CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000600130001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 13, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 20
OCI NO. 8197/55
13 October 1955
DOCUME 4T NO. ~. ..>_
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 0
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: S ~?J
NEXT REVIEW DATE: ~C ~ ..__`
At1TH: 1 %70-2
6k -
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
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State Department review completed ALGOCY
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and. conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
. 13 October 1955
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
NEW AFGHAN-PAKISTANI CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The merger of all of West Pakistan into a single nrovince,
scheduled to be made official on 14 October, may lead to a
rupture in Afghan-Pakistani relations. Afghanistan objects.to'?the
merger because the Pushtoon area for which it demands'.irideperidence
would be swallowed up. Any break in relations would give the
Soviet Union an opportunity to enlarge its economic offensive
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ARAB STATES RESPOND FAVORABLY
TO EGYPT-SOVIET BLOC-ARMS DEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
Tie-reaction of other Arab states to Egypt's arms agreement
with the Soviet bloc has been overwhelmingly favorable. Although
credit for the deal has redounded so far much more to Egypt than
the Soviet bloc, Moscow's public reiteration of its eagerness to
provide all the assistance the Arabs may ask--economic as well
as military--may focus Arab attention more directly on Soviet
generosity and friendship.
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FRENCH ASSEMBLY
DEBATES ALGERIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
In its debates on Morocco and Algeria, the French National
Assembly has succeeded neither in settling these issues nor in
clarifying-its attitude toward the Faure government. The out-
look for the vote on Algerian policy reflected the Socialists'
rejection of a program aimed at integrating Algeria fully in
the French republic, and the rightist extremists' demand for
strong repressive measures to nip budding nationalism.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Foreign Ministers' Conference Issues: Moscow may be preparing to
modify its position on disarmament at the forthcoming foreign
ministers' conference. With respect to German unification,
the USSR has been reiterating both officially and in propa-
ganda that this problem cannot be solved at the conference.
At the same time, the USSR is actively promoting East-West
contacts and cultural exchanges in order to convince inter-
national opinion that no iron curtain exists.
D
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Molotov's Self-Criticism: Soviet foreign minister Molotov's
admission M-at a s atement in his speech to the Supreme
Soviet on 8 February 1955 was "theoretically mistaken and
politically harmful" and the Kommunist editorial criticizing
the mistake reflect continuing a-fsks a against him for
being inflexible and out of tune with the times in foreign
policy. The latest attack may be merely a warning to
conform to present policies, but it could also foreshadow
Molotov's removal from all posts--party presidium member,
first deputy premier, and foreign minister.
I- I
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
French North Africa: In Morocco, formation of the promised
council or e throne, considered to be the next es-
sential step in solving the present impasse, is still
being delayed. Tribal raids have created a precarious
military situation for the French, in northeastern
Morocco. In Algeria, terrorism and rebel activity con-
tinue, and in Tun s a, extreme nationalist leader Salah
ment which became effective last month. Page
Political Developments in Greece: The strong vote of con-
fidence accorded Greek pr me minister Karamanlis by the
Chamber of Deputies on 12 October will stabilize Greek
politics temporarily, giving him an opportunity to pro-
ceed with plans to develop a new party. Maneuvering
among the opposition parties as well as within the Rally
is likely to increase as national'. elections, announced
for April 1956, draw near. 1 ~. . . . . rage a
Effects of Iran's Adherence to Baghdad Pact: Iran's de-
cision to join the "northern er"defense alignment,
as announced formally to the members of the Baghdad
pact on 12 October, results from strong Turkish pres-
sure and apparently from the Shah's conviction that it
is a "now-or-never" proposition. The USSR has warned
Iran that it attaches "grave importance" to this de-
cisinn_ and some Arab states will probably strongly
criticize Iran's move. ~? ? rage '
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13 October 1955
Atomic Civilian Defense Training in USSR: Two Soviet publi-
cations have recently published in?ormation on atomic
defense for the civilian population. By introducing
atomic defense instruction for civilians, the USSR
probably hopes to increase support for the civilian
defense training program. . . Page 8
Warship Construction in East German :
the East German naval orces, w c a
present consist of 26 minesweepers, and a small number
of auxiliary service craft, are being expanded. A
construction program now under way is reported to include
destroyers, mine vessels, motor torpedo boats, and patrol
craft. In addition, an East German shipyard at Rostock
is believed to be building a class of 3,000-ton sub-
marine tenders for the USSR. Page 8
Communist China Entering Southeast Asian Markets: Communist
China is carrying out its offer to, supply Southeast-Asia
with machinery and light industrial equipment, and has
substantially increased exports of manufactures in 1955.
China's determination to increase its share in this
market is demonstrated by the great number and variety of
low-priced consumer goods which recently arrived in
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Singapore for exhibition. . . . . Page 10 25X1
Laos: Pathet Lao chief Prince Souphannouvong and Premier
Katay have broken off their negotiations in Rangoon
and have referred outstanding issues back to the negoti-
ating teams in Vientiane. The two, men had reached an
agreement for a cease-fire but this was reportedly
contingent on a settlement of the basic issues at dispute.
. . . . . . Page 11
Indonesian Elections: With unofficial returns from Indo-
nesia's 29 September elections largely in, it is clear
that no party will have a majority and that a coalition
government will be necessary. The National Party, which
still has.=a plurality, has stated through a spokesman
that it intends to exclude the Communists from any
coalition it forms. National Party demands for the
resignation of the Masjumi-led government have abated
with the rising tide of Masjumi votes. Page 12 25X1
Communist Activities in Malaya and Singapore: The amnesty
offered the Malayan Communists on 8 September has so
far been accepted by only 21 persons. It has, however,
brought forth a request from the Communist Party secretary
general for a cease-fire and for a meeting with Malayan
chief minister Rahman, which Rahman has agreed to with
qualifications. In Singapore, the government faces in-
tensive Communist subversive efforts which are greatly
aided'by the fast-growin People's Action Party, a Communist-
front. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
United Front Influence Threatens Pakistan's Stability: The
United Front Party is extracting a heavy price for its
participation with the Moslem League in Pakistan's
coalition government. As a result, the freedom of
action of Governor General Mirza and Prime Minister
Chaudri Mohammad All, both of the Moslem League, is
limited and the nosit:ion of the whole
i
i
l
ncreas
ng
y
14
government is precarious. I I . ? . ? . rage
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Bonn Abandons Trade Embargo Against East Germany: The West
German government as abandoned its retaliatory trade
embargo against East Germany. Bonn has never been con-
fident of its capabilities to force East Germany to
discontinue restrictive truck tolls on Berlin traffic
and apparently recognizes that Germany may remain divided
for an indefinite period. Meanwhile, with the exception
of the truck toll and sporadic scrap confiscations, the
Ea
ans have refrained from harassing traffic be-
t G
r
s
e
m
tween West Germnay and Berlin. I . . . rage --
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE SAAR REFERENDUM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Most observers anticipate that the statute for Euro-
peanizing the Saar will be rejected when the population
of the territory goes to the polls on :33 October. Pro-
German elements in the Saar are conducting a vigorous
campaign against the statute. The West European Union
governments, however, are moving to strengthen the forces
supporting it. Rejection of the statute would entail
serious consequences for French-German relations.
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF THE UNITED STATES . . . Page 4
The Soviet press and radio continue to follow the
moderate and restrained line toward the United States
which they adopted last June. Eastern European media, as
is often the case, have delayed somewhat in picking up the
Soviet line, and Far Eastern Communist propagandists are
making only a token contribution to this effort to sup-
port the Kremlin's current foreign policy.
PEIPING'S CONCILIATORY APPROACH TO FAR EASTERN PROBLEMS. . Page 6
Peiping's professed adherence to the "Geneva. spirit"
has emerged in such recent gestures as the announced de-
cision to evacuate six divisions from Korea and the con-
tinuing calm in the Formosa area. Without renouncing its
objective of liberating Formosa, Communist China is
apparently deferring further major attacks in the offshore
island area while it sees some prospect of political gain
in direct talks with the United States. Elsewhere in Asia,
the Chinese Communists maintain the conciliatory tone
adopted at the Bandung conference last April and seek to
weaken American prestige and influence by-intensifying
appeals to neutralist sentiment.
TROUBLE IN INDIAN-HELD KASHMIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 8
Strong Communist influence in the government of Indian-
held Kashmir and continuing popular opposition to the admin-
istration endanger the internal stability of this area which
remained in Indian hands at the time the fighting with Paki-
stan ended in January 1949. While Pakistan continues to
press its claims to Kashmir, most of the immediate local diffi-
culties are caused by indigenous opposition to the present
government. The 40,000 Indian troops in Kashmir probably
could handle any sudden crisis, but New Delhi appears uncertain
how to resolve the long-range internal political problem it
faces in Kashmir.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
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SOVIET AIRCRAFT ENGINE INDUSTRY . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Page 11
The USSR has made rapid progress in research, develop-
ment, and production of modern aircraft engines since World
War II and, on the basis of recent observations, now appears
to have a capability comparable to that of the West in this
field. The demands of any foreseeable aircraft production
ro ram can be met by the existing aircraft engine industry.
