CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700170001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 38
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 21, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 8, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
DOCUNENTNO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ^
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
COPY NO. 19
OCI NO. 1772/56
8 March 1956
DATJFf E`JIEWER:.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Department review completed
S
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CONFIDENTIAL;,
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The rapid succession of incidents on Israel's borders
with Syria, Jordan and Egypt is evidence of increasing
confidence on the part of the Arabs and of Israel's deter-
mination to maintain an unyielding position. These factors,
the weakening of restraints in Jordan implicit in the dis-
missal of British officers from the Arab Legion, and
Israel's apparently increasing fears of Arab intentions
have materially increased the danger that war could break
out as a result of miscalculation on either side.
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THE THREAT TO BRITISH INTERESTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
King Hussain's abrupt dismissal of General Glubb is
symptomatic of the decline in British influence in the
Middle East generally. The Foreign Office has indicated
to the American embassy in London that it.believes closer
support from the United States is essentials
FURTHER SOVIET MOVES
IN THE NEAR EAST . . . . .
A delegation of Soviet engineers, authorized to make
new offers and negotiate on the spot, is traveling through
the Arab states. The Soviet ambassador in Egypt has re-
emphasized the USSR's official interest in Middle Eastern
affairs,and Moscow has saluted Jordan's dismissal of General
Glubb as "a sound patriotic Arab decision." Moscow
apparently intends to maintain a polite diplomatic pose
with the Israelis while continuing to support Arab asni-
FRANCE AND THE ALGERIAN CRISIS . . . . . . . . .
The Mollet cabinet is facing its first major test in
the current National Assembly debate on its request for
extraordinary powers for Algeria. The government still
lacks a really effective policy for Algeria. French
military leaders incline to the view that Algeria will be
lost unless extensive military action is taken soon.
Page
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Peiping's Statement on the Geneva Talks: The 4 March state-
ment by Peiping 's Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the
Sino-American negotiations implied a more specific
threat to the offshore islands than previous Communist
declarations. The statement was apparently timed to
coincide with Secretary of State Dulles' visit to
Asia, in the hope that Asian leaders would bring
personal pressure on him to agree to direct talks with
Chou En-lai. Peiping seems disposed to continue the
negotiations while preparing a case for American re-
sponsibility if the talks break down.
Page 1 25X1
Cyprus: A new test of strength between the British
security forces on Cyprus and the island's Greek
majority seems likely following the suspension on
1 March of negotiations between the British and Arch-
bishop Makarios. The failure of the talks also has
the effect of widening the breach between Greece and
Turkey. . . . . . . . . Page 2
Morocco and Tunisia: The declaration issued on 2 March by
the French an Moroccan governments is essentially a
compromise permitting the current talks to proceed.
Negotiations which will spell out French-Moroccan
ties are expected to be conducted simultaneously in
Rabat and Paris and may last until late in the summer.
The Tunisians, who began new negotiations with the
French on 29 February, have demanded the abrogation
of the 1881 Treaty of Bardo, which established the
protectorate. . . . . . Page 3
Afghanistan: The fast pace set by the USSR in its Afghan
aid program is reflected in an unusually heavy flow
of Soviet traffic and personnel to Kabul late in
February and reported Afghan approval of an increase
in the Soviet embassy staff. An agreement covering
part of the $100,000,000 Soviet credit was signed on
2 March. Provision for airfield construction in the
agreement is probably part of a Soviet drive to get
control of Afghan civil aviation.
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 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 March 1956
Shift in Communist Tactics Against South Vietnam: Continued
strengthening of t -Se Diem regime, most recently dem-
onstrated in the 4 March election, has caused the Viet
Minh to reassess its tactics toward the south. Real-
izing that unification elections will not be held in
1956 and that there are no good prospects for over-
throwing Diem by internal revolt, the Viet Minh is
calling for new international negotiations, and is pre-
paring for a long-term subversion effort. Page
Singapore: Singapore's Chief Minister David Marshall is
preparing to go to London late in April for talks
on self-government. He does so in an atmosphere of
diminishing British confidence in Singapore's readi-
ness for self-rule. In view of steadily increasing
Communist subversion in the colony, British officials
are concerned over the absence of a strong non-
Communist party or a competent non-Communist local
leader in whose hands the new powers could be safely
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. . . . . . - . . Page 8
Indonesia: President Sukarno has asked ex-prime minister
Al~Sastroamidjojo to be the formateur of a new
Indonesian cabinet. Chances that Sastroamidjojo will
succeed are slim, and Sukarno may have to appoint
one or more other formateurs. Sukarno would like
to have the cabinet formed by 26 March when the
elected parliament is to be installed. Regardless
of whether the anti-Communist Masjumi participates
in the new cabinet, Indonesian policy probably will
be more strongly nationalistic than at any time in
USSR Urges Resumption of Relations With Australia: Soviet
officials in the UN have approached t eir Australian
colleagues three times since November with proposals
for re-establishing Soviet-Australian relations.
Their efforts so far have made little progress,
because of Soviet insistence that Australia publicly
take the initiative, but the USSR will probably
modify this position. Page 9 25X1
South Korean Liberal Party Nominations: President Rhee's
ref usa to be renominated on the Liberal Party ticket
serves to remind the party of its dependence on Rhee
and sets the stage for his draft by popular acclaim.
Although Liberal Party chairman Yi Ki-pung has been
nominated for vice president, it is possible that
Rhee will not endorse any one candidate.
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Opposition to Rakosi in Hungary: Hungarian party leader
ads , who has been having difficulty for some
time in controlling. nationalist elements among the
Hungarian Communists, probably faces new threats to
his position. Moscow may decide eventually to
sacrifice Rakosi, particularly if he is unable to
overcome the serious factionalism within his party.
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET POSITION ON DISARMAMENT .
The Soviet representative in the London talks of the
UN Disarmament Subcommittee convening on 19 March will
probably press the Western powers to accept the interim
measures suggested by Khrushchev in his report to the
20th Party Congress: discontinuation of thermonuclear
weapons tests, prohibition of possession of atomic
weapons by forces stationed in Germany, and reduction
of military budgets. Otherwise the USSR probably will
stand firm on the basic disarmament position set forth in
its 10 May proposals of last year.'
Page 11
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THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF WESTERN EUROPE . . . , , . , Page 3
The evolution of the new Bulganin-Khrushchev foreign
policy over the past year seems to have been of little
help to the political fortunes of the Communist parties of
Western Europe. In most countries, the influence of the
parties has remained about the same or slightly declined.
Where they have gained, or where they remain a major
political force, as in France and Italy, this is largely
the result of local developments. As adjuncts of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the European Communists
appear to have been able to produce only limited support
for Soviet foreign policy goals and to gain only limited
benefits from shifts in Soviet policy, even when these have
been in the direction of moderation.
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MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE . Page 8
Mao Tse-tung and other Chinese Communist leaders
have regularly endorsed the principle of "collective
leadership," but Mao for many years has personally led
the Chinese Communist Party and has personally controlled
its policy in a way not very different from Stalin's
domination of the USSR. Mao's personal direction has
been particularly evident in the past year. Nevertheless,
Mao's program in China--that is, Chinese "application"
of Marxist-Leninist doctrine--has continued to be warmly
praised by Soviet leaders. Khrushchev's pragmatic
approach to ideology suggests that he and Mao are suited
to work well with one another. C
JAPANESE INTEREST IN PROMOTING AN INDEPENDENT TAIWAN . . Page 11
Japanese leaders have long maintained that the
creation of two Chinas offers the only feasible solution
for the present impasse over the international status of
Taiwan and Communist China. They are insistent that
Taiwan must not fall into Communist hands. They fear
this might occur suddenly, because of a collapse of the
Nationalist regime through demoralization or the death of
Chiang Kai-shek. This apprehension and the conviction
that an independent Taiwan would be the most favorable
solution for Japanese interests are behind the inclination
of Japanese leaders to favor a Taiwan independence move-
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The rapid succession of
border incidents on Israel's
borders with Syria, Jordan
and Egypt illustrates the in-
creasing confidence of the
Arabs, as well as Israel's
determination to maintain an
unyielding position. These
factors, the weakening of re-
straints in Jordan implicit
in the relief of British of-
ficers in the Arab Legion,
and Israel's apparently in-
creasing fears of Arab inten-
tions have materially in-
creased the danger that war
could break out as a result
of miscalculation on either
side.
There are some indica-
tions that Israel, in the
light of its failure to se-
cure arms from she West, may
seek a rapprochement with the
USSR. Tel Aviv officials
have said they are now will-
ing to admit Soviet personnel
under the UN technical assist-
ance program, and even moder-
ate Israeli newspapers have
suggested. that the Soviet
Union be given a voice in Near
Eastern affairs.
Some went so Tar as to
suggest that Israel might ask
the USSR for a guarantee of
the status quo. This may be
the policy decision American
observers in Israel have be-
lieved imminent. The USSR,
however, apparently has not
thus far made any move to
suggest that it will meet the
Israelis even halfway in
supporting them against the
ArabE.. (Also see Part I, page 4).
The.fact that Israel has
formally called the Palestine
situation to the attention of
the UN Security Council sug-
gests that the Israelis have
not decided to use the latest
spate of border incidents as
a takeoff point for larger-
scale hostilities. Should
some kind. of UN action not be
forthcoming, however, the Is-
raeli government might well feel
impelled to stage a Iretaila-
tory" action, especially if
new incidents seem to threaten
the security of Israel's bor-
ders.
