CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 41
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 13, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 15, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

Approved F Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00-000700 OQJ-1
SEQET
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
I I ' COIdr11010441A
COPY NO. 1
OCI NO. 9429/55
15 December 1955
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. L
I ~ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUTH
PAT !4 ! REVIEWER.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA, USAF and DOS
review(s) completed.
C~Di
ENTIA
RET
25X1
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
 Approved For Fase 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A700050001-1
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
 Approved F elease 2005Ib
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1955
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
the divided city is unchanged.
BERLIN SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The USSR is permitting the East German -government to. continue
its public claims of authority over East Berlin, but apparently
will not authorize at this time direct East German interference
with the position of the Allies in West Berlin. Tension and pres-
sure are being maintained by recurrent Soviet emphasis on:East
German sovereignty over East Ber;Lin, alternating with statements
by Soviet and East German officials that the four-power status of
THE BULGANIN-KHRUSHCHEV TOUR . .
including arms shipments.
GITRDP79-009 f 000700050001-1
. Page 2
In their joint communique of 13 December, the Soviet leaders
and Prime Minister Nehru went on record as being in agreement on
a number of international issues. Moscow, for 'its part, will use
the communique to show India's support for the Soviet Union's
policies. A new trade agreement announced at the conclusion of
Bulganin's and Khrushchev's''visit to India commits Moscow to supply
India with 1,000,000 tons of steel over the next three years and
sets the stage for considerably expanded Soviet-Indian economic
relations. In Burma, the Soviet leaders' visit may have had-the
effect of adding impetus to the trend toward closer relations with
the Sino-Soviet bloc. During their stay in Afghanistan, the Soviet
leaders undoubtedly will also make favorable economic offers,
FRENCH ELECTION PROSPECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The large number of party slates in the 2 January elections
for the French National Assembly and the restricted scope of party
alliances rule out the possibility of achieving a stable majority.
The Communists are almost certain to increase their representation--
possibly by?as much as 30 to a total of about 125. Mendes-France
admits privately that his alliance, including the Socialists and
part of the Radicals, can win only about 150 of the 596 seats.
The support of the Gaullist groups will probably be spread from
the Socialists to the extreme right, the bulk going to Pinay's
Independent bloc which may obtain about 150 seats. With little
change anticipated in the strength of the Popular Republicans and
Faure's Radicals the present government coalition could muster'
25X1 about 275.
to-
25X1
25X1
Approved For Releasp 2 /110- IQ FP79-00927A000700050001-1
 Approved Fo ,Release 2005/02/10: c iRDP79-009$ 1000700050001-1
CU! REL?T INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NATIONALIST CHINA'S VETO
IN THE UNITED NATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
Nationalist China's veto on 13 December of Outer Mongolia'-s
application for UN membership was cast in full knowledge that such
action might lead to moves in the UN to unseat it. Brazil, Colombia,
and Sweden had previously said they would move for Taipei's ouster
if it used the veto on the issue. The admission of the 16 nations
on 14 December, however, removes much of the pressure behind any
movement to exclude the Chinese Nationalists at this session.
The rejection of Japan's membership application may have extensive
political repercussions in Japan 25X1
JORDAN AND THE BAGHDAD PACT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Jordanian political leaders are split sharply over the issue
of the country's adherence.to the Baghdad pact. While King Hussain
and leaders from East Jordan favor adherence, representatives from
the western area where Palestine refugees are concentrated are
strongly opposed. There is a possibility of serious agitation
and rioting in West Jordan should the government announce adherence.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Arab-Israeli Situation: Israeli troops raided Syrian positions
near the shore of Lake Tiberias on 11 December. The latest
round of talks between UN truce chief, General Burns, and
the Egyptian and Israeli leaders has resulted in no appreci-
able progress toward adoption of the UN proposals for main-
taining peace in the El Auja demilitarized zone.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Page 1
French North Africa: The movement for complete independence is
gat ering strength in French North Africa. Encouraged by the
gains the nationalists have made in Tunisia and by French-
Moroccan negotiations, the Algerians are preparing to seek
a new relationship with France. The French government has
indefinitely postponed parliamentary elections in the four
Algerian departments. . . . . . . . Page 2 25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved F elease 2005/ D71Q'?N-RDP79-009g 000700050001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1955
Cyprus: The prospects for renewed discussions of the Cyprus
problem between the British governor of the colony and
Cypriot archbishop Makarios appear to have improved since
the British on 9 December suggested.to Athens a revised
formula for settling the dispute.. Athens is likely to
urge Makarios to resume negotiations on the basis of the
British proposal. The archbishop stated publicly on 11 De-
cember that his talks with Governor Harding might soon.be
resumed. I I . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Turkey: The new Turkish cabinet has been approved by the Dem-
ocratic Party caucus and should have no major difficulty
winning a vote of confidence in the Grand National'Assembly,
probably on 16 December. The vote in the assembly, where
party loyalties are reflected, is not likely to indicate the
extent and intensity of the opposition to Prime Minister
Menderes or his policies. Unless Menderes proves his.will-
ingness and ability to cope with Turkey's basic economic
problems, the cabinet may fall again within a few months.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Page 5
Plans for Egyptian Parliament: Egyptian prime minister Nasr
has set January as t e date on which he will announce
plans for re-establishing a national parliament. The
narrow range of powers which the regime intends to. allow
the parliament makes it unlikely that the move will arouse
much popular enthusiasm. F__ 7 Page 5
Electrification of Soviet Railways: According to recent an-
nouncements, the USSR ntends to electrify the Trans-
Siberian railway from Moscow to Irkutsk during the sixth
Five-Year Plan (1956-1960). Mainline steam locomotives
are to go out of production during 1957, and the percentage
of total freight hauled by diesel and electric locomotives
is to increase from about 10 percent to 40-45 percent by
1960. .. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
South Vietnam: Communist propaganda from Hanoi is denouncing
the forthcoming election of a national assembly in South
Vietnam, and according to President Diem, the Viet Minh
has intensified subversive activities in the country.
