CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A001000010001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 19, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 27, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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-c
CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 16
OCI NO. 6113/56
27.September 1956
Np CHANGE IN CLASS. D
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GLAt5. CH?N E TO;
KX,t AEV1EVV C?A1E:
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIA1
5 Yom"
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
OF IMMEDIATE. INTEREST
SUEZ DEVELOPMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
As the UN Security Council prepares to debate the
Suez issue, Britain and France seem assured of support
from Australia and Belgium, but there is some doubt re-
garding the attitudes of Peru, Cuba, and China. Iran,
as spokesman for the Near East on the council, will
probably follow a cautious course. Egypt is likely to
receive full support from the USSR and probably from
Yugoslavia. In Egypt, about half the old force of
pilots continues to operate the canal with only minor
interruptions.
Israel's attack on Jordanian military positions
southwest of Jerusalem on 25-26 September will probably
be followed by a period of tension comparable to that
which followed a similar raid against Egyptian forces
in the Gaza strip just over a year ago. Neither side
appears ready to expand this incident--or series of
incidents--into an all-out war.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Page 3
SOVIET POLICY SPLIT RUMORED
OVER TITO AND SATELLITES .:t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
As a result of Khrushchev's trip to Yugoslavia,
reports have been circulating that the rapprochement
with Tito and his influence in the Satellites have
caused a rift in the Soviet leadership. It is probable
that the consequences of recent "liberal" Soviet
policies toward the Satellites and Yugoslavia are a
cause of real concern to the Soviet leaders but that
they have not led to a split among them. Khrushchev's
return to the USSR on 27 September, accompanied by
Tito, his wife, and Yugoslav vice premier Rankovic,
indicates that discussions on Soviet-Yugoslav relations
will continue.
CONfyIAL
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
DIVERGENT SATELLITE ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE USSR . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 000. , .0 Page 2
The frank and often critical treatment of the USSR
in the Polish press is completely different from articles
on the USSR appearing elsewhere in the Satellites.. While
Polish papers are stressing the "independence of countries
in the socialist camp" and playing down references to
the USSR, articles in Albania and Czechoslovakia are
virtually attacking the doctrine of "many roads to
socialism" and are hailing close relations with the USSR
as the indispensable foundation of the Satellite regimes.
HUNGARIAN WRITERS DEMAND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Hungarian writers, who have spearheaded the drive
for moderate policies, have resumed their offensive
against the Communist regime following a two-month
period of relative restraint. They met in Budapest in
mid-September to rally support for their cause and to
re-endorse as their leaders those individuals who have
led them in their fight for freedom of expression.
Although viewed with varying degrees of disapproval by
government leaders, the writers' program is more apt
to be met with compromise than with repression.
CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT
ON GENEVA TALKS . . . . . . .
In its fourth official statement this year on the
Johnson-Wang talks at Geneva, Communist China on 21
September repeated previous warnings against "dragging
out the talks." The tone of the statement was moderate,
and Peiping's expression of its desire to move on to a
new subject suggests that the Chi
break off the talks at this time.
Page 5
CHINESE COMMUNIST CONGRESS . . . .... ... . . . . . Page 6
Speeches at the Chinese Communist eighth. party
congress, which was to end on 27 September, continued
to place major emphasis on collective leadership and
"democratic" m6thods at all levels. The special
praise Mao Tse-tung received was extended, in some
degree to Liu Shao-chi, who has apparently been chosen
by Mao as the leader of the group that is to succeed
him.
fJDJJTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
CHOU EN-LAI PLANS
MAJOR ASIAN TOUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Chinese Communist premier Chou En-lai will leave
Peiping in late November for a tour through South and
Southeast Asia which may take him to the capitals of
ten Asian nations. Chou's general objective probably
is to repeat his success at the Bandung conference of
1955 and renew the image he created then of Communist
China as a peace-loving great power.
Should President Somoza of Nicaragua die as a result
of the assassination attempt of 21 September, a long
period of political uncertainty and violence may follow.
The National Guard, Nicaragua's only armed force, would
be a decisive factor in the post-Somoza political scene,
and the defense minister, Colonel Francisco Gaitan,
would probably play a leading role.
SOVIET BLOC CULTURAL CENTERS
IN LATIN AMERICA . . . . . .
Soviet bloc countries are having some success with
cultural and friendship societies in Latin America.
These organizations are important in providing means
through which bloc contacts with Latin America may be
expanded.
.NEW POLITICAL CRISIS THREATENS
IN PAKISTAN OVER SUEZ . . . . . . . . . . .
Page 8
Page 10
Page 11
Pakistani president Mirza's desire to join the Suez
Canal Users' Association and Prime Minister Suhrawardy's
unwillingness to do so may result in a dispute between
the two men which could end in Suhrawardy's dismissal
or resignation. In this event, President Mirza would
probably attempt to govern by direct rule.
JAPANESE POLITICAL DISPUTES
OVER RELATIONS WITH USSR . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . Page 12
A new series of political disputes has been touched
off in Japan by Soviet premier Bulganin's ambiguous
note of 14 September agreeing to resume negotiations on
the basis of the Japanese "five-point" proposal. The
anti-Hatoyama movement within the Liberal-Democratic
Party is growing and some elements have threatened to
split the party if the prime minister goea to Mnsnnw
bef ore the Soviet position is clarified.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
Page 13
S INGAPORE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
In the Singapore government's crackdown on Communist-
front organizations, seven Communist-front leaders have
been arrested and three organizations ordered dissolved.
Caught off guard, the pro-Communist People's Action
Party is reacting slowly and cautiously- h ere is a
possibility of disorders.
REUNIFICATION PROBLEMS
OF THE ITALIAN SOCIALISTS .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
Major difficulties still block early reunification
of the Socialists in Italy despite recent expressions
of optimism by Democratic Socialist and Nenni Socialist
spokesmen. Sentiment.for reunification seems to be
strong among the rank and file of both parties.
Moscow is taking a cautious attitude on the reunification
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TURKISH PRIME MINISTER
MOVES TO SUPPRESS OPPOSITION . . . . . . . .
In the face of mounting economic difficulties,
Turkish prime minister Menderes `"'h'as iristituted `ifl--r
creasingly authoritarian measures rather than agree to
economic reforms, He will probably be able to suppress
opposition criticism as long as he has the support of his
party and of the farmers.
PROSPECT OF
LABOR UNREST IN SPAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 17
Spanish industrial workers may soon strike again in
protest against inadequate wage boosts in the face of
rising living costs. The government does not seem Pre-
pared to offer the workers economic relief, 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
PROSPECTS FOR THE MOLLET GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
When the French National Assembly reconvenes on 2
October, Premier Mollet will face mounting political
opposition as a result of growing frustration over the
Suez crisis, the Algerian problem and domestic.inflation,
Mollet will not take a merely defensive attitude toward
these problems. He may in any event be overthrown in
his attempts to deal with them.
PROSPECTS FOR THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAPAN .
The Japan Socialist Party has gained sufficient
strength to worry seriously the dominant conservatives,
but it is not expected to gain power in the near future.
Although 'the party suffers from immaturity and faction-
alism, its influence will affect Japan's domestic and
foreign policies. It will continue to oppose many
American objectives and push for greater "independence."
Page 3
THE DE-STALINIZATION CAMPAIGN IN SOVIET GEORGIA. . . . . Page 7
In the face of the unexpected popular resentment in
Georgia to the attack on Stalin at the 20th Soviet party
congress, de-Stalinization was delayed there but has
now begun in earnest. The effect of the incident on
Georgian nationalism will probably color relations
betwee cow government for years to
come.
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27 September 1956
SUEZ DEVELOPMENTS
As the UN Security Council
prepares to debate the Suez
issue, support of Britain and
France from Australia and Bel-
gium appears virtually certain,
but there is some doubt re-
garding the attitudes of Peru,
Cuba, and China. Iran's posi-
tion as spokesman for the Near
East on the council will prob-
ably lead it to take an ex-
tremely cautious approach.
Egypt, attending as an in-
terested party, is likely to
receive full support from the
Soviet Union and probably Yugo-
slavia. For the Soviet Union,
the deliberations will serve
as a propaganda forum for re-
asserting the similarity of
Soviet and Arab po'icies on
colonial matters, and an op-
portunity to draw out negotia-
tions for a peaceful settle-
ment on Egypt's terms.
The USSR's position prob-
ably will hew closely to the
Soviet statement of 15 Septem-
ber, defending nationalization
of the canal and Egyptian com-
petence to operate it and sup-
porting Nasr's call for a 45-
nation conference as a means
of achieving a peaceful solu-
tion to the problem. Moscow
is likely to attack very
strongly Western economic pres-
sure on Egypt as economic sanc-
tions without UN authorization.
Moscow radio on 25 September
stated that the Western appeal
to the United Nations "is hard-
ly likely to bring success."
Through amendments voted
on separately and possibly
paragraph by paragraph, any
resolution introduced by
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Britain and France maybe so
modified as to compel them
to vote against it themselves.
Any amendment eschewing the
use of force would be as dif-
ficult to oppose as to defeat.
Some elements in both
Britain and France hope that
an inconclusive UN debate will
"prove" the necessity for more
direct action. Despite this
and recent minor additions to
the military build-up, London
and Paris probably do not in-
tend the UN appeal to be merely
a preliminary step to the ap-
plication of military force
against Egypt.
While attention centers
on the United Nations, Britain
is proceeding with its plans
to set up a Suez Canal Users'
Association (SCUA) at meetings
in London beginning on 1 Octo-
ber. France's grudging ac-
ceptance of the plan dramatized
the widespread lack of enthu-
siasm among the 18 London con-
fereesfor the project that
many had initially hoped would
show the way to forcing a set-
tlement on Egypt.
