CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000600120001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 32
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 7, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 6, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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NOW
CONFIDENTIAL
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
CENTRAL
COPY NO. 20
OCI NO. 8196/55
6 October 1955
DOCUME .40.
NO CHANGE INH c 8s. D
C3 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: T S
NEXT REVIEW DATE:
AUIH: ~~ff 70 2
DATE !!REVIEWER:
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
State Dept. review completed
On file USDA release instructions apply.
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1955
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
THE FRENCH CABINET CRISIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The departure of the Gaullist Social Republicans from the
French cabinet makes Premier Faure's downfall almost certain.
The imminence of the Big Four foreign ministers' meeting in
Geneva, however, may delay his overthrow.
FRENCH NORTH AFRICA . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . Page 1
Failure of the French government to follow up the removal
of the sultan of Morocco with formation of the promised council
of the throne is causing further antagonism among Moroccan
nationalists. The French bureaucracy, settlers, and generals
in Morocco, on the other hand', will oppose vigorously any
decision by Premier Faure to proceed with formation of the
council. Large-scale attacks by Berber tribesmen in north-
eastern Morocco suggest that co-bperatioh,is developing
between Algerian and Moroccan nationalists.
GREEK PRIME MINISTER'S DEATH
PRECIPITATES POLITICAL CRISIS. . ./. . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
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The new Greek cabinet of Pri a Minister Constantine Karamanlis
is composed entirely of Rally me ers, including several of the
outgoing cabinet officers. Kara anlis probably intends this to
be a temporary. arrangement and ans to expand his government to
take in some politicians of the center groups. A period of
political instability is in pro pect and, if elections are held
soon, a new unstable coalition overnment with strong leftist
and neutralist influence is likely to result. 25X1
INDONESIAN ELECTIONS .
Page 5
With 90 percent of the votes counted, the National Party
continues to retain its plurality in the Indonesian elections..
National Party leaders have not indicated whether they would
prefer to form a coalition government with the Communists or
with one or both of the two large Moslem parties. Although
there are mounting pressures for the formation of a new govern-
ment at an early date, the present Masjumi prime minister insists
that his cabinet will remain in office 'until the new parliament
is seated in three or more months from now.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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Soviet Arms to Middle cast: The first shipment of arms under
the Soviet agreement to arm Egypt through Czechoslovakia
has apparently already reached Egypt. The USSR is taking
advantage of general Arab approval of the agreement with
Egypt to push a similar offer to Syria. Israel, which
views arms shipments to the Arabs as a direct threat, is
making a major diplomatic effort to counteract'the _
Egyptian arms deal. . . . Page 1
Laos: There is little hope of progress in the-negotiations"
between the Laos government and the Pathet Lao, and after
10 October the government plans to proceed with preparations
for national elections without Pathet Lao participation.
There may be a brief deferral of the deadline as the
result of a last-minute agreement by the Pathet Lao chief,
Prince Souphannouvong, to meet with the Laotian premier
in Rangoon on 9 October; it is unlikely that the meeting
will prove productive. A final breakdown in negotiations
may lead to intensified military action in the two disputed
northern provinces. I I , . . Page 2 25X1
South Vietnam: The South Vietnam government is preparing plans
for re erenda on two basic questions--the first to be held
on 23 October on deposing Bao Dai and designating Diem as
chief of state; the second, tentatively scheduled for 27.
November, on adopting a constitution. The government
subsequently intends to conduct elections for a national
assembly,- possibly in December. . Page 3
American-Chinese Negotiations: Deliberate leaks from Chinese
Communist sources aft Geneva suggest that Peiping may be
preparing to modif - its adamant stand regarding the repa-
triation of 18 American prisoners still held in Chinese
jails. Nevertheless, Peiping still wishes to make the
release of the prisoners dependent on progress toward a
discussion of "other practical matters at issue" at Geneva.
Peiping's statements revealed a continued, reluctance to
apply to Formosa any formula for renouncing force.
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UN Disarmament Talks.: -Soviet representatives at the United
Nations last week, both officially and in private conver-
sations, concentrated on criticisms of the United States'
failure to commit itself to a general. disarmament program
prohibiting nuclear weapons aild limiting conventional
armaments. The Soviet delegation may press for a general
debate on disarmament in the General Assembly before the
Big Four foreign ministers' meeting. Page 4
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1953
World Peace Council May Launch New Signature Drive for Disarma-
ment: The simple "ban-the-bomb" theme of the Communist-
front World Peace Councils "Vienna Appeal'. is likely to be
replaced soon by a new campaign to collect signatures in
favor of general disarmament, bringing the council's
propaganda efforts in closer alignment with immediate
Soviet foreign policy objectives. Page 5
Chinese Communists to Withdraw Two Armies from North Korea:
Korea below that of the UN Command. Page 6
drawals would reduce Communist numerical strength in
ping is expected to wit draw six divisions from Korea
in October as announced on 29 September. These with-
Changes in Rumanian Regime Reaffirm Pros-eminence of Party: The
recent shuffle in the Rumanian regime, by returning the top
man to the party secretariat, reaffirms the pre-eminence of
the party in the Satellite regimes. Gheorghiu-Dej retains
complete control over the government through the appoint-
ment of a close associate as premier. The long-delayed
party congress has been scheduled for 23 December.
I I . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Growing Labor Unrest in France'. Recent agitation for wage
increases by the Commun st-dominated General Labor Con-
federation is probably aimed in part at weakening the free
labor unions and ensuring worker support for the Communist
Party in the 1956 parliamentary elections. The strikes and
work stoppages pose a real threat to French economic progress.
. . . . v Q Page 8
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New Argentine Government Marks Time'. 'rhe provisional Lonardi
government continues to consolidate its position, but many
Argentines evidently remain wary Of it. Page 11 25X1
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
SOVIET CROP PROSPECTS . .