Diem is seeking to counter Communist influence by estab-
lishing a village defense force and resettling anti-Commu-
nist refugees from the north in areas where Communist cadres
are active. . .. . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Laos: The Pathet Lao attack against royal government troops
southeast of Muong Peun on 5 December appears to have been
a localized skirmish rather than the signal for military
action throughout northern Laos. The government forces
repulsed the attempt to cut their line of communications
and have forced the enemy's retreat. F_ 1. Page 8
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/ TD iCIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
25X1
25X1
 Approved For Release 2005tOg11 CIA-RDP79-009 A000700050001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1955
25X1
Satellites Move to Improve Relations With United States: Ex-
pressions of interest by East European countres n improv-
ing relations with the United States have now been followed
by action. On 28 November, negotiations on outstanding
economic problems began in Prague between the United States
and Czechoslovakia, and on 7 December, Rumania granted 13
long-denied exit visas requested by the United States,
Polish and Hungarian officials have also expressed interest
in negotiating outstanding problems with the United States.
USSR Returning Satellite Prisoners: A former anti-Communist
Hungarian political leader w o had been imprisoned in the
USSR for more than eight years is reported to have been
returned to his homeland and to be under detention there.
This is the first indication that Soviet authorities may
have begun to return Satellite nationals accused of polit-
inal crimes as as those sentenced for war crimes.
25X1 . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 10
Hungary's Relations With Yugoslavia: Recent reports indicate
that the Hungarian regime may be falling in line with the,
other Satellites in improving relations with Yugoslavia.
Hungary apparently is prepared to begin payments on Yugoslav
economic claims and to repudiate the anti-Tito Rajk trial
25X1 held in 1949. . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Argentina: The Aramburu government is continuing efforts to
reduce Peronista strength and placate divergent political
elements among its own supporters. No substantial threat
to the regime has materialized to date. Page 12
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
port of his own Radical Socialists.
MENDES-FRANCE AND THE FRENCH ELECTION. . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Much of ex-premier Mendes-France's effort in the French
election on 2 January will be directed toward those Frenchmen
who have traditionally voted against the government in power
in protest against the established order. He feels that this
protest vote, which has been a major part of Communist strength,
must be won over to a new and dynamic non-Communist program if
France is to achieve political stability. He is counting heavily
on the Socialists for the base of his "Republican Front," but
his success will depend to a large extent on retaining the sup-
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/1': CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
25X1
25X1
 SECRET
Approved Fo elease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-0092000700050001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1955
REVOLUTIONARY PLOTTING IN CENTRAL AMERICA. . . . . . . . . Page 4
Central America is again being shaken by rumors of impending
revolutions. High officials of the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan
governments claim to have evidence that Costa Rica is the center
of an international conspiracy aimed at ousting various anti-
Communist governments in the area, including that of Nicaragua._
The Costa Rican government, on the other hand, gives credence to 25X1
rumors that is is about to be attacked from Venezuela and/or
Nicaragua. Internal pressures are building up in Nicaragua and
El Salvador which may lead to violence in these countries.
SHORTAGES OF KEY RESOURCES SLOW WESTERN EUROPEAN BOOM. . . Page 6
Western Europe's three-year economic boom is being slowed
down by shortages of skilled manpower and coal and steel. These
shortages have generated inflationary pressures and contributed
to trade deficits. There will probably be a further slowdown in
the rate of economic expansion in 1956, but improved basic c?n
ditions and the financial policies of the governments make the
recurrence of an economic crisis unlikely at this time.
STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY INTERFERE WITH
REGIONAL CO-OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
25X1
The continuing diplomatic "cold war" between Greece and
Turkey makes unlikely the resumption of full Greek participation
in the Balkan pact and NATO until Athens can present some semblance
of a diplomatic victory over Turkey to the Greek people. The
jockeying between the two countries over issues arising from the
anti-Greek riots in Istanbul and Izmir last September reflects
their traditional competition for prestige in the eastern
Mediterranean and more recently for American favors. Athens
apparently feels that the riots and the Greek defeat in the UN
on the Cyprus issue seriously damaged Greek prestige and is
seeking a way to redress the balance. 25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/113 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
THE WEEK IN BRIEF
 Approved Foelease 2005/OS~'LGI~.MLAIRDP79-0092,700700050001-1
15 December 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
The USSR is permitting the
East German government to con-
tinue its public claims of au-
thority over East Berlin, but
apparently will not authorize
at this time direct East German
interference with the position
of the Allies in West Berlin.
Tension and pressure are being
maintained by recurrent Soviet
emphasis on East German sover-
eignty over East Berlin, al-
ternating with statements by
Soviet and East German officials
that the four-power status of
the divided city is unchanged.
A Soviet protocol officer
told several correspondents on
8 December that the USSR had no
intention of tearing up any four-
power agreements and would con-
tinue to respect Allied rights
in East Berlin. He said that
nothing had been changed, de-
spite Soviet commandant Dibrova's
statements on the incident in-
volving American congressmen.
He repeated Dibrova's assertion,
however, that East Berlin is no
longer occupied territory and
is the capital of a sovereign
East Germany. Soviet ambassador
to East Germany Pushkin, in a
formal note of 14 December to
the three Western ambassadors,
reiterated completely Dibrova's
position that East German au-
thoritj extends o East Berlin.
As long as Soviet authori-
ties act as intermediaries for
American nationals on duty in
Germany, the USSR will argue
that the four-power status of
Berlin remains unchanged. The
West considers, however, this
concept to have been narrowed by
the Soviet assertion of East
German sovereign authority J.n
East Berlin.
East German ieputy premier
Nuschke told a correspondent
that the Allies had uncontested
freedom of movement in East Ber-
lin, and that there would prob-
ably be no further arrests like
that of the congressmen on ;67
November, which he said was made
by a "simple-minded" policeman.
He argued, however, that inci-
dents would be less likely if
American authorities provided
the East Germans with advance
notice of such trips. He ruled
out the possibility of a new
blockade of Berlin.
It appears that the Soviet
Union, desiring to build up the
prestige of the East German gov-
ernment, is permitting it to as-
sert authority in East Berlin,
and that Soviet authorities will
step in to prevent any serious
inte,~-ference with Allied travel
to West Berlin or in East Berlin.
