
Polish press attacks on
Soviet policy toward Hungary
reflect a decision by Poland's
leaders not to remain silent any
longer on the Soviet intervention
in Hungary lest they appear to
be acquiescing in Moscow's in-
terference in the internal af-
fairs of a Satellite. They ap-
parently are prepared for a ver-
bal battle with the USSR on this
issue, but probably believe that
more direct and pressing-problems
will prevent the Soviet leaders
from taking strong action.
The first attack, which
appeared in Zycie Warszaw on
23 November, was reportedly
approved in advance by the press
department of the central com-
mittee of the Polish United
Workers (Communist) Party. The
article compared the Hungarian
revolution with the Poznan up-
rising and said the "heroic"
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
Hungarians were fighting for
the same thing as the Poles--
sovereignty. It called the
Soviet line on Hungary a "sense-
less theory," and stated that
the Soviet system itself, as
well as Stalin, bears a heavy
responsibility for Stalinist
practices.
Various other Polish papers
have joined in this criticism
of the USSR. Trybuna una Wolnosci,
weekly organ of the party cen-
tral committee, endorsed Tito's
views on relations between so-
cialist states and called for
Polish-Yugoslav co-operation in
the struggle against Stalinism.
It also endorsed most of Tito's
analysis of recent events in
Hungary, but did not mention
his justification of the second
intervention by Soviet troops
at the call of the Kadar regime.
There are also signs that
Poland may withdraw its support
of Hungarian premier Kadar.
An open letter signed by most
of Poland's leading writers
and blaming the Hungarian blood-
shed on a "compromised regime"
was published in Warsaw news-
papers on 25 November. In ad-
dition, the Warsaw branch of
the Union of Journalists passed
a resolution condemning the kid-
naping of former premier Nagy.
There has been no open
Soviet reaction to these criti-
cisms thus far, although Soviet
leaders have probably been an-
gered by them. On 26 November,
Zycie Warszaw attempted to as-
sure t e USSR that Polish criti-
cism was limited to Soviet ac-
tions in Hungary by attacking
Western commentators who said
its earlier article indicated
a weakening of the Soviet-Pol-
ish alliance.
The willingness of the
Polish regime to challenge
Soviet action in Hungary will
give it increased stature in
the eyes of the Polish people.
The Gomulka government, however,
is aware that such articles
could spark further demonstra-
tions against the USSR, and the
26 November article in Zycie
Wars zaw may also have been de-
signed to remind the people of
the necessity for maintaining
friendly relatinns with the
Soviet Union.
THE NEW POLISH REGIME
The extensive personnel
and organizational changes in
the Polish party and government
since the accession to power of
First Secretary Gomulka have
continued the liberalizing and
streamlining program in prog-
ress since the Soviet 20th
party congress last February.
Of the present nine polit-
buro members, four were members
before the 20th congress, while
only one of the seven party
secretaries is a holdover. In
addition, only 15 of the 33
ministers of the present govern-
ment were in the same jobs
prior to the congress.
Pre-Gomulka Changes
A total of 34 ministers
or deputies were fired between
February and late October when
Gomulka came to power. Four
ministries were also abolished.
These changes, apparently in
response to public demands for
a liberalization of the govern-
ment, may have been designed
to remove officials thought to
be associated with the excesses
of the Stalinist period. Also
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
some ministers who were re-
sponsible for the economic
shortcomings that led to the
Poznan riots were fired.
During this period, Jakub
Berman and Hilary Mine were
removed from tho?politburo.
These two men, with the late
Boleslaw Beirut, were the
ruling triumvirate responsi-
ble for the purge of Gomulka
in 1948, and their removal
paved the way for the return
of Gomulka to a position of
leadership.
Post-Gomulka Changes
Gomulka, to assure a regime
loyal to himself, went much
further in shaking up the party
apparatus after his return to
power, removing six politburo
members as well as a secretary
of the central committee who
were considered Stalinists.
He replaced the politburo mem-
bers with three men who are
considered "liberal" Communists
and one who is a known Gomulka
supporter. He also appointed
two new secretaries to the cen-
tral committee, including one
"liberal."
Similar changes are taking
place in lower echelons of the
party. Most of the executive
boards of the party provincial
organizations have been changed
since Gomulka became first
secretary.
A number of governmental
changes have also been made,
presumably at Gomulka's insist-
ence, including the abolition
of two ministries and the state
economic planning commission.
In addition, 14 ministers or
deputy ministers have been ap-
pointed, including "liberal"
Communists, known Gomulka sup-
porters and non-Communists who
were appointed for their tech-
nical competence.
The most notable post-
Gomulka personnel change was
the removal of Marshal Rokos-
sowski from his key posts of
defense minister, politburo
member and deputy premier.
Rokossowski was replaced as
defense minister by General
Spychalski, who had been purged
in 1949 in connection with
Gomulka's downfall.
Gomulka, who has undoubt-
edly been haunted by memories
of the wholesale denunciation
of him in 1948-49 by his erst-
while comrades in the Polish
party hierarchy, including
some persons who still hold high
offices, appears to be clearing
the political scene of persons
he does not trust. The fact
that some of these remain in
high positions probably reflects
the difficulty of finding re-
placements as well as the ne-
cessity for making some con-
cessions 'to all factions for
the sake of party unity.
