CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000800110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 39
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 25, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 24, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 17
OCR NO. 3259/56
24 May 56
DDcurnent Na. -- 7 ' ---
N Chan In Class.
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Auth. HR 70-3 pq
Date: (~ F
Date: Z01 _u__j '1 j
Next Review D -
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uucument No. ---- rl__-___-
No Change In Class. ^
^ Declassified
Class. Changed to: TS_S C
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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CONFIDENTI&,
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 a - s
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 May 1956
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
ARAB REACTION TO EGYPT9S
RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . .
Official Arab reaction to Egypt's recognition of
Communist China has been mixed and suggests that the
other Arab states, with the possible exception of Syria,
will not immediately follow Egypt's lead. Arab public
reaction, however, has been generally favorable.
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . .
Several reports suggesting that Egypt may be pre-
paring to lead the Arab states in a new attempt to
negotiate with Israel lend some slight substance to
new optimism voiced by UN secretary general Hammarskjold.
There has been no relaxation, however, in the military
preparedness maintained by each side.
LAOS . . . . . . a . . . . . . . . . e a . 0 a 0 0 . a .
Communist diplomatic activity with respect to Laos,
designed to exclude Western influence from that country
in return for settlement of the Pathet Lao issue, is
making headway. Laotian premier Souvanna Phouma is
strongly attracted to the idea of arranging private talks
with Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphannouvong, his half-
brother, in the hope of reaching a settlement.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
SOVIET-FRENCH TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Soviet-French talks which ended in Moscow on
19 May were marked by lack of agreement on Important
issues. The Soviet leaders followed rigidly their
standard lines and did not seek to exploit French differ-
ences with the West. The French reaffirmed their loyalty
to NATO and adhered to agreed Western positions on the
issues discussed. Nevertheless, Paris and Moscow will
probably continue efforts to improve their relations.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 May 1956
SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
The generally favorable popular reaction to the
Japanese-Soviet fishery pacts will have the effect of
encouraging the Hatoyama goiernment to establish normal
relations with the USSR. In addition, Soviet insistence
on official negotiations in Tokyo to carry out the pro-
visional agreement for the present fishing season may put
pressure on Japan to consider a prompt exchange of am-
bassadors, without a formal treaty.
SOVIET WITHDRAWALS FROM GERMANY . . . , . . . . . . . . Page 4
In an effort to keep Soviet disarmament proposals
in the public eye, the East Germans announced the be-
ginning of Soviet troop and air unit withdrawals from
East Germany within a week after the USSR stated that
it would reduce its forces by 1,200,000 men, including
30,000 from East Germany. F_ I
DISCONTENT IN
CZECH CQMMUNIST PARTY .
Czech Communist Party intellectuals and provincial
leaders, taking advantage of confusion and uncertainty,
are reportedly demanding the dismissal of most members
of the present politburo. Open discontent has not been
quieted by the removal of Defense Minister Cepicka, and
may lead the regime to undertake further dismissals,
particularly among those who can be closely identified
with Stalinist policies. The position of the rulin
triumvirate appears relatively stable.
YUGOSLAVIA INCREASES EFFORTS
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TO INFLUENCE ALBANIA . . . . Page 5
Recent shifts among Yugoslav officials concerned
with Albanian affairs and indirect criticism of
Albanian premier Shehu in the,Yugoslav press indicate
a heightening of Belgrade's interest in Albania.
Developments at the current Third Albanian Party Congress
should provide some indication as to the course
of Yugoslav-Albanian relations. 25X1
SOVIET APPROACHES TO TURKEY , . . , Page 7
Turkish leaders continue to view persistent Soviet
offers of "unconditional" economic aid with considerable
suspicion. In the event of a further worsening of Turkey's
critical economic situation, however, the Turkish govern-
ment may feel the need for reappraising its economic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 May 1956
EGYPT MAY RECONSIDER USSR OFFER
TO BUILD ASWAN HIGH DAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Moscow is reported to have renewed on 17 May its
offer to Egypt to construct the Aswan High Dam. The
new offer presumably was timed to exploit any apprehension
Cairo may have felt that in view of its recognition of
Communist China, Western financing arrangements might fall
through. The Nasr regime may give serious consideration
EAST GERMANY SEEKS CLOSER TIES
WITH NEAR EAST AND AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The East German government has recently stepped up
its efforts to establish closer economic ties with
countries in the Near East and Africa. These efforts
may eventually result in diplomatic recognition of East
Germany by the Sudan, Syria, Egypt, and Lebanon.
O
BRITISH SEEK FEDERATION
OF ALL SOMALI TERRITORIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Britain is trying to promote a union under paramount
British influence of all the Somali territories of eastern
Africa despite the initial opposition of Ethiopia,
France, and Italy as the other powers involved. The
governor of British Somaliland is soon to make the first
public move in this direction. Britain?s plan is to re-
ensure its strategic position in this area and to acquire
more effective means to counter Egyptian, Saudi, and
Dossibly Soviet influence there in the long run.
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THE CYPRUS SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The situation in Greece and Cyprus continues to
be dominated by repercussions of the executive on 10 May
of two Cypriot terrorists. The British have imposed
complete curfews in some parts of Cyprus, but outbreaks
of violence and student demonstrations have increased
sharply.
The new Jordanian cabinet of Said al-Mufti shows
signs of leading the country toward greater nationalism
and away from its special relations with Britain.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 May 1956
PAKISTAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Pakistan's seven-week-old political crisis remains
unresolved. The parties supported by President Mirza
have apparently won a struggle with the Moslem League
in the West Pakistan Assembly but lost in the East
Pakistan legislature. The turmoil in the provinces has
delayed a decision on changes in the central leadership,
and it appears possible that Prime Minister Chaudhri
Mohammad Ali?s trip to Communist China may again be
delayed.
SINGAPORE a .
The breakdown of the Singapore self-government
talks in London will probably bring new elections in
Singapore which the Communist-manipulated People?s Action
Party stands a good chance of winning. The odds appear
to be against any early outbreak of violence unless the
British attempt to hold up elections or suspend consti-
tutional government altogether.
Page 14
NEW ASIAN-AFRICAN MEETINGS
UNDER CONSIDERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 15
A second Asian-African conference seems likely
some'timp in 1957, and an economic conference may be held
sooner. Stronger Communist and neutralist representation
.than at Bandung could be expected, and the Communists
presumably would come armed with firm offers of assistance
SOUTH KOREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
The considerable opposition strength manifested in
South Korea's presidential elections will require polit-
ical adjustments and will probably inaugurate a period
of political instability. President Rhee has already
replaced his home minister, and other governmental and
Liberal Party changes appear likely. The strong showing
by the Democratic Party will boost the prestige of Vice-
President-elect Chang Myon6 and move South Korea in the
direction of a two-party system.
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE BRITISH MILITARY POSITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA . Page
Britain evidently considers that loss of access to
its air and naval bases in Ceylon, as threatened by the
Bandaranaike government, will not have irreparable
consequences and has begun exploring possibilities for
alternative base sites in the Indian Ocean area. Further-
more, London evidently believes Ceylon will wish to main-
tain some defense ties with Britain as a counterweight to
the influence of India.
STATUS OF FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN a. . . . . Page
Afghanistan
has
moved rapidly to use the $100,000,000
credit granted by
the
USSR during the visit of Soviet
leaders Bulganin
and
Khrushchev last December. At the
same time, Kabul
has
sought to emphasize its neutrality
by showing increased receptivity to contact with the
West, particularly the United States. Possible Afghan
moves toward Western-supported Pakistan, however, are
limited in view of Prime Minister Daud's unswerving
policy on Pushtoonistan.
SOVIET POLICY IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION 1955-1956. . Page
The USSR achieved an influential voice in Near and
Middle Eastern affairs during the past year by pro-
moting a de facto alliance with the Egyptian-led Arab
states through sales of arms to Egypt and Syria. The
Soviet Union further succeeded in raising additional
obstacles to the expansion of the Baghdad pact, as well
as bypassing the 1950 US-British-French tripartite agree-
ment, the outstanding symbol of Western influence in the
Near and Middle East. An ultimate Soviet aim probably
is to convene a special conference on the entire problem
of the Middle East with the participation of the great
powers and the states of the area.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
ARAB REACTION TO EGYPT'S
RECOGNITION OF COMMUNIST CHINA
Official Arab reaction
to Egypt's recognition of Com-
munist-China on 16 May has been
mixed and suggests that other
Arab states, with.the possible
exception of Syria, will not
immediately follow Egypt's lead.
Arab public reaction, however,
has been generally favorable.
Syria
Syria, strongly anti-
Western and pro-Egyptian, is
probably the most likely Arab
state to follow Egypt's lead,
with the Sudan a possible third.
