CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000800010001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 46
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 15, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
COPY NO. 19
OCR NO. 1773/56
15 March 1956
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY 25X1
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text Review Bat
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Date:.144 k4 L-l
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
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PNFIDENTIAL
D
E 1~ 'F1L+
SUMMARY CI:
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CONFIDENTIAL
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page i
There has been no letup in the number of incidents on
the borders between Israel and the Arab states and in
military preparations. Conditions continue to be such that
a minor incident could expand into major hostilities.
CYPRUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
The storm aroused over the British deportation of
Archbishop Makarios on 9 March has severely strained the
relations between Greece and its Western allies. Prime
Minister Karamanlis, who is trying to build popular
support for his regime, is determined to follow an uncom-
promising line on the Cyprus question. London and Ankara
have demonstrated no willingness to compromise concerning
Cyprus.
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The French National Assembly's endorsement of Premier
Mollet's Algerian policy--strong military action against
the rebels combined with long-term economic and social
projects--is unlikely to check the growing conviction
among Algerian Moslems that it might be possible to oust
the French and take control. In Morocco, the sultan,
despite French pressure, has failed to call for the
surrender of the Berber rebels in the Rif area. As in
Algeria, increasing numbers of native troops are deserting
from the French army. In Tunis, the local government is
using the failure of the French-controlled police to
prevent the 9 March attack on the American consulate as a
lever to gain control over Tunisian internal security.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 March 1956
SOVIET CONCILIATORY GESTURES
TOWARD FRANCE ? . . . . . . . . . . Page
The Soviet Union is showing a new interest in ex-
ploiting differences between France and its Western
allies and is encouraging France to play a more inde-
pendent role in international affairs. This interest
has been evident in recent Soviet statements on dis-
armament, Moscow's reaction to Foreign Minister Pineau's
speech of 2 March, Communist support of the French govern-
ment on the Algerian question, and the invitation to
French government leaders to visit the Soviet capital.
Soviet spokesmen have described France as th
further relaxation of international tension.
THE LONDON DISARMAMENT TALKS . . . . . . . Page
London and Paris are prepared to use their joint
disarmament plan--incorporating both Soviet and Western
views--as a basis for negotiations with the USSR at the
UN Disarmament Subcommittee talks opening in London on
19 March. The British-French plan is based on proposals
drawn up by French delegate Jules Moch. The USSR will
try in the discussions to disrupt the Western front on
disarmament and to lure the French delegate into further
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Jordan: Jordan's King Hussain is attempting to use the
Popularity he gained from the dismissal of Britain's
General Glubb to maintain a neutral position between
Iraq on the one hand and Egypt, Syria, and Saudi
Arabia on the other. Hussain has not yet accepted
the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi offer of financial assistance
to replace the British subsidy, but the probable
growth in influence of the "Free Officers Movement"
in the Arab Legion is likely to push him in the
Soviet Leaders Discuss Collective Leadership: Soviet
leaders, av ng savowed to n-type rule and the
cult of personality, now seem eager to explain to
outsiders how the current collective dictatorship
contrasts with the tyranny of one-man rule. In
conversations with Ambassador Bohlen at a reception
on 6 March, the top leaders claimed that it was
"absolute nonsense" that Khrushchev was on his way
to becoming a "great leader" like Stalin, and that
decisions in the party presidium ar t k
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 March 1956
Revision of Stalinist History Gets Off to Fast Start: The
Soviet press has wasted no time in launching t e
revision of the history of the Stalinist period
touched off by the 20th Party Congress. The program,
which is designed to justify the destruction of the
Stalin myth, has begun with the return to honor of a
number of Old Bolshevik victims of Stalin's purges.
New Soviet Agriculture Decree Curtails Private Ownership:
new Soviet agricultural decree of 9 March opens
a campaign to end the 20-year compromise between
the Communist Party and the Soviet peasant. In the
coming months, the party plans to move as fast and
as far as possible toward complete elimination of
the private plot and personal livestock holdings.
The terms of the decree, however, leave the way open
for a retreat from advanced positions if the drive
provokes serious popular resistance.
I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Communist China's Economic Dependence on the USSR: The
composition and or g n of Communista s imports
during its First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) bear
out Khrushchev's 14 February speech to the 20th
Party Congress on the nature and magnitude of Soviet
aid to Communist China. These imports indicate
China's dependence on the bloc, particularly for
military and key industrial equipment.
Okinawan Election: The decisive victory scored by the
conservative and pro-American Ryukyu Democratic
Party (RDP) in the Okinawan election held on 11
March suggests that sentiment for reversion to Japan
is not as strong as the Japanese and some Okinawans
Laos: Premier Katay having failed to form a government
in Laos, Souvanna Phouma, a former premier and
defense minister in the Katay government which re-
signed on 14 February, has again been called on to
attempt the formation of a new cabinet. The
activities of Bong Souvannouvong, an opposition
leader and minority deputy who is sympathetic to
the Pathet Lao, tend to stimulate neutralism in
Laos, and frustration among the deputies over the
unresolved Pathet Lao situation is reaching a
point where overtures from the Communists to arrange
a settlement might appear attractive.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 March 1956
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Cambodia: Overtures by Communist China and the USSR to
establish, respectively, economic and diplomatic ties
with Cambodia are part of an intensified Communist
effort to disrupt Cambodia's relations with the West,
particularly the United States. The precarious
balance of Cambodia's foreign policy--based on strict
neutrality-=is reve .led:i.in 'Pr.emier Sihanouk' s . recent
statement that "our policy will essentially adopt
itself to circumstances and world developments and to
positions taken toward us by various powers."
Spain's Position on Moroccan Independence: The Spanish
Foreign M n s ry has affirmed pains willingness
to meet Moroccan nationalist demands for independence.
This constitutes no more than an effort to maintain
maximum influence in Spain's own zone and the good
will of the Arab states in general and not a change
in policy toward Spanish Morocco. Spain may be
counting on a breakdown in French-Moroccan negoti-
ti
a
ons so that it can evade its own rather vague
Denmark's Agreements With the USSR: Danish prime
m n ster ansen, during his visit to Moscow, an-
nounced that Denmark would build two freighters for
the USSR under a trade agreement to be negotiated
in April. The two countries also are to expand
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
COMMUNIST CHINA'S ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH ASIA . . . Page 1
As part of the general Communist economic offensive
in Asia, Communist China is offering to buy agricultural
surpluses at premium prices and is making available a
wide range of manufactured products at low cost. Peiping
is thus trying to impress Asians with the speed of
Communist China's industrialization and to encourage
neutralism through increased trade. These economic
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
activities, which are more modest than the Soviet campaign
in the area, complement rather than compete with Soviet
activities, and the over-all Communist effort appears to
be well co-ordinated.
THE FRENCH ECONOMIC SITUATION . . . . . , . . . . . . Page
At a time when the French position in Nprth Africa
is under severe attack, France is entering its third year
of unprecedented prosperity. Serious basic weaknesses
remain uncorrected, however, and the business community is
nervous about a Socialist-led government's economic
policies. Premier Mollet's proposals for dealing with the
Algerian problem involve vast new expenditures which may
set inflation in motion again and arrest expansion of the
economy. F_ I
WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES ON ALLIED MILITARY SUPPORT COSTS . Page 6
The West German cabinet is apparently unanimous in
its determination to discontinue direct cash payments for
the support of NATO-committed troops stationed in West
Germany after the present special agreement expires on
5 May. The cabinet appears divided over the scope and
form of alternative arrangements. 25X1
ROLE OF SOVIET NAVY MAY BE UNDERGOING RE-EVALUATION . . Page 3
Soviet leaders may be engaged in re-evaluating the
role of the Soviet navy in the light of its suitability
for modern combat. Khrushchev said to the British
ambassador in Moscow on 6 March that Soviet ships are
"obsolete" and unsuited for modern war conditions. The
navy commander in chief responsible for the postwar build-
up apparently has been replaced, and the Communist Party
central committee now includes only one naval officer, a
candidate member, whereas in the previous committee one
full member and three candidates were naval officers. A
re-evaluation of the navy's role might result in the
curtailment of the naval program or its being redirected
toward producing ships of more advanced design.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET ELECTRIC POWER . . . . . . . . . . Page l0
Electric power development under the USSR's draft
Sixth Five-Year Plan is geared to a new 15-20 year
electrification program. Calling for a rate of expansion
a little higher than that achieved under the last five-
year plan, the new plan requires twice the absolute
increase achieved in 1951-55. It will probably be ful-
filled for power production but not for installed capacity.
The 15-20 year program emphasizes large individual projects,
useful also for propaganda purposes, including at least
four hydroelectric stations bigger than any now in exist-
ence and the world's longest and highest-voltage trans-
mission system.
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CTJ t_tENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
There has been no letup
in the number of incidents on
the borders between Israel
and the Arab states and in
military preparations. Condi-
tions continue to be such that
a minor incident could expand
into major hostilities.
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The communique issued by
the heads of state of Egypt,
Syria and Saudi Arabia follow-
ing their meeting in Cairo from
6 to 11 March contained no in-
dication that the Arabs are
prepared to compromise on any
issue. There appears to be a
fairly widely held feeling
among the Arabs that Israel
will be restrained by Western
policy. This belief reportedly
is held by such different ele-
ments as Nasr and Palestinian
refugees in West Jordan.
No such sentiment regard-
ing the Arabs appears to exist
in Israel, where large-scale
civil defense e7ercises have
been held and where government
leaders donated a day's work
to the digging of trenches and
fortifications. The Israeli
government in its domestic
press announcements seems to
be trying to keep a balance
between alarming :statements
of Arab strength and border ac-
tivities and expressions of
confidence that Israel can repel
an Arab attack, but privately
Israeli leaders continue to
hammer on the single theme that
Arab aggression is inevitable
and that their failure to obtain
arms from the West encourages
Arab belligerence.
The views each side holds
regarding the other have the
effect of causing both to stand
pat. General Burns' admitted
failure to get either Egypt or
Israel to make any significant
move toward easing even local
border situations is an illus-
tration of this attitude, as is
the manifest reluctance of Arab
leaders to resume discussion of
the Johnston plan for Jordan
River development. On the Jor-
dan issue, the Israelis also
have repeated that time is run-
ning out, and that they defi-
nitely will not delay an-
other work season before
going ahead with their own
water diversion projects.