Page 1
Soviet officials have expressed general satisfaction over
this year's harvest prospects. Despite the drought in the new
lands area of the Soviet Far East, both the quantity and quality
of the average citizen's diet probably will be slightly higher
between 1 July 1955 and 30 June 1956 than in the preceding 12
months. Nevertheless, the Soviet diet remains below the prewar
level. A long-term improvement in agriculture over the next
five years depends on the weather and the regime's willingness
to make heavy investments in machinery and equipment.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY - SU14MMARY
6 October 1955
SINO-SOVIET BLOC PROMOTES UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH JAPAN . Page 4
While Soviet-Japanese relations have been highlighted by
stalemates on several major issues in the negotiations in London,
a number of exchanges between the countries of the-Sino-Soviet
bloc and Tokyo on lower levels--involving cultural, economic
and political contacts--have been taking place on an active and
friendly basis. F__ I
NEW SOVIET POLICY ON TOURISM . . . . . ?. . . . . . . . . . Page 6
To add luster to its campaign for "peaceful coexistence"
and to escape the opprobrium of the "iron curtain" label, the
Soviet Union in the last few months has been actively promoting
an exchange of tourists with other countries. For the first
time in Soviet history, a small number of tourists without
official status are going abroad, and for the first time since
the 1930's, unofficial foreign tourists are being admitted to the
Soviet Union in considerable numbers.
JAPAN SOCIALIST MERGER APPEARS ASSURED .
. Page 8
Japan's Right and Left-Socialist Parties have submerged their
divergent policy viewpoints,and their merger, scheduled for mid-
Octoberp seems assured. Although the merger will improve the
Socialists' tactical position, it will not immediately increase
their strength in the Diet. Basic antagonisms will be carried
over and differences between the left and right factions are
likely to make Socialist unity relatively short-lived.
AUSTRIA SINCE THE STATE TREATY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
Since the Austrian state treaty came into effect on 27 July,
Austria has cautiously adjusted to new conditions wtthiA the
general pattern of neutrality formed by ten years of occupation,
and on the whole has fared a little better than anticipated.
The two governing coalition parties have reached compromises on
the procedure for forming an army and on the disposition of the
formerly Soviet-held industries. The latter are generally in
better economic shape than had been expected. The government
has made minor progress in eliminating local Communists from
influential positions in these industries and has removed the
remaining Communist police chiefs in Vienna.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMAR.
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
The departure of the Gaul-
list Social Republicans from
the French cabinet makes Premier
Faure's downfall almost certain.
The imminence of the Big Four
foreign ministers' meeting in
Geneva, however, may delay his
overthrow.
Four of the five Social
Republicans in the cabinet re-
signed on Faure's request after
their parliamentary group had
appealed to President Coty to
form a new government of "nation-
al union." They hinted that
General De Gaulle should head
such a government, but it is
highly unlikely that he is be-
hind this . suggestion .and' im-
probable that he could get
enough support to form such_a
government.
Since Coty cannot act un-
til Faure resigns or is over-
thrown, the Gaullist move was
an attempt to put pressure on
Faure on North African. policy.
Other rightist opponents of
Faure's Moroccan program may
now be encouraged to desert the
government.
Before Faure is overthrown,
he may succeed in getting Nation-
al Assembly approval of his
Moroccan program for which he
Failure of the French gov-
ernment to follow up the re-
moval of the sultan of Morocco
with formation of the promised
council of the throne is causing
further antagonism among Mo-
can count on the support of the
Socialists, who are not in the
coalition. It is possible that
the Socialists may decide to
back, him on other issues as well,
in order to avoid a prolonged
political crisis during the
Geneva conference.
Faure's position had been
considerably weakened in recent
weeks by his vacillation on
North Africa, and 30 interpel-
lations had been.deposited be-
fore the assembly reconvened
on 9, October. Rightist deputies
were angered by the ouster of
Moroccan. sultan ben Arafa, and
the left was increasingly per-
turbed over the delay in imple-
menting the agreements reached
in September with Moroccan na-
tionalists at Aix-les-Bains.
Faure's credit is not
entirely exhausted, however.
The government rallied much
support at home when it pulled
the French delegation out of
the UN General Assembly follow-
ing-the vote calling for dis-
cussion of the Algerian situa-
tion. Moreover, many deputies
are reluctant to precipitate a
political. crisis because of the
difficulty of forming a new
government a few months before
elections are due.
roccan nationalists. Large-
scale attacks by Berber tribes-
men in northeastern Morocco
suggest the development of
collaboration between Algerian
and Moroccan nationalists.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
French Morocco: A new
stalemate for Premier Faure's
three-point program for Morocco
developed on 1 October when
Moroccan sultan Mohamed ben
Arafa delegated his powers to a
cousin and withdrew to Tangier.
The transfer of powers,
accomplished by Resident General
Boyer de Latour in agreement
with the reactionary French
settler organization, the Pres-
ence Francaise, is considered
by Paris a step toward installa-
tion of the council of the
throne agreed on by Faure and
Moroccan nationalists at Aix-
les-Bains in August. Faure is
reported to have ordered Boyer
de Latour to proceed with the
initial plan.
Nevertheless, French bu-
reaucracy, settlers, and gen-
erals in Morocco consider the
transfer of power a major con-
cession on their part and prob-
ably will continue to oppose
t U S Airfields
+ French Military Outposts Attacked
IFNI
V.
BERBER ATTACKS
TANGIER ,
vpAN\~SH?
L1 MoRO~~o
t tFeZr
Casablanca
vigorously the concept of the
council.