In Syria, an enthusiastic
press and many.politicians are
urging the government to recog-
nize Peiping. Akram Hawrani,
leader of the influential Arab
Socialist Resurrection Party,
has called for adoption of the
October 1955 petition of 50
Syrian deputies demanding recog-
nition, Prime Minister Ghazzi
was evasive on the subject in a
talk with Ambassador Moose on
19 April. Press reports indicate
the question is now being dis-
cussed by the cabinet. Jordan's
former prime minister Rifai
and Nationalist China's Ambassa-
dor Ho in Cairo believe that
Syria will recognize Peiping.
but he could not see any partic-
ular benefits He said that the
action was probably the result
of Soviet pressure, but that
the Sudan was under no such
pressure. Notwithstanding
Azhari's remarks, the Chinese
Communists have been pressing
the Sudanese for recognition
and closer trade and cultural
relations, and a Sudanese gov-
ernment delegation is now visit-
ing Communist China. Chinese
Nationalist ambassador Ho be-
lieves the Sudan will "sit on
the fence" for the present.
Iraq and Lebanon
Iraq and Lebanon will prob-
ably continue to maintain their
relations with Nationalist China,
although some Lebanese politi-
cians are urging recognition of
Peiping. An Iraqi Foreign
Ministry spokesman told the
press that Iraq has never con-
sidered recognizing Communist
China and will continue its
cordial and friendly relations
with the Nationalists. Iraq
recently agreed to have National-
ist China raise its diplomatic
mission from legation to embassy
level. Prime Minister Nuri Said
characterized the Egyptian action
as "Just one more move by Nasr
in his campaign of blackmail."
The Sudan
Reports from the Sudan
over the past months,have shown
confusion and disagreement on
the question of recognizing
Peiping. Prime Minister Azhari
said on 21 May that he was not
surprised at Egypt's action,
Lebanon will not be under
strong pressure to follow Egypt's
lead, and will be relatively
free to chart its own course,
which has generally been pro-
Western. Prime Minister Yafi
has made no statement other
than that Egypt could do as it
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24 May 1956
chose. President Chamoun, how-
ever, told Ambassador Heath on
21 May that he had.spoken against
recognition in a recent cabinet
meeting, and'Foreign Minister
Lahoud said there was no imme-
diate danger that Lebanon would
recognize Peiping.
Last December, Lebanon
signed, but has not yet ratified,
a trade agreement with Communist
China which provided for the
exchange of permanent trade
missions. The Lebanese Foreign
Ministry official in charge of
United Nations affairs stated
in February that the question
of,Chinese representation in
the UN would be more difficult
in the future, and that even
Lebanon might "have to retreat
into abstention in view of the
changing attitude of the Arab
states."
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia will probably
not recognize Communist China.
King Saud's secretary told the
American charge in Jidda on 21
May that Saudi Arabia had no
intention to do so and would not
be influenced in this by the
Egyptian action. However, Saudi
Arabia will probably not imple-
ment an agreement with Nationalist
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
Several reports suggesting
that Egypt may be preparing to,
lead the Arab states in a new
attempt to negotiate with Israel
lent some slight substance to
new optimism voiced by UN secre-
tary general Hammarskjold.
There has been no relaxation,
however, in the military pre-
paredness maintained by each
side.
China to change the present
consular representation to
embassy level.
The Jordanian press reacted
favorably to Egyptian recogni-
tion and hailed it as a blow to
the 'West and to the United
States in particular. However,
the fluid political situation
in Jordan, the recent change of
government, and Jordanian pre-
occupation with local problems
suggest that Jordan will side-
step the issue as it has in the
pasta Former prime minister
Rifai, shortly before he resigned,
said that there was no thought
of recognizing Peiping when
Jordan had not "even recognized
the head of the outfit--Russia."
Libya and Yemen
There has been little re-
action in either Libya or Yemen.
Chinese Nationalist ambassador
Ho believes that Libya will not
follow Egypt's lead, but will
also not agree to Ho's proposal
to establish relations with
Nationalist China now for fear
of offending Egypt.
Yemen has indicated some
interest in closer relations
with Communist China.
Arab. Statements
The Arab foreign ministers'
conference in Damascus on 17-18
May issued only a noncommittal-'
communique, but press reports
and Lebanese diplomats have
suggested that Egypt pointed
out the impracticability of the
Arab states' insistence on the
UN 1947 Palestine partition
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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plan as the only basis for
negotiation with Israel. The
only recent report of what
Egypt might consider as a sub-
stitute negotiating position,
however, repeated previous
ideas of an Arab corridor
across Israel's Negev desert--
a proposal Israel has frequently
rejected.
Cairo did take an unprece-
dented step in permitting
publication in a weekly magazine
of an article which, while
sharply critical of Israel's
treatment of its Arab minority,
gave evidence of accepting the
thought that Israel is here to
stay. It is not clear whether
publication of the article--
reportedly the first in a series
--is merely a freak action which
the Nasr regime will soon repent
or whether it is a trial balloon
to test popular reaction to a
public abandonment of the
standard Arab thesis that the
state of Israel in its present
form must eventually disappear.
Hammarskjold's Views
The UN secretary general
meanwhile appears to have re-
vised his earlier view that his
mission to the Near East had
achieved at best a two- to six-
month truce. He told Ambassador
Lodge that he foresaw no war
for at least a year, and sub-
sequently cited press reports
on Arab diplomatic activity as
a "straw in the wind" supporting
his belief that the Arabs will
ask him to come back to the
area this summer. An Arab
statement, however, reportedly
opposed Hammarskjold's return
with any broader terms of refer-
ence than those of his previous
mission.
Some of Hammarskjold's
optimism may derive from
negotiations he apparently has
been carrying on since his re-
turn to New York. The secretary
general said on 21 May that
these activities were bearing
fruit, and hinted that he might
accomplish much by "confidential
means" with the "possibility of
newspaper publication-as a sort
of club behind the door." The
Arab-Israeli situation has lent
itself to this style of "con-
fidential" operation, but public
commitments have seldom resulted,
since Arab leaders in particular
have felt unable even to admit
publicly that they have indulged
in thoughts of compromise.
Israeli Actions
On the Israeli side, press
and government continued to take
an unenthusiastic view of Ham-
marskjold's achievements. Tel
Aviv newspapers seized on the
first Cairo announcement of a
new arms deal with Poland--a
development later denied by
both Poles and Egyptians--as
"proof" that the Arabs were
continuing on their warlike
course. Some military move-
ments in Israel looked like
possible reinforcement of the
area near Banat Yacov. The
Israelis were also apparently
building up a "case" of truce
violations against Syria,
perhaps with the idea of justi-
fying a resumption of work in
the demilitarized zone on the
Jordan water project.
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bloc supplies continued to
arrive in Alexandria, and that
the Egyptian recognition of
Communist China was intended to
assure Cairo of a future source
of such material in case the
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USSR became involved in a UN
arms embargo to the Middle East.
These military developments
indicated clearly that whatever
diplomatic initiatives the Arabs
Communist activity with
respect to Laos, designed to
exclude Western influence in
that country in return for set-
tlement of the Pathet Lao issue,
is making headway. Despite his,
avowed firmness in dealing with
the Communists, Laotian premier
Souvanna Phouma is strongly
attracted to the idea of
arranging private talks with
Pathet Lao leader Prince Soix-
'phannouvong, his half -brother ,
in the hope of reaching a set-
tlement,
Souvanna Phouma believes
the Pathets are one the defen-
sive and is confident he can
exploit the differences between
those Pathets who are oriented
toward the Viet Minh and those
who are "nationalists." He
bases his belief largely on the
fact that the Laotian govern-
ment's guerrilla war of attri-
tion against the Pathet forces
has weakened the Communist hold
on the two northern provinces
of Phong:Saly and Sam Neua.
Viet Minh strategy in
Laos apparently has been to
promote frustration by maintain-
ing a deadlocked situation in
the hope of eventually gaining
important concessions from the
government. The Communists
may now feel, however, that the
and Israelis might be contem-
plating, they continued to put
their main reliance on their
armed forces. Any change in
this basic attitude seems re-
mote,
time has come to make the best
possible deal with Vientiane.
They may believe there is much
more to gain by "peaceful"
penetration and subversion
throughout Laos than by con-
tinuation of an increasingly
unrewarding military effort in
the remote north. It may have
been in this connection that
Wilfred Burchett of the London
Daily,.~.Worker went to Vientiane
and sounded out the Laotian
government's position.
In addition to Communist
blandishments, the premier is
under strong internal pressure
to obtain a peaceful solution
to the Pathet Lao problem.
Indian officials in Vientiane
are also promoting the idea
that if Laos would act "more
like Cambodia," the Pathet Lao
would be reasonable and would
come to terms.
Although he apparently is
well-intentioned, Souvanna
Phouma is naive and may be
manipulated into making danger-
ous concessions. In an inter-
view on 10 May that may give a
preview of his position in any
meeting with Souphannouvong,
Souvanna Phouma told Burchett
he was prepared to reintegrate
the Pathets into the govern-
ment and the armed forces
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"without discrimination" in
return for restoration of
the government's authority in
Phong Saly and Sam Neua Prov-
inces,. He also declared that
Laos would observe the "five
principles of coexistence.."