Only seven have indicated
they definitely will join:
Britain, the United States,
Italy, France, the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Sweden. Accept-
ances from six others--Austra-
lia, New Zealand, West Germany,
Portugal, Turkey and Norway--
are anticipated.
Pakistani prime minister
Suhrawardyj has told the Amer-
ican ambassador in Karachi
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
that Pakistan would not as-
sociate with the users' as-
sociation, and the ambassador
believes that no pressure from
the West or from President
Mirza will change the prime
minister's mind (see Part II,
p.. 11).. Japan evidently in-
tends to reject. membership.
Of the remaining three,
Iran is hesitant to align it-
self publicly against Egypt.
Spain's joining is doubtful,
in view of its continued
pressing of its own proposal
for negotiations with Nasr.
Ethiopia's position is uncer-
tain.
Even among those most
favorable toward the users'
association, little agreement
on SCUA's precise function is
evident. The 18-nation dis-
cussions at London that'ended
on 21 September showed far too
great differences to support
any such a firm plan as sending
a test ship through the canal
to try Nasr's intentions.
Britain and France still seek
an active role for the organ-
ization.
French and British Reactions
Disillusion and discour-
agement with the results of
the second London conference
have been most marked in France.
Blame has fallen principally
on the United States. Foreign
Minister Pineau has reiterated
that direct force is not ex-
cluded.
Premier Mollet will prob-
ably be forced into a debate
on Suez when the National As-
sembly reconvenes on 2 October.
The government will be sub-
jected to bitter attacks as a
result of the mounting opposi-
tion to its Suez policy,
conbined with frustration over
the Algerian situation and
domestic economic and social
problems. (See Part III, p.
1.)
In Britain, the turn of
events has centered attention
on conflicting pressures with-
in the Conservative cabinet.
There are no indications that
Eden's hold on the party leader-
ship has been shaken. The Con-
servative Party conference on
11-13 October should give some
indication of Eden's standing
with the rank and file, and
also the relative prestige of
Chancellor of the Exchequer
Macmillan and House of Com-
mons leader Butler, respective
champions of toughness and con-
ciliation. Parliament recon-
venes on 23 October.
Egyptian Developments
Egypt continues to main-
tain canal operations without
a major interruption. For the
first time since the Western
pilots walked out, three ships
were held up for lack of pilots
on 23 September when the high-
est total of ships since the
walkout--44--transited. Three
convoys a day is likely to re-
main standard procedure until
more pilots are trained.
About 100 pilots are now
available--approximately half
the number before nationaliza-
tion. More than 40 new foreign
pilots have arrived, including
15 from the Soviet Union, 12
from Poland, and 11 from Yugo-
slavia.
President Nasr sought to
demonstrate solidarity within
the Arab bloc by going to
Dammam with Syrian president
Quwatli for talks with King
Saud of Saudi Arabia. The
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27 September 1956
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Syrian and Saudi chiefs could
hardly do less for Egypt at
this time than the communique
they issued reaffirming their
support. Nasr evidently was
concerned lest Saud?s preceding
talks with King Faisal of Ira
suggest Arab differences.
Nehru?s statement
criticizing Nasr's method of
Suez nationalization almost
certainly has also given the
Egyptian president some worry.
Numerous press reports
and rumors of the presence of
British and French military
units in Israel reflect ex-
treme Arab nervousness and
suspicion--reinforced by re-
cent Israeli raids on Jordan
and the sale of Canadian-built
jet fighters to Israel--that
the West will take advantage
of Egypt's preoccupation and
move on the Arab states in
concert with Israel.
Sino-Soviet Support
Apart from pilots, Egypt
continues to receive economic
support from the Soviet Union,
Israel's attack on Jorda-
nian military positions south-
west of Jerusalem on 25-26 Sep-
tember will probably be fol-
lowed by a period of high ten-
sion comparable to that which
followed a similar raid against
Egyptian forces in the Gaza
strip just over a year ago.
Neither side, however, appears
ready to expand this incident--
and has had offers from Com-
munist China. A delegation of
Soviet cotton production spe-
cialists arrived in Egypt on
19 September for a three-week
visit. The group is led by
Deputy Minister of Agriculture
Rasulov, and, in addition to
other high agricultural of-
ficials, includes the minister
of light industry of the Tadzhik
Republic. Chou En-lai, in re-
porting to the Standing Com-
mittee of the National People's
Congress, stated his govern-
ment's complete support of the
Egyptian position.
Over the last two weeks,
Soviet propaganda attacks on
the American position on Suez
have steadily increased,
especially in broadcasts to the
Arab states, which say the
United States is no better than
Britain and France, label as
American all "colonial" plans,
and claim that American policy
is hostile to Egypt, the Arabs,
and peace and security. A
Pravda editorial on 24 Septem-
er pointed to the "failure"
of the London conference and
called Western introduction of
the Suez dispute into the
United Nations another colonial
maneuver.
or series of incidents--into
an all-out war.
As: usual after the Israelis
inflict a serious blow, Arab
propaganda sought to minimize
the political impact of the
raid by asserting that Jorda-
nian forces made a strong de-
fense and were overrun only by
"overwhelming" Israeli numbers.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
It seems that in this case, at
least, there may be some sub-
stance to the claims.
Israel reportedly suffered
substantial losses, since its
attack was launched against
prepared positions in full
moonlight, and because the
Jordanians had anticipated that
an Israeli reprisal would come
despite Amman's apologetic
assertion that "temporary in-
sanity" seized a machine gunner
who killed four Israeli archae-
ologists two days before.
With Egypt still preoc-
cupied with the Suez situation,
the Arab reaction is likely to
be confined mainly to com-
plaining and biding time, al-
though there almost certainly
will be further minor Jorda-
nian incursions into Israel,
either centrally directed or un-
controlled by the Amman au-
thorities.
The initial attitude of
Jordan's leaders was indicated
by an appeal from Chief of
Staff Nuwar, who stated short-
ly after the Israeli attack
began that unless it were
stopped by morning there would
be very serious consequences.
These were not the words of a
military leader seeking an op-
portunity to attack the enemy.
King Hussain's immediate
reaction was to consult with
Arab and Western diplomats, and
to consider making a complaint
to the UN Security Council.
The effect of the Israeli
raid is likely to be greatest
on the internal situation in
Jordan. It seems doubtful that
Hussain will want to repeat on
this occasion the tactic he
adopted in regard to earlier
Israeli actions--an appeal to
the people for calm on the
ground that Jordan should not
let itself be drawn into an
Israeli trap. Such an implicit
confession of weakness would
further erode his prestige,
even if his opponents were
unable to suggest a better
course themselves.
Hussain may, however, use
the incident and the ensuing
tension as an excuse to post-
pone the parliamentary elec-
tions scheduled for 21 October.
Under present conditions, such
elections would probably re-
turn a majority of extremists
indifferent or hostile to the
monarchy. The king may also
use the incident to justify a
new flurry of visits to Arab
countries with the object of
establishing closer Arab unity
and obtaining additional fi-
nancial support for Jordan's
military forces.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOVIET POLICY SPLIT RUMORED
OVER TITO AND SATELLITES
As a result of Khrushchev's
trip to Yugoslavia, reports
have been circulating that the
rapprochement with Tito and
his influence in the Satellites
have caused a rift in the So-
viet leadership.
The American embassy in
Belgrade, reports that a high
Yugoslav official recently
said that Khrushchev is "alone
in the more liberal approach
to Yugoslavia" and that the
other Soviet leaders, includ-
ing Bulganin and Mikoyan, would
turn on him "at the first false
step." Yugoslav vice president
Vukma.novic-Tempo has also hint-
ed that Khrushchev may be in
trouble a
This Yugoslav hypothesis
argues that Khrushchev, having
sponsored the rapprochement
with Tito, now finds that Tito,
is endangering the Soviet sys-
tem of making trouble in the
Satellites, and went to Yugo-
slavia to get Tito to "call
off the dogs."
It is likely that the
consequences of recent Soviet
policy toward the Satellites
and Yugoslavia. are causing
varying degrees of concern to
all Soviet leaders. Tito's
continued pressure for lib-
eralization in the Satellites
and the results of some of the
liberal policies already being
enacted in Eastern Europe may
have forced the Soviet leaders
to decide to toughen up.
Khrushchev's return to the USSR
on 27 September, accompanied
by Tito, his wife, and Yugoslav
vice premier Rankovic,, prob-
ably indicates that discussions
on Soviet Yugoslav relations
will continue.
Split Improbable
It is probably incorrect,
however, to presume that
Khrushchev stands alone as the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
champion of a more liberal poli-
cy toward Yugoslavia. Bulganin
and Mikoya.n--particularly the
latter--have been at least as
prominently associated with
Soviet policy toward Yugoslavia
as Khrushchev. Also, the de-
cision taken last year to at-
tempt to re-establish a close
relationship with Yugoslavia
was probably agreed on by a
majority of the Soviet leaders.
Khrushchev, Bulganin and
Mikoyan are'probably the most
powerful in the hierarchy and
their alliance has shown no
sign of being disrupted. Molo-
tov, considering his present
position, seems incapable of
DIVERGENT SATELLITE ATTITUDES
TOWARD THE USSR
The remarkably frank and
sometimes critical treatment
of the USSR in the Polish press
is completely different from
articles on the USSR appearing
elsewhere in the Satellites.
