CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700080001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 35
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 30, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: January 5, 1956
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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COPY NO. 1
OCI NO. 0052/56
5 January 1956
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CURRENT
DOCUMENT NO. _
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CED TO: TS S
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
CONFIDWMAk'
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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5 January 1956
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
FRENCH ELECTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The three-way split in the new French national assembly
resulting from enlarged Communist representation on the left,
the new Poujadist bloc on the extreme right, and a weakened and
divided center, leaves little possibility of achieving a stable
coalition government. The Algerian problem will probably force
the center parties--the Faure-Pinay and Mendes-France groups--
to find some compromise on which to base a coalition before the
assembly convenes on 19 January. Any new government would probably
find itself in the position of having to`seek a new majority in
the assembly on each major issue. F__ I 25X1
BULGANIN'S AND KHRUSHCHEV'S
YEAR-END SPEECHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The confident statements made by the Soviet leaders at year's
end reflected the belief that the Bulganin-Khrushcbev foreign
policies achieved their goals in 1955,,and that the USSR is in a
favorable position militarily, economically, and in its foreign
relations to compete effectively with the West in international
power politics. They stressed the importance of the Egyptian-led
group of Arab states which they regard as an expanding nucleus
of "neutralism," and implied that a de facto alliance of Moscow,
Peiping and New Delhi would, as Lenin had suggested, largely
determine the fate of mankind. 25X1
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Arab-Israeli border activity during the past week was confined
mainly to sporadic firing across the frontiers in the Gaza area.
JORDAN AND THE BAGHDAD PACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page
Jordan is unlikely to Join the Baghdad Dact
co,
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5 January 1956
INDONESIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . Page 6
The Indonesian cabinet has only temporarily warded off the
danger that it may collapse over the current Dutch-Indonesian
talks. Should the discussions show no positive results within the
next week, the cabinet will again be subjected to serious crit-
icism both from within its'own ranks and from President Sukarno
and the opposition parties. The Masjumi party is reported ready
to compromise "in every possible way" in order to stay,in office
until the newly elected parliament is seated in spring, and there
is a possibility that the pro-Western foreign minis be
dropped from the cabinet. 25X1
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet Bloc Relations With Greece: The USSR and its European
Sate tes in recent months-have been making efforts to
improve their relations with Greece and encourage it to
follow a neutralist policy in foreign affairs. Moscow's
immediate aim is to exert enough influence in the Greek
elections, scheduled for February, to seat a government in
Athens that would agree to closer ties with the Soviet bloc.
It has been reported that prior to the election, the USSR
plans to offer subs economic aid to
25X1 Greece. . . . . . Page L
Rumanian Party Congress: The first of the new five-year plans
of the Soviet bloc to be spelled out in detail, the Rumanian
Second Five-Year Plan (1956-1960), was presented to the second
Rumanian party congress in Bucharest 23-28 December. The
plan continues the First Five-Year` Plan,'s _emphasis on.capital
goods production and also calls for a sharp increase in farm
collectivization. Other Satellite plans,to be announced
shortly, will probably follow the same principles. The
congress also confirmed the stability of the party leadership
but stressed the need ty'discipline.
25X1 F_ I . . . . . . . . . . Page l
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Brazilian President-elect's Visit to the US and Europe: Brazilian 25X1
President-elect Kubitscbek's visit to the United States and
Western Europe is intended to "call the world's Brazil as an investment "
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5 January 1956
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Berlin Situation: The USSR is continuing to act with caution
In restricting Allied access to Berlin. East German author-
ities have not recently interfered with freight shipments
between West Germany and West Berlin, but some new restric=-
tions have been imposed on'intersector-border crossings.
25X1 . . ... . . . . . Page 4
Austria: If Austria's two coalition parties cannot resolve the
current deadlock on economic issues, they may agree to ad-
vance the date of the'elections which had been tentatively
schedh.led -for October.' Neither 'art v can ithout
25X1 the other. Page 5
North Korea: The North Korean assembly in late December enacted a
roa egislative program to counter widespread apathy toward
the economic development program of the regime and toward
increased formation of farm co-operatives. Principal measures
were reduced income taxes for urban'worke
Communist China Challenges Rhee Line: Peiping radio's declaration
. . . . . . . . . < Page 5
taxes and production' quotas for farmers.
on 27 December that bO ChI se people would protect the
25X1
rights of all nations' fishermen on the high seas increases
the possibility of further incidents between the South Korean
coast guard and the Chinese Communists in the Yellow Sea
fishing grounds. The declaration amounts to an informal
offer to protect Japanese fishermen against South Korean
interference on the high'seas with the "Rhee line."
25X1 I I. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Chinese Communist Party Enrollment: The Chinese Communist Party
now is estimated to have around 8,000,000 members, as compared
with an official membership of 6,500,000 at the end of 1953.
Such an enrollment would make the Chinese party about as
large as the Soviet Communist Party.
South Vietnam: Elections for a national assembly in South Vietnam,
originally planned for January or early February, will be
postponed at least for a few weeks. The government is still
making efforts to ensure the election of an assembly that
it Will control. Viet Minh propaganda co s to denounce.
25X1 the elections. I I . . . Page 7
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5 January 1956
Cambodia: Prince Sihanouk has temporarily given up his post as
prime minister, and a struggle for power among his adherents
has begun as a result. At the same time, Cambodia is viewing
sympathetically a Soviet bid to establish diplomatic rela-
tions, and-Sihanouk apparently wants to vi it Communist
China soon. TO . . . . Page S
Laos: Latest returns from the 25 December elections show Prime
Minister Katay's Progressive Party considerably strengthened
and the Independent Party, the second member in the coalition
government, somewhat weakpr.pd. Katay may drop the Inde-
pendents and form a new government with the support of minor-
ity parties, including the small National Union Party, headed
by the anti-American Bong Souvannouvong.
Finnish Presidential Election: Finland goes to the polls on
16 aana 17 January to select 300 presidential electors. Since
no single political party is expected to win a majority of
electors, considerable maneuvering will probably precede the
actual selection of the president on 15 February. The chances:.
of any but a candidate sympathetic toward the West being
elected are slim, and any new president'. will probably seek
to strengthen the country's ties with the West, while still
recognizing the necessity of maintaining good relations
25X1
with the Soviet Union.
Chile: Chilean labor has called a general strike for 9 Jan-
uary in protest against the Ibanez administration's bill
to control wages and freeze prices which was passed by Con-
gress on 4 January. The 15,000 copper ,workers, who stopped
work on 14'December in a separate dispute. have'for thQ mn_t
par-c agrees to_ return to, work . 5 Page 12 25X1
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5 January 1956
THE NEW MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN COMMUNIST CHINA . . . . . . Page 1
Power in the Chinese Communist military structure appears to
be passing from China's old revolutionary heroes to a group of
somewhat younger and lesser known generals under the aegis of
Defense Minister Peng Teh-huai. This group could play a signi.f-
icant or even critical role in any struggle for power following
Mao Tse-tung's death or retirement, 25X1
COMMUNISTS SEEKING TO RECOUP LABOR LOSSES IN ITALY . . . . Page 3
After suffering several serious defeats in the past year, the
Communist-controlled Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL)
is attempting to regain its dominant position among organized
labor. Its nonpolitical campaign in support of higher wages has
had some success among government employees, nearly all of whom
are dissatisfied with the size of pay raises recently announced
BRITAIN ACTIVELY OPPOSES EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROPOSALS. , Page 4
Leaders of the European integration movement are disturbed
over Britain's active opposition in recent weeks to the European
atomic energy community and, to the plans for a customs union
which -#Lhe Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration
will propose to the six'Coal-Steel Community countries early this
INDIAN LINGUISTIC STATES ISSUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The failure of India's Congress Party to settle the linguistic
states issue damages the-prestige of the party's high command.