Given present attitudes, a new
period of intensified crisis
is probably coming up about
the middle of April, if not
earlier.
The storm aroused over the
British deportation of Archbish-
op Makarios on 9 March has se-
verely strained the relations
between Greece and its Western
allies. Prime Minister Kara-
manlis, who is trying to build
popular support for his regime,
is determined to follow an un-
compromising line on the Cyprus
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question. London and especially
Ankara have demonstrated equal
unwillingness to compromise
concerning Cyprus.
Athens has launched a dip-
lomatic campaign aimed at com-
pelling London to reconsider its
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Cyprus policy and has appealed
to the United States, the
United Nations, and international
Christian leaders.
Greek forces may not take
part in the approaching com-
bined NATO exercises. Kara-
manlis is unlikely to risk the
downfall of his government by
taking any step which might
alienate Greek public opinion.
The Balkan alliance appears
to be in suspense and the gradual
improvement of relations between
Greece and Turkey is now sharply
reversed. The Turks continue
to regard resumption of friend-
ship with Greece as possible
only if Athens abandons it
Cyprus claims, while the Greeks
in turn recently told the Turks
that they must recognize the
principle of self-determination
as prerequisite to the re-estab-
lishment of friendly relations.
The tension in relations be-
tween Greece and Britain and
Turkey may cause new violence at
any time. Any Greek attacks on
Turks or their property in Greece
or on Cyprus would probably bring
swift and violent retaliation.
Communist agitators may be ex-
pected to exploit any outbreaks in
the hope of making the breach
irreparable. The British re-
moval of Cypriot nationalist
leadership gives local Com-
munists a chance to gain con-
trol of the resistance move-
ment on Cyprus.
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA
Algeria
The French National As-
sembly's endorsement of Premier
Mollet's Algerian policy--strong
military action against the reb-
els, combined with long-term
economic and social projects--
is unlikely to check the growing
conviction among Algerian Mos-
lems that it might be possible
to oust the French and take
control.
An increasing number of Algerian
troops are deserting from the
French army to join the rebels.
Moslems
A nationalist uprising in
the city of Algiers, and pos-
sibly also in Constantine, Bone,
and Bougie, is considered im-
minent F- I 25X1
in Algiers turned on Europeans
for the first time on 11 March,
and serious clashes between
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Moslems and Christians are now
considered a distinct posi'bil-
ity. In addition, recent in-
cidents in Oran indicate the
insecurity of a city hereto-
fore largely untouched by ter-
rorism.
The Algerian press, which
is controlled almost exclusively
by French settler extremists,
is aggravating an already tense
situation, while paramilitary
groups of settler reservists
are intensifying their activi-
ties. The settlers are not
likely to co-operate with Paris
by restraining extremists in
their midst.
Morocco
Sultan Mohamed V, who re-
turned to Rabat on 5 March after
completing the first phase of
Moroccan negotiations with
France, on 7 March made a gen-
eral appeal for order similar
to previous appeals he has made.
Despite French hopes, however,
he again failed to call for a
surrender of the Berber tribes
which have been in rebellion
Since last October in the Rif
area of northeastern Morocco.
French officials in Rabat
are concerned over the deterio-
rating situation in the Rif as
well as with the accelerating
rate of desertions of Moroccan
troops from the French army.
While they probably will continue
to press the sultan for a sur-
render call, he is unlikely to
risk his personal prestige until
the groundwork can be laid by na-
tionalist leaders for a cease-fire.
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Top nationalist leaders
now in Madrid to confer with
Allal el-Fassi, who has remained
in self-imposed exile, prob-
ably are'reviewing their policy
toward the rebellion in the Rif.
They may also be establishing
a policy toward Spain, whose
contradictory activities in
Spanish Morocco have caused
considerable tension among the
Moroccans. (See Part II, p.1'..)
Tunisia
The Tunisian government is
exploiting the political gains
from the 9 March sacking of the
American consulate general and
information center in Tunis by
a mob of young French settlers.
The Tunisians are using
the failure of the French-con-
trolled police to prevent the
attack as a lever to gain con-
trol over Tunisian internal
security. Tunisian insistance
on this issue may complicate
the current French Tunisian.
negotiations in Paris. These
negotiations are expected to
provide Tunisia with at least
a token army and some diplo-
matic representation. A dec-
laration including a promise
of independence such as has
been won by the Moroccans
and which has become the
most immediate goal of Tu-
nisian nationalists may be
issued shortly.
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SOVIET CONCILIATORY GESTURES
TOWARD FRANCE
The Soviet Union is show-
ing a new interest in exploit-
ing growing differences between
France and its Western allies
and encouraging France to play
a more independent role in inter-
-riational affairs.
This interest has been
evident in recent Soviet state-
ments on disarmament, Moscow's
reaction to Foreign Minister
Pineau's speech of 2 March,. and
Communist support of the French
government on the Algerian
question. The attention given
ex-president Auriol during his
visit in Moscow and the invita-
tions to Pineau, Premier Mollet,
and other leading French figures
to visit the Soviet capital are
also part of this effort. One
motive for the French Communist
Party's support of the Mollet
government may be to keep it
in power for this latter visit.
The immediate purpose of
these Soviet, moves appears to
be to encourage the French to
take a position independent of
':'.he other Western powers in the
disarmament talks starting in
London on 19 March. Press re-
ports. on former president Au-
riol's talks with Soviet lead-
ers have quoted them as encourag-
i.ng French efforts to act as an
intermediary between East and
Vest on disarmament. (Also see
Part I,p.6.)
Molotov's speech to the
Soviet 20th Party Congress noted
that France had shown a special
interest in disarmament and prom-
ised that . the. USSR would work
with France on this problem,
while Khrushchev's speech in-
cluded in a list of interim dis-
armament steps the budget reduc-
tions which France proposed at
the summit conference.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE, WEEKLY SUMMARY
Moscow welcomed the sug-
gestions in Pineau's speech of
2 March that German unity should
be considered only within the
framework of a disarmament a-
greement. Soviet propaganda
reaction to Pineau's speech
has exaggerated his criticisms
of the 'West and has claimed it
indicated the French govern-
ment's recognition of a "broad
public movement in the country
demanding a new foreign policy."
Soviet spokesman have described
France as the key to a further
relaxation in international
tension.
The Soviet Union is prob-
ably behind the shift in the
French Communist line on Algeria,
which led to Communist support
of Mollet in the French National
Assembly on the 12 March votes
of confidence. Communist propa-
ganda, siding with current pop-
ular sentiment in France for
French-Algerian interdependence,
has played down the French Com-
munists' ultimate objective of
independence for Algeria and
has stressed their areas of a-
greement with Mollet's policy.
:2y supporting the Socialist-
led government, the Communists
preserve the illusion of a de
facto popular front in France.
That this tactic serves
a broader Soviet purpose was
indicated by Soviet ambassador
Vinogradov's recent statement
to a French official that the
USSa supports continued French
::presence in North Africa. This
recalls the statement in October
of a Soviet official, who was sug-
gesting talks with France in Mos-
cow on North Africa, that the USSR
wanted the French to remain in
North Africa because it discovered
in Indochina that if the .French
moved out, the Americans wouia
move in.
The Soviet leaders are aware
that French sensitivity on the
Norte African question is caus-
ing r rene ai3tagonism toward the
United States, and the: recall
that the Soviet vote in the UN
on Algeria last fall provoked
1-remier T'a.ure to cancel hick sched-
uled visit to Moscow, The Uoo-A
is atempting to avoid antagoniz-
ing France and perhaps to create
the impression that it is more
sympathetic than the United States
and Britain toward France's prob-
lems in. North Africa.
There also growing evidence
that Moscow is now taking more
seriously its cultural exchange
program with France. Instead of
inviting only the usual fellow
travelers to visit the USSR, Mos-
cow is now issuing invitations
primarily to important scholars,
rising young politicians, and con-
servative business leaders who are.
not friendly to Communism. Ambas-
sador Vinogradov is trying to get
prominent writers to visit Mos-
cow and Leningrad and meet Soviet
leaders in their fields. French
officials are concerned that such
guided tours may leave French in-
tellectual leaders favorably im-
pressed with the USSR.
London and Paris are pre-
pared to use their joint dis-
armament plan as a basis for
negotiations with.the USSR at
the UN Disarmament Subcommittee
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talks opening in London on 19
March. The British-French nego-
tiating paper, which is said to
incorporate both the East's and
West's views on disarmament, is
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 March 1956
based on proposals drawn up
,by the French delegate, Jules
Moch. The USSR will try in
the discussions to disrupt the
Western front on disarmament
and to lure Moch, who tends to
play the role of mediator, in-
to further concessions to So-
viet views.
The British French plan
provides for conventional and
nuclear disarmament in three
stages and incorporates Presi-
dent Eisenhower's proposal for
the exchange of military blue-
prints, Premier Bulganin's plan
for establishing control posts
at key transportation centers,
and former premier Faure's pro-
posal to allocate savings from
reduced military expenditures
to improving standards of liv-
ing. Principal points of di-
vergence from American views
are the implied provision for
a ceiling of 1,500,000 on con-
ventional forces, the prohibi-
tion of nuclear weapons testing,
and the i.inconditional prohibition
of use of nuclear weapons.
British working-level dele-
gates have expressed the
opinion that if London xaiieu
to join the French in present-
ing the synthesized proposal,
some degree of French-Soviet
rapprochement might result, to
the detriment of.the subcom-
mittee talks and the solidarity
of NATO. The British also be-
lieve that any disarmament pro-
posal must be not'morely "a
set of principles," but must
provide for a series of defi-
nite steps with fairly precise
time relationships. They pre-
sumably believe tlv t the pres-
ent proposal meets these re-
quirements.
The strengthening of Moch's
hand in the disarmament nego-
tiations was emphasized by his
speech of 2 March to the Socialist
International council. He
criticized the "open skies"
proposal as "control without
disarmament" and similarly re-
jected plans for disarmament
without effective controls. He
characterized his own plan as
encompassing "progressively
all the disarmament which is
.at present controllable." He
expected the French government
to maintain this position even.
if it meant isolation from the
other Western powers during the
subcommittee talks.