MOLOTOV' S STATUS IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP
Two recent events have cast
some light on V. M. Molotov's
influence and responsibilities
in the Soviet top leadership.
On 20 November Sovetskaya
Kultura, organ of the USSR Min-
istry of Culture, reported that
Molotov had spoken at a con-
ference of leaders in the field
of Soviet art. On the following
day his appointment as minister
of state control was announced.
Molotov's speech before
representatives of the Soviet
art world in his first public
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
activity as overseer of cul-
tural and educational affairs,
a post to which he was assigned
sometime after his replacement
last June as foreign minister.
It is not known whether he still
retains his responsibilities as
a watchdog over art and liter-
ature, a post carrying consider-
able ideological influence.
M?lotov's appointment as
minister of state control--
taken by itself--does not ap-
pear to represent a comeback
for the former minister of
foreign affairs. His new post
carries no policy-making
authority and no supervisory
powers over party organs; the
minister of state control does
not exercise a powerful in-
fluence in top party circles.
in his new position, Molotov,
while still a first deputy pre-
mier, remains removed from the
vital area of foreign policy
and heads a ministry which has
had a substantial diminution
in influence since Stalin's
death.
Although his long-stand-
ing opposition to the rapproche-
ment with Tito has apparently
been vindicated by recent de-
velopments, Molotov does not
appear to have regained a pri-
mary power position in the
Soviet hierarchy as a result of
the difficulties in Hungary
and Poland.
Reports emanating from Bel-
grade and Warsaw since Septem-
ber of a deep split in the
Soviet leadership and the as-
cendance of a "Stalinist" fac-
tion headed by Molotov have
been modified. Officials in
these capitals now say that
the Soviet leaders are united
on policy toward the Satellites
and that Khrushchev's dominant
position has not been affected
by the stiffening of Soviet
policy. In a recent conversa-
tion with Ambassador Bohlen,
the Yugoslav envoy in Moscow
denied that Khrushchev, in his
talks with Tito in the Crimea
in late September and early
October, had raised the subject
of opposition to his policies
by other Soviet leaders.
The timing of Molotov's new
assignment, the continued promi-
nence of Khrushchev, and Pravda's
authoritative reaffirmation on
23 November of the "different
roads to socialism" doctrine op-
posed by Molotov all appear to
refute rumors that Molotov's
stock is rising spectacularly.
NEW SOVIET HARASSMENT OF ALLIED TRAVEL TO BERLIN
Soviet authorities in East
Germany on the night of 20-21
November began an attempt to
subject Allied military trains
traveling between West Germany
and Berlin to new regulations.
They demanded more detailed
documentation for passengers,
including Russian translations
of travel orders and identity
cards, and asserted they had
the right to board trains to
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLYSUMMARY
check passengers and their
documents. Although the Rus-
sians deny they are challenging
Western rights, their recent
efforts may presage an attempt
to establish more rigid controls
over access to the city.
The USSR may be demonstrat-
ing its retaliatory capabilities
in an attempt to forestall
possible Western moves to stimu-
late and exploit popular unrest
in East Germany, which Moscow
has always blamed on "spy cen-
ters" in Berlin. In more gen-
eral terms the Soviets, having
been caught off balance in
Eastern Europe, may be trying
to test Allied unity by put-
ting the West under pressure
where its vulnerability is high.
They may hope that one direct
result of their pressure will
be to increase the number of
Westerners forced to seek East
German. documentation for non-
official travel to Berlin.
The United States, Britain
and France operate passenger and
freight trains between Berlin
and West. Germany under a four-
power agreement which sets no
limit on categories or national-
ities of personnel who may be
carried. The only limits are
those which Western military
commanders themselves have im-
posed. Heretofore, Soviet
authorities have not normally
required travel orders or
identity documents of passengers.
Train commanders have merely
submitted passenger lists and
freight manifests.
On 22 November, the Allied
political advisers in Berlin
protested to: the acting Soviet,
commander in: Berlin the attempt
to alter established procedures
unilaterally. He replied that
such procedures were entirely
a matter for decision by the
.Soviet authorities, who had the
right to change them as they
wished. He emphasized that the
purpose of the stricter controls
was to limit travel to members
of the Allied garrisons in Ber-
lin and their dependents. This
limitation, he said, would apply
to. both rail and highway traffic
to Berlin. There has been no
hindrance of autobahn traffic.
as yet.
Enforcement of the new con-
trol procedures thus far has
not been consistent. In some
instances, trains have passed
through the'East German border
check point at Marienborn with
only a cursory check and a mini-
mum of difficulty. One train,
however, was delayed for three
hours, and another was turned
back after a two-hour delay on
the grounds that. schedules were
disrupted. Soviet authorities
warned that they would start
boarding Allied trains on the
night of 25-26 November, but
they failed to carry out their
threat. 25X1
FRENCH PREMIER FACES INCREASED OPPOSITION
Disillusionment over the
Anglo-French intervention in
Egypt is growing in France as
the gloomy economic outlook
becomes more apparent, and
criticism of government policies
is increasing within Premier
Mollet's party . No immediate
crisis is expected, however,
because there are few likely
successors anxious to take
responsibility for France's
critical domestic and inter-
national problems.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
French public opinion
still supports Mollet's
original aims of ousting
Egyptian president Nasr and.
internationalizing the Suez
Canal, but the belief is
growing that the intervention
was a disastrous failure, and
that the worst is yet to come.