A decision had been anticipated by 24 December, but the party
remains divided on the question. Home- Minister Pant has stated
it will now be impossible to accomplish the tasks necessary to
establish the new states on 10 October 1956 as earlier planned.
As a result, the Congress may enter the national election campaign
late this year with less ifternal-unity and stronger 1
opposition than had been expected.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 January 1956
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
FRENCH ELECTION
The three-way split in the
new French National Assembly
resulting from enlarged Com-
munist representation on the
left, the new Poujadist bloc
on the extreme right, and a
weakened and divided center,
leaves little possibility of
achieving a stable coalition
government. The Algerian prob-
lem will probably force the
divided center parties to find
some compromise onwhich to
base a coalition before the
assembly convenes on 19 January.
Any new government would prob-
ably find itself in the position
of having to seek a new major-
ity in the assembly on each
major issue.
The main unknown factor in
the new assembly will be the
attitude of the extreme right
antitax forces of Pierre Pou-
jade. The nucleus of his
strength rests with the small
independent shopkeepers whose
livelihood has depended on tax
evasion. Much of his support
in the elections represents a
protest against the regime be-
yond the question of taxes.
Apart from his antitax stand
and a call for a convening of
States General like that of
1789 to air the complaints of
the people, he has offered no
positive program.
Poujade has hinted, how-
ever, that he might be willing
to co-operate with other parties
to form a government, and his
national organization is meet-
ing immediately to decide on
its policies. He has reportedly
stated his preference for Pre-
mier Faure over a government
headed by Mendes-France or a
Socialist. In the immediate
future, at least, he is expected
to maintain a tight rein on his
deputies, who will probably re-
main largely in opposition.
Any coalition including them
might lose even more votes on
the left.
The non-Communist parlia-
mentary groups, from the So-
cialists on the left to the
Peasants and ex-Gaullists on
the right, cover a wide range
of differing views on principal
issues which have been accentuated
FRENCH NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION
UNOFFICIAL RESULTS AS OF NOON: 5 JANUARY 1956
(METROPOLITAN FRANCE ONLY)
544*
SEATS
*Returns incomplete on 52 overseas seats. Elections for 30 Algerian seats postponed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 January 1956
OUTGOING
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
SHOWING LINE-UP OF COALITIONS
FOR 2 JANUARY ELECTIONS
THE REPUBLICAN LEFT,
REPUBLICAN COALITION
FRONT (Faure-Pinay)
(Mendes-France)
+`- EPUBUCANS
OY REPUBLICAN ANDN
CIAL ACTION
0.P.- .
DEMOCRATIC AND
SOCIALIST UNION
by the animosities of the elec-
toral campaign. The Socialists
are in a key position despite
the loss of some seats. They
increased their popular vote
and appear to have picked up
enough additional worker sup-
port to remove, for the moment,
pressure from the rank and file
for a move toward a popular
front.
The poor showing made by
the Faure-Pinay coalition, par-
ticularly the losses by Pinay's
Independents who had expected
to make significant gains, will
probably increase the coalition's
willingness to reach an under-
standing with the parties of
the Republican Front. Some In-
dependent leaders have already
hinted at obtaining Socialist
support of, if not participa-
tion in, a government coalition
to forestall a popular front.
Moreover, the Popular Republi-
can leaders, restive in their
PART I
affiliation with the right,
have reiterated their preelec-
tion plea for broad co-operation
among the center parties. Ef-
forts will also be made by the
Radical Socialists to patch up
their internal disputes.
The Communists are playing
up as a great victory the
sharply increased parliamentary
representation which they won
with a slightly smaller pro-
portion of the popular vote.
They have renewed their popular
front offer to the Socialists,
and can be expected, despite con-
tinued rebuffs, to deep on press-
.ing for broad co-operation on
the left.
The formation of a govern-
ment depends largely on a com-
promise between the two main
elements of the center--the
Faure-Pinay coalition and the
Mendes-France forces. The
Algerian problem is seen as
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5 January 1956
sufficiently pressing by all
the center parties to force
their respective national coun-
cils to make special efforts
for agreement between now and
19 January, when President Coty
must designate some party lead-
ers to make the first attempt
to form a new government.
BULGANIN'S AND KHRUSHCHEV'S
YEAR-END SPEECHES
The confident statements
made by the Soviet leaders at
year's end reflected the belief
that the Bulganin-Khrushchev
foreign policies achieved their
goals in 1955 and that the USSR
is in a favorable position mili-
tarily, economically and in its
foreign relations to compete ef-
fectively with the West in inter-
national power politics.
A conviction on the part
of the Soviet leaders that their
military position is becoming
almost invulnerable is suggested
by two unusual references Bul-
ganin and Khrushchev made to
significant recent developments
in the field of advanced weapons.
Bulganin's discussion of
the need to end the arms race
by concluding an agreement to
prohibit nuclear weapons in-
cluded a reference to rocket
weapons which he described as
having undergone particular de-
velopment over the past few years
and - ecoming intercontinental
weapons." Khrushchev's descrip-
tion of the latest Soviet hydro-
gen bomb test as the "equivalent
of many million tons of conven-
tional explosives" appeared in
the context of a warning to the
Western powers against the "er-
roneous assumption" that they
The center parties remain
divided, however, over a num-
ber of other key issues from
economic reform to the question
of state aid to church schools,
and any coalition formed quickly
to deal with Algeria is almost
certain to be inherently un-
stable.
possess "some kind of superi-
ority in strength and hence...
it is not to their advantage
to disarm."
In this New Year's eve in-
terview, Bulganin also rejected
the theory that the possibility
of thermonuclear war is auto-
matically excluded by the East-
West nuclear stalemate. He did
state that "the circles which
would like to unleash war" are
somewhat deterred by the fact
that under present conditions
nuclear weapons "cannot be used
with impunity," but he accused
these circles of spreading
"dangerous assertions" that
peace can be preserved by con-
tinuing the atomic arms race.
This competition, he said, is
increasing the threat of a new
war, and he called for fresh
efforts to achieve a disarmament
agreement.
Bulganin and Khrushchev
defended Moscow's position on
all the topics discussed at the
Geneva foreign ministers' con-
ference (Germany and European
security, disarmament, and ex-
pansion of East-West contacts),
and gave every indication that
they intend to seek their ob-
jectives by cultivating the
"Geneva spirit."
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 January 1956
Khrushchev's criticism
of President Eisenhower's
Christmas message to the peo-
ples of Eastern Europe was
made in the context of an at-
tack on the "strange under-
standing" of the Geneva spirit
recently displayed by some
Western statesmen. He de-
clared that the message vio-
lated the Geneva spirit and
was "nothing else but rude
interference in the domestic
affairs of free and sovereign
states--members of the United
Nations."