While Polish papers are stress-
ing the "independence of coun-
tries in the socialist camp"
and playing down references to
the USSR, articles in Albania
and Czechoslovakia are virtually
attacking the doctrine of "many
roads to socialism" and are
hailing close relations with
the USSR as the indispensable
foundations of the Satellite
regimes.
Poland
According to at least one
Polish author, writing this
month in testimony to Polish-
Soviet Friendship Month, Polish
relations with'the USSR "are
only being formed" and have as
yet to "find their equilibrium."
The same.writer suggests that
the "tragic element of truth"
heading an effective opposition
to Khrushchev. Khrushchev's
successful "packing" of the cen-
tral committee last February
also militates against the
chances of a leadership upheaval.
Finally, it is unlikely
that the figures most intimately
concerned would be away from Mos-
cow if, in fact, a major split
did exist in the leadership over
the Yugoslav issue. Khrushchev,
however, was on vacation for
more than two weeks before he
left for Belgrade. Bulganin has
been vacationing in the Caucasus
since 1 September. Mikoyan was
away between 14 and 24 September
as the leader of the Soviet dele-
gation to Peiping.
about Soviet-Polish relations
during the war has been con-
cealed and that the full story
should now be told.
A Polish radio commentator,
speaking to a domestic audience
on 19 September, stated that the
appearance of critical comments
"shows the evolution of our
friendship with the USSR--from
sugar-coated, lacquered glorious
descriptions of everything that
was Soviet to the present sober
evaluations." Admitting that
the present period of franker
discussion of the USSR is caus-
ing "considerable difficulties"
because of "conservative" oppo-
sition both in Poland and in
the USSR, the same speaker
nevertheless claimed that the
"new atmosphere is spreading
with varying speed" throughout
the bloc.
Other Satellites
This new atmosphere, how-
ever, has been rejected by at
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
least two other members of the
bloc--Albania and Czechoslovakia.
An Albanian editorial, on the
occasion of Albania's Soviet
Friendship Month, claimed that
"only the enemies of socialism"
try to deny the international
importance of the USSR. The
Albanian party has "always based
its activities on the valuable
and tested experience of the
Soviet Communist Party."
The Czech party daily,
Rude Pravo, took a similar line
on September. The Czech re-
gime, the paper declared, is
based on its alliance with the
USSR; consequently, attitudes
toward the USSR are not a fit
subject for discussion. Every
"slander" against the Soviet
Union is aimed against the very
existence of Czechoslovakia.
All of these statements
were made after 3 September,
when the USSR reportedly warned
the Satellites that the Soviet
Union, not Yugoslavia, was the
correct socialist model and
attacked the Yugoslav concept
of genuinely "independent roads
to socialism." The reaction in
Albania and Czechoslovakia,
apparently to this warning, re-
flects loyal, unquestioning
subservience to the latest line
from Moscow.
Irritation Over Warning
The statements by the Poles,
on the other hand, are very
HUNGARIAN WRITERS DEMAiID
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
Hungarian writers who have
spearheaded the drive for moder-
ate policies have resumed their
offensive against the Communist
regime, following a two-month
period of relative restraint.
They met in Budapest in mid-
much in line with their apparent
irritation over an earlier Soviet
warning, delivered by Bulganin
in Warsaw last July, about the
limits of de-Stalinization and
freedom from Soviet control.
The chief of the Polish parlia-
mentary delegation in Yugoslavia,
for example, declared on 20
September that what had struck
him most during his visit was
the Yugoslav "independence of
views" and a "boldness for in-
dependent experimenting in
building socialism."
A great many Polish Com-
munist officials apparently
see a real need for a modifica-
tion of Polish-Soviet relations,
within the framework of an al-
liance with the USSR. They
seem bent on gaining this, re-
gardless of the attitudes in
the other Satellites and re-
gardless of signs of disapproval
from Moscow.
Specific official statements
concerning Soviet-Satellite re-
lations have not been observed
in recent weeks from Hungary,
East Germany, Rumania and Bul-
garia. On the basis of their
over-all policies, however, it
is likely that Hungary will
avoid statements of implicit
subservience to the USSR, while
the other three countries can
be expected to echo the senti-
ments expressed by Albania and
Czechoslovakia.
September to rally support for
their cause and to re-endorse
as their leaders those individ-
uals who have led them in their
fight for freedom of expression.
Although viewed with varying
degrees of disapproval from
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September. 1956
within the regime, the writers'
program is more apt to be met
with compromise than with re-
pression.
Renewed Attack
The uneasy cease-fire dur-
ing the first weeks of the Gero
regime between the government
and the writers, who play a
strong political role in Com-
munist nations, was brought to
a dramatic close on 8 September
by Gyula Hay, a leading Hun-
garian Communist writer. Hay,
in a magazine article, demanded
complete freedom of expression
for "both Marxists and non-
Marxists, the right to believe
in God or not to believe in
God, the right to criticize
anybody or anything, and to
like or not to like any of
Hungary's leaders." Hay's posi?
tion was democratic in tone
and concept and, in, effect, rep-
resents a public denial of
Communist omnipotence.
This attack, described by
the American legation in Buda-
pest as the clearest challenge
to Communism yet publicized,
set the stage for the general
meeting of the Hungarian Writ-
ers' Association which opened
on 17 September. Speaker after
speaker, inspired by Hay's
words and angered by two antag-
onistic Szabad Nep editorials
on the eve of the meeting, in-
dulged in defiant speeches
against Hungarian regime poli-
cies and regime "reactionaries."
The writers, as a body,
vigorously re-endorsed their
leadership and also elected to
high office in their associa-
tion a number of members who
had been censured for "anti-
party" views during Rakosi's
tenure in office. Hay was
elected vice president and
several non-Communist writers
were elected to the presidium.
The writers repeatedly
asserted their unwillingness
to compromise on any points.
As one writer stated, "We can-
not enter into a 'gentlemen's
agreement' with anybody, we
must go straight to our goal."
As a group, the writers
appeared sensitive to the fact
that some of their attitudes
are known only in literary cir-
cles and hence do not have wide-
spread popular support. To
rectify this, one literary
leader proposed that groups of
writers visit factories to en-
sure that their point of view
is received by working groups.
Party Reaction
Since Rakosi's ouster, the
new party leadership, headed by
doctrinaire party first secre-
tary Gero but including a num-
ber of moderate Communists, has
moved steadily toward moderate
domestic policies, including a
significantly more concessionary
attitude toward the intellec-
tuals. Reaction within the party,
however, to the present sweep-
ing demands of the writers will
be mixed. The natural response
of party first secretary Gero,
who personifies the doctrinaires,
presumably would be to resist.
The regime as a whole, however,
which includes a significant
number of party moderates, ap-
pears to have little inclina-
tion to crack down on the writers
for their beliefs at this time
and may grant added concessions
in an effort to appease the in-
telligentsia.
But the "moderate" forces
in the party are not unanimous
in their views. One group, in-
cluding a significant number
of party intellectuals and
activists who support former
premier Imre Nagy, is undoubt-
edly sympathetic to and active
in support of the demands of
the writers.
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4 ? Jc4ItG i
27 September 1956
But other "moderate" ele-
ments in the party who are
willing to permit the natural
development of political and
intellectual endeavor within
certain. limits may object to
at least some of Hay's demands.
Members of this group are
sufficiently good Communists
to reject proposals which pose
a direct challenge to the prin-
ciples of party discipline and,
in effect, the primacy of the
party in society. In addition,
this group, which may include
politburo members Szalai,
Kovacs and Kadar, may be wary
of a too rapid liberalization
of policy lest the domestic
situation get out of control
and lead the Soviet Union to
interfere.
Soviet Attitude
Soviet leaders undoubtedly
recognize the risk involved in
giving the Hungarian writers
free rein to work out their own
ideological standpoint and are
aware that a mere "braking
action" will not be enough to
forestall demands for increas- 25X1
there is no Soviet inter-
vention at this time, it might
indicate that the USSR has ac-
cepted a further gradual liber-
alization in Hungary and that
justment.
the point has not yet been
reached--nor been defined--
where the USSR will attempt
to call a halt in this read-
CHINESE COMMUNIST STATEMENT
ON GENEVA TALKS
In its fourth official
statement this year on the
Johnson-Wang talks at Geneva,
Communist China indicated on
21 September that it regards
further discussion of the US
proposal on a renunciation of
force in the Taiwan area as
fruitless and repeated previous
warnings against "dragging out
the talks." The tone of the
statement was moderate, however,
and Peiping's expression of its
desire to move on to a new sub-
ject suggests that the Chinese
do not intend to break off the
talks at this time.
The Chinese comments on
the renunciation-of-force ques-
tion indicate that Peiping will
not agree to any declaration
which might compromise its
position that the "liberation"
of Taiwan is an internal problem
to be settled by peaceful means
if possible, but by force if
necessary. Peiping evidently
expects no concessions from the
United States on this question,
and believes that continued
exploration of the issue will
yield no further propaganda
advantage.
Peiping charges that al-
though the Communists have "time
and again" put forward propos-
als for the peaceful settle-
ment of disputes--including a
conference of foreign ministers
--the United States has made
agreement impossible by per-
sisting in its demands for a
declaration on the renunciation
of force which would infringe
on China's "sovereignty." In
order that the Geneva meetings
may not be further "dragged
out meaninglessly," the Chinese
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
on to the question of the "em-
bargo." Peiping apparently
considers that this issue could
be exploited to embarrass
Washington in the light of pres-
ent pressure from many free
world nations for a relaxation
of trade controls.