The disappearance of
British influence in Jordan
has led Israeli foreign min-
ister Sharett to comment that
Israel was being "encircled"
by the "long arm" of Egyptian
prime minister Nasr. Egyptian
influence in Jordan is almost
certain to become dominant
with the departure of the Brit-
ish,; but Nasr's problems
may Llso increase as a result
of this victory for his policy.
Nasr has already been at
pains to urge the Syrians to
moderation; with Jordan under
his wing, he must also con-
cern himself with the possi-
bility that precipitate action
by Arab Legion units against
Israel could lead to Egyptian
involvement in war before Cairo's
preparations are completed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
THE THREAT TO BRITISH INTERESTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST
The Jordanian king's abrupt
dismissal of General Glubb on
1 March is symptomatic of the
decline in British influence
in the Middle East generally.
The Foreign Office has indicated
to the American embassy in
London that it believes closer
support from the United States
is essential.
Britain's capacity to.ar
rest the decline of its influ
ence in the Middle East has been
weakened by the progressive de-
cline in the leverage it can
exert from its military bases
in the area.
In Cyprus, which is now
Britain's principal base in
the Middle East, the collapse
of the latest negotiations with
Archbishop Makarios means the
continued commitment of many
of the 20,000 British troops on
the island to an intensive anti-
terrorist drive. British
evacuation of the Suez Canal
base is now far advanced, and
the Egyptian army maintains
close surveillance over the
disposition of the remaining
British units. In Libya, the
British plan soon to increase
their garrison to armored divi-
sion strength, but the Foreign
Office anticipates increasing
political problems there.
.FURTHER SOVIET MOVES
.IN THE NEAR:EAST
Moscow is continuing to
capitalize on its rapprochement
with the Arabs. A delegation
of Soviet engineers is on a
fact-finding trip through the
Arab states. According to the
London interprets recent
developments in the Middle East
as increasing the threat to
Britain's vital oil interests.
A possible alliance between
Jordan and Egypt and Syria at
the minimum could bring heavy
pressure on Britain by threat-
ening to stop the flow of Brit
ish oil through Syrian pipe..
lines.
Reaching an agreement with
Saudi Arabia in the Buraimi
dispute is now seen by the
British as of increased urgency,
both for their oil interests
and for the general stability
of the region.
The British view that im-
mediate strengthening of the
Baghdad pact is now necessary
may reflect a belief that the
developments in Jordan have
further increased the USSR's
ability to exert influence in
the Middle East. There have
been no indications that the
British favor seeking additional
Arab adherents to the pact at
this time, but they have in the
past shown that they would re-
gard the pact as a convenient
means for dispensing economic
aid on a multilateral basis.
F77 I
Soviet minister to Lebanon,
this group is prepared to fur-
nish technical assistance or
advice and to sign contracts
for projects on the spot. The
delegation already has visited
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Lebanon and is now in Syria.
It is going on to Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and possibly Yemen.
The Arab News Agency states
that the Soviet delegation has
shown interest in providing
Lebanon and Syria with oil refin-
eries, textile factories, and:..'.
other installations. The simi-
larity of these projects to
the industries covered in a
detailed market survey made by
Czechoslovakia several months
ago suggests that the Soviet
survey team will attempt to nego-
tiate detailed contracts.
Egypt
In his first public state-
ment since he arrived in Cairo
in late January, Soviet ambas-
sador Kiselev told the Egyptian
press that any event in the
Middle East that affected Soviet-
Egyptian relations is "an impor-
tant matter" for the USSR. He
said that the Soviet Foreign
Ministry's statement of 13
February on the Middle East
and the resolutions of the So
viet 20th Party Congress made
clear the USSR's opposition to
the dispatch of American and
British forces to the area--
without the consent of the
countries in the area--in the
event of an Arab-Israeli war.
Kiselev's remarks, which
apparently were made with the
prior approval of the Egyptian
Foreign Ministry, were evidently
staged to ensure that Soviet
views--which tend to support
present Egyptian foreign policy
-reach the Egyptian public.
Just as Moscow hailed the
violent anti-Western riots in
Jordan in December and January,
it has saluted the dismissal
of General Glubb by King Hussain
as "a sound patriotic Arab de-
cision." Referring to Glubb as
the "honest servant of colonial-
ism," Moscow accuses him of
attempting to use the Arab Legion
to push Jordan into the "prison"
of the Baghdad pact by Machine-
gunning the Jordanian people
during the December riots. Iz
veStia has termed Glubb's dig-
-m ssa "a new great defeat of
British foreign policy in the
Middle East."
The USSR apparently hopes
to maintain a polite diplomatic
attitude toward Israel while
simultaneously continuing to
support Arab aspirations. Molotov
reportedly has told Israeli am-
bassador Avidar in Moscow that
he could understand Israel's
security fears and why it de-
sires to improve its armament.
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'Israel recently announced
that an exchange of Soviet and
Israeli parliamentary delega-
tions would take place at an
unspecified date. 25X1
(Concurred in by -
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The Mollet cabinet is facing
its first major test in the
current National Assembly debate
on its request for extraordinary
powers for Algeria. The govern-
ment still lacks a really effec-
tive policy for Algeria and the
search for a scapegoat has in-
creased the tendency to blame
the United States for France's
North African difficulties.
Premier Mollet's quasi-
ultimatum to the rebels on 28
February to lay down their arms
or face an all-out effort app.eazs
to have had little effect and
has tended to weaken his parlia-
mentary position. The threat
of force shocked many members
of the premier's own Socialist
Party, and the Popular Republi-
cans have stated that they can-
not condone the government's
policy. The current Communist
line stresses "ties between
France and Algeria" rather than
Algerian independence. The
Communists may support Mollet
because of their eagerness to
maintain the fiction of a. popular
front.
The parties of 'the ,?'right
remain critical of what they
consider to be Mollet's con-
tinued inaction, but may be
willing to keep him in office
to take the blame for unpopular
measures--a factor which Mollet
probably has taken into consid-
eration.
The search for a solution
now focuses on the feasibility
of early and massive reinforce-
ment of French troops in Al-
geria. Robert Lacoste, minister
residing in Algeria, has asked
for additional troops, in amounts
variously reported between 100,-
000 and 200,000,;to::strengthen
an estimated 200,000 already
there. He is reported ready
to resign if the government does
not comply.
French military leaders
incline to the view that Al-
geria will be lost unless ex-
tensive military action is
taken soon. General Valluy,
French representative to the
NATO Standing Group, estimates
that the situation requires
a total of 500,000 troops, but
he fears that there is not
enough time to train so many
men for guerrilla warfare. Gen-
eral Augustin Guillaume resigned
as chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Committee in protest
over the government's indecision,
stating subsequently that France
has two alternatives: to call
up new troops
to "evacuate."
he
French army maintains a reserve
subject to immediate recall
without parliamentary consent
composed of all conscripts who
have completed their military
service within the past three
years. This reserve is believed
to total 420,000, and, although
it has already been levied on,
it should be adequate to cover
a call-up of as many as 300,000.
Certain officials have
charged the United States with
encouraging the nationalists.
At the same time they have
argued that the USSR is attempt-
ing to outflank NATO by encour-
aging the Arab states to back
North African nationalists, and
Mollet has asked for a joint
French-American-declaration of
common,policy on North Africa.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Peiping's Statement on the
Geneva Talks
Peiping's Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has made its
second appeal to international
opinion in seven weeks in eon
nection with the Sino-American
negotiations at Geneva. Charg-
ing that the United States has
been using the negotiations mere-
ly to forestall Communist China's
exercise of its rights to Taiwan
and the offshore islands, Pei-
ping warned on 4 March that it
would not agree to the "dragging
out" of the talks.
The specific mention of
"Taiwan and the coastal islands"
at five different points in the
4 March statement strikes a new
emphasis on the question of the
offshore islands. For the past
year, Communist China has re-
frained from attempts to capture
any of the offshore islands and
in its statements on the Sino-
American negotiations has slighted
the islands by referring general-
ly to the "Taiwan area." The
shift in emphasis may be designed
to underscore the Communists'
disposition to exercise their
capabilities against the offshore
islands if the United States
maintains its present stand at
Geneva.
The ambassadorial-level
negotiations at Geneva, which
began on 1 August 1955, resulted
in fairly rapid agreement that
nationals desiring repatriation
would be released expeditiously.
Despite this agreement, Peiping
has continued to hold 13 Ameri-
can prisoners in an obvious at-tempt to force American conces-
sions as a condition for their
release. The concession Peiping
most desires at this time is
agreement to hold direct talks
between Secretary Dulles and
Foreign Minister Chou En-lai,
The 4 March statement was
apparently timed to coincide
with Secretary Dulles' visit to
Asia. The Communists undoubtedly
hope that Asian leaders, some
already favorably disposed to
a Dulles-Chou meeting, will per-
sonally press their views on
Mr. Dulles. Peiping would look
for assistance particularly from
Indian prime minister Nehru, who
will receive the US secretary
of state over the 9 March week
end. During the visit of Khru-
shchev and Bulganin to India,
Nehru ,1 oti.ned them in urging
that the Sino-American talks at
Geneva be raised to a "higher"
level.