This was the first time
top Soviet leaders had leveled
a public personal criticism
at President Eisenhower. Khru-
shchev, however, protested his
regret at having'to speak a-
bout the President, "whom I
especially respect," and has-
tened to add that he was merely
replying to those who inter-
fere in the domestic affairs
of the People's Democracies
in violation of the Geneva
spirit. He also denied that
his statements in India and
Burma were insulting or of-
fensive to the British gov?.
ernment and drew a careful dis-
tinction between the British
people and British colonialists.
The Soviet leaders" con-
fidence in their policies to-
ward the Afro-Asian states was
ARAB-ISRAELI SITUATION
Arab-Israeli border activity
during the past week was con-
fined mainly to sporadic firing
across the frontiers in the
Gaza area, but two Israeli pub-
lic works officials were killed
and another wounded on the
highway between Beersheba and
apparent in their remarks con-
cerning the Egyptian-led faction
of the Arab League, whose neu-
tralism Moscow has long encour-
aged. Moscow regards this
faction as an expanding nucleus
of a bloc of "neutralist" states
which will agree to closer ties
with the Soviet bloc.
The leaders repeatedly
asserted that the success of
their trip through Soviet Asia
had borne out the correctness
of the Leninist principle of
Soviet foreign policy--"the
policy of peaceful coexistence
of nations with different so-
cial and political systems."
They recalled Lenin's predic-
tion that the time would come
when the hundreds of millions
of people in Asia would play a
part in deciding the "destinies
of the whole of humanity."
According to Bulganin, "'this
time has now come."
They also attempted to
demonstrate that another Leninist
prediction was materializing by
the emergence of a de facto
alliance between Moscow, Peiping
and New Delhi, thereby bringing
together the three most heavily
populated nations of the earth.
The clear implication was that
the fate of mankind would large
ly depend on the role of these
three states in international
affairs.
Eilat.. Israel claims these men
were'ambushed byan Arab suicide
squad.operating:from Jordan.
The confidence vote which
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion re-
ceived on 29 December from the
leadership of the Mapai party
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 January 1956
and his subsequent speech to the
Knesset suggest that Israel
intends to continue a tough
policy toward any Arab incur-
sions on its frontiers. Ameri-
can officials in Israel believe
Ben-Gurion's hand is still
strongly on the helm and that
efforts to improve the country's
military and defensive position
will continue on an urgent basis.
Differences of opinion
between Ben-Gurion and Foreign
Minister Sharett, as indicated
in reports of the Mapai debate,
appear to be centered on ques-
tions of timing rather than of
policy itself. Sharett's fail-
ure to obtain definitive support
from the Western powers has not
yet been openly criticized, and
he is pressing very hard for
favorable action on outstanding
arms requests.
The report that a "committee
of three"--consisting of Ben-
Gurion, Sharett and Finance
Minister Eshkol--has been es-
tablished to formulate over-all
security and foreign policy for
Mapa.i may indicate that future
retaliatory attacks against any
of the Arab states may be co-
ordinated more closely with
over-all foreign policy.
Israel. is holding a. firm
line on any concessions to the
Arab states. UN truce chief
General Burns is reported to
believe that continued nego-
tiations to obtain Tsraeli and
Egyptian agreement to UN pro-
posals for the Gaza. and El Auja
areas are unlikely to be reward-
ing.
retaliation.
There is no firm evidence
that Israel is planning major
military activity. Any new
Israeli venture to "protect
its territorial integrity"
would put Egyptian prime min-
ister Nasr--along with other
Arabs--in a position of losing
face or of backing up his
declarations that a new Israeli
attack would bring major
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5 January 1956
25X1 sentiment an increase in de-
or an mands for the removal of British
unlikely to loin a Baghdad officers from the Arab Legion.
25X1 pac
The American embassy in
Baghdad reported on 1 January
that Iraq is trying to put on
"the best face possible" over
Jordan's rejection, but rank-
ing Iraqi officials are clear-
ly disappointed and believe
now that Jordanian adherence
is probably remote.
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he majority of the Jor-
anians on the west side of the
Jordan River remain opposed
the Palestine problem can re-
move Jordanian objections to
joining. The American embassy
in Amman reports in addition
to a rising wave of anti-Western
The Indonesian cabinet has
only temporarily warded off the
danger that it may collapse over
the current Dutch-Indonesian
talks.
where the talks are being held,
Should the discussions show no
positive results within the
next week, the cabinet will
again be subjected to serious
criticism both from within its
own ranks and from President
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5 January 1956
Sukarno and the opposition
parties.
The Masjumi, which heads
the cabinet, is reportedly
ready to effect a. compromise
"in every possible way" in order
to stay in office until the
newly elected parliament is
seated sometime next spring.
The cabinet's "solid" a-
greement to continue the talks
reverses a situation existing
a few days before but at best
appears to be a temporary ar-
rangement. A small government
party, the Indonesian Islamic
League (PSII), had demanded
suspension of the Dutch talks,
and one of its leaders was
planning to preside at a. left-
wing rally which would demand
the "return" of Netherlands
New Guinea--a major issue be-
tween Indonesia and the Neth-
erlands which is being soft-
pedaled in the talks. The
rally on New Guinea has now
been postponed until 7 January.
The Nahdla.tul Ulama (NU),
a major government party, had
also been critical of the
government's de-emphasis of the
New Guinea question and indi-
cated an intention to withdraw
from the cabinet. But appar-
ently it plans to give Prime
Minister Harahap another chance.
The Masjumi presumably
has made certain concessions to
these dissident parties. It
possibly offered to withdraw
Indonesia's delegation if no
progress were made in the talks
during the next week, and
Prime'Minister Harahap may be
considering dropping his pro-
Western nonparty foreign
minister.
The Masjumi is especially
eager to stay in office until
next spring so that it can in-
fluence the naming of the ap-
pointive parliament members,
21 or less, who may hold the
balance of power in the new
legislature.
The Ma.sjumi is trying to
form a "Moslem front" with the
PSII and the NU in order to
strengthen its bargaining
position in negotiations for
a new cabinet after parliament
is installed.
The September elections
having failed to give any one
party anything like a majority,
a coalition government will
be necessary, and Masjumi
leaders fear that unless they
form an alliance with NU, they
may be relegated to minor
cabinet posts. They fear they
might even be excluded from the
cabinet.
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5 January 1956
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet Bloc Relations With Greece
The USSR and its European
Satellites in recent months
have been making efforts to
improve relations with Greece
and encourage it to follow a
neutralist policy in foreign
affairs. According to a recent
report, Moscow plans in the
near future to offer substantive
technical and economic aid to
Greece.
The latest Satellite over-
ture was Bulgaria's announce-
ment on 30 December that it is
prepared to resolve the rep-
arations question, but would
prefer to make a resolution
dependent on the resumption of
normal relations. It has agreed
to advaice a preliminary pay-
ment to Greece as a token of
good will. Reparations claims
against Rumania and Bulgaria
arising out of World War II
have figured prominently in
Orbit-Greek friction.