Canada, the other Western
member of the subcommittee, will
not eo-sponsor the British-
French proposal unless the United
States does. However, Canadian
working-level delegates would
prefer a comprehensive pro-
posal along the lines of the
British-French plan in order.
to take into account the in-
creasing public interest in dis-
armament.
Moscow's first authorita-
tive comment on the subcommittee
talks, published in Pravda on.
9 March, provided fur er evi-
dence that the Sov-ie't represent-
ative in London will be par-
ticularly alert to exploit any
cleavages' which may develop be-,
tween the French delegate and
his Western colleagues. Pravda
stated that the Mollet govern-
ment's "new disarmament plan"
had aroused "open discontent"
in the United States and charged
that the consultations among the
four Western powers prior to the
opening of the subcommittee talks
were partly aimed at "curbing
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France and depriving her of
the poasiibility of displaying
her initiative."
Pravda implied that French
.;elega a Moch, under pressure
from his Western colleagues,
would abandon the joint British-
French plan, and support the
American plan "disguised
as a united plan of the
West." The article reported
the main points of President
Eisenhower's letter of 1 March
to Premier Bulganin on dis-
armament without independent
comment and predicted that
the Western position will
"throw the subcommittee...a lore
distance back." 25X1
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France and depriving her of
the possibility of displaying
her initiative."
Pravda implied that French
elea;a a 3och, under presbure
from his Western colleagues,
would abandon the joint British-
French plan, and support the
American plan "disguised
SECRET
as a united plan of the
West." The article reported
the main points of President
Eisenhower's letter of 1 March
to Premier Bulganin on dis-
armament without independent
comment and predicted that
the Western position will
"throw the subcommittee...a long
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
25X1
Jordan's King Hussain is
attempting to use the popular-
ity he gained from the dismis-
sal of Britainb General Glubb
as commander of the Arab Legion
to maintain a neutral position
between Iraq on the one hand
and Egypt, Syria, and Saudi
Arabia on the other. Hussain
has not yet accepted the Egyp-
tian-Fyrian-Saudi offer of
financial assistance to replace
the British subsidy, but the
probable growth in influence of
the "Free Officers Movement"
in the Arab Legion is likely
to push him in the direction of
the Arab group.
In dismissing Glubb and
replacing other British officers
of the Legion with Arabs, the
king appears to have been try-
ing desperately to recoup the
loss of prestige he and his
government suffered as a result
of the two series of riots last
December and January. Hussain
probably has gained only a
temporary respite, however,
since in reducing British in-
fluence he has opened the way
to other influences, domestic
and foreign, which in the longer
run may overthrow the monarchy.
The Jordanian government,
meanwhile, appears to be trying
to buy time. Hussain did not
attend the recent Arab "summit"
meeting in Cairo, and the Jor-
danians still hold to the line
that they will accept Arab aid
if it is offered by all the
Arab states, including Iraq,
and if it is regarded as a sup-
plement to rather than a sub-
stitute for British assistance.
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Jordan has taken great pains to
States that the relief of
British officers does not imply
a break with the West in general
or with Britain in particular.
Soviet Leaders
Discuss o ective Leadership
The Soviet leaders, having
disavowed Stalin-type rule and
the cult of personality, now
seem eager to explain to out-
siders how the current col-
lective leadership contrasts
with the tyranny of one-man 'rule .
In convey sa c uYis with Ambassa-
dor Bohlen at a reception for
the Danish prime minister on 6
March, the USSR's top leaders
gave the best explanation to
date on how collective leader-
ship actually operates within
the top echelons of the Soviet
hierarchy.
London is apparently taking
seriously King Hussain's ex-
pressed desire to maintain close
and friendly relations, and is
considering measures that would
presumably enable Britain to
retain a special position in
Jordan. According to plans
under study at the War Office,
Britain would continue to fur-
nish officers as advisers to
the Arab Legion. London has
agreed to replace the officers
asked to be withdrawn, and
Prime Minister Eden has also
said he might be willing to al-
low a British officer to be-
come second in command of the
Legion.
Britain apparently will
continue its subsidy to Jordan
if adequate controls over its
expenditure can be devised,
probably in the form of an
Anglo-Jordinian financial audit,
Finally, Britain will probably
insist on an annex to the Anglo-
Jordanian treaty, releasing it
from its commitment if Jordan
should engage in military ad-
ventures. F_ :1 25X1
Khrushchev, Bulganin,
Mikoyan, Malenkov, and Molotov
in separate conversations all
emphasized to Bohlen that under
present conditions in the Soviet
Union, collective leadership is
the only form of rule possible.
Khrushchev termed "absolute
nonsense" any thought that he
was on the way to becoming
another "great leader" like
Stalin, and Mikoyan later made
a similar statement about
Khrushchev's position.
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As if to reinforce these
words, Soviet leaders at all
social gatherings have been
displaying a lack of deference
for Khrushchev and an easy com-
radeship with one another that
would have been unthinkable in
the Stalin era. For example,
when at one point during the 6
March reception Bohlen mentioned
to Bulganin and Molotov that he
had seen a film of the Soviet
leaders' trip to India in which
there was a. very interesting
picture of Khrushchev getting
on an elephant, Molotov glee-
fully quipped, "Yes, an elephant
getting on An elephant!"
At one point in a conversa-
tion with Khrushchev and Malen-
.kov, the subject of the latter's
resignation as chairman of the
Council of Ministers came up.
On this question the party line
was rather closely adhered to,
with Malenkov claiming that
after he had been designated to
head the group at the time of
Stalin's death it was found that
he did not have enough "experi-
ence."
Both Khrushchev and Malen-
iov vigorously denied that there
had been any "quarrel" between
them on economic policy, although
Khrushchev admitted that certain
adjustments in economic policy
had been necessary, partly be-
cause the Soviet leadership came
to realize that disarmament was
not an immediate prospect.
Khrushchev added that "Georgi
Idaximilianovich(Malenkov)a.s -one
of my closest fiends, "but Bohlen
.Felt that, of all the topics
discussed, the statements on
this subject were the least
frank.
In discussing the workings
of the top party organizations,
Molotov and Khrushchev in-
dividually explained that deci-
sions in the party presidium
are now usually reached after
discussion without a vote, but
that in the event of disagree-
ment, a. vote is taken and mi-
nority or even'individua.l views
are made a part; of the record.
Both leaders were emphatic on
this subject, and Khrushchev
said that in the event of dis-
agreement which cannot be ironed
out in discussion, a vote is
"obligatory."
The leaders stated that
the party secretariat, headed
by Khrushchev as first secretary,
is subordinate to the presidium
during periods between meetings
of the central committee and
that the secretariat has no
independent status of its own.
The newly created Central Com-
mittee Bureau for the Russian
Republic, also headed b-,. Khru-
schey, is also completely sub-
or illa ue to r; ie pi e ~iuiul;i. It
was also revealed that candi-
dates to the party presidium
have the right to attend regu-
lar sessions of the-presidium.
but do not do so in all cases.
They have the right to pa.rtici.-
pate in discussions but not to
vote.
Mikoyan contrasted these
present practices with Stalin's
later days, which he described
as "difficult times," and bit-
terly condemned Stalin for fre-
quently making decisions on
his own without consultation
"with any of us." He said that
by this procedure Stalin had
destroyed the principle of
voting in party organs and in
effect had destroyed their
usefulness.
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Revision of Stalinist History
Gets Off to Fast Start
The Soviet press has wast-
ed no time in launching the re-
vision of the history of the
Stalinist period touched off by
the 20th Party Congress. A
rapidly developing program de-
signed to justify the destruc-
tion of the Stalin myth and to
create a historical perspective
more in harmony with the general
lines of Soviet policy has been
set in motion.
Revision of Soviet history,
like the doctrinal revisions
also announced recently, appears
to have a twofold purpose. By
washing its face and putting
on a clean shirt the regime.
hopes to find a readier welcome
in the international community.
At home, it is part of an effort
to reinvigorate intellectual
activity by removing a number
of Stalinist taboos and histori-
cal falsifications. While this
revision will be a controlled
process, there are signs that
it will eventually reach sub-
stantial proportions.
The outlines of the new
historical approach were set out
at the party congress by Anna
Pankratova, one of the regime's
foremost "house historians."
Condemning the "cult of per-
sonality," she indicated the
need for a new look at the
history of the whole post-
revolutionary period. The pres-
ent official history, which is
little more than a testimonial
to the genius of Stalin, was
said to be unsatisfactory.
Party historians should go back
to the revolution, she said,., and
reassess the part played by the
hitherto neglected Old Bolshe-
viks.
Taking this cue, the Soviet
press has in recent weeks begun
a display of affection and re-
spect for a number of long-for-
gotten Old Bolsheviks. The
purge period of the 1930s is
now to be interpreted as an
excess resulting from the
"cult of personality." Accord-
ingly, a start has been made
toward restoring the reputations
of such Old Bolshevik victims
of the purge as Kosior, Potyshev,
Kosarev, Chubar and Gamarnik.
The history of the USSR,
Pankratova stressed, is no
longer to be interpreted in the
oversimplified and distorted
terms applied in the past. In
Stalin's day every Soviet
achievement was seen as a sign
of his genius and every setback
was attributed solely to the
work of foreign enemies. This
approach has done great damage
to the Soviet cause because it
has made impossible a realistic
appraisal of outstandin?, prob-
lems and' has hindered their
solution. Subsequent announce-
ment that thk: archives of the
Ministries of Defense, Interior
and Foreign Affairs are to be
opened to Soviet historians is
a step in the direction of meet-
ing this problem.
Idealization of the heroes
of Tsarist times, a conspicuous
incongruity of Soviet historog-
ra.phy,.is. also to be discon-
.tinueu. Suvorov, Kutozov and
Ivan IV, for example, who served
Stalin as symbols of Russian
nationalism, will no longer be
treated as national heroes and
the bearers of progressive
Russian culture to inferior
peoples.
Little has been left of
Stalin's reputation. As it
stands now, he is said to have
contributed to the achievements
of the Soviet Union in its early
days but thereafter to have
embarked on an erroneous and
harmful policy. Satellite
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15 March 1956
leaders and their propaganda.
media have adopted this line
as explanation to their parties
of the meaning of the 20th con-
gress. It appears;now,;however,
that the attacks on Stalin will
be carried even further. If,
as Deputy Premier Mikoyan in-
timated to Ambassador Bohlen,
Lenin's testament, which re-
putedly found Stalin "crude"
and unfit to be party secretary,
is published, the blackening
of his reputation will be vir-
tually complete.