Peiping's primary considera-
tion in pressing for a Dulles-
Chou meeting involves prestige
and implied recognition of
great-power status, which would
raise its international stature
and further erode.the standing
of the Nationalists. It is
unlikely that the Communists ac-
tually believe a meeting of
foreign ministers could resolve
the disputed points at issue.
The Chinese Communists are
willing to renounce force but
only in the most general terms.
They will not agree to renounce
force against Taiwan, asserting
that the "liberation" of Taiwan
is a purely domestic matter.
They concede that Taiwan should
be "liberated by peaceful means,
if possible," but affirm tha-L
it will be "liberated by war, if
necessary." They will not recog-
nize the US right of "individual
and collective self-defense"
in the Taiwan area, since this
would acknowledge the legitimacy
of the US Mutual Defense Treaty
with the Chinese Nationalists.
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While unwilling to renounce
force against Taiwan, they would
like to discuss the "question
of relaxing and eliminating
tension in the Taiwan area'-? at
a conference attended by Dulles
and Chou. Since Peiping argues
that this tension derives from
the American "occupation" of
Taiwan, the conference would
consider the question of Ameri-
can "withdrawal." On all these
points, Communist China has
taken an unequivocal stand both
in official statements and propa-
ganda broadcasts, and loss of
face would be entailed in any
retreat from these declared
positions.
Cyprus
A new test of strength
between the British security
forces on Cyprus and the island's
Greek majority seems likely
following the suspension on 1
March of negotiations between
the British and Archbishop
Makarios, The failure of the
talks also has the effect of
widening the breach between
Greece and Turkey.
Following the breakdown in
the talks, Governor Harding
ordered the immediate resump-
tion of extensive security op-
erations by the 15,000 police
and British troops. Makarios
has announced that the British
must initiate any further talks
and has asked the 410,000 Cypriot
Peiping seems disposed to
continue the negotiations while
preparing a case for American
responsibility if the talks
break down. This does not neces-
sarily mean continuing Communist
forbearance toward the offshore
islands. As the record in Korea
demonstrates, protracted nego-
tiations do not preclude con-
current military pressure by the
Communists. While there are
no indications of an imminent
attack against any of the off-
shore islands, the Communists
are conceded the capability for
launching a major assault with
little or no warning.
Greeks to continue their "pas-
sive resistance." His refusal
to comment on terrorist activi-
ty will also probably encour-
age the underground organization
EOKA to intensify its efforts.
Makarios apparently re-
jected the final British offer
because of suspicion that Britain
intended to manipulate the later
constitutional negotiations so
as to deny the Greek population
a proportionate majority in a
Cypriot legislature. Before
the arrival of British colonial
secretary Lennox-Boyd, Makarios
had told the American consul
in Nicosia that Harding's re-
fusal to commit himself on that
issue was the only remaining
obstacle to agreement.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Makarios apparently inter-
preted Lennox-Boyd's sudden
trip to Cyprus as a sign of
British weakness. He probably
renewed demands for an amnesty
for political offenses and a
time limit on the governor's
control over public security
as a means of exerting pressure
for a concession on the propor-
tional representation issue.
Makarios probably expects
that continuing pressures on
the British will force the con-
cessions he wants. A Labor
member of the British Parlia-
ment who participated in the
final phase of the negotiations
has told,the'.-American .embassy
in Athens that he sees no way
of breaking the impasse'. He
questioned the wisdom of London's
apparent attempt to convey con-
flicting assurances to the Greek
and Turkish communities on Cy-
prus. He asserted, and the
British ambassador in Athens
"rather ruefully" agreed, that
in six months Britain would wish
it had made concessions on the
three unsettled points.
In retaliation for British
jamming of Athens radio on 6
March, the Greek government
Morocco and Tunisia
The declaration issued by
the French and Moroccan govern-
announced termination of re-
lays of broadcasts of the Brit-
ish Broadcasting Corporation.
Athens also appears to be exert-
ing diplomatic pressure on the
British and on its other allies
in support of Makarios.
The Greeks apparently con-
sider the "hidden veto" Turkey
has exercised over the negotia-
tions as the cause of their
breakdown. The Greek ambassa-
dor in Belgrade was instructed
to inform the Yugoslavs that
'Greece would withdraw its agree-
ment to an early meeting of the
ministerial council of the
Balkan alliance, which includes
Turkey. The Greek ambassador
said that Turkish foreign minis-
ter Koprulu's "provocative"
speech to the Turkish parlia-
ment on 26 February has made it
necessary for Athens to review
the entire question of its rela-
tions with Ankara.
For.both Greece and Turkey,
the Cyprus;issue'is closely con-
nected with.. violent nationalist
emotions. Britain's attempt to
straddle the basically uncom-
promisable,positionof the two
countries . resulted in accen-
tuating the contrast. between
them.
merits on 2 March in effect re-
iterates the promise of inde-
pendence given last November
but does not materially alter
France's continued dominance in
Morocco. The declaration
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
suspends the protectorate treaty
signed at Fez in 1912 and is
essentially a compromise per-
mitting the current negotiations
to proceed. The Moroccans had
demanded immediate abrogation of
the 1912 treaty, while the
French had insisted that the
links of "interdependence" with
France must be spelled out prior
to abrogation.
France now has agreed to
Moroccan participation in
Morocco's foreign affairs, de-
fense and internal security.
In general, however, the
Moroccans will be confined to
token representation. A
French Foreign Ministry spokes-
man has told the American embassy
in Paris that the French are
following the same line the
British have used successfully
--that is, "giving... everything
on paper and hoping to retain
substantial influence in fact."
The spokesman added that France
is relying heavily on the ex-
cellent personal relations
existing between the sultan and
Andre Dubois, the former French
resident general in Morocco who
is now designated high commis-
sioner.
Negotiations to spell out
French-Moroccan ties are expect-
ed to be conducted simultaneous-
ly in Rabat and Paris and may
last until late summer. The
Moroccans fear the French may
exploit the near. bankruptcy of
Morocco's treasury to bind the
country more closely to France
than they desire.
The French Foreign Minis-
try spokesman also stated that
France is anxious to see a Mo-
roccan army created rapidly so
that it can take over the major
portion of operations in the
Rif. While composed of Moroc-
can soldiers, the army would be
commanded by a French general
and rely on the French for ar-
tillery support, all logistics,
and special services.
The spokesman also expect-
ed that the sultan would soon
make a strong statement calling
on Moroccan rebels to lay down
their arms. In the past the
sultan has resisted French pres-
sures for a surrender call,
partly to avoid the risk of
having the call ignored, and
partly to use the rebellion for
:bargaining purposes. He may
now delay a surrender call until
he is certain such a request
would be obeyed.
Both the declaration on.
2 March and the return of the
sultan to Rabat on'5 March re-
sulted in popular demonstrations
throughout Morocco acclaiming
independence. In Spanish Morocco,
demonstrators clashed with the
police and 19 Moroccans were
killed and more than 150 in-
jured. Spain, whose position
with regard to the joint dec-
laration has been "reserved,"
may now be subjected to increas-
ing nationalist pressures for
concessions in Spanish Morocco..
TUNISIA
French-Tunisian negotia-
tions, which will probably lead
to Tunisian participation in
foreign affairs and defense
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8 March 1956
matters, opened in Paris on
29 February. A French Foreign
Ministry spokesman has informed
the American embassy that
France will not consider the
Tunisian demand for abrogation
of the Treaty of Bardo, which
established the. protectorate
in 1881, until a written re-
quest is submitted by the Tuni-
sian bey. The French, if they
desire, can influence the bey
not to sign a formal request
The bey,,whose political
stature is negligible, is re-
ported to fear that Habib
Bourghiba, head of the moderate
Neo-Destour party who paved
the way for the current nego-
tiations, plans eventually to
abolish the monarchy and es-
tablish a republic. The bey,
therefore, reportedly is sup-
porting extremist nationalist
Salah ben Youssef, who fled
to Tripoli in January to avoid
arrest.
Afghanistan
The fast pace set by the
USSR in its aid program in
Afhanistan is reflected in an
unusually heavy flow of Soviet
traffic and personnel to Kabul
late in February, and reported
Afghan approval of an increase
in the Soviet embassy staff.
An Afghan-Soviet agreement
covering part of the $100,000,-
000 Soviet credit was signed
on 2 March, Provision for air-
field construction in the agree-
ment is probably part of a
Soviet drive to get control of
Afghan aviation..
The agreement, as reported
by Radio Moscow, also provides
for construction of two hydro-
electric stations, three motor
Ben Youssef desires com-
plete and immediate independ-
ence for Tunisia and has en-
gaged in a long campaign of
opposition to the French-Tuni-
sian conventions signed in Paris
last June,
The elections, the first
ever to be held in Tunisia, are
for a constituent assembly which
is to convene on 8 April to write
a new constitution for Tunisia.