Bulgaria's initiative ap--
parently grew out of Soviet
prodding. Soon after the Soviet
ambassador to Greece offered
last June to use Soviet influ-
ence to effect a settlement of
Greek financial claims against
Bulgaria and Rumania, Rumania
agreed to settle outstanding
claims.
Albania, Bulgaria and
Rumania have all officially
expressed the desire to re-
establish full diplomatic re-
lations with Greece. Poland
Rumanian Party Congress
The second Rumanian party
congress, which met in Bucharest
from 23 to 28 December after a
postponement of 20 months,
confirmed the stability of the
and Greece are expected to
exchange ambassadors soon.
Bulgaria and Greece last July
concluded their first general
boundary settlement since the
end of the war, but the Alba-
nian-Greek boundary question
remains open because of sharply
conflicting territorial claims.
In the next few months,
Moscow's immediate aim is to
exert enough influence in the
Greek elections scheduled for
February to seat a left-of-
center government in Athens
that would agree to closer ties
with the bloc.
The Greek foreign minister
claims that the USSR is giving
financial assistance to leftist
candidates. As a result of
continuing tensions with the
British over the Cyprus issue
and the current rift in Greek
Turkish relations, some party
leaders--chiefly Venizelos,
leader of the Liberal Democratic
Union--are under strong pres-
sure from their following to
form a popular front with the
Communist-dominated EDA party.
Such .a merger would seriously
damage pro-Western Prime Min-
ister Karamanlis' election
prospects and make the election
of a "neutralist'"-oriented
government a strong possibility
party leadership but stressed
the need for more party dis-
cipline. The Rumanian Second
Five-Year Plan (1956-60), the
first of the Soviet bloc's new
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5 January 1956
five-year plans to be spelled
out in detail, was presented
at the congress. Like the
first plan, it emphasizes
capital goods production and
also calls for a sharp increase
in agricultural collectiviza-
tion.
Party First Secretary
Gheorghiu-Dej announced that
the party would resume admis-
sions of new members, primarily
from the working class. He
revealed that party strength
totaled approximately 595,000,
a drop of over 100,000 since
the 1948 congress.
Party strength in Rumania
is smaller in proportion to
the population (one to 29)
than in the Soviet Union or
any other European Satellite
except Albania.
The enlarged central com-
mittee and politburo maintain
the party hierarchy without
major alteration. Despite the
congress' lip service to "col-
lective leadership," the polit-
buro membership was again
listed in order of precedence,
with Gheorghiu-Dej maintaining
his predominant position, other
members following in exact pre-
congress order.
In part inspired by the
recent release of former non-
Communist political.leaders, it
had been rumored that the party
base would be broadened or
that puppet minority parties
would be established. However,
of an estimated 14 Social Demo-
crats who received full or
candidate membership on the
central committee at the time
of the merger of the Socialist
and Communist Parties in Feb-
ruary 1948, only seven remain.
Rumania's Second Five-Year
Plan directives in general re-
flect the expected emphasis on
expansion of the means of pro-
duction. The plan calls for
a rise from 71 percent in 1955
to 85 percent in 1960 in the
percentage of national income
derived from the socialist
sector; for an over-all in-
crease in industrial output
of 60 to 65 percent, including
a 70-75 percent increase in
capital goods; and for a 50-55
percent increase in consumer
goods. Total planned invest-
ments will rise sharply in the
next five years.
Gheorghiu-Dej asserted that
socialization of agriculture
was essential for expanded ag-
ricultural production, and he
called for greater efforts to-
ward political education of the
peasant. He maintained that
while only 26.5 percent of
arable land had been collecti-
vized through 1955, by 1960 the
collectivized sector of agricul-
ture must control a predominant
amount of farm acreage and pro-
duce 60 to 70 percent of total
agricultural production.
It is expected that other
Satellite plans to be announced
shortly will follow the same
general principles in economic
planning, including emphasis
on the expansion of capital
goods, particularly in those
branches of heavy industry
which have an assured source
of supply of raw materials.
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5 January 1956
Brazilian President-elect's
Visit to the US and Europe
Brazilian president-elect
Kubitschek's visit to the
United States and Western
Europe is intended to "call
the world's attention to Brazil j
Despite the severe politi-
cal crises that have developed
in Brazil in prospect of his
inauguration, Kubitschek has
apparently devoted the past
three months principally to
studying the country's economic
situation and to formulating
a program for his administra-
ccor -
i.ng to the American embassy,
he intends to give less than
usual emphasis to the mutual
dependence of Brazil and the
United States, as apparently
confirmed by the inclusion of
various Western European coun-
tries in his tour.
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5 January 1956
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Berlin Situation
The USSR is, continuing to
act with caution in restrict-
ing Allied access to Berlin..
East German authorities have
not recently interfered with
freight shipments between West
Germany and West Berlin, nor
have there; been any reports of
harassment of West German
transport personnel,, The
number of uniformed and civil-
ian guards at intersector
crossing points was increased,
however, and some new controls
have been imposed on residents
taking goods from West to East
Berlin.
Soviet authorities have
continued to issue documenta-
tion to Allied officials for
transit through East Germany
en route to and from their posts
in Eastern Europe, but a Soviet
consular official in East Berlin
implied on 28 December that this
procedure would end if Allied
authorities allowed West Ger-
many to issue comparable transit
permits to Soviet pers "T el.
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5 January 1956
If Austria's two coalition
parties cannot resolve the cur-
rent deadlock on economic is-
sues, they may agree to advance
the date of the elections which
had been tentatively scheduled
for October. Neither party can
now govern without the other.
The People's Party and the
Socialists are deadlocked pri-
marily over the future of in-
dustrial assets in Austria for-
merly held by the USSR. Tech-
nically the dispute is over
which ministry shall administer
these assets but actually it is
over whether they are to be
nationalized or returned to
private ownership.
This basic controversy be-
came acute in October when the
USSR tentatively offered to
loan $30,000,000 in Austrian
shilli.nps to the Lower Austrian
provincial government, which is
dominated by the People's Party.
Politicians of that party in
Vienna, including Chancellor
Raab, favored acceptance of the
loan in the belief that it would
facilitate government invest-
ment in the economically de-
pressed areas of the former So-
viet zone, of which Lower Aus-
tria is a part.
Socialist leaders--who
knew nothing of the loan until
the lower Austrian government
asked the federal government
to approve and guarantee it--
bitterly oppose it, partly be-
cause of the opportunity the
loan affords for Soviet economic
penetration. Furthermore, they
alleged that the People's Party
North Korea
The North Korean assembly
from 20-22 December enacted a
broad legislative program to
counter widespread apathy to-
ward the economic development
program of the regime and toward
would attempt to use the loan
to turn over the disputed as-
sets to private interests. The
Socialists, who operate much of
the country's oil industry
through their control of the
Ministry of National Industries,
favor permanent nationalization
of the properties.
Chancellor Raab has been
unsuccessful to date in obtain-
ing a federal guarantee of the
loan. It is possible, however,
as predicted:by Minister of
Finance Kamitz, that the USSR
will offer to proceed without
a guarantee, in which case the
loan would become a major elec-
tion issue.
Both People's Party and
Socialist leaders probably.be-
lieve they would stand to gain
by advancing the elections.