Within the party, this
may already have been achieved.
Ambassador Bohlen reports that
he has been informed that
Khrushchev delivered an address
lasting two or three hours to
a secret session of the party
congress, excoriating Stalin
and explaining why the party
had to destroy his reputation.
Bohlen also reports that several
busts of Stalin are known to
have been removed from public
places, and the ambassador has
been told that Stalin's body
may be removed from the Lenin-
Stalin mausoleum.
The desire to create a, new
image of the US5- in foreign
eyes can be clearly seen in this
historical revision. It has
domestic objectives as well,
however, a, clue to which can be
found in the latest issue of
the party's theoretical journal.
New Soviet, 'Agri,cul.ture .Decree
Curt.-ails Private OwnershiP
A new Soviet agricultural
decree of 9 March opens a cam-
paign to end the 20-year com-
promise between the Communist
Party and the Soviet peasant.
In the coming months, the party
plans to move fast and as far
as possible toward complete
elimination of the private plot
The "cult of personality" has
hampered the development of
revolutionary theory, the
journal asserts. "This cult
killed faith among workers of
the ideological front in their
own strength and in their ca-
pacity to move theory forward,
and raised the idea. that the
development of Marxist-Leninist
theory and its enrichment were
the destiny et the chosen."
The party now wants, it
seems, to overcome the stultify-
ing effects of years of syco-
phantic subservience to the
whim of an "infallible" leader
and to encourage a.. more real-
istic and fruitful approach to
the problems facing it.
It is probably a sign of
confidence that the present
regime does not feel the need
of some of the props of falsi-
fied history inherited from
Stalin and has moved, to some
extent, away from the defensive,
ultranationalistic attitude
which, in Stalin's time, buried
Soviet history in a. miasma. of
conspicuous absurdities. It
is Stalin's history which the
present leaders are rewriting,
however, not their own, and it
remains to be seen how much
objectivity will be applied to 25X1
an analysis of their own era.,
for instance, in such matters
as the Beria purge.
and personal livestock holdings.
The terms of the decree, how-
ever, leave the way open for a
retreat from advanced positions
if the drive provokes serious
popular resistance.
Individual holdings of
land and livestock presently
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15 March 1956
account for the greater part
of peasant income. About 60
percent of the total number of
cows in the USSR, and about 30
percent of the pigs, are pxi-
va.tely owned. These holdings,
however, greatly hamper the
collective farms because they
encourage the shirking of com-
munal tasks.
The decree calls on col-
lective farms to reduce the
size of private plots of those
who fail to devote the required
amount of labor to communal
tasks. It recommends a, re-
examination of personal live-
stock holdings in a. context
clearly implying that they
should be reduced. Lastly, it
seeks to make communal labor
more attractive by providing
monthly advances to collective
farmers in place of annual
lump-sum payments.
The decree climaxes a num-
ber of recent indirect measures
putting pressure on the private
plot and livestock. The burden
of executing it clearly falls
on party members, whose numbers
in agriculture have greatly in-
creased since 1953 and now ex-
ceed 3,000,000.
The casting of the decree
in terms of "recommendations"
to collective farms, however,
leaves room for the party
leaders to disclaim responsi-
bility for abuses which local
officials may be forced to
commit as the campaign accel-
erates in the next few months.
If the local officials en-
counter serious resistance, the
party will have to decide
whether to drive through to
complete socialization at any
cost or to retreat, for the
sake of maintaining output, as
it has in the past.
Soviet agricultural policy
has been punctuated by a series
of drives since collectiviza-
tion began in the early 1930s.
The compromise mixture of com-
munal and private property has
remained unstable, with the
party periodically trying to
squeeze out private elements
and the peasant constantly seek-
ing to concentrate on his own
household economy and avoid com-
munal labor. At various times,
most recently the period 1948-
52, intensified party pressures
provoked a. decline in produc-
tion.
The official attitude was
relaxed in 1953 as part of the
measures for agricultural growth,
but the conflict remained un-
resolved. Two complementary
lines of policy have developed
in recent years: higher finan-
cial incentives for corzauna'
work and indirect pressures on
private activity. The leaders
evidently have determined that
their economic and political
preparations are now complete.
The party's ultimate goal
is to bring peasant ways of
life more closely to those of
urban life, in order that fa.c-
tory methods of organization
and discipline can be imposedon
agriculture. The new decree
provides fc~:' an-incentive pay
system similar to tha.t used in
industry and envisions a. greater
role for money wages as opposed
to payments in kind. The large-
scale assignment of agricultural
specialists to collective farms
since 1953 also has had an ur-
banizing effect, as did the
transfer in 1953 of tractor
drivers to the machine tractor
stations, which used to borrow
them from collective farms for
seasonal work.
Even the concentration of
farm villagers in larger com-
munities (a.grogorods), which
was publicly repudiated when
Khrushchev proposed it in 1951,
is now favored in the Soviet
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15 March 1956
press and may be scheduled for
implementation soon.
These changes in the col-
lective farm system, and the
reactions they provoke among
the peasantry, will be impor-
tant determinants of agricul-
tural developments. The incen-
tives to increase communal out-
put now offered to collective
farmers, as well as the penal-
ties for spending too little
time working on communal tasks,
may weaken peasant resistance
to complete socialization. On
the other hand, peasant dissat-
isfaction at being forced
still further into the collec-
tive strait jacket may result
in a net loss in agricultural
production and cause another
delay in the drive for complete
socialization. 25X1
(Prepared by ORR
Communist China's Economic
Dependence on the
The composition and origin
of Communist ?-ChiAa's..:i~iports :
since the beginning of its
First Five-Year Plan (1953-57)
bear out Khrushchev's 14 Febru-
ary speech to the 20th Party
Congress on the nature and
magnitude of Soviet aid to
Communist China. These imports,
and those expected during the
remainder of the Five-Year Plan,
emphasize China's dependence
on the bloc, particularly for
key industrial and military
equipment.
China's industrial construction
through 1960. The First Five-
Year Plan report issued in
Peiping in August 1955 stated
that 145 of these installations
will be under construction by
1957. More may be under con-
struction by then because,
according to recent Peiping
propaganda, the schedule for
building electric power and
machinery plants has been ad-
vanced since the First Five-
Year Plan was prepared.
Industrial Aid
Soviet aid"is'clearly
essential'to,China's industriali-
zation,"since 156 major indus-
trial installations being built
and largely equipped,by the
USSR constitute the nucleus of
Peiping has said that
work on projects in this Soviet
aid program during the First
Five-Year Plan will cost China
the equivalent of $4.4 billion--
44 percent of investment in
all industrial construction
planned for the period.
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15 March 1956
I ` ~ T'
CN1 ~ I Ti IMPORTS
1953 THROUGH 1957
almost the sole
ese items; possibJ
lion supplied on
billjpn o .t i,
he West, Wt~h~ich _"
~
a sourcl Eii raw
and cons foods,
Khrushchev told the party
congress that in an unspecified
five-year period the USSR will
ship equipment worth 5.6 bil-
lion rubles--$1.4 billion at
the official rate of exchange--
to its industrial aid projects
in China. This figure is about
the amount the USSR would be
expected to deliver during
China's First Five-Year Plan.
Soviet deliveries to the 156-
project aid program will com-
prise about 20 percent of all
.equipment required for the en-
tire Chinese capital invest-
ment program for the 1953-57
plan. per'iod` The USSR and.
Satellites are also suppLyif,d
lesser projects with capital
equipment valued at about'tho.'
same amount.
Peiping appears to-have a
high priority for delivery of
Soviet equipment. Schedules
have been consistently met and
in some cases advanced,
enabling China to main-
tain rapid industrial
and military progress.
Military Aid
China has built
up the world's fourth
largest air force; it
is expanding its small
navy, and is moderniz-
ing its army. The
material that makes
this possible--received
almost entirely from
the Soviet bloc--will
reach a value estimated
at $2.5 billion during
the First Five-Year
Plan. The equipment
involved will account
for 25 percent of
China's total imports
and 20 percent of total ex-
penses of its military estab-
lishment during this period.
Communist China is en-
forcing severe austerity-at
home to provide exports to
pay for a large proportion of
its estimated $10 billion im-
ports from 1953 through 1957.
The remainder of these imports
will be paid for by secret
military credits, probably in
excess of $1 billion during
the First Five-Year Plan, and
long-term industrial loans
which may total another $300,-
000,000. In underwriting ex-
isting programs for economic
development and military
modernization, the USSR does
not appear to have withheld
military or industrial
equipment because of Chinese
inability to pay.
(Prepared by ORR)
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Okinawan Election
The decisive victory scored
by the conservative and pre-
American Ryukyu Democratic.
Party (RDP) in the Ryukyuan elec-
tion held on 11 March suggesLs
that sentiment for reversion of
the islands to Japan is not so
strong as the Japanese and some
Okinawans have claimed.
Approximately 75 percent
of the eligible voters of the
islands' estimated 798,20C
population participated in the
election. The RDP increased
its seats from 12 to 16 in the
29-member unicameral Ryukyuan
legislature and the party's
majority will be further strength-
ened by the support of four
independents who oppose return
of the Ryukyus to Japan.
The leftist Okinawa Social-
ist Masses Party, which opposes
close ties with the United
States and also advocates the
islands' return to Japan, won
eight seats, a decline of two
from the number they held in
the outgoing legislature. The
pro-Communist Okinawa People's
Party ran five candidates but
was again able to elect only
one, an incumbent of the pre-
vious legislative body.
The RDP victory takes on
added significance because the
party is handicapped by its
identification with the United
States in a political battle
in which advocacy of reversion
to Japan is a perennially
favorite political issue. Even
the RDP hesitates to support
American policies too openly and
thereby become vulnerable to
allegations of favoring the
continued jurisdiction of a
"foreign nation" above rever-
sion to the "fatherland" of
Japan.
All parties were united
in their campaigns in advocat-
ing greater local autonomy,
popular election rather than
appointment of the chief execu-
tive of the government, and
increased compensation for
land acquired for military use.
Thus, the election will not
eliminate some serious points
of conflict between the island
government and the American
administration.