VIET MINH RESTORING ROADS AND RAILWAYS .
The Viet Minh, with Chinese Communist assistance, has
made a major effort during the past year to rehabilitate the
road and rail transport network in North Vietnam. Nearly the
entire network, which is of vital importance to Viet Minh
economic recovery and the preservation, of military ngth,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
NEW AFGHAN-PAKISTANI CRISIS
The merger of all of West
Pakistan into a single province,
scheduled to be made official
on 14 October, may lead to a
rupture in Afghan-Pakistani re-
lations. Afghanistan objects
because the Pushtoon area for
which it demands independence
would be swallowed up in the
merger. Any break in relations
would give the Soviet Union an
opportunity to enlarge its
economic offensive in Afghan-
istan.
Afghan foreign minister
Naim has proposed a meeting of
the Pakistani and Afghan prime
ministers before 14 October,
when the merger is to become
official, as the "final hope"
of preserving relations between
the two countries.
Nairn is reported to have
predicted anti-Pakistani dem-
onstrations in Kabul on 14 Octo-
ber,' ,and there have been un-
confirmed reports of troop
movements and preparations for
tribal uprisings on that day.
Afghanistan only a month ago
promised to refrain from anti-
Pakistani activities in order
to get the Pakistani blockade
of its borders lifted, but the
heavy personal involvement of
Naim and Prime Minister Daud in
opposition to merger of the
Pakistani provinces may result
in at least token action on the
fourteenth.
Renewal of the bitter Pak-
istani-Afghan quarrel would pro-
vide the USSR with an excellent
opportunity to expand its eco-
nomic offensive in Afghanistan,
where it already has well-devel-
oped economic contacts. Iran's
adherence to the Baghdad pact
might also inspire added Soviet
efforts to keep Afghanistan out
of the Western camp.
The Afghans may be expected
to try to profit from both Amer-
ican and Soviet interest in
their dispute with Pakistan.
Naim told an officer of the
American embassy in Kabul on
8 October that Afghanistan is
still willing to co-operate
with American plans for Middle
East defense. At the same time,
an Afghan official has reportedly
been sent to Cairo to investigate
the Egyptian-Czech arms deal.
Although Afghanistan has
in the past been careful to
avoid those types of Soviet
assistance which could lead to
significant political penetra-
tion, current bitterness toward
Pakistan, dissatisfaction with
American economic aid, and the
recently increased economic
contacts with the Soviet Union
could result in establishment
of closer ties with the Soviet
bloc, if the latter is prepared
to make a vigorous effort to
achieve them.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
ARAB STATES RESPOND FAVORABLY
TO EGYPT-SOVIET BLOC ARMS DEAL
The reaction of other Arab
states to Egypt's arms agree-
ment with the Soviet bloc has
been overwhelmingly favorable.
Although credit for the deal
has redounded so far much more
to Egypt than the Soviet bloc,
Moscow's public reiteration of
its eagerness to provide all
the assistance the Arabs may
ask, economic as well as mili-
tary, may focus Arab attention
more directly on Soviet gen-
erosity and friendship.
Egypt's gains in prestige
from the arms deal have been
reflected in favorable press
comment and in official state-
ments from all the Arab states
except Iraq. Even the Iraqis
have felt constrained to con-
fine their criticism to private
talks. The Arabs generally see
the deal as a major move in
their emancipation from Western
dominance. Egypt reportedly
has been quick to capitalize on
this sentiment by,offering
itself as a,channel through
which Syria, Lebanon, and
Libya also can acquire arms.
The Arab reaction has
emphasized Egypt's heroic role
in breaking with the West on
the arms issue, rather than
any policy change in the Arabs'
favor by the USSR. However,
Moscow's gains, though slower
in coming, are likely to be
nonetheless real.
I
14-man
contingent of
Czech an
Soviet
arms experts
arrived in
Cairo
on 2 October.
Not only have the Czechs
started implementation of the
agreement with Egypt quickly,
but Moscow has followed up
promptly with a public announce-
ment of its willingness to pro-
vide economic assistance, specif-
ically for Egypt's Aswan high
dam 'project. Soviet ambassador
Solod told the press in Cairo
on 110 October that the USSR
could assist with equipment,
though not with cash.
In Arab international
politics, as distinct from
Arab public opinion, the arms
deal has had a disturbing effect.
The increase in Egypt's pres-
tige and the possibility that
Syria may also deal with the
bloc have aroused Iraqi and
Lebanese fears that Egypt may
use its new supplies of arms
to secure the dominant influ-
ence among the Arabs that it
failed to obtain through the
abortive Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi
Arabian defense pact.
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FRENCH ASSEMBLY
DEBATES ALGERIA
In its debates on Morocco
and Algeria, the French National
Assembly has succeeded neither
in settling these issues nor
in clarifying its.. attitude
toward the Faure government.
The debate on Algeria got
off to an apathetic start on
11 October, but as the time
for a vote approached, the
outlook appeared less favorable
to Faure than immediately
following the Moroccan debate.
The prermi er must play for
time to work out a long-range
program for Algeria., The Social-
ists reject as unrealistic a
program aimed at integrating
Algeria fully within the French
republic, and rightist extrem-
ists demand strong repressive
measures to nip budding national-
ism. Assembly opinion on
Algeria's relationship to France
is evolving fast, however, and
support is growing for a fed-
eralist solution.
A major influence in this
direction is the fact that com-
plete integration of Algeria
would mean 140 Moslem deputies
in the French National Assembly.
In the meantime, the immediate
reform measures sponsored by
Governor General Soustelle are
sufficiently supple to be backed
by disparate elements in Paris.
The final 477-140 vote of
9 October on the Moroccan issue
was not an indication of Faure's
parliamentary strength. It was
more of a warning to Faure to
stop pussyfooting and begin
immediately to implement the
Aix-les-Bains agreement with
the Moroccan nationalists.
Disgruntled rightists who de-
serted Faure on the Moroccan
issue but are still nominally
in the government coalition are
determined to block such a pro-
gram, however, and the Socialists,
despite their strong support of
Faure on the Moroccan issue, are
still basically an opposition
party.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Foreign Ministers' Conference
Issues
DISARMAMENT
Soviet delegate Sobolev's
speech at the last meeting of
'the UN Disarmament Subcommittee
until after the Big Four for-
eign ministers' conference at
Geneva. recapitulated previous
Soviet statements and con-
`tained no important new points.
'He persisted in his refusal
to be drawn into a detailed
examination of the problem
of inspection and control,
arguing that agreement must
first be reached on.,the princi-
ples of a general disarmament
plan. The United States, he
said, was merely trying to
avoid such agreement in con-
centrating on President Eisen-
hower's aerial inspection pro-
posals.
However, there are signs
that Moscow may be preparing
to modify its disarmament posi-
tion in the belief that the
foreign ministers' conference
will provide a more effective
forum than the UN subcommittee
talks.'
In the past the USSR has
insisted that a ban on nuclear
weapons would necessitate de-
struction of existing stocks
of such weapons. On 8 October,
however, a member of the Soviet
delegation to the UN subcom-
mittee told American officials
that, as currently used by Mos-
cow, the term "prohibition of
atomic weapons" means prohibi-
tion of use and production for
military purposes rather than
destruction.of existing stocks.
Premier Bulganin's letter to
President Eisenhower on 19
September conveyed the same
impression. While Ambassador
Malik and other Soviet spokes-
men subsequently denied that
this letter indicated a change
in the Soviet position as stated
on 10 May, the letter may have
been intended as a first step
toward revising that position.
Such revisions. may in-
volve changes in the time sched-
ule envisaged in the 10. May plan
which would be designed to bring
Moscow's disarmament policy into
line with Bulganin's Geneva
position on European security.
The 10 May plan, for example,
proposed a two-stage disarma-
ment program, including liquida-
tion of foreign military bases,
to be completed within two
years, by the end of 1957. At
Geneva, however, Bulganin's pro-
posals on European security
envisaged the continued exist-
ence of NATO and the Western
European Union for at least
another two or three years.
Any new disarmament pro-
posals at the foreign ministers'
meeting may follow the pattern
of Bulganin's European security
proposals at Geneva by stressing
gradual, step-by-step progress,
but without abandoning insist-
ence on terms of an ultimate
agreement presently unacceptable
to the Western powers. Thus,
the Soviet Union may propose
implementation of the first
stage of the Soviet disarmament
plan which calls for states to
pledge to discontinue testing
nuclear weapons and to pledge
not to use nuclear weapons,
except in defense against agre&-
sion,, and then only on the
aecision of the UN Security
Council.
Such proposals would be
designed to demonstrate the
USSR's interest in extending
the area of agreement with the
Western powers on disarmament
and to increase the pressure on
the United States to commit
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY'
itself to a general disarmament
program.
GERMANY AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Soviet insistence that the
German unification question
cannot be solved at the for-
eign ministers' meeting was
expressed more bluntly than
ever in a speech by Presidium
member Suslov in Berlin on 6
October and in a similarly
worded Pravda editorial 'on 7
October.