East 3ermany will probably be
given more latitude to exploit
every opportunity to press the
West Germans to negotiate and
submit to East German authority
on such matters as visas, per-
mits and police regulations.
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 8
 Approved Fcelease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927000700050001-1
SECRET
Bonn ministries are cur-
rently studying what reply
should be sent to East German
transport minister Kramer, who
in November sent a letter to
his West German counterpart,
Seebohm, proposing the joint
issuance of permits for new
India
The Soviet leaders ended
their visit in India on 13 De-
cember with another denuncia-
tion of the West and colonial-
ism, with special emphasis on
the status of Goa and Kashmir.
Their speeches continued to be
strikingly indicative of the
differences in the personali-
ties and positions of the two
men. Khrushchev has been out-
spoken and taken stands on
specific issues while Bulganin,
on the other hand, has been
much more conservative and
general in his approach.
In their joint communique
of 13 December, the Soviet lead-
ers and Prime Minister Nehru
sought to go on record as being
in agreement on a number of
international issues. Moscow,
for its part, has tried to use
the communique to show India's
support for the Soviet Union's
policies. The absence of any
statement on anticolonialism
was probably the result of the
restraining influence of Prime
Minister Nehru, who reportedly
was pressed by the Soviet
leaders to include statements
on Goa and Kashmir.
The declaration supported
the Nehru-Chou "five principles,"
Communist China's claims to Tai-
wan and a UN seat, and elevation I
barges using interzonal water-
ways. Bonn is aware that to
act on Kramer's proposal would
lead to a joint meeting of min-
isters, which would be unprec-
edented and might convey an
impression of GDR legitimacy.
of the Geneva ambassadorial
talks between the United States
and Communist China to a higher
level. The declaration also
condemned the formation of mil-
itary blocs--a statement not
contained in the declaration
issued at the conclusion of
Nehru's visit to Moscow in
June and apparently aimed pri-
marily at the Baghdad pact.
A supplementary communique
on Soviet-Indian economic rela-
tions suggested that for prac-
tical purposes New Delhi has
accepted the formal Soviet pro-
posal to construct a steel
works at Bhilai. The $95,000,-
000 project, the largest ever
undertaken by Moscow in a non-
Communist country, will prob-
ably become a central theme in
the USSR's current drive to im-
press underdeveloped countries
with the sincerity of its offers
and its ability to deliver.
Although no other specific
projects are mentioned-in the
communique, earlier reports
indicate that Moscow is inter-
ested in many phases of the
forthcoming Indian second Five-
Year Plan, particularly in the
electrification program.
While the agreement sets
the stage for considerably ex-
panded economic relations and
calls for an exchange of
delegations to work on further
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 2 of 8
 Approved F-or elease 2005I& R&IRDP79-00991000700050001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
contracts, there is no state-
ment on the extent to which
trade will play in the picture.
The communique announced, how-
ever, that Moscow will "con-
siderably" increase its pur-
chases of Indian goods in the
next year in an effort to cover
the cost of the Soviet ship-
ments of plants and equipment.
To assure a smooth flow of goods,
Moscow and New Delhi will or-
ganize a shipping route be-
tween Indian and Soviet ports
using ships of both countries.
The new trade agreement
announced at the same time as
the communique commits Moscow
to supply India with 1,000,000
tons of steel over the next
three years. Moscow's willing-
ness to alleviate the severe
Indian steel shortage at the
expense of Soviet domestic re-
quirements underlines the Krem-
lin's desire for Indian good
will.
The USSR apparently plans,
as part of its new assistance
program, to use increased num-
bers of Communist technicians
to construct industrial installa-
tions in foreign countries. In
this connection the decision
to supply India with equipment
for oil and mining activities
is obviously tied to the pres-
ence of Soviet technicians now
investigating the possibilities
of developing these industries
in India.
In addition to the Soviet-
Burmese declaration at the end
of the leaders' visit, new a-
greements were reached under
which the USSR apparently will take
additional quantities of surplus
Burmese rice in exchange for
Soviet agricultural and indus-
trial assistance. The Soviet
Union's willingness to permit
deferred payment in rice for
the goods and services it will
provide indicates that it en-
visions a program considerably
larger in scope than could be
arranged under the existing
three-year barter agreement.
In an initial analysis of
the Khrushchev-Bulga.nin visit,
the American embassy commented
that it provided added impetus
to the trend toward closer re-
lations between the Sino-Soviet
bloc and Burma. The embassy
believes the trend can be checked,
however, especially if markets
can be found in friendly non-
Communist countries for Burmese
rice.
Local Communist tactics in
Burma--particularly the surrender
offer--appear to be aimed at
influencing the Burmese govern-
ment, rather than overthrowing
it, according to the American
embassy. The Soviet Union and
Communist China are believed
to have convinced most Burmese
that they support the present
government and that local. Com-
munists are no longer a threat.
Bulganin and Khrushchev ar-
rived in Kabul on 15 December
after a day's delay because of
bad weather. Soviet efforts to
extend the stay of Bulganin and
Khrushchev in Afghanistan from
three days--as preferred by the
afghans--to five days apparently
have been successful. Invita-
tions for a. reception on the
fifth day of their visit have
been sent out by the Afghan gov-
ernment. In view of the length
of the visit, original Afghan
plans will have to be consider-
ably expanded. Soviet repre-
sentatives in Kabul have been
busily preparing for the visit
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 3 of 8
 Approved Fo elease 2005/ '9RE1 RDP79-009200700050001-1
CU .IZENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
but, according to Foreign. Min-
ister Naim, their requests
for mass rallies to greet the
Soviet leaders have been de-
nied because of "bad weather."
Na.im believes the visit
of the Soviet leaders will be
"less triumphal" than was the
case in India and Burma, with
only a minimum of speeches sched-
uled. In view of Khrushchev's
informal behavior in India and
Burma., however, there appears
to be only an outside chance
that he can be restrained from
addressing the Afghan populace.