Laos
Premier Katay having failed
to form a government in Laos,
Souvanna Phouma , a former .)remier
and defense minister in the
Katay government which resigned
on 14 February, has again been
called on to attempt the forma-
tion of a new cabinet. His
chances of success appear to be
better than even as he will be
supported by Katay,who opposed
him in his first effort. He
is faced with an extremely
delicate situation, however.
Tenuous party lines have been
shattered, and relations among
the 39 deputies in the national
assembly have been strained as
a result of numerous deals made
since last December's elections.
Bong Souvannouvong, leader
of the small National Union
Party and a Pathet Lao sympa-
thizer, has skillfully ex-
ploited this situation, and by
joining with anti-Katay elements
in the assembly has emerged the
nominal leader of a strong coali-
tion bloc called the Lao Union
for Public Welfare.
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Bong, who refers to the
Pathets as "our compatriots
who wish to work with us for
the good of the nation," seeks
the premiership on the pledge
that he will solve the Pathet
Lao issue within three months
or resign. I
Although it is not expected
that Bong will be given an op-
portunity to try to form a gov-
ernment, his activities have
tended to stimulate neutralism
in the assembly. His emphasis
on a peaceful approach to the
Pathet Lao issue may also dis-
sipate a resolve on the part of
the government to use direct
means--principally expanded
guerrilla operations--to wrest
control of Phong Saly and Sam
Neua Provinces from the Viet
Minh-supported Pathets.
?'ru$tration among the dep-
uties over the unresolved
Pathet Lao situation, which the
government has tried to settle
by negotiation since January,
1955, is reaching a point where
overtures from Peiping or Hanoi
to arrange a settlement might
appear attractive to the as-
sembly. The Indian charge in
Vientiane reports that Viet
Minh premier Pham Van Dong
recently indicated a willing-
ness to exercise his "good of-
fices" to settle the Pathet
issue, presumably in return for
lessened American influence in
Laos.
Recent favorable treatment
accorded Laos in the Chinese
Communist press indicates the
Chinese may be preparing to
offer to serve as mediators
between Hanoi and Vientiane
and at the same time promote
Laotian neutralism, as in the
case of Cambodia.
Cambodia
Overtures by Communist
China and the USSR to establish,
respectively, economic and dip-
lomatic ties with Cambodia are
part of an intensified Communist
effort to disrupt Cambodia's
relations with the West,pa.rtic-
ularly the United States. The
precarious balance of Cambodia's
foreign policy--based on strict
neutrality--is revealed in Pre-
mier Sihanouk's recent state-
ment that "our policy will
essentially adapt itself to
circumstances and world develop-
ments and to positions taken
toward us by various powers."
Communist China's offer
to purchase Cambodian rice and
25X1
25X1
rubber on attractive terms is
probably aimed at weakening
the UN embargo and, according
to the American embassy in
Phnom Penh, may also be designed
to forestall further American
aid to Cambodia. The Communists
probably calculate that if Cam- 25X1
bodia accepts the Chinese offers,
and American aid is terminated
because of Battle Act restric-
tions, Cambodia would be forced
to turn to Moscow or Peiping.
Sihanouk appears interested
in the trade offer and is re-
ported to have commented, "If
Ceylon can send rubber to Com-
munist China and still receive
American aid, why can't I?"
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15 March 1956
He announced he would send an
economic delegation to Peiping
to discuss commercial exchanges.
In his investitute speech
on 29 February, the Cambodian
premier revealed that he had
been assured by Chou En-lai
that Communist China stood ready
to give unconditional economic
assistance to Cambodia. Al-
though Sihanouk referred to
"heavy responsibilities" in-
volved in accepting Communist
assistance, his statement that
Cambodia would accept aid from
"the right, the left, and from
the center--in any way which
will stabilize our policy" sug-
gests he is at least considering
such a move to counterbalance
American grants.
Regarding the USSR, Siha-
nouk doubts that Cambodia will
be able to avoid recognizing
Moscow, a question insistently
raised in Peiping by the Soviet
charge there. Cambodia has
managed to avoid diplomatic re-
lations with China on the
grounds of the unresolved Taiwan
issue, but its pretext vis-a-vis
Moscow has been based on the
Spain's Position
Un Moroccan Independence
The Spanish Foreign Min-
istry has affirmed Spain's
willingness to meet Moroccan
nationalist demands for inde-
pendence. This constitutes
no more than an effort to main-
tain maximum influence in Spain's
own zone and the good will of
the Arab states in general, and
not a change in policy toward
Spanish Morocco. Spain may be
counting on a breakdown in
French-Moroccan negotiations
so that it can evade its own
rather vague promises toward
Spanish Morocco. If the nego-
latter's attitude toward Cam-
bodian UN membership which is
no longer valid.
Sihanouk has also said that
political representation might
be established soon with both
North and South Vietnam, al-
though outright recognition is
impossible. The Soviet charge
had urged early establishment
of a Viet Minh embassy in Phnom
Penh. In addition, the Viet
Minh has for some time indicated
a strong interest in establish-
ing diplomatic relations with
Cambodia, and Premier Pham Van
Dong has this week repeated an
earlier invitation for Sihanouk
to visit Hanoi.
of the year.
Cambodia's relations with
South Vietnam, however, are still
seriously strained by a Viet-
namese embargo on Cambodian
trade, but both sides are be-
ginning to show some disposition
toward a settlement of their
differences. Crown Prince
Sihanouk's resumption of the
premiership and the investiture
of a competent "action cabinet"
on 29 February to carry out his
policies has ended Cambodia's
aimless drifting since the first
tiations succeed, however, Spain
seems likely to seek extensive
economic and political conces-
sions in the whole area as the
price of an eventual grant of
independence to its zone.
On 13 March, Foreign Min-
ister Artajo confirmed the state-
ment made the previous day by
the head of the official Spanish
news agency that Spain is willing
to negotiate with the Moroccans
for the incorporation of its
zone in a united independent
Morocco. There are several
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indications that Spain has
recently been preparing for
such a move.
Spain has invited Sultan
Mohamed V to visit Madrid soon
for.talks on Moroccan independ-
ence and unity. Following the
3-5 March disorders in Spanish
Morocco, the press reported
that High Commissioner Genera].
Garcia-Valino had been summoned
to an "urgent conference" with
Franco. There are rumors that
his replacement, long a sub-
ject of speculation, may now
be imminent. Franco has been
reported as resigned to the
eventual independence of Spanish
Morocco and may be planning to
replace Garcia-Valino with some
one more acceptable in Moroccan
eyes for implementing any agree-
ment reached.
Spain's declared willing-
ness to negotiate is, however,
made contingent on the sultan's
status as a "free sovereign"
under the French-Moroccan dec-
laration of 2 March suspend-
ing the protectorate treaty of
1912. This proviso, together
with the conditions which the
Spanish Moroccan nationalist
leader, Abdelkhalik Torres,
has declared must be met prior
to a Spanish-Moroccan agreement,
will be used by the Spaniards
to delay actual negotiations
for independence.
There are indications,
nevertheless, that the Spaniards
would like to gain a "ground-
floor" economic position through-
out Morocco. The statement of
12 March insisted that Spain
must receive treatment in all
of Morocco equal to that accorded
France. 25X1
25X1
Franco hopes that good relations
with both the Moroccan national-
ists and the Arab League will
give Spain a more favorable
status than France in an inde-
pendent Morocco.
The statement of 12 March,
furthermore, would not apply to
two important cities of the Spanish
zone, Ceuta and Melilla, which
have long been legally part of
metropolitan Spain. These could
serve as bases for a Spanish
drive for economic concessions
in a unified Morocco.
an independent Morocco s support
for Spanish interests in the area
25X1
25X1
A further deterioration of
Spanish-French relations seems
likely. Madrid's repeated public
affirmations of sympathy for the
Moroccan independence movement
will be increasingly resented by
the French as a maneuver to gain 25X1
at France's expense.
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15 March 1956
Denmark's Agreements
With the R
Danish prime minister Han-
sen, during his visit to Moscow,
announced that Denmark would
build ships for the USSR under
a trade agreement to be negoti-
ated in April. The two coun-
tries are also to expand their
cultural contacts.
Jansen's agreement to
build a tanker or two fast
freighters for the USSR pre-
sents COCOM' s strategic control
program with new complications.
Hansen, apparently because of
COCOM prohibitions, later
stated in a press interview
that Denmark would hardly be
able to provide the tanker.
The prime minister bowed
to strong domestic pressure to
reopen trade talks with the
USSR and apparently felt a re-
versal of Denmark's stand on
construction of vessels for
the USSR was a necessary con-
cession. Formal :grade rela-
tions between the two countries
were broken off in mid-1954
when Denmark, observing COCOM
prohibitions, refused to build
any more tankers for the USSR.
The Danes are having dif-
ficulties selling their farm
products in Western Europe, and
in the interests of achieving
maximum diversification of
trade are eager to have the
Soviet market reopened.
Neutralist elements among the
population stress the political
importance of maintaining trade
relations with both East and
West.
The sale of the two
freighters to the USSR would
raise serious difficulties in
COCOM, where regulations on
the export of merchant vessels
to the orbit have been in dis-
pute. Negotiations on revised
controls failed in 1955 when
Britain refused to agree to
Denmark's exemption from a pro-
posed regulation that all ves-
sels with a speed of over 15
1/2 knots be embargoed.
The freighters which Den-
mark would sell are described
as 10,000-tonners with a speed
of 17-18 knots. Regulations
require only that Denmark con-
sult with COCOM before making
its decision. Despite objec-
tions from some COCOM members,
the Danes will most likely
honor their commitment to the
1- zSR, thus encouraging other
countries to be move lax about
their COCOM obligations.
Hansen refused the Soviet
request for a formal assurance
that no foreign troops would
be stationed in Denmark during
peaf:etime. No mention was made
of Doe;,n; ark' s membership in NATO
or of NATO bases in Greenland.
Hansen :'ejected the Soviet pro-
posal that formal contacts be
established between the Soviet
Communist and Danish Social
Democratic Parties.
Apparently at Denmark's
suggestion, agreement was
reached for an expanded ex-
change program of students and
professors, especially in the
arts and sciences. Hansen in-
vited Bulganin and Khrushchev
to visit Denmark at some un-
determined date in connection
with similar invitations from
Norway and Sweden. These ex-
panded. contacts may convince
some Danes that Russia is sin-
cerely seeking peaceful coex-
istence with the West.