Suslov denied the Western
assertion that the success of
the conference depends on
solving the German unification
question. He asserted that
West Germany's membership in
NATO and its remil?itarization
have ,nade a simple solution
impossible. He warned that
the USSR would not agree to
inclusion of a united Germany
in NATO.
Suslov said that the for-
eign ministers must not look
for differences of opinion,
but rather seek to bring closer
together the various view-
points on disarmament, banning
of atomic weapons, and European
security. He stated that a
collective security system
would increase trust between
states and bring East and West
Germany closer together, the
latter development being a
particularly important prereq-
uisite to German unity.
The East German paper
Neues Deutschland has charged
that Western planners, by decid-
ing to bar German representa-
tion at the foreign ministers'
conference, are violating the
directive of the heads of
governments. It claimed that
this destroyed the possibility
of discussing at Geneva steps
toward German reunification.
These statements indicate
that, in line with its stand
at the summit meeting, the USSR
will seek to avoid discussion
of the unification question
altogether at the foreign
ministers' conference. If
forced to discuss it, the USSR
will, emphasize negotiations
between East and West Germany
and other standard Soviet pre-
requisites to German reunifica-
tion..
West German Socialist
leader Ollenhauer reportedly
believes Molotov will suggest
that East and West Germany
simultaneously renounce their
respective memberships in the
Warsaw pact and 'NATO as his
price for discussing all-German
elections. It is more likely,
however, that Molotov will con-
centrate on European security
plans designed to achieve the
complete dissolution of NATO.
Soviet propaganda has
given no clues concerning any
modifications the USSR may make
in its security proposals.
Comment on Western planning has
been limited to attacks on the
West's desire to maintain NATO
in any security system and to
assertions that the USSR does
not need any Western guarantees
against German attack.
EAST-WEST CONTACTS
Since the summit conference
the USSR has been actively pro-
moting East-West contacts and
cultural exchanges, including
a large number with Britain,
France and the United States.
Soviet propaganda has reported
the steady stream of visiting
delegations to and from the
Soviet Union, particularly in
broadcasts beamed internally,
but has offered little editorial
comment on them.
One of the purposes of this
propaganda has been to show how
faithfully the USSR has been
pursuing the "Geneva spirit,"
while another has probably been
to prepare the Russian people
for a continuation of this
spirit for a prolonged period.
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Moscow has not recently
criticized the United States
or other Western countries for
obstructing these visits, nor
has it exploited what admin-
istrative difficulties have
arisen in Western countries to
charge sabotage of exchange
programs.
One likely Soviet effort
at the Geneva conference will be
Molotov's Self-Criticism
Soviet foreign minister
Molotov's admission in an open
letter to the editor of the
Communist Party's top theoretical
journal, Kommunist, that a state-
ment in his speec to the USSR
Supreme Soviet on 8 February
1955 was "theoretically mistaken
and politically harmful" reflects
continuing attacks against him.
In the Supreme Soviet speech
Molotov characterized the Soviet
Union as a country "where the
foundations of a socialist so-
ciety have already been built."
This was clearly at variance
with official dogma, which since
1936 has stated that socialism
has been achieved ancc that the
Soviet state is now on the path
to the higher stage--communism.
Molotov's "error," however,
appears to have been a slip in
terminology rather than an at-
tempt to contradict official
doctrine, since just five para-
graphs earlier in the same speech
he had "correctly" stated that
"socialism had already triumphed
in our country in the period be-
fore the Second World War."
The lead editorial in the
same issue of Kommunist that
published Molotov's Witter re-
fers to his "erroneous" formula-
tion and emphasizes the unity of
communist theory and practice
and the necessity to be flexible
West.
to outline what the USSR has
done to promote East-West ex-
changes and to convince world
opinion that no iron curtain
exists. Moscow may consider
that this agenda item offers
an easy opportunity to cite in-
creased trust among nations and
promote its general strategy of
obtaining a detente and arma-
ments reductions with a minimum
of formal agreements with the
in tactics. This editorial ap-
pears directed against Molotov
for his general inflexibility
and obstructionism as one of the
formulators of top policy, in-
ternal as well as foreign, rather
than exclusively for his dogmatic
approach to foreign relations.
Apparently alluding to the
latter, Kommunist asserts that the
party" Airing y combines adher-
ence to principles and flexibility
in foreign policy" and claims
that this has been the cause of
the "successes of the Soviet -
Union's foreign policy in the
struggle for peace."
Molotov has been under fire
for some time, and as late as
two months ago his retirement
as foreign minister appeared im-
minent. Since then, however, he
has headed the Soviet delegation
to the United Nations and as re-
cently as 10 October stated that
he would be at the Big Four for-
eign ministers' conference at
Geneva later this month. He
told correspondents at a party
he gave for Canadian minister of
external affairs Lester Pearson
in Moscow that "anybody who reads
the letter can see there is no
question of retirement, and no
question of retirement arises.
If you look again, everything
will be clear. There is no
question of retirement."
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Pressure may have been
brought to bear on Molotov to
admit his February mistake.pub-
licly in order to add ideological
deviation to his catalog of sins,
which include opposing the Yugo-
slav rapprochement and being
inflexible and out of tune with
the times. It would appear that
the domestic reasons for Molo-
tov's self-criticism and the,
publishing of his letter at this
time were stronger than the pos-
sible adverse effects his hum-
bling would have on the'strength
of the soviet position at tue
Geneva foreign ministers' confer-
ence. Molotov may have continued
to resist the presidium policy
he will be required to represent
there.
Whether this is more than
a warning to mend his ways is
not clear at this time,. but it
could pave the way for his re-
moval from n.11 posts--party
presidium member first deputy
premier, and foreign minister.
Likely candidates to suc-
ceed Molotov as foreign minister
Morocco: Premier Faure's
policy or Morocco, endorsed
by the French National Assembly
on 9 October, remains bogged
down in the face of opposition
by the French settlers and by
right-wing elements in France.
Formation of the promised coun-
cil of the throne, which is bit-
terly opposed by the settlers,
but considered to be the next
essential step in solving the
Moroccan impasse, has not yet
occurred. This council may be
formed by 16 October, according
to recent press reports from
Paris.
should he be removed are his
two first deputies, A.A. Gromyko
and V.V. Kuznetsov, with Kuz-
netsov favored because of his
higher party position. Kuznet-
sov is a full member of the
central committee and a former
presidium member, while Gromyko
is only a candidate member of
the central committee. Kuznet-
sov, too, better epitomizes the
"Geneva spirit" personality-
wise than Gromyko, who is cast
more in the Molotov mold.
D.T. Shepilov, Pravda
editor, who was rumored at the
time of Khrushchev's visit to
Belgrade to have been picked for
Molotov's replacement, appears
now to be out of the running be-
cause of his recent election as
Communist Party secretary under
First Secretary Khrushchev.
Another choice might be P.I.
Mikoyan, Communist Party pre-
sidium member and first deputy,.
chairman of the USSR Council of
Ministers, because of his ex-
perience in dealing with for-
eigners as foreign trade min-
ister.
Resident General Boyer de
Latour is unlikely to be a suc-
cessful instrument for imposing
Faure's policy. He does not
favor a moderate policy toward
the Moroccans, and he has close
ties with Marshal Juin and Gen-
eral Koenig, leaders of the op-
position in France to Faure's
program. In any case, an at-
tempt by him to install the
council of the throne probably
would evoke settler demonstra-
tions so intense that he would
have to resign or be recalled.
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The reactionary Presence
Francaise, which claims to rep-
resent 90 percent of the 400,-
000 French settlers in Morocco,
recently published the text of
an agreement allegedly made with
the resident general in which
the settlers acceded to the
withdrawal of Sultan Mohamed ben
Arafa on condition that no coun-
cil of the throne be installed.
The settlers have threatened to
resort to violence if such a
council is established, and on
10 October reinforced this
threat with a 24-hour commer-
cial strike.
The Moroccan nationalists
continue to insist on implementa-
carious and state that as many
as 35,000 tribesmen may be in-
volved in the attacks.
Algeria: Debate in the
French National Assembly on
Governor General Soustelle's
modest program of reforms for
Algeria commenced on 11 October.
The :French government is offi-
cially committed to a policy of
fuller integration of Algerian
Moslems as French citizens,
while the Algerian Moslems are
now openly campaigning for an
autonomous state federated with
France. Right-wing elements in
France are supporting the set-
tlers in Algeria who oppose
any steps toward ameliorating the
UNREST IN NORTH AFRICA
.Fez
0
asablanca l
-
}
Khouribga.t
tion of the program agreed to
at Aix-les-Bains in August. The
upsurge of terrorism in the
past month and the continuing
tribal assaults on French mili-
tary outposts since 1 October
were probably initiated by the
moderate nationalists to remind
France of the strength of the
nationalist movement and at the
same time satisfy the extremist
demand for action.
French officials admit
that the military situation in
northern Morocco remains pre-
position of the natives, while
the Socialists and Communists
are sympathetic toward the
nationalists' aspirations.
'terrorism and rebel activ-
ities have increased in western
Algeria near the Moroccan border.