The fuel shortage is already
causing a cutback in important
sectors of industry, but its
full impact is not expected to
be felt until January (see page
15). The government has im-
posed rationing effective on
29 November. So far, the
French public blames the oil
shortage.on Nasr, but there is
growing anger over American
refusal to make alternate sup-
plies available.
An important minority in
Mollet's Socialist Party is
openly criticizing his policies,
and has asked for a special
Algeria
put off until January.
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party congress to discuss the
Middle East and Algeria. This
group argues that Western-inter-
vention in Egypt lost the So-
cialists an opportunity to at-
tract those Communists repelled
by the Soviet repression in
Hungary.
Rightist parliamentary
elements are also increasingly
critical of Mollet. There are,
however, few political leaders.
willing to take on Mollet's
task of meeting the anticipated.
economic crisis of liquidating
France's North African problems.
The budget has frequently
served as an excuse to over
throw a premier, but the present
budget debates appear to be
progressing smoothly. 'Moreover,
the government seems to have
been successful.in avoiding
assembly consideration of the
Algerian issue, and the contro-
versial debate on government
aid to church schools has been
the United Nations or a "suit-
able neutral" and-negotiate a
"liberal political settlement"
which would "admit the principle
of full self-government for
Algeria." Acceptance of. UN
supervision would be a complete
reversal of France's conten-
tion that Algeria is a domestic
problem outside the scope of
UN jurisdiction.
France may drastically
revise its policy toward Al-
ger.ia
the cabinet rea -irmed on 24 No-
vernber their confidence in Minis-
ter. Lacoste, who still advocates
.pacification by. force, which he
hrpes to corplete before the Al-
gerian issue is debated in the United
Nations, probably in January.
Mollet told an American
congressional delegation that
terms for a cease-fire would
be generous and would include
permission for the rebels to
retain their arms and to hold
areas controlled when a cease-
fire becomes effective. France
would then hold free elections,
which might be supervised by
Although such a new policy
would fail to meet the primary
rebel demand of independence,
it might be acceptable to
enough rebel leaders to reduce
'hostilities'somewhat. Mollet
could then take the line domes-
tically that Lacoste'.s policy
had borne fruit.
Both the rebels and the
French security forces have
stepped up their operations
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since mid-November. Prospects
of a nationwide rebel offensive
in December have been reported.
Guerrilla activity seems to have
increased markedly'in the rural
areas of the Algiers region and
to a lesser extent in the Oran
and the Constantine regions.
Urban terrorism also. continues
to increase. These developments
seem to belie Lacoste's con-
tention to the French cabinet
on 21 November that there has
been "an extremely substantial
improvement in the military,pic-
ture" and that the rebellion
is in its eleventh hour. The
American consul general in
Algiers does not believe that
pacification can be completed
in the near future.
In Morocco, the nationalist
trade union has succeeded in de-
ferring a strike of American-
employed workers at the naval
air base at Port Lyautey, which
is jointly operated by the
United States and France. The
Moroccans had erroneously as-
sumed that French military con-
struction on the American wharf
had American approval. The
French have now agreed to stop
the construction of military
barracks, but indicate they will
continue to offload military
supplies on the wharf. Still
fearing that France intends to
reimpose its control in Morocco,
the Moroccans probably will
continue to protest such activ-
ity. 25X1
After months of fruitless
efforts to agree in advance on
a successor to Japan's Prime
Minister Hatoyama, leaders of
the ruling Liberal-Democratic
Party may settle the question
by an open party convention
vote, an unusual procedure in
Japan. Plans call for the
election of a new party presi-
dent at the national convention
on 12 December, with the winner's
name to be submitted to the reg-
ular Diet session on 20 Decem-
ber for approval as the succes-
sor to Hatoyama as prime minis-
ter. The new prime minister is
then expected to appoint his
cabinet immediately, postponing
any general election at least
until spring.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
2.9 November 1956
The leading candidates in
the struggle are Nobosuke Kish:,
party secretary general, Tanzan
Ishibashi, .international. trade
and industry minister, and
Mitsujiro Ishii, party executive
board chairman. Kishi, who
long had tried to maintain a
neutral position among all
party factions in order to ob-
tain wide support:, appears to
be the favorite, but his de-
cision to identify himself
with the "main stream" faction
led by Agriculture and Forestry
Minister Ichiro Kono recently
strengthened his opposition.
If an open vote is carried
out, the party president will
be selected by 297 members of
the lower house, 124 members
of the upper house, and 92
regional representatives. At
least half of these are believed
to be uncommitted. In addition,
the probability of last-minute
deals makes the outcome far
from certain. Some observers
believe there is still a pos-
sibility that a preconvention
agreement will be reached,
making the convention vote a
mere formality.