Socialists traditionally favor
elections in the spring, when
unemployment tends to rise; and
the People's Party would like
elections held before the pres-
tige it gained for its work on
the state treaty is dissipated.
The election will be close
in any case. The People's Party
holds 74 seats in the 165-seat
national parliament to the So-
cialists' 73. The current split
in the small right-wing Union
of Independence would favor the
People's Party, while the So-
cialists are expected to pick
up votes from the decline in
Communist strength since the
withdrawal of Soviet troops.
increased formation of farm co-
operatives. Principal measures
were reduced income taxes for
urban workers and reduced grain
taxes and production quotas for
farmers.
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5 January 1956
The law reducing the grain
tax, which permits further cuts
in the event of natural dis-
asters, is to be implemented
immediately. Although an ad-
ditional grain tax reduction of
five percent is to be offered
as an incentive to peasants who
join co-operatives, this con-
cession is unlikely to attract
many additional farmers as the
grain tax has proven difficult
to administer and in some
cases peasants outside the co-
operative movement have been
able to avoid payment of the
agricultural tax-in-kind.
The goal for grain pro-
duction in 1956, the final
year of the current three-year
plan, has been lowered from
3,200,000 tons to a more real-
istic 'target of:?730,00CD It is
to be met by rehabilitation of
fallow land and by expansion of
co-operatives through incentives,
rather than by increased yield
quotas on existing acreage.
Minister of Agriculture Kim I1
stated during the assembly
session that the acceleration
of industrial development was
dependent on the fulfillment of
Communist China Challenges
R nee Line
Peiping radio's declara-
tion of 27 December that the
Chinese people would protect
the rights of fishermen of all
nations on the high seas in-
creases the possibility of
further incidents between the
South Korean coast guard and
the Chinese Communists in the
Yellow Sea fishing grounds.
The declaration amounts to an
informal offer to protect Jap-
anese fishermen against South
Korean interference on the high
seas within the "Rhee line."
Further serious incidents
could create new difficulties
agricultural goals, but it is
not clear whether the announced
increased investment in the
agrarian economy will involve
a reduction of industrial goals.
The assembly reduced taxes
on the income of office and
factory workers by 30 percent,
and taxes on the incomes of
"handicraftsmen, entrepreneurs
and merchants" by 20 to 25 per-
cent. These reductions for
nonagricultural workers may
represent an inexpensive means
of improving civilian morale,
since statistics released by
the Ministry of Finance indicate
that only 9.3 percent of North
Korea's revenue for 1955 was
expected to come from income
taxes.
It is probable that Pyong.-
yang will continue to emphasize
industrial rehabilitation to the
greatest extent practical, and
that its eventual role in the
bloc economy is envisaged as
that of a producer of manufac-
tured goods and electric.nawer
in South Korea's relations with
the UN Command, particularly
if Rhee were to try to employ
his regular naval and air
forces without approval of the
UN commander. According to the
terms of South Korea's aid
agreement with the United States,
its military forces, except for
the coast guard, are under the
operational control of the UN.
They therefore are unavailable
to enforce Rhee's unilateral
claim to exclusive fishing
rights in waters extending
from 60 to 200 miles offshore.
The present situation was
precipitated by a clash on
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5 January 1956
NORTH
KOREA
C Pyongyang
SOUTH
KOREA
Mokpo.
w INCIDENT
Chinese Communist Party Enrollment
The Chinese Communist Party
now is estimated to have around
8,000,000 members, as compared
with an official membership of
6,500,000 at the end of 1953.
Such an enrollment would make
the Chinese party about as
large as the Soviet Communist
Party.
Most of the new members
are peasants, whose support
the regime has especially
South Vietnam
Elections for a national
assembly in South Vietnam, ori.g-
inally planned for January or
early February, will be post-
poned at least for a few weeks.
The government is still making
efforts to ensure the electior.L
of an assembly that it will
control.
Viet Minh propaganda con-
tinues its denunciation of the
elections. A recent broadcast;
J\4PAN
Christmas Day between
a South Korean coast
guard ship and a Chi-
nese Communist fish-
ing fleet, approxi-
mately 115 miles
southwest of the Ko-
rean port of Mokpo,
within the "Rhee
line."
Subsequently,
a Korean press release
declared that the De-
fense Ministry had
proclaimed an "emer-
gency status" in the
Yellow Sea, and a
statement released
in the name of De-
fense Minister Sohn
declared that naval
and air units would
be called out if the
coast guard were un-
able to enforce the
Rhee line a ainst the
Chinese.
desired during its drive to in-
crease the number of agricul-
tural co-operatives.
The American consulate gen-
eral in Hong Kong believes the
Chinese party is aiming at a
membership of about 3 percent
of China's 600,000,000 people,
and will have 11 or 12,000,000
members--2 percent of the pop-
ulation--bythe end o 1957.
1
called on all persons in the
south "irrespective of political
party, religious creed, or na-
tionality to unite still more
closely" to boycott the elections.
In its election prepara-
tions', the Diem government is
encounteringresistance in its
efforts - to :forge -a' 'single gov-
4ernmennt 'party.. and a. "supervised"
loyal opposition group from
mong thev v arious
olitic
l
p
a
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5 January 1956
elements in South Vietnam.
Principal opposition stems
from the loyal Cao Dai and
Hoa Hao political forces, which
are reluctant to accept the
onus of an "opposition" label.
They prefer inclusion on the
government ticket, from which
position they aspire to gain
control of a third of the
assembly seats.
The National Revolutionary
Movement (NRM), the nucleus of
the government's political
support, is extending its
organizational activities into
traditional Cao Dai and Hoa
Cambodia
Prince Sihanouk has tem-
porarily given up his post as
prime minister "in order to
take a rest from his official
duties." He has turned over
the office temporarily to Oum
Cheang Sun, president of the
National Assembly. Sihanouk
intends to spend a month in
France and may also visit
London; he will probably take
over again as prime minister
after his father's coronation
in early March.
A struggle for power
broke out among second-echelon
leaders of the prince's po-
litical movement, the Sangkum,
when he announced his impending
resignation. Although Oum is
apparently Sihanouk's choice,
it is probable that the strug-
gle will continue, possibly
resulting in serious disunity
within the movement.
At the Sangkum congress on
30 December, which voted unani-
mously to accept continued
American military and economic
aid,, Sihanouk referred to an
Hao areas. A senior NRM leader
reports considerable success
in winning over rank-and-file
sect members,, especially in the
Hoa Hao areas of western Viet-
nam, where a large number of
persons are reported to have
recently declared themselves
active NRM partisans. Sect
leaders who have remained
loyal to the government are
apparently being deliberately
bypassed in this recruitment
drive, and there is growing
resentment among them over
government maneuvers to mini-
mize their political impor-
tance, F77 I
25X1
overture from the USSR for the
opening of diplomatic relations.
This follows recent Viet Minh
approaches for the exchange of
diplomatic representatives,
and there are indications that,
at least as far as the Soviet
overture is concerned, Cambodia
is increasingly receptive. A
Cambodian radio commentary on
17 December said the Soviet
stand on UN admissions would
encourage the initiation of
diplomatic relations.