In an attempt to forestall rebel
activity as serious as exists
in eastern Algeria, the French
have armed several thousand Al-
gerian Moslems who are considered
reliable, as well as many set-
tlers. Attacks may be expected
to continue at least until the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
Algerian issue has been acted
on by the UN General Assembly.
Tunisia: While the month-
old. government of Premier Tahar
beg Amar is engrossed in or-
ganizing for its newly acquired,
autonomy, some Tunisians are be-
coming impatient with the lack
of political action. Only stop-
gap measures have thus far been
taken to alleviate the near-
famine conditions and severe un-
employment.
Incursions of Algerian
rebels into western Tunisia and
consequent destruction of life'
and property have created a spe-
cial security problem which may'
be exploited by extremist nation-
alist leader Salah ben Youssef.:
Ben Youssef, in his first
speech since his return to
Tunisia last month, stated on.
7 October that Tunisians are not
Political Developments in Greece
The strong vote of confi-
dence accorded Prime Minister
Karamanlis by the Greek Chamber
of Deputies on 12 October will
stabilize Greek politics tem-
porarily, giving Karamanlis an
opportunity to proceed with
plans to develop a new party.
Maneuvering among the opposi-
tion parties as well as within
the Rally is likely to increase
as national elections, announced
for April 1956, draw near.
Karamanlis' policy state-
ment to parliament on 10 October
contained nothing new, which
suggests that he plans for the
present to continue policies
of the Papagos government and
to concentrate on strengthening
his position and organizing
party machinery for the elec-
tions. His critical references
to Turkey and friendly refer-
ences to Yugoslavia were ges-
tures to anti-Turkish popular
sentiment. In an effort to
cater to public sentiment and
possibly also to demonstrate
independence of American
bound by their government's
agreement with France. He de-
clared, "We must not let slip
any opportunity to reach our
total independence."
Ben Youssef was expelled
from the Neo-Destour party on 12
October because his views run
counter to the moderate and
conciliatory policy of the
party's president, Habib
Bourghiba, who was largely re-
sponsible for the conclusion of
the French-Tunisian agreement
last. spring.
Ben Youssef is obviously
campaigning to wrest the mod-
erate Neo-Destour party from
Bourghiba's control. His ex-
pulsion highlights the problem
which nationalism in Tunisia'
faces, and is likely to cause
a. split within the nationalist
movement.
influence, Karamanlis apparently
has decided to focus Greek re-
sentment over the Cyprus issue
against Turkey.
In his dual capacity of
prime minister and minister of
defense, Karamanlis announced
on 11 October that Greece would
not participate in NATO exer-
cises this month pending satis-
faction from Ankara, over the
anti.-Greek riots in Istanbul
and Izmir. He also said the
Greek expeditionary force in
Korea would be withdrawn.
The decision of the Rally
caucus on 7 October to support
Karamanlis in the parliamentary
vote of confidence indicates
that the party is at present
accepting his leadership. How-
ever, some disappointed groups,
such as those led by former
deputy premier Stephanopoulos
and others, are likely to join
the opposition eventually and
may even try to embarrass the
new government during the life
of the present parliament. This
may fit in with the plans of
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
Karamanlis, who may even en-
courage the defection of Rally
factions he considers unreliable
so he can build his own party
with broader representation of
elements of the political center.
The opposition outside, the
Rally continues dsdtni'ted and,
Effects of Iran's Adherence
To Baghdad Pact
Iran's decision to join
the "northern tier" defense
alignment, as announced for-
mally to the members of the
Baghdad pact on 12 October, re-
sults from strong Turkish pres-
sure and apparently from the
Shah's conviction that it is a
"now-or-never" proposition. The
USSR has warned Iran it attaches
"grave importance" to this de-
cision and some Arab states will
probably strongly criticize
Iran's move.
Reports from Tehran indi-
cate the Shah is convinced
immediate action is necessary
to forestall increasing in-
ternal pressure to prevent Iran's
joining the pact. Prime Min-
ister Ala has already submitted
a bill to the Senate providing
for Iranian adherence, and early
approval by both houses of par-
liament is expected, despite
some anticipated increased re-
sistance as a result of Soviet
warnings and veiled threats.
Turkish president Bayar and
the strong Turkish delegation
which visited Iran recently were
largely responsible for swinging
Iran into line with Iraq, Paki-
stan, Britain, and Turkey to
complete the "northern tier."
The five members plan to meet in
Baghdad next month to begin
preliminary planning.
Iran's strategic location
has long made its participation
in Middle East defense arrange-
ments a virtual necessity. The
country has no significant mili-
tary strength, however, and the
barring further incidents damag-
ing to Greece's international
position, its arguments for
Greek; neutralism may have lost
most of their present popular
appeal by election time. In
any case, Karamanlis' prospects
at present appear good.
1 71 25X1
Iranian government will now look
to the United States to bolster
its military potential through
augmented military assistance.
Iraq and Pakistan are also
likely to press for additional
American military aid in order
to implement the pact fully.
Among the Arab states,
Egypt and Saudi Arabia will
probably regard Iranian adher-
ence to the Baghdad treaty as
a diplomatic defeat and a boost
to Iraq's prestige. They may
also fear that Lebanon, Syria,
and Jordan will be more strongly
tempted to join the pact.
Moscow has already termed
Iran's action a violation of the
Soviet-Iranian treaty of 1927.
Moscow's propaganda campaign
has indicated the intensity of
Soviet opposition to Iran's in-
clusion in Middle East defense
planning. The USSR may insist
that Iranian treaty obligations
prohibit foreign military bases
on Iranian soil. The USSR may
also increase its activities in
Afghanistan, where there is al-
ready dissatisfaction with US
economic aid and continuing bad
feeling toward Pakistan.
Moscow is likely to inter-
pret the Iranian decision to
adhere to the pact as a Western
attempt to retaliate for Soviet
bloc offers of arms to the Arab
states. The USSR may be confi-
dent, nonetheless, that it can
consolidate its position south
of the "northern tier" and thus
make Western plans for the de-
fense of the Middle East in-
effective.
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Atomic Civil Defense Training
in USSR
Two Soviet publications
have recently discussed atomic
defense for the civilian popula-
tion. Until early this year,
published information on atomic
defense had generally been for
troops, with many articles ap-
pearing in military periodicals.
Although basic civil defense
training in first aid, gas de-
fense, fire fighting, etc., has
been in progress in the USSR
since 1948,civilian instruction,
except possibly at higher levels,
has been limited to defense a-
gainst conventional weapons of
air attack.
The June 1955 issue of a
periodical published by a Soviet
civil defense training organi-
zation, DOSAAF, states that the
civil defense training for air
and chemical defense is to in-
clude familiarization with, and
the means of protection against,
atomic and bacteriological weap-
ons and incendiaries of the
napalm type. Better training
methods and the need for quali-
fied instructors are stressed,
giving the general impression
that this type of training is
in its early stages.
Komsomolskaya Pravda, on
16 July , contain-e-&-an ar-
ticle on decontamination pro-
cedures to be followed in a
populated area after an atomic
explosion. Organization for
decontamination is to be ac-
complished by the local air
defense, whose personnel will
be charged with detecting radio-
active areas in and around
buildings, removing radioactive
materials and rechecking after
the areas have been decontami-
nated. Exposed personnel are
also to be checked for radio-
active material, and decontami-
nation will consist primarily
of thorough bathing.
The articles introducing
atomic defense instruction for
civilians have not described
the wide range of destruction
possible with present nuclear
weapons. However, the limited
awareness of Soviet civilians
to the dangers of atomic attack
gained from military periodi-
cals will now be further in-
creased by specific instruction
in passive defense. The govern-
ment probably hopes this will
result in increased interest
in and support for the civilian
defense training program. Sup-
plemental training for much of
the Soviet population will be
necessary in carrying out a-
tomic defense.
(Prepared by ORR. oncurre
in by OSI)
Warship Construction
In East Germany
the
East German naval, which
at present consist of only 26
minesweepers and a small number
of auxiliary service craft, are
being expanded. A construction
program now under way is re-
ported to include destroyers,
mine vessels, motor torpedo
boats, and patrol craft. In
addition, an East German ship-
yard at Rostock is believed to
be building a class of 3,000-
ton submarine tenders for the
USSR.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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25X1
Under Soviet im-
petus, East Germany's
shipbuilding industry
expanded extensively
immediately following
the end of World War
II. At that time pri-
mary emphasis was
placed on construction
of commercial vessels.
A program for building
a limited number of
destroyers, motor
torpedo boats, and
mine vessels had been
planned prior to 17
June 1953, but the
riots of that date
caused it to be sus-
pended.
Since approxi-
mately mid-1954, there
have been numerous
reports of a resump-
tion of planning for
warship construction.
Of the numerous proj-
ects reported,;the
"Falke" class de-
stroyer is the most
important. F_ I
25X1
The planned characteristics
of the "Falke" have been re-
ported only, sketchily, but in
several respects they compare
quite closely with those of the
new Soviet "Riga" class escort
destroyer. Although some of the
ordnance equipment reportedly
will be of Russian manufacture
and design, there are no other
indications of Soviet influence.