The bey..fears that the con-
stituent assembly under the in-
fluence of Habib Bourghiba may
draft a constitution for a re-
public rather than a constitu-
tional monarchy. However, the
Treaty of Bardo, which was
specifically mentioned in the
June conventions as retaining
its full validity, guarantees
the bey's position and reroga-
tives.
repair shops, a road across the
Hindu Kush Mountains, irrigation
works, a laboratory at Kabul,
and a fertilizer plant. Afghan
press reports also include a
road maintenance unite
The arrival in Kabul on
1 March of a high-level Soviet
aviation mission to negotiate
establishment of an air service
between Afghanistan and the
USSR coincides with the an-
nouncement that the Russians
will undertake reconstruction
of the Kabul airfield and de-
velopment of a new field 30
miles north of Kabul, a place
known locally as Bagram. The
Bagram field is to be a mili-
tary one, according to several
reports.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 March 1956
~' Broad gauge railroad
All-weather road
zil Qala
HELMAND RIVER
DEVELOPMENT AREA,
R andahar
Chaman
Quetta
PROBABLE LOCATION OF SOVIET PROJECTS
UNDER THE 2 MARCH 1956 AGREEMENT
Fort
Sandeman
Gilgit
_ ,J JAM M U
KIS?TAN AND
,[a r ShaWaf. ($Ya[OS in dispute)
Khyber
Pass
SAUDI
ARABIA
Rawalpindi
L -I
MILES -
Laboratory
Airfield
AL Irrigation dam
Hydroelectric station
Hindu Kush road
Motor repair shop
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25X1
Shift in Conruz.ist Tactics
Against Sou a nazis
Continued strengthening of
the South Vietnamese government,
most recently demonstrated in
the 4 March election, has caused
the Viet Minh to reassess its
tactics against the south.
Despite bitter Viet Minh de-
nunciation of the election,1a
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solid progovernment slate was
returned for the 123-seat Viet-
namese constituent assembly
summoned tc approve Diem's
constitution.
Realizing that the uni-
fication elections, scheduled
for July 1956,:will not be held
and that there is no good pros-
pect for overthrowing Diem by
internal revolt;, the Viet Minh
is now calling for new inter-
national negotiations and is
preparing for a ,long-term sub-
versive effort ;in South Viet-
nam, In conformity with cur-
rent international Communist
strategy, the Viet Minh does
not appear to contemplate the
use of its superior military
forces.
Initially the Viet Minh
appears to be considering
supporting a neutralist South
Vietnam government-in-exile
under the leadership of Tran
Van. Huu, onetime French-
controlled premier...
Huu; hopes to
set up a rival government for
South Vietnam possibly based
just north of the 17th parallel.
While Huu has little or no
support in the south, his close
contact with North Vietnam leaves
little doubt that the Viet Minh
is intimately acquainted with
Huu's plans ands is very prob-
ably supporting the movement.
On the international scene,
Communist efforts to obtain a
new Geneva conference on Indo-
china have been well co-ordinated,
with Moscow and Hanoi endorsing
Chou En-lai's call for such a
conference. Concurrently, Pol-
ish members of the International
Control Commission have stated
the need for a new conference
with the implied threat that
"we cannot hold them (the Viet
Minh) back indefinitely."
Communist policy makers
probably feel that they have
everything to gain and little
to lose if they can maneuver
the West into accepting a new
conference. Hanoi may hope for
an agreement to increase economic
and political relations between
north and south, and perhaps
even to commit the Diem govern-
ment to a definite election
schedule for all Vietnam.
In South Vietnam, the
constituent assembly is ex-
pected to convene shortly and.
will undoubtedly approve, within
the specified 45-day limit, a
draft constitution prepared
under Diem's supervision. The
draft constitution reportedly
provides for a separation of
powers, with overriding author-
ity vested in the presidency.
The emphasis placed on impeding
Viet Minh efforts to subvert
the young republic is indicated
in a provision of the assembly
election ordinances waiving
parliamentary immunities in
cases where opinions expressed
by deputies "aim at supporting 25X1
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munists or rebels."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUM'KARY
Singapore
Singapore's Chief Minis-
ter David Marshall is preparing
to go to London late in April
for talks on self-government.
He does so in an atmosphere
of diminishing British con-
fidence in Singapore's readi-
ness for self-rule. In view
of steadily increasing Com-
munist subversion in the
colony, British officials are
concerned over the absence of
a strong non-Communist party or
a. competent non-Communist local
leader in whose hands the new
powers could be safely en-
trusted. Obstruction of the
movement toward independence,
on the other hand, would pro-
vide the Communists with polit-
ical capital.
Marshall, who is strongly
anti-Communist, has not been
an effective chief minister.
His health is poor and he lacks
a strong political organiza-
tion. His party, the Labor
Front, was hastily organized
in 1954 to contest the April
1955 elections. It is now
unsuccessfully competing for
support among the same popula-
tion groups which are being ex-
ploited by Singapore's best
organized and most rapidly
growing party--the Communist-
manipulated People's Action
Party. In the Singapore Legis-
lative Assembly, opposition
strength--of which the People's
Action Party is a part--equals
that of the government.
Marshall ansi other Labor
Front leaders have considered
expanding the present coalition
government, which also includes
the Alliance, a Malay-Chinese
political organization which
has little strength in Singa-
pore. The Labor Front has ex-
plored co-operation with a. newly
organized Chinese party, the
Liberal Socialist Party, and
with the so-called "right wing"
of the People's Action Party.
Both of these groups, however,
appear increasingly dis-
inclined to enter the govern-
ment before the London talks.
Should Marshall be unseated
after the talks, his pros-
pective successors appear
less likely to provide vigor-
ous anti-Communist leadership
than he.
Although plans are con-
tinuing to hold the self-govern-
ment talks in April as scheduled,
tentative alternative schemes
are being explored. The prin-
cipal one is' the admission of
Singapore as the twelfth state
in the Federation of Malaya,
where the government is much
stronger and where Communist
subversion has not developed
to the extent it has in Singa-
pore. Marshall claims that
such a course would be politi-
cally unpalatable to Singapore.
He prefers a form of political
combination which the two gov-
ernments would enter on equal
terms.
This suggestion, how-
ever, has already been re-
jected by Malaya's Chief
Minister Rahman. Rahman is re-
luctant to get involved in Singa-
pore's intricate political prob-
lems on any basis and partic-
ularly dislikes the prospedt
of the accession of Singapore's
large Chinese population. 25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Indonesia
President%Sukarno has asked
ex-prime minister All Sastro-
amidjojo to be`the formateur
of a new Indonesian cabinet.
Chances that Sastroamidjojo will
succeed are slim and Sukarno may
have to appoinlY one or more
other formate0s. Sukarno would
like to have the cabinet formed
by 26 March, when the elected
parliament is to be installed.
The Harahap cabinet, which re-
signed on 3 March, is continu-
ing in office as a caretaker
government andthe old parlia-
ment has recessed pending for-
mal dismissal on 25 March.
Cabinet negotiations will
revolve around. 'the National
Party (PNI) and the Nahdlatual
Ulama (NU). WIether these par-
ties will turn 'to the moderate,
anti-Communist:Masjumi, also
a major party,to give their
government stability in the par-
liament is the principal ques-
tion which the negotiations will
decide.
Editorials in NU-.influenced
papers state.that resignation
of the Masjumi;led cabinet has
."kept the door open" for.co-
operation with,the Masjumi...
Masjumi chairman Natsir, how-
ever, has said he does:notbe-
lieve the PNI?-NU "team" would.
accept his.part.y in the cabinet
as an "equal"..and that he re-
jects any other ,terms. Other
reports, however, state that
Vice Chairman Sukiman and not
Natsir will speak for the Mas-
jumi, and that his more flexible
attitudes and greater political
skill may open the way for Mas-
jumi participation on satis-
factory terms.
Should efforts toward a
tripartite coalition fail, the
PNI and NU will turn to the 22
small parties which account for
21 percent of the membership
of the new Indonesian parliament.
A coalition including the NU
and numerous small parties would
lend itself to largely unre-
strained direction by the Na-
tional Party and President Su-
karno, and would have the support
of the Communist Party.
In any event., Indonesian
policy probably will be more
strongly nationalistic than at
any time. heretofore. The plu-
rality of the National Party in
the September and December elec-
tions has been interpreted by
all parties as an endorsement
of a nationalistic approach to
Indonesia's problems.
Probably scheduled to re-
ceive early and continued atten-
tion is-;the country's claim to 25X1
Netherlands New Guinea (West
Irian).
Soviet officials in the UN
have approached their Australian
colleagues three times since
November with Tronosals that
Australia take the initiative
publicly in re-establishing re-
lations with the USSR, which
were suspended in April 1954
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY,., SUMMARY
after the Petrov spy scandal.
The conversations have made
little progress because of So-
viet insistence that Australia
make the first public approach
and also guarantee diplomatic
protection for the Soviet em-
bassy and its personnel. Aus-
tralia has countered with the
proposal that both sides simul-
taneously exchange identical.
notes to avoid appearance of
initiative from either side.
The USSR will probably
modify its present position
eventually to achieve normaliza-
tion of relations. Australia
is one of the few countries
still untouched by the post-
Stalin Soviet policy of expand-
ing relations with non-Communist
countries.
The presence of Soviet
diplomatic representatives in
Australia would facilitate
establishment of support facil-
ities for the Soviet Antarctic
expedition and participation
of Soviet athletes in the sum-
mer Olympics at Melbourne.
A high official of the
Australian Department of Ex-
ternal Affairs has expressed
the opinion that both embas-
sies will be restaffed and
relations resumed at the latest
prior to the opening of the
Olympics in November. He
thought that the Petrov revela-
tions would work against re-
sumption of Soviet expionage
activity.