Meanwhile, relations be-
tween Cambodia and South Viet-
nam are strained. The Cambodian
government recently protested
border violations by Vietnamese
military units and warned that
it would use its armed forces
to ensure respect for its ter
tory. 25X1
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em government considers Phnom
Penh to be the center of anti-
Vietnamese intrigues and that
relations with Cambodia are
likely to deteriorate further
in comin months.
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5 January 1956
Laos
Latest returns from the
25 December elections show
Prime Minister Katay's Progres-
sive Party considerably strength-
ened and the Independent Party,
the second member in the coali-
tion government, somewhat
weakened. Katay may drop the
Independents and form a new
government with the support of
minority parties, including the
small National Union Party,
headed by the anti-American
Bong Souvannouvong.
Katay has not yet commit-
ted himself, but in a conversa-
tion with an American official
has pointed out that there are
enough Progressive and "friend-
ly" deputies to provide the
necessary two-thirds assembly
approval for a new cabinet.
Meanwhile, in a gesture
which Ambassador Yost describes
as "at least curious," the
Finnish Presidential Election
Finland goes to the polls
on 16 and 17 January to select
300 presidential electors.
Since no single political party
is expected to win a majority
of electors, considerable maneu-
vering will probably precede the
actual selection of the presi-
dent on 15 February. The
chances of any but a candidate
sympathetic to the West being
elected are slim, and any new
president. will probably seek
to strengthen the country's
relations with the West while
still recognizing the necessity
of maintaining good relations
with the Soviet Union.
The two strongest candi-
dates at present are Prime
Minister Kekkonen of the Agrar-
ian Party and K. A. Fagerholm
of Finland's largest party, the
Viet Minh has sent a message
through the International
Control Commission contratulat-
ing Laos on its admission to
the United Nations. This comes
at a time when the Viet Minh
radio is violently attacking
the royal government for
carrying out "illegal unilat-
eral" elections.
The congratulatory message
may be intended to promote con-
fusion among Laotian leaders
as to the government's policy
toward the Communists or to
underscore Russia's role in
the success of the Laotian bid
for UN membership. It is
possible, however, that the
Viet Minh is laying the ground-
work for a campaign for the ex
change of,diplomatic representa-
tives and a deal in which
Pathet Lao forces would be dis-
banded in return for Communist
Participation in the gay ernment.
Social Democrats. Kekkonen's
attempts to consolidate his posi-
tion as President Paasikivi's
logical successor have been
handicapped by the belief of
many Finns that he is "too
acceptable" to the Soviet Union
to be trusted with the presiden-
cy, which under the constitution
is entrusted with the direction
of foreign policy. In actual
fact, Kekkonen if elected would
be unlikely to change Finland's
foreign policy.
Fagerholm, although not the
strongest or most popular member
of the Social Democratic Party',
has considerable support in non-
Socialist circles, but two of
the three "bourgeois" parties
have already announced they will
support him in the electoral
college balloting if their own
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5 January 1956
candidates' chances appear to
be slight.
If a deadlock developed in
the electoral college between
Kekkonen and Fagerholm, the
electors would turn to the 85-
year-old President Paasikivi
or one of the "bourgeois" party
nominees for a compromise
candidate. Paasikivi has not
yet definitely stated whether
he would be a candidate, but
he reportedly would agree to
run again if a majority of the
parties favor him. His popular-
ity and prestige remain high,
and he would probably receive
the support of a large majority
of electors if he chose to run
for a full or shortened term.
All non-Communist candi-
dates agree that Finland must
continue to maintain and
develop good relations with
the Soviet Union and remain
outside great power conflicts.
The election of Paasikivi,
Fagerholm or one of the
"bourgeois" party candidates,
however, would assure the
continued development of strong
ties between Finland and its
Scandinavian neighbors, espe-
cially Sweden, and would
strengthen the country's general
Western orientation.
President Paasikivi rather
than Prime Minister Kekkonen
appears to have reaped the
credit for the Soviet-Finnish
agreement last September which
returned the Porkkala naval
base to Finland. Because actual
turnover of the base is
scheduled to take place before
the end of January, the occasion
will serve to remind the elec-
tors of further dividends which
might accrue from a continuation
of the policy consistently 25X1
followed by Paasikivi, with
which Kekkonen has sought to
identify himself.
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5 January 1956
Chilean labor has called
a general strike for 9 January
in protest against the Ibanez
administration's bill to control
wages and freeze prices. The
15,000 copper workers, who
stopped work on 14 December in
a separate dispute, have for the
most part agreed to return to
work.
Chile's largest labor con-
federation, CUTCH, had been
discussing strike plans for
several days. A split within
CUTCH over strike tactics had
been reported. One group was
said to favor a general strike
of indefinite duration. Another
group, including the Communists,
favors only a 48-hour general
strike. The Communist leaders
fear repressive action by the
government and are reported
ready to engage in strike-
breaking even at the risk
of splitting CUTCH--rather than
embark on a strike of indefinite
duration.
The administration's
wage-price bill, which has been
opposed consistently by the
leftist political parties as
well as CUTCH, was passed by
the Senate on 4 January after
being approved by the Chamber
of Deputies last month.
Even if the wage-price
bill should fail to become a
law, which seems unlikely,
labor unrest could be expected
to continue until some means
are found to control inflation.
The cost of living in Chile has
increased about 200 percent
in the past two years.
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Power in the Chinese Com-
munist military structure ap-
pears to be passing from China's
old revolutionary heroes, as
exemplified by Chu Teh, to a
group of somewhat younger and
lesser known generals under
the aegis of Defense Minister
Peng Teh-huai. This group
could play a significant or even
critical role in any struggle
for power following Mao Tse-
tung's death or retirement.
Army Leaders Named Marshal
Ten army leaders named in
1955 as marshals have been
the regime's top commanders for
the past 25 years or more. Chu
Teh, prior to late 1954, was
commander in chief of all Chi-
nese Communist forces and, with
Mao, was coleader of the first
Chinese Communist armies. His
principal lieutenant was Peng
Teh-huai, who also commanded
the Chinese forcesin Korea.and
was appointed to his present
position in September 1954.
On a level with Peng within the
military hierarchy was Lin Piao,
who in recent years has been
described as sick by Peiping.
Liu Po-cheng (the one-
Eyed Dragon), Ho Lung (a re-
formed bandit), Chen I, Lo
Jung-huan, Hsu Hsiang-chien
(also believed sick), Nieh
Jung-chen and Yeh Chien-ying
held top command posts in the
Chinese Communist military.
With the exception of Peng
and possibly Chen I, however,
none is now believed to hold a
key military post. Although
their party positions and
National Defense Council jobs
may enable them to influence
some aspects of policy and
although several are directors
of departments of the general
staff, none has been associated
since 1954 with an operational
command. The title of marshal
seems to be little more than
recognition for past services.
Almost all of the marshals
seem to have been victims of
Peiping's efforts since 1952
to subordinate the armed forces
more directly to central au-
thority. In 1954 the regime
eliminated regional "kingdoms"
and transferred the old com-
manders to Peiping. The new
constitution adopted in Sep-
tember 1954 brought the mili-
tary completely under govern-
ment organs for the first time
and Peng was made the active
commander of all Chinese forces
and, apparently, the main
source of orders to operational
commands.