The Soviet leaders are al-
most certain to take a. stand
on supporting the Afghans and
denouncing the Pakistanis on
the Pushtoonistan issue, just
as they supported India. on the
status of Kashmir. In view
of the widely publicized con-
cern in non-Communist countries
FRENCH ELECTION PROSPECTS
The large number of party
slates in the 2 January elec-
tions for the French National
Assembly and the restricted
scope of party alliances rule
out the possibility of achiev-
ing a stable majority.
The Communists are almost
certain to increase their rep-
resentation.--=possibly by as
much as 30 to a. total of about
125. Mendes-France admits pri-
vately that his- alliance, in-
cluding the Socialists and part
of the Radicals, can win only
about 150 of the 596 seats.
The support of the Gaullist
groups will probably be spread
over Afghanistan's increasing
economic dependence on the So-
viet bloc, the Soviet ]...e.Aders
proba ;ly will. make a special
e:s_ ort to convince the Afg pan ~
that the USSR has no designs cn
A 'ghani ;tan and that MM4oscow's
:rimary wish is to conduct its
relations along the lines of
good-neighbor lines and the
"five principles."
The American embassy be-
lieves the Soviet leaders will
make the most headway in further
economic agreements, possibly
including deals for Soviet bloc
arms. According to press re-
ports of 13 December, the USSR
plans to facilitate Afghani-
stan's trade with the Far East
by shipping Japanese goods des-
tined for the Afghans via So-
vietSiberia,thereby avoiding
the delays that have been en-
countered by sending these ship-
ments through Pakistan.
(Concurred in by ORR)
from the Socialists to the ex-
treme right, the bulk going; to
Pinay's Independent bloc which
may obtain about 150 seats. lith
little change anticipated in the
strength of the Popular -Repub-
licans and Fa.ure's Radicals, tae
present government coalition
could muster about 275. (For
an analysis of Mendes-France's
role in the elections, see Part
III, p. 1.)
With elections for the 30
Algerian deputies indefinitely
postponed because of the local
situation,, the l03 districts
of metropolitan France have
nearly 1,000 party lists and
over 5,000 candidates--25 percent
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 4 of 8
25X1
 Approved Fo Release 2005/cSJ RDP79-009_000700050001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEE],= SUMMARY
more than in 1951. Many of
these lists have only nuisance
value, but local issues may com-
plicate the situation for most
of the national parties to the
advantage of the better disc i-
plined Communists.
The Communist Party's im-
proved prospects, despite its
lack of alliances, stems mostly
from dissension among the mid-
dle-of-the road parties. Un-
like 1951, when the center groups
combined forces in 83 election
districts to block both Communists
and Gaullists, major non-Com-
munist alliances are competing
with each other in 56 of the
95 constituencies where af-
filiation of party lists is
permitted. In 28 other dis-
tricts, a single alliance in-
volving some of the non-Com-
munist parties has been made,
and only in 11 constituencies
have no alliances been reached.
The chances of any one af-
filiation winning a majority
of the votes in a given district
are considerably reduced in coin-
parison with 1951, when 38 al-
liances got all the seats in
their respective districts on
that basis. An increase in the
number of Communist deputies
is practically assured because
the percentage of Communist
votes is not expected to drop
appreciably, and in 1951 the
party's popular vote warranted
about 50 more deputies if pro-
portional representation had
applied generally, as it will
this time.
Mendes-France has split
the Radical Socialist Party in
an effort to build a, non-Com-
munist left-wing majority. His
"Republican Front" is based pri-
marily on the Socialists, with
minority Gaullist support. The
government coalition has formed
less extensive lisp,-; than had
PA" tT I
been anticipated, partly because
the Popular Republicans, re-
luctant to widen their drift
from the Socialists, with whom
they had 51 affiliations in 1951,
rejected alliances with LuIe In-
dependents in a number of districts.
The major factor which will
be difficult to assess is the
remarkable increase in regis-
tration, which boosts the number
of those eligible to vote to over
26,000,000--some press reports
give 30,000,000 compared to
24,500,000 in 1951. An increase
of over 1,000,000 -voters in the
17 November social security e-
lections was distributed evenly
over all the major party lists,
and there is little evidence of
a stampede to any one party now,
despite the efforts of the Merides-
Fra.nce group to play up the large
registration as evidence of op-
position to the Faure coalition.
Many late registrants seem
to be under the impression that
voting is now compulsory, be-
cause the assembly had approved
such a measure on first reading;
in November. Moveover, there
will be an unusually high pro-
portion of young voters. Both
Pinay and Mendes-France opened
their campaigns on 13 December
by direct appeals to this group,
stressing the desirability of
reduced compulsory military
service.
danger.
Another uncertain factor
is the strength of the Poujade
antitax candidates. They may
be able to whittle away enough
support from moderate rightist
candidates to bring proportional
representation into play and
thus help the Communists in some
districts where Communist rep-
resentation would have otherwise
been effectively excluded. Lead-
ers of the Independent-Peasant-
ex-Gaullist bloc have already ex-
pressed some concern over this
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 5 of 8
25X1
 Approved For, Release 2005/Q2 p~RDP79-00000700050001-1
CUR ,ENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKL.k SUMMARY
15 December 1955
NATIONALIST CHINA'S VETO
IN THE UNITED NATIONS
Effect on Taiwan's Position
Nationalist China's veto
on 13 December of Outer Mongo-
lia's application for UN member-
ship was cast in full knowledge
of threats that such action
might lead to moves in the UN
to unseat Taipei. China's veto
was followed by the Soviet veto
of the 13 free world applica-
tions, thus defeating the 18-na-
tion membership proposal. Brazil,
Colombia, and Sweden had pre-
viously threatened to move for
Taipei's ouster if it used the
veto on the issue. The admissirn
of 16 nations on 14 December,
however, removed much of the ires-
sure behind any movement to ex-
clude the Chinese Nationalists
at this session.
If the General Assembly
concludes its session as sched-
uled on 16 December, the motion
to oust Taipei from its permanent
seat could be originated in the
Security Council. Any attempt
by one of the five permanent mem-
bers to use the veto would prob-
ably result in the referral of
the issue to the International
Court of Justice for a ruling on
whether the veto could legally
be applied to such a motion.