Approximately 15 miner-
sweepers are under construction
at Wolgast, Stralsund, Branden-
burg, and Berlin, and 13 others
have recently been added to Sea
j& Shipyard engaged in
. . warship construction
Other important
2 - shipyard
Police forces. Construction
of an unknown number of high-
speed motor torpedo boats has
been reported at Wolgast, Ber-
lin, and Rosslau. An unknown
number of submarine chasers and
patrol craft are also reported
under construction at unidenti-
fied shipyards..
Although there are no in-
dications that East Germany
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13 October 1955
plans to construct submarines,
several reports indicate the
USSR may transfer several World
War II German U-boats to the
East Germans. Such craft, be-
cause of their age, would be
of very limited usefulness.
The strengthening of the
East German Sea Police by ad-
dition of the number of vessels
planned or already under con-
struction would improve Soviet
Communist China Entering
Southeast Asian Markets
Communist China's deter-
mination to increase its share
in the Southeast Asian market
is demonstrated by the large
quantity and variety of low-
priced consumer goods and raw
materials which it recently
sent to Singapore for exhibi-
tion during October. China's
policy of underpricing compet-
ing textiles and light indus-
trial commodities has enabled
it to secure a firm foothold
in this market, historically
supplied by Hong Kong and Ja-
pan.
At the Bandung conference
in April, the Chinese Commu-
nists declared that neighboring
countries could now be supplied
with Chinese machinery and light
industrial equipment. In August
Peiping stated that exports of
manufactures during the first
half of 1955 were 250 percent
above the level in the last
half of 1954. According to a
review by the Ministry of For-
eign Trade in late July, ex-
ports of manufactures totaled
more than $60,000,000 in 1954.
It is believed that most of
these exports occurred in the
last half of the year.
The American consul gen-
eral at Singapore has reported
bloc naval strength at the en-
trance to the Baltic and pro-
vide a real nucleus for any ad-
ditional East German naval ex-
pansion.
yards.
Furthermore, conversion of
East German shipyards to warship
construction and repair will
provide the Soviet Union with
valuable potential advance naval
repair bases. In this way, a
part of the load can be diverted
from Soviet repair and building
that in addition to imports of
Chinese nails, wire, newsprint,
and textiles which began in
late 1954, Chinese electrical
appliances, hand tools, bicycles,
and chemicals have appeared on
the market since March 1955.
Peiping has been carrying
on a direct mail campaign among
Chinese in Singapore and Malaya
to obtain agents for and sales
of light manufactures. Favor-
able payment terms have been
granted and direct barter deals
have been concluded with local
merchants, many of whom formerly
imported Chinese products
through Hong Kong.
Japanese exporters are cur-
rently urging their government
to initiate countermeasures to
meet the increasing competition
in Southeast Asia from growing
Chinese exports of underpriced
light industrial manufactures
and :Low-grade textiles. China's
expanding sales in this market
threaten Japanese trade planning
which looks to Southeast Asian
trade as Japan's best prospect
for obtaining long-range eco-
nomic stability.
Economic planning in Com-
munist China continues to em-
phasize the development of
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heavy industry. Peiping, how-
ever, has recognized the over-
whelming political advantages
of supplying the light in-
dustrial goods market in South-
east Asia. Through exports of
these manufactures, it hopes
to impress its Asian neighbors
with its progress toward in-
dustrialization.
(Prepared by ORR)
The meeting between Pathet
Lao chief Prince Souphannouvong
and Premier Katay in Rangoon
started out amiably but broke
down on 13 October when the
basic issues at dispute came
under discussion. These have
now been referred back to the
negotiating teams in Vientiane
which have been meeting inter-
mittently since last January.
The two men did, on 11
October, reach agreement on a
cease-fire but the agreement is
of dubious value. It provides
for a cessation of hostilities
within ten days and the estab-
lishment of a neutral zone be-
25X1 tween the opposing forces.
the agreement is contingent on
settlement of the other out-
standing issues which include
the basic one concerning the
re-establishment of the royal
government's authority in the
disputed provinces.
Most of the truce agree-
ment's terms are merely a re-
iteration of the terms of a 9
March cease-fire agreement,
which was short-lived. A major
difference is the clause pro-
hibiting any reinforcement of
military strength in the two
disputed provinces. A Laotian
official explained this provision
by stating that the government
has no intention of increasing
its strength in the Pathet Lao
areas, and that in any case the
entire agreement was "provisional."
With the breakdown of the
Katay-Souphannouvong talks, the
chance of a negotiated settle-
ment appears to have vanished.
At Rangoon, Katay insisted that
with the passage of the 10 Octo-
ber deadline, it was too late
for the Pathets to enter candi-
dates for the December elections.
The government will probably
conduct the elections in the
ten provinces under its control
and seek relief from the Geneva
signatories for the Pathets'
25X1
refusal to admit royal authority
to the disputed provinces in
accordance with the Geneva a-
greement. Laotian officials
insist they have
no plans
to
initiate
respond
military
vigorously
action
to any
but will
con-
25X1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
Revised unofficial returns
in Indonesia's 29 September
elections show over 28,000,000
votes counted and fairly evenly
distributed among the four major
parties. The National Party
retains its lead with 25.7 per-
cent of the total vote and is
followed by the Masjumi with
24.1 percent, the Nahdlatul
Ulama. with 21.6 percent, and the
Communists with 20.1. Minor
parties account for the re-
mainder.
Completion of the official
count, which has already begun
in several districts, will have
to await elections not yet held
in more remote areas. These
include approximately 4,500,000
people, or 10 percent of the
electorate. The 180,000-man
army will vote on 15 October,
and the holding of a new elec-
tion in six cities in central
Java ordered by the district
election committee currently
awaits the approval of the Cen-
tral Election Committee. This
area includes about 3,000,000
voters and originally was re-
ported as overwhelmingly Na-
tionalist and Communist. All
elections must be completed by
29 November by executive decree.
National Party demands for
the resignation of the present
Masjumi-led cabinet have abated
with the better showing of the
Masjumi. Since the National
Party seems assured of a major
role in the next government, it
may be willing to bide its time
either until the new parliament
Communist Activities
In Malaya and Singapore
The amnesty offered the
Malayan Communists on 8 Septem-
ber has so far been accepted by
only 21 persons. It has, how-,
ever, brought forth a request
is seated or until a suitable
issue presents itself to bring
about the fall of the cabinet.
All Sas troamid j o j o,, a
former prime minister and Na-
tional Party spokesman; told
an American official on 8 Octo-
ber that his party council had
decided to exclude the Commu-
nists from the next cabinet.
He said a coalition with the
Masjumi could not be excluded
as a possibility, but hinted
that the Nahdlatul Ulama would
be a preferable government
partner.
According to present un-.
official returns, the total
number of seats of any two of
the four major parties will be
slightly less than a bare ma.-
jority. When seats are actual-
ly allocated, this situation
may change and two parties may
be .able to achieve a, majority.
Otherwise either a triple al-
liance of the three major non-
Comnlunist parties will be nec-
essary, or enough minor parties
will have to join the coalition
to constitute a majority.
The Communists continue to
demand participation in the
next cabinet. If the National
Party council remains firm in
its decision to exclude the
Communists, the most they can
hope for is a government based
on a. bare majority which, for
safety's sake, would accept
Communist parliamentary support.
from the Communist Party secre-
tary genera], Chen Peng,for a
cease-fire and for a meetinr
with Malayan chief minister Rah-
man, which Rahman has agreed to
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with qualifications. The meet-
ing has not yet been arranged
and the Communists may hope that
public pressure will induce
Rahman to go beyond the terms
of the amnesty and negotiate
with them.
In a nationwide broadcast
on 7 October, Rahman stated
that a general cease-fire can
be considered only after Chen
Peng has accepted the terms of
the amnesty and ordered his men
to surrender their arms. He
said he hopes to convince Chen
Peng that the amnesty comes from
Malaya's elected government and
not from the British.
The amnesty covers all
crimes committed "under the di-
rection of the Communists" since
June 1948. Those who surrender
may choose either to go to China,
the country of origin of many
Malayan Communists, or to stay
in Malaya as loyal citizens.
Those who surrender are screened
by the government to ascertain
their wishes, a device by which
questionable persons presumably
may be detained.
Rahman has stated that if
the Communists refuse the amnes-
ty,?he will be in a position to
ask for an all-out military ef-
fort against them by the people
of Malaya. There is some danger,
however, that if the Communists
continue to demand negotiations
while at the same time increas-
ing their armed activity, as
they have done in recent weeks
--they have estimated 3,000-
3,500 armed terrorists in the
jungle--enough political-pres-
sure will accumulate to induce
Rahnian to blame the British for
the amnesty failure and to offer
new terms including some form
of negotiations.
In the separately admin-
istered colony of Singapore,
Chief Minister Marshall faces
intensified Communist infil-
tration and subversion, which
has been vastly aided by the
Communist-manipulated People's
Action Party.