South Korean Liberal Party
Nominations
President Rhee's refusal
to be renominated on the Liberal
Party ticket has served to re-
mind Liberal politicians of
their dependence on Rhee, and
sets the stage for his renomina-
tion by popular acclaim. Rhee
has stated that while he does
not consider himself "incapable
of working for the country," the
Liberal Party should ''wait:-and
listen" for the voice of the
people.
The nomination of Liberal
Party chairman Yi Ki-pung for
vice president reflects his
continued domination of the
party organization and the pre-
vailing view that his candidacy
is acceptable to President Rhee.
Election to the vice presidency
would make Yi the likely succes-
sor to the 80-year-old Rhee;
however, his prospects might be
jeopardized should Rhee fail to
endorse him or if Rhee should
run independently. A member of
the opposition Democratic Party
has predicted that Rhee will
encourage several vice-presi-
dential condidates without sup-
porting any one.
Reports that Rhee desires
an overwhelming vote of confi-
dence in the election suggest
that he will take advantage of
the support of the Liberal Par?-
ty organization. However, mem-
ories of the 1952 campaign., in
which Rhee at the eleventh hour
successfully shifted his support
from the Liberal Party vice-pres-
idential nominee to the present
incumbent, Ham Tae-yang, will
encourage Yi's opponents and
possibly stimulate independent
campaigns for the vice presi-
dency.
25X1
25X1
The rapid initiation of
"draft Rhee" demonstrations in
Seoul suggests that Rhee will
shortly announce his willingness
to bow to the people's will. 25X1
The opposition Democratic Party
is expected to nominate its tick-
et later this month.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY "-:SUMMARY
after the Petrov spy scandal.
The conversations have made
little progress because of So-
viet insistence that Australia
make the first public approach
and also guarantee diplomatic
protection for the Soviet em-
bassy and its personnel. Aus-
tralia has countered with the
proposal that both sides simul-
taneously exchange identical
notes to avoid appearance of
.initiative from either side.
The USSR will probably
modify its present position
eventually to achieve normaliza-
tion of relations. Australia
is one of the few countries
still untouched by the post-
Stalin Soviet policy of expand-
ing relations with non-Communist
countries.
South Korean Liberal Party
Nominations
President Rhee's refusal
to be renominated on the Liberal
Party ticket has served to re-
mind Liberal politicians of
their dependence on Rhee, and
sets the stage for his renomina-
tion by popular acclaim. Rhee
has stated that while he does
not consider himself "incapable
of working for the country," the
Liberal Party should '.'wait:.and
listen" for the voice of the
people.
The nomination of Liberal
Party chairman Yi Ki-pung for
vice president reflects his
continued domination of the
party organization and the pre-
vailing view that his candidacy
is acceptable to President Rhee.
Election to the vice presidency
would make Yi the likely succes-
sor to the 80-year-old Rhee;
however, his prospects might be
jeopardized should Rhee fail to
endorse him or if Rhee should
run independently. A member of
the opposition Democratic Party
has predicted that Rhee will
The presence of Soviet
diplomatic representatives in
Australia would facilitate
establishment of support facil-
ities for the Soviet Antarctic
expedition and participation
of Soviet athletes in the sum-
mer Olympics at Melbourne.
A high official of the
Australian Department of Ex-
ternal Affairs has expressed
the opinion that both embas-
sies will be restaffed and
relations resumed at the latest
prior to the opening of the
Olympics in November. He
thought that the Petrov revela-
tions would work against re-
sumption of Soviet expionage
activit
encourage several vice-presi-
dential condidates without sup-
porting any one.
Reports that Rhee desires
an overwhelming vote of confi-
dence in.the election suggest
that he will take advantage of
the support of the Liberal Par-
ty organization. However, mem-
ories of the 1952 campaign., in
which Rhee at the eleventh hour
successfully shifted his support
from the Liberal Party vice-pres-
idential nominee to the present
incumbent, Ham Tae-yang, will
encourage Yi's opponents and
possibly stimulate independent
campaigns for the vice presi-
dency.
The rapid initiation of
"draft Rhee" demonstrations in
Seoul suggests that Rhee will
shortly announce his willingness
to bow to the people's will.
The opposition Democratic Party
is expected to nominate its tick-
et later this month.
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CURRENT IXTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 March 1956
25X6
Opposition to Rakkosi in Hungary
Hungarian party leader
Rakosi, who has been having dif-
ficulty for some time in con-
trolling nationalist elements
among the Hungarian Communists,
probably faces new threats.to
his position.
Rakosi has apparently
depended mainly on Moscow's sup-
port to maintain himself in
power since his ouster of the
more moderate Communist leader,
ex-premier Nagy, a. year ago.
The leaders of Rakosi's opposi-
tion reportedly feel that his
personal leadership and austere
domestic policy no longer con-
form to Soviet precept or prac-
tice, in view of recent Soviet
criticism of Stalin and offical
Soviet pronouncements endorsing
collective leadership and ad-
mitting the possibility of a.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 I a.rc:h 1956
different path to socialism
than that followed by the USSR.
They are also encouraged
by reports that an official
revision of the findings of the
1948 trial of Laszlo Rajk, who
was executed on charges of
nationalist deviation and con-
spiracy with Tito, is under
study both in Moscow and
Budapest.
A reversal of the Rajk
verdict would stimulate Rakosi's
opponents to greater efforts.
Rakosi probably will not be
directly implicated in any re-
vision of the official version
of the Rajk trial, since the
blame can be laid on conven-
ient scapegoats such as ex-
police chief Gabor Peter and
former politburo member Mihaly
Farkas. Nevert:heles.s,,.RakosVs
critics would'interpret revisiop
of the findings in the Raj:k case
as a withdrawal of Soviet sup-
port for Rakosi and tacit en-
dorsement of their demands for
freer expression of their con-
flicting views and for greater
local autonomy in working out
Hungarian policy.
Moscow may in fact even-
tually decide to sacrifice
Rakosi, particularly if he is
unable to overcome the'serious
factionalism within his party.
His removal from the Hungarian
scene would add to the general
persuasiveness of the ideologi-
cal shifts enunciated at the
recent Soviet party congress by
showing that Moscow was ap-
plying a less heavy hand in
the Satellites.
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 March 1956
PART III
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET POSITION ON DISARMAMENT
The line the Soviet dele-
gate to the UN Disarmament Sub-
committee will probably take
when it reconvenes in London
on 19 March was indicated in
speeches by the top Soviet
leaders at the recent party
congress in Moscow. The Soviet
leaders regard their disarma-
ment policy, not a,s an end in
itself but rather as a power-
ful political instrument to
be manipulated in the pursuit
of broader foreign policy ob-
jectives.
Soviet Position at London
The Soviet representative
in the forthcoming London talks
will probably press the Western
powers to take the preliminary
steps proposed by Khrushchev
in his report to the party con-
gress. Khrushchev suggested
that agreement on the "more
intricate aspects of disarma-
ment" would be facilitated if
the nations would (1) discon-
tinue thermonuclear weapons
tests; (2) prohibit possession
of atomic weapons by forces
stationed in Germany; and (3)
reduce military budgets. This
simple three-point interim
program is another example of
the USSR adopting elements of
proposals previously advanced
by non-Communist spokesmen.
Nuclear Weapons Tests
The proposal to discontinue
thermonuclear tests is the first
Soviet suggestion that this
measure could be adopted outside
of a, general disarmament agree-
ment. It will establish a
basis for later Soviet denuncia-
tion of the series of American
nuclear tests in the Pacific
beginning late in April and of
Britain's initial. hydrogen bomb
test later this year.
Since Khrushchev's speech)
the Soviet delegate on the UN
Trusteeship Council has been
pressing the council to halt
further tests in trust terri-
tories. Although the Soviet
delegate did not insist on a
vote on th s issue, India's
Khrishna Menon used the occa-
sion to warn that if the
United States proceeded with
the tests in the Marshall
Islands, India would demand
that the International Court
of Justice be asked to rule
on the legality of nuclear
tests in trust territories.
The Soviet leaders also
expect that the proposed ban
on hydrogen tests will have a.
strong appeal in Western Europe.
Moscow probably expects that
the French delegate, Jules
Moch, will be prepared to move
further and faster than his
Western colleagues toward pro-
moting a. synthesis between the
Soviet and Western positions.
Molotov, in his party congress
speech, noted that Premier
Mollet had expressed a special
interest in the disarmament
problem and promised that the
USSR would strive, "together
with France, to achieve certain
progress in the solution of this
problem."
Moscow may also anticipate
that a nuclear test ban proposal
would place the Eden government
in an embarrassing position with
British public opinion and the
Labor Party, which has been press-
ing the government to seek
agreement on limiting or pro-
hibiting further tests.
Atomic Weapons in Germany
Khrushchev's second point--
prohibition of possession of
atomic weapons by troops
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stationed in Germany--was first
put forward in the Prague dec-
laration of the Warsaw pact
meeting on 28 January. At that
time it was coupled with a
modified version of Eden's sum-
mit conference plan, which
called for the creation of a.
semidemilitarized zone in
Europe, incorporating both
East and West Germany, in which
opposing forces would be limited
and controlled.
M litary Budgets
The third point--reduc-
tions in military budgets--was
apparently intended as a cau-
tious endorsement of former
French premier Fa.ure's proposal
at the summit conference.