The imminence of this ses--
sion's closing and the need for
UN members to get instructions
from their ,overnments make it
more .iicely that the Chinese rep-
resentation issue will arise at
a possible spring session of the
General Assembly and in any event
at the regularly scheduled fall
session. At that time, a residue
of ill will over the sacrifice of
Japan and the increase in. stragth
of the Arab-Asian bloc, added to
the growing N desire to settle
the Chinese representation issue,
may result in a defeat for the
Chinese Nationalists.
In a 1950 resolution, the
General Assembly reserved to
itself the power to decide which
membership credentials are valid.
It further requested the other
organs of the UN to abide by
the will of the ass;mbly. Any
General Assembly action pre-
sumably would not legally en-
danger Taipei's permanent seat
on the Security Council.
Taipei, however, may fore-
stall attempts to remove it
from the UN by walking outtoof the
the international body..
On 8 December Chiang informed
Ambassador Rankin that Nation-
alist China would remain in the
UN only as a symbol of anti-Com-
munism. Except for this con-
sideration, Chiang said, the
Nationalists would be better
off outside the UN because their
continued presence could bring
"more shame and disgrace to
China."
Effect in Japan
In Japan, where support for
the Chiang Kai-shek regime has
never been strong, criticism is
being directed primarily against
Taiwan., but also against the
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 6 of 8
 Approved Fo~5lease 2005/0 I - DP79-0092700700050001-1
C
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
United States and the USSR.
Japan's rejection is likely to
further weaken Japanese support
for continued recognition of the
Nationalist regime, and increase
the already strong pressure for
widening relations with the main-
land. The government is also
being attacked by the Socialists
and even some members of the gov-
ernment party for its overde-
pendence on the United States
and for its refusal to conclude
an early agreement with the USSR
on normalization of relations.
Foreign Minister Shigemit-
5u, who is the greatest Japanese
axponent for continued close co-
operation with the United States,
has told Ambassador Allison he
JORDAN AND THE BAGHDAD PACT
Jordanian political lead-
ers are split sharply over the
issue of the country's adherence
to the Baghdad pact. While King
Hussain and leaders from East
Jordan favor adherence, repre-
sentatives from the western area,
where Palestine refugees are
concentrated, are strongly op-
posed. There is a possibility
of serious agitation and rioting
in West Jordan should the gov-
ernment announce adherence.
The British offer to re-
vise the Anglo-Jordanian treaty
of 1948 and to increase equip-
ment and financial aid to the
Jordanian Arab Legion in return
for adherence to the pact ap-
parently won the support of the
king and those members of the
previous government who come
from the eastern part of the
country--"old Jordan" as it was
called before the Palestine
war.
may be forced to assume respon-
sibility for Japan's UN defeat
and resign. The Socialists are
plannin:,je a no-confidence vote
against Shigemitsu in the Diet,
and although it will probably
fail, Prime Minister Hatoyama
may take the opportunity to
shelve the foreign minister for
differing with his own more con-
ciliatory policy toward the USSR.
Hatoyama has told the Japa-
nese press that the only way now
to ensure Japan's entry into the
UN is to bring about an early
normalization of relations with
the USSR. He indicated he
would be willing if necessary
to visit the Soviet Union.
Leaders from west Jordan,
the area. annexed after the
Palestine war which contains
the bulk of the half million
Ara.b refugees who fled to Jor-?
dan from what is now Israel,
see in the Baghdad pact a de-
vice which at least tends to
distract attention from the
Arab-Israeli dispute and which
may limit Jordan's freedom of
action in regard to Israel.
The west Jordan outlook
was manifest in the hostile
public attitude toward the visit
of Turkish president Bayar to
Jordan in November. It was also
responsible for the fall of
the Jordanian cabinet on 13
December, when four west Jor-
dan ministers who refused to
approve adherence to the pact
resigned.
For these reasons King
Hussain asked General Templer,
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 7 of 8
25X1
 Approved Forlease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-0092WA -- 00700050001-1
SECRET .
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
chief of the British Imperial
General Staff and Michael Rose,
head of the Levant Department
of the Foreign Office, who
brought the British offers to
Jordan, for time to prepare
public opinion for the step.
Templer was scheduled to leave
for London on 15 December, but
he is prepared to return to
Jordan should further talks
with the new government be
needed. #-
The British Foreign Office
is inclined to believe that the
new government will be stronger
than the last and will not
hesitate to join the pact.
Egyptian intrigue and
Saudi Arabian money will be
brought to bear against a.fa-
vorable decision. The memory
of the assassination in 1951
of King Abdullah, who also was
accused of softness toward
Israel, is likely to be evoked.
Rigorous security measures will
therefore be necessary if Jor-
dan does join the pact, and the
decision, whichever way it goes,
will probably continue to be an
issue dividing the country frr
some time to come. 25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 8 of 8
 Approved Fo R lease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-0092 A 00700050001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1955
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Arab-Israeli Situation
Israel raided Syrian posi-
tions near the shore of Lake
Tiberias on 11 December. The
latest round of talks between
UN truce chief General Burns
and the Egyptian and Israeli
leaders has resulted, in no
appreciable progress toward
adoption of the UN proposals
for maintaining peace in the
El Auja demilitarized zone.
An Israeli official told
the American embassy in Tel
Aviv that the raid was really
"preventive" rather than "re-
taliatory," since the Israelis
wished to teach the Syrians
that they could not interfere
with Israeli activities on Lake
Tiberias. Israel claims the
lake and all its shores are in
Israeli territory.
The action may also have
been intended to test the newly
created Syrian-Egyptian joint
command. If Tel Aviv's object
is to discredit the effectiveness
of this alliance, it may well
have had initial success; the
joint command headquarters re-
portedly refused to make any
comment on the attack. Should
the Israelis pursue these tac-
tics further, however, Egyptian
prime minister Nasr will be
under considerable pressure to
take some counteraction, since
his failure to do so could
result in a serious loss of
Egyptian influence in Syria.