Marshall made a series of
speeches during the first week
of October condemning Communist
subversion in the strongest
terms. He has repeatedly chal-
lenged Lim Chin-siong, the
leader of the People's Action
Party, to state whether or pot
he Is a Communist. Meanwhile
he is striving desperately to
build his own Labor Front into
an organization capable of
challenging the rapidly grow-
ing People's Action Party.
Marshall has been invited by
Rahman to join the discussions
with Chen Peng when and if they
take place.
The movement toward self-
government has not been shunted
aside by the Communist issue
in either Malaya or Singapore.
Marshall will go to London in
November to discuss a further
transfer of authority to elect-
ed officials. In Malaya; plans
are under way for the appoin-c-
ment of a special commission,
including members from Common-
wealth countries, to revise
the constitution. in, preparation
for self-government which
Rahnnan has demanded "in a year
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13 October 1955
25X6
United Front Influence
Threatens Pakistan's Stability
The United Front Party is
extracting a heavy price for
its participation with the Mos-
lem League in Pakistan's coa-
lition government. As a result,
the freedom of action of Gov-
ernor General Mirza and Prime
Minister Chaudri Mohammad All,
both of the Moslem League, is
increasingly limited and the
position of the present admin-
istration precarious.
The Moslem League, which
represents West Pakistani inter-
ests almost exclusively and
which had ruled Pakistan since
the country received its inde-
pendence in 1947, failed to ob-
tain a majority in the elections
for a new constituent assembly
this June. The party was able
to form a government only with
the support of the United Front,
a collection of irresponsible
and erratic politicians who
control East Pakistan.
The United Front was orig-
inally given five of the 14
cabinet posts, and on 26 Sep-
tember it obtained two more
portfolios, including that of
foreign affairs. The new for-
eign minister, Hamidul Huq Chou-
dhury,
first
statements after taking office
reflected an anti-American neu-
tralist line contrary to Paki-
stan's current foreign policy.
The increased influence of
the United Front in Karachi is
also reflected on the local scene
in East Pakistan. Recent reports
indicate that the central govern-
ment is not'supporting its civil
Bonn Abandons Trade Embargo
Against East Germany:
The West German government
has abandoned its embargo of
iron and steel products to East
Germany which it instituted last
and military officials in dis-
putes with local United Front
politicians.
Meanwhile, the United
Front chief minister of East
Pakistan has recently released
several hundred political pris-
oners, most of them Communists,
whom the central government
imprisoned last year, when the
province was under direct rule
of Karachi. While these re-
leases were ordered in fulfill-
ment of election promises, they
may lead to a repetition of
last year's political disturb-
ances.
Mirza and the prime minis-
ter,, by virtue of their ability
and prestige and the backing of
the civil and military, services,
would probably be able, if nec-
essaary, to dismiss the United
Front and rule under emergency
powers as the previous gover-
nor general, Ghulam Mohammad,
did from October 1954 to June
1955. Thus far, however, they
have chosen to attempt to make
the representative process work
by compromising with the United
Front.
The governor general and
prime minister will probably be
able to prevent for some time any
major change in Pakistan's for-
eign policy, but the United Front
may gain a decisive voice in in-
ternal affairs. In view of its
past record of irresponsibility
and corruption, the United Front's
expanded role in the government
will almost certainly be detri-
mental to the future stability
of Pakistan. F_ I 25X1
April in retaliation for exces-
sive East German tolls on truck-
ing to West Berlin. Bonn main-
tains that these tolls are the
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sole disturbing element in an
otherwise satisfactory Berlin
access picture and do not
warrant restriction of inter-
zonal trade.
In recent trade negotia-
tions, West Germans were im-
pressed with the East German
arguments that Berlin access
difficulties had actually been
eased. Actually, except for
truck tolls and sporadic con-
fiscations, the East Germans
have refrained from harassing
traffic between West Germany
and Berlin.
Bonn's real reason for re-
suming normal trade is probably
recognition that Germany will
remain divided for an indefinite
period, and that this was clear-
ly forecast by the Soviet-East
German treaty of 20 September
and by Soviet-East German state-
ments during the summer.
Bonn has never been confi-
dent of its capabilities to
force East Germany to abandon
truck tolls on Berlin traffic.
In addition, Bonn fears that
the unprecedented gains of the
German Democratic Republic to-
ward a creditor position in
interzonal.trade could do much
to boost its respectability in
West German and Western trade
circles and might sell the idea
that Bonn is "antireunification"
in its interzonal trade policy.
The drive for Western rec-
ognition is a paramount factor
in East Germany's trade policy
and can be expected to govern
East German behavior in dealing
with interzonal trade issues.
The East Germans have consist-
ently fulfilled their inter-
zonal trade commitments in the
face of West German curtailment
of deliveries.
There is reason to believe,
however, that this East German
co-operativeness is focused
solely on the objective of ob-
taining diplomatic recognition
and that the government is not
prepared to alter its general
attitude on trade and communi-
cations with West Germany. On
the contrary, it has recently
increased restrictions on the
movement of residents of East
Germany and the Soviet sector
into West Berlin. Factories
and party organizations in
the provinces are now following
East Berlin in forcing em-
ployees to sign pledges not
to go to West Berlin.
even further tightened.
Many of the refugees
arriving in West Germany ex-
pect the restrictions to be
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE SAAR REFERENDUM
On 23 October the Saar-
landers will vote to accept or
reject the Saar statute em-
bodied in the settlement nego-
tiated last fall by France and
West Germany as a part of the
Paris accords "package." An
affirmative vote in the refer-
endum would make the Saar
"European" territory with local
autonomy but with all matters
of defense and foreign affairs
under the control of the Western
European Union (WEU).
Pro-German elements in the
Saar are conducting a vigorous
campaign against the statute,
and the outcome of the refer-
endum is in doubt. The WEU
governments are moving to
strengthen the forces support-
ing the statute, but at the
same time some of them are
considering alternative solu-
tions in the event of an un-
favorable vote.
Background
The Saar statute was ap-
proved last spring by all seven
WEU countries--France, West
Germany, Britain, the Benelux
countries, and Italy. It stipu-
lates that the baar's defense
and foreign affairs be control-
led by a European commissioner
responsible to the WEU Council
of Ministers. The territory
would be politically autonomous
in other respects, and West
Germany would be permitted to
develop close economic ties
similar to those already exist-
ing between France and the
Saar.
The French-German settle-
ment provided for a 3-month
period of campaigning to pre-
cede a. referendum on the stat-
ute, and Jurisdiction over the
campaign was entrusted by the
WEU Council to a commission
including representatives of
all the WEU powers except France
and West Germany. The stipu-
lated conditions for the cam-
paign period and for a free
referendum were established in
July when bans on political
activity by pro-German groups
in the Saar were rescinded.
Opposition to Statute
Until the referendum cam-
paign started, a favorable
vote was taken for granted,
largely because the parties en-
dorsing the status quo in 1952
polled nearly two thirds of
the vote in that year's Land-
tag election. However, most
of the eight new parties li-
censed in the Saar following
the recent lifting of the bans
on pro-German political activity
are violently opposed to the
statute. The pro-German enemies
of the statute and the Saar
Communist Party are conducting
a vigorous and noisy fight
against the "Europeanization"
principle.
At present, the most opti-
mistic prediction by disin-
terested observers gives the
statute little better than an
even chance of being approved,
while most anticipate its re-
jection.
This arrangement would
not necessarily be permanent,
however, since the statute
was made provisional to satisfy
Bonn's demands that the area,
which is almost entirely Ger-
man-speaking, be permitted to
make a final choice following
a German peace treaty.
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The average Saar voter is
apathetic and ignorant about
the issue, which has been con-
fused by the Nazi-like tactics
adopted from the outset of the
campaign by the pro-German
parties. Meetings in support
of the statute were broken up
by gangs of hoodlums, some im-
ported from West Germany, and
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
the area was flooded with propa-
ganda recalling to the Saar-
landers their German allegiance
and inflaming them against the
pro-French administration of
Premier Johannes Hoffmann. The
Saar Communists, seeing an op-
portunity to. wreck prospects
for French-German rapprochement,
are reported to have played a
large role in fomenting dis-
orders.
Although disorders have
abated somewhat since the WEU
commission issued a sharp
warning in August further
disorders about 25 October are
INDICES OF PRO-GERMAN SENTIMENT IN SAAR
FOR CONTINUED
AUTONOMY UNDER
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
ACCEPT
STATUTE
REJECT
STATUTE
(PRO-GERMAN)
1935
PLEBISCITE
INVALID VOTES
(PRO-GERMAN)
1947 1952
LANDTAG ELECTIONS
1955
PRIVATE GERMAN POLL
AUGUST 1955
possible, particularly if the
vote is close. The WEU com-
mission, fearing that the small
Saar police force could not
control widespread outbreaks,
has strongly. recommended that
an international police force
be established to move in if
necessary.
Although outside efforts
to influence the campaign are
prohibited, the-pro-German
parties have received consid-
erable assistance from mem-
bers of their affiliated
parties in West Germany. West
German politicians attended
the organization meetings of
the new Saar parties,.and
funds and campaign literature
have been funneled into the
Saar from West Germany. Al-
though Chancellor AdenAuer
has publicly urged support of
the statute, he has been
unable to overcome the opposi-
tion of his party leaders.