The prospects are that, of
the leading candidates, only
Kishi would be able to form a
stable government; the others
would be regarded as interim
governments until a. stronger
party leadership emerged.
Kishi has told Ambassador
Allison that. the three leading
candidates are united on foreign
policy, and that no matter who
wins, the next government will
continue to co-operate with
the United States. Kishi in-
dicated, however, that Japan
would seek a revision of the
US-Japan security treaty, pos-
sibly including a date for the
withdrawal of American troops,
and the release of the remain-
ing war criminals in Sugamo
,prison. Some conservative
leaders contend that only such
measures would demonstrate
Japan's independence from the
United States and prevent a
Socialist government from gain-
ing power. 25X1
The arrest on 22 November
of seven high-ranking South Ko-
rean army officers, including
wormer 2nd Army commander Lieu-
tenant General Kang Mun-bong,
is expected to increase the al-
ready existing factionalism and
anxiety among South Korean army
leaders. Kang is a close sup-
porter of Joint Chiefs of Staff
chairman Chong Il-kwon, and his
arrest may be connected with
Army Chief of Staff Yi Hyong-
hun's persistent efforts to
undermine Chong's influence in
the army.
The arrests climax a new
;.nvestigatian of the assassina-
tion on 30 January of CIC chief
Major General.. Kim Chang-yong
("Snake" Kim). Four conspira-
tors in the assassination were
sentenced to death or life im-
prisonment last October. Kang
is now charged with having giv-
en the wife of one of the con-
demned men-a considerable sum
of money.
Kim, who considered him-
self responsible only to Presi-
dent Rhee, had incurred the
hostility of many army elements,
:including persons close to Chong
Il-kwon. The special board of
inquiry appointed to reopen the
"Snake" Kim case is dominated
by officers hostile to Chong and
I.ang.
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
desires a speedy end to the
case, especially since the Choaig-
Yi feud now shows signs of
spreading within Rhee's Liberal
Party. Nevertheless, the case
has tended to discredit the
army in the eyes of South Ko-
reans, and has adversely af-
fected morale among many senior
army officers.
CHOU EN-LAI'S TRIP
Chou En-lai's statements
in North Vietnam, the joint
Sino-Viet Minh communiqud is-
sued in Hanoi on 22 November,
and Chou's speech before the
Cambodian parliament two days
later are evidence of Peiping's
continued reliance on a soft
policy to achieve Chinese Com-.
munist objectives in Asia.
Chou's remarks appear intended
to widen the gap between the
uncommitted states and the West
and to draw the Asian-African
nations nearer to the Sino-So-
iet bloc by stressing "anti-
colonialism" and Communist ded-
ication to "peace."
In..what was evidently an
effort to counter the impact
of recent developments in East-
ern Europe, Chou went out of
his way to reassure North Viet-
nam as to Peiping's intentions.
He strongly rejected "great-
nation chauvinism" and promised
Chinese Communist adherence to
the "five principles of peaceful
coexistence," which he said
should govern the relations be-
tween all nations. At the same
time, Communist China
and the.Viet Minh ax---
firmed their support
of "solidarity. among the
socialist countries"
and endorsed the Soviet
30 October statement
on internal relations.
SECRET
President Rhee probably
A major theme of
the Hanoi communiqud
was the importance of
the continued "strug-
gle against aggression
and colonialism" which
was stressed as a com-
mon bond among all
the Asian-African
states. The two prime
ministers promised
support to Egypt un-
til its "national in-
dependence and sov-
ereignty" have been
restored.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
The communique declared
that the Chinese Communists and
the Viet Minh would stand to-
gether to bring about "thorough
implementation" of the Geneva
agreements, which it asserted
were being "gravely sabotaged"
by the government of South
Vietnam. Failure to demand a
new conference on Indochina,
however, suggests the Communists
are willing to accept the sta-
tus quo for the present.
The theme of anticolonial-
ism received additional emphasis
when Chou arrived in Cambodia.
In his speech before parliament
on 24 November, Chou reviewed
Sino-Cambodian "successes"
against the "colonialists" at
the Geneva conference in 1954
and at Bandung the following
year. He asserted that Peiping
and Phnom Penh share a love of
independence, a devotion to
peace, and a desire to "proceed
with their construction," which
provide a basis for friendly
relations.
Chou received a carefully
contrived "hero's welcome" in
Cambodia, largely on the per-
sonal orders of Prince Siha-
ARGENTINE ARMY
The shake-up in Argentine
army commands starting on 22
November results from the con-
tinuing struggle for political
dominance between two loosely
defined military groups, the
"democratic gorillas" and the
"nationalists." The "gorillas,"
reportedly scoring a victory in
these changes, hope to reduce
the electoral chances of Arturo
Frondizi, who on 9 November won
the Radical Party presidential
nomination for the elections
:aow scheduled in late 1957.
They also hope'to increase the
nouk, who was anxious to repay
Chou for the warm reception
given the Cambodian delegation
to Peiping last February. The
welcome to Chou was also in
keeping with Sihanouk's view
that to be a "good friend" of
Peiping is Cambodia's best de-
fense against Communist aggresr
siozi. -Ubder' the circumstances,
Chou's visit constitutes a
propaganda victory for the Com-
munists which seems likely to
strengthen Peiping's standing
among the influential Overseas
Chinese community in Cambodia.