Egyptian recognition of
this possibility is presumably
behind Nasr's announcement on
15 December that Egypt and
Syria will attack Israel on two
fronts if there is "any further
Israeli aggression."
Both the Israeli action
and General Burns' conspicuous
lack of success in bringing
Egypt and Israel closer to a
solution of the El Auja problem
suggest that neither side any
longer considers the UN a seri-
out factor in the situation.
The Israelis have shown for
some time that this was their
attitude by their tactic of
calling the truce organization's
attention to border violations
and shooting incidents while
neglecting to ask for formal
investigations.
Reports from Cairo and Tel
Aviv indicate that basic deci-
sions on future policy are being
held up pending the return of
Israeli foreign minister Sharett
from his trip to the United
States and some announcement
of the Western attitude toward
Israel's request for arms.
SECRET
25X1
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 1 of 1-
 Approved ForpIease 2005/02/t(-; ~P79-00927A400700050001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
The movement for complete
independence is gathering
strength in French North Africa.
Encouraged by the gains the
nationalists have made in Tuni-
sia and by French-Moroccan ne-
gotiations, the Algerians are
preparing to seek a new rela-
tionship with France. The
French government has indefi-
nitely postponed parliamentary
elections in the four Algerian
departments.
Rabat
.Casablanca
t t
F R E N C H
M 0 R 0 C C O
SPANISH
SAHARA
TAP
?Tetuan
~;,'4N/S1{ ~M
1,y Mokocco ? lilla
dujda
Berber tribal attacks con-
tinue in northeastern Morocco.
French authorities fear that
the rebellion may spread to the
Beni Snassen tribe in the fer-
tile Oujda area. Moroccan
prime minister Si Bekkai, a mem-
ber and former chieftain of this
tribe, probably is being pressed
by the French to exert his in-
fluence to prevent such a devel-
opment.
American air force offi-
cials in Morocco believe the
tribesmen are supplied by two
major routes, one extending
south through Spanish Morocco
from Melilla and the other across
the Algerian border. Should
the Spanish authorities tighten
existing controls, the tribes
would probably be supplied from
Algeria.
In an apparent effort to
force the Spanish high commis-
sioner to proceed with his re-
ported plan to establish an
.
Algiers Constantine.
Medenine
TU N I S 1?A
autonomous Moroccan government
in Tetuan subordinate to the
sultan in Rabat, Istiglal leader
Allal el Fassi and Islah (Span-
ish Morocco) leader Abdelkhalek
Torres issued a joint communique
on 10 December requesting Spain
to free and unite its protector-
ate with the rest of Morocco.
The eventual unification of
Morocco, including the inter-
nationalized zone of Tangier,
is a basic policy of all Moroc-
can nationalist groups.
25X1
25X1
SECRET
PART I I Approved For Relea*81?5/RY~0- fffg9-00927A0007000500a0g1e 1 2 of 12
 Approved ForReeR lease 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A 00700050001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1955
Meanwhile, the Moroccan
Communist Party has stepped up
its propaganda activities.. Al-
legations by the French resident
general that the Communists are
involved in the tribal rebellion
in the Rif have not been sub-
stantiated. The Moroccan Com-
munist Party, however, is at-
tempting to take credit for
participation in the independ-
ence movement.
The French government has
indefinitely postponed the 2
January parliamentary elections
in the four Algerian departments
because of deteriorating public
safety and indications of a
widespread boycott by potential
Algerian Moslem candidates as
well as the voters.
Sixty-on6.of the:`91_.Alger-
ian Moslem members of various
national elected bodies, known
as the "61,?" appear to have so-
lidified their organization
formed in September. An "Action
Committee of the 61" recently
issued a communique calling for
immediate negotiations by all'
representative political groups
aimed at establishing a new Al-
gerian Charter. This group may
ally itself with the organization
of liberal French settlers now
being formed by Jacques Cheval-
lier, mayor of Algiers.
TUNISIA
The French high commissioner
announced on 8 December that
France had turned over several
internal security police units
to the Tunisian government.
Other units will be transferred
gradually to Tunisian authori-
ties. This development should
strengthen the hand of the Ben
Amar government, which is
strongly criticized by sympathiz-
ers of extremist nationalist
Salah ben Youssef as being too
conciliatory toward the French.
Under the French-Tunisian con-
ventions, transfer of control
over internal security forces
was not scheduled until late
1957.
Ben Youssef is continuing
his campaign both to discredit
moderate leader Habib Bourghiba
and to undermine the Tunisian
government. On 10 December, sev-
eral hundred demonstrators,
probably followers of Ben Youssef,
clashed with French troops while
attempting to loot the Neo-
Destour party headquarters in
Medenine, southern Tunisial.
Such clashes will probably
continue unless the government
soon acts to suppress Ben
Youssef's activities.
25X1
25X1
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 3 of 12
 Approved For Release 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-009270700050001-1
SECRET
Cyprus
The prospects for renewed
discussions of the Cyprus prob-
lem between the British governor
of the colony and Cypriot arch-
bishop Makarios appear to have
improved since the British de-
livery in Athens on 9 December
of a revised formula for set-
tling the dispute. Athens is
exerting pressure on Makarios
to ensure that their positions
are co-ordinated, and the arch-
bishop stated publicly on 11
December that his talks with
Governor Harding might soon be
resumed.
Although the British am-
bassador in Athens was not en-
couraged by the initial reaction
of the Greek foreign minister
to the latest British revised
formula, Athens is nevertheless
likely to urge Makarios to re-
sume negotiations on the basis
of that proposal. Prime Minis-
ter Karamanlis evidently wants
to continue his bargaining,
and he would probably like to
see new Makarios-Harding ne-
gotiations protracted until
after Greek elections early
next year in order to minimize
the Cyprus issue during the
election campaign.
Since the prime minister
is now primarily concerned with
avoiding Cyprus as an election
issue, he will probably soft-
pedal the controversy to avoid
further incitement of popular
emotions in Greece. King Paul,
who reportedly favored support
of London's original formula,
and Foreign Minister Theotokis
are probably reconciled to
Britain's refusal to guarantee
a time limit for self-determina-
tion.