25X1
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COMMUNIST CdINA'S ECONOMIC OFFENSIVE IN SOUTH ASIA
As part of the general
Communist economic offensive in
Asia, Communist China is offer-
ing to buy agricultural sur-
pluses at premiur prices and is
making available a wide range
of manufactured products at low
cost. Peiping is thus trying
to impress Asians with the speed
of Communist China's industri-
alization and to encourage
neutralism through increased
trade. These economic activi-
ties, which are more modest
than the Soviet campaign in the
area, complement rather than
compete with Soviet activities,
and the over-all Communist ef-
fort appears to be well co-
ordinated.
Offers of Industrial Products
Communist China is deter-
mined to acquaint the Asian
people with Chinese products
by increasing its share in the
low-priced consumer goods mar-
ket through sales of textiles
and light industrial commodi-
ties on more favorable terms
than competing items from out-
side the bloc. These items ac-
count for a notably larger
share of Communist China's ex-
ports to Ma.laya., Hong Kong and
Burma in recent months.
Moreover, China began ex-
porting heavy industrial goods
in 1955 with deliveries of
25,000 tons of steel products
to Burma and contracts to de-
liver 60,000 tons to Egypt by
mid-1956. Continued export of
these items is intended to
demonstrate to Asians the rapid
growth of an underdeveloped
economy with Soviet guidance
and assistance.
A new protocol to the 1954
Sino-Indian trade agreement is
now being negotiated in New
Delhi. Chinese exports under
this pact are to include
construction materials and 50,-
000 tons of steel, all of which
are required by India for its
Second Five-Year Plan.
Effect on Chinese Industry
In addition to its propa-
ganda value, the new export
drive may even support planned
development of heavy industry
in China. It earns foreign ex-
change without apparently de-
priving heavy industry of criti-
cal materials. The new exports
are either products of the
large and recently socialized
consumer goods industry, or
are industrial materials which,
according to trade data, are
at least not in seriously short
supply.
Officially guided tours
for South Asian business and
government groups are being
sponsored by Peiping. Favor-
able press statements issued
by these visitors, who come
from basically agricultural
countries aspiring to rapid
industrialization, indicate
that their itinerary is care-
fully planned to include mainly
the installations being con-
structed with Soviet aid.
25X1
Communist China
plans to invite representatives
from most Southeast Asian coun-
tries to witness the production
of China's first motor vehicle
at Changchun in August this
ye a r. The plant at Changchun
wi.Li be one of the first large
new machine building plants to
go into operation and will be
presented as evidence of China's
industrial progress.
Encouragement of Neutralism
China's trade offensive in
Asia includes countries known
to be following a pro-Western
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policy such as Pakistan,; Ceylon
and Thailand. In these coun-
tries Peiping aims at encourag-
ing and exploiting growing popu-
lar pressures for increased
economic relations with Peiping.
Pakistan: The Pakistani
premier pro ably will discuss
a formalization of economic re-
lations between China and Pak-
istan during his visit to Pei-
ping later this spring. Market
reports suggest that the Chinese
are holding back on normal cot-
ton purchases from Pakistan to
allow later procurement to be
publicized as part of an expan-
sion of China's foreign trade.
Large Chinese Communist pur-
chases of raw cotton at the a.p-
propria.te moment would help to
impress Pakistan with the bene-
fits to be derived from formal
trade relations with Peiping.
Such actions would be political
rather than economic in motiva-
tion, since China's last cotton
crop was notably successful.
Ceylon: The Sino-Ceylonese
rice-rubber pact, under, which
Peiping purchases rubber at pre-
mium prices, has not seriously
affected Ceylon's pro-Western
policies, but Peiping is in-
terested in diversifying and
developing Sino-Ceylonese trade.
By implementing a provi-
sion of the rice-rubber agree-
ment, China, has, under the fourth
annual contract, offered com-
modities for Ceylonese accept-
ance in lieu of the usual ster-
ling payment. Peiping has
explicitly offered wheat flour
and sugar purchased from France
with sterling and small cargo
ships built in Poland to reduce
the adverse balance under the
rice-rubber agreement.
Thailand: To support the
efforts a.i groups favoring
the esta.blishment of direct
trade with Communist China,
Peiping--a. net exporter of rice--
has offered to purchase Thai
rice. Peiping is apparently
trying to undermine the Thai
government's intention to pro-
hibit all direct trade with
China by offering an opportunity
for large personal profits to
government officials who have
extensive interests in rice ex-
porting companies.
Cambodia.: Chou En-la.i took
advantage of the Cambodian
premier's February visit to
China to reward Cambodia's
adoption of a, neutral policy by
offering "unconditional economic
assistance." In acknowledging
this offer, the Cambodian pre-
mier noted that other offers of
aid had entailed compromise of
Cambodian independence of a.c -.
tion, whereas Peiping accepted
Cambodia.'s refusal to consider
political recognition at this
time as warranted by its neutral
position.
Although there is no eco-
nomic basis for any significant
exchange of goods, during talks
to take place shortly in China.,
Peiping will probably offer
premium prices for surplus
agricultural commodities such
as rubber.
Burma and India.: Peiping
maintains that its economic
relations with Southeast Asia.
are based on exchanges that
are advantageous to all trad-
ing partners. Recent Peiping
press releases have called at-
tention to expressions of satis-
faction by Burma and India over
increased economic relations
with Communist China.. Peiping
notes that all three countries
are regions of vast resources
busily engaged in economic
construction and that mutually
beneficial economic co-operation
furthers the development and
industrialization of each of
the three countries.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 March 1956
Types of Bloc Efforts
The Chinese economic pro-
gram in South Asia is more
modest than the Soviet campaign
in the area. It is mainly aimed
at increasing trade, in contrast
with the Soviet effort, which
emphasizes the export of in-
dustrial installations and
technicians.
While China is planning to
build a cotton mill in Burma
soon, it is not known to have
any other plans for export of
capital equipment to South Asia.
It has apparently dropped vague
offers it made following the
Bandung conference in early 1955
to provide a cement plant for
Indonesia and paper and jute
mills for Burma.
A Chinese offer of assist-
ance in the development of Ne-
pal in February was probably a
follow-up to the campaign that
resulted in Nepalese official
recognition of China. While
the assistance to be rendered
was not defined, any serious
effort in Nepal would compli-
cate China's relations with
India.
Peiping, at present at
least, plans to supplement
rather than compete with the
Soviet bloc in expanding eco-
nomic relations. This is evi-
dent from recent Peiping propa-
ganda citing the Soviet Union
and European Satellites as
sources of industrial installa-
tions while the availability. of
such equipment from China was
not mentioned.
The Chinese, who have much
less to offer, will Probably
continue to be more moderate
and easy to deal with than So-
viet representatives in economic
actions with Asian countries.
A softer diplomatic approach by
China is also apparent. For
example, Chou En-lai's attend-
ance at the Bandung conference
a year ago was marked by the
avoidance of controversial sub-
jects. More recently Madame
Sun Yat-sen's visit reflected
a continuation of this policy,
which differs considerably from
that followed by I3ulganin and
Khrushchev in their Asian tour.
.Chinese Communist propa-
ganda mutes differences in ap-
proach between Peiping and Mos-
cow and publicizes the concept
of Chinese-Soviet solidarity.
In its turn, the Soviet bloc
supports Peiping's trade activi-
ties by quietly buying from
China much of the rubber China
imports from Ceylon and far
greater quantities of rice than
China imports from Burma. Both
the USSR and Communist China
evidently will continue to dis-
play their unity in a concerted
effort in Asia. Pre- 25X1
pared by ORR)
THE FRENCH ECONOMIC SITUATION
At a time when the French
Position in North Africa is
under severe attack, France is
entering its third year of un-
precedented prosperity. Serious
basic weaknesses remain uncor-
rected, however, and the busi-
PART III
ness community is nervous about
a Socialist-led government's
economic policies. Premier
Mollet's proposals for dealing
with the Algerian problem in-
volve vast new expenditures
which may set inflation in
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
motion again and arrest the ex-
pansion of the economy.
Despite the generally un-
settling effects of the North
African situation, the French
economy continued to boom
throughout 1955. There was
nearly full employment, a. record
industrial production index of
181 (1938 - 100) in November,
increased gold and short-term
dollar holdings, and a generally
favorable balance with the
European Payments Union for the
year. Wages rose steadily dur-
ing the year, bringing the
estimated average level up 7
percent over 1954. At the same
time retail price levels rose
only fractionally, and consumer
goods increased considerably in
number and variety. The only
lag in major industries was in
textiles and leather goods.
French business leaders
and economists foresee continued
prosperity during the first six
months of 1956, and no major
:Letdown in business activity is
expected during the current
year. An official poll among
industrialists, wholesalers and
retailers, taken in November
1955, indicated that over two
thirds of those interviewed
believed industrial production
would increase 3 to 10 percent
in 1956.
Other sources, including
the Finance Ministry, see no
immediate letup in the continued
over-all increase in production.
The rate of increase is expected
to fall off however, and, in
the face of continuing consumer
demand and increased government
expenses--particularly in con-
nection with North Africa--will
probably result in a. fairly
general rise in prices.
Factors Threatening the Boom
Until more definite steps
are taken to correct such basic
weaknesses as noncompetitive
prices, continuing government
subsidies and protection for
trade, and insufficient private
investment, the current aura of
prosperity could be dissipated
by slight changes in any of a
number of factors. French of-
ficials and other observers fear
that broad wage increases, or a
drop in public: confidence in the
franc, would bring about a new
inflationary spiral which could
undo the progress made over the
past two and one half years.
The tenuous position of
the franc was graphically il-
lustrated in December when
speculation on the outcome of
the national elections brought
about a 30- to 40-franc rise in
the value of the dollar, despite
more than two years of relative
stability. Increased activity
in the money market was in turn
directly reflected in the status
of France's international clear-
ances in she European Payments
Union. A deficit of $55,000,000
in January brought the first
major break in over a year of
generally favorable monthly
balances.
Furthermore, government
costs and the budgetary deficit,
which preliminary figures for
1955 indicate was about 1.2
billion dollars, will probably
increase sharply in 1956. Mol-
let's Algerian program involves
extraordinary military expenses
as well as funds for Algerian
agricultural and industrial
development which will require
new internal borrowing.