The reaction in Cambodia to
Soviet intervention in Hungary,
however, has offset the effects
of Chou's visit to some ex-
tent. The Cambodian delega-
tion in the UN, in contrast
to other Asian neutrals, has
consistently supported the-West
on this issue. The final com-
muniqud, moreover, was largely
a repetition of the one signed
in February which indicates
that Sihanouk avoided making
any new commitments to Peiping.
The Chinese Communist pre-
mier finished his visit to Cam-
bodia on 27 November and is
now in India.
COMMAND SHIFTS
navy's strength at the expense
of the traditionally stronger
army.
The term "gorilla," orig-
inally applied to young officers
active in ousting Peron, has
been extended to those--includ-
ing some civilians--who favor
the forced retirement of other
generals and continued drastic
repression of the Perouistas.
The "gorillas" reportedly sup-
port President Aramburu's plan
for democratization of the
armed forces and their eventual
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,1 n vrn T T NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 17
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
elimination from politics.
Many generals who do not share
the "gorilla" point of view are
labeled "nationalists," whether
merited or not. Aramburu has
tried to reconcile the two
groups.
Army Changes
The army shifts are still
under way and reportedly have
affected 36 generals and vari-
ous command posts throughout
Argentina. The first to be
ousted were the army commander
in chief, the chief of staff,
and the commanding generals of
the cavalry and First Motorized
Infantry Division. The politi-
cal sentiments of the new ap-
pointees appear to be. anti-
Frondizi. This would reflect
the predominant "gorilla" view
that Frondizi is an undesirable
presidential candidate and that
elections should be delayed
somewhat beyond the scheduled
period of the last quarter of
1957.
Army Minister Ossorio
Arana emphasized during his
ICELAND* S NEW ATTITUDE
In the negotiations with
the United States last week,
Iceland indicated its willing-
ness for American troops to re-
main in the country and pro-
posed that discussions concern-
ing their withdrawal be discon-
tinued.
Two factors have evidently
induced the Icelandic government
to retreat from its earlier de-
nands. First, Soviet repression
of the Hungarian uprising has
:nade an unprecedented impact on
announcement of the shifts that
elections would be held as
scheduled. It is rumored, how-
ever, that Ossorio may be re-
lieved of his duties in the
near future, since he maintains
that the army should not try to
influence the elections.
Conflicting Claims
Both the "gorillas" and
the "nationalist" army group
profess a desire to remove the
military from politics, The
"gorillas" charge, however,
that the army is in effect pro-
moting the fortunes of Frondizi
by not supporting measures which
would delay the elections and
give other political groups
more time to strengthen their
positions. Army "nationalists"
favor letting the election date
stand and would like to reduce
the army purges and other os-
tensibly anti-Peronista meas-
ures, asserting that these
store up potential resentment
against the regime and could
eventually provoke n7 revo-
lutionary outbreaks.
ON THE KEFLAVIK BASE
Icelanders and raised doubts as
to the "improvement in the world
situation" cited as a reason for
the March resolution. Second,
the government is anxious to
have dollar-earning construction
resumed at the base, and also
desires a minimum $4,000,000,
20-to-25-year loan from the
United States to stabilize its
currency.
The action of the Icelandic
government is more a tactical
retreat than a fundamental
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
change of policy. The govern-
ment will make no effort to
remove from the books the
parliamentary resolution of
28 March, which called for a
revision of the defense agree-
ment of 1951 and the withdrawal
of American forces. It also
seems determined to avoid re-
ferring the base question first
to the North Atlantic Council
in the future. When Iceland
asked the council last June
for an opinion on the continu-
ing need for American troops
at Keflavik, the council's
affirmative reply put all of
Iceland's allies on record
against the government's pro-
posal and intensified doubts
among the Icelandic public.
The government has now
proposed the formation of a
US-Icelandic Standing Group
"to consult from time to time
as to the defense needs of
Iceland and the North Atlantic
area, to consider arrangements
SECRET
WESTERN EUROPE'S PETROLEUM POSITION
Western Europe's current
and prospective supplies of
petroleum are now estimated by
experts of the Organization
for European Economic Co-opera-
tion (OEEC) * at from 75, 000, 000
to 30,000,000 tons or 50 percent
of normal requirements for the
next six months. These experts
expect an additional 10 percent
to be obtained from Saudi
Arabia through Tapline and hope
for 15, percent more from in-
creased Western hemisphere ex-
ports. The Tapline and western
The 17 member countries
are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Germany, Greece, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, and the United Kingdom.
PART II
appropriate to meeting such
needs. and, taking into account
the general political and
military situation, to make
recommendations to the two
governments."