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The Soviet-French talks
which ended in Moscow on 19
May were marked try lack of
agreement on important issues,
The Soviet leaders followed
rigidly their standard lines,
and the Mollet-Pineau team was
determined to give Moscow no
chance to exploit any French
differences with accepted West-
ern policies. The most specific
agreement reached covered an
expansion of cultural exchanges
in a wide variety of fields.
Soviet Aims
Bulganin and Khrushchev
evidently looked on the trip,
like their visit to London,
primarily as a means of estab-
lishing a channel for approaches
at a more auspicious time in
the future. The USSR may have
been somewhat circumscribed by
French firmness. In any event,
the Soviet leaders apparently
did not attempt to bargain
seriously to gain French agree-
ment with the Soviet position
on outstanding issues. Nor did
they appear to make any deter-
mined effort to capitalize on
French differences with other
Western powers on such questions
as the Middle East, disarmament,
or a security system for a
divided Europe, but were con-
tent to reiterate their es-
tablished positions.
In Moscow, Premier Mollet
reaffirmed France's loyalty to
the Atlantic Alliance, and his
handling of the talks appears
to have strengthened his in-
ternal political position. The
French were impressed by the
frankness of the Soviet leaders
and their inflexibility on most
issues. They seem to have been
surprised by the apparent So-
viet acceptance of continued
French participation in NATO
as a fact of international life.
Despite the lack of agree-
ment in Moscow, Paris will prob-
ably continue its efforts to in-
crease cultural and trade rela-
tions with the East and to seek
high-level contacts. Polish,
Czech, and Soviet visits to
Paris are already in prospect.
Middle East and Algeria
On the Middle East, the
joint communique was largely a
restatement of the Soviet-Brit-
ish communique. Moscow re-
jected as premature and inap-
propriate a French proposal ap-
proving UN secretary general
Hammarskjold's efforts on be-
half of peace in the Near East.
It barred any statement on
future UN measures to put an
end to the arms race, such as
an embargo on arms shipments
to the Near East, that did not
specifically mention Iran and
Pakistan.
The statement in the com-
munique on the Algerian ques-
tion was a cautious compromise.
The French would have preferred
some unilateral expression of
sympathetic Soviet understand-
ing, but hope that the com-
promise statement will have
some sobering effect on the
Arab countries and the French
Communist Party. The Soviet
leaders implied that they wanted
to oblige with a statement but
were worried about critical
Arab reaction and therefore
merely expressed hope that
the French would find a solu-
tion. Khrushchev took a pub-
lic opportunity to counter any
adverse Arab reaction to the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY ;SUMMART
24 May 1956
communique by toasting "the
Arabs and all others who are
struggling for national in-
dependence."
Other Issues
The clearest illustration
of the deadlock was on European
issues. The USSR spent hours
denouncing NATO and barred any
reference in the communique to
French membership in the organ-
ization. Khrushchev was ada-
mant on the question of German
unification and likewise re-
fused to have it included in
the communique.
There was no difficulty in
agreeing to endorse the pro-
posals on Indochina made by the
Soviet-British Geneva confer-
ence co-chairmen on 9 May.
Nevertheless, the USSR tried
in vain to insert a reference
to France's continuing re-
sponsibility in Indochina.
The Soviet leaders, as they
had with the British, offered to
increase trade three- or four-
fold if strategic trade controls
were lifted. Agreement was
reached on negotiating a three-
year trade agreement in the
fall. Mollet was quoted by the
Soviet press as saying after
.the talks that while "France is
bound by certain obligations,"
he intends "to work out an
agreement with the United States
and Britain for changes in the
existing rules", to allow an in-
crease in trade.
SOVIET-JAPANESE RELATIONS
The generally favorable
popular reaction to the Jap-
anese Soviet'fishery pacts,
will have the effect of en-
couraging the Hatoyama govern-
ment to establish normal rela-
tions with the USSR. In ad-
dition, the necessity of offi-
cial negotiations in Tokyo to
implement the provisional agree-
ment for the present fishing
season will, at the least,re-
suit in de facto official rela-
tions and probably will hasten
the resumption of full diplo-
matic relations.
Although many influential
Japanese have declined to take
a stand on the Moscow negotia-
tions until the chief Japanese
negotiator, Minister of Agricul-
ture and Forestry Kano, returns
and makes a statement, his per-
sonal political position and
the prestige of the Hatoyama
government have improved as a
result of the fishery pacts.
The prime minister told the
Diet on 21 May that Kano con-
ducted the Moscow talks in ac-
cordance with official policy,
and Foreign Minister Shigemitsu,
a proponent of firmness toward
the USSR, is showing signs of
reconsidering his stand. He
has stated that Japan must now
reassess its policy in prepara-
tion for the scheduled reopening
of treaty talks no later than 31
July. Over-all, the Japanese
appear to feel the settlement
was the best possible in view
of Japan's weak bargaining posi-
tion.
Cabinet Reorganization
Hatoyama and his influen-
tial following in the ruling
Liberal-Democratic Party, which
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favors relations with the So-
viet bloc, feel that public ac-
ceptance of the Moscow agree-
ments has provided an oppor-
tunity for a cabinet reorgan-
ization. The proposed cabinet
would be designed to strengthen
the control of the Hatoyama-
Kono-Bukichi Miki faction of
the party, and at the same time
bring other factional leaders
into. the government.
A reorganization now being
discussed would make Shinsuke
Kishi, a leading contender for
Hatoyama's post, deputy prime
minister, while Kono would re-
place Kishi in the important
party secretary general post.
Many political observers antic-
ipate Shigemitsu will be
dropped.
Issues at Stake
Japanese leaders apparently
believe there is no prospect
for the immediate return of the
southern Kurils, and that it is
preferable to make early set-
tlements without final deter-
mination of the islands' status.
The alternatives under considera-
tion are whether to resume re-
lations via the "Adenauer for-
mula," with a prompt exchange
of ambassadors without a formal
treaty,. or to try for a treaty
which recognizes a possible
future reconsideration of the
territorial problem. Should
the Japanese decide to seek a
treaty settlement, it is
highly probable they would make
a bid. for Soviet recognition of
residual Japanese sovereignty
over the southern Kurils.
Status of Soviet Mission
Meanwhile, problems have
arisen involving the provision-
al fishery pact and the status
of the Soviet representation in
Tokyo. The provisional agree-
ment appears to require that
Japanese fishing licenses be
endorsed by the Soviet mission
chief to be valid, and Moscow
has indicated that any negotia-
tions over ship seizures should
be handled in Tokyo.
The new Soviet chief rep-
resentative in Tokyo, Sergei
Tikhvinsky, has indicated that
any negotiations between his
mission and the Japanese govern-
ment related to fishery or other
matters cannot be undertaken
until Japan recognizes the mis-
sion. Tikhvinsky's position
directly rejects the Japanese
Foreign Ministry stand that
Tokyo will not recognize the
mission prior to the establish-
ment of diplomatic relations be-
tween the two countries. A
statement by the first returning
Japanese fishery delegates that
Japan will start negotiations
promptly with the Soviet mission
further undermines the Foreign
Ministry position.
The necessity for making
arrangements which will safe-
guard Japanese fishing during
the present season apparently
will compel the Japanese govern-
ment to undertake official nego-
tiations with the Soviet mission.
This in turn probably will in-
fluence Tokyo toward accepting
a formula restoring normal rela-
tions prior to a peace treaty.
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SOVIET WITHDRAWALS FROM GERMANY
In an effort to keep So-
viet disarmament proposals in
the public eye, the East Ger-
mans announced the beginning
of Soviet troop and air unit
withdrawals from East Germany
within a week after the USSR
stated that it would reduce
its forces by 1,200,000 men,
including 30,000 from East Ger-
many.
On 18 May an unstated
number of Soviet troops, pre-
sumably ground forces, were
claimed by the East Germans to
have boarded a USSR-bound train
at Falkenberg; their departure
remains unconfirmed. Similarly
on 20 May, the East German press
reported the departure of "two
Soviet air force units" from
Brandenburg for the USSR. The
units involved are probably
the two Soviet ground attack
regiments at Brandenburg.
Withdrawal of the air
regiments, which are equipped
primarily with obsolete IL-
10's of World War II vintage,
would not alter appreciably
DISCONTENT IN
CZECH COMMUNIST PARTY
Czech Communist Party in-
tellectuals and provincial lead-
ers, taking advantage of con-
fusion and uncertainty, are
reportedly demanding the dis-
missal of most members of the
present politburo. Open dis-
content and ferment have not
been quieted by the removal of
Soviet ground support capabili-
ties in East Germany. The three
regiments of the remaining
ground attack division in East
Germany are now equipped with
MIG-151s, and the third regi-
ment of the Brandenburg divi-
sion began converting to jets
in April.