Despite its charges of
American intransigence at Gene-
va, the Chinese statement is
couched in moderate language
and leaves the door open for
further discussions. This,
plus the lack of a propaganda
build-up for a breakoff in the
talks, makes it unlikely that
the Chinese plan to end the
meetings at this time. Nor does
it seem probable that the new
line adopted at Geneva pre-
sages moves to increase tension
in the Taiwan Straits. The
"liberation" of Taiwan has
CHINESE COMMUNIST CONGRESS
Speeches at the Chinese
Communist eighth party congress,
which was to end on 27 Septem-
ber after election of a 170-man
central committee, continued
to place major emphasis on
collective leadership and "demo-
cratic" methods at all levels.
Mao Tse-tung still received
special praise, and Liu Shao-
chi was included in this treat-
ment to some extent.
Collective Leadership
Further changes in the
organization and operation of
the party have been disclosed
which appear designed to en-
hance the "democratic" features
of party life. Under the new
party constitution, national,
provincial and county congress-
es, whose members will be elect-
ed for terms of five, three
and two years respectively,
will meet annually. Peiping
Peiping's statement makes
no mention of the ten American
prisoners still held in Commu-
nist China. The only prison-
ers freed thus far in 1956 were
released after the expiration
of their sentences. If the
Chinese continue this practice,
which suggests they still re-
gard the prisoners as having
some value as hostages, no fur-
ther releases can be expected
until 1957, when the sentences
of four imprisoned missionaries
expire. 25X1
received little attention dur-
ing the Chinese Communist eighth
party congress. Mao Tse-tung
ignored the subject, and other
officials referred to Taiwan
only in passing and continued
the "soft" approach which Pei-
ping has taken to the problem
for the past 18 months.
claims that these congresses
will constitute an annual check
on the work of the central,
provincial and county party
committees.
The party intends to es-
tablish more organs under the
central committee. This ap-
parently includes the resur-
rection of military, women's
and youth affairs committees,
all of which are primarily con-
cerned with supervising party
control in these areas.
Party Control
The speech of Defense Minis-
ter Peng Te-hua.i placed de-
tailed. emphasis on the leading
role which the party plays in
making military policy. Peng
specified that all "important
matters" are discussed at party
committee meetings, and that
decisions are transmitted to
military commanders.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
Peng's speech confirmed
that in the Chinese Communist
system, party committees at
all military levels are superior
to both the military commanders
and the political officers. As
the political officer is usually
the head of the party committee,
in most cases the political of-
ficer is more powerful than the
commander.
While hailing China's re-
cent strides toward increased
modernization of the armed
forces, Peng referred only once
to his air force--fourth largest
in the world--declaring that it
is "no longer a very weak one."
Chinese air defense forces,
which have consistently demon-
strated general ineptness, were
said by Peng to have received
"modern technical equipment,"
but Peng made no claim of air
defense capability.
Both Liu Shao-chi and
Teng Hsiao-ping stressed the
need for party control of gov-
ernment affairs, which are
directed by Premier Chou En-7,ai.
Teng stated that party members
in government organs must obey
the party, and that the party
must regularly discuss and
decide all policy and impor-
tant organizational matters
relating to government work.
He also said the party must
exercise regular supervision
over the work of government
organs and that no comrades
should be permitted to make
their own departments into "in-
dependent states."
Treatment of Mao and Liu
Chairman Mao Tse-tung
continues to be the subject of
laudatory references. The
party's successes are attrib-
uted "particularly" to Mao,
although Peiping's comment por-
trays Mao as a modest personal-
ity.. Teng said that Mao him-
self was responsible for pro-
hibiting the offering of birth-
day greetings to party leaders
and the use of their names for
places, streets and enterprises.
Liu Shao-chi is now being
accorded a small share of the
special propaganda treatment
previously reserved exclusively
for Mao. Teng Hsiao-ping de-
scribed Liu's report to the
seventh congress in 1945 as
being, like Mao's report, a
"brilliant elucidation" of
doctrine. Peiping radio has
described a new Chinese Commu-
nist film as depicting the caves
where "Mao Tse-tung, Liu Shao-
chi and other leaders" lived
during Yenan days. This line
supports other evidence that
Mao has chosen Liu as the
leader of a collective to suc-
ceed Mao.
CHOU EN-LAI PLANS
MAJOR ASIAN TOUR
Chinese Communist premier
Chou En-tai will leave Peiping
in late November for a tour
through South and Southeast
Asia which may take him to the
capitals of ten Asian nations.
Chou's general objective prob-
ably is to repeat his success
at the Bandung conference of
1955 and refurbish the image
he created then of Communist
China as a "peace-loving" great
power. He will undertake ne-
gotiation of the Sino-Burmese
boundary dispute while in Ran-
goon.
Chou's itinerary apparently
is not yet firm, but he reportedly
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27 September 1956
plans to visit North Vietnam,
Cambodia, Burma, India, Pakistan
and possibly Indonesia, Ceylon,
Nepal and Afghanistan. Sou-
vanna Phouma has denied inviting
Chou to visit Laos but has in-
dicated that if he sought an
invitation, it could not be re-
fused.
Chou is tentatively sched-
uled to arrive in Cambodia in'
late November, which suggests
that the first leg of the tour
will cover North Vietnam, Laos
and Cambodia, where Peiping has
apparently been working to es-
tablish a "southern tier." A
dramatic final settlement of the
Pathet Lao insurrection could
spell success for this venture..
Pathet strength derives directly
from the Viet Minh and indirect-
ly from Communist China. Chou
may thus be in a position to
arrange a final settlement. In
Cambodia, where a Chinese eco-
nomic aid mission is momentarily
expected, Chou will meet once
again with Prince Sihanouk, who
took over as premier on 15 Sep-
tember, and may take this oppor-
tunity to press for formal
Should President Anastasio
Somoza of Nicaragua die as a
result of the 21 September as-
sassihation attempt, a period
of political uncertainty and
violence may ensue. The Nica-
raguan strong man, who has been
dictator since 1934, was shot
only a few hours after being
acclaimed Liberal Party candi-
date for the 1957 to 1963 presi-
dential term. If he lives, his
victory in a controlled."elec-
tion" next February is virtually
assured. Even then, however,
diplomatic relations with Cam-
bodia.
While in New Delhi, Chou
will probably seek to smooth
over points of friction. which
have developed along the Sino-
Indian border and to reassure
Nehru concerning Chinese Com-
munist efforts to establish
closer relations with Nepal.
At the same time, Chou will
probably try to undercut pos-
sible Indian support for Burma
in the Sino-Burmese.boundary
dispute.
The main item of business
during Chou's visit to Rangoon
will be the boundary question.
Chou will need all his skill
as a negotiator to quiet Ran-
goon's outcries--which jeopard-
ize Communist China's pose as
a "peaceful" power--while tem-
porizing on substantive issues.
In the remaining countries
on his itinerary, Chou will
probably concentrate on genera-
ting good will and persuading
Asian leaders that he is a "man
of peace."
he would face continued and
possibly heightened domestic
opposition. If he is incapaci-
tated and retains his mental
faculties, he is likely to
continue his domination of the
Nicaraguan political scene.
The president's elder son,
Luis, who is president of con-
gress, is Somoza's constitutional
successor and now acting presi-
dent. The younger son, Anas-
tasio, Jr. ("Tachito"), is di-
rector of the national guard
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27 September 1956
and chief of the air force.
Together, the two brothers can
probably hold the fort for their
father if he lives. Somoza,
who is in a Panama Canal Zone
hospital, can constitutionally
continue as president for up
to three months as long as he
remains somewhere in Central
America or Panama.
If Somoza dies, any at-
tempt to maintain the regime
by force alone would lead to
serious violence.
A solution offering the
best chance of political sta-
bility would be agreement on a
new government among the op-
posing political factions.
Such an agreement would be pos-
sible, since the most irrecon-
cilable issue--Somoza's dicta-
torship--would no longer exist.
There are prominent members of
Somoza's Liberal Party, among
them Luis Manuel Debayle and
Alejandro Abaunza Espinosa, who
opposition Conservative Party
leaders have previously indi-
cated would be acceptable as
a compromise for president.
Such an agreement would prob-
ably require the postponement
of the February election and
guarantees of free elections
later.
A political solution ac-
ceptable to the national guard
would almost certainly have to
include the replacement of the
32-year-old "Tachito" as head
of the guard. He is hated by
many officers and known for his
cruelty and impulsiveness.
Luis Somoza, an easygoing
gentleman farmer of 34, might
be more pliant. However, the
actions of the Somoza brothers
will be dictated by their esti-
mate as to how they can best
protect the tremendous wealth
amassed by their father.
would be a decisive factor, if
not directly, then. as a behind-
the-scenes political referee.
The minister of defense, Colonel
Francisco Gaitan, a stanch friend
of the United States who came
up through the ranks and enjoys
wide popularity in the guard,
would probably be able to con-
trol the guard. If political
leaders are unable to reach an
acceptable solution on a post-
Somoza government, or if "Tachi-
to" attempts to act independent-
ly, guard leaders would probably
assume direct control of the
government.
The danger of violence
will be heightened if the re-
gime carries out widespread
reprisals against the opposition.
Although most present evi-
dence suggests that Somoza's
attacker acted on his own, the
Somoza brothers seem to be try-
ing to implicate Conservative
leaders or Somoza's enemies in 25X1
exile. Over 200 opposition
leaders were arrested within
hours of the attack and are now
undergoing interrogation
It is still possible that
evidence may be found--or manu-
factured--to link the assassi-
nation attempt with Nicaraguan
exiles in Costa Rica and, through
them, with Costa Rican presi-
dent Figueres. If so, the Nic-
caraguan government could be
expected to react strongly,
possibly to the extent of in-
stigating an assassination
tempt against Figueres.