The Communist-dominated
Labor Alliance, which with the
Progressives and Social Demo-
crats forms the incumbent
coalition government, is ap-
parently willing to let Ameri-
can troops remain in Iceland
for the present, although
some self-righteous outbursts
are to be expected. The Ice-
landic Communists are determined
to remain in the government,
where they are relatively immune
to criticism from the other gov-
ernment parties and can proceed
to reorganize their somewhat
shaken ranks. More important,
they can pursue their basic long-
range aim of acquiring a firm
grip on the island's economy
through the Ministries of Fisheries
and Commerce, and Social Affairs.
hemisphere arrangements, however,
have still to be formally
worked out and consumption is
meanwhile'running at 90 percent
of normal through the use of
reserve stocks.
The Soviet Union, accord-
ing to press reports, is making
substantial oil offers to
various Western European coun-
tries but these reports are
unconfirmed. By curtailing
domestic consumption and drawing
on reserve stocks,. the Soviet
bloc could release some petro-
leum beyond the present 2,500,
000-ton annual. delivery rate to
Western Europe. However, even
under these circumstances, the
amount which the bloc could
offer would contribute only a
small percentage to Western
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 17
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Europe's needs and
the bloc would en-
counter obstacles
in arranging trans-
portation to effect
deliveries. Under
OEEC's proposed
emergency regula-
tions, however, any
member country would
be bound to contrib-
ute its imports from
the USSR and from all
other sources into a
community pool.
Most OEEC mem-
ber countries are
now or soon will be
enforcing measures
designed to limit
consumption on a
WESTERN EUROPE'S PETROLEUM POSITION
NUMBER OF DAYS SUPPLY AVAILABLE 1 NOVEMBER 1956
NONAVIATION
GASOLINE
DIESEL
FUEL OIL
TOTAL FUEL
PRODUCTS*
BELGIUM
18
20
9
15
DENMARK
47
50
25
35
FRANCE
29
19
16
21
GREECE
52
38
35
42
ITALY
21
16
20
19
NETHERLANDS
36
23
12
20
NORWAY
70
57
45
54
PORTUGAL
55
42
73
64
SWEDEN
98
60
29
51
SWITZERLAND
63
55
28
50
WEST GERMANY
31
22
17
22
UK and EIRE
48
49
49
54
AVERAGE
47
38
30
37
national basis. Stocks, which
averaged only 37 days of norm-
al supply just before the
Suez Canal was closed, vary
considerably between countries
as do the measures taken to
restrict consumption. Few of
these measures, however, under-
take to cut consumption below
'75 percent of normal, and at
best, efforts made by individual
nations separately will be
cumulatively much less effective
than would be pooling and co-
operative restriction through
the OEEC.
In these various national
measures for restricting con-
sumption, internal political
considerations seem to have
played at least as large a part
as the respective countries'
greatly differing dependence
on oil for their basic energy
requirements. Italy, for ex-
ample, though dependent on oil
for about a third of these
requirements, fears to begin
rationing because it anticipates
panic buying and hoarding.
supply is assured until early
1957. However, the Ministry of
Fuel and Power is extremely
concerned about the January-
February position and the prob-
lem of making up the gap between
assured imports for that period
and the 75-percent level of
availabilities on which present
planning and rationing is based.
Following up the 10 per-
cent cut in oil companies'
deliveries ordered on 7 Novem-
ber, the government announced
much more stringent measures
on 20 November. Diesel oil for
nonindustrial central heating
will be cut one third and fuel
oil for the same purpose cut
25 percent effective 1 Decem-
ber. Industrial consumption
of diesel oil will be cut 20
percent on 1 January. Gasoline
ration books providing fuel
for about 200 miles per month
will be in use on 17 December.
France is basing most of
its restrictions on the assump-
tion of a 25-percent shortage
during the next six months.
Continued receipt by Brit- I In heavy industrial fuel oil,
ain of 70 percent of its normal I however, there is a prospective
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
40-percent shortage. Consump-
tion of such oil by industries
other than utilities has al-
ready been cut to two thirds
of 1955 requirements, and the
situation is expected to be
even more serious by 1 January.
Automobile travel-has been re-
stricted since 15 November, in.
anticipation of an acute gaso-
line shortage by April-.
Italy
Italy sees no problem on
gasoline before mid-January
but anticipates a serious fuel
oil shortage during the first
week in December. The govern-
ment has prevailed on the re-
fineries to cut deliveries of
fuel oil by 5 percent and has
levied a tax on gasoline, the
proceeds to be used to offset
the increased cost of fuel oil
to consumers.
West Germany
West Germany's supply
situation appears to be less
acute than that of most other
European countries, but a short-
age of fuel oil is anticipated
and the major oil companies
have been forced to cut back
deliveries to major consumers
by about 20 percent. The
government wishes to avoid
direct consumer, rationing for,
fear of speculative hoarding
and possible unfavorable com-
parison with conditions in
East Germany.
Belgium anticipates a
tight fuel oil situation and
has taken steps to reduce
consumption of all petroleum
?roducts by 15 percent. The
Netherlands has also cut con-
sumption of fuel oil for do-
mestic heating by 20 percent
and for industry 1.0 percent.
Both countries have banned
Sunday driving.