Rail shipments of equip-
ment, military personnel and
dependents from Brandenburg to
the USSR began on 7 May, a week
before the Soviet announcement
of the forces reduction, and
apparently continued through
19 May.
Although only about seven
percent of Soviet forces in
Germany are to be affected by
the Soviet announced ground and
air units withdrawals, a maximum
propaganda effort unquestionably
will publicize their return to
the USSR. Defeat of conscrip-
tion legislation soon to be con-
sidered by the West German
Bundestag may be the immediate
goal.
Defense Minister Cepicka, and
may lead the regime to under-
take further dismissals, par-
ticularly among those who can
be closely identified with Sta-
linist policies. The position
of the ruling triumvirate ap-
pears relatively stable.
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24 May 1956
An earlier report stated
that top party figures have
been unable to give clear policy
guidance to the rank and file,
and there are indications that
confusion at the top levels has
stimulated considerable specula-
tion, even among politburo mem-
bers themselves, as to who will
be forced from office next.
Most frequently reported
in trouble is the propaganda
boss, Ladislav Kopecky, a mili-
tant figure who could easily,
and probably justifiably, be
accused of Stalinism. Other
possible candidates for removal
include Minister of Culture
Stoll, a protege of Kopecky,
and Slovak party leader and
former security minister Bacilek.
The position of the ruling
triumvirate--party first secre-
tary Novotny, President Zapotocky,1
and Premier Siroky--appears to
be relatively stable, despite
the fact that some criticism of
Novotny has been voiced. Re-
portedly only Zapotocky, how-
ever, enjoys party popularity.
Pressures from increAsingly ?
vocal elements in the party may
lead the regime to follow up
Cepicka's ousting with addi-
tional firings, particularly of
those who have been most closely
identified with the unpopular .
YUGOSLAVIA INCREASES EFFORTS
TO INFLUENCE ALBANIA
Recent shifts among Yugo-
slav officials concerned with
Albanian affairs and indirect
criticism of Albanian premier
Shehu in the Yugoslav press
indicate a heightening of
Belgrade's interest in Albania.
Developments at the current
Third Albanian Party Congress
should provide some indication
as to the future course of
Yugoslav-Albanian relations.
cultural and security policies
of the past. Such removals,
however, would not indicate a
coming disintegration of the
party leadership nor of the
party control mechanism.
The open dissidence ex-
pressed by party intellectuals
has not as yet been echoed by
the public, which apparently
has adopted a "wait-and-see
attitude." University students,
however, are now militantly
expressing their grievances
against the regime, and this
may foreshadow a spread of such
activity to other informed ele-
ments of the citizenry.
The party leadership is at-
tempting to draw the line on
public criticism. President
Zapotocky warned outspoken
critics at the Writers' Congress
in April, for example, that
the party must be immune from
attack. Criticism, however,
will not be silenced by mere
policy speeches, particularly
since the regime appears un-
certain as to methods of en-
forcement,and even the removal
of one or two more politburo
members may fail to placate
the opposition. Nevertheless,
the regime's task is not so
difficult as that confronting
the Polish and Hungarian
parties.
On 4 May, the Yugoslav
minister to Albania, Predrag
Ajtic, was replaced by Arso
Milatovic, who reportedly co-
operated with Albanian party
boss Hoxha during the "partisan
days." Ajtic was known to pre-
fer the company of his Western
colleagues, and Belgrade may
have felt he would not be use-
ful in any future plans for
improving relations with Tirana.
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24 May 1956
Ajtic, who is-thoroughly versed
in Albanian -Yugoslav affairs,
is now playing an important
role in the Kosmet, a region
inhabited mainly by ethnic Al-
banians, where Yugoslavia has
shaken up the leadership of
the regional and local govern-
ment.
Premier Shehu's Position
A Yugoslav Macedonian
paper claimed on 14 May that
a bill recently sponsored by
Premier-Shehu was twice over-
whelmingly rejected by the Al-
banian parliament. When Shehu
demanded a third vote, he re-
portedly was told that even
though he was premier, he had
no right to ask for another
vote.
This.story appears to be
a fabrication and may merely
be the opening of a public
Yugoslav campaign to discredit
Shehu and force his removal.
According to the Italian
Foreign Ministry, one of its
legation officials in Tirana
was present at the assembly
session in question and ob-
served the bill's passage with
the usual unanimity.
The Italians have aspira-
tions of their own in Albania
and view Shehu as the best
barrier to the development of
Belgrade's influence there
because of his extreme hostility
to Yugoslavia.
Albanian congress will find
Shehu in a weak position, with
the iSR making every effort
to replace him with someone
more amenable to Yugoslavia's
infl.ua.encc, .
Albanian Views
Albania.has done little to
conform to the bloc campaign
of wooing Tito, presumably out
of fear of stimulating Yugosjlavia
to reassert its pre-1948 influ-
ence there--a development which
would be universally unpopular
in ilba:via. The removal of
either :she.l:~u or Hoxha, re-
sponsible for executing pro-
, a :t t oX;:_i a, Loci Xoxe in 1949,',,
would be interpreted in Al-
banian party circles as yield-
ing to Yugoslav pressure. Bel-
grade in .act dislikes both
men, but presumably feel=s a
sati 3fac. ory arr'augev'nen : could
be wor .ed ouL with Hoxha, ii
.;ihehu were removed. ahehu had
taken a decidedly anti-Yugoslav
position even prior to the 1948
break.
The U,58'11,1 may believe some
gesture in regard to Albania
is necessary prior to Tito's
visit to Moscow. Tito probably
will raise the question of Al-
bania's unfriendly attitude
I toward Belgrade, pointing out
in particular that .Koci Xoxe,
Tito's front man prior to 1948,
remains the only Satellite
"Titoist" purge victim who has
not been rehabilitated. Bel-
grade has criticized this failure
and the recurring Albanian
press articles which characterize
Xoxe as an "enemy of the party."
For the present,Tito would prob-
ably be satisfied b? the demo-
tion of Shehu. 25X1
The Italian minister to
Tirana believes that the
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Turkish leaders continue
to view persistent Soviet offers
of "unconditional" economic aid
with suspicion. In the event
of a worsening of Turkey's crit-
ical economic situation, how-
evers the Turkish government
may feel the need for reapprais-
ing its economic relations with
the Soviet Union.
Soviet Approaches
Since Stalin's
death in March 1953,
Soviet officials have
approached the Turks
on at least 20 occa-
sions with expres-
sions of good will
and suggestions that
improvement of Soviet-
Turkish relations
would be of mutual
benefit. In May 1953,
Soviet foreign min-
ister Molotov opened
the campaign to win
Turkish good will by
handing the Turkish
ambassador in Moscow
a note renouncing
Soviet territorial
claims to two of
Turkey's eastern
areas---Ardahan and
Kars. Later that year
the long-standing dis-
pute involving the
regulation of Aras
River watera. was
Turkey during 1955, and this
number has already been sur-
passed during the first five
months of 1956.
Moscow has offered exten-
sive and ostensibly uncondition-
al economic aid to the Turkish
government and to private busi-
ness. The latest Soviet effort
reported is a "$14,000,000 credit
offer to finance the import of
Soviet goods. Turkey's trade
settled to Turkey's satisfaction.
the Soviet
nion has steadily pressed its
campaign to develop a new asso-
ciation with Turkey. At least
seven official and semioffi-
cial approaches were made to
with the Soviet bloc in 1955
amounted to 20 percent of its
total foreign trade as compared
with about 12 percent in 1954.
The USSR is currently seeking
exchanges of parliamentary, ath-
letic, and cultural delegations.
Turkish Reaction
Despite clever propaganda
in support of Soviet diplomatic
and economic overtures, and de-
spite popular pressure to accept
the badly needed financial
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24 May 1956
assistance, the Menderes-Bayar
government has remained firm in
its insistence that the inter-
national atmosphere cannot be
cleared bilaterally. The Turks
view the Soviet strategy as aimed
at' dividing the Western world
into more "digestible portions."
Turkey has shown no incli-
nation to isolate itself from
the Western defense complex.
Ankara has even requested Amer-
ican guidance in meeting the
current Soviet approaches. It
feels isolated, however, in its
uncompromising position because
many of its Western allies are
less resolute in opposing the
exchange of various types of
delegations with the USSR. Ac-
cordingly, the Turks may adopt
some elasticity in their policy
regarding such exchanges, a
development which might result
in some weakening of the popu-
lar anti-Soviet attitude.