The position of the 3,500-
nian national guard, Nicaragua's
well-trained and efficient army,
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27 September 1956
SOVIET BLOC CULTURAL CENTERS
IN LATIN AMERICA
Soviet bloc countries are
having some success with cul-
tural and friendship societies
in Latin America. These organ-
izations are important in pro-
viding means through which bloc
contacts may be expanded. The
centers have increased in num-
ber during the past year or so
and several have become more
active.
The greatest activity has
taken place in Argentina, where
the Argentine-Soviet Institute
of Cultural Relations has opened
even new branches outside
Buenos Aires, bringing the to-
tal of such branches to 11.
The institute's lecture program
has been intensified this year,
and its showings of Soviet bloc
films reportedly have increased
in a number of cities in the
interior. New bloc binational
centers reportedly have opened
in Mexico and Brazil in 1956.
Soviet cultural so-
ciety VOKS, and a
VOKS delegation
the exploitation of
returning travelers.
In Chile, for in-
stance, the Chilean-
Chinese Institute of
Culture played an
active role in the
entry of the Chinese
Communist opera
troupe last August.
A group from the
Argentine-Soviet In-
stitute traveled to
Moscow in April at
the invitation of the
In addition to publishing
and distributing a variety of
Communist propaganda, part of
which comes from bloc nations
and missions, and offering
cultural attractions, the cen-
ters are engaged in the promo-
tirn of cultural exchange
visits with bloc countries and
reportedly attended the insti-
tute's national conference in
Cordoba.
The centers apparently
have been involved in the bloc
repatriation program in Uruguay
and Argentina. Most repatriates
from Uruguay during 1956 re-
portedly came from an area where
the Soviet legation and the
Uruguayan-Soviet Cultural In-
stitute had been conducting a
campaign. The institute in
Argentina probably has facili-
tated the large-scale re atria-
tion effort there.
Many of the centers main-
tain close ties with Soviet and
Satellite diplomatic missions,
which participate in the cul-
tural programs and probably give
at least some direction to cen-
ter activities. Presumably the
centers receive financial sup-
port from the bloc, although
some apparently operate on
insufficient funds.
Chile is the only one of
these countries which has bloc
LOCATION OF BINATIONAL CULTURAL
AND FRIENDSHIP CENTERS IN LATIN AMERICA
Argentina
Uruguay
Bolivia
Brazil Chile Mexico
"
USSR
i~1ilE5
Czechoslovakia
Poland
Rumania
Hungary
Bulgaria
Communist
China
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
25X1
25X1
cultural centers and does not
have relations with any Commu-
nist country.
NEW POLITICAL CRISIS THREATENS
IN PAKISTAN OVER SUEZ
Pakistani president Mirza's
desire to join the Suez Canal
Users' Association and Prime
Minister Suhrawardy's unwill-
ingness to do so may result
in a dispute between the two
men which could end in Suh-
rawardy's dismissal or resigna-
tion.
Mirza only reluctantly
accepted Suhrawardy as prime
minister. He has several times
indicated his intentions to
get rid of him if he fails to
support a pro-Western policy.
Mirza. seems inclined to press
Suhrawardy to join the users'
association and might take this
opportunity to take drastic ac-
tion against Suhrawardy.
Suhrawardy's government
has already publicly opposed the
users' association. Suhrawardy
has also told the American am-
bassador that while he did not
denounce it during the second
London conference to avoid
embarrassing Pakistan's West-
ern allies--his country would
not associate-itself with the
association under any circum-
stances.
the new prime minister
faces a particularly tricky
problem on Suez, His pre-
decessor, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali,
was shouted off the platform at
a public meeting a. month ago be-
cause of Pakistan's pro-Western
policy on Suez, and popular pro-
Egyptian opinion has mounted
since then.
Suhrawardy probably feels
that if he gives in to Mirza
and the West on the users'
association, he will lose his
popular support and become just
another one of Pakistan's "pup-
pet prime ministers." Conse-
quently, if Mirza forces the
issue, Subrawardy may resign
instead of forcing Mirza to
dismiss him.
Since the Suhrawardy
government constitutes the only
representative political
grouping now available in Paki-
stan, his downfall would prob-
ably mean the establishment
of direct rule by Mirza with
the backing of the army and
civil service.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 'WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
JAPANESE POLITICAL DISPUTES
OVER RELATIONS WITH USSR
A new series of disputes
and maneuvers among Japanese
government and conservative
party leaders has been touched
off by Soviet premier Bulganin's
ambiguously worded note to
Japan's prime minister Hato-
yama on 14 September that the
USSR is willing to use Japan's
"five points" as a basis for
the normalization of relations.
While a special emissary is now
in Moscow to clarify the Soviet
position, Japanese press and
business community criticism
of the Hatoyama government's
ineptness has been mounting,
and former prime minister
Yoshida's followers are threat-
ening to split the ruling
Liberal-Democratic Party if
Hatoyama goes to Moscow as
planned in early October.
The Japanese five-point'
proposal envisaged an agreement
calling for the termination of
the state of war, an exchange
of ambassadors, the immediate
repatriation of Japanese detain-
ees in the USSR, implementation
of the fishery agreements, and
the USSR's unconditional support
for Japan's admission to the
United Nations. Japan also
wants to continue the negotia-
tions for the return of the
Southern Kurils and to have
Shikotan and the Habomai Is-
lands turned back immediately.
Official Japanese reaction
to Bulganin's letter is that
the Soviet position is too
vague. It apparently made no
mention of the territorial is-
sues and, moreover, did not
give assurance that the USSR
is ready to drop its insistence
on the simultaneous accession
of Japan and Outer Mongolia to
the United Nations. On 21
September, Special Ambassador
Shunichi Matsumoto was sent
to Moscow to determine the
Soviet position on these points.
Business leaders who fi-
nance the Liberal-Democratic
Party have become impatient
with the government's inability
to conclude the negotiations
with the USSR successfully.
They regard Hatoyama's weak
leadership as the primary diffi-
culty and have demanded that he
retire before further negotia-
tions are undertaken.
The Japanese press, which
earlier had been instrumental
in forcing the government to
stop Foreign Minister Shigemit-
su from signing away the disputed
islands, now has objected to
Hatoyama's trip until the So-
viet position is clear and in
agreement with Japanese demands.
The press seems fearful that
Hatoyama, given any room for
negotiation, will be inveigled
by the USSR into selling out
Japanese interests.
The anti-Hatoyama movement
within the Liberal-Democratic
Party is gaining strength, and
224 of 423 party members in both
houses of the Diet have support-
ed the formation of the "Situa-
tion Discussion Council," which
has the avowed purpose of pre-
venting Hatoyama's trip to Mos-
cow and forcing his retirement.
Hatoyama continues determined to
make the trip and fulfill his
February 1955 election pledge
the USSR.
to normalize relations with
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
The Singapore government's
move to suppress Communist ac-
tivity in the British crown
colony, which began on 18 Sep-
tember, was well planned and
deliberately executed. In the
initial action, seven Communist-
front leaders were arrested and
three organizations ordered
dissolved.
One of the groups was the
3,000-member Chinese Middle
School Students' Union, prob-
ably the most thoroughly in-
doctrinated front in the colony.
It was banned on the grounds
that although it had registered
as a nonpolitical organization,
it had "persistently flouted"
its pledge to abstain from
political activity.
Chief Minister Lim Yew
Hock says he intends to press
his challenge and to eliminate
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as an effective political force
the pro-Communist People's Ac-
tion Party. The Action Party
has been the most vigorous
political party in Singapore
and the chief co-ordinating
body for Communist activity.
Lim set the stage for his crack-
down on 6 September when he
demanded a vote of confidence
from the Legislative Assembly
for his government's entire
program, which specifically in-
cluded the antisubversion cam-
paign.
With attention centering
primarily on the negotiations
with London for more independence,
he won a unanimous vote of con-
fidence and has since rejected
a demand by the People's Ac-
tion Party for a special as-
sembly debate on the arrests,
claiming that he already has
clear-cut support for his actions.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
The People's Action Party
and its affiliates were caught
off guard by the government's
sudden moves. Reaction so far
has involved a one-hour pro-
test strike by the leftist Fac-
tory and Shopworkers' Union on
24 September and a "stay-at-
school" strike by nearly 1,000
Chinese students.
Left-wing unions have
threatened to use a "peaceful
secret weapon," and various
front organizations have ac-
cused the government of arrest-
ing "ardent" independence sup-
porters and of being led by
"colonialist stooges." The
People's Action Party has pub-
licly limited itself to a
statement that the government's
action was "sudden and arbi-
trary," giving rise to "grave
concern," and that the party
would investigate the matter
and "pursue it to the end."
Although at the moment it
appears. unlikely that the Peo-
ple's Action Party will risk
a major showdown, the possibil-
ity exists that it might mo-
bilize large-scale disorders
in an effort to discredit Lim.
The chief minister has publicly
stated, however, that any un-
lawful activities by the Com-
munists would be "ruthlessly
wiped out."
ical suicide.
since to do so would be polit-
. Two members of Lim's gov-
ernment have informed American
officials that the action taken
to date is "only the beginning,"
and other moves will follow
shortly to keep the Communists
off balance. They emphasized
that there is no turning. back 25X1
REUNIFICATION PROBLEMS OF THE
ITALIAN SOCIALISTS
Major difficulties still
are likely to block early re-
unification of the Socialists
in Italy, despite recent public
expressions of optimism by
spokesmen of both the Democrat-
ic .Socialist Party and the
Nenni Socialists.