In any new talks with
Harding, Makarios will probably
continue the moderate approach
he took in the talks last month.
Although Makarios has been crit-
icized by the Communists and
terrorist groups for his moder-
ate stand, his position has
probably been strengthened as a
result of several recent develop-
ments. The British military
operation in the Troodos Moun-
tains on 11 December, for ex-
ample, resulted in what appears
to have been the first signifi-
cant success of the British
security forces to date against
guerrillas of the terrorist
organization EOKA.
Moreover,:the Nicosia
newspaper controlled by the
Cyprus ethnarchy recently began
warning the Cypriots against
Communist intrigue to undermine
Nationalist unity and destroy
the gains already achieved
under Makarios' leadership.
The outlawing of the Cypriot
Communist Party on 14 December
and the arrest of 135 party
leaders in an island-wide
roundup by the British may also
have the effect of easing the
pressure of the extremists on
Makarios and further strength-
ening his position.
In general, the circum-
stances appear favorable for an
interim settlement at an early
date. Although some extremists
will probably persist in terror-
ist activities, gradual pacifi-
cation of the island may follow
as Makarios' followers in the
countryside discontinue support
of EOKA guerrillas.
25X1
25X1
SECRET
PART I I Approved For Releaq~5/f10 CC Page gf S79-00927A000700050001-1 4 of 12
 Approved F r R ase 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-009270700050001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Turkey
The new Turkish cabinet
has been approved by the Demo-
cratic Party caucus and should
have no major difficulty win-
ning a vote of confidence in the
Grand National Assembly, proba-
bly on 16 December. The vote
in the assembly, where party
loyalties are reflected, is not
likely to indicate the extent
and intensity of the opposition
to Prime Minister Menderes or
his policies.
Menderes' decision to keep
the national defense portfolio
suggests his intention to con-
tinue personal domination of
the government.
When the previous cabinet
was forced to resign on 29 No-
vember, Menderes was able to
obtain a narrow vote of "per-
sonal confidence." The party
caucus agreed to give him an-
other chance. Unless he proves
Plans for Egyptian Parliament
Egyptian prime minister
Nasr has set 16 January as the
date on which he will announce
plans re-establishing a nation-
al parliament. This action will
fulfill one of the long-stand-
ing promises made by Nasr's
military regime. However, the
narrow range of powers which
the regime intends to allow the
parliament makes it unlikely
that the move will arouse much
popular enthusiasm.
Ever since they overthrew
the monarchy in 1952, the army
officers who led the revolution
have considered ways and means
of returning Egypt to. at least
his willingness and ability to
handle Turkey's economic
problems, the cabinet may fall
again within a few months.
Menderes' new program pro-
vides several administrative
and judicial reforms but ap-
parently includes no major
economic reforms.
A second cabinet crisis,
possibly when the budget is
debated in March, might end
Menderes' political career.
If he were dropped from the
premiership, President Bayar
would probably assume a more
active leadership of the Demo-
cratic Party and of government
affairs.
In a policy statement to
the assembly on 14 December,
the new government confirmed
its position on the Cyprus
question and its intention to
continue working for the de-
velopment of the Balkan pact.
F__ I
ostensible civil control. A
constitutional committee, named
in January 1953, has produced
drafts, but none of these
seems to have found much favor
with Nasr, in whose hands the
decision rests. Nasr's prob-
lem is to institute consti-
tutional arrangements which
will preserve his own power
against possible opponents both
in and outside the present
governing body, the Revolution-
ary Command Council (RCC), and
which, at the same time, will
not be too patently rubber-
stamp in nature.
The solution Nasr and his
close advisers have chosen
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 5 of 12
25X1
 Approved F r Re ase 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A040700050001-1
SECRET % - OF
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1955
is a strong executive, with Nasr
as president and with the pres-
ent members of the RCC--minus
any who may be purged in the
interim--as cabinet officers.
The proposed parliament is
usually envisaged as a largely
appointed one in which interest
groups, such as industrial and
agricultural labor, industry,
etc., rather than geographic
constituencies will be repre-
sented.
Such a constitutional struc-
ture closely resembles the cor--
porate state outlined in Ital-
ian Fascist theory. The proto-
type of the Cairo regime's con-
ception, however, is reportedly
Portugal under Salazar, whose
example presumably is more pal-
atable than Mussolini's. A
parliament composed on these
lines has the advantage of
avoiding popular elections.
Such a parliament of interest
groups also practically ensures
the political anonymity of its
members, who, if known to the
Electrification
U ov~et a ways
According to recent an-
nouncements, the USSR intends to
electrify the Trans-Siberian
from Moscow to Irkutsk. Main-
line steam locomotives are to
go out of production during 1957,
and the percentage of total
freight hauled by diesel and
electric locomotives is to in-
crease from about 10 percent to
40-45 percent by 1960.
public at all, are identified
with the groups they represent
rather than as individual lead-
ers.
The RCC has indicated that
a considerable share in a new
parliament would be given to
organized industrial labor, a
group which the regime has
sought to use to develop the
mass base of support which it
lacks. During the last six
months, however, this still
relatively small group has
shown little interest in the
RCC's proposals, regarding with
indifference the jussihi_LxL;y of
representation in a powerless
parliament whose members would
be hand-picked. Regardless of
how adroit the constitutional
arrangements are, this indif-
ference is likely to be the re-
action of the Egyptian public
as well, and the regime may find
that in instituting a parlia-
ment of this kind it will lose
rather than popularity.
.Flans for electrification
after 19.60 include the remain-
ing stretch of the Trans-Sibe-
rian from Irkutsk to Vladivostok,
a Moscow-Flack Sea-Sochi line,
a Moscow-.Sverdlovsk line, a
Moscow-Leningrad line, and
several important shorter stretches.
By 1965 diesel and electric loco-
motive f r.,,ight haulage is sched-
uled to rise to 30-85 percent
of total haulage.
SECRET
Approved For Rele 220054 /1 0 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
jT S AI. C01,5MENTS Page r : c_z 1"",
25X1
 Approved For Re ase 2005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00 27A 00700050001-1
SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Advantages of railway
electrification over steam
location are higher speeds,
heavier loads, lower mainte-
nance costs, higher degree of
readiness for operation, and
savings of high-quality coal.