EGYPT MAY RECONSIDER USSR OFFER
TO BUILD ASWAIT HIGH DAM
The reported renewal by
Moscow on 17 May of its offer
to construct the Aswan High
Dam was designed to exploit any
apprehension Cairo may have felt
that Western financing arrange-
ments might fall through. In
renewing the offer, Soviet
ambassador Kiselev allegedly
pointed out to Egyptian prime
minister Nasr that Moscow
realized Cairo's recognition
of Communist China had jeopard-
ized Egypt's chances of obtain-
ing aid from the West. The
Egyptian minister of national
production. told a press confer-
ence in m--a-May that the Soviet
American emergency aid in
foodstuffs, spare parts, raw
materials, and petroleum has
temporarily eased Turkey's eco-
nomic problems. Nevertheless,
the cost of living is excessive-
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high and the value of Turkish
currency continues to drop. The
The Turkish government is
fully alive to the possible po-
litical consequences of Soviet
economic assistance. In the
event the present critical eco-
nomic situation develops into
a major crisis with severe
hardships on a large segment of
the Turkish population, however,
Ankara would be faced with over-
whelming popular pressures to
seek relief wherever it could
be found.
(Concurred in by ORR)
offer to finance the dam still
held and that Egypt could
"accept it at any time."
The driving ambition of
the Nasr regime to construct
the dam, and the difficulties
it feels it has faced in trying
to obtain Western financing,
may cause Cairo to reconsider
the Soviet offer first made
public last October. At that
time Moscow offered a 30-year
loan for an unspecified amount
at 2 percent interest payable
in Egyptian rice and cotton.
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24 MAY 195?
O MILES
PROPOSED ASWAN HICK DAM
Extent of the Project
The dam, which is a central
feature in Egypt's TVA-like 1.3-
billion dollar Sadd-el-Asli prvj-
act,, has become a symbol of the
EAST GERMANY SEEKS CLOSER TIES
WITH NEAR EAST AND AFRICA
The East German government
has recently stepped up its ef-
forts to establish closer eco-
nomic ties with countries'in the
Near East and Africa. An East
German trade delegation headed
by Heinrich Rau, deputy premier
and minister for foreign and do-
mestic trade, which toured the
Sudan, Syria, Egypt and Lebanon
in April and May,was well re-
ceived. The delegation was
accorded official treatment in
these countries, and Rau met
with the presidents of Lebanon
and Syria.
success or failure of the do-
mestic program of the present
Cairo government. While pre-
liminary engineering work has
been going on for many months`,
construction awaits agreement
on financing. The estimated
cost of the dam will be approxi-
mately $480,000,000, of which
about $275,000,000 will have to
be spent on imported equipment.
This amount, therefore, would
have to be obtained in foreign
currency.
The International Bank, the
United States and the United
Kingdom have approved in prin-
ciple and in some detail the
financing of the dam. The In-
ternational Bank would make
available $200,000,000 for a
20-25 year period at an interest
rate of 4.5 to 5 percent. Ini-
tially Britain and the United
States would also make avail-
able grants totaling $70,000,000.
pared by ORR)
(Pre-
While no formal trade agree-
ments between East Germany and
the countries visited have been
announced as a result of Rau's
tour, the delegation apparently
did arouse interest in doing
more business with East Germany.
The establishment of closer
commercial relations could be
a prelude to an institution of
full diplomatic relations with
East Germany.
Some Sudanese leaders, es-
pecially Premier Ismaili Al
Azhari and Deputy Premier Ibrahim
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24 May 1956
al--Mufti, are reported to favor
closer commercial, if not polit-
ical,relations with East Germany,
and the Sudanese government ac-
cepted Rau's invitation to send
a trade delegation to East Ger-
many. On 13'May, only a week
after the invitation was extend-
ed, Al Mufti, the highest-rank-
ing non-Communist government
official to pay a formal visit
to East Germany, arrived in
East Berlin.
The conversations in Khar-
toum indicated that the Sudanese
government is especially inter-
ested in selling agricultural
products such as cotton, veg-
etable oils and canned meats.
BRITISH SEEK FEDERATION OF
ALL SOMALI TERRITORIES
Britain is trying to pro-
mote a union under paramount
British influence of the Somali
territories of eastern Africa
in an effort to reinforce its
strategic position in that area
and to acquire more effective
means to counter Egyptian,
Saudi, and possibly Soviet in-
fluence there. Ethiopia will
probably continue to protest,
perhaps to the extent of seek-
ing Soviet support, but Britain
hopes its objections and those
of Italy and France can eventu-
ally be overcome. A preliminary
public announcement is scheduled
for the end of May.
"Greater Somalia"
Britain's plan is an evi-
dent attempt to forestall fu-
ture trouble in an area where
political frontiers have little
significance for the nomadic.
In return, it wants to import
East German agricultural ma-
chinery, fertilizers and chem-
icals, including insecticides
and materials for combating
various types of plant diseases.
The Sudanese government has
also indicated it wants tech-
nical assistance in exploiting
its natural resources. East
Germany has already shown its
willingness to co-operate and
had sent some geologists to
prospect for water and super-
vise the construction of water
supply installations in arid
regions of the Sudan.
25X1
inhabitants and where most req-
uisites for genuine independ-
e nce are lacking--despite the
UN's schedule of full independ-
ence :n 1960 for its Italian-
administered trust territory of
Somalia. In an effort to pre-
clude penetration by unfriendly
powers with offers of aid, Brit-
ain goes so far as to suggest
ultimate Commonwealth member-
ship for a federation of all
territories inhabited by.the
Somali tribes.
According to a Foreign
Office policy paper, the ini-
tial federation would consist
of Somalia and British Somali-
land and probably would be es-
tablished by 1960. As an es-
sential granary, the Ogaden
region, the Haud, and the
territory known as the Reserved
Area would be transferred from
Ethiopia at some later date.
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24 May 1956
French Somaliland
and that part of
northern Kenya inhab-
ited by Somalis would
also eventually be in-
cluded. London en-
visages that such a
Greater Somalia would
require financial help
from France, Italy,
the United States,and
the International Bank
for Reconstruction and
Development at the
rate of more than
$7,000,000 annually
for the first stage
of federation and pre-
sumably more later.
Objections
Ethiopia, France,
and Italy have offered
vehement objections
to an initial outline
of. British intentions.
British negotiations
with Ethiopia in April,
ostensibly over re-
interpreting a 1954
agreement that turned
the`Haud over to Ethi-
opian administration,
led to acrimonious
Asmara.
ERITREA
discussion, and American observ-
ers at one point thought Ethiopia
might seek Soviet support. Lon-
don later claimed it does not
in theory oppose a federation
under Ethiopian hegemony but
that such a solution would be
inadvisable in view of Somali
hatred of the Ethiopians and
insufficient Ethiopian resources
for development.
France's initial reaction
to the British scheme was also
negative, but a French official
said in mid-May that France might
be amenable to ceding all of
French Somaliland except the
port of Djibouti. Italy also
objected in talks on 8 May but
London has expressed the hope
Approximate area of pro-
posed Somaliland Federation
O G A D?-.E N
/ SOMALIA
MILES
that the various difficulties
can be surmounted.
The British are therefore
planning to continue cautiously,
and preliminary measures are
to be introduced in British
Somaliland with guidance from
Parliamentary Undersecretary
for the Colonies Lord Lloyd,
who arrived there on 20 May.
At the end of May the governor
of British Somaliland will an-
nounce publicly that Britain
favors federation and will out-
line plans for economic and
social development, particularly
in education, to prepare British
Somaliland for internal autonomy.
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24 May 1956
THE CYPRUS SITUATION
The situation in Greece
and Cyprus continues to be
dominated by repercussions of
the execution on 10 May of two
Cypriot terrorists. The Brit-
ish have imposed complete cur-
fews in some parts of Cyprus,
but outbreaks of violence and
student demonstrations have
increased sharply.
In Greece, lengthy par-
liamentary debates over the
government's handling of the
Cyprus issue have begun. Op-
position leaders Sophocles
Venizelos and George Papandreou
The new Jordanian cabi-
net of Said al-Mufti shows signs
of leading the country toward
greater nationalism and away
from its special relations with
Britain.
One of the new prime min-
ister's first acts was to an-
nounce his intention to amend
the Ang1o-Jordanian treaty to
"make it more compatible with
are urging a vote of censure
against Prime Minister Kara-
manlis. If Karamanlis can
maintain party discipline, he
should win the confidence vote
expected on 25 May.If he does
win, Foreign Minister Theotokis,
a major opposition target,
as a spokesman for the govern-
ment's moderate approach on
the Cyprus question, will prob-
ably be replaced and Karaman-
lis may feel impelled to
broaden his government to in-
clude opposition members.
Jordanian interests." In a
subsequent interview,he hinted
that Britain might be asked
to modify its present base
rights, and declared that he
would ask the British whether
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24 May 1956
their annual $26,180,000 mil-
itary subsidy to Jordan rep-
resented rent paid for Brit-
ish air base rights or a grant
of aid. He added that aid with-
out conditions from the United
States was welcome.
Premier al-Mufti's cab-
inet'includes former ambas-
sador to Egypt Fawzi al-Mulgi
as vice premier and minister
of foreign affairs, and Major
General al-Ajluni as minister
of defense and interior. Al-
Ajiuni's son is a military
aide to the king and report-
edly a supporter ofultranation-
alist Major General Ali Nuwar.