The chief obstacles to
the creation of a unified party
are trade union problems, the
Nenni Socialists' undemocratic
internal organization, and
their strong pro-Communist
faction,, The merger outlook
is further complicated by re-
ported opposition from the
Nenni Socialist left wing in
the face of the apparently
favorable attitude of the Ital-
ian Communists.
Both Socialist parties call
for a single labor union free
from domination by any political
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party, but the Nenni Socialists
endorse the Communist-controlled
General Confederation of Labor
as the basis for unity in the
trade unions. The Democratic
Socialists, however, seem in-
clined to compromise by post-
poning this issue.
In an obvious bid for
Socialist: support, Giuseppe di
Vittorio, the General Labor
Confederation's secretary gener-
al, declared in August his
organization would be apoliti-
cal. According to a rumor re-
ported in the Italian press of
25 September, Di Vittorio may
announce his resignation as
president of the Communist-
dominated World Federation of
Trade Unions at that organiza-
tion's congress now meeting in
Sofia.. Such a move could be
a Communist tactic to make the
General Labor Confederation
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27 September 1956
more attractive to the free
trade unions by appearing to
weaken its connection with the
world federation.
Nenni Socialist leadership is
already insisting that a united
Socialist Party reject any
discrimination against Commu-
nists, beginning with employ-
ment in public administration.
TURKISH PRIME MINISTER MOVES
TO SUPPRESS OPPOSITION
In the face of mounting
economic difficulties, Prime
Minister Menderes has insti-
tuted increasingly authoritarian
measures rather than agree to
economic reforms. He will
and Pravda on 13 September 25X1
carried summaries of a speech
by Togliatti in which he said
the Communists could not be op-
posed to a restoration of
Socialist unity, but warned that
enemies of the working class
were trying to win over the
Socialists to the anti-Communist
front. Moscow thus appears to
be endorsing Togliatti's cau-
tious attitude of approving
Socialist reunification. Nenni
himself has said reunification
would not impair and might bene-
fit his party's relations with
Communists. The Communists may
hope to exploit a merged Social-
ist Party, even if an open break
with Nenni results.
The Nenni Socialist central
committee is to meet from 27 to
29 September to consider the
unity question, and the Social-
ist International Bureau appoint-
ed a three-man committee on 20
September to follow rob-
lem. r 25X1
probably be able to suppress
opposition criticism as long as
he has the support of his party
and of the farmers.
Opposition attacks on Men-
deres' economic policies have
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
been the main factor in the
government's decision to insti-
tute controls over all means of
public expression. Menderes
is committed to a continued
high rate of industrial and
agricultural expansion, al-
though these policies have pro-
duced a critical economic situ-
ation, including a heavy foreign
debt and trade deficit, sharp
inflation and domestic short-
ages. An economic stabilization
program which the prime mini.s-
ter, agreed to reluctantly
after a cabinet crisis in late
1955 apparently has now been
abandoned. Menderes reportedly
brought about the resignation
of two key cabinet ministers
responsible for carrying out
the program so that he could
appoint men personally loyal
to him.
The opposition Republican
People's Party is exploiting
the government's handling of
the economic situation in its
attack on the government.
Menderes has responded by in-
stituting repressive measures,
reminiscent of the Ataturk era.
With an overwhelming par-
liamentary majority, Menderes
has had little, difficulty in
obtaining approval for laws
restricting assembly, silencing
press criticism of the govern-
ment, and lifting the' parlia-
mentary immunity of opposition
deputies.
Several High Court judges
who were known to oppose the
government have been retired,
and newspaper editors have
been arrested for "journalistic
sabotage"--criticism of govern-
ment officials or policies.
An example of the operation of
the press law is seen in the
case now being tried in an
Ankara court-of a 15-year-old
newsboy, arrested for shouting
the headline that the minister
of finance had resigned.
Opposition leader Kasim
Gulek, who is already under a
six-month suspended sentence
for violating the law restrict-
ing assembly, appears to be con-
tinuing to try to goad the gov-
ernment into further action
against him. It is not yet
clear if his attempts at politi-
cal martyrdom will win widespread
public sympathy.
The opposition parties--
the Republican People's Party,
the Republican Nation Party
and the Freedom Party--apparent-
ly hope to keep the government
on the defensive while they
seek enough public support to
be a challenge to it in an
25X1
25X1
The Freedom Party, 2
an o s oO of the Democrat
Party, has been especially
active in seeking co-operation,
but the leaders of the two Re-
publican parties appear wary
of any formal arrangement. The
great mass of the voters are
farmers and strongly support
the Democrat Party, whose poli-
cies favor agriculture.
give measures may be taken.
Barring an economic crisis
intense enough to lose Menderes
the confidence of his party and
the support of the farmers, the
prime minister's policy of sup-
pressing all criticism will prob-
ably continue, and further repres-
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
PROSPECT OF
LABOR UNREST IN SPAIN
Spanish industrial workers
may strike again shortly after
1 October in protest against
the meager wage raise which
will be effective on that date.
The steady rise in the cost of
living during the past year is
a source of mounting concern to
labor, which blames the govern-
ment for its precarious economic
status. Moreover, the workers
still resent the harsh measures
employed by the regime against
the strikers in northern Spain
last May.
Although the upward trend
of living costs leveled off
somewhat during the summer, it
will probably advance again in
the autumn, particularly in
view of last spring's wage in-
crease and the salary raise
granted on 1 June to civil serv-
ants and the armed forces.
A 16-percent wage increase
on 1 April brought walkouts in`
northern Spain because the in-
crease neither offset the rise
in prices nor improved the liv-
ing standard of low-income
groups. Labor had been led to
expect a 30- to 60-percent
increase, but in most cases the
April hike amounted to only 6
or 7 percent of take-home pay.
The wage boost for industrial
workers scheduled for 1 October
amounts to an additional 6 per-
cent.
Labor resents the small
contribution to the pay increase
to be made by employers during
a period of high profits for
industry. An additional irri-
tant is the discrimination evi-
dent in the considerable raise
given civil servants, amounting
to as much as 60 percent on the
lowest salaries.
Genuine economic relief
would require the government
to improve the workers' living
conditions,. provide a more flex-
ible wage policy, raise the
minimum wage rates, and place
adequate controls on prices.
I The government, however, has
not yet shown any intention of
repealing the punitive measures
taken in May against strikers
which have deprived them of sen-
iority rights and, in some cases,
resulted in their transfer to
other cities at lower pay.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SU)NARY
27 September 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
PROSPECTS FOR THE MOLLET GOVERNMENT
When the French National
Assembly reconvenes on 2 Octo-
ber, Premier Mollet will face
mounting political opposition
as a result of growing frus-
tration over a number of do-
mestic and foreign issues, any
one of which could lead to
Mollet's overthrow. Despite
the difficulties over Suez, his
failure to achieve a settlement
in Algeria, and strong infla-
tionary pressures in the French
economy, Mollet will continue
to press for enactment of a
positive program.
Parliamentary Picture
Many deputies who
voted Mollet's in-
vestiture on 31 Jan-
uary are now ready to
risk his overthrow
because of the dead-
lock on an Algerian
settlement and disil-
lusionment and dis-
couragement over the
Suez crisis. Many
right and right-center
deputies acquiesced in
his minority govern-
ment's program for
social welfare, eco-
nomic expansion and
European integration
only in the hope of
seeing Mollet saddled
with an unpopular settlement in
Algeria. Regardless of whether
or not he gets a settlement
there, the assembly is unlikely
to continue subordinating every-
thing else to this problem.
Radical leader Mendes-
France left the cabinet last May,
and will probably become increas-
ingly critical of the govern-
ment's economic and social pol-
icies. Some of Mollet's fellow
Socialists are irritated at the
slow pace of reforms in Algeria;
and when the second London con-
ference on Suez ended, one of
his Gaullist ministers called
on the cabinet to resign. The
center Popular Republicans are
reported negotiating with the
Socialists with an eye toward
entering the cabinet. This
step would greatly strengthen
Mollet's position and would
make him less susceptible to
pressure to rely on the Commu-
nists, who backed him until the
Suez issue arose, and who still
seem eager to "co-operate" with
the Socialists.
While Mollet is under no
strong domestic pressure to
forge ahead on EURATOM and the
common market, European in-
tegration has broad
Socialist backing, and
the government seems
prepared to press for
simultaneous assembly
approval of both.
The authority of
the regime may be
threatened by antitax
leader Pierre Poujade's
call for a massive
demonstration in mid-
October in Paris to
serve as the "legal
parliament" of France.
Poujade hopes to at-
tract half a million
adherents to the meet-
ing, which apparently
is to be his long-heralded States
General. Mollet may feel it
necessary to prohibit this
gathering because of the danger
of violent countermanifestations.
Despite unprecedented
assembly support for the gov-
ernment's strong position a-
gainst Egyptian nationalization
of the Suez Canal, this issue
may precipitate Mollet's over-
throw. The effect of the dead-
lock on France's already tight
budget is becoming increasingly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMY
27 September 1956
apparent. The requisitioning
of commercial ships and the
transfer of troops to Cyprus
have already boosted expenses
considerably, and any rise in
oil prices would have an ad-
ditional deleterious effect on
the economy, particularly on
the government's wage-price
stability campaign.
There is growing sentiment
in France against military ac-
tion in Egypt. In general, the
right. and right-center is less
enthusiastic than the government
on using force. French disil-
lusionment at the outcome of the
second London conference has
unleashed the first attacks on
Mallet's Suez policy and is
likely to lead to a bitter and
prolonged debate. The premier's
failure to obtain a satisfactory
solution undermined his prestige
and may deal the final blow to
France's position in North
Africa.