Recent Soviet statements
have provided no hints that
there will be any shift in
Moscow's position on the car-
dinal problem of inspection and
control. The Soviet delegate
probably will continue to stress
the importance of the conces-
sions 'to the Western position
embodied in the plan his govern-
ment presented on 10 May 1955
and to insist that the sub-
committee should reach agree-
ment on force levels and the
timing of the prohibition on
the use of nuclear weapons as
the first step toward final
agreement.
The Russians still appear
confident that the plan they
advanced on 10 May has given
them a. strong advantage over
the Western powers and that
they ca.n maintain it indef-
initely. The Soviet dele-
gate may introduce amendments
ostensibly designed to widen
the possible area of agreement
with the West. For example,
he may announce that the USSR
is not irrevocably committed to
the .:orce levels in the Soviet
draft, and would be willing
to discuss modifications as
long as the West accepts the
principle of fixed reductions
as an integral part of a general
disarmament treaty which would
require a complete prohibition
of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet delegate may
also suggest that rockets and
missiles be prohibited along
with nuclear weapons. Premier
Bulganin told the Supreme Soviet
on 29 December that the USSR
favors outlawing "atomic and
hydrogen weapons and other
types of weapons for wars of
annihilation, including rocket
missiles which have been de-
veloped particularly over the
past five years and... are
becoming intercontinental
weapons."
As always, Soviet disarma-
ment policy is shaped to serve
broader political objectives.
For many years after World
rrd.r II, Moscow relied on the
simple demand for immediate pro-
hibition of atomic weapons and
a one-third reduction in armed
forces and armaments. The
first major shift in this
policy came in September 1954,
three months after France and
Britain had outlined a new
phased disarmament program
.which departed significantly
from past Western positions.
The USSR's acceptance of
this program as a, basis for a,
disarmament convention, an-
nounced by Vyshinsky in the UN
General Assembly on 30 September
1954, was clearly timed to coin-
cide with the crucial meeting
of the Western foreign min-
isters in London to devise a,
substitute to the EDC plan for
rearming West Germany, which
had been defeated by the French
assembly a month earlier.
This shift was aimed
directly at the French in the
hope that they would postpone
any action toward German re-
armament until they had ex-
plored the new Soviet dis-
armament position. The USSR
at that time accepted the
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concept of a two-phase program,
and, for the first time, agreed
that reductions of conventional
armaments should be initiated
prior to an unconditional re-
nunciation of the use of nuclear
weapons.
The next major Soviet dis-
armament plan was placed before
the UN Disarmament Subcommittee
meeting in London on 100Ma.y 1955,
five days after the final ra.ti-
fication of the Paris agreements
and West Germany's entry into
NATO. It was a vital component
of the new Soviet diplomatic
offensive launched last spring.
THE COMMUNIST PARTIES
The new Eulganin- Xhrushchev
foreign policy over the past
year seems to have been of little
help to the political fortunes
of the Communist parties of
Western Europe. In most coun-
tries the influence of tl a par-
ties has remained about the same
or slightly declined. Where
they have gained it has been
largely the result of indigenous
developments.
Communist capabilities
continue to vary widely from
country to country in Europe.
Communism remains a major polit-
ieal. force in France and in.
Italy; elsewhere in Western Eu:-
rope,, excepting Iceland, it is
Moscow then accepted the max-
imum levels for conventional
forces and the timing of the
ba.n on the use of nuclear
weapons proposed by the Western
powers on 8 March 1955.
The timing of Soviet dis-
armament moves suggests that
the Soviet leaders are less
interested in a formal enforce-
able disarmament agreement with
the West than in manipulating
world opinion in such a way as
to cause the curtailment of
Western military spending, the
reduction of armed forces, and
the weakening of NATO.
politically isolated, a minor
force in the councils of labor,
and. an instrument of question-
able value for the propagandiz-
ing of Soviet directives.
During most of the past year,
the Communists in Western Europe
have sought to align themselves
with the democratic left. In
doing so, they have acknowledged
the vitality of the anti-Commu-
nist opposition in most of these
countries and their own liability
derived-from Soviet aggressive-
ness during the Stalinist period.
Communist adjustment to the
concept of an East-West detente
was evidently not easy. In some
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countries there was
confusion in the rank4
and in Italy and Rmnce
particularly, there
was renewed dissension
within the party leader-
ship over party poli-
cies. The "class
struggle" theme was
re-emphasized, reflect
ing not only a desire
to reassert Communist
leadership among the
masses, but apparently
some fear as well that
the Communists might
become engulfed by
the non-Communist
left.
This pattern of
strength and weakness
reflects the extent to
which Communism in
Western Europe is in
basic respects an in---
WESTERN EUROPE - COMMUNIST PARTY STRENGTH
ESTIMATED
PARTY
MEMBERSHIP
VOTE POLLED
IN LAST
GENERAL ELECTION
FRANCE
ITALY
FINLAND
ICELAND
NETHERLANDS
AUSTRIA
NORWAY
SWEDEN
DENMARK
BELGIUM
300,000 5,519,495
Percent
of Total
1,800,000 6,120,709 22.6
40,000 417,000 21.7
1,000 12,422 16.5
40,000 328,571 6.1
40,000 228,228 5.2
8,000 90,422 5.1
30,000 164,000 4.3
16,000 93,824 4.3
14,000 184,098 3.5
607,000 2.2
33,144 .9
PARLIAMENTARY
REPRESENTATION
(Lower House)
Communist Percent
Date Seats of Total
1956 145a 24.4
1953 143b 24.2
1954 43c 21.5
1953 7 13.4
1952 6 8.0
1953 4 2.4
1953 3 2.0
1954 5 2.2
1953 8 4.4
1954 5 2.3
1955 4 2.0
1953 0 0
1955 0 0
a- Excluding 8 Progressist allies
b- Excluding 75 Nenni Socialist allies
c- Finnish People's Democratic League
digenous problem. As adjuncts
of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, the European Com-
munists appear to have been able
to produce only limited support
for the foreign policy goals of
the Soviet Union and to gain
only limited benefits from shifts
in Soviet policy, even when these
were in the direction of modera-
tion.
In those countries where
the economic and social griev-
ances of the people were exten-
sive, the Communist menace re-
mained a serious one. Where
a vigorous and responsible non-
Communist political leadership
directed its efforts to redress
these grievances, the Communist
menace was weakened.
During 1955, the French
Communists stressed two major
themes: that the progressive
"pauperization of the working
class" is the inevitable result
of a capitalist society and that
unity of action on the left is
the best way to a."popular
front," eventually to be led by
the Communists.
In both cases, the Commu-
nists were seeking broad left-
ist support to strengthen their
position in the 1956 elections
and to remove their party (PCF)
from its isolation in the Nation-
al Assembly and establish it as
the champion of the French work-
ing class.
Although the "unity of
action" theme had been stressed
intermittently for some time,
especially on the labor front,
concentration on its political
aspects came with Thorez' call
in May 1955 for a renewal of
"class war." The Communist-led
General Labor Confederation (CGT)
subsequently embarked on a broad,
militant strike program, the
early successes of which netted
the PCF renewed prestige. This
prestige was considerably dissi-
pated, however, when in September
the CGT rejected the generous con-
cessions offered by the Renault
management which were later ac-
cepted by non-Communist labor
elements.
As the national elections
approached, Thorez stepped up
his drive to increase the
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respectability of the PCF as
a political party. This drive
was aided when Premier Faure
accepted Communist support in
November In order to stay in
power. Moreover, although So-
cialist leadership prevailed,
nearly 40 percent of the dele-
gates at the late November So-
cialist congress voted in favor
of electoral alliances with the
Communists.
Communist expectations of
gaining parliamentary seats
from the split among the center
parties were borne out by the
election results. The party
suffered only a fractional de-
cline in its share of the total
vote and its appeal as the in-
strument of revolutionary change
apparently remained intact.
Having achieved an assembly
representation roughly commen-
surate with their electoral vote,
the Communists are now in a
strong position. So long as
the center remains divided, Com-
munist support of Mollet's Re-
publican Front government allows
the PCF to claim the de facto
existence of a "popular front."
At the same time, the party can
press the Socialists, who vie
for working-class support with
the PCF, to undertake reforms
which would split the Republican
Front.
Mollet has so far been
little dependent on Communist
votes because his economic
measures have been too moderate
to arouse widespread right-center
opposition; but the Communists
will probably try to force his
hand by demanding broad wage
hikes and more liberal social
security payments.
Italy.
In Italy, where 143 Com-
munist deputies and their 75
Nenni Socialist allies comprise
one third of the lower house of
parliament, the Communist Party
(PCI) has been unable to block
important government measures,
and its prestige declined dur-
ing 1955. In the midyear
regional elections in Sicily,
Communist votes were fewer than
in the general elections in
1953. Communist domination of
Italian labor also weakened
in 1955, with Communist-affili-
ated unions suffering losses
averaging about 12 percent in
the shop-steward elections.
In many plants, notably
the Fiat works, the Communists
lost their majority, and de-
fections from Communist-contlled
unions were more frequent.
The decline in Communist
fortunes revived dissension
within the Communist hierarchy.
In January, Vice Secretary
Pietro Secchia, a leading ad-
vocate of a more militant policy,
was demoted. Recently, there
have.been new reports of P "bit-
ter struggle" within the PCi
and the Communist-dominated
General Confederation of Labor,
whose secretary general has long
been considered "lukewarm" toward
exploiting the confederation for
purely political purposes.
Communist leaders have
reacted to these problems with
evident confusion. Although
the conciliatory policy long
advocated by Togliatti continued
to predominate in practice, the
party also invoked the theme
of class struggle, alleging that
even in a period of international
detente there was still a need
to call for revolutions. While
asking for a broad alliance, Commu-
nist leaders also attacked Chris-
tian Democrat "reformists" for
trying to beat the Communists
on their own ground by pressing
for speedy action on the govern-
ment's Vanoni plan and other
socio-economic reform programs.
The Vanoni plan does in
fact offer some threat of divid-
ing the Communists from their
Nenni Socialist allies, for
Nenni's endorsement of the plan
in principle suggests that it
would be difficult for him to
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8 March 1956
oppose in practice measures
which in the long run might
deprive the Communists of the
support they derive from the
economic grievances of the pop-
ulation.
West Germany and Austria
The Communists were clearly
on the defensive in West Germany
and Austria, where the anti-Com-
munist left is strong, the right
is united under vigorous leaders,
and there is a painful aware-
ness of Soviet imperialism and
the rigors of Soviet army occu-
pation.
In West Germany, Communist
policies were dominated by the
expectation that the courts would
soon announce in favor of the
government's long-pendin suit
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percent since the state treaty
was signed last June.
Circulation of the party
press has also declined, and
in local and provincial elec-
tions the Communist vote has
dropped in some cases as much
as 25 percent. The party has
been undergoing an internal re-
organization, and the Communist-
front election alliance, the
People's Opposition, has been
dissolved. Only Communist
strength in the former Soviet-
controlled enterprises in east-
ern Austria gives the govern-
ment any real concern.
Iceland and Finland
By exploiting xenophobia,
the ineffectiveness of the non-
Communist left, and a precarious
economic situation, the Ice-
landic Communists have been able
attain a unique position it
northern Europe. The party is
the third largest in the coun-
try and, with the help of the
left-wing Social Democrats, it
gained control of the Icelandic
Federation of Labor (IFL) in
November 1954.
In the meantime, overt ac-
tivities of the party were de-
voted to propaganda support of
the Communist line on German
reunification and to a vigor-
ous effort to 1.nr.rease Communist
influence in German -'.abor. The
success of the Communists in
fomenting strikes in Bremen and
Hamburg and in electing an abso-
lute majority to the works coun-
cil of a large Ruhr steel plant
in the fall spurred some unions
to take direct action against
Communist infiltration. In
later elections, in the Bremen
and Flensburg shipyards, Commu-
nist losses were severe.
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In Austria, the party seems
to be fighting a losing battle
in its efforts to retain the
advantages it enjoyed under the
occupation.
the drop in party
membership is as much as 50
Last spring, the Communists
played a leading role in a six-
week general strike, the infla-
tionary results of which have
placed a severe strain on the
governing coalition of Conserva-
tives and Progressives. Empha-
sizing national issues and soft-
pedaling their ties:. with Moscow,
the Communists are now promot-
ing a leftist coalition under
the aegis of the IFL. They agi-
tate particularly against the
American troops stationed at
the NATO air base of Keflavik.
In Finland, however, the
special considerations which
enhanced the Communist cause
in the immediate postwar period
have largely ceased to obtain,
and the party appears to have
gained no significant strength
as a result of the USSR's re-
turn of the Porkkala naval base.
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The Communists poll about
20 percent of the popular vote,
but this seems to reflect a
good deal of protest as well
as pro-Communist sentiment.
They have been pushing hard for
restoration of a common front
with the Social Democrats and
for representation in the govern-
ment--proposals which are repeat-
edly ignored. In the meantime,
the Social Democrats are making
progress in their efforts to
reduce the strong minority which
the Communists still have in the
trade union-movement.
Other Countries
In the other Scandinavian
countries, Britain and the
Benelux countries, the Communist
parties are all politically iso-
lated and reduced to hard-core
elements which try to infiltrate
the ranks of labor, slavishly
propagandize "favorable" turns
in Soviet foreign policy and
have difficulty in maintaining
their party press.
Both in Denmark and Sweden,
there have been frequent reports
of dissension among Communist
leaders. The Swedish Communists
have been unsuccessfully push-
ing united front tactics since
1953, even admitting the needs
at a December party convention
of a "reasonable" military pro-
gram in Sweden. Communist in-
fluence in the unions is largely
confined to the miners and forest
workers in the north, construc-
tion workers in Stockholm, and
the ship and dockyard employees
in Goteborg.
In Norway, the Communists
have had no success with united
front tactics directed at the
Labor Party, and in the October
local elections the Communists
received about the same share of
the popular vote as in the 1953
national elections.
The British Communist Party
contested only 17 of the 630
parliamentary seats at stake in
the 26 May general elections and
won none, polling a total vote
little greater than the party's
estimated membership. Efforts
to infiltrate the trade unions
achieved their first noteworthy
success in several years with
the election last December of a
Communist to the executive of
the Amalgamated Engineering Union.
Membership of the Belgian
Communist Party has continued to
decline, and the only Communist-
dominated labor union in Bel-
gium, the Syndicat Unique, dis-
integrated last fall. Party
membership in the Netherlands
is stable at an estimated 40,000,
and the Communist-controlled
Unity Trade Union Central had
no notable successes during 1955.
The capabilities of the
Swiss Communist Party, a negli-
gible political force, remained
stationary. On the Iberian Penin-
sula, Communist organizations are
illegal, are under strict sur-
veillance, and have virtually no
potential for subversive action
among the anti-Communist popu-
lations.
Prospects
In recent months, the
Soviet Union itself has seemed
to give increased recognition
to the problems faced by the
parties of Western Europe in
their efforts to give effective
local representation to the for-
eign policy objectives of the
USSR and at the same time gain
an effective voice in the forma-
tion of national policies.
The direct overtures the
Soviet Union has made to seven
of the thirteen Socialist par-
ties of Western Europe since
last fall seem intended both
to encourage Socialist support
for the foreign policy views
of Moscow on a variety of issues
and to overcome the suspicion
with which the European Social-
ists have greeted local Commu-
nist appeals for common fronts
and election alliances. The
doctrinal innovations proclaimed
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at the 20th Party Congress of
the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union--the attacks on
Stalinism and the proclamation
of a parliamentary route to Com-
munism--were directed also to
these ends.
It is too early to deter-
mine the effectiveness of these
maneuvers, although in come cases,
the direct overtures to the
Socialist parties have already
been spurned. The attitude taken
by the Council of the Socialist
International at its 2-4 March
meeting in Zurich suggests that
many Western Socialists remain
highly conscious of previous
experience with united fronts
both in their own countries and
in Eastern. Europe immediately
following the war. Moreover,
the Communists themselves have
historically found it difficult
to cope with the tactical prob-
lems of participating in a par-
liamentary system which they
are dedicated to destroy.
MAO TSE-TUNG AND THE COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLE
Mao Tse-tung and other
Chinese Communist leaders have
regularly endorsed the principle
of "collective leadership," but
Mao for many years has personally
led the Chinese Communist Party
and has personally controlled
its policy-in a way not very
different from Stalin's domina-
tion of the USSR. Mao's per-
sonal domination has been par-
ticularly evident in the past
year. Nevertheless.Mao's pro-
gram in China--that is, the Chi-
nese 'application" of Marxist-
Leninist doctrine--has continued
to be warmly praised by Soviet
leaders. Moreover, Soviet par-
ty leader Khrushchev's pragmat-
ic approach to ideology suggests
that he and Mao arc suited to
work well with one another.
The Chinese Communist Party
has always been committed in
theory to direction by party
organizations rather than by a
single leader. In fact, however,
the party's early years were
marked by a series of struggles
between individual leaders, with
Mao and Mao's policies emerging
triumphant in 1935, at which
time Mao's program was given
Soviet blessing. Having risen
to oower,much as Stalin did,
Mao since 1935 has dominated
his party much as Stalin con-
trolled the Soviet party, al-
though the Chinese leader has
apparently relied more on per-
suasion than on purges.
Khrushchev and Mao Tse-tung
at Peiping in October 1954
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8 March 1956
Chinese Communist pronounce-
ments endorsed the collective
leadership principle, without
great enthusiasm, during 1953
and 1954, and in 1954 Peiping
carried on a mild campaign for
the principle during the "party
unity" drive. The reorganiza-
tion of the government structure
in the fall of 1954 indeed
established the basis for a
collective leadership in the
government. Nevertheless Chi-
nese pronouncements and Chinese
practice continued to reflect
the fact of Mao's domination.
Since mid-1955 Mao has
publicly and emphatically as-
serted his personal leadership
of the Chinese Communist Party,
and, through the party, his
control of the government. In
this period Chinese Communist
spokesmen have been eulogizing
Mao in extreme terms much like
those employed in 1953, when
China was said to be entering
"the. era of Mao Tse-tung."
Special consideration for Mao
has continued despite the strong
reaffirmation of collective
leadership and denunciation of
"the cult of personality" at
the Soviet party congress last
month.