Nuwar, who spearheaded the
movement to oust General Glubb,
PAKISTAN
Pakistan's seven-week-old
political crisis remains un-
resolved. Although the govern-
ment-backed Republican Party
has apparently managed to or-
ganize a small majority in the
West Pakistan assembly, the
opposition Awami League suc-
ceeded on 22 May in getting the
East Pakistani assembly to re-
fuse to accept the budget pre-
seat-e,:y the United Front pro-
vincial government, which has
been supported by President
Mirza.
The East Pakistan assembly's
action will probably force Mirza
to institute several months of
direct rule of the province,
during which he will have to
try to organize a new coalition
there.
was promoted and elevated
to" chief of staff of the Arab
Legion on 24 May following the
resignation of the, figurehead
chief of staff Innab. Ex-
premier Rifai had opposed the
king's proposal to make Nuwar
commander of the Arab Legion.
The United Front may be ab]e
to develop enough support dur-
ing this interim to reassure
control of the government after
the ending of direct rule, but
it will be faced with keen
competition from the Awami
League, whose national leader,
H. S. Suhrawardy, will attempt
to take advantage of the situa-
tion to promote further new
claims to the premiership of
Pakistan.
The turmoil in the provinces
has delayed a decision on changes
in the central leadership, and
it appears likely that Prime
Minister Chaudhri Mohammad Ali's
trio to Communist China, origi-
nally scheduled for 15 May, may
be further postponed beyond the
resent 2 June departure date.
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24 May 1956
SINGAPORE SITUATION
If Singapore's Chief Min-
ister Marshall carries out his
stated intention to resign on
6 June, new elections are likely
which pro-Communist elements
stand a good chance of winning.
It seems probable, however,
that the British governor will
first ask one or two other mem-
bers of the legislative assembly
to try to form a new government.
Then, if these efforts fail,
the only alternative appears
to be for the governor to set
a date for new elections with
various nominated and ex-offi-
ciomembers of the assembly
acting in the capacity of a
caretaker government.
Election Demands
Spokesmen of the Commu-
nist-manipulated Peoples Action
Party (PAP) have already is-
sued strong demands for early
elections. On arriving in
Singapore, a PAP leader who
had been a member of Marshall's
delegation declared that the
party returned to power would
be able to reopen negotiations
with London from a "position
of strength." He further
stated that the PAP was pledged
to "jam the present constitui
tion" as a means of securing
a better one.
The PAP is the best or-
ganized political party in
Singapore. It exercises a
large measure of control over
local student and labor or-
ganizations which have pre-
cipitated serious riots in the
past, and its influence among
the island's 800,000 Chinese
has been growing steadily. The
general consensus is that
the PAP stands an excellent
chance of winning any elec-
tion held in the near future.
The PAP'.s.inter.est in.
elections would seem to indicate an
estimate that its immediate ob-
jectives would best be served
by using its influence to main-
tain peace. Should the Brit-
ish either stall on elections
or suspend constitutional
government altogether, the
chances are good that they
would be faced with violent
disorders even though they
have taken elaborate security
precautions.
Britain's Position
There are indications that
the British will not attempt
to hold up elections, although
they are aware of the likeli-
hood of a PAP victory. In the
absence of a promising alter-
native, the British may be
inclined to let events take
their course in the hope that
a PAP government would turn
out to be more amenable to
deal with in power than it has
been as an irresponsible op-
position party. The British
have made clear, however, that
in the final analysis they
have no intention of allowing
Singapore to be dominated by
a Communist regime.
The British are convinced
that the only real solution to
the problem is the integration
of Singapore with an independ-
ent Malaya. The Malayan govern-
ment, however, is unwilling to
become involved in Singapore's
difficulties and is refusing
to consider a merger before
August 1957, when Malaya is
scheduled to achieve full in-
dependence. Chief Minister Rah-
man will probably become in-
creasingly reluctant to accept
the British plan.
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24 May 1956
NEW ASIAN-AFRICAN MEETINGS
UNDER CONSIDERATION
Prime Minister All of
Indonesia stated on 17 May
that the Colombo powers--India,
Burma, Pakistan, Ceylon and
Indonesia--were considering
holding a second Asian-African
conference some time in 1957.
He further indicated that his
government was ready to call
for an economic conference of
these countries to study how
the "practical sides" of the
Bandung resolution could be
put into effect. Under pres-
ent circumstances, the pre-
vailing tone of any such con-
ferences would almost certainly
be more neutralist than at
Bandung, and more receptive
to Communist offers of co-
operation and aid.
quite possible that, in addi-
tion to Communist China and
North Vietnam, the Sino-Soviet
bloc would be represented by
Mongolia and North Korea. Even
the USSR might be present. The
neutralist contingent would
probably be strengthened by
the addition of Ceylon--which
was strongly pro-West at Ban-
dung--and perhaps Morocco,
Algeria and Tunisia. Moreover,
such countries as Pakistan,
Turkey, Thailand and the Philip-
pines have not been entirely
unresponsive to bloc overtures
and would probably be reluctant
to take an unequivocal stand
against Communist-neutralist
"peace" prop-sals.
Favorable Sentiment
The widespread attention
given the first anniversary of
the Bandung conference, par-
ticularly in Communist and
neutralist countries, clearly
indicates the existence of
considerable pressure for more
Asian-African meetings. The
Communist bloc hailed the Ban-
dung meeting as a "turning
point in world history," and
expressed gratification over
the growth of closer ties be-
tween the bloc and Asian-
African countries. Prime Min-
ister Chou En-lai and Vice
Premier Ho Lung publicly de-
clared that a second such con-
ference "is to be welcomed."
Neutralist treatment of
the Bandung anniversary was
more reserved, but favorable.
In Burma, India and Indonesia,
the conference was said to have
cased world tensions and demon-
strated the unity of Asian-
African anticolonialism.
The Communists are in a
good position to take advantage
of any new conference. It is
An Asian-African economic
conference would appear to be
particularly vulnerable to
Communist exploitation. The
first section of the Bandung
conference communique was de-
voted to economic co-operation,
which was described as an
urgent requirement in the Asian-
African region. Exchanges of
experts, trainees and pilot
projects on the basis of "mutual
interest" were recommended.
The communique also called for
increased trade, collective
action to stabilize prices of
primary commodities, and ex=
ploitation of training facili-
ties in the peaceful uses of
atomic energy.
Communist representatives
at any new conference can be ex-
pected to be armed with concrete
proposals of economic and tech-
nical assistance and to press for
the expansion of trade and cul-
tural exchanges. Such a posi-
tive approach would undoubtedly
appeal to many delegates and
would effectively back up the
bilateral approaches Moscow and
Peiping are making in Asia Af-
rica and the Middle East.
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24 May 1956
The unprecedented expres-
sion of opposition sentiment in
South Korea's election on 15
May has resulted in an atmos-
phere of political instability.
There is a possibility of a
large-scale governmental and
party shake-up. Serious vio-
lence was averted by Rhee's ac-
knowledgment of Chang Myon's
election as vice president, but
the cabinet has resigned, citing
the strong opposition showing
as its reason.
There are indications that
the extent of opposition strength
came as a suprise to President
Rhee. The American embassy re-
ports that not until after the
election was he shown a photo-
graph of the Democratic Party
rally of 3 May at which Sin Lk-
hui addressed 150,000 persons
outside Seoul. Rhee is re-
ported to have excoriated his
running mate, Liberal Party
chairman Yi Ki-pang, charging
him with responsibility for
their poor showing. Rhee's
displeasure with Yi may have
contributed to his willingness
to accept Chang's election as
vice president.
Political Changes
Rhee has already replaced
his home minister, and other
changes appear likely. While
it is possible Rhee will offer
certain posts to persons not af-
filiated with the Liberal Party,
such gestures probably would not
involve a formal coalition.
Nonetheless, the strong showing
by the Democratic Party appears
to represent a long step in the
direction of a two-party system
in South Korea.
The advent of the Demo-
cratic Party in a position of
power would be unlikely to af-
fect South Korea's pro-American
orientation, although party
spokesmen in the campaign
criticized the Rhee regime for
placing sole reliance on the
United States. The Democratic
Party directed its attacks
largely on the alleged corrup-
tion and excesses of the Rhee
administration, appealing to
sentiment for "a change." Demo-
cratic leaders also advocated
a reduction in the powers of
the executive and the improve-
ment of relations with Japan.
Liberal Party leaders re-
portedly desire a thorough re-
form of their party, and have
told Rhee that the loss of the
vice presidency stemmed from
poor living conditions and
government corruption.
Certain officials have in-
dicated a fear of intervention
by the army if Liberal Party
leadership further deteriorates.