Subsequent legislation
establishing a Soviet-type
military rank system and a com-
pulsory military service pro-
gram seems designed in part
to destroy any traces of per-
sonal loyalty such as existed
under the former system, where-
by a commander served concur-
rently as government or party
boss and recruited troops from
his own military area.
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The stronger central author-
ity in Peiping and the ensu=ing legislation have also been
aimed at modernization of the
military establishment--an ob-
jective which Peiping has taken
pains to emphasize.
Peng Teh-huai Plays Key Role
The new group around
Defense Minister Peng, chiefly
his deputies in the Ministry
.of National Defense and its sub-
ordinate organ, the General
Staff of the People's Libera-
tion Army, are five or six
years younger on the average
than the marshal group. Some
of the younger men can boast,
however, of comparable experi-
ence, if not rank, in China's
revolutionary movements.
Peng appears to have
brought military leaders loyal.
to himself into this group,
which could become important
either as an independent center
contesting for power or as sup-
port for a candidate other than
Peng.
Chou En-lai, for example,
is believed to have close
connections with the military,
not only because of his formal
supervision of the military as
head of the government admini-
stration but also through per-
sonal relationships.
Peng's seven deputies in
the National Defense Ministry
are all party members and three
are members of the Chinese
Communist Party's central com-
mittee. One served under Peng
in Korea as chief of staff
of the Chinese People's Volun-
teers and another was Peng's
deputy in Northwest China.
Three others were born in Peng'E
native province of Hunan and
may have become associated with
Peng long ago.
Su Yu Heads General Staff
The General Staff is head-
ed by General Su Yu, who al-
though outranked by the marshals,
probably now stands next to Peng
Teh-huai as the most powerful
figure in the Chinese Communist
military establishment. The
chief functions of this staff
are to advise the minister and,
in his name, to issue orders
and to implement directives.
The departments under the Gen-
eral Staff--political, training,
cadre, supervision, rear serv-
ices and finance--perform im-
portant administrative functions
but for the most part do not
seem to be power positions.
SU-YU
Su Yu and his four assist-
ants are all Chinese Communist
Party members; three are members
of the party's central committee.
Su and two of his deputies were
born in Hunan, and one served as
Peng's deputy commander in the
1st Field Army. One of the deputy
chiefs of staff, .Li Ko-nung, may
be head of the secret police ap-
paratus in the armed forces.
Party Concern Over Leadership
An article published in
August 1955 by Lo Jung-huan--
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5 January 1956
a marshal and the director of
the army's political department
--highlights the party's con-
tinuing concern over maintain-
ing its control of the military
and its determination to elim-
inate any threats to its con-
trol. Lo complained of a grow-
ing tendency to weaken the
"glorious traditions" of the
army, particularly the party's
leadership of the military,
a principle which Mao had es-
tablished in the first years
of the Chinese Communist armies.
The Chinese Communist
Party has disclosed that Kao
Kang and Jao Shu-shih, Chinese
Communist leaders whose purge
was announced in March 1955,
had made overtures to high-
ranking party members in the
army for support in their
"antiparty" alliance.. The ex-
tent to which military leaders
became involved with Kao is
not known, and the party has
not announced any purge of the
military. However, the party's
admission that a dissident
faction wished to conclude an
alliance with the military re-
flects a continuing problem
for those who wish to succeed
Mao as the head of the Chinese
Communist Party and regime.
COMMUNISTS SEEKING TO RECOUP LABOR LOSSES IN ITALY
After suffering several
serious defeats in the past
year, the Communist-controlled
Italian General Confederation
of Labor (CGIL) is attempting
to regain its dominant position
among organized labor. Its non-
political campaign in support
of higher wages has had some
success among government employ-
ees, nearly all of whom are dis-
satisfied with the size of pay
raises recently announced un-
?der the terms of a 1954 law.
The CGIL's program for
agitation on economic issues
was endorsed on 28 November by
Italian Communist Party chief
Togliatti. It probably will
remain in force at least until
the confederation's Congress
convenes in February. The
program may well have some
success in reversing the CGIL's
recent setbacks and weakening
the position of the non-Com-
munist unions.
Election Setbacks
Although the CGIL still
has over 3,000,000 members and
is larger than all the other
unions combined, it has had a
number of setbacks in 1955.
In shop steward elections,
Communist-affiliated unions have
suffered losses averaging about
12 percent. In many plants,
most notably the Fiat automo-
tive works, they dropped to a
minority status, and their
majority has been cut in other
industries, particularly trans-
portation and shipbuilding.
The losses were the result
in part of.anti-Communist action
by firms seeking to meet Amer-
ican requirements for loans or
offshore procurement contracts
and hence in some cases may
prove to be temporary. How-
ever, the losses also reflect
stepped-up activity by non-.
Communist unions, and a greater
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5 January 1.956
willingness on the part of
management to sign separate
agreements with these unions.
The CGIL's strike record
in 1955 was unimpressive. It
called no strikes of a purely
political nature, not even on
the likely occasions of parlia-
ment's approval of the Western
European Union and the redeploy-
ment to Italy of American troops
formerly stationed in Austria.
Moreover, support for CGIL-
called sympathy strikes fell
off markedly. The port strike
in Genoa, which lasted from
January to May, was the only
major strike the Communists
conducted alone, It put a heavy
strain on the union's resources
and won the Communists a de-
cision which only barely con-
cealed the fact that their con-
trol over hiring and firing of
ship repair workers had been
eliminated.
Defections from CGIL, which
have occurred intermittently on
the local level for several
years, have recently assumed
greater significance. A part
of the Federation of Postal and
Telegraph Employees withdrew
on 3 December and transferred
its allegiance to the Democratic
Socialist-oriented Italian Labor
Union. This followed the defec-
tion in late summer of two in-
dividuals who were prominent
in the CGIL-affiliated national
organizations of Agricultural
Workers and Fishermen.
A number of factors will
probably contribute to the
success of CGIL's campaign:
continuing feuds among the non-
Communist unions, anger over
heavy-handed measures taken by
management in some localities,
and the limited scope of the
government's economic reforms.
Although the non-Communist
labor organizations are wary
of "unity of action" campaigns,
they can be maneuvered into
co-operating. On occasions
when both Communist and non-
Communist unions have called
their members out on an is-
sue, strike action has been
relatively successful. Strikes
on salary questions by spe-
cific categories of workers--
the 90,000 high school teach-
ers, for instance, who walked
out several times last year--
have been particularly well
supported by non-Communist
labor.
BRITAIN ACTIVELY OPPOSES EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROPOSALS
Leaders of the European
integration. movement are dis-
turbed over Britain's active
opposition in recent weeks to
the European atomic energy
community and the plans for a
customs union which the Inter-
governmental Committee on Euro-
pean Integration will present
to the six Coal-Steel Community
countries early this year.
While they had not hoped
for British participation,
integration leaders expected
London would refrain from op-
posing the projects and might
even support them during the
difficult negotiating period--
perhaps ultimately seeking ties
along the lines of Britain's
association with the CSC.