Furthermore, the West
German bishops of Trier and
Speyer, whose dioceses include
the Saar, sympathize with the
pro-Germans despite-the offi-
cially neutral position of
the Church, and they have not
denied propaganda assertions
of the pr:o-German parties
that the Church regards vot-
ing for the statute as sinful.
Adena.uer's efforts to per-
suade the bishop of Trier 'to
modify his position, which
carries great weight in the
predominantly Catholic Saar,
have been rebuffed. The papal
representative at Saarbruecken
stated on 27 September, how-
ever, that the Church leaves
its members free to vote
according to their conscience.
Factors Helping the Statute
Several recent develop-
ments indicate that the forces
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
The German press has al-
ready reported French threats
of the serious consequences
that rejection of the statute
would have on the French at-
titude toward German reunifica-
tion efforts.
Alternative Proposals
The British, who have
been consistently pessimistic
regarding the outcome of the
referendum, have evolved a tem-
porary alternative solution.
Under a plan considered by the
Foreign Office, the Saar would
be treated as though the refer-
endum had been favorable and a
"caretaker government" would
be set, up which Waal;d' ?be' 'r1DSpan-
sible, to a commission appointed
by the WEU Council.
A similar plan reportedly
has been considered in Bonn.
Such a scheme would of
course require French concur-
rence and it is by no means
certain that Paris could be per-
suaded that a "European solution,"
even a temporary one, would be
pre:eerable to the situation
likely to result from the Saar's
reversion to direct French control.
With National Assembly
elections imminent, the French
government would find it diffi-
cult to make concessions. Pre-
occupation with domestic and
North African problems, however,
might encourage the French to
accept another "temporary solu-
tion." to the Saar problem.
COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OFF THE UNITED STATES
A moderate and restrained
attitude toward the West, par-
ticularly the United States,
remains a dominant feature of
Soviet propaganda supporting
the Kremlin's current foreign
policy efforts. Nonetheless,
there is no evidence of any
change in Moscow's long-range
strategic objectives.
East-.West Negotiations
Perhaps the best evidence
for this-.:can be found ' in' the
sustained domestic propaganda
preparing the Russian people
for a period of East-West nego-
tiations. This material is
characterized by an absence of
distorted pictures of American
life and invective against Amer-
ican personalities, by more
objective treatment of American
affairs, by daily reports on
friendly exchanges of visitors
between the USSR and the West,
and by avoidance of comment on
sensitive issues.
Soviet propagandists, are.
developing the technique of
clothing standard criticisms
of American foreign policy in
new dress. For instance, some
are presented as "logical"
discussions. Many others mere-
ly quote well-known American
news analysts' criticisms of
United States policy.
This pattern is vividly
depicted in the Russian "humor"
magazine, Krokodil. Before
July, every e was filled
with such anti-American car-
toons as the one below.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
The change which took
place in the 28 July issue was
the more pointed because dis-
tribution was held up eight
days--presumably for a reprint
and such an about-face "in the
spirit of Geneva" as in the
cartoon above.
Soviet Cautions
But Moscow limits
this type of propa-
ganda so as to avoid
any hint of Soviet
weakness or capitula-
tion, to ensure con-
tinued progress to-
ward the achievement
of domestic goals,
and to accommodate any
tactical reversal
should the situation
demand it.
Thus, Moscow em-
phasizes favorably
foreign reaction to
its efforts to pro-
mote the "Geneva
spirit," demands re-
ciprocal American
deeds, discusses the
advantages of neu-
tralism and conversely
the dangers inherent
in the existence of
foreign bases. It
warns that the settle-
ment of many problems
depends on the estab-
lishment of mutual
trust and this is~ a.
'time-consuming process..
There are also persistent
reminders that "certain circles"
in the United States refuse to
enter into the spirit of the
times. Soviet officials,'.on
the other hand, it is stated,
will never. submit to dictation
or threats but will patiently
weigh all proposals in search
for common.grounds for negotia-
tion since they believe Presi-
dent Eisenhower and, to some
extent Secretary Dulles, are
sincere in their endeavors to-
ward world peace.
Kro odil interprets this
line as n . e cartoon below.
Other Communist Efforts
Elsewhere in the Sino-
Soviet bloc a modified version
of Moscow's propaganda pattern
is being'carried out--with East-
ern European media only slowly
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
picking up the Soviet line, and
Far Eastern Communist propa-
gandists making only a token
contribution to the new effort.
Satellite anti-American
propaganda was sharply reduced
after the "successful conclu-
sion" of the summit talks
and has since remained at a
low level. Favorable commen-
taries dealing with the United
States, particularly with the
President, have recently ap-
peared in Satellite output.
At the same time, however, the
Satellites have continued to
criticize some aspects of
American foreign policy.
Peiping's failure to
accord the "Geneva spirit"
theme as much emphasis and
significance as Moscow. reflects
the difference between the pres-
sures and problems confronting
the two governments. The conflict
between Chinese Communist and
American interests, particularly
in the Formosa area, is ex-
pressed in sharper and simpler
issues than the more general
and complex conflict between
the Soviet Union and the United
States. This difference in the
nature and intensity of Soviet
and Chinese collisions with
American power and interests
requires different postures
toward the United States and
different approaches to for-
eign and domestic policies.
PEIPING'S CONCILIATORY APPROACH TO FAR EASTERN PROBLEMS
Peiping's professed adher-
ence to the "Geneva, spirit" has
emerged in such recent gestures
as the announced decision to
evacuate six divisions from
Korea and the continuing calm
in the Formosa area. Without
renouncing its objective of
"liberating" Formosa, Communist
China is apparently deferring
major attacks in the offshore
island area, while it sees some
prospect of political gains in
direct talks with the United
States, Elsewhere in Asia,
the Chinese Communists maintain
the conciliatory tone adopted
at the Bandung conference last
April and seek to weaken Ameri-
can prestige and influence by
intensifying appeals to neutral-
ist sentiment.
The capture of several Na-
tionalist-held offshore islands
in early 1955 was announced by
the Communists as preliminary
to the "liberation" of Formosa
itself. The "liberate Formosa"
propaganda campaign, however,
diminished sharply just before
the Bandung conference in April
at which Chou En-lal declared
Communist China's readiness to
negotiate with the United States.
Since then, no assaults have
been made on the offshore is-.
lands .
Communist China appears to
be impatient to get from the
current ambassadorial talks at
Geneva to higher-level discus-
sions on the Formosa issue.
Charges by Peiping radio that
the United States is obstruct-
ing progress in the talks show
that China is anxious to give
the appearance of adhering to
the "Geneva spirit."
The "Geneva spirit," as
statements on Communist China's
national day, 1 October, make
clear, does not entail renuncia-
tion of the "liberate Formosa"
goal. Peiping acknowledges the
possibility of "peaceful libera-
tion" but does not reject the
use o:E military force if "peace-
ful" methods fail. Through
negotiations with the United
States, it sees the possibility
of a withdrawal of American
forces from the Formosa area
and a consequent erosion of the
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Nationalist position. But it
insists that the status of
Formosa, and the offshore is-
lands is a purely domestic is-
sue.
The Chinese Communists
have tried to contrast the
"military threat" of the United
States in Asia with their own
"peaceful moves" in other ways.
For example, Peiping has as-
serted that the alleged demobi-
lization of 4,500,000 Chinese
troops and the forthcoming
withdrawal of six more Chinese
divisions from Korea are in
keeping with the regime's ef-
forts "to ease the Far Eastern
and world situation." In fact,
however, the reduction of Chi-
nese strength in Korea has been
accompanied by a strengthening
of North Korean military forces,
to some extent in violation of
the terms of the Korean armi-
stice.
Professions of the "Geneva
spirit" also emerge in Peiping's
appeals for peaceful unifica-
tion of Vietnam and for compli-
ance with the provisions of the
1954 Geneva settlement on coun-
try-wide elections. But mili-
tary aid is still extended to
the Viet Minh, and the Viet
Minh in turn promotes subver-
sion in South Vietnam and small-
scale warfare in Laos.
Lifting the Bamboo Curtain
To support its Far East
peace campaign, Communist China
seeks to associate itself with
the rest of the Asian community
and to demonstrate that the
bamboo curtain is an American
fiction. To this end, the in-
vitation to visit China has be-
come a standard tactic. At
Bandung, Chou En-lai invited
even such staunch anti-Com-
munists as Carlos Romulo of
the Philippines and Prince Wan
of Thailand to visit Communist
China.
The response to these in-
vitations has been quickest
where neutralist sentiment is
strongest. Former Indonesian
UNWARY
premier Ali undertook a good-
will mission to Peiping shortly
after the conclusion of the
Bandung conference. The Bur-
mese have responded to Peiping's
invitations by sending three
top-level groups to China.--a
cultural mission headed by a
cabinet officer, a religious
mission led by the chief justice,
and a military mission under
the commander in chief. On 1
October, some 300 Japanese
visitors were said to be in
Peiping.