Although the army is not an
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24 May 1956
active force in South Korean
politics, its leaders generally
have identified themselves with
the Rhee administration and its
objectives. Defense Minister
Son has stated to the American
charge that the present situa-
tion is dangerous for both Rhee
and Chang, and that assassina.-
tion attempts might be made a.-
against either one. A Liberal
Party official has observed
that while neither the Liberal
nor the Democratic Party would
order the assassination of Rhee
or Chang, an individual act of
terrorism is possible.
The chances for political
stability in South Korea may be
dependent upon the future rela-
tionship between Rhee and Chang.
The South Korean vice presi-
dency at present is'largely a
ceremonial post, and Rhee, who
has charged Chang with Commu-
nist ties, is unlikely to in-
crease Cha,ng's prestige by
delegating to him any major
-functions of government.
Although differences in
philosophy between the Liberal
and Democratic Parties are rel-
atively minor-, Chang stated
during the campaign that his
task as vice president would be
to criticize as well as to ad-
vise. Recognition that Chang
could succeed the 81-year-old
Rhee will increase Chang's po-
litica.l following, and may
destroy the monopoly of politi-
cal power hitherto enjoyed by
President Rhee. Chang's po-
sition might, prompt Rhee to
attempt to remove him from the
succession, possibly by a con-
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24 May 1956
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE BRITISH MILITARY POSITION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA
London evidently views the
new Ceylonese government's threat
to evict Britain from its air
and naval installations in Ceylon
as a symptom of the advance of
neutralism among Asian Common-
wealth members. The British
seem to think the military con-
sequences of the loss of access
to these installations during
peacetime can be remedied. If
Ceylon can be induced to increase
its insignificant defense force,
the British would consider this
a net gain to the Commonwealth
defense concept.
Ceylon Bases
Britain tends to regard
the renewed threat to its bases
in Ceylon as the almost in-
evitable outcome of problems
left unsettled when Ceylon a-
chieved independence in 1947.
The Ceylon air and naval instal-
lations represent the remnant
of a strategic position in South
Asia which the United Kingdom
has largely had to abandon in
favor of its Commonwealth ap-
proach to regional defense.
The principal air installa-
tion still in commission is the
Negombo airfield, near Colombo,
which is classed by the British
as a. staging post on military
air transport routes. Staffed
by only a. few Royal Air Force
technical personnel, the field
lacks up-to-date repair and
maintenance facilities, and its
6,000-foot runway would require
expansion for jet bomber opera-
tions. This post is operational
ly subordinate to Far East Air
Force headquarters at Singapore.
The naval installations at
Trincomalee, which are held by
the British under a 999-year
lease from the Ceylon govern-
ment, represent a much larger
investment than Negombo, Trin-
comalee is the headquarters of
the Royal Navy East Indies Sta- 25X1
tion, which has one light cruis-
er and several escort vessels
ssigned to it.
Other British military in-
stallations in Ceylon, including
the former Southeast Asia. Com-
mand headquarters at Kandy, and
various depots, camps, and stor-
age areas, have largely been
deactivated since World War II.
British ground forces have long
been withdrawn.
London's Policy
London has doubted the a-
vailability of the Ceylonese
bases in wartime ever since it
failed to reach written agree-
ment in 1951 on implementation
of the 1947 Anglo-Ceylonese de-
fense agreement. Even at that
time,the,Ceylonese government
was fearing a hostile public
reaction to any explicit accept-
ance of continued British occu-
pation. For reasons of economy
as well, Britain has sought to
reduce'its dependence on these
installations. The general
British policy accordingly has
been to encourage Ceylon--as
well as India. and Pakistan--to
build.a.s strong a military es-
tablishment as its resources
allow,, and to co-operate in
Commonwealth defense planning.
Until, very recently, the
Ceylonese government has shown
no inclination to build up its
military establishment. Despite
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24 May 1956
British offers to make equipment
and training facilities a.vail-
able to the Ceylonese government,
the country's combined forces
remain less than 4,000 men.
Britain has meanwhile technically
honored its commitment under the
1947 treaty and maintained to-
ken occupation of the air and
naval bases, in Ceylon with a
near-minimum outlay of resources.
London evidently believes
Prime Minister Ba.nda.ra.naike will
AK
TUDAN
ETHIEi PIA
Negombo airfield
1 Trincomalee
Colombo Kandy
TANGANYIKA
JAMM~
AFGHANISTAN-?, KASK M, R`/
ISTAN ew y,I ..~`
SAUDI ARABIA
\TttjY EMEM
C
I r' Naval installation s -
` L
MALDIVE
Is.
Add. Atoll
undertake operation of the bases,
with civilian labor costs to be
met by Britain. Earlier, the
Foreign Office indicated Britain
would attempt to retain access
to Trincomalee by relinquishing
its "nonessential" installations
on the island. London doubtless
has received some encouragement
from Bandarana.ike's statement
on 4 May that the departure of
the remaining British forces
from Ceylon will require some
increase in Ceylon's forces.
EURMAZ -,'\ ti
CEYLON
British military
installations
I N D / A N 0 C F A N
wish to maintain some defense
ties with Britain as a counter-
weight to the influence of India,
which is reportedly already
pressing Ceylon to permit it to
participate in operation of the
bases.
During his mid-April visit
to Ceylon, First Sea. Lord Mount-
batten informally proposed to
Bandaranaike. that. Ceylon
Alternates to Ceylon Bases
The British are exploring
possible alternatives. to main-
taining their military position
on Ceylon. London officials
state they can obtain permis-
sion under existing agreements
to route military air traffic
through Pakistan and India if
they have to relinquish the
Negombo air field. As further
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24 May 1956
insurance, the Royal Air Force
is preparing to rehabilitate
and expand an unused wartime
airstrip on Addu Atoll in the
Maldive Islands some 700 miles
southwest of Colombo. Accord-
ing to the Foreign Office, how-
ever, permission to start this
project has yet to be obtained
from the ruling sultan.
London is apparently re-
signed to losing access to Trin-
comalee. Such a loss would ne-
cessitate finding a new head-
quarters for the East Indies
Station, which controls an area
extending from the Persian Gulf
to near Sumatra in the east,
and south to 30 degrees south
latitude.
An obvious alternative is
Singapore, where the British
military stake is far greater.
Concern over the situation there,
however, has recently become
marked, and Britain, Australia,
and New Zealand have all evinced
interest in developing facili-
ties elsewhere. Australian
commentators have referred to
New Guinea and Manus in the
Admirality Islands in this
connection, Possibly having in
mind a redistribution of naval
responsibilities between Britain
and Australia, Mountbatten re-
cently inspected Cockburn Sound,
a deep-water harbor site on the
west coast of Australia.
There is also reason to
believe that Britain may re-
vive the idea of an allied na-
val command in the Indian Ocean,
possibly under SEATO. Royal
Navy circles have long been in-
terested in such a plan, and
their past attitudes suggest
that the United States would be
invited to take part.
The British now believe
that Bandaranaike will be able
to resist pressure from his
supporters for an even more
thoroughgoing revision of Cey-
lon's relations with the Com-
monwealth and with the West.
The Commonwealth Relations Of-
fice believes there is a chance
the bases issue can be resolved
amicably at the Commonwealth
prime ministers' conference in
June, presumably along the lines
of Mountbatten's proposal for
British financing.
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STATUS OF FOREIGN AID PROGRAMS IN AFGHANISTAN
Afghanistan has moved
rapidly to use the $100,000,000
credit granted by the USSR dur-
ing the visit of Soviet leaders
Bulganin and Khrushchev. last
December. At the same time,
Kabul has sought to emphasize
its neutrality by showing in-
creased receptivity to contact
with the West, particularly the
United States. Possible Afghan
moves toward Western-supported
Pakistan, however, are limited,
in view of Prime Minister Daud's
unswerving policy on Pushtoon-
istan.
Soviet Bloc Activities
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24 May 19 56
Broad gauge railroad
Narrow gauge railroad
All-weather road
PROBABLE LOCATION OF SOVIET PROJECTS
UNDER THE 1 MARCH 1956 AGREEMENT
Aral
S..
?? Gilgit
. . J AM M U AKISTAN
I Aryb
Hydroelectric station
Hindu Kush road
*, Motor repair shop
Shortly after the departure
of Bulganin and Khrushchev,
top-level'Soviet.negotiators
appeared in Kabul and Soviet
survey teams fanned out across
Afghanistan, visiting Jalalabad
and Kandahar near the Pakistani
border, among other places.
Soviet advisers for the first
time established themselves in
an Afghan government office--
the Ministry of Public Works.
An Afghan-Soviet project
agreement signed on 1 March
.provides for reconstruction of
the Kabul airport, development
KASHM7R
(StatusH dispute)
Laboratory
- Airfield
A Irrigation dam
of a new military airfield
about 30 miles north of Kabul,
construction of two electric
power stations, three motor
repair shops, a laboratory at
Kabul, a fertilizer plant, a
new road across the Hindu Kush
Mountains, and three irrigation
dams, one of which is reportedly
about 30 miles from the Khyber
Pass, strategic road passage
to Pakistan. At least $30,000
000 and perhaps $60,000,000 of
the $100,000,000 credit is
estimated to have already been
committed for these projects.