Denmark appears to be in
the most difficult situation,
with only about four weekst sup-
ply of fuel oil reported as of
mid-November. Swedish law
requires refineries to maintain
reserves equal to about three
months consumption at normal
rates. The Norwegian minister
of commerce reported in late
November that the government
was not presently concerned
about stocks. Through curtail-
ment of deliveries to retailers,
Denmark has arranged to cut
gasoline consumption by 25 per-
cent, Sweden by 20 percent and
Norway by 10 percent.
General Economic Repercussions
The chairman of the OEEC';:s
petroleum committee has spoken
of "disastrous" economic con-
sequences for Western Europe
unless the over-all petroleum
shortage is kept below 25
percent during the next six
months and unless the available
supplies are efficiently al-
located throughout the area.
More immediate repercussions
are already apparent in the
aggravation of Britain and
France's dollar problems.
Britain's gold and dollar
reserves have in recent weeks
I approached the minimum safety
working level of two billion
dollars. During the week ended
17 November, these fell $102,-
000,000,and added dollar pay-
r.ients for western hemisphere
oil during the next six months
are estimated at $225,000,000.
French dollar reserves, now down
to $1,,3 billion, are expected 25X1
to be similarly depleted by
from $65,000,000 tol$100.000.000
(Concurred in by ORR~
in the same period.
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CO N'tTLAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
AUSTRIAN NEUTRALITY AND THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION
The Soviet intervention
in Hungary has presented the
Austrian government with
challenging and difficult
problems scarcely a year after
the withdrawal of Soviet occu-
pation forces. The govern-
ment and the people on the
whole have met this challenge
wii;h circumspection, and ' the USSR
has not seriously criticized
Austria's neutral. conduct. In
doing so, they have had to
prevent prorebel activities
with which they sympathized,
contrive measures to protect
and control the eastern fron-
tiers, refute Communist
charges of neutrality viola-
tions, and contend with a
major refugee problem.
Sympathy for the Rebels
The desire of the Austrian
population to give support to
the Hungarians presents the
government with perhaps its
most delicate problem. There
have been numerous demonstra-
tions throughout the country
on behalf of the rebels. The',,
party-controlled and independ-
ent, press has condemned
Soviet intervention, and par-
liamentary leaders have openly
declared support for the
Hungarians.
Responsible leaders of
both the People's Party and
the Socialists sent fraternal
greetings to the Hungarian
Smallholders and Social Demo-
cratic parties after their re-
constitution and, during the
period when the rebels seemed
to have a chance, received
delegations from them.
The government has urged
Austrians to exercise restraint,
reminded the population of the
obligations of neutrality, and
attempted to take as strong a
stand as it could against
Soviet intervention. The
Austrian cabinet requested
the Soviet Union on 28 Octo-
ber to "help bring about the
cessation of fighting in
Hungary." In a radio address
on 11 November, Chancellor
Raab reminded the Austrians
that the gauntry must maintain
its military neutrality, but
he rejected any "colorless
neutralism" for Austria and
charged that the Soviet Union
was crushing a "people attempt-
ing to rise up against politi-
cal terror."
Emigrd Activities
Another difficulty for the
government has been the Hungar-
ian expatriates, some of whore
have viewed Austria as a poten-
tial base from which to con-
tinue resistance. Early in
the rebellion Hungarian refu-
gees in Austria reportedly
broke out of federal camps, in-
tending to return to their
native country., Ambassador
Thompson, moreover, has ex-
pressed concern over the in-
tentions of various Hungarian
emigre organizations.
The government initially
seemed indisposed to intervene
in these activities. The
hazards of such a course were
soon recognized, however, and
Ferenc Nagy, former Hungarian
premier, was asked to leave
Vienna a few hours after he
arrived from America. Faced
with reports that the refugees
were thinking at one point of
establishing an emigre govern-
ment and hoping to recruit arms
and men for the rebels, the
Austrian government has also
urged the immediate removal of
all refugees as quickly as
possible.
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES I?affe I of 5
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
Frontier Controls
During the initial stages
of the rebellion, the Hungarian
frontier was policed on the
Austrian side only by border
and customs guards. As the
struggle approached the Austrian
frontiers, however, the govern-
ment directed the clear demar-
cation of the border with Aus-
trian flags. Some 4,000 troops
were deployed in the area with
orders to fire on Soviet or
Hungarian border-crossers who
refused to be disarmed. During
the first two weeks of the
fighting, about 1,500 Hungarians
were disarmed and interned.
Prior to the appearance
of Soviet troops at the border,
Austrian press reports claimed
open fraternization and free
traffic across the frontier,
which the border guards were
evidently neither able nor dis-
posed to control. Evidence is
lacking, however, that assist-
ance, other than welfare aid,
reached the rebels from Austria,
and Ambassador Thompson esti-
mates that no more than a few
hundred persons resident in
Austria crossed the border to
join the rebels.
Refugee Problem
Providing teimapo
rary.housin and care
for 96,000 refugees
has overwhelmed Aus-
trian facilities, and
international assist-
ance has afforded only
partial relief. While
the Vienna government
has insisted it will
grant asylum to all
who desire to come,
its official position
is that the permanent
absorption of these
refugees is not only
economically impossi-
ble but politically
dangerous. Many Hun-
garians will try to
stay in Austria in
the hope that conditions will
improve in Hungary and they
will be able to return..