Asian Peace Pact
In further support of its
effort to identify China, with
other Asian--particularly
neutralist--countries, Peiping
on 30 July proposed a "collec-
tive peace pact" for Asia.
Such a pact is intended to sup-
plant the American-sponsored
Manila pact which has been un-
popular with neutralists and
unde:r attack in Communist
propaganda, as a military bloc
organized to have "Asians fight
Asians." Peiping also proposed
a general Far Eastern confer-
ence to discuss a wide range of
Asian issues. Most neutral na-
tions are believed to favor such
a conference.
Communist China's flattery
of India affords the most con-
spicuous illustration of the
effort to enlist neutralist
sympathies. India, which used
to be treated in Peiping's
propaganda as only semi-inde-
pendent,is now acknowledged to
be fully independent and is as-
sociated with China as a charter
subscriber to the "five prin-
ciples of coexistence." India
invariably is China's announced
preference for membership on
international armistice commis-
sions and has been chosen to
represent Peiping's interests
in the repatriation of Chinese
desiring to leave the United
States.
Trade Agreements
The trade agreement is
another tactic used by Peiping
to exploit neutralist sentiment.
Peaceful trade is offered as an
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13 October 1955
alternative to the economic
warfare fostered by American
policies. Perhaps to dramatize
its own "peaceful reconstruc-
tion," Communist China evidently
intends to offer quantities of
machinery and iron and steel
products in forthcoming agree-
ments.
The precedent for such of-
fers has been set in recently
concluded trade pacts with Burma,
Indonesia, and Egypt. In China.'s
present primitive stage of in-
dustrial development, the ex-
port of industrial products
probably is not warranted on
economic grounds, and the ex-
ports reflect the fact that
political rather than economic
factors constitute for Peiping
the overriding consideration in
the negotiaciun of trade agree-
ments.
Peiping's appeal for
"peaceful" trade has been ad-
dressed particularly to Japan.
Communist China's political
overtures to Tokyo--the latest
was Chou En-lai's reported offer
to restore diplomatic relations
"without conditions''--have thus
far failed to evoke a clear af-
fir:na.tive response from the
Japanese government. But in
the matter of trade, Peiping
has been able to address itself
to unofficial or semiofficial
levels in Japan, and has suc-
ceeded in concluding agreements
with Japanese businessmen.
The result of these eco-
nomic overtures and the Chinese
Communist practice of offering
to barter industrial raw ma-
terials for strategic goods has
increased pressure in Japan
for a relaxation of trade
con-
trols and for recognition
of
Communist China. In
this
con-
nection, Peiping may
feel
it
is forcing Washington
to
choose
between reducing its efforts to
apply strict trade controls on
strategic items for China, or
perpetuating American-Japanese
differences on trade with
Peiping. (Concurred .in 25X1
by ORR)
TROUBLE IN INDIAN-HELD KASHMIR
Strong Communist influence
in the government of Indian-
held Kashmir and continuing
popular opposition"to the ad-
ministration endanger the in-
ternal stability of this area,
which remained in Indian hands
at the time the fighting with
Pakistan ended in January 1949.
While Pakistan continues to
press its claims to Kashmir,
most of the immediate local
difficulties are caused by in-
digenous opposition to the pres-
ent government. The 40,000
Indian troops in Kashmir prob-
ably could handle any sudden
crisis, but New Delhi appears
uncertain how to resolve the
long-range internal political
problem it faces in Kashmir.
Just after the partition
of India in October 1947, Pathan
tribal raiders from Pakistan
entered Kashmir in an attempt
to join the state, which has a
majority of Moslems, to Pakistan.
The Hindu maharaja, who until
then. had refused to attach his
state to either India, or Pak-
istan, decided for union with
India. Regular Indian army
forces entered the state to
battle with the raiders and
occupied the most important
areas.
United Nations interven-
tion brought a cease-fire agree-
ment in January 1949. Pakistan
and India, have continued their
quarrel over the state on the
diplomatic level ever since,
without any solution being in
sight. Last July, Indian prime
minister Nehru even implied he
no longer felt bound by his
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 8 of 14
 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
Q2LI
Approved For lease 2005/
pSEUff 00600130001-3
KASHMIR
OCTOBER 1955
25X1
Peshawa?r
kq
Rq
PAKISTANI- O
R
e
?
Srinagar
Jammu
Lahore*
Amritsar
?
promise of a plebiscite for the
state which. he offered at the
time of Kashmir's decision to
unite with India. Pakistan's
new premier, Chaudri Mohammad
All, however, made it clear as
soon as he took office in August
1955 that his country is still
keenly interested in the state.
Karachi is again threaten-
ing to return the issue to the
United Nations, but long-term
Indian economic development and
eight years of occupation have
given Kashmir close and probably
permanent ties with New Delhi.
The Kashmir Constituent Assembly
has approved the state's acces-
sion to India and an official
1954 Survey of India map shows
all of Kashmir, including the
part held by Pakistan, as part
of India.
Political Situation
Sheik Abdullah, creator of
the :Kashmir National Conference,
which has ruled the state since
1947, commanded strong popular
support and maintained a fairly
stable internal political situ-
ation. Since he was deposed by
an Indian-inspired coup in Au-
gust 1953 for allegedly seeking
autonomy for Kashmir, the Nation-
al Conference government has
deteriorated.
Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, pro-
Indian National Conference leader
who replaced Abdullah as prime
minister, has met heavy opposi-
tion since the beginning of his
rule. His government in turn
has grown constantly more oppres-
sive. During its first six
months, nine daily newspapers
.were suppressed.
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES. Page 9 of 14
 Approved Flease 2mp,,IA,IA-RDP79-009200600130001-3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
25X1
With apparent Indian Con-
gress Party support, the Nation-
al Conference has vigorously op-
posed.entry of the Indian opposi-
tion parties into the Kashmir
political scene. Leaders of the
local Praja Socialist Party and
the Jan Sangh have been impris-
oned, . as have workers of the in-
digenous Praja Parishad.
As a result, the Praja So-
cialists have recently agitated
for dismissal of the National
Conference-dominated Kashmir
Constitutent Assembly and the
holding of new elections. Na-
tional Conference members loyal
to Sheik Abdullah have formed
a "Plebiscite Front," demanding
a referendum to determine the
validity of the Constituent
Assembly's decision to unite
with India. Several of the
front's spokesmen were arrested
in August and September 1955,
but the agitation continues.
Bakshi's inability to suppress
the agitation indicates a weak
ness which did not exist under
Abdullah.
Most likely to profit from
the unrest is Bakshi's political
foe, Education Minister Ghulam
Mohammad Sadiq, who, as presi-
dent of the National Conference,
has been exerting a major in-
fluence in the government.
5X1
5X1
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 10 of 14
 Approved Fora Release 2005/O2 : CIA- DP79-00929.WO0600130001-3
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY -SUMMARY
13 October 1955
SOVIET AIRCRAFT ENGINE INDUSTRY
The USSR has made rapid
progress in research, develop-
ment, and technology for pro-
duction of modern aircraft
engines since World War II and,
on the basis of recent observa-
tions, now appears to have a
capability comparable to that
of the West. In the field of
heavy engines, the USSR has
successfully pioneered the de-
velopment of turbo-jets and turbo-
props larger than any developed
in the West. The turbo-props
were engineered with consider-
able help from German techni-
cians.
AIRCRAFT PLANT
FLOOR SPACE
(MILLIONS OF SQUARE FEET)
In 1953, Soviet production
of aircraft engines was esti-
mated at 11,000 propeller-driven
and 15,000 centrifugal-flow jet
engines. Since then, the USSR
has begun to switch to the more
efficient axial-flow jet. No
estimates are available on pro-
duction of the new engines.
The Soviet air force now
has one medium and one heavy
bomber equipped with the heavy
turbo-jets. (BADGER and BISON),
and one heavy bomber equipped
with turbo-props (BEAR).
In contrast, the United
States has concentrated on
small, multiple units of turbo-
jets to power heavy bombers, on
the assumption that such units
can be standardized for smaller
aircraft. The United States
also has favored turbo-jets
over the turbo-props because
of a, theoretical superiority
of jet engines for military use.
Turbo-props have been projected
largely for noncombat use.
In producing two new
fighters (FLASHLIGHT and FARMER)
mounting small axial-flow en-
gines, the USSR is following
the Western trend toward dis-
carding centrifugal-flow in
favor of axial-flow designs.
This preliminary move will prob-
ably be followed by a general
standardization in the axial
line, and a corresponding phasing
out of centrifugal-flow jets,
SOVIET AIRCRAFT ENGINE PLANTS
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fl
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1
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A
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PART III PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES Page 11 of 14
25X1
 Approved Fo lease 2005/02/ E P79-0092 00600130001-3
MW
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
13 October 1955
The transition from con-
ventional engines to turbo-jets
and turbo-props has apparently
been accomplished smoothly.
While returning German tech-
nicians have reported typical
development problems in the
initial series of turbo-props,
to corresponding production-.
problems have been evidenced.'
The appearance of seven BEARS
less than two years after ac-
ceptance of the engines