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24 May 1956
Kabul has used extensively
the transit facilities through
the USSR provided for in the
agreement of June 1955. Ship-
ments to and from West Germany,
the Nether lands, the-= Scainda a.via.s1
countries, Britain, Japan, lndia:.
and even the United States are
apparently passing through scad.ett
bloc ports on the Black, Baltic
and Japan Seas.
Czechoslovakia is reported
to have offered a $10,000,000
credit in addition to the $5,-
000,000 previously extended.
Prague reportedly has also sold
Afghanistan more than $10,000,-
000 worth of telephone equipment,
of which about $7,000,000 was
on credit. East Germany to
apparently offering a $5,000,000
credit and pushing hard for dip-
lomatic recognition in return.
Trade missions from Poland, East
Germany,and other Satellites
are reported en route to Kabul,
and Czech technicians have been
replacing the West German engirt.
neers-employed by the Afghan
government.
Attitude Toward United States
Meanwhile, Kabul has
sought to demonstrate that it
still wants to do business with
the United States.
King whir Shah made a
special tour of the Helmand
Valley project b,ein..g constructed
by the American Morrison-Knudsen
Company in March and lavished
praise on the work. Prime..Mtn-
ister Daud welcomed the American
offer to assist in developing
Afghanistan's aviation and prom-
ised his personal~co aper.tion
to see that it Was implemented.
Foreign MiniSter:i:;Natm ecedded
t&an7-American request that 200
American International Harvester
trucks which were to be shipped
through the USSR be allowed to
pass through Pakistan.
The most striking over-
ture to the United States
was the request by the chief
of staff of the Afghan army
early in May that some of his
officers be trained in American
military schools and that the
United States attempt to get
Turkey to train more Afghan
officers than the 70 to 80
now there.
Daud's Policy
These overtures are part
of Daud's policy of working
both sides of the street--a
game which he views as insurance
for Afghanistan's continued
independence. As long as Daud
remains solidly in control of
Afghanistan, he may be expected
to persevere in his policy,
which has produced impressive
results in the past five months.
Daud's freedom of action
is limited by two factors. The
first is the relatively narrow
field within which he can pro-
mote competition between the
United States and the USSR as
a result of Afghanistan's
present close relationship with
the USSR.
Daud encountered this prob-
lem in regard to an American
offer of $10,000,000 for avia-
tion development. He first
suggested that the United States
co-operate with the USSR in
building the Kabul airport,
which he had already committed
"in principle" to the Soviet
Union. The Russians, he sug-
gested, might build the runways
and the United States might
install the communications
equipment. However, when
negotiations got under way, he
backed off and said the Kabul
airport project must be with-
hold from both sides for the
time being.
The second limiting factor
is Daud's anti-Pakistani policy,
which makes impossible the
aevelopment Of additional ties
with the West through US-fig
n..nced regional co-operation
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 May 1956
projects involving both countries.
The Afghan government probably
also fears that Pakistani presi-
dent Mirza might instigate a
tribal uprising against the
Daud government, and Kabul is
unlikely to come to any signifi-
cant understanding with Mirza
during his scheduled visit to
Kabul in mid-June.
Daud is probably hoping
for massive American aid to
match what he has accepted
from the USSR. He probably
also wants the United States'
political support--or at least
neutrality--in regard to
Pakistan. However, he would
probably settle for something
less--especially if he thought
it would serve as a sort of
"insurance policy" against the
day when the USSR might attempt
to make political capital out
of its economic investment.
The hard bargaining with
the United States which the
Afghans are presently engag-
ing in on the air development
proposal indicates they are not
yet desperate for such an ar-
rangement.
SOVIET POLICY IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION 1955-1956
The USSR achieved an in-
fluential voice in Near and
Middle Eastern affairs during
the past year by promoting a
de facto alliance with the
Egyptian-led Arab states through
sales of arms to Egypt and
Syria. The Soviet Union fur-
ther succeeded in raising ad-
ditional obstacles to the ex-
pansion of the Baghdad pact and
undermining the 1950 US-British-
French tripartite agreement,
the outstanding symbol of West-
ern influence in the Near and
Middle East.
Early Soviet Moves
In early 1955, with the
West rapidly closing the gaps
in the "northern tier" along
the USSR's southern border, the
USSR began to apply new poli-
cies to the Arab states, where
Great Britain and France were
finding it increasingly diffi-
cult to cope with the demands
of rising nationalism. Fol-
lowing World War II, the
French withdrawal from Syria
and Lebanon, the British exit
from a divided Palestine and
from Suez, and revolution and
counterrevolution in Iran
severely damaged the position
of the West in the Middle East.
In a Soviet Foreign Min-
istry statement on 16 April
1955, Moscow indicated that it
considered the area of vital
interest to Soviet security.
The Role of Egypt
Moscow directed its new
policies mainly at Egypt,
which among the Arab states,
appeared to have the greatest
potential for leadership. The
USSR's willingness to supply
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 May 1956
Premier Nasr with arms gave
new hope to the Arabs in their
cause against Israel and en-
hanced the prestige of Nasr and
the Revolutionary Command with-
in Egypt and in neighboring
Arab and North African states.
The Russians have appar-
ently not attempted to attach
political strings to their
arms and economic deals. They
have agreed to take surplus
cotton and other commodities
instead of hard currency in ex-
change for military equipment
and have punctiliously carried
out agreements.
The USSR reportedly has
been in close contact with
Premier Nasr concerning its
activity in the Sudan and
Libya, apparently in an at-
tempt to allay any Egyptian
suspicion that Moscow might
be trying to encroach on what
Cairo considers its sphere of
influence. Moscow has co-
operated with the Arabs in the
United Nations, and is report-
ed to'have given Nasr general
reassurances of its plans for
policy-making moves involving
the Western powers.
Recent Developments
Soviet actions during
April 1956 indicated that the
USSR does not intend to encour-
age the Arabs to wage open
warfare with the Israelis, at
least for the present. Both
the Soviet Foreign Ministry
statement on 17 April, mention-
ing Israel on a par with the
Arab states, and the Anglo-
Soviet statement on 26 April,
calling for a solution accept-
able to both sides, served to
dampen the hopes in those
Arab circles which believed the
USSR would give all-out sup-
port to the Arabs against
Israel. Moscow may believe
that an outbreak of full-scale
hostilities could cause Western
intervention which would threat-
en the achievements of Soviet
policy during the past year.
Despite these statements
in April, however, it is un-
likely that the level of Soviet-
Arab co-operation established
over the past year has been
permanently reduced.
Moscow has repeatedly made
it clear that it would consider
any interference in Middle
Eastern affairs by the Western
tripartite powers as "inad-
missible" and "illegal," The
Arab states have long put for-
ward the same view.
Soviet Negotiation Efforts
In the recent Anglo-
Soviet talks, the USSR ob-
tained agreement by Great
Britain to restrict its efforts
to deal with the Arab-Israeli
dispute--at least temporarily--
to the United Nations Security
Council and gained an official
British admission that the
USSR has.a direct interest in
the Arab-Israeli situation and
in the Middle East generally.
An ultimate Soviet aim
probably is to convene a
special conference on the entire
problem of, the Middle East with
the participation of the great
powers and the states of the
area. Moscow might insist
during the Security Council
discussions that neither the
USSR nor the .Fgyptia.n,_.bloc...can
agree to a settlement with Is-
rael except in the context of
an area-wide agreement.
Khrushchev told British
foreign minister Selwyn Lloyd
on 21 April that as long as
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
24 May 1956
Britain supports the Baghdad
pact, it must expect the USSR
to take such measures as arms
sales to Yemen to cause maxi-
mum annoyance to Britain. He
later told the press that the
USSR would be willing to join
in a UN embargo on arms ship-
ments anywhere in the world.
Moscow probably does not
believe the United States and
Britain are prepared to make
concessions on the Baghdad pact
even in exchange for a Soviet
promise to stop shipments of
arms to the Arab states. It
probably believes negotiations
would afford the USSR an ex-
cellent opportunity to curry
favor with France--which is
opposed to expanding the Bagh-
dad pact--and to pose as the
champion of the Arab cause
against the West and Israel.
Soviet maneuverability in the
UN, particularly regarding an
arms embargo to the Middle
East, will probably be con-
siderably enhanced by Egypt's
decision to assure itself of a
continued arms supply by reach-
ing an agreement with Communist
China.
The Northern Tier
Having stalemated further
development of the Baghdad pact
by its successes to the south,
Moscow probably will rely pri-
marily on further economic and
diplomatic moves toward the
northern tier states to under-
cut the pact. Since the first
of the year, Moscow has been
pressing the argument in ap-
proaching these states that
the Soviet threat has dis-
appeared and that to arm now is
a useless drain on national
treasuries.
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