Ben Arafa's cousin, Moulay
Abdullah ben Moulay Abdel Hafid,
45-year-old petty official in
the Moroccan administration of
religious properties, is not
likely to prove more effective
than the vacating monarch and
would under no circumstances be
acceptable to the nationalists.
On 1 October, apparently
according to a well-drawn plan,
Berber tribesmen attacked three
French military outposts along
the Spanish Moroccan border and
two others southeast of Fez.
Two other posts were under attack
on 4 October. At least two arms
depots of unknown size were
seized by the attackers.
These attacks, together
with the 20 and 21 August inci-
dents at Oued gem and Khouribga,
are probably the opening phases
of guerrilla operations in
IN MOROCCO
Algiers /Ponstantine.
?tis
o }Z
T q
e r
~7 R S
r
V
Khouribga.?
?Oued Zem
t
F R E N C H
O
SPANISH
S AHARA
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1955
Morocco on the pattern es-
tablished in Algeria last No-.
vember. This thesis is support-
ed by the distribution in Mo-
rocco of what purports to be
the "first communique of the
liberation army of Morocco."
This leaflet states that long-
planned joint operations are
commencing in Morocco and
Algeria and will continue un-
til independence is won for all
North Africa and former sultan
Mohamed ben Youssef is returned
to the Moroccan throne.
A similar announcement of
a combined nationalist military
direction was broadcast by the
Cairo radio on 4 October. While
these claims are almost cer-
tainly exaggerated, they may
portend a trend toward closer
collaboration by dissident
forces in Morocco and Algeria.
Algeria: Rebel.activi-
ties continue in eastern
Algeria, and minor terrorist
attacks were reported on 1
October along the Moroccan
border near the port of Nemours.
The withdrawal of three battal-
ions of French troops to re-
inforce units in Morocco may
encourage the rebels to commence
attacks in western Algeria.
In Paris, officials in the
Ministry of the Interior are
pessimistic regarding Governor
General Soustelle's modest re-
form program for Algeria. They
consider it unlikely that the
Faure government will last long
enough to accomplish anything
in Algeria and expect that the
restoration of order there. will
be a long and discouraging task.
They have reiterated that the
Algerian problem is more diffi-
cult than either the Tunisian
or Moroccan, principally be-
causee of the absence of national
traditions and a coherent group
of Algerian spokesmen.
Nationalist reaction to
inscription of the Algerian
item on the agenda of the UN
General Assembly and France's
subsequent withdrawal from that
.body is not yet known. Both
Algerian and Moroccan nation-
alist positions will presumably
become firmer, as will those of
the settler groups in both areas,,
thus contributing to local
disturbances.
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GREEK PRIME MINISTER'S DEATH
PRECIPITATES POLITICAL CRISIS
The Greek government re-
signed on 5 October, following
the death of Prime Minister
Papagos, and King Paul asked
the former minister of public
works, Constantine Karamanlis,
to form a new cabinet. Papagos
was the unifying force in the
Greek Rally coalition, which
will now probably disintegrate.
A period of political insta-
bility is in prospect and, if
elections are held soon, an
unstable coalition government
with strong leftist and neutral-
ist influence is likely to
result.
The king, who had been
seriously concerned for months
over the government's lack of
leadership during the prolonged
illness of Papagos, recently
insisted that the prime minister
resign. Papagos' refusal, re-
flecting long-standing friction
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between himself and the palace,
was partially overcome shortly
before his death and Foreign
Minister Stephanopoulos was
named temporary prime minister
during Pagagos' illness.
Apparently fearful of a
bitter struggle within the Rally
over the succession to leader-
ship of the party, the king has
dramatically cleared the way
for the popular and able Kara.-
manlis to try to form a, new
government. Karamanlis had al-
ready organized the nucleus of
a new center party and he and
the king apparently believe
that enough Rally deputies will
switch to his party to keep a
Karamanlis government in office
until national elections are
held.
Karamanlis' cabinet, which
was sworn in on 6 October, is
comprised entirely of Rally mem-
bers, including several of the
outgoing cabinet officers.
Karamanlis probably intends this
to be a temporary arrangement,
and he plans to expand his gov-
ernment to take in some politi-
cians of the center groups. The
"old guard" of the Rally, how-
ever, is excluded, and its re-
sentment may force a parliamen-
tary fight over voting confi-
dence in the Karamanlis govern-
ment.
Members of the parliamen-
tary opposition have recently
been clamoring for elections
and threatening to resign en
masse--to force by-elections
and thus a display of popular
sentiment--if they are delayed.
The king will probably delay
holding any new elections at
least for several months in or-
der to allow Greek anger and
frustrations relating to the
Cyprus issue to subside and to
give Karamanlis and his party
time to gain public confidence
and build an effective organ-
ization.
Since Karamanlis is closely
connected in the public mind
with the United States, he will
have to contend with the strong
anti-NATO and neutralist trend
of Greek opinion. He can be
expected, therefore, to make
strong efforts to establish his
independence of American influ-
ence during the current anti-
American clamor. Meanwhile,
Turkish prime minister Menderes'
message to Papagos of 29 Sep-
tember will probably serve to
re-establish formal Greek-Turk-
ish co-operation and may have a
calming effect on Greek popular
passions.
The Greek parliament, which
legally must convene on 15 Oc-
tober, will probably soon re-
vise the electoral law and then
devote itself to preparing for
national elections which were
scheduled for November 1956 but
which may now be held earlier.
The present majority electoral
system, which favored any party
receiving a majority of popular
votes, is almost certain to be
abandoned and some modification
of the proportional system adopt-
ed. Since with the death of
Papagos no party will expect to
gain an electoral majority, the
various factions in parliament
will probably agree on a new
election law which will seat
more splinter groups. This may
enable Communist-front candidates
to regain a voice in parliament.