Diesel engines have, in general,
similar advantages over steam
locomotion. Dieselization.costs
less than electrification, and
is therefore preferred in areas
of relatively lower traffic
densities and longer hauls.
Less than one fourth of
the 3,320-mile stretch from
Moscow to Irkutsk is now elec-
trified, and the remaining dis-
tance is about equal to the
2,500 miles of line electrified
in the Soviet Union in the past
quarter century.
When this project is com-
pleted, the electrified por-
tion of the Trans-Siberian,
with a sizable increase in
capacity, will not only serve
the rapidly developing Irkutsk
area but will also reach almost
to Ulan Ude, the junction with
the new Mongolian railway to
China. Electrification to this
junction, including a difficult
stretch around the southern tip
of Lake Baikal with many tun-
nels, will probably soon follow.
The intention to end steam
locomotive production in 1957
indicates that plans have been
radically revised since May
1954, when First Deputy Premier
Kaganovich announced that during
the 1956-60 plan, 6,000 steam,
2,000 diesel-electric, and
2,000 electric locomotives
would be needed. If steam loco-
motive production ends in 1957,
only 2,000 or 2,500 will prob-
ably be built during the coming
plan period. 25X1
pared by ORR
IHlll _ - - ` JJi
\ ~ . r it P LJ ~?
7' C
j
fi0
LECT IF S y1g, I 4
AD
Ilion ~' rm sk
and I sha .., ~~
lQO
e
El
ifi
t
d
il
d
ec
r
e
ra
roa
~ /
o
iJJod
i~
I ~ I Railroad, to be electrified by 1960
? p l 1l ----- Railroad, to be electrified after 1960
Kiev (L
Moscow
Krivoy
Ro
Gorki
'"
i
y
g Ryo
,
an
Solikask
IDeboltsevo -Molotov Serov 0f
~ {r l
I.- I . Sverdlovsk 0
QD
Sochi Abd ulino
KI910VOd5k Chelyabinsk `".
5
a s Magnitogorsk
7
Tbilisi _ Omsk
Yerev n Novosibirsk
B. /-~ Khabaro//
.' fix., Stalinsk r ggg~
t
40
VI ivostok
rr
yA
I
18 DECEMBER 195
9 1000 11q 149]0
6D eD 100 12D
SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
PART II NOTES AND COMMENTS Page 7 of 12
25X1
 Approved F r Re ase 2005/02/10 : CIA-RDP79-00 7AOA0 700050001-1
SECRET
South Vietnam
Viet Minh propaganda is
devoting considerable attention
to the forthcoming elections for
a national assembly in South
Vietnam, which will probably be
held sometime before mid-
February. It describes them as
an integral part of a plot to
"wreck the Geneva agreement,
integrate South Vietnam into
the SEATO bloc, and rekindle
the war." One broadcast noted
that the experiences gained in
struggling against the October
referendum on Bao Dai's future
provides "ample means of op-
posing the American-Diem plot
for wrecking peace and unifi-
cation."
Recent reports credit the
Viet Minh with an increased
capacity for infiltration,
sabotage and terrorism at the
village level in South Vietnam,
The Pathet Lao attack a-
gainst royal government troops
southeast of Muong Peun on 5
December now appears to have
been a localized skirmish rather
than the signal for military
action throughout northern Laos.
The government forces repulsed
the attempt to cut their line
of communications and have
forced the enemy's retreat.
The American army attache
in Vientiane reports that the
government troops demonstrated
a reasonably good degree of com-
bat effectiveness. French air
supply, on which the troops
especially in the area west of
Saigon. Viet Minh infiltration
of the Hoa Hao dissidents in
this area is apparently making
headway and President Diem has
described the situation as
critical. The Viet Minh may
hope to utilize the Hoa Hao
rebels as a front to harass
the Diem government, and thus
avoid open violation of the
Geneva terms.
To counter Viet Minh in-
fluence in rural areas, Diem
has inaugurated a village self-
defense corps. In addition,
he has decided to resettle ap-
proximately 100,000 northern
refugees in western South Viet-
nam. The presence of these
anti-Communist refugees will
ultimately aid greatly in
eliminating the security prob-
lem in that region.
involved were totally dependent,
continued during the operation.
Government commando units
reportedly have also retaliated
in other areas, attacking Pathet
Lao munitions depots. Reports
on the extent of this activity,
which could provoke a strong
enemy reaction and expand the
present hostilities, are frag-
mentary. Premier Katay, how-
ever, has told the American am-
bassador that the government
does not wish to press a counter-
offensive prior to the National
Assembly elections on 25 Decem-
ber.
SECRET
Approved For ReI a 005/02/10: CIA-RDP79-00927A000700050001-1
AND COMMENTS Page 8 of 12
25X1
 Approved F r Re ase 2005/02/ i P79-00 7A0 .0700050001-1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
15 December 1955
Satellites Move to Improve
Relations With United a es
Expressions of interest
by East European countries in
improving relations with the
United States have now been
followed by action. On 28 No-
vember negotiations on outstand-
ing economic problems began in
Prague between the United
States and Czechoslovakia, and
since 7 December Rumania has
granted 13 long-denied exit
visas requested by the United
States. Polish and Hungarian
officials have also expressed
interest in negotiating out-
standing problems with the US,
but no'formal action has yet
been taken by either government
comparable to the Czech and
Rumanian initiatives.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The announced objective
of the talks in Prague is to
normalize economic relations be-
tween the United States and
Czechoslovakia insofar as pos-
sible under existing political
circumstances. The current
series of meetings caps several
years of efforts to establish
some mutual basis of discussion.
Czechoslovakia's approach
however, makes it improbable
that any quick settlement will
be reached. Czechoslovakia has
included in its agenda, proposals
for a general discussion of all
outstanding economic issues, in-
cluding the problem of "economic
discrimination" against Czecho-
slovakia, which is very important
"since the United States had dis-
criminated unscrupulously against
Czechoslovakia