Algeria
25X1
25X1
Paris has concluded that it is
unable to combat Nasr's rising
prestige as a nationalist Arab
leader, and the government now
seems resigned to imposing a
reform plan unilaterally. The
The Suez seizure did,'in
fact, kill Mollet's faint hope
of pacifying Algeria as the
first step toward a settlement.
might be led to consider it.
However, Mollet is in no po-
sition to agree now to complete
independence, the nationalists'
goal.
The impact of increased
expenses resulting from the
Algerian and Suez crises has
forced the French economy from
a period of price stability and
economic growth to a period of
strong inflationary pressures.
The damage to agricultural
production from-last winter's
freezing weather, a major mil-
itary effort imposed on a full-
employment economy, increased
wages and consumption, the ex-
pansion of industrial production,
and the effort to maintain a
high level of investment have
already brought. about an upward
movement in prices and costs of
production, speculation against
the franc-", labor restiveness,
and a deterioration in the
French balance of payments.
To contain the inflation-
ary movement, the Mollet gov-
ernment has instituted price
controls and has been manipu-
lating the price index to keep
it below the point that would
make a general wage increase
mandatory. In the fiscal sphere,
the government reportedly intends
to practice a policy of selective
plan has little prospect of be- investments, and plans a drastic
ing accepted by the Algerian financial reform, including a
nationalists. widening of the tax base and
more stringent provisions to
prevent tax dodging.
The government's effort to
keep prices and wages stable will
depend on its success in winning
voluntary support of employers to
hold the price line and of the
labor federations to forego re-
quests for wage increases. Fol-
lowing conversations with Mollet
General Juin's public on 12 September, the major em-
statement in late August favor- ployers'association modified its
ing federation for Algeria may outspoken opposition to price
help get a fairly liberal pro- controls but insisted on in-
posal through the assembly, creasing' prices to' meet
and the Algerian nationalists rising costs. The medium and
small employers' organization,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMfdg.RY
27 September 1956
however, virtually defied the
premier to try to enforce price
controls. Bakers and grocers
have already staged protest
strikes in Paris against price
ceilings, and farmers are ex-
pected to increase agitation,
particularly if the government
succeeds in reducing subsidies.
Labor Unrest
25X1
25X1
While the fall tradition-
ally is a time for working-
class unrest, the non-Commu-
nist labor federations do not
seem inclined at the present
to launch agitation that would
cripple the government's
stability program. They seem
temporarily mollified by.Mol-
let's reaffirmation on 11 Sep-
tember that the escalator wage
law will be allowed to operate
and by his promise to continue
technical discussions of the
wage-price problem, despite his
firm opposition to a general
wage increase.
The Communist-dominated
General Labor Confederation
(CGT) offers the most serious
threat to labor stability,
but it has reacted relatively
mildly. In the mid-September
discussions, it contradicted
the government's analysis of
inflationary pressures and
announced its intention to
agitate for a 15-franc increase
in the hourly minimum wage and
replacement of the consumer
price index with the budget in-
dex as a more accurate reflec-
tion-of the cost of living.
Many non-Communist labor lead-
ers also favor the latter move.
Communist press comment indi-
cates that the CGT intends to
use protests and strike actions
in the factories on the local
level, with an appeal for the
unity of workers, rather than
1g1tation.
PROSPECTS FOR THE SOCIALIST PARTY OF JAPAN
The Japan Socialist Party
won almost one third of the
seats in the Japanese upper
house elections in July. In
the more important and repre-
sentative lower house elections
in February 1955, the Socialists
had garnered 29.2 percent of
all votes cast to the conserva-
tives' 63.2 percent. The con-
servatives, although down from
.their postwar high in 1952 of
66.2 percent, still hold ap-
proximately two thirds of the
seats in both houses of the
Diet.
Despite this disparity,
there has been a discernible
trend toward the Socialists
since their postwar low in
1949, when they received only
13.5 percent of the vote. The
Socialists point out that at
their present rate of growth
of about 1,000,000 votes a
year, their support should
match that of the conservatives
within three years.
The conservatives have
been considerably disturbed by
this trend, however. In calling
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SAY
27 September 1956
25X1
25X1
for Prime Minister Hatoyama's
early retirement recently, 90
Japanese businessmen, described
as the "pillars" of Japan's
economy, were motivated by the
fear that if new leadership
were not provided soon, the
Socialists would head the gov-
ernment in Japan.
Socialist optimism was
given a boost by the results
of a nationwide public opinion
sampling by Tokyo's largest
newspaper, the Asahi Shimbun,
published on 7 September, The
poll found that 33 percent of
those interviewed supported
the conservatives while 30 per-
cent favored the Socialists,
a 6-percent drop and 4-percent
gain, respectively, since No-
vember 1955.
Party Program
The Socialists are active-
ly moving to increase their
following. A campaign is
under way to gain 100,000 new
party members by the end of
November and each Socialist
officeholder has been assigned
a quota to recruit. The mem-
bership drive aims at broaden-
ing,the party's support beyond
labor's ranks, with emphasis
on new farmer and small entre-
preneur members.
At the same time, a "prac-
tical" economic program--a five-
year plan to begin in 1957--
is to be mapped out by mid-Oc-
The Socialists, as avowed
"neutralists," have indicated
they will still call for the
return of Okinawa to Japan,
and the early restoration of
relations with the USSR and
Communist China, and will op-
pose American bases in Japan,
nuclear weapons, a constitu-
tional revision to "legalize"
rearmament and the US-Japan
Security Treaty.
Views on US and Bloc
The Socialists' domestic
program emphasizes protecting
"the people's livelihood" and
safeguarding "human rights,"
which particularly appeals to
Japanese labor. Their foreign
policy, stemming from their
"humanistic" attitudes, appeals
to the widespread pacifist sen-
timents among Japanese women,
youth and intellectuals. In
practice, the Socialists oppose
practically every American ob-
jective in Japan and emphasize
the necessity for "independence"
from the United States.
Most Socialists accept
the leftist caricature o
America.
Pacifist and neutralist
sentiment leads the Socialists
to welcome the Communist "peace
offensive," and they attribute
America's "hard"policy to a
"pathological" fear of Commu-
nism. One party leader says
Socialist dislike of America
springs from an inferiority
complex resulting from the
knowledge that Japan is depend-
ent, on the United States and
must cast its lot with America.
Regardless of the reasons,
the Socialists can be expected
to continue vocal opposition to
American policies, at least as
long as they are outside the
government. Should the Social-
ists themselves form the govern-
ment, the responsibilities of
office would force a more prac-
tical consideration of politics.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUN"=
27 September 1956
The Socialists are split
on their views of the Commu-
nist bloc... A very small fac-
tion sees the Communists as
the "camp of peace." The
dominant group tends to equate
the "sins" of capitalism and
Communism--both are said to
be systems in which "man ex-
ploits man"--and to see social-
ism as the middle road. An-
other relatively small faction
is realistic in its appraisal
of Communism and, while avoid-
ing actions which could be in-
terpreted as "pro-American,"
recognizes the advantages
accruing to Japan as a result
of its ties to the West.
Labor Support
The Japanese labor move-
ment is the main source of
Socialist strength and, in
the estimation of one high
Socialist, delivered roughly
one half of the 11, 200, 000
Socialist votes in the recent
upper house elections. While
this support is vital to the
party, the drive to broaden
the party's popular base re-
flects concern that such sup-
port will not be sufficient
to bring the Socialists to
power.
In addition, labor's
influence on Socialist policy
has, in some cases, been embar-
rassing. In one instance,
labor insisted that the Social-
ists include provisions in a
Socialist budget proposal for
the payment of minimum wages
even though it was known reve-
nues were not available and
that labor's objective was to
dramatize its call for a na-
tional minimum wage. A party
official said that although
this action added substance to
charges of Socialist "unreal-
ism," the party had to include
the provision for fear of
losing labor votes in the next
election.
Labor's support may also
complicate the Socialist stand
vis-a-vis the Japan Communist
Party. The Socialists have
maintained, since their merger
in 1954, a clear distinction
between themselves and the Com-
munists. They maintained this
stand during the July election
despite repeated Communist
overtures for a "united front"
and the temptation posed by a
few more possible Socialist
victories if Communist support
were accepted. Three prefec-
tural parties did accept Com-
munist support against the
central leadership's advice.
On the whole, the party has
avoided becoming a Communist
captive and the small pro-
Communist group within the
party has been virtually iso-
lated.
One of the best avenues
for Communist influence on
Socialist policy would seem to
be through the labor movement,
in which awareness of the dan-
ger of Communist infiltration
is not so strong. Sohyo,
Japan's largest labor federa-
tion, showed signs of serious
Communist infiltration at its
convention in late August and
adopted an action policy which,
among other things, follows
the line of the Communist-
dominated World Federation of
Trade Unions and calls for
joint action with the Commu-
nists in "nonpolitical" matters.
Just what this will mean in
practice is, as yet, unclear.
That the Socialists will
be able easily to break away
from their espousal of labor's
interests seems doubtful in
view of the party's heavy de-
pendence on labor. The unions
have demonstrated their ability
to deliver votes and funds to
the Socialists and, in the re-
cent election, to elect labor-
backed candidates. Of the
Socialist Diet seats, almost
one third ate held by former
Sohyo members and 10 percent
by former members of one union,
the Communist-dominated Japan
Teachers' Union.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
The immediate outlook is
rather for increased labor un-
ion influence in the Socialist
Party, and Sohyo's secretary
general is urging union mem-
bers to join the party. Modi-
fications in the Socialist plat-
form to gain wider appeal--
for example, by revising the
call for a national minimum
wage, which small entrepreneurs
find unpalatable--probably will
be objected to by the labor
element, however.