The budget burden will also
be increased by larger social
security benefits just as dollar
receipts--particularly dollar
supporc for the French troops
in Indochina--are being sub-
stantially reduced. Moreover,
the continuing atmosphere of
economic expansion is expected
to bring about an increase in
imports which would also tend
to reduce France's gold and
dollar holdings.
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15 March 1956
Business Attitudes
The problem of continuing
expansion without inflation
rests to a large extent on the
maintenance of confidence. The
accession of a Socialist gov-
ernment with left-center sup-
port has caused considerable
concern among businessmen, who
fear developments adverse to
their interests, including pos-
sible broad wage increases or
devaluation.
Mollet has taken steps to
reassure business opinion by
pledging to combat inflation
and by limiting his immediate
concessions to labor to three-
week vacations, increased old-
age benefits, and a reduction
in wage-zone differentials.
He has also tried to build.con-
fidence in his government by
giving cabinet posts to people
with business ties. These in-
clude Robert Lacoste, for example,
who has friendly connections
in banking circles, and Jean
Filippi, a Radical senator who
is a corporation director.
Despite Mollet's efforts,
business leaders will probably
continue to have some apprehen-
sions about the government's
program. Fear of inflation may
lead to business retrenchment
which will hamper further econom-
ic. development. Free labor
leaders feel that the psycho-
logical effects of a move by
management to suspend wage nego-
tiations until government tax
and financial policies are
known would facilitate Communist
exploitation of labor resentment.
Political Pressures
The political aspects of
the wage question appear to be
potentially the more dangerous.
Despite the gains made during
1955, labor is expected to bring
pressure for further increases
this spring, and the Communist-
led General Labor Confederation
will probably attempt to use
such demands in support of
Communist pressure for a Popular
Front. Since the Socialists
vie for the labor vote which
goes in large measure to the
Communists, Mollet can be pressed
for widespread wage hikes which
might alienate both the Radicals
and the right center.
Mollet's political vulner-
ability on the question has
been increased by the extrav-
agant promises made by some
Socialist candidates during the
election. Free union spokes-
men have expressed the fear that
despite Mollet's effort in the
mid-January Socialist Congress
to tone down these campaign
statements, the Communists may
be able to exploit them if the
government holds back on wage
increases.
The political aspects
of economic programing have
also created strains in the
relations between Socialists
and Radicals in the Republican
Front. Mendes-France, fearful
that overemphasis on social
reform will tip the economy to-
ward inflation, refused to ac-
cept the Finance Ministry post in
Mollet's government. In a
letter to his fellow Radical
Socialists on 17 February, he
stated that neither he nor the
Radical Party opposed social
reforms, "but there would be
an evident danger if the reforms
were not preceded or accompanied
by measures to prevent a threaten-
ing increase in prices and to
improve noticeably the balance
of the treasury and of foreign
accounts."
Nevertheless, the effort
to maintain the wage price
balance is aided by an economic
atmosphere which, despite the
threat to France's interests
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 March 1.956
in North Africa, remains un-
usually favorable. There is
also a general recognition a-
mong key labor, management
and government figures of the
existing dangers. The American
embassy points out that the chief
danger lies in the possibility
that the non-Communist forces 25X1
may squabble over What should
be done, thus playing into the
hands of the Communists.
25X1
WEST GERMAN ATTITUDES ON ALLIED MILITARY SUPPORT COSTS
The West German cabinet
is apparently unanimous in its
determination to discontinue
direct cash payment for the sup-
port of NATO-committed troops
stationed in West Germany after
the present special agreement
expires on 5 May. The cabinet
appears to be divided over the
scope and form of alternative
arrangements.
Financial Aspects
After 5 May, West Germany's
annual cash contribution of 3.2
billion marks for NATO troop
support will cease. West Ger-
many agreed to this sum in Oc-
tober 1954 at the time West Ger-
man sovereignty was arranged
for, While the finance con-
vention of the 1954 treaty pro-
vided for resumption of nego-
tiations on support costs--as
in fact occurred the beginning
of this month--it did not commit
West Germany to the principle
of direct cash payments after 5
May. The Allied view has been
that so long as West Germany
had no forces in being and was
not using all of the monies com-
mitted in its budget for defense,
support payments would be con-
tinued for troops actually de-
fending West Germany.
Financially, West Germany
can afford to continue making
a substantial contribution to
troop support. Foreign exchange
reserves in November 1955 amount-
ed to the equivalent of $2.3
billion. West German rearma-
ment is moving slowly, and re-
armament expenditures this year
will likely fall considerably
below the 5.2 billion mark
budget.
According to estimates re-
vealed in the NATO annual re-
view, if the West Germans do not
extend support payments, their
defense expenditures for fiscal
1956-57 will amount to only 6.8
percent of the gross national
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
product, as compared to 9-11
percent for the United States,
9-10 percent for Britain, and
at least 7 percent for France.
These other countries, more-
over, devoted to their defense
build-up a percentage of GNP
considerably higher than that
currently envisaged by the Bonn
government.
West German public opinion,
however, is solidly arrayed a-
gainst the idea of continuing
the cash payments. Although
several major newspapers admit
that various interpretations
can be put on the wording of
the finance convention, the
consensus of editorial comment
is that the Allies want "to
bleed" the Federal Republic.
All papers strongly reject Al-
lied demands for continued troop
support payments, calling such
demands discriminatory and sprdhg-
ing from a reluctance to give
up the prerogatives of the oc-
cupation period. Most of the
press supports the Socialist
view that the Allies are demand-
ing support payments because of
the Bonn government's policy of
hoarding "large. cash. reserves..
The cabinet now appears to
.be unanimous in the opinion that
further cash payments are polit-
ically impossible, since they
would imply continuation of the
occupation and put the govern-
ment on the defensive in the
national election next year.
Finance Minister Schaeffer also
alleges that the cash payments
generated inflationary pressures
that delay West Germany's own
rearmament program.
The government seems to have
reached no firm decision, however,
about alternative arrangements.
Economics Minister Erhard and For-
eign Minister Von Brentano are
more conciliatory than Schaeffer.
Erhard'has discounted the infla-
tionary effects of continuing
troop support payments.
The British would be hit
hardest among the Allies by
West Germany abandoning its
support cost-payments. Their
budgetary troubles would be
aggravated, since West German
payments are equal to 3 per-
cent of Britain's estimated
total military expenditures for
the coming fiscal year.
A Possible Alternative
American ambassador Conant
in Bonn believes there is a close
relationship between the question
of continuing support cost pay-
ments, the speed of the West Ger-
man military build-up, and ad-
ditional American military aid.
Conant estimates that the most
Bonn could be expected to agree
to is a bargain by which it would
continue some cash payments during
the first year of their military
build-up--when not all the funds
appropriated can actually be spent--
in return for the promise of ad-
ditional outside aid during the
third year of the build-up when
the government anticipates serious
economic strains.
In view of the differences
of opinion in the cabinet on the
implication,-of the support dosts
quC?tion fore.West Germany,;:Chan--
cellor:Adenauer mar.be forced to
intervene personally, with., a: de-
cision made on brbad political
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ROLE OF SOVIET NAVY MAY BE UNDERGOING RE-EVALUATION
Soviet leaders may be
engaged in re-evaluating the
role of the Soviet navy in the
light of its suitability for
modern combat. Khrushchev told
the British ambassador in Mos-
cow on 6 March that Soviet .
ships are "obsolete" and un-
suited for modern war condi-
tions. The navy commander in
chief responsible for the post-
war build-up apparently has
been replaced and the Communist
Party central committee now
includes only one naval of-
ficer, a. candidate member,
whereas in the previous com-
mittee one full member and
three candidates were naval
officers.
Almost immediately after
World War 11 the rehabilita-
tion of the Soviet naval ship-
building industry was begun,
and partly finished destroyers,
cruisers and submarines of
prewar design were completed
and others laid down. By
about 1949,the Soviet navy had
regained most of its defense
strength. Meanwhile, through
research and experimentation
with the aid of German engi-
neers, postwar designs of
destroyers, cruisers and sub-
marines were completed and
very extensive building pro-
grams were begun.
Under this construction
program, large numbers of
cruisers, destroyers and sub-
marines of reliable and rugged,
but not ultramodern, designs
were built and are still being
built. Despite the fact that
no aircra.ft carriers were laid
down, the traditional role of
the navy as a. seaward adjunct
of the land forces appeared to
be changing.
PART I II pproved For F eJW.
The programing of several
hundred long-range submarines
gave the Soviet navy an offen-
sive striking power which it
had never had. Nevertheless,
the surface ships and the sub-
marines are all of conventional
design. Ina few more years,
the rapid advances in naval
warfare concepts and techniques
by Western countries will have
made many of the new Soviet
ships substantially inferior
to their Western counterparts
unless major modifications
such a.s the addition of guided
missile armaments and nuclear
propulsion are made.
Admiral N. G. Kuznetsov
had been commander in chief of
the navy between 1939 and 1947
but was court-martialed by
Stalin and demoted. In July
1951 he was reinstated and be-
came head of the Nava?. Minis-
try. On the merger of the
War and Navy Ministries in
March 1950 he 'became a. first
deputy defense minister. Ku%-
netsov thus is closely as-
sociated with the second phase
of the build-up of the postwar
Soviet navy.
The second demotion of
Admiral Kuznetsov may have be-
gun as early as July 1955,
when he was absent from Navy
Day celebrations in Moscow.
More recently, he was dropped
from his position as full mem-
ber of the central committee.
Concurrently, three other ad-
mirals were dropped from al-
ternate membership of the cen-
tral committee. Only Admiral
S. G. Gorshkov, who apparently
has replaced Kuznetsov as com-
mander in chief of the navy,
now represents the navy on
the central committee; Gorshkov
is a. candidate member.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The weakening of the
navy's position on the central
committee was accompanied by
the elevation of Marshal Zhukov
to candidate membership of
the party presidium. Zhukov
is the first professional mili-
tary officer to reach this
position. Zhukov's speech to
the party congress on 18 Feb-
ruary included a statement that
"the Soviet navy is now capable
of reliable defense, alongside
the army and air force, of the
sea. frontiers of our mother-
la.nd." Nowhere did he indi-
cate an offensive role for
the Soviet navy, although he
claimed that Soviet aviation
is now capable of performing
"any mission" which might be
required of it.