Early elections are likely
to result in an unstable coali-
tion government which, because
of general disillusionment with
Rally conservatism and popular
feeling against NATO and the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
United States, might be domi-
nated by a, leftist bloc led by
Liberal Democratic Union chief
Sophocles Venizelos. The power-
ful ultraconservative secret
military society IDEA, which
enjoyed a unique position of
influence under Papagos, would
probably attempt a coup only if
a, clearly leftist election trend
was established and support
from other rightist groups
seemed probable. 25X1
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The National Party continues
to retain its lead in the In-
donesian elections. On the
basis of unofficial returns a.c-
counting for 90 percent of the
estimated vote, it has won 2.7
percent of the votes, which
constitutes a, plurality. The
three other large parties--the
Moslem Masjumi, the conserva.-
tive Moslem Nahdlatul Ulama
(NU), and the Communist Party--
are closely grouped in that
order. Inconclusive returns
from Sumatra and Borneo show
the Masjumi leading and have
revived Masjumi leaders' hopes
of further diminishing the
National Party's lead.
The central Java election
committee 'is reported to
have ordered new elections
in five cities in central Java
because of irregularities and
illegal activities. Both the
National and Communist Parties
have polled well in this area.
Returns are sufficiently
advanced, however, to indicate
that no party is likely to win
a. majority and that a new coa-
lition government will be nec-
essary. All Sa.stroamidjojo,
former premier and National
Party spokesman, has refused to
discuss parties with which the
Nationalists might co-operate.
A pro-National Party daily has
suggested co-operation with
either the Masjumi or the NU,
and leaders of the latter are
advocating a. triple coalition
of the largest non-Communist
parties. The NU has stated
specifically that it will not
participate in a, government in
which the Communist Party is
represented.
The possibility of a Na-
tional Party coalition with the
Communists, however, cannot be
disregarded, and the Communists
have already indicated their
eagerness for inclusion. The
last; Nationalist government
accepted Communist support.
Prime Minister Harahap has
stated that his Masjumi-led
cabinet will remain in office
until the new parliament is
seated some three months or
more. hence. Harahap may wish
to stay in power in order to
preside over the 15 December
elections which will choose 520
members of a constituent assem-
bly to draft a permanent con-
stitution.
There is no assurance, how-
ever, that Haraha.p will be able
to remain in office. The Na-
tional Party has already called
for his resignation, and sev-
eral. small parties are consid-
ering withdrawing their min-
isters from the coalition cabi-
net. The reassembled provi-
sional parliament, depending on
Masjumi placement in election
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1955
returns, may bring further pres-
sure on the prime minister to
return his mandate. President
Sukarno has shown a marked pref-
erence for the National Party
and may make efforts to get it
in office as soon as possible.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
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Soviet Arms to Middle East
The first shipment of arms
under the Soviet agreement to
arm.Egypt through Czechoslo-
vakia has apparently already
reached Egypt. The USSR is
taking advantage of general
Arab approval of the agreement
with Egypt to push a similar
Israel meanwhile is engage in
a major diplomatic maneuver to
forestall its loss of military
superiority in the area.
American officials
when questioning Syrian of-
ficials on the alleged Soviet
offer received evasive re-
sponses .
While the new Syrian gov-
ernment.is friendly toward the
Western powers, it may be in-
clined to follow Egypt's lead,
especially if it were offered
arms on advantageous barter
terms. Such terms reportedly
were indicated in the Soviet
offer. The Damascus stopover
of the Egyptian delegation on
its way to Prague suggests that
Egypt may be trying to promote
Syrian interest in obtaining
Soviet equipment, possibly
through Egyptian representations.
The first Soviet statement
on the arms sales was expressed
in a TASS eommunicatibh dated
2 October which stated that each
goverpment has the rlght`to buy
weapons for its defense require-
ments on "'usual commercial
terms," and that "no foreign
state has the right to intervene
and to present any one-sided
claims which would infringe the
rights or interests of other
states."
The political 'aspect of the
Czech arms deal was virtually.
admitted in a 30 September Czech
army newspaper editorial'which!
stated that the arms agreement
was motivated by Czech respect.
for Egypt's sovereignty and its
increasing contributions to the
cause of peace.
The USSR's deal with Egypt
and other offers are designed
to weaken Western ties with the
Middle Eastern states and draw
them toward a neutral position
in international affairs. This
would serve Soviet interests by
undermining the "northern tier"
defense system.
In the longer run, the
long-term barter agreements
involved in Soviet bloc arms
deals.and associated economic
assistance offers would make
the Muddle East states vulner-
able to Soviet bloc economic
penetration. Once having es-
tablished a steady market in
the Soviet bloc for vital ex-
ports, countries such as-Egypt
and Syria will be under.pres-
sure to hold on to this market.,;
Israel, which views any
arms shipment to the Arabs as a
direct threat to its existence,
is making a major diplomatic
effort to counter the Egyptian
arms deal. In the press, the
UN, a;nd representations to the
Western powers, Tel Aviv's
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
spokesmen have emphasized the
arms deal as a threat to Middle,
East peace. Tel Aviv believes
the situation requires new
Western guarantees to maintain
the status quo of the area and
wants the West, particularly the
United States, to supply Israel
with additional military equip-
ment. At the same time, Israel
is'approaching Prague and Mos-
cow, where it will also attempt
to induce the Communists to
modify their present Middle
East policy.
Meanwhile, Israel will al-
most certainly step up its pur-
The necessity of preparing
for the national elections
scheduled for 25 December has
led the Laotian government to
set a 10 October deadline for
agreement with the Pathet Lao
in the negotiations which have
been under way intermittently
since last January. If no
settlement is reached by 10
October, the last date candi-
dates may file for the national
assembly elections, the govern-
ment plans to hold elections
only in the 10 provinces under
its control.
There may be a brief de-
ferral of the deadline as the
result of a last-minute agree-
ment by the Pathet Lao chief,
Prince Souphannouvong, to meet
with Premier Katay. Souphann-
ouvong has agreed to a meeting
in Burma on 9 October. He had
earlier refused to attend a
scheduled meeting. in Laos on
the grounds that the site was
"insecure" because of "aggres-
sive" actions by the government.
chases of military equipment in
other,parts of Europe. The
intemperate press campaign
now being conducted is likely
to promote public 'sentiment in
favor. of aggressive action, and
the government will, as a re-.
suit, probably adopt a tougher,
border policy aimed at warning
the Arabs., If Soviet equipment
begins to pour into the Arab,
states in quantity, Israel is
likely to give serious consid-.
eration to launching a full
scale war before the Arabs over-
take it in military strength.
Indian representatives on
the In Control Com-
mission termed. this excuse
"ridiculous.." They are not
optimistic of any results ,from
the meeting in Burma, which the
commission will sit in on, and
believe it will not last more
than two days. They think the
p?Or shoving made by the Commu"
nists in'Cambodia's recent elee-
tioiis have probably convinced
the Pathets that 'it would be
unwise to test their popularity
at the polls
If the government-Pathet.
Lao negotiations end incomplete
fa.1ure there is a strong
possibility that the Pathet Lao
will resort to intensified
military activity.
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6 October 1955
? PHONG ~?
1 r
PROVINCE
_ TOTAL FORCES
PL 1500
ANL 700
V
1
2200
IMMEDIATE ~~ ??~?? ~~,?~?FO?RC S
OLUANG PRABANG
1
PL PATNET LAO FORCES
ANL LAOTIAN NAFIONAL ARMY
AREA OF ACTIVITY
~? TRAILS (SELECTED)
South Vietnam
The South Vietnam govern-
ment has announced plans for a
referendum on 23 October on
deposing Bao Dai and desig-
nating Diem as chief of state.
Tentative plans are that this
will be followed on 27 November
by a referendum on the adoption
of a constitution. Election of
a national assembly may take
place in December. Premier
Diem, who holds that only a
popularly elected body can
pass on the question of all-
Vietnam elections, hopes this
plan. will ease the interna-
tional pressure on him to ac-
cept the Geneva commitments.
The government has begun
a campaign against Bao Dai in
the controlled press, and his
0
SERVES
Nn N(;
general unpopularity leaves no
doubt as to the outcome of a
referendum on him. The con-
stitution now being drafted
will provide a regular term of
office for Diem as president.
Diem is personally super-
vising the drafting of the
constitution because he fears
that drafting by a constituent
assembly would be time-consum-
ing and might result in the
legislature's gaining too much
powe:r at the expense of the
executive. As prepared thus
far, the constitution will
provide for a president with
powers vastly overshadowing
those of a house of represent-
atives of some 240 elected
members.
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09
NEL7/A
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1955
American-Chinese Negotiations
Deliberate leaks by
Chinese Communist sources at
Geneva suggest that Peiping
may be preparing to modify its
adamant position regarding the
repatriation of 18 Americans
still held in Chinese jails.
The Chinese in recent weeks
have insisted that these peo-
ple are "criminals" without
"civilian" status and techni-
cally did not come under the
10 September repatriation a-
greement.
Even though Peiping may
have adopted a more concilia-
tory pose in regard to the 18
prisoners, it still wishes to
make release of the prisoners
dependent on progress to the
discussion of "other practical
matters at issue" at Geneva.
Peiping's statements of 1 Oc-
tober--the.Chinese Communist
national day--reveal a contin-
ued reluctance to apply to
Formosa any formula requiring
a renunciation of force, al-
though these anniversary
speeches re-emphasized Pei-
ping's peaceful intentions in
international relations. For-
mosa is held to be an "inter-
nal" Chinese problem.
Communist China is prob-
ably interested in discussing
a renunciation of force in
terms of a "relaxation of ten-
sion in the Formosa area."
Peiping prefers, however, that
this be considered at a "higher-
level" conference rather than
in the present ambassadorial
talks at Geneva.
25X1
UN Disarmament Talks
Soviet representatives at
the United Nations last week,
both officially and in private
conversations, criticized the
United States' failure to com-
mit itself to a general disarma-
ment program which would pro-
hibit nuclear weapons and limit
conventional armaments.
Soviet spokesmen appeared
to be trying to create the im-
pression that the USSR might
accept the President's plan in
some form if it were incorpo-
rated as an organic part of a
comprehensive disarmament pro-
gram.
Soviet delegate Sobolev
assured the UN Disarmament Sub-
committee on 28 September that
the USSR is continuing to study
the Eisenhower plan. Molotov
responded to French delegate
Moch's suggestion for a synthe-
sis of the various proposals
befo:re the subcommittee by say-
ing this would be possible but
not easy. Moch later expressed
the belief that the USSR could
be brought to accept the Eisen-
hower plan if it were expanded
to cower other countries and
made part of a comprehensive
plan.
The Soviet press printed
an extensive account of French
foreign minister Pinay's speech
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE` WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1955
in the UN General Assembly,, in-
cluding his suggestion that the
Eisenhower, Bulganin, and Faure
plans might be combined to.:
serve as a first step toward
disarmament.
The Soviet delegation may
press for a general debate on
disarmament in the General.As-
sembly before the Big-Four
foreign ministers' meeting in
Geneva later this month. This
might be done' in the belief
that spokesmen of most of the
smaller powers will be more
World Peace Council May Launch
Re-Disarmament gnature Drive
The Communist-front World
Peace Council's signature cam-
paign for the Vienna Appeal a-
gainst atomic weapons will soon
end and will be followed by a
new campaign to collect signa-
tures on a plea for general dis-,
armament
The simple "ban-the-bomb"
theme of the Vienna Appeal, for
which the Communists claim to
have obtained more than 656,-
000,000 signatures since the
campaign was launched in Jan-
uary 1955, is too restricted in
light of the comprehensive
Soviet disarmament proposals of
10 May. These proposals called
for reductions of conventional
forces and prohibition of the
use of nuclear weapons as the
first phase of world disarmament.
A new campaign more closely
aligned with immediate Soviet
favorable toward the Soviet,'
plan for general disarmament,
including prohibition of the
use of nuclear weapons, than
toward American efforts to give
top priority to the President's
proposals for aerial inspection
and exchange of military in-
formation. Molotov's resolu-
tion of 23 September calling
on the General Assembly to con-.
sider all the plans submitted
at the recent summit conference
may have been intended to set
the stage for such a debate
25X1
foreign policy objectives is
likely.
Joliot-Curie, chairman
of the World Peace Council,
said at the World Peace Congress
in Helsinki in June that the
Vienna Appeal was not compre-
hensive enough and that general
disarmament must be considered
along with atomic weapons.
A new campaign may be an-
nounced at a meeting of the
World Peace Council called for
12 October in Vienna to con-
sider "disarmament and the se-
curity of all states." The
Communists may calculate that
a comprehensive disarmament
appeal, probably emphasizing
the social and economic bene-
fits which would accrue as a
result of reduced defense
budgets, will gain widespread
25X1
support, particular1 in
Western Europe.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1955
Chinese Communists to Withdraw
Two Armies from North Korea
Peiping is expected to
withdraw six divisions from
Korea in October as announced
on 29 September. These with-
drawals would reduce Communist
numerical strength in Korea
below that of the UN Command.
In September 1954 and March
1955, the Chinese made similar
public announcements and with-
drew troops shortly afterwards.
On the basis of present
information, departure of six
divisions, which presumably
comprise two armies, would
reduce the number of Chinese
Communist armies in Korea to
five and lower troop strength
from 449,000 to approximately
350,000--augmented by about
329,000 in the North Korean
army. The present strength
of the UN Command in Korea is
slightly over 750,000.
When the withdrawals are
carried out, the Chinese will
have removed at least 13 of
the 19 armies which were de-
ployed in Korea in July 1953
when the armistice was signed.
The fact that even with the
announcement of the October
withdrawals Peiping will have
publicly acknowledged the de-
parture of only six of these
armies may reflect an unwill-
ingness to reveal the magnitude
of the effort the Chinese were
compelled to make against UN
forces in Korea. On the basis
of past performance, the public
announcement of the divisions'
departure suggests that they
Changes in Rumanian Regime
Reaffirm re-eminence o arty
On 1 October, some 17
months after he had belatedly
adhered to the collective lead-
ership principle by giving up
his position as leader of the
.may be checked on by Neutral
Nations Inspection Teams, al-
though this has not yet been
stated by Peiping.
The announced departures
appear motivated primarily
by propaganda rather than
military considerations, and
are likely to be publicized as
being in keeping with the
"spirit of Geneva" during the
month of the foreign ministers'
conference. The Chinese
Communists have offered to
withdraw all their forces from
Korea if the.tjnited States does
the same. Chinese withdrawals
of troops would strengthen
Peiping's propaganda and polit-
ic~tl' position and bring pres-
sure on the United States to
withdraw its forces from Asia.
The newly announced Chi-
nese withdrawals would not
basically weaken the Communist
strategic position in North
Korea, since large-scale rein-
forcements`would be available
from Manchuria on short notice.
Moreover, the effectiveness of
North Korea's military forces
has been improved through in-
tensive training, reorganization,
and re-equipment' programs, which
have to a certain extent been
carried out in violation of
the terms of the Korean a.r9
thistice; The withdrawals would,
however, further, diminish the
prospect of any sudden resump-
tion of hostilities by the
Cormunisi. ,forces in' Korea
party secretariat, Rumanian Com-
munist leader Gheorghiu-Dej re-
assumed the post of party first
secretary. In order to main-
tain the facade of collective
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1955
GHEORGHIU-DEJ
in 1945 to 1952. Both Apostol
and Stoica have been closely
associated with Dej since the
1930's
Rumanian leaders may have
been instructed to make these
latest shifts by Soviet party
first secretary Khrushchev, who
visited Bucharest at the end of
August for the second time in
two months. Since Khrushchev
also made an unannounced visit
to Sofia in August, it is pos-
sible that Bulgarian premier
Chervenkov, the only other Sat-
ellite leader to relinquish the
post of first secretary in 1953,
may also soon resume personal
leadership of the party appara-
tus.
The Rumanian party central
committee has set 23 December as
the date for the second party
congress. lone.h ,s been held
since 1948. This move suggests
that the Rumanian leadership
considers Soviet bloc policy
and the internal Rumanian eco-
nomic situation sufficiently
stabilized to permit holding
the twice-postponed party caucus.
The congress was first post-
poned in April 1954, allegedly
to give the regime time to show
some improvement in the workers'
living standard,,, and again in
October 1954,possibly in an-
ticipation of important changes
in Soviet policy.
In announcing his latest
shift from the government to
the party post, Gheorghiu-Dej
stated that,the government has
shown considerable progress in
the development of an effective
cadre and the solution of eco-
nomic problems. The appoint-
ment of party theoretician
Chisinevehi to the secretariat
suggests that the party has not
developed an effective cadre
and that the party leadership
is still seriously concerned
over the low level of training
and discipline of party members.
leadership, Dej simultaneously
relinquished the premiership
and proposed First Vice Premier
Chivu Stoica as his replacement.
This shuffle, which brings
the top man in the Rumanian
regime to the post of party
first secretary, follows the
pattern in the Soviet Union
since Malenkov's demotion last
February. In April 1954, Dej
relinquished his post. as party
first secretary to a close as-
sociate.., Gheorghe Apostol,
while retaining the post of
premier.
Dej retains, as he has since
June 1952, complete control
over the important sectors of
the party apparatus, the govern-
ment, and the council of trade
unions. Gheorghe Apostol, who
served as party first secretary
from April 1954 until this
latest reshuffle, has been re-
assigned to the post of chair-
man of the trade union council,
which he held from its creation
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Growing Labor Unrest in France
Recent agitation for wage
rises by the Communist-dominated
General Labor Confederation
(CGT) is probably aimed in part
at weakening the free labor
unions and ensuring worker sup-
port for the Communist Party in
the 1956 parliamentary elections.
The strikes and work stoppages
pose a real threat to Faure's
economic program as well as
to the stability of his govern-
ment.
Despite a 15-percent in-
crease in real wages during
the past three years, French
workers are convinced they have
not kept pace with the economy,
and in recent months they have
shown new willingness to strike.
They have been encouraged to
resort to violence by the suc-
cess of the shipyard workers
at St. Nazaire who in August
won wage hikes as high as 22
percent as a result of strong-
arm union action.
The CGT effort to exploit
this discontent has in recent
weeks been directed at the pub-
lic utilities, railroads, and
the civil service. Although
strikes called have been of
short duration thus far and
only moderately effective, non-
Communist labor spokesmen main-
tain that workers in these na-
tionalized industries and
services are particularly
sensitive to the wage issue.
Free labor spokesmen fear
that CGT tactics are aimed at
eliminating the non-Communist
unions, particularly the So-
cialist-orientated Force
Ouvriere (FO). The atmosphere
of detente is reducing the
effectiveness of the FO, which
based its opposition to the
CGT campaign for "unity of
action" on anti-Communism. The
CGT has been careful to keep
its current campaign nonpoliti-
cal, and free unions fear they
may "give the appearance of
denying the authenticity of the
labor unrest and the virtue of
worker demands." The serious
inroads made by these CGT
tactics on the loyalty of FO
members, including some of the
local leaders, have forced the
FO civil servants' union to
second the CGT demand for a
revision of the accord on wages
of ,30 June.
Officials of both the
Technicians `` Union and the FO
believe the CGT has an eye on
the 1956 elections, and that
by undermining free union
strength and prestige, the
Communists expect to weaken the
Socialists and Popular Repub-
licans. By this tactic and
their pressure for a united
front, it is believed they
might swing enough votes to
Communist and co-operative So-
cialist candidates to elect up
to 150 Communists and party
sympathizers to the National
Assembly.
Recurring strikes threaten
the price stability which has
been the key factor in the French
prosperity of the past two years.
Premier Faure made it clear in
a radio speech on 21 September
that the government will brook
no adjustment in price controls,
and added that he would "accept
no public disorder while the
North African situation is so
disturbed."
The inflationary effect
of wage increases in conjuction
with a general loss of confi-
dence in economic circles is
already reflected in the rise in
the 'black-market rate for the
dollar from 364 to 388 francs
in the past month. A break in
the current economic prosperity
or an all-out strike effort might
well be exploited as a con- 25X1
venient issue to bring down the
Faure government.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
6 October 1955
New Argentine Government
Marks Time
The Argentine provisional
government headed by Maj. Gen.
Eduardo Lonardi continues to
consolidate its position with
a gradual purge of personnel.
Lonardi has announced that
he will not deprive labor of
any gains achieved under Peron,
and, according to press reports,
he appears to be winning a
victory over the pro-Peron
General Confederation of Labor
(CGT) in that a number of unions
have ousted their pro-Peron
leaders, possibly.with assist-
ance from the new government.
All of the secretaries of the
CGT have now reportedly resigned
with..hew elections'.to. be .held
in four months.
Lonardi's dealings with
labor may be complicated by the
SECRET
reported decision of the Commu-
nist Party to fight the new
government by supporting the
Peronistas. Communist Party
members were instructed to
agitate for new elections in the
unions in the hope of electing
Communists to key positions.
The Argentine public is in
general wary of the new regime.
The government has had plans to
set up a consultative junta, as
an interim body in the absence
of a congress, composed of rep-
resentatives of labor and all
political parties except the
Peronista and Communist. The
plan now appears doomed, how-
ever, inasmuch as the Radicals,
the only anti-Peron party of
any consequence, have reportedly
refused as a matter of principle
to participate in the junta.
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The harvest in the Soviet
Union this year will probably
exceed the postwar high of 1952.
Generally the weather has been
favorable in much of the impor-
tant crop area of the European
USSR, and acreage has been ex-
panded since last year, pri-
marily in the new lands area
of West Siberia and Kazakhstan.*
Prospects for 1955
The Ukraine and North
Caucasus, important areas of
grain production, are reported
to have had good harvests. De-
spite the low wheat yields due
to the drought in the new lands,
over-all production in the So-
viet Union will probably ex-
ceed the good wheat harvest of
1954 because of the 25-percent
stlmates are made on the
basis of weather and crop in-
formation as of mid-August.
Factors on which a final esti-
mate of the Soviet crop harvest
can be based will not be avail-
able until late 1955.
increase in acreage over last
year.
This may again permit some
rebuilding of wheat reserves de-
pleted during the last two years
and even allow a moderate expan-
sion of wheat exports while do-
mestic consumption attains a
level somewhat higher than last
year. The increase in grain
production will include corn
planted on some 45,000,000 acres,
a fourfold increase over 1954.
Sugar beet., and potato pro-
duction probably will also be..
better than in 1954 because of
favorable weather and the ex-
panded acreage devoted to these
crops this year.
Little change is likely in
cotton production as compared
to 1,954, which was a good year.
Members of the American agri-
cultural delegation who inspected
several cotton fields near Tash-
kent in Uzbek SSR, a republic
which accounts for about two
25X1
USSR AGRICULTURE PRODUCTION
SELECTED COMMODITIES
(1950 =100 )
CORN INDEX BASED ON ACREAGE; WHEAT, MEAT,
AND COTTON INDICES ON TONNAGES,
1952 1954 _ 1955
WHEAT
1954
MEAT
1952 1954 1955
BORN .__...v
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1952 1954 1955
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thirds of the USSR's total cotton
output, reported that the cotton
in the fields was in very good
condition.
Russian officials last sum-
mer expressed general satisfac-
tion to the American agricultural
delegation over harvest prospects
in spite of drought in the new
lands area, excessive precipita-
tion and cold weather in the
Baltic Republics and Belorussia,
below normal rainfall in the
Urals, and cold weather and in-
sect pests in the central Asian
cotton-growing areas.
Long-term Outlook
The present prospects for
limited success in raising ag-
ricultural production this year
point up certain realities which
the USSR must'face if it is
to attain its long-i rm objectives
in agriculture. These include a
significant long-term increase
in agricultural output, diversi-
fication of the diet of the av-
erage citizen, maintenance of
state reserves of foods and
grains, and production of ex-
portable quantities of agricul--
tural commodities.
Growing a calorically suf-
ficient amount of food for the
Soviet people has not been a
pressing problem in recent years,
but now, ten years after World
War II, there is a demand for
variation in the high starch
diet, which sufficed in the post-
war rebuilding years. This de-
mand can be met by improving the
quality and quantity of live-
stock production. Between 1 July
1954 and 30 June 1955, the Soviet
diet averaged 2,780 calories a
day. A slightly higher caloric
intake and somewhat more varied
diet is likely for the 12-month
period extending to 1 July 1956,
but the average intake is not
likely to attain the prewar
level of 2,900 calories per day.
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6 October 1955
Corn Program
In this respect the corn
program, which has been stren-
uously pushed--particularly
in 1955, is a key issue. The
substitution of corn acreage
for other feed grains such as
barley and oats makes it impera-
tive that good returns be ob-
tained from corn. A modifica-
tion of the corn program in line
with some of the recommenda-
tions of the American delega-
tion--for example, concentrat-
ing on corn only in select
areas such as the Kuban and
using sorghum in certain other
drier areas--would probably make
possi0le greater achievements
toward the goal of doubling milk
and meat production in the
course of the.next five years.
The cultivation and sow-
ing of. increased acreages in
the new lands, if they can be
made to produce even low yields
of grain consistently could aid
in the maintenance of Soviet
reserves and contribute to
supplies for export. An above-
average crop on the new lands
once in every three years
apparently would mean a more
than successful new lands pro-
gram. With crops cultivated
over a more diversified area,
droughts may not be as crippling
as in prior years.
If large areas in the new
lands ultimately prove unsuit-
able for agriculture, i.e., if
droughts such as those ex-
perienced this year continue to
harass agricultural production
in succeeding years, the USSR
will be forced to cope with the
increasing food demands of a
growing population by abandon-
SOVIET AGRICULTURE
CALORIES/ DAY/ PERSON
LI S (1953-54)
USSR (1954-55)
(Estimated)
OTHER( Fruits, -
veg., sugar etc, )
ing its hope for self-suffic-
iency and looking for some
sources outside the Soviet
bloc to obtain grain as well
as other agricultural products
for home consumption and for
inclusion in reserves.
With an improved harvest
and success this year in the
fodder program, based to a
large extent on corn produc-
tion, the Soviet leaders may be
encouraged to continue the
heavy agriculture investment
into the sixth Five-Year Plan
and thereby push on to obtain
a strong agricultural position.
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While Soviet-Japanese re-
lations have been highlighted
by stalemates on several major
issues in London, a number of
exchanges between the countries
of the Sino-Soviet bloc and
Tokyo on lower levels--in-
volving cultural, economic and
political contacts--have been
taking place on an active and
friendly basis.
The Communists, by encour-
aging such contacts, apparently
are trying to dispel Japanese
reservations with respect to
normalizing relations with bloc
countries. While Tokyo has
avoided actions implying of-
ficial recognition of Peiping
and adopted a cautious approach
in the negotiations with the
USSR in London, it has openly
encouraged informal contacts.
One of the chief induce-
ments which Peiping and Moscow
have offered Japan--even before
relations are normalized--is
the promise of expanded trade.
Sponsors of private trade and
fishing agreements between
Japanese firms and the Chi-
nese Communists last spring
failed to obtain official
participation by the Japanese
government but laid the ground-
work for a renewed effort next
year. The Communist refusal
to accept more than a limited
quantity of nonembargoed items
has led influential Japanese
businessmen to support the
campaign for a reduction of
China trade controls.
Efforts to Expand Trade
Moscow has had a trade
mission in Tokyo for more than
a year negotiating contracts
which exaggerated press reports
have set at $94,000,000 each
way. Only an insignificant
portion has been realized,
however, because of high Soviet
prices, financing difficulties
and uncertainties over the
quantity of Soviet products.
Khrushchev told a Japanese
parliamentary delegation last
month that the Soviet Union
would place "large" orders for
Japanese ships and ship repairs
in exchange for Russian oil,
gasoline, coal and timber.
Beginning with the UN-
sponsored ECAFE conference in
Tokyo earlier this .year, when
a Czech delegate contacted
Japanese businessmen, the Eu-
ropean Satellites have exchanged
unofficial trade delegations,
negotiated contracts and in-
vited Japanese businessmen to
attend sample fairs with all
expenses paid. Even North