In addition, the Social-
ist leadership itself is split
on the-issue, with the Marxists
favoring a labor-dominated pa.r-
ty. Serious attempts to weaken
labor's influence, therefore,
could precipitate an intra-
party factional struggle which
would be as likely to split the
party as win it added support.
In expanding their in-
fluence among the farmers, the
Socialists are faced with the
difficulty of breaking the
association between Socialism
and radicalism in the minds of
many rural voters. This belief,
fostered by the prewar govern-
ment, has not been weakened
by Socialist-inspired riots in
the Diet.
6LC 'U.J' ...
Socialist Chances
Socialist prospects for
attaining power in the next
few years remain limited, ex-
cept in the case of a prolonged
economic crisis, gross conserva-
tive ineptitude, or a major
split in the conservative party.
Public support of the party will
probably continue to grow gradu-
ally as the. Socialists exploit
the labor field more intensely,
"enlighten" more pacifist wom-
en voters, and hold the votes
of intellectuals and youths,
There are some signs that
'the party is becoming increas-
ingly mature and realistic on
certain issues. On the problem
of restoring relations with the
USSR, for example, the Social-
ists have recently eased indis-
criminate attacks on the govern-
ment for failure to secure an
"early settlement" and, for the
moment at least, have agreed to
co-operate with the Hatoyama
administration in bringing
about an agreement which does
not sacrifice Japan's terri-
torial claims permanently.
While decrying "American inter-
ference in Japan's internal af-
fairs" during the debates on
Japan's policy in the negotia-
tions,Socialist secretary gen-
eral Inijiro Asanuma even ad-
mitted it might be proper to
seek American views, "for ref-
erence. only."
Socialist influence on
Japan's national policy is like-
ly to be somewhat greater than
the party's vote-getting ability
or Diet representation might
indicate. The conservatives'
fear of the Socialist "trend"
has prompted them to appropriate
certain Socialist campaign planks
and to attempt to avoid creating
clear-cut issues on others. The
conservative setbacks in the July
election, following blatant at-
tempts to rig the election mecha-
nism against the Socialists, may
make the conservatives more
cautious in their efforts to
contain the Socialists.
In addition, the vocal in-
tellectuals and much of the press
are sympathetic with the Social-
ists, and few conservatives have
so far been willing to explain
vigorously the rationale behind
their willingness to see Japan
go along with certain American
policies, This assures wide
publicity, without refutation,
of Socialist charges of "sub-
servience" to America. The
political climate makes a
showing of "independence" from
America politically valuable,
even to conservatives.
Japan's basic alignment
with the United States is not
likely to be broken either by
Socialist influence on a con-
servative government or even by
a Socialist government. At the
least, however, the Socialists
can be expected to push to in-
crease Japan's maneuverability
in its international relations.
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In the face of the unex-
pected popular reaction in
Georgia to the attack on Stalin
at the 20th Soviet party con-
gress in February, de-Stalin-
ization was delayed there but
has now begun in earnest. The
effect of the incident on Geor-
gian nationalism will probably
color relations between Geor-
gia and the Moscow government
for years to come.
SECRET Numm"r
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
March Demonstrations
The details of what took
place during the four days of
disorder in Tbilisi can now be
pieced together
The students went ahead
with their plans to read poems
and lay wreaths at Stalin's
statue in Stalin Park. The
police apparently took no
action. An air of excitement
developed because of the semi-
illegal nature of the activity,
and crowds drifted into the
city from outlying towns.
At the same time, resentment
mounted as word leaked out of
Khrushchev's secret speech at
the party congress.
Apparently there was no
violence until 8 March, when
students rioted through the
town shouting anti-Soviet, anti-
Russian slogans, smashing win- 25X1
dows and overturning street- 25X1
cars. Other citizens jointed
Although many of the dem-
onstrators were undoubtedly
motivated by genuine hero worship
of Stalin, the prevailing senti-
ment seemed to have been one of
outraged national pride. There
are indications that over the
past several years, Georgians
have grown resentful at losing
the prestige they had enjoyed
under Stalin and his fellow
Georgian, Beria.
In an unusual gesture of
deference to public opinion,
the authorities on 8 March of-
ficially authorized commemorative
meetings, probably in the hope
of ending the disorder. Zarya.
Vostoka, the Georgian party news-
paper, appeared the next day
with a front-page picture of
Stalin and Lenin and an edi-
torial commemorating Stalin's
death. The paper announced the
scheduling of mass meetings
that day in factories, schools
and other institutions. These
moves did not placate the people.
Disorders continued throughout
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
AP.Q
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that day despi'Le exhortations
from loudspeakers that people
go home.
On the evening of 9 March,
crowds gathered in Stalin Park
shouting, "To the post office!"
The idea reportedly was to send
a telegram to Molotov and the
United Nations protesting the
denigration of Stalin and dis-
criminatory treatment of
Georgia. Army troops, which
had apparently been moved into
the city the night before, were
drawn up in front of the govern-
ment buildings. As the people
converged on the post office,
troops opened fire, first into
the air and then into the
crowd. Reports of the number
killed have ranged from 10 to
100, with many others wounded.
There apparently was no
further violence. More troops
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were brought in and patrols from
the security forces ranged the
streets. Patrols were still in
evidence, however, when foreign-
ers were again allowed to visit
Tbilisi a month later, and West-
ern newsmen noted that an under-
lying bitterness among the popu-
lation which they felt would not
soon disappear. As one old
woman put it, "We don't say
much openly, but inside we are
seething."
Official Reactions
The local authorities ap-
parently had not expected such
a strong reaction to the de-
Stalinization campaign in Geor-
gia and were dismayed by the
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25X1
25X1
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of lp
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a- JGLIZG 1
27 September 1956
show of nationalism. There
was probably considerable re-
luctance to push the campaign
in the face of such opposition.
It is probable, furthermore,
that Georgian officials re-
quested Moscow for permission
to slow down the campaign to
allow more time for propa-
ganda groundwork.
In the uneasy period that
followed, the Georgian papers
struck out against propaganda
organizations, hooliganism,
and "collective" cutting of
courses on dialectical materi-
alism. They referred menac-
ingly to "enemies of the peo-
ple who are trying to weaken
the friendship of people and
restore bourgeois nationalism
and national exclusiveness."
Two Komsomol central committee
secretaries and the first sec-
retary of the Tbilisi city
party committee were removed.
The de-Stalinization cam-
paign was virtually halted and
praise for Stalin continued in
the press. In reporting the
May Day parade in Tbilisi,
Zarya Vostoka observed that
demonstrators carried portraits
of Stalin which described him
as "one of the most outstanding
figures of the Communist move-
ment" and included a reference
to a number of institutes named
after him. The press also re-
ported that the Georgian govern-
ment had received approval from
Moscow to complete the construc-
tion of a museum dedicated to
Stalin.
After publication of the
central committee's resolution
of 30 June, however, the de-
Stalinization campaign was re-
sumed in Georgia, probably as
a result of impatience in
Moscow over foot-dragging by
Georgian officials. In early
August, P. V. Kovanov, a deputy
head of the all-Union central
committee's Department of
Propaganda and Agitation, was
.transferred to Georgia as party
second secretary--the first non-
Georgian to serve in the top
leadership since the early
thirties.
During the first two weeks
in August, an intensive propa-
ganda campaign was launched with
a series of articles in Zarya
Vostoka which indicate tit the
aim was to interpret the
"evils" of the personality cult
in terms of specific local
problems. The alarming extent
of bourgeois nationalism in
Georgia was the principal devi-
ation blamed on the Stalin cult.
The goal is to eliminate both
deviation and its cause.
The burden of blame was
placed on Beria, but it was
made clear that Stalin was re-
sponsible for Beria's regime in
Georgia. The unpopular Beria
image is thus being used as a
means of discrediting the still
revered Stalin.
Because of the influence
of Beria and Stalin, the arti-
cles explained, a "barrier ex-
isted between the Georgian
leadership and the central
committee" of the Sovie c Commu-
nist Party, and thus for many
years Georgia remained outside
the effective control of Moscow.
As a result, "foreign, anti-
party practices" sprang up, and
literary works saturated with
ultranationalistic, anti-
Russian feeling were allowed to
run into many editions. His-
torians, it was said, belittled
the importance of the union of
Georgia and Russia and concen-
trated on the distant past. No
serious studies of problems of
Marxist philosophy were published
for ten years, and ideological
indoctrination, particularly of
the youth, was almost non-
existent.
Party boss Mzhavanadze ad-
mitted at the party plenum in
August that the "central com-
mittee of the Georgian Commu-
nist Party underestimated how
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
27 September 1956
deeply the Stalin cult had be-
come rooted in the consciousness
of the people of Georgia, or
its excessive proportions and
nationalistic character." It
"failed to give an adequate
explanation to the people" or
take any effective action.
Although Mzhavanadze
placed the blame on the Geor-
gian central committee, it is
clear that Moscow did not
take a firm stand on what course
should be pursued. Georgian
officials, lacking definite
directives, perhaps disagreeing
as to approach, and differing
in their degree of enthusiasm
for the de-Stalinization cam-
paign, allowed the situation
to drift, and this led to
Moscow's action in early
August.
Moscow faces a real problem
in the existence of strong na-
tionalist sentiment in Georgia.
Never far below the surface,
this sentiment has now been
aroused by a direct and open
clash with Moscow. Although
the regime is apparently de-
termined to employ every means
to overcome this attitude, it
will probably continue to be a
source of trouble for some
years to come.
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