Bloc Allegations
On 2 November, Moscow radio
broadcast charges of violations
of Austrian neutrality, alleg-
ing that air shipments of muni-
tions from Vienna to Budapest
had occurred, that the Hungar-
ian uprising had been directed
by Americans, and that Hungar-
ian emigres were being flown
into Hungary from Vienna. These
allegations have been repeated
at various times by Satellite
transmitters, and most recently
by the Budapest radio. More-
over, on 14 November, Izvestia
specifically charged t a~i t some
Austrian officials had violated
the neutrality principle.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
Immediate Dangers
Ambassador Thompson is in-
clined to discount the serious-
ness of these allegations, at-
tributing the unofficial charges
of violations of Austrian neu-
trality to Communist efforts to
maintain the fiction that the
Hungarian rebellion was not
spontaneous but organized from
abroad.
Any political activity on
the part of Hungarian emigres
in Austria, however, would be
certain to provoke a Soviet
protest. Moreover, the shooting
on 23 November of a Soviet
soldier by an Austrian customs
guard points up the danger of
continuing border incidents.
Long-Term Problems
The Austrian government is
obviously aware of such poten-
tial dangers. It will speed its
efforts to create Austrian forces
capable of at least policing its
frontiers. Some consideration
is also being given to the need
for legislation to restrain the
activities of individuals and
organizations in accordance with
the requirements of military neu-
trality. Despite the opposition
of the Western powers, new con-
sideration has been given to the
possibility of seeking a four-
power guarantee of Austria's
territorial integrity.
Revulsion against the Aus-
trian Communists is at an all-
time high, and defections "by
the thousands" will further di-
minish the already bleak pros-
pects of the party for gaining
any influence over Austrian pol-
icy. Moreover, there will be 25X1
increasingly strong opposition
to expanding cultural and social
exchanges with the bloc.
Antigovernment Indonesian
army elements have been sub-
stantially weakened by the army
crisis, which reached its peak
between 16 and 21 November, and
any attempted coup in the near
future would seem to have little
chance of success. The crisis,
however, stimulated the fac-
tionalism prevalent in the army,
which may now'be exploited by
political elements.
The frictions between the
army and government in Indo-
nesia have their roots in the
mutual suspicions that exist
between most top army leaders
and the National Party, which
heads the government coalition,
and date back at least to 1952.
Army leaders distrust the party
because of its record of inter-
ference in military affairs and
intermittent co-operation with
the Communists. The National
Party, for its part, . h'as been
concerned over the army's in-
creasing interest in political
matters and over the large de-
gree of provincial autonomy
exercised by the seven ter-
ritorial commanders.
Since the National Party
assumed control of the cabinet
in April 1956, Chief of Staff
Nasution has sought to promote
centralized control. To this
end he has carried out the long-
postponed transfers of the seven
territorial commanders, a move
which has scattered the army's
strongest leaders and deprived
them of their chief sources Of
strength.
The principals in the re-
cent flare-ups were General
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
25X1
Nasution and former deputy
chief of staff Colonel Zulkifli
Lubis. Lubis has been the main
spokesman for army grievances
against the government for the
past 18 months and has been the
chief instigator of the plotting
against the government.
army transfers, reprimands,
and arrests ordered by Nasution
aimed at reducing political
activity in the army.
Lubis was appointed deputy
chief of staff by a pro-Com-
munist defense minister in 1953.
During the ensuing two years,
Lubis' career indicates
that his recent activities
have been motivated by personal
ambition and a dislike for Na-
sution which derives from their
long-standing identification
with opposing army factions.
In any case, in his ef-
forts to discredit Nasution
and to increase his own sup-
port, he has exploited legiti-
mate army grievances and disap-
pointment over Nasution's fail-
ure to rectify them; the desire
of the territorial commanders
to retain a high degree of in-
dependent action in the face
of Nasution's drive to increase
headquarters' authority; and
tension aroused by a series of
the seven territorial commanders
--and particularly Colonel
Simbolon of North Sumatra and
Colonel Kawilarang in West Java
--provided the principal resist-
ance to Communist influence in
Indonesia. They were so suc-
cessful in uniting the army
against the defense minister
that Lubis apparently was in-
spired to switch sides in 1955
and to take the lead in army
tactics which resulted in the
collapse of the first All
Sastroamidjojo cabinet in July
1955. 25X1
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CURRENT I11TELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
29 November 1956
Tension continues high in
Indonesia, but Nasution appears
to have the situation under
control, Even resentment over
the transfer of territorial
conunanders appears to be. dimin
:fishing, and the transfers are
increasingly regarded as "re-
grettable"but part of a log-
ical army rotation.
Despite the success Nasu-
tion has achieved in disciplin-
ing the army, widespread dis-
satisfaction over low wages
and poor living conditions con-
tinue. This dissatisfaction
is aggravated by the knowledge
of continued civil corruption
and the government's inability
or unwillingness to deal ef-
fectively with pressing domes-
tic problems.. Moreover, army
factionalism is based heavily
on personal loyalties as well
as policy differences, which
have not been eliminated in
the,recent crisis.
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