Khrushchev's opinions
of 6 March regarding the
"obsolescence" of navies in
general and the unsuita _:ility
of Soviet ships for modern war
reportedly were expressed in
a jocular tone. Ambassador
Bohlen speculates, however,
that since last summer there
may have been a. re-evaluation
of the Soviet naval position,
particularly the postwar con-
struction program, which may
account for the reduction of
naval representation on the
central committee.
The effect on the Soviet
navy of Khrushchev's and
Zhukov's attitude cannot
yet be determined. It ap-
pears possible, however,
that the present building
program may be curtailed
or redirected toward pro-
ducing ships of more advanced
design.
SOVIET POSTWAR NAVAL GROWTH
CLASS OF SHIPS
ON HAND 1945
POSTWAR FOREIGN
ACQUISITIONS
PREWAR DESIGNS
COMPLETED AFTER WAR
POSTWAR DESIGNS
COMPLETED
CURRENT
STRENGTH
Carriers
0
0
0
0
0
Battleships
2
1
0
0
3
Monitors
0
1
0
0
1
Heavy cruisers
6
0
0
0
6
Light cruisers
0
2
5
15
22
Destroyers
46
5
81
20
137
Escort destroyers
0
0
0
61
61
Submarines
accurate
Long range
figures
10
14
183
258
Medium range
not
1
12
13
54
Short range
available
2
60
0
109
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 March 1956
DEVELCPNENT OF SOVIET ELECT.YJC POWER
"Communism is Soviet power
plus electrification of the
whole country" -- Lenin in
his REPORT TO THE 8TH CON-
GRESS OF SOVIETS on 22 De-
cember 1920.
Electric power develop-
ment under the USSR's draft
Sixth Five-Year Plan is geared
to a new 15-20 year electrifica-
tion program. Calling for a
rate of expansion a little
higher than that achieved in
the last five-year plan, the
new plan requires twice the
absolute increase achieved in
1951-55. It will probably
be fulfilled for power produc-
tion but not for installed
capacity. The 15-20 year pro-
gram emphasizes large individual
projects, useful also for prop-
aganda purposes, including
at least four hydroelectric
stations bigger than any now
in existence and the world's
largest and highest-voltage
transmission system.
Electric Power Production
The Sixth Five-Year Plan
calls for an 88-percent increase
in electric power output by
1960. Electric power produc-
tion will continue to grow
faster than the Soviet gross
national product and total
industrial output. The magni-
tude of these goals is best
illustrated by the necessary
annual increment: between 1950
and 1955, the increase in So-
viet production of electric
power averaged 16 billion kilo-
watt hours (kwh) per year; in
the 1956-1960 period the annual
growth must average 30 billion
kwh per yea.r.. By way of com-
parison, the average US annual
increment of electric power
in the period 1951-1960, it
is estimated, will be 58 billion
kwh.
In 1050, Soviet output
of electric power was about one
fifth that of the US and in
1955 about one fourth. In 1960,
it will reach about one third
of projected US production.
Should present rates of growth
continue, Soviet production of
electric power will catch up
with that of the United States
during the Twelfth Five-Year
Plan (1:05-1990).
Soviet industry's consump-
tion is growing, In 1955 it
used about 70 percent of the
power produced, as compared to
50 percent for the United States.
In absolute amounts, it will
probably be using nearly half
as much as American industry
in 1960, as compared to nearly
one third in 1950.
Generating Capacity
As in the last two Five-
Year Plans, goals for adding;
new generating . capacity will
probably not be achieved. Since
the estimated increase in gen-
erating capacity of 2.3 times
is desired partly in order to
increase the very limited re-
serve, the goal can be under-
fulfilled by 15 to 20 percent
without affecting fulfillment
of the plan for electric power
output. However, failure to
achieve the scheduled reserve
of generating capacity will
preclude a, much desired improve-
ment in maintenance and relia-
bility of the individual power
stations. Lack of reserve capac-
ity, may also retard the five-
year plan goal to reduce the
workweek, in industry from 48
to 41 hours.
The Sixth Five-Year Plan
calls for an increment to gen-
erating capacity of nearly 10,-
000,000 kw per year in the 1956-
1960 period as compared with
less than 4,000,000 kw per year
in 1951-1955. Availability
of the generators themselves
is a major limiting factor.
The Sixth Five-Year Plan sched-
ules the annual production of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
US-USSR
POWER PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION
A-GROSS ELECTRIC POWER
PRODUCTION *
B- HYDROELECTRIC POWER
PRODUCTION
C- INDUSTRIAL ELECTRIC
POWER CONSUMPTION
Figures are in billion kwh, rounded
to nearest 5 billion kwh
*US electric power production statistics are re;)orted as net, exclusive of powe.
consumed in power plants. Since USSR is believed to report gross production,
US net figures have been converted to gross for iurposes of comparison.
(Net production is about 95% of gross)
generators to grow from 4,500,-
000 kw total capacity in 1956
to 11,000,000 kw in 1960. This
does not seem adequate to allow
a 10,000,000 kw average yearly
increase in installed capacity.
A serious effort to meet the
planned goals will mean import-
ing considerable generating
equipment-- t-zrbines and gen-
erators--anu will preclude
significant exports of such
equipment.
Hydroelectric Program
The publicity accorded
the hydroelectric construction.
program continues to be far
out of line with its importance
in tdta,l power production. The
1960 target for production by
hydroelectric stations, 59 bil-
lion kwk ; is less than 19 per-
cent of the total planned out-
put for that year. About 10,-
000,000 kw of hydroelectric
capacity will be waded by 1960,
to give a total of approximately
16,000,000 kw.
At least two thirds of
this added capacity will be
in a, group of major hydro.le c-
tric stations, frequently men-
tioned in the Soviet press,
which are now in advanced stages
of construction. Stalingrad,
with 2,300,000 kw, will be
the world's largest when com-
pleted.
Even larger stations will
be started during the Sixth
Five-Year Plan period: Bratsk
on the Angara, and Krasnoyarsk
on the Yenisey will have 3,-
200,000-kw capacities. la
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 March 1956
SOVIET HYDROELECTRIC
CONSTRUCTION PROGRAM
C
Shulbinska x
A Hydroelectric stations (400,000 KW and over)
to be constructed or completed during the
Sixth Five-Year Plan
O Hydroelectric stations reported to be in the
planning stage
UPt BukhTarma
addition, planning is in prog.-
re?ss,. for stations at Ust Ilim
and Boguchany in East Siberia.,
which will be about the same
size as Bratsk and Krasnoyarsk,
and a. 5,000,000-.kw station on
the Yenisey.
Nuclear Power Program
The Soviet program to con-
struct nuclear thermal electric
stations having a total capacity
of 2,000,000 to 2,500,000 kw
is highly ambitious. The at-
tainment of a hydroelectric
capacity of about
2,000,000 kw was
spread over nearly
four five-year, plans.
The construction
period for large con-
ventional thermal
electric stations is
two to three years.
Nuclear stations are
experimental in na.-
tore and probably
cannot be built as
rapidly.
Should the USSR
attain 2,000,000 kw
by the end of 1960,
nuclear plants would
then account for about 2.5 per-
cent of total planned generat-
ing capacity and possibly about
2 percent of the.total planned
production. I. V. Kurcha.tov
of the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences, speaking before the 20th
Party Congress, claimed. that
two nuclear plants with a total
capacity of 1,000,000 kw would
be located in the Urals and
one of 400,000 kw near Moscow.
The remaining capacity will
probably be in smaller plants
located in fuel deficit areas.
V"KOV
millions of
kilowatts
40[
Planned Nuclear
Electric capacity
'37 40 42 45 48 50 'S5 1960
END OF YEAR
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 March 1956
The first of these plants may
go into operation during 1957.
Kurcha.tov stated that
investment costs per installed
kw will be about one and a half
times the cost of a, conventional
thermal electric plant, and he
claimed production costs will
be comparable to present Soviet
electric power production costs.
Technology
Advances in the technology
of the electric power industry
are planned by means of automa-
tion and the use of larger,
more efficient turbines and
generators. The installation
of relatively small, inefficient
turbines and generators in new
power plants is the principal
cause of underfulfillment of
previous capacity goals, accord-
ing to presidium member M. G.
Pervukhin in his speech to the
20th Party Congress. The tech-
nology of.the Soviet electric
power industry is probably 5
to 10 years behind that of the
United States. Elimination of
such technological lags is an
objective of the Sixth Five-
CONCEPTION OF PLANNED
SOVIET
TRANSMISSION NETWORK
European USSR-Urals network (400 KV)
planned --Possibly planned
Approximate area of 110.220 KV power systems
Existing Planned
SECRET
Year Plan. This objective will
be only partly achieved in the
electric power industry.
Construction of a high-
voltage transmission network
to connect the Central, Southern,
Volga., and Urals power systems
is planned during the Sixth
Five-Year Plan. This network
will operate at 400 kilovolts,
the highest transmission voltage
in the world, and will link
power plants having a total
capacity of 28,000,000 kw.
It will provide alternative
sources and greater reliability
in the electric power supply
of vital industrial centers,
and will allow a wide distribu-
tion of relatively low-cost
hydroelectric power.
Work will also procede on
a. Siberian high-voltage tra.ns-
mission network which will
eventually be connected with
the Urals, resulting in the
interconnection of practically
all of the major power systems
of the USSR and the world's
largest transmission system.
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E;y 1970-75, the Siberian trans-.
mission network is planned to
connect hydroelectric and ther-
r.:al plants having a. total
capacity of 50,000,000 kw mid
an annual production of 250
to 300 billion kwh, or about
one and a. half times the total
Soviet power production in
1955.
vegional Trends
The Sixth Five-Year Plan
emphasizes the acceleration
of the development of the east-
ern USSR, which reportedly
conta.ii about 75 percent of
the USSR's coal reserves and
80 percent of its hydroelectric
potential. However, this de-
velopment is a, long-range ef-
fort and will not begin to show
significant results until after
1960 when new power plants will
come into operation.
East Siberia seems slated
to have the fastest growth of
installed generating capacity.
Other areas in which electric
power production is scheduled
to increase sharply during
the Sixth Five-Year Plan in-
clude the Kazakh SSR, and
Tadzhik SSR, and the Volga
region. Prepared
by ORR)
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