Britain's Opposition Stand
However, both in bilateral
.approaches to the CSC countries
and in the Organization for
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5 January 1956
European Economic Co-operation
(OEEC), London has made it clear
that (1) it will not extend to
the nuclear pool (EURATOM) as
such the benefits which its
members could derive individu-
ally in bilateral agreements
with Britain; and (2) it may
work against the formation of
the six-nation customs union
by using its influence in the
several CSC countries, and
through the OEEC and the Gener-
al Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).
Explaining his govern-
ment's position, the British
foreign secretary told Secretary
Dulles in mid-December that
"tight integration" of the
Community of Six implies high
tariffs which would be a source
of "division rather than
strength" on the Continent and
that while London otherwise
'would .iot be unsympathetic, "
Britain desires to "avoid fu-
ture opprobrium" by announcing
its intentions now.
Early in December, another
British spokesman said he fore-
saw the "danger of dividing
free Europe into two camps" and
the possibility that the OEEC
would "collapse" as a result of
the "formation of discriminato-
ry groups."
Pro-European Views
Pro-Europeans are both
annoyed and alarmed by the
British action. Belgian foreign
minister Spaak contends that
London has launched a "strong
offensive" against the common
market concept, and is "unfavor-
able, even aggressively un-
favorable" in its attitudes.
Dutch co-foreign minister Beyen
reportedly believes he has been
"led up a garden path" and, with
Spaak, suspects the British are
opposing the projects now be-
cause there is a chance of their
being approved. CSC president
Mayer speaks of a German "tor-
pedo," and West German foreign
minister Von Brentano has told
Secretary Dulles that British
opposition had "created real
difficulties" in West Germany
for European integration pros-
pects.
The emotional tone of these
statements is in part a hangover
from the EDC crisis. Many pro-
Europeans suspect that London
was not entirely displeased
with the defeat of EDC, and
it is still following its his-
toric policy of opposing the
emergence of a concentration
of power on the Continent.
Spaak notes, for instance, the
unreasonableness of Britain's
objection to the common market
on the basis of discrimination
in view of Britain's involve-
ment in intra-Commonwealth
tariff preferences.
Effect of British Stand
Basically, however, pro-
Europeans are alarmed lest the
British position spells failure
for the integration projects
in question.
Integration measures are
strongly supported in the
Benelux countries but command,
at best, an uncertain majority
in France and West Germany.
Any British doubts in the matter
can be expected to reappear
as arguments among the opposi-
tion. Also, by supporting in-
stead the looser OEEC inter-
governmental approach, the
British encourage those, too,
who are not opposed to integra-
tion as such but who dislike
the political and economic im-
plications of the more drastic
CSC formula.
Some of the potential
candidates for membership in
the European community, such as
Switzerland and Norway, sympa-
thize with Britain. Since the
establishment of a European
common market would require
another waiver from the OEEC
and GATT , a practical problem
immediately presents itself.
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The anger at Britain being
felt, particularly in the Low
Countries, reflects the politi-
calovertones which have always
been implicit in the support
these countries have given to
the European movement. In his
conversations with Secretary
Dulles on 17 December, Spaak
spoke "feelingly" of the need
for "giving the Germans hope,"
of the overriding importance of
tying Bonn to the West, and of
the danger that West Germany
will turn to the USSR. The
British position, Spaak insists,
is shortsighted at best "in
terms of what the situation
could be in Germany in five
years if the present opportuni-
ties are missed."
The possibility of a bi-
lateral understanding between
France and Germany--which was
raised during the tenure of Men-
des-France--has also not been
entirely discarded. Among the
smaller countries there is still
a good deal of feeling that the
present moment offers a new
chance and possibly the last
chance for a permanent recon-
ciliation of France and Germany
in a framework in which the other
European countries would still
have a voice. 25X1
INDIAN LINGUISTIC STATES ISSUE
India's most critical do-
mestic political problem--the
linguistic states issue--has
again defied efforts by the
Congress Party to reach a sat-
isfactory solution. This failure
damages the prestige of the gov-
erning party's high command,
which had hoped to announce a
final decision on 24 December.
Home Minister Pant has stated
it will now be impossible to
accomplish the tasks necessary
to establish all the new states
on 1 October 1956 as earlier
planned. It also indicates that
the party may enter the national
election campaign in late 1956
with less internal unity and
stronger external opposition
than it previously anticipated.
Some Congress Party and
government leaders, including
Prime Minister Nehru, have pri.-
vately opposed the idea of di-
viding India along linguistic
lines. Popular demand, however,
forced the government to appoint
a States Reorganization Commis-
sion to study the problem. The
commission last October sub-
mitted recommendations which
included enlargement of Bombay
state to take in parts of
Hyderabad and Saurashtra. It
also recommended unification of
the Punjab, Himachal Pradesh,
and Patiala and East Punjab
States Union (PEPSU) into a
single state.
The Congress high command
subsequently decided that Bom-
bay should be divided into three
separate states--Bombay city,
a southern Mahratti-speaking
state, and a northern Gujrati-
speaking state. It also sug-
gested further discussion about
the Punjab area, where the Sikhs
have long agitated for a state
entirely for themselves.
Provincial Reaction
Violent rioting in Bombay
during late November, unrest in
other parts of the country, and
dissension in the Punjab area
over the new proposals led to
talks between New Delhi repre-
sentatives and provincial leaders
and to debates in parliament,
which the Congress Party and tile
government hoped to conclude
satisfactorily by 24 December.
On the 24th, however, the
party admitted defeat by deciding
to remand the matter to a four'-
-man subcommittee, while Prime
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5 January 1956
Minister Nehru told the upper
house of parliament that the
government would assume the
burden of further study and
decision.
At the moment, no settle-
ment is in sight. On 21 Decem-
ber, Nehru indicated his con-
tinuing private opposition to
the idea of linguistic states
and opened a whole new line of
discussion by stating that in
DIU DAMAO~ h,la-
(Port.) (Port.) QNAGAR-AVELI
(Port.) #
GOA
(Port.T.
-C AN
1f;ALtRAv
the long run he favored divid-
ing India into only five or
six major areas. This would
eliminate the possibility of
any one linguistic group becom-
ing a seriously disrupting in-
fluence.
In Bombay, dissension with-
in Congress Party ranks led
the chief minister on 27 Decem-
ber to request the resignation
of one of his deputy ministers
who was accused of starting a
rival party favoring the
INDIA
PROPOSED NEW STATES
Boundary proposed by the States' Reorganization
Commission
Present boundary
9 MILES
W E
B U. R M-A
CEYLON
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inclusion of Bombay city in a
Mahratti-speaking state.
In the Punjab, where the
Congress Party leadership is
not strong, dissension between
Hindu and Sikh elements threat-
ens to result in the ouster of
Chief Minister Bhim Sen Sachar,'
a Hindu. He seems likely to be
supplanted by the state's pres-
ent economic development minis-
ter, Pratap Sigh Kairon, a Sikh,
who would be chosen as a com-
promise leader if the Sikhs are
not granted their long-standing
dream of an enlarged Punjab
state.
Future Prospects
Continued disagreement
inside and outside India's Con-
gress Party on the boundaries
of the proposed new linguistic
states makes it unlikely that
the government will be able to
create the new states and have
them functioning smoothly by the
time all political parties be-
come deeply involved in the na-
tional election campaign in late
1956. F_ I 25X1
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