In July 1955 Mao personally
reversed a moderate line on the
collectivization of agriculture,
affirmed by the Chinese Commu-
nist Party central committee
and approved by the National
People's Congress only a few
days before Mao spoke. Mao,in
calling for a rapid speed-up
in agriculture, not only did not
follow the collective leadership
principle in so acting, but
seemed unconcerned about making
all other party leaders look
foolish on this issue. Mao
committed his own prestige so
heavily as to suggest the
possibility, for the first time,
that a resounding failure of
the line he had laid down
might threaten his dominance
of the party.
Evidently unperturbed by
this risk, Mao in November 1955
exhorted the All-China Federa-
tion of Industry and Commerce,
meeting at his instance, to
carry out a commensurate speed-
up in the socialization of in-
dustry. The transformation of
"capitalist" industry to joint
state-private industry had
moved only slowly in the 1949-
1955 period. Within two months
of Mao's address, according to
official pronouncements, private
industry in major cities had
been "transformed."
In December 1955, Mao an-
nounced flatly that the question
of the tempo of socialization
"has been settled," and in
January 1956 he predicted that
China's "socialist revolution"
could be completed "in the main"
in about three more years.
Premier Chou En-lai, following
up, said in January that "right-
leaning conservatism" in regard
to China's transition would be
the "central question" for con-
sideration by the Chinese
Communist Party Congress later
this year.
"Peaceful" Transition
Mao's theory that the
transition in China will be
"peaceful" in nature has been
claimed by Peiping as another
of Mao's "contributions" to
Marxist-Leninist doctrine. In
view of the current speed of
agricultural socialization,
which may encounter substantial
resistance, there is some ques-
tion as to whether the theory
fits the facts. Nevertheless,
a Peiping spokesman has recently
asserted that the "peaceful"
advance of Chinese capitalists
to socialism is "something that
has appeared for the first time
in the world."
Soviet Views
Since Stalin's death, So-
viet ideologists have at least
in part accepted Chinese claims
of Mao's eminence among living
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
8 March 1956
Communist greats by describing
him as a "strong Marxist theo-
retician" and his work as an
"enrichment" of a major "con-
tribution" to Marxist theory--
terms previously reserved for
Lenin and Stalin. The recent
Soviet party congress in effect
no-t4 need this practice, by
warmly praising Chinese "appli,-
catioj,," of Marxist-Leninist doc-
trine. Soviet leaders, how-
ever, in line with their em-
phasis on collective leadership,
for the most part modified
their praise of Mao by citing
the Chinese Communist Party
rather than Mao personally.
Khrushchev in his report
to the congress observed that
the Chinese Communist Party,
like other parties of the bloc,
had demonstrated in its domestic
program "creative Marxism in
anti-on." Similarly, party
secretary D. Ti Shepilov paid
tribute co the Cninese for a
"masterly application" of
Marxist doctrine.
The Chinese Communists
have not set themselves up as
original theorists on any queE.-
tion more ambitious than that
of the applicability of doctrine
to backward "semicolonial"
areas, such as China. They are
evidently prepared to accept
Khrushchev's revisions of Com-
munist dogmas on the inevi-
tability of war and the possi-
bility of a peaceful "transition
to socialism" in some countries.
The Chinese Communist Party's
official newspaper, People's
Daily, has already endorsed
rushchev's ideological points.
Mao and Khrushchev
While Khrushchev's newborn
pretensions as a Communist theo-
retician may in the long run
tend to lessen Mao's eminence
in the Communist world, Khrush-
chev's approach to ideology
suggests that he is the type of
leader with whom Mao should be
able to work very well for the
time being. A milestone in
Khrushchev's rise to power in
the USSR seems to have been his
trip to Peiping with Bulganin
and Mikoyan in the fall of 1954,
and he has consistently sup-
ported and endorsed Mao's
program in China.
The Soviet leader seems to
resemble Mao strongly in his
willingness to readjust dogma
to fit the changing needs of
basic strategy. Moreover,
both Khrushchev and Mao exhibit
great self-confidence, a bold-
ness of approach, a livelier
literary style than is customary
among Communists, and a willing-
ness to engage occasionally in
undignified personal behavior.
While nothing concrete is known
of their personal relationship,
such evidence as there is of
the men and their policies sug-
gests a cordial one.
Mao is expected to retain
his authority in shaping Chinese
Communist policy while contin-
uing to reduce his role in
routine party and government
affairs. He will almost cer-
tainly be re-elected, as the
party's top leader at the 1956
party congress.
Mao's frequent absences
from the public eye during 1955
may be explained in part by a
need for withdrawal to think
and write on major policy matters.
It also seems likely, as he is
62 and reported suffering from.
a variety of ailments, that he
is actually incapacitated from
time to time. For example, in
1954 he was "on holiday" for
three months, missed a major
party conference, and reappeared
looking thinner.
West.
25X1
Should. he die in the near
future, his power would probably
pass to a collegium including
Liu Shao-chi, who has seemed to
be his most trusted lieutenant
for many years, Premier Chou En-
lai and Defense Minister Pena
Teh-huai, both of whom have
gained considerably in power in
recent years, and a few other
figures less -well known in the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
JAPANESE INTEREST IN PROMOTING AN INDEPENDENT TAIWAN
Japanese leaders have long
maintained that the creation
of two Chinas offers the only
feasible solution for the pres-
ent impasse over the inter-
national status of Taiwan and
Communist China. They are in-
sistent that Taiwan must not
fall into Communist hands.
They fear this might occur sud-
denly, because of a collapse
of the Nationalist regime
through demoralization or the
death of Chiang Kai-shek. This
apprehension and the conviction
the an independent Taiwan would
be the most favorable solution
for Japanese interests are be-
hind the inclination of Japanese
leaders to favor a Taiwan in-
dependence movement.
Beginning of Movement
Embittered by the Chinese
Nationalist takeover at the end
of World War II and the Chiang
regime's maladministration, the
Taiwanese openly revolted in
February 1947. Many Taiwanese,
including most intellectual and
professional leaders, were
killed, and the surviving lead-
ers went abroad or underground
to form an independence move-
ment. The presence in nearby
Japan of more than 40,000 Over-
seas Chinese--19,000 of Taiwanese
origin--as well as mutual eco-
nomic and strategic interests,
inevitably involved Japan in
the Taiwan problem and made it
an appropriate headquarters for
the Taiwan independence move-
ment.
Although the movement's
leaders preferred Nationalist
to Communist domination, they
continued to work for independ-
ence, and by 1950 several organ-
izations sponsoring Taiwan auton-
omy had been formed in Japan.
Of these groups, the Taiwan
Democratic Independence Party,
led by Thomas Liao (LIAO Wen-i),
has emerged as the principal
promoter of Taiwan independence
in Japan
Japanese Doubt
It was apparent as soon
as it had regained its independ-
ence that Japan questioned the
durability of the Chinese
Nationalist government and the
value of establishing relations
with it. Some Japanese offi-
cials alleged that American
pressure compelled Tokyo to
conclude a peace treaty with
Taipei. The foreign minister
at that time, Okazaki, pub-
licly stated that Japan recog-
nized Nationalist sovereignty
only over territory controlled
by Taipei.
By 1952 the growing
strength of the Taiwan independ-
ence movement led American offi-
cials in Tokyo to expect unoffi-
cial Japanese support for the
movement, official aid being
barred by Tokyo's political
commitments to the Nationalists.
Japan Seeks Solution
Japan's desire for rela-
tions with Communist China, the
growing assertion of independ-
ence from the United States,
and the awareness of the po-
tential danger to Japan of the
explosive situation in the
Taiwan Strait are among the
factors prompting Tokyo to
seek a solution of the Taipei-
Peiping impasse. Influential
Japanese leaders have repeatedly
sought to determine whether the
recognition of two Chinas is to
become American policy. They
fear that both Washington and
Tokyo will be caught short by
an early collapse of the Chiang
Kai-shek regime.
A Foreign Ministry offi-
cial asserted in mid-February
that internal political dissen-
sion and a, deterioriating inter-
national position precluded the
continuation of the present Na.-
tiona.list leadership for more
than two years. In early December
1955, Foreign Minister Shigemitsu
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
suggested to Ambassador Allison
that a plebiscite be held on
Taiwan which the foreign minis-
ter believed would clearly show
that the islanders rejected
Communist rule. Shigemitsu
stressed that the anticipated
Taiwanese vote for autonomy
would strengthen the free
world's endeavor to prevent
Taiwan from becoming Communist.
Latest Moves
Subsequent events empha-
size the continued growth of
Japanese interest in Taiwan
independence. The Foreign
Ministry in mid-February appar-
ently leaked a. background paper
"Analysis of China" in an effort
to ascertain Washington policy,
to influence that policy toward
relaxing strategic trade con-
trols against the mainland,
and to persuade the United
States to support Taiwan auton-
omy.
The Japanese government
has rejected Chinese Nationalist
requests to restrict the activ-
ities of the Taiwan Democratic
Independence Party (TDIP). On
1 September 1955, the TDIP had
inaugurated a Provisional Na-
tional Congress of Taiwan and
on 28 February 1956 had formea
a "Democratic Taiwan Government."
In each case, the Japanese gov-
ernment maintained there was
no legal basis for it to take
any action against the party.
A Foreign Ministry official,
did, however, call in its lead-
er and told him "to take it
easy."
These actions and the
recurrent approaches to Ameri-
can representation by Japanese
officials on the two Chinas
problem and the status of Tai-
wan suggest that the Japanese
will continue to work for Tai-
wan autonomy as the solution to
this major Far East problem.
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