CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 19, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 26, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved,F r lease 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-0092007.-4
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
II CONFIpENT
AUT
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
NO CHANGE IN CLAS
,' DECLASSIFIED
COPY NO. .9
OCI NO. 0055/56
26 January 1956
DOCUMENT N0.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
III OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
SEC
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
25X1
 Approved ForR lease 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00927000700110001-4
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
USSR APPLIES NEW PRESSURE
TO NORTHERN, TIER STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 , r Page 1.
The USSR is bringing new diplomatic pressure to
bear on Turkey and Iran, key states in the northern tier
Baghdad pact grouping. These moves follow Soviet offers
of arms and economic assistance to the Arab states,
which apparently were a decisive factor in halting, at
least temporarily, further extension of the Baghdad pact.
The USSR is now trying to deal a frontal blow, crippling
the pact in spirit if not, in body.
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Border incidents continue on the Israeli-Egyptian
frontier. Israel reports it used "heavy artillery"
in countering alleged Egyptian attacks on border patrols
in the El Auja area. New truce arrangements for the El
Auja zone, the possibility that Syria will. release Israel
military prisoners, and Israel's apparently continuing
reassessment of its internal and external position
account for the relatively static conditions prevailing
MOLLET WILL ATTEMPT
TO FORM FRENCH GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
If French Socialist leader Guy Mollet succeeds in
forming a Republican Front government, it will probably
be with Communist backing. The Communists will then
be able to claim that a popular front has actually been
achieved. Right-center leaders (Faure-Pinay) have indi-
cated a willingness to tolerate a Republican Front
government, but they still demand that the Republican
Front disclaim acceptance of Communist support as a
prerequisite to their support.
~ONFIIfE1Nt x
Approved For-Release 2005/Q~
Wt-RDP79-00927 Q0700110001-4
SEC ET
/02/ : CIA-R
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005 DP79-00927A000700110001-4
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved Forplease 2005/Q?Et d&RDP79-009270700110001-4
26 January 1956
NOTES AND. COMMENTS
Soviet Bloc Activity in Africa: The.Soviet bloc's effort
to expand is economic and diplomatic influence in
Africa is continuing. There are reports of new
Soviet moves in Libya, Liberia, the Belgian Congo,
the Sudan and possibly Morocco. . . Page 1 25X1
Warsaw Pact Nations Meet: What is believed to be the
first session of the political committee of the
Warsaw pact since its creation last May is
scheduled to convene in Prague on 27 January. It
will probably enroll East Germany as a full mili-
tary partner and discuss long-range planning for
Soviet bloc defense production. F_ I . . Page 2 25X1
High-Level Chinese Delegation Tours Soviet Bloc: The
high-level Chinese delegation headed by Vice
Premier Marshal Chu Te touring the Satellites
has been enthusiastically received, particularly
in Prague and Budapest. American observers report
that the Chinese are receiving more attention than
comparable Soviet delegations. In general, the
Satellites' treatment of the Chinese suggests they
are following the Soviet line laid down last Feb-
ruary that the Communist camp is headed jointly
by the USSR and Communist China. I. . Page
25X1
Soviet Forces in Germany in Winter Training: Soviet
forces in Germany are conducting a normal winter
training program after completing the annual fall
rotation of incoming recruits and.outgoing dis-
chargees'in December. The rotation did not affect
Soviet ground strength in Germany which remains
at about 400,000. . . . . . . . . Page 3
Khrushchev's '.'New Lands" Speech: Khrushchev's recent
criticisms of the shortcomings of the "new lands"
development program do not indicate there will
be major modifications of that program. Most of
his criticisms were standard complaints directed
at perennial deficiencies and bureaucratic mis-
management in Soviet agriculture. Page 4 25X1
SECRET
ii
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For.Release 2005/ 1e T=RDP79-00920700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
Japanese-Soviet Negotiations: Top Japanese government
and party officials have discounted persistent
Tokyo rumors that Japan will compromise on the
territorial issue in order to reach a settlement
with the USSR. Despite strong popular support for
a firm Japanese position, however, Tokyo is likely
to compromise rather than let the talks fail.
Page 5
N. Korea N. Vietnam, Outer Mongolia Move for Recognition:
There' have' been' an increasing .riumbe.r.of Sino
Soviet bloc overtures in the last month aimed
at obtaining diplomatic recognition of North
Korea, North Vietnam and Outer Mongolia. So far,
the recognition of Outer Mongolia by India and
North Vietnam by Indonesia are the only instances
of recognition of these countries by non-Orbit
countries. I .. . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Peiping Accelerates Socialization: Communist China
is moving far more rapidly than scheduled in
early 1955 toward complete socialization of in-
dustry, commerce, and agriculture. The accel-
erated drive may add temporarily to China's
economic problems, and arouse widespread dis-
affection, but government controls over the
population are believed adequate to enforce the
program. . . . . . . . . . . . .
Madame Sun Yat-sen's "Goodwill" Tour: Peiping has
made Madame Sun Yat-sen 's visits to India and
Burma the occasion for reviving the concept
of a high-level conference of all Pacific powers.
Madame Sun Vat-sen's failure to comment on Indian-
Pakistani relations and her acceptance of Paki-
stan's invitation for a visit demonstrate: that'
the Chinese Communists apparently will not allow
past strong Communist criticisms of Pakistan
to interfere with their Policy of courting that
Page 7
country and other SEATO powers. . . Page 8 25X1
Indonesia: The moderate Masjumi party, which leads
the present Indonesian cabinet,has managed thus
far to keep the. government in office, but its
chairman, Natsir, faces an attempt, apparently
backed by President Sukarno and the Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU), to deprive him of party leadership.
His probable successor, Sukiman, would be less
likely to resist the extreme brand of nationalism
increasingly practiced by President Sukarno and
the National Party and supported by the Communists.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
SECRET
'iii
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Y Approved For ease 2005/09/,Q,fff DP79-009270 0700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
The Bombay Riots: New Delhi intervened for the first
t me on 23 January to bring to an end the week-
old rioting in Bombay and some other cities over
India?s most critical domestic political problem--
the linguistic states issue. The rioting will
probably die down in the near future and be
followed by political negotiations. This might
eventually lead to a decision not to divide Bombay.
E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
North Africa:
n Morocco, the nation-
aiists continue to express a desire for discussions
with American officials concerning US air bases.
. . . . . . . Page 12
Cyprus: Governor Harding returned to Cyprus on 25
January, following several days of discussions
in London, for talks with Archbishop Makarios.
Harding will tell Makarios that London is willing
to modify "objectionable language" in its formula
for a settlement, if the archbishop will agree
to denounce terrorism and co-operate in estab-
lisping self-government. The British seem confi-
dent, however, they can stamp out terrorism
whether Makarios agrees to co-operate or not.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 13
25X1
Monnet Marshaling Support for EURATOM Proposals: The
33 political and trade union leaders w o attended
the inaugural meeting of Jean Monnet's Action
Committee for a United States of Europe in Paris
on 17 and 18 January agreed to support parlia-
mentary resolutions which would pave the way for
the EURATOM (European atomic agency) plan. The
conference made a promising initial attack on the
current political obstacles facing the European
integration movement. I I . . . . . . . Page 13 25X1
Antitax Movements on Poujade Model in Italy and Greece:
The Pau adf -anti ax movement's success in the
French National Assembly elections of 2 January
has encouraged the formation of similar organi-
zations in Italy and Greece, and may lead to a
new extreme rightist movement in West Germany.
While the initiative seems in no case to have
come from Poujade, reports of existing or pro-
jected contacts between him and surviving elements
of the prewar extreme right suggest that efforts
may be made to foster and manipulate Poujadism in
their interest. I I . . . . . . . .-. Page 14
SECRET
iv
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For. Release 2005/00/,a,?,k4A*RDP79-009270700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THE EVE OF THE
2 O t PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The emergence of Party First Secretary N.S.
Khrushchev as the dominant figure in the Soviet party
presidium is probably the most significant of the
changes in the collective leadership in the three years
since Stalin's death. Group rule continues, however,
and policy is apparently still made in committee where
the other leaders exercise a moderating influence on
Khrushchev. Preparations for the 20th Party Congress in
February have been accompanied by political maneuvering
and personnel shifts-at the intermediate level.
25X1
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY SINCE STALIN'S DEATH . . . . Page 4
The reorganization of the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and a number of shifts in foreign
service personnel are the latest in a series of trans-
fers, appointments, and administrative realignments
which have taken place periodically since Stalin's
death. Assignments within the Sino-Soviet bloc are now
held primarily by party careerists turned diplomat,
while posts outside the bloc continue in the hands of
career diplomats. These changes appear to be aimed
primarily at making the Foreign Ministry a more effective
instrument of the Khrushchev-Bulganin diplomacy. They
may, however, be related to Foreign Minister Molotov's
public humbling in September, and it is possible that
many of the changes within the ministry since Stalin's
death have been the subject of controversy between
Molotov and the party leaders. 25X1
'PEIPING ACCELERATING ECONOMIC PROGRAM . . . . . . . Page
Many important upward revisions have recently been
made in Communist China's First Five-Year Plan, suggesting
that Peiping, as did the USSR, will complete its first
plan well ahead of schedule. The plan covers the period
1953 through 1957?. Plan goals for socialization of
farming, industry and commerce have already been achieved,
and industrial production during 1956 may approach the
plan target for 1957. Important elements of the
economic construction program are ahead of schedule, an
achievement partly due to strong Soviet and Satellite
SECRET
v
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved Forlease 2005/0?RDP79-0092700700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
technical and material support. Financing of the new
course will require continued emphasis on austerity, and
the program will continue to be faced by problems re-
sulting.from a severe shortage of technicians, overem-
phasis on quantity rather than quality, and passive re-
sistance by peasants to joining the co-operative
system.
CONFLICTS IN PAKISTAN. . . . . . Page 10
The ability of Pakistan's government to make
domestic decisions and to evolve a consistent foreign
policy is being reduced by ideological and political
conflicts which have arisen since East Pakistan re-
ceived a greater voice in government six months ago.
None of the warring political factions is yet strong
enough to overthrow Pakistan's present leadership, but
the prospect of the government's achieving stability
and of continuing its wholehearted co-operation. with
the West seems less assured than a year ago. Top
Pakistani officials are now emphasizing the advantages
of neutralism, possibly to promote additional American
aid and support.
THE UNREST IN SPAIN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
The past few months have been marked by wide-
spread public dissatisfaction in Spain over price
rises, by increasing dissension within the Falange,
and by signs of deep disillusionment with the regime
on the part of university students. There are indi-
cations that Franco is disturbed over the situation
and may attempt to deal with it by reshuffling his
25X1
SECRET
vi
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved For tease 2005/02/,1A.~G1P79-00927/00700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
USSR APPLIES NEW PRESSURE
TO NORTHERN TIER STATES
New Soviet diplomatic
moves toward Turkey and Iran
are aimed at convincing the
states along the USSR's south-
ern borders that their partici-
pation in the Western alliance
system is not necessary because
there is no Soviet threat.
The presence in the USSR
in early January of several
top-ranking Soviet diplomats
from Near Eastern posts sug-
gests that Moscow is carefully
co-ordinating its campaign
against the northern tier. The
Soviet ambassadors to Iran and
Turkey returned to their posts
on 19-20 January after an ab-
sence of approximately two and
one half months in the USSR.
Concurrently the appoint-
ment of a new Soviet ambassa-
dor to Pakistan, Ivan F. Shped-
ko, was announced on 19 January.
Shpedko has had considerable
diplomatic experience in the
area. He may bring offers
with him designed to take ad-
vantage of growing sentiment
in Pakistan that neutralism
pays better than alignment
with the Baghdad pact and
SEATO.
Soviet bloc offers of arms
and economic assistance to the
Arab states appear to have been
a decisive factor in causing
at least a temporary halt in
the extension of the Baghdad
pact. The success of that So-
viet campaign also set the
stage for a frontal diplomatic
drive on the members of the
pact, in which the USSR sees
its best chance to date of
crippling the spirit, if not
the body, of the pact.
Turkey
Although Turkey has sharply
rebuffed friendly Soviet over-
tures in the past, Moscow has
persisted in its efforts to
neutralize this keystone of
the Western alliance system in
the Middle East. Khrushchev
argued forcefully with the Turk-
ish ambassador in November
for an improvement in Soviet-
Turkish relations and admitted
that past Soviet policy toward:
Turkey was "an error."
"Northern Tier"
Arab League
26 JAN 1956
LEB,
ISR.I
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 5
 Approved For Flease 2005/02/'4A&GI,9-R~P79-00927Add00700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
In his Supreme Soviet
speech on 29 December, Khxush-
chev again admitted that some
part of the blame for the un-
favorable state of Soviet-
Turkish relations lay with the
USSR.
President Voroshilov went
out of his way on 10 January to
outline to the new Turkish am-
bassador the importance of good
relations between the two coun-
tries and repeated Khrushchev's
remark that the blame for un-
favorable Soviet-Turkish rela-
tions was not all on one side.
Unlike previous encounters be-
tween Soviet leaders and the
Turks, no reference was made
to Turkey's role in NATO. Voro-
shilov urged an improvement of
relations between the USSR and
Turkey independent of other
relationships. According to
President Baya.r, Voroshilov
also told the ambassador that
the USSR was willing to give
Turkey unlimited economic aid
"with no strings attached,"
and to help it out of its
present financial straits.
Baya.r said that the USSR
has stepped up its campaign
against the present Turkish
government through the distri-
bution of leaflets in principal
Turkish cities where there are
"large numbers of marginal work-
ers" who might be influenced
by Soviet propaganda. The leaf-
lets attack the pro-Western
policies of the government and
call upon the people to bring
about a. change.
Moscow probably-does not
expect the Turks to respond
favorably to its offers at this
time, but calculates that ulti-
mately Soviet "bargains" in
economic and financial assistance
will have some effect. Turkish
officials have voiced some con-
cern lest the Soviet offers, if
propagandized in Turkey, might
increase the power of opposition
elements.
While it is unlikely under
present conditions that the
Soviet offers will be given
any immediate consideration,
the Turkish government is ex-
ploiting them to expedite the
long-awaited loan from the Unit-
ed States.,
After a. brief period of
coolness following Iran's ad-
herence to the Baghdad pact,
Moscow is again pursuing a
policy of aggressive cajolery
aimed at encouraging Iran to
reappraise its military align-
ment with the West.
Hard on the heels of ex-
ceptionally cordial treatment
of the Iranian parliamentary
delegation in Moscow, Foreign
Minister Molotov on 13 January
attended an Iranian embassy
reception and told the Iranian
ambassador that if Iran is not
satisfied with the assurances
of nonaggression contained in
the 1927 Soviet-Iranian treaty,
it could be replaced by a four-
power guarantee of Iranian
neutrality. According to the
Iranian minister of foreign
affairs, Molotov stated that
the USSR would be happy to
participate in such a. guaran-
tee if Iran would withdraw from
the Baghdad pact.
SLCRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 5
 Approved For 41ease 2005/02 1R + I DP79-00927A400700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
Iranian officials fear
an increase of neutralist senti-
ment, unrest among the popula-
tion, and indecision in the
government if Moscow should
propagandize such an approach.
A Tehran newspaper has already
stated that the idea of a new
nonaggression treaty with the
Soviet Union has been mentioned
in Tehran political circles.
: :'It seems likely, in view:
of increasing Iranian economic
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
. Border incidents continue
on the Israeli-Egyptian fron-
tier. Israel reports it used
"heavy artillery" on the fron-
tier on 21 January in counter-
ing attacks on border patrols
in the El Auja area.
Incidents on the Egyptian-
Israeli frontier may be reduced
if Egypt and Israel observe
the new UN arrangements in the
El Auja zone. These call for
demarcation of the border and
the withdrawal of both Egyptian
and Israeli military forces
from the zone. UN secretary
general Hammarskjold obtained
Egyptian agreement to the ar-
rangements on 22 January. UN
truce supervisor General Burns
had earlier received a letter
from Israel "confirming" accept-
ance.
The Israelis claim that
the UN Security Council resolu-
tion of 19 January condemning
PART I
difficulties partly induced by
Soviet refusal to buy Iranian
rice, that the USSR will soon
propose revival of trade and
possibly some form of economic
assistance. In the unlikely
event that Moscow does not
soon follow through on the de-
marche in Moscow, the Shah's
trip to Moscow tentatively
scheduled for May may be the
occasion for further offers.
Israel for its attack on Syria
on 11-12 December failed to con-
sider the whole history of
Syrian-Israeli relations. A
long-standing thorn in these
relations may be removed, how-
ever, if, as seems likely, Syria
fulfills the UN request that
all Israeli military prisoners
be returned. The Syrian chief
of staff has indicated to the
American army attache that if
necessary he will do this on
his own initiative.
Passage of the UN resolu-
tion has brought renewed Is-
raeli efforts to press for arms
from the Western powers--mainly
the United States. It is proba-
ble that purchasing missions
have already been sent to likely
markets of supply. The Syrian
chief of staff told the Ameri-
can attache in Damascus he
believes Israel has an arms
purchasing mission in Prague,
but there is no confirmation
of this. A group of Israeli
army engineers--possibly a
SECRET
Approved For ReoJ IMMED/IAA/TE : IINTEREST-00927A0007001100 p0a1g-4e 3 of 5
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005/02ZDP79-00927QO 0700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
purchasing mission--is to leave
in early February for a three-
week visit to London and proba-
bly to Continental Europe.
Traditionally moderate
newspapers in Israel have re-
cently speculated along alarm-
ist lines concerning Israel's
course if the United States
refuses or delays approval of
its arms request. The American
embassy in Tel Aviv believes
these editorials may be part
of a propaganda effort to sup-
port Tel Aviv's pressure for aims..
The embassy also suggests this
press speculation may indicate
a growing conviction that Is-
rael may be required to adopt
measures stronger than in the
past. Thus far, however, there
has been no indication of in-
tent. to initiate full-scale
hostilities or another major
border attack, although a tough
MOLLET WILL ATTEMPT
TO FORM FRENCH GOVERNMENT
If French Socialist leader
Guy Mollet succeeds in forming
a Republican Front government,
it will probably be with Commu-
nist backing. The Communists
will then be able to claim that
a popular front has actually
been achieved.
Right-center leaders '(Faure-
Pinay)'.zave indicated a willing-
ness to tolerate a Republican
Front government, but they still
demand that the Republican Front
disclaim acceptance of Communist
support as a prerequisite to
their support. The Popular Re-
publican party (MRP) in particu-
lar would like to stay close to
the Socialists, not only to
thwart a popular front but to
posture on the frontier will
almost certainly be maintained.
The Israeli government may
be forced to pay more atten-
tion to its internal political
problems if the Progressive
Party carries out its threat
to resign from the present gov-
erning coalition over the long-
debated compromise on wage in-
creases.
vailing at present.
The Arab states, meanwhile,
also continue to be largely
preoccupied with their own in-
ternal problems. Consequently,
the new truce arrangements for-the
El Auja zone, the possibility
that Syria will release Israeli
military prisoners, and the
apparent continuation of Israel's
careful reassessment of its
current internal and external
position account for the rela-
tively static conditions pre-
protest its reputation for so-
cial liberalism.
Most parties to the right
of the Socialists, including
the Mendes-France Radicals,
are worried not only about a
popular front evolving from
Communist support of a Socialist
premier but also about joint
Communist-Socialist efforts to
abrogate the law permitting state
aid to church schools. There is
some speculation that to prevent
such a popular front the MRP will
be willing to offer Mollet its
support if he will make so forth-
right a statement on foreign
policy as to force the Communists
to qualify their support.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 5
25X1
 Approved For eease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927700110001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
The Republican Front is
experiencing difficulty in
distributing the prospective
cabinet posts within its own
camp. Mendes-France is report-
edly reluctant to accept the
over-all direction of economic
affairs including finance, and
wants instead the Foreign Min-
istry. Mollet reportedly feels
such a move might frighten the
'right-center, from which the
Republican Front will have to
get support for its foreign
policy. The Socialist leader
would prefer having a Radical
in the economic post to reassure
conservative deputies and busi-
ness interests.
The two leaders are also at
odds over other appointments.
Mollet is cool to Mendes-France's
wish to accommodate Mitterrand
of the Democratic Resistance
Union and Chaban-Delmas, the
Gaullist Social Republican lead-
er.
Although the Republican
Front thus faces considerable
difficulty in forming a govern-
ment, the need for rapid action, 25X1
particularly in regard to the Al-
gerian problem, is expect d
speed up the process.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 5
 -App oved.Eor- e~ease_ -nno, P79:-0Q927 0 0Z0D'1:10001
CUR RENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1,956
PART -II
Soviet Bloc Activity in Africa
The Soviet bloc's effort
to expand its economic and dip-
lomatic influence in Africa is
continuing. There are reports
of new Soviet moves in Libya,
the Sudan, Morocco, Liberia,
and the Belgian Congo.
While presenting his cre-
-'dentials to the king of Libya,
Soviet ambassador Generalov
offered to supply immediately
40,000 tons of wheat and spoke
of "unlimited" economic assist-
'ance, according to Prime Min-
ister Ben Ilalim. Generalov also
n' dicated to the Chairman of the
Libyan Petroleum Commission that
the USSR wishes to apply for an
oil concession in Libya, but
this subject has apparently not
been brought up officially.
with Egypt, which. regards those
countries as falling within its
sphere of influence. The re-
action of Libyan and Sudanese
leaders has not been unfavorable
to-bloc approaches, probably
because of their awareness of
the increased bargaining power
the offers will give them vis- 25X1
a-vis the United States.
Pen IIalim says he will
definitely limit the USSR to
normal diplomatic activities,
buut might be "most reluctantly
forced to accept" Soviet eco-
nomic aid, unless he has clear
eviCynce of support from his
Western allies.
Sudanese premier Azhari
publicly stated on 22 January
that his government had sent
delegations to Czechoslovakia
and other Eastern and, Western
European countries to shop for
arms. The Soviet bloc's eager-
ness to establish trade rela-
tions with the Sudan' and. ,Czech-
oslovakia's active role as arms
seller-to underdeveloped areas
make it likely that Azhari will
get very good terms from the
Communists.
It is probable that Moscow
has co-ordinated its moves in
Libya and the Sudan very closely
'SECRET
LIBERIA
The Soviet-Liberian nego-
tiations pressed by A. P. Volkov
at President Tubman's"_ inaugura-
tion have so far''resulted in a
j oi,nt commun iquue " and two notes
which, as interpreted by Moscow,
left an impression that an ex-
change of ambassadors was im-
minent. The American embassy
believes that this was the re-
sult-of naivete on the part of
Liberian drafters. Tubman on
24 January declared that the
legislature would not take ac-
tion on the Soviet proposal
during this session. The em-
bassy believes Tubman will re-
main firm.
BELGIAN CONGO
V. I. Avilov,., .the Soviet
ambassador to Belgium, told the
governor general of the Belgian
Congo during his current tour
there that the USSR, intends to
compete both. peacefully and
PART I I Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
NOTES AND COMMENTS PAGE 1 of15
 Approved For F, a ase 2005I ( 1e J-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
successfully in all markets,
and indicated Soviet interest
in establishing trade with the
Congo. Any economic agreements
involving the Congo would have
to be proposed in Brussels,
through the Belgium-Luxembourg
Warsaw Pact Nations Meet
What is believed to be the
first session of the political
committee of the Warsaw pact
since its creation last May is
scheduled to convene in Prague
on 27 January. It will probably
enroll East Germany as a full
military partner. The Soviet
regime has shown the importance
it attaches to this meeting by
including Foreign Minister
Molotov and Defense Minister
Zhukov in the Soviet delegation.
The assumption of full
responsibilities under the
Warsaw pact by East Germany is
possible now because of the
formalization of the East German
army on 20 January. Although
High-Level Chinese Delegation
Tours Soviet Bloc
The high-level Chinese
Communist delegation now tour-
ing the Satellites has been
enthusiastically received in
the various Satellite capitals,
particularly in Prague and
Budapest. The head of the dele-
gation,Marshal Chu Te, a famous
figure in the Chinese Communist
movement, is a politburo member
and vice premier.
The Chinese junket, which
is one of tk',,,: broadest under-
taken by high-level Chinese fig-
ures in several years, started
with a brief stop in Moscow on
economic union. According to
a Soviet official, the USSR
does not plan to open a con-
sulate in the Congo. It might
use the services of the Czech
consul in any commercial trans-
actions. (Con- 25X1
curred in by ORR)
East Germany was a signatory
of the pact in May 1955, it
was excluded from participation
in the Joint Command established
at that time.
The committee reportedly
will also discuss long-range
planning for Soviet bloc defense
production. It will probably
give guidance to the Council
for Economic Mutual Assistance
in the co-ordination of Satellite
economic plans. The Soviet
journal New Times has stated
that economic co-ordination of
Communist countries will be
"further strengthened in the
nearest future." 25X1
(Concurred in by ORR)
18 December and has included
official visits to Rumania,
East Germany, Hungary and Czech-
oslovakia. Chu Te attended the
Rumanian Second Party Congress
from 23 to 27 December and de-
livered a major speech which
was given wide coverage by the
Communist press, including the
Cominform journal. The group
participated in the birthday
celebration for East German
president Wilhelm Pieck in East
Berlin on 4 January and will be
represented at the meeting of
the Warsaw pact political com-
mittee which will convene in
SECRET
PART I I Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 2 of 15
 Approved For jase 2005/ CP4fV-RDP79-00927A0000700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
Prague on 27 January. A member
of the group, Marshal Nieh
Jung-chen, has been designated
as Communist China's official
observer at the meeting.
Official speeches and
press coverage in both Hungary
and Czechoslovakia stressed,
without specifically referring
to ties with Moscow, the signif-
icance of close economic and
cultural relations with Peiping.
The receptions accorded
the Chinese delegation in Buda-
pest and Prague have been
characterized by American offi-
cials as equal to and possibly
greater than the receptions
granted to comparable Soviet
delegations.
The delegation arrived
in Prague on 17 January and
for the next three days was
treated to a round of official
speeches, tours and state re-
ceptions. The American embassy
noted that the regime leader-
ship was "so busy looking after
the Chinese that when the new
Soviet ambassador arrived in
Prague, only second-or third-
Soviet Forces in Germany
In Winter Training
Soviet forces in Germany
are conducting a normal winter
training program after complet-
ing the annual fall rotation
of incoming recruits and out-
going dischargees. The rotation
did not affect Soviet ground
strength in Germany, which
remains at about 400,000.
. Infantry units have ap-
parently reached the inter-
PART II
stringers were at the airport
to meet him."
The embassy also commented
that a statement in a speech
given by Premier Siroky might
sound as if Czechoslovakia, put
Communist China "above the USSR
in importance to the bloc."
This apparent faux pas was cor-
rected the following day, how-
ever, when President Za.potocky
placed the friendship of China
"next" to that of the USSR.
The attention devoted to
the visiting Chinese by Prague
and Budapest is in harmony with
the Soviet line--introduced in
February 1955--that the Com-
munist camp is headed jointly
by the USSR and Communist China.
Although Soviet and Satellite
leaders have used this formula.
in referring to the leadership
of the Communist camp, the
Chinese Communists continue to
refer to the Communist camp as
headed by the USSR alone. Thus,
in his reply to Zapotocky, Chu
Te stated that Czechoslovakia
and Communist China are "equal
brothers" in the camp of
Socialism "headed by the USSR.."
mediate training pha,se--company
group exercises emphasizing
physical condition. A rein-
forced battalion conducted
exercises on January, a few
weeks earlier than is usual for
this type of field problem.
The rotation of rocket
launcher, field artillery, and
antiaircraft artillery units
from home stations to firing
SECRET
Approved For R Il,-~e~20Ap5~02C/oO~ C -RDP79-00927A0007001Page 3 of 15
25X1
 Approved For Lase 2005/01SECRDP79-00927700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
ranges has become. extensive.
Intensified artillery training
may be expected this winter
with the improved weapons
Khrushchev's "New Lands" Speech
Speaking on 21 January be-
fore a conference of Komsomol
members engaged in the "new
lands" program, Communist Party
first secretary Khrushchev
criticized bureaucratic mis-
management and called for great-
er efforts to raise the pro-
ductivi ty of agricultural labor.
brought in as part of the pro-
gram of improving field and
antiaircraft capabilities of
the Soviet forces in Germany.
F__ I
Khrushchev's criticisms
of the shortcomings of the
'tnew lands" development pro-
gram do not indicate there will
be major modifications of that
program. Most of his criti-
cisms were standard complaints
directed at perennial deficien
cies of. Soviet agriculture.
Main New Lands area
Areas of Secondary Consideration
SOVIET
NEW LANDS PROGRAM
SECRET
25X1
FAST I I Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 4 of 15-
 Approved For Lease 2005/02/SECRE 1P79-009270700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
Khrushchev's "suggestion"
that a part of the poor lands
having a high salt content and
too shallow topsoil be used for
animal husbandry was an inte-
gral part of the "new lands"
program as initially conceived.
In newly formed state farms,
such marginal lands were planned
to make up not more than 25
percent of the cultivated area.
In practice, however, the ini-
tial effort was devoted almost
exclusively to meeting the
goals for increasing the sown
area, and poorer soils now con-
stitute over half the total.
Since the effort to expand
the sown area is now nearly
complete, Khrushchev's sug-
gestion that mare effort be
put on livestock production
is timely but not a major
change.
Khrushchev also promised
a limited additional agricul-
tural expansion in eastern
Siberia and the Far East. He
described these areas in glow-
ing terms, 'hut his key state-
ment was, "W' shall not force
the development of work on fur-
ther reclamation of virgin land
in eastern Siberia and the Far.
East." During 1954 and 1955,
local reclamation projects, to
be com feted by 1955, were
Japanese-Soviet Negotiations
The Japanese and Soviet
negotiators, Matsumoto and Mal-
ik, gave no indications of will-
ingness to male early conces-'
sions when they resumed their
discussions in London on 17
January. In a barbed exchange
reiterating previous positions
on the prisoner-of-war issue
Matsumoto insisted that Japa-
nese -etainees be returned prior
to the sigaing of a ' treaty,
while Malik asserted that the
PART II
established in areas from Irkutsk
to Sakhalin, but these areas
were of seco l.rln. r consi(lr`,0")..
iii. t'..1:. `'new lands"program. Expan-
sion will apparently stay within
the limits set by the new Five-
Year Plan, under which land may
be reclaimed if great capital
investment is not required ,anr
if a good stable harvest can be
obtained.
Khrushchev's exhortations
to raise agricultural labor
productivity, especially in ani-
mal husbandry, reflect,- the
goals of the Sixth Five-Year
Plan, which calls for increases
in labor productivity of 73 p,---!r-
cent on' state farms and 100 per-
cent on collective faros, Such
rates of growth have never been
achieved in the past, but are
now necessary because of in-
creasing demands being placed
on the labor resources of the
USSR. Soviet agriculture has
been notoriously extravagant
in its use of labor, particulaLr-.
ly in animal husbandry, which
employs more than half the
agricultural labor force, and
in which.productivity is be-
lieved to be still below the
prewar level, 25X1
(Prepared by OR1
USSR, by offering to free all
prisoners after conclusion of
a treaty, was granting better
terms than the United States
gave at San Francisco.
Malik, obviously angered
by the Japanese statements and
confident of the strong Soviet
bargaining position, reminded
Matsumoto that Japan had surrer_-
dered unconditionally. 'ie im-
plied that Japan must cease
SECRET
Approved For Releg8$ Jg05I02DI1 : CIA RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
N Page 5 of 15
 Approved For,Jease 2005& ,1i-RDP79-00927 0700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
introducing artifical obstacles
in the negotiations and must
make concessions if the talks
are to succeed.
At their meeting on 24
January the negotiators, in an
article-by-article discussion
of the Japanese draft treaty,
agreed on noncontroversial
clauses and minor questions of
terminology but avoided dis-
cussion on territorial and
other disputed issues. A dis-
pute did arise, however, over
the Soviet demand for most-
favored-nation treatment, which
Matsumoto would not concede.
Such treatment would undercut
Japanese enforcement of the
embargo on the shipment of stra-
tegic materials to the USSR.
N. Korea, N. Vietnam, Outer
Mongolia, Move for RecognTITIon
There have been an in-
creasing number of Sino-Soviet
bloc overtures in the last
month aimed at obtaining diplo-
matic recognition of North
Korea, North Vietnam and Outer
Mongolia. So far, the recog-
nition of Outer Mongolia by
India and North Vietnam by
Indonesia, are the only instances
of recognition of these coun-
tries by non-Orbit countries.
Persistent Tokyo rumors
allege that Matsumoto is secret-
ly empowered to reach a compro-
mise settlement with the USSR,
perhaps by agreeing to the re-
turn of only one of the southern
Kuril islands which Japan claims.
These speculations have been
discounted by top officials of
the Foreign Ministry and the
ruling Democratic-Liberal
Party, and it appears likely
that Matsumoto will receive
strong popular support for firm-
ness on Japan's territorial de-
mands, as he has on the prisoner
issue. The Japanese government
is likely, however, to compro-?
mise rather than let the talks
fail if ultimately faced with
such a prospect.
25X1
25X1
To bolster the Soviet po-
sition supporting Outer Mongo-
lia's candidacy for membership
in the United Nations, the USSR
has lately permitted Outer Mongo-
lian officials to adopt a more
independent pose in inter-
national relations. The current
visit to New Delhi of Outer
SECRET
PART I I Approved For ReI TES AND /1COOMM NTSP79-00927A00070011 f~%164 6 of 15
 Approved For Iease 2005/WRgT-RDP79-00927AZP700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
Mongolia's ambassador to India,
who normally resides in Peiping,
marks the first time since 1925
that the USSR has permitted an
Outer Mongolian official to
engage in bilateral contacts
with any nation outside the
Communist bloc.
Efforts apparently are
being made to obtain recogni-
tion from the newly independ=
ent Sudan, whose loosely word-
ed replies to congratulatory
messages from all the Orbit
countries hinted at possible
recognition of Communist China,
North Korea, and East Germany.
The Viet Minh has indicated
its readiness to exchange dip-
lomatic representatives with
the Sudan, and North Korea has
Peiping Accelerates Socialization
Communist China is moving
far more rapidly than scheduled
in early 1955 toward complete
socialization of industry,
commerce and agriculture. All
private enterprises reportedly
have become joint state-private
enterprises in major Chinese
cities, including Peiping, Shang-
hai, Canton and Tientsin, which
were the principal remaining
strongholds of private capital.
Co-operative farming is far
ahead of original estimates
for this date.
"Socialism has fundamen-
tally replaced capitalism in
China," the Peiping People's
Daily concluded on 22 January.
Direct state or party control
appears to have been estab-
lished over nearly all eco-
nomic groups in China except
a minority of farmers and ped-
dlers and handicraft workers
in rural areas.
The Chinese Communists
have pushed socialization well
publicized a Sudanese note an-
ticipating "the most amicable
relations" between the Sudan
and North Korea.
date.
The recognition of Outer
Mongolia by India may set a
precedent for the recognition
of that country, and possibly
North Vietnam, by certain of the
Afro-Asian neutrals. Efforts
on behalf of North Korea are
less likely to prove fruitful,
however, in view of the UN de-
nunciations of North Korea in
connection with the Korean war.
Where efforts to obtain recog-
nition are unsuccessful, these
countries will presumably con-
tinue to stress commercial and
cultural ties, with an eye to
obtaining recognition at a later
beyond the Five-Year Plan goals
announced last July. Under the
original plan, only half the
private industrial firms were
"gradually" to become joint
state-private enterprises be-
tween 1952 and 1957. Similarly,
only one third of the peasants
were to be farming in co-opera-
tives by 1957.
Last summer, Peiping
actually scheduled an increase
in private retailing between
1954 and 1957, explaining that
state and co-operative commerce
had overextended itself. This
plan was abandoned after a
speech by Mao Tse-tung in
October and a party central
committee directive, both of
which urged acceleration of
socialization in cities. In
July, Mao had abandoned a
cautious schedule enunciated
in the Five-Year Plan by
sparking a mass drive toward
co-operative farming.
SECRET
Approved For Rele 2005A0h10 - - P79-00927A00070011100g01 7 of 15
25X1
 Approved For ease 2005/02/~tifPDP79-009270 0700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
There will be major prob-
lems of consolidation and ad-
ministration of the new joint
state-private enterprises and
co-operatives, although public
reaction to "socialist trans-
formation" probably will be
greater in rural areas than in
cities, where indirect controls
over capitalists have been strong
since the early days of the re-'
gime. The Peiping press is al-
ready discussing the next move
into the final stage of social-
ism, i.e., into collectives in
the countryside and state enter-
prises in the city. This is
apparently to be attempted dur-
ing the next two or three years.
No clear reason for this
important and unexpected speed-
up of socialization has emerged.
Mao insisted in a December
Madame Sun Yat-sen's
"Good-will" Tour
Madame Sun Yat-sen's recent
visits to India and Burma, fol-
lowing hard on the Bulganin-
Khrushchev tour of those coun-
tries, were apparently designed
to keep the initiative for
"peace" in Communist hands and
to expand contacts with all
countries receptive to Peiping's
advances.
Madame Sun's trip was an
anticlimax to the Bulganin-
Khrushchev visit, evoking "no
great enthusiasm" in India and
an embarrassingly small turnout
in Burma, according to officials
in both countries. Unlike the
Soviet leaders, Madame Sun
avoided making provocative
statements. Her failure to com-
ment on Soviet support for Indi-
an claims to Kashmir and her
acceptance of Pakistan's invi-
tation for a visit suggest that
statement that the leadership
had simply underestimated the
pressures and capabilities for
moving toward socialism and
for China's economic develop-
ment. Soviet advisers have
probably emphasized the diffi-
culties of state planning while
there is still a. sizable private
sector with capitalistic inter-
ests in. conflict with the
state's aim to monopolize all
profits.
The effects of the ac-
celerated program will be most
pronounced in the countryside,
where peasants have reacted by
selling off and killing farm
animals. The regime's controls
over the population, however,
are probably sufficient to en-
force the program.
25X1
I Prepared by ORR) 25X1
the Chinese Communists will not
allow past strong Communist
SECRET
Approved For Releas
ROTE 0 /10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 15
 Approved For Rase 2005/02/10,;dQff P79-00927A 700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
criticisms of Pakistan to inter-
fere with their policy of court-
ing that country and other SEATO
powers.
Madame Sun repeated Chou
En-lai's proposal of last year
for a high-level great-power
conference on Far Eastern prob-
lems and called for all Pacific
powers, including the United
States, to sign a "collective
peace pact" to replace existing
"antagonistic military blocs."
Indonesia
The moderate Masjumi-led
government coalition in Indo-
nesia, having survived the re-
cent withdrawal of two Moslem
parties from the cabinet, is
continuing its efforts to re-
main in office until the elect-
ed parliament is seated,.prob-
ably in April, Prime Minister
Harahap has announced that
Dutch-Indonesian negotiations--
the issue which sparked the
cabinet withdrawals--will be
continued.
The Masjumi's principal
reason for wanting to continue
in office at present is its
desire to influence the selec-
tion of some 20 appointive rep-
resentatives of racial minority
groups to the recently elected
.parliament. Should these rep-
resentatives vote with the Mas-
jumi, the party would probably
have a plurality in the new
parliament.
The Masjumi's success in
avoiding an immediate cabinet
.collapse as a result of the
withdrawal of the Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU) and the Islamic
League is a minor victory, how-
ever, when weighed against the
fact that the Masjumi is well
on the way toward isolation
PART II
Peiping's propaganda
continues to suggest that
it desires a general con-
ference only as an alternative
to a high-level American-Chi-
nese meeting, and Madame Sun's
proposal was probably in-
tended to probe Indian and
Burmese receptivity to the
idea of a general conference
on Far East problems, Thus
far, Indian and Burmese officials
have not indicated their views on
the proposal, I 25X1
from other Moslem parties. Its
chances for participation in
the next cabinet have been con-
siderably reduced. The Mas-
jumi also faces increasing in-
ternal disunity which appears
to be abetted by the NU and
probably by President Sukarno.
Leaders of the NU--the only
other large Moslem party--claim
they want to co-operate with
the Masjumi but probably can-
not do so as long as Natsir re-
tains chairmanship of that par-
ty. There are strong indica-
tions that the NU will back
an effort by the Masjumi deputy
chairman, Sukiman, either to
take over leadership of the par-
ty or to withdraw his sizable
faction.
Possibly as a move in this
direction, Sukiman told the press
on 24 January that he regarded
the government's negotiations
with the Dutch as a "national
tragedy" and would prefer not
to continue them.
Any change in the Masjumi
leadership or organization in
favor of Sukiman would probably
lead to greater Masjumi accom-
modation to the position of the
National Party, which won a
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 9 of 15
 Approved For upase 2005/02/~P79-00927A700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
plurality in the 1955 elections
and now leads the opposition.
Although an alliance between
Sukiman and the NU would theo-
retically strengthen conserva-
tive forces in Indonesia, it
The Bombay Riots
New Delhi intervened for
the first time on 23 January
to bring an end to the week-
old rioting in Bombay and some
other cities over India's most
critical domestic political
problem--the linguistic states
issue. The rioting will prob-
ably die down in the near fu-
ture and be followed by politi-
cal negotiations.
The seriousness of the
riots was indicated by, among
other things, the unusual. insults
hui -Led at Prime Minister Nehru.
Nonetheless, the strategy of
both the Bombay government and
New Delhi appears to have been
to let popular passions have
a relatively free hand in the
hope that they would wear them-
selves out. New Delhi is capa-
ble of taking drastic, effective
action to end such riots and
has done so in the past. It
apparently has been awaiting
the first signs of exhaustion
among Bombay rioters to step
in with full force.?
The Congress Party high
command announced on 23 Janu-
ary that the government would
not alter its decision at some
time in the future to divide
Bombay into three new states--
namely, Bombay City, Maharash-
tra, and Gujerat. This an-
nouncement will probably be
accepted as final by opponents
of the move.
Moreover, the Congress
Party's refusal to accept the
resignation of local officials
unless they simultaneously
would provide little resistance
to the extreme brand of nation-
alism increasingly evidenced by
Sukarno and the National Party
and supported by the Communists.
resign from the party itself
should greatly discourage this
form of protest against the
government's decision. Use of
Indian army troops for the first
time on 23 January also indi-
cates that New Delhi is now
prepared quickly to stamp out
further disturbances.
Indian Communists, who
have capitalized on the situa-
tion in Bombay by indulging in
their standard tactics of
throwing acid bombs and attack-
ing police stations and public
utilities, are probably not
strong enough effectively to
oppose the government's firm
new. actions.
Though it has been re-
ported that Communists were
directing the Bombay riots,
their part has; probably been
exaggerated by Congress Party
leaders anxious to discredit
the Communists following the
Bulganin-Khrushchev visit and
to hide the probability that
many rioters belonged to the
Congress Party. The rioting
on this same issue in Bombay
last November was apparently
inspired by Socialists and only
subsequently exploited by Com-
munists. Top Communist leaders
in Bombay are now under arrest.
The most important factor
likely to restore peace may be
the informal announcement on
23 January by the chief minis-
ters of West Bengal and Bihar
states of their agreement to
end boundary differences by
seeking to merge the two states
SECRET
Approved For Relea Sn5 D2fl 0 .0%~,NTS79-00927A000700110001-4
N Page 10 of 15.
25X1
 Approved Fc rease 2005/02i?1bICRDP79-00927A000700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
into a single unit. This polit-
ical maneuver, if accepted by
the people of the two states,
would make the merged state
the most populous and probably
the richest one in India, would
challenge Uttar Pradesh, now
holding first place, and would
be in strong contrast to the
division of Bombay into three
minor states with knotty ad-
ministrative and economic prob-
-_1 DAMA.j,
oa
PART II
INDIA
PROPOSED NEW STATES
Boundary proposed by the States' Reorganization
Commission
lems and with little political
influence.
Recognition of these facts
might lead Bombay's politicians
to reconsider their insistence
on their state's division and
to decide that they too should
favor a single, enlarged Bombay
state even more powerful than
the present one. This was the
recommendation originally made
Present boundary
a MILES 400
AN DAMAN
AND
NItOBAR IS.
(F. D.;
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 11 of 15
25X1
 Approved For R ease 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-009 00700110001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
by the States Reorganization
Commission in its report sub-
mitted last October, which was
later modified by the Congress
Party high command in response
to provincial protests.
Nehru and his government
would welcome a reunification
of Bombay, since this would fur-
ther decrease provincialism and
increase the spirit of national
.unity. Nehru has personally
opposed the division of India
along linguistic lines, and his
government approved it in 195
only in response to growing pop-
ular agitation. As shown by the
Congress Party's recent adoption
of Nehru's new proposal that
India eventually be divided in-
to only five regional groupings,
Nehru is still working to counter
the efforts of provincially mind-
ed divisive elements in the In-
dian population.
25X1
25X1
The death on 23 January of
Hadj Thami el Glaoui, the pro-
French pasha of Marrakech, does
not appear to have poli ticLLl
significance.
Isti.q,lal party offie.. als
continue to indicate publicly
and privately their desire for
governmental discussions of the
American air bases constr,,ictad.
under a 1950 US-French agreement.
The principal nationalist ob-
jective is to procure a financial
settlement with which to modern-
ize the Moroccan economy and
reduce the heavy trade deficit.
The Nationalists also seek the
renunciation of American extra-
territorial rights in Morocco
as well as all special privileges
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 12 of 15
 Approved Fo ase 2005102 U. 1RDP79-00927A 700110001-4
-SE mor-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January
enjoyed by foreign countries
under the 13-power Algeciras
Convention of 1906.
The most recent approach
concerning the bases was initi-
ated by Moroccan minister of
finance Abdelkader Benjelloun
in his capacity as secretary
general of Shoura, the rival
nationalist party. Denjelloun
sought an opportunity to dis-
cuss the bases with a "quali-
fied high American official."
He admitted that his objective
was American financial assist-
ance :end added that Moscow
Cyprus
Following several days of
discussions in London, Governor
Harding returned to Cyprus on
25 January for talks with
Archbishop Makarios which are
expecterd to be crucial. Hard-
ing plans to tell the archbish-
op that the substance of Lon-
don's formula for a Cyprus
settlement cannot be changed,
'b'ut that he will welcome fur-
ther talks using the formula
as a basis.
According to the- British
Foreign Office, Harding will
'tell Makarios that London will not
"be difficult" a mudi-
ficatiou Df objectionable
language in the formula if the
archbishop will agree to de-
nounce terrorism and co-operate
in establishing self-government.
The British apparently
distrust Iakarios and fear that
blonnet Marshaling Support
For EURATOM Proposals
The inaugural meeting of
Jean Monnet's Action Committee
for a United States of Europe
in Paris on 17 and 18 January
made a promising initial attack
on the current political ob-
stacles facing the European
.1956
has made both direct and-,.in-
direct offers'. of financial 'aid
to Morocco. HO said the Egyp-
tians have also hinted that
they are willing to help Morocco
financially. These claims are
believed to be exaggerated.
Benjellotn's approach
does not appear to have had the
backing of_either the Istiglal.
party or of the Moroccan arnvern
he might not live up to any
agreement. A, They seem anxious
to reach an early decision and
are confident they can stamp
out terrorism whether Makar ios
agrees to co-overate or not.
Makarios' acceptance of
the British formula may depend
on Harding's willingness to
make textual changes which
Makarios can use to convince
his followers that the British
recognition of self-,'etermination
is genuine, and on the arch-
bishop's own estimate of Brit-
ish ability to suppress unrest.
'integration movement.
The 33 committee members
at the meeting included such
prominent figures as French
Socialist Party leader Guy
Mallet, the secretary general
SECRET
25X1
25X1
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
PART II - NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 13 of 15
 Approved F r R lease 2005TE1CO-PIQ-RDP79-00900700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
of the Italian Christian Demo-
cratic Party, Amintore Fanfani,
and West German Socialist Par-
ty chairman Erich Ollenhauer.
They agreed unanimously to a
substantive program for Euro-
pean integration and to an
outline of political strategy.
In general, the Action
Committee's program is the one
approved in principle by the
foreign ministers of the six
European Coal-Steel Community
countries last June, but its
political strategy is to focus
for the present on EURATOM, the
plan for a European atomic a-
gency. Committee members will
try to get suitable parliamen-
tary resolutions passed at an
early date in an effort to guar-
antee that parliamentary major-
ities will be available to rat-
ify:the EURATOM treaties once
they have actually been nego-
tiated. By this device, and al-
so by attempting to influence
the form and content of the
treaties in the drafting stage,
they hope to avert another de-
bacle such as befell the EDC
treaty.
Monnet's activities on be-
half of EURATOM have, with some
exceptions, apparently been fa-
vored by most of the "pro-
Ant itax Movements on Poul ade
Mode : in Ita,.y and' Greece -
The Poujade antitax move-
ment's success in the French
National Assembly elections of
2 January has encouraged the
formation of similar organiza-
tions in Italy and Greece, and
may lead to a new extreme right-
ist movement in West Germany.
While the initiative seems in
no case to have come from Pou-
jade, reports of existing or
projected contacts between him
and surviving elements of the
European" government. leaders in
the CSC countries. In West Ger-
many, his apparent success in
getting the opposition Social
Democrats to support the project
is being recognized as a unique
achievement, possibly having
wider implications for future
West German foreign policy.
According to the American embassy
in Bonn, however,` some govern-
ment officials who have supported
EURATOM only as part of a general
movement toward European inte-
gration are concerned that Mon-
net has postpcned until ..pril. any
political action on the common
market proposals.
In Fiance, Monnet seams al-
so to have gained support for
EURATOM from elements of the new
National Assembly which are
widely separated on other issues.
The Republican Front press has
endorsed the atomic energy proj-.
ect, and an effort is reportedly
being made to have the assembly
take up at an early date the
Monnet committee's resolution
supporting it. The American
embassy in Paris has commented,
however, that the close associa-
tion of the Socialists with the
Monnet committee maybe lessening
the attractiveness of integra-
tion to onservative ele-
ments.
prewar extreme right suggest
that efforts may be made to
foster and manipulate Poujadism
in their interest.
Italy presents some of
the same conditions responsible
for the rise of Poujadism in
France and Poujade-type move-
ments have recently been re-
ported in Rome, Naples, Milan,
and Bologna. There is much dis-
content among small businessmen
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 14 of 15
 Approved Fo ase 2005/ i--RDP79-0092 A ,{}0700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
in Italy with the Segni govern-
ment's "interference" in pri-
vate enterprise, and evidence
of this was seen in the out-
bursts against cabinet repre-
sentatives at the Rome Conven-
tion of Small Industries last
week.
Prospects for an Italian
Poujadist movement will be
better indicated in local elec-
tions this spring. Poujadist
groups may be encouraged by
the success of the movement i'ri
France to run lists, particu-
larly in view of the growing
political vacuum on the right
caused by quarreling of mon-
archist and neo-fascist parties.
Poujade has reportedly
told an Italian press corre-
spondent that he plans to visit
Italy in the spring in connec-
tion with the formation of a
'"middle-class international."
While it is unlikely that
Poujade himself has as yet
formulated any long-range
project for international
organization of rightist middle-
class elements, he would pre=
sumably welcome foreign move-
ments of this type as strength-
ening prospects for his own
organization in France.
SECRET
In West Germany, Otto
Strasser, Nazi leader who
broke, with Hitler in a struggle
for power within the Nazi
party, is reported planning a
trip to France to meet Poujade
soon. Strasser returned to
Germany about a year ago and
has since tried to establish
an authoritarian-minded po-
litical following, but so far
with little success. Strasser
may hope that a Poujadist con-
nection would attract other
extreme right elements to his
support.
A Poujadist party has al-
ready been organized in Greece
and will present candidates in
the elections scheduled for
19 February. If this group
has an electoral success similar
to that of its French proto-
type, the small fascist organ-
izations which have been nurs-
ing cells in several European
cities may be emboldened to
seek broader support. The
French group, as soon as it
had demonstrated extensive
popular support, reportedly
began receiving substantial
financial backing, from well-
known World War II French col-
laborators. C
25X1
PART II Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 15 of 15
 Approved Fob- Reloease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-0092 O 0700110001-4
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY' SUMMARY
26 January 1956
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ON THE EVE OF THE 20th PARTY CONGRESS
The emergence of Party
First Secretary N. S. Khru-
shchev as the dominant figure
in the Soviet party presidium
is probably the most significant
of the many changes in the col-
lective leadership in the three
years since Stalin's death. On
the eve. of the 20th Party Con-
gress, Khrushchev's pre-eminence
is reflected by his ability to
control personnel appointments,
by the adoption and continuation
of major policies associated
prominently with him, and by
the gradually increasing defer-
ence accorded him by lesser
leaders.
Despite this show of
strength, collective leadership
will probably continue. The
other top members of the hier-
archy--Bulganin, Kaganovich,
and Mikoyan---appear to work
compatibly with Khrushchev, and
they occupy positions of great
importance in both the party
and government where their ex-
perience and ability are prob-
ably felt to be essential.
Therefore, while Khrushchev's
pre-eminence now appears to be
an accepted fact, the common
interests of those at the top
level may dictate that these
other leaders continue to serve
in capacities where they can
act as a moderating influence
on Khrushchev.
Khrushchev's Recent Gains
Since the demotion of
Malenkov, Khrushchev has pressed
steadily forward, seemingly
making decisions with increasing
confidence and sometimes arbi-
trariness, and apparently re-
ceiving little or no opposition,
even to his more dubious under-
takings. His daring policies,
presented with great persuasion,
have played no small part in his
political success. His really
solid gains, however, have been
made in securing the appointment
of his political associates to
positions which are likely to
carry a slot on the party's
central committee to be elected
at the congress in February.
Over a third of the old
central committee members have
died,,been purged or relegated
to lower jobs. . Their places:
on the new central committee
will probably be taken by the
men who have succeeded them in
their party or government work.
A significant number of the
new appointees were closely
associated with Khrushchev,
either when he was party boss
in the Ukraine or party first
secretary in Moscow oblast.
Others by their actions and
speeches appear to be loyal to
him and in accord with his
methods and policies.
Some of the more signifi-
cant appointments of Khrushchev
associates from the Ukraine
and Moscow are given.in the
table on page. 2. None of these
listed was on the last central
committee elected in October
1952; all may be expected to be
on the new central committee
elected in February.
Appointments made at the
July 1955 central committee
plenum have been generally in-
terpreted as a sign of Khru-
shchev's growing strength. They
undoubtedly strengthened loyal-
ties already existing and may
have created others. A. I.
Kirichenko, who along with M. A.
Suslov was made a member of the
party presidium, was associated
with Khrushchev in the Ukraine.
N. I. Belyayev, one of the new
secretaries elected at the plenum,
seems to have been astrong
supporter of Khrushchev's agri-
cultural policies, and D. T. Shepi-
lov, another new secretary, seems
equally a supporter of Khrushchev's
methods and policies in foreign
relations and a trusted emissary.
SECRET
PART I I I Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 1 of 13.
 Approved For Release 2005/02RIBgDP79-0092 A0 (A700110001-4
26 January 1956
Other Khrushchev associ-
ates and friends elected to
the central committee in 19,52
have received promotions. L..R.
Korniyets was named minister
of agricultural procurement
and 1. A. berov made chairman
of the Committee of State
Security. Z. T. Serdyuk was
promoted from oblast committee
secretary to be party boss in
Moldavia. It also seems likely
that Khrushchev's influence
figured in the promotion of
General A. A. Grechko, former
Kiev,military district command-
er, to marshal's rank.
The recall of L. G. Melni-
kovs closely associated with
thrushchev in the Ukraine since
1938, from the Soviet embassy
in Rumania to head the Ministry
of Construction of Coal Industry
Enterprises probably saved him
from losing his central commit-
tee membership.
The most recent indication
of Khrushchev's strength was
noted in the dismissal of A.
I. Niyazov, party boss of Uzbek-
istan. This action was taken
on zG ,iecember, presumably at
a special plenum of the Uzbek
central committee which followed
immediately the two-day visit of
Khrushchev and Bulganin to Uzbek-
istan on their return trip from
South Asia,
There have been several
other personnel shifts and signs
of maneuvering at the interme-
diate level, possibly in prepa-
ration-.for'the 20th Payty Con-
gress.
Position of the Other Leaders
As indicated above, Khru-
shchev does not seem to be
FORMER KHRUSHCHEV ASSOCIATES PROMOTED TO
PARTY OR GOVERNMENT JOBS THAT PROBABLY
CARRY A SLOT ON THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE
Deputy Chairmen, USSR Council of Ministers:
V. A. Kucherenko - also Chairman of the State
Committee for Construction
P. P. Lobanov - agriculture overlord in the
Council of Ministers
USSR Ministers:
1. K. Kozyulya - Urban & Rural Construction
V. V. Matskevich - Agriculture
USSR State Prosecutor:
R. A. Rudenko
Commander, Moscow Military District:
K. S. Moskalenko
Central Committee "Apparatus" Department Heads
V. M. Churayev - Party Organs for the RSFSR
N. P. Dudorov - Construction
V. P. Mylarshchikov - Agriculture for the RSFSR
Republic Party Bosses:
V. P. Mzhavanadze - Georgia
RSFSR Oblast and Krai First Secretaries:.
A. P. Kirilenko - Sverdlovsk Oblast
M. M. Stakhursky - Khabarovsk Krai
A. I. Struyev - Molotov Oblast
G. V. Yenyutin - Kamensk Oblast
facing strong opposition with-
in the presidium.
Bulganin, whom Khrushchev
nominated for the position of
chairman of the Council of Min-
isters, seems content to play
a supporting role, and a friend-
ly atmosphere seems to exist
between the two leaders.
Mikoyan appears to approve
fully of the current state of
affairs. He apparently took
over the reins of government
during the recent Khrushchev-
Bulganin trip to South Asia,
and there have been several
indications that Khrushchev and
Mikoyan are particularly close
to one another.
The position-,of Kaganovich
is less clearly defined, .partly
because he has been subjected..
to foreign scrutiny less often,
than some of._:the other. leaders.
In, fact, however,. he is. one of
the key economic experts for the
25X1
SECRET
PART II I Approved For e e 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
RNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 2 of 13
 Approved For Release 2005 NE&fs --RDP79-009270700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
regime. His speech at the revo-
lution anniversary celebration
on 6 November was a forceful ad-
vocacy of the policies of the
regime.
As for Molotov, he has been
relegated almost to the position
of an ideological deviationist,
whose future, both as foreign
minister and as a member of the
party presidium, would seem to
be considerably less than cer-
tain. Molotov's position also
suffers because there do not
appear to be any other "forces':'
within the party hierarchy to
support his "Stalinist" orien-
tation in foreign affairs. (See
Part III, p. 4)
Malenkov, of course, has
been demoted to second rank in
the government, and his once
powerful voice in the presid-
i im?. now .seems to. be all but.
silenced.
The other members of the
presidium do not seem to have
been included in the governing
collective.
The leadership has had to
cultivate.other:forces care-
fully lest they become dis-
affected. The army, for in-
stance, might logically harbor
dissident elements. Yet the
officer corps is probably in a
better position under Khrushchev
and Bulganin than it was under
Malenkov, both in respect to
budget allocations and to pres-
tige status. Marshal Zhukov,
undoubtedly the man to contend
with in the military, is prom-
inently associated with the
policies of the regime and with
the activities of the top lead-
ers. Marshal Konev, with ties
to Khrushchev, may have been
placed close to the center of
the military scene to protect
the politicians' best interests.
Weaknesses of the Leadership
Although the leadership
does not appear to be seriously
divided, it displays several
other weaknesses, not of a. crit-
ical nature, but possible sourc-
es of trouble in the future.,
control is gradually becoming
centered in fewer hands at
the top, and the leaders seem
reluctant to let younger men
fill the void within the party
hierarchy left by the elimina-
tion of Beria and the down-
grading of Malenkov and Molotov.
Thus, while vacancies in both
the presidium and secretariat
were filled at the July plenum
of the central committee, these
accretions did not broaden the
inner core.of leadership.
Another possible source of
weakness--impulsiveness in de-
cision making--stems in no
small part from Khrushchev's
own personality. He has spon-
sored, and the regime has adopt=
ed, uch ill-planned projec..s
as the corn-hog venture and the
new lands program. He has un-
necessarily offended influential
foreigners by his untimely re-
marks, and has caused the other
leaders to monitor his conver-
sations and censor his indis-
cretions in the press.
Some opposition within
the collective seems probable,
particularly since the leader
ship has permitted the members
it has discredited to retain
positions of importance. Signs
that this opposition may have
made itself felt have been sug-
gested by such developments as
the failure to replace Molotov,
the unexplained announcement
and subsequent denial that Mal-
enkov had been promoted to first
deputy chairman of the Council
of Ministers,.and the dispute
between Pravda, and Izvestia
over newspaper coverage of the
corn program. More recently,
passible signs of dissidence
have been noted in the post-
ponement of the Supreme Soviet
in December, and the recent
delay in convening several
republic parity congresses.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 3 of 13
 Approved F r Re ease 2005/(1T-RDP79-009?710700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
If, in fact, disaffected
elements have gotten together,
it seems likely that they would
decide to act promptly, either
to force a postponement in the
congress, itself, or to prevent
a Khrushchev "walk away" at
the congress-by focusing at-
tention, ahead of time, on some
dubious appects of his leader-
ship. Preparations for the
congress are now taking place
in a normal manner, however, and
the recently published draft
directives for the new Five-
Year Plan follow closely the
policies enunciated earlier in
speeches by Khrushchev and Bul-
ganin.
Conclusions
Group rule continues to
prevail. The top group of
leaders has decreased in size
and the "chairman" has become
significantly stronger. Policy,
however, apparently is still
being set. by committee. It
is also important to note that
Stalin-like adulation of
Khrushchev has not set in,
nor are there signs that it
is about to begin. The other
top members of the regime have
leading roles to play and they
seem satisfied with their lot
and confident about the future.
They seem increasingly sure of
themselves and their policies.
The party congress has been
ordered to convene in order.
to endorse these policies and
the leadership that has been
responsible for inaugurating
THE SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTRY SINCE STALIN'S DEATH
The Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs has recently
reorganized part of its head-
quarters staff in Moscow and
made a number of personnel
shifts both in Moscow and a-
broad. These changes are the
latest in a series of transfers,
appointments and administrative
realignments which have taken
place periodically since Stalin's
death in March 1953.
These moves seem to have
been aimed 'primarily,.at making
the Foreign Ministry a more ef-
fective instrument of Soviet
diplomacy and only secondarily,
if at all, at increasing the
political reliability of the
foreign service. The shifts
may be related, however, to
Foreign Minister Molotov's
public humbling and loss of
status last September. If so,
it is possible that many of the
changes within the ministry
since Stalin's death were op-
posed by Molotov and that further
institutional developments and
personnel shifts may take place.
Post-Stalin Developments
A drastic personnel shake-
up in the ten months following
Stalin's death affected almost
70 percent of the top Foreign
Ministry -positions. By 10 Jan-
uary 1956, only nine of the ap-
proximately 76 top men in the
ministry remained in positions
to which they had been appointed
prior to Stalin's death, and
many of the men assigned soon
thereafter had been moved to
other posts.
A new trend in personnel
assignments developed. Over,the
past 34 months, 20 former party
careerists turned diplomat were
brought into the ministry and
assigned to high-level posts.
Two of them, successively, head-
ed the ministry's press division;
a third is, possibly, head of
its personnel division; and the
,SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND. PERSPECTIVES Page 4 of 13
25X1
 Approved For Release 20CSfIC7REpA-RDP79-0090700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S;UMMARY
26 January 1956
other 17 were assigned to dip-
lomatic posts in Sino-Soviet
bloc countries. At the pres-
ent time the Soviet Union's
top diplomatic posts in all
Communist countries except
East Germany are held by these
ex-party careerists. Apparently
Foreign Ministry training is
considered less important in
Satellite relations than party
organizational, propaganda, and
industrial experience.
Simultaneously with the
influx of party men into the
ministry for work within the
bloc, steps were taken to re-
vitalize and improve the qual-
ity of diplomatic representa-
tion with non-Communist states
to which only traditionally
trained diplomats were assigned.
Furthermore, steps were taken
to increase the number and
prestige of diplomatic missions
maintained abroad. In March
1953 the USSR had 43 foreign.
missions--the UN mission, 28
embassies, and 14 legations;
now it has 48--the UN. mission,.
40 embassies, and 7 legations.
ALBANIA E
BULGARI--E
GREECE-
HUNGARY-E
RUMANIA-E
YUGOSLAVIA-E
SOUTHEAST ASIAN DE~IC-`
BURMA-E NORTH VIETN AIO
INDIA-E PAKISTAN-E
INDONESIA-E THAILAND-L
GEOGRAPHICAL DESK RESPONSIBILITIES
'SECRET
GREAT BRITAIN-E
NEW ZEALAND-L
CZECHOSLOVAKIA-E
POLAND-E
Recent Developments
Within the past two months
a sharp increase in personnel
transfers and assignments.has
taken place and a, reorganization
of two of the geographic divi-
sions of the ministry has been
carried out.
More high-level changes
have been effected in the min-
istry in the last two months
than in the preceding seven.
Heads of nine diplomatic mis-
sions (Ethiopia, Albania, New
Zealand, Lebanon, Uruguay, Egypt,
Thailand, Pakistan, and North
Vietnam) were removed. All of
them, except the charge in Uru-
guay, and the ambassador to
North Vietnam,. had held their
posts for two years or more.
The New Zealand post has not
yet been filled, but ambassadors
were appointed for the first
time to Libya and West Germany,
where diplomatic relations were
only recently established.
The new ambassadors to
Czechoslovakia. (post vacant.
25X1
PART I II Approved For Re %V g/0 j/ :1qft- jTI j7A000700110 p1a-g4e 5 of 13
 Approved FQrRelease 2005/sELDRErF-RDP79-009 00700110001-4
26 January 1956
since the transfer of N. P.
Firyubin to Yugoslavia iri Au-
gust), Albania, and North Viet-
nam are former high party of-
ficials turned diplomat. since
Stalin's death. I. T. Grishin,
the ambassador to Czechoslovakia,,
was party boss in the important
Stalingrad oblast; L. I. Krylov,
the ambassador to Albania, was
formerly party boss in Orel
Oblast; and M. V. Zimyanin,
the ambassador to North Vietnam,
USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(CHRONOLOGY OF RECENT CHANGES)
7 October 1955
F. 1. Baranenkov appointed Member of the Foreign
Ministry's Collegium
7 November 1955
5th European desk (Balkans) created and V. F.
Nikolayev appointed Acting Head
7 November 1955
Scandinavian Desk created and M. G. Gribanov
appointed Head,
21 November 1955
B. I. Karavayev replaced A. P. Korobochkin as
Minister to Ethjopia
22 November 1955
S.'S. Nemchina,promoted from Minister to
Ambassador to, Syria
26 November 1955
V. A. Zorin appointed Ambassador to West
Germany
6 December 1955
L. I. Krylov replaced K. D. Levychkin as
Ambassador fo;Albania
10 December 1955
I. T. Grishin appointed Ambassador to
Czechoslovakia
10 December 1955
N. I. Generalov released as Ambassador to
Australia (diplomatic relations had been broken on
23 April 1954} and Minister to New Zealand and
appointed Ambassador to Libya
x x
16 December 1955.
S. P. Kiktev re laced V. A. Belyayev as
Minister, to" Lebanon
23 December 1955
S. S. Mikbailov appointed Minister to Uruguay
31 December 1955
Ye. D. Kiselov replaced D. S. Solod as
Ambassador to Egypt
2 January 1956
P. K. Yermoshy promoted from Minister
to Ambassadorao Iceland
4 January 1956
I. N. Yakushlh,replaced F. P. Dolya as
Ambassador to
Thailand
19 January 1956
I. F. Shpedko re laced A. G. Stetsenko as
Ambassador to alcistan
20 January 1956
M. V. Zimyan n replaced A. A. Lavrishchev as
AmbassadortoTlVorth Vietnam
was formerly the second secre-
tary in Belorussia. These ap-
pointments continue the post-
Stalin policy of assigning for-
mer party officials as ambas-
sadors to Satellite counk..eies.
Another post-Stalin trend
furthered by recent diplomatic
action is that of upgrading mis-
sions. The legations in Ice-
land and Syria have both been
raised to embassies with the
subsequent promotion of the in-
cumbent chiefs of mission.. In
addition, relations with Uruguay
have been regularized by the
appointment of a minister. The
Uruguayan post had been held
by a, charge since N. V. Gorel-
kin was released in August 1952.
Organizational changes,
too, have been recently car-
ried out. The Third and Fourth
European Divisions (geographic
desks) in the ministry's Mos-
cow offices were reorganized
in late October or November.
This reorganization resulted
in the re-creation of the old
Fifth European Division as
the Scandinavian Countries Divi-
sion and the old Balkan Countries
Division as a. new Fifth European
Division. The old Fifth Euro
pean.and.the Balkan Countries
Divisions had been merged into
the Third and Fourth European
Divisions, respectively, shortly
after Stalin's death in March
1953. The heads of the newly
created divisions were both
formerly deputy division heads.
Conclusions
Taken individually, the
current transfers and appoint-
ments appear to be consistent
with personnel policies followed
within the ministry since Sta-
lin's death and therefore appear
to have only routine signifi-
-canoe. The large number of
changes in such a short period
of time, however, suggest the
possibility that more is in-
volved. Some of the shifts may
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 6 of 13
 Approved Fq4JRe
2005/.SEREIT-RDP79-009Q0700110001-4
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
have been the subject
of controversy between
Molotov and Khrushchev
or Bulganin, with Molo-
tov's humbling in Sep-
tember an incident in
a battle over decisive
action on transfers
and assignments, favored
by the party leaders.
The -key to any
connection between
the recent personnel
shifts and Molotov's
difficulties might be
found in the appoint-
ment early in October
1955 of a former de-
partment head of the
Communist Party cen-
tral committee, F. I.
Barenenkov, to the
Collegium of the For-
eign Ministry. The
collegium is chaired
by Molotov and has
as its members the
deputy foreign minis-
USSR MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Minister
V. M. Molotov
1st Deputy Minister
A. A. Gromyko
Deputy Minister
N. T. Fedorenko
1st Deputy Minister
V. V. Kuznetsov
Deputy Minister
V. S. Semyonov
Collegium Member
F. I. Baranenkov
Collegium Member
S. P. Kozyrev
Protocol
F. F. Molochkov
Treaty & Legal
.G. I. Tunkin
Press
L. F. Ilyichev
Consular
A. P. Vlasov
Economic
--------------
Administrative
S. P. Kozyrev
r--_ Persannel
ters and a "number of other im-
portant chiefs," all appointed
by the Council of Ministers.
It advises the minister and its
members have the right of appeal
to the Council of Ministers
if they disagree with any of
the minister's decisions. Baren-
kov has a background of per-
sonnel work in the apparatus
of the party's central committee
and may have been transferred to
the ministry to oversee person-
nel administration for the
Khrushchev-Bulganin group.
Collegium Member
L. F. Ilyichev
Colleglum Member
S. K. Tsarapkin
Collegium Member
M. A. Kostylev
International
Organizations
S. K. Tsarapkin
1st European
A. A. Arutyunyan
3rd European
S. G. Lapin
5th European
V. F. Nikolayev*
Near & Middle
East Countries
G. T. Zaitsev
American
Countries
A. A. Soldatov
2nd European
V. Ya. Yerofeyev
4th European
Scandinavian
Countries
M. G. Gribanov
Southeast Asia
B. M. Voikov
Far Eastern
I. F. Kurdyukov
The continued reliance
on career diplomats for posts
outside the bloc, however, indi-
cates that Khrushchev and his
associates, despite their ob-
vious impatience with diplomats
and traditional diplomacy, still
feel that formal missions to
non-Communist countries should
be headed by professional diplo-
ma.ts. The top Soviet leaders
may be expected,. however, to
bypass these career diplomats
in the future as in the past by
means of special missions when-
ever they feel Soviet aims could
be furthered. in .tha.t way.
PEIPING ACCELERATING ECONOMIC PROGRAM
Many important upward re-
visions have recently been made
in Communist China's First Five-
Year Plan, suggesting that Pei-
ping, like the USSR, will com-
plete its first plan well ahead
of schedule. The final draft
of the plan, covering the period
1953 through 1957, was completed
only last year. Its success is
dependent on continued support
from the Soviet bloc, which is
providing thousands of technic
cia.ns and essential. capital
equipment on a priority basis.
Mao Tse-tung set a, new
course::for 1956 in late Decem-.
tier when he stated that the par-
ty and the country should turn
their full attention from ques-
tions of the speed of "social-
ist transformation"--which have
now been settled--to problems
of economic development--agri-
cultural and i:ndus:tnial
SECRET
United Nations
40 Embassies
7 Legations
---Presumed to exist
*Acting Head
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700110001-4
PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 7 of 13
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY .SUMMARY
26 January 1956
production, construction, com-
merce, and economic aspects
of scientific, cultural, edu-
cational and health work. Ac-
cording to Mao, "rightist con-
servatism" about these prob-
lems is still "doing mischief"
and Five-Year Plan goals "should
no longer be taken completely
i.n the:mann.erorigina.lly planned,"
but, "should be approp
ria_tely expanded and acceler-
ated. f,I
' Five-Year Plan goals for
the socialization of agricul-
ture, industry and commerce
have already been achieved, two
years ahead of schedule.
announced that 1957 production
targets will be approximated
during 1956. The electric pow-
er industry presumably has sim-
ilar plans in order to meet
new demands.
The single most important
enterprise under the Ministry
of Heavy Industry--the Anshan
steel combine--plans to reach
1957 production targets during
1956 with an increase over the
1955 plan of 109 percent for
steel ingot and 74 percent for
rolled steel products. The 1957
target is to be reached or ex-
ceeded in 1956 in the output
of steam turbines, generators,
lathes, diesel engines, elec-
tric motors, mining
equipment, locomotives
and rolling stock.
COMMUNIST CHINA
ACTUAL VERSUS PLANNED GROWTH OF FARM CO-OPERATIVES
Percent 26 JANUARY 1956
Approved Fiease 2005/(BCff-RDP79-00900700110001-4
1
100
,
? ^ ^ - ORIGINAL FIVE YEAR PLAN
ACTUAL
00
. CURRENTLY PROJECTED
00
00
MID
1954
MID
1955
MID
1956
Production
The outlook is good for
industrial production during
1956 to rise by perhaps 20 per-
cent over 1955, approaching the
Five-Year Plan target of dou-
bling the 1952 level of output.
The bumper 1955 crops provided
unexpectedly large quantities
of agricultural raw materials
for the important textile and
other industries that process
agricultural products. More-
over, many new factories will
begin operating during 1956.
The Ministries of Heavy
Industry, First Machine Build-
ing, Petroleum, and Coal have
MID
1957
In agriculture,
on the other hand, the
regime has set un-
realistic targets for
1956, calling for an
increase in foodstuffs
production of 9 percent'
above the 1955 har-
vests--which were good
as a result of favor-
able weather--or 3 per-
cent above the orig-
inal target for 1957.
Even if weather con-
ditions are as favor-
able in 1956, this
target would be over-
optimistic. The gov-
ernment has only limit-
ed programs to expand acreage and
fertilizer supply. The recent
mass formation of co-operatives
has disorganized farming, and
peasants have reacted to recent
policies of the regime by sell-
ing and slaughtering livestock,
possibly resulting in a serious
reduction of farm animals.
Construction
The construction program
was lagging last year but will
more than catch up in 1956 if
Peiping achieves its announced
plan to increase state invest-
ment in capital construction by
50 percent over 1955.
'SECRET
PART III Approved For Rp Ip I3jff0p i3L?e M 27A00070011BO014
age 8 of 13
 Approved Forjase 2005/Q5jfCDP79-00927k
0qP700110001-4
,Q
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
26 January 1956
The over-all, five-year in-
vestment program of $18 billion
(at the official rate of ex-
change) has not been greatly en-
larged but its emphasis has
shifted, with further reductions
of nonproductive investments
like housing and major expansion
of mlans for basic economic ac-
ti.vities such as_Lransportation,
the electric power industry, and
geological surveys.
The plan target for 2,500
miles of new railroads is to be
met during 1956, more than a
year ahead of schedule, and the
goal of building and restoring
14,000 miles of new highways
had already been reached by the
end of 1955.
Much of this
construction supports
an accelerated program
to open up resources
of Western areas of
China, which have been
populated mainly by
nomadic minority peo-
ples. Expansion of
communications in the
coastal areas opposite
Formosa has also been
accelerated, primarily
to increase the Commu-
nists' military capa-.
bilities in that area.
The electric pow-
er industry expects
to exceed its original
construction plan for
1956 by 20 percent,
in order to meet unex-
pected industrial de-
mands for power. Qlbse
Soviet suppotxt"' Tr
this revision in the
construction program
has been necessary be
cause nearly all of
the 2,000,000 kilowatts:
of generating equip-
ment to have been added
to the industry during
the plan period was to
have been of bloc manu-
facture.
PART I I I
Also ahead of schedule,
according to Peiping,. are three
of its largest industrial con-
struction projects: the Anshan
steel combine, its first truck
factory--at Changchun, and the
first tractor factory--at Loyang.
These projects are designed and
built under Soviet supervision.
The Anshan combine plans to com-
plete all construction work
scheduled under the original
plan three to six months before
the end of 1957. The vehicle
factory, which under the orig-
inal plan was to begin produc-
ing in 1957--eventually annual
capacity to be 30,000 trucks--
is now scheduled to produce
its first vehicles in October of
this year.
Major Projects in Communist ,China
Under Construction
Under the First Five-Year Plan
IRON ANO SiflL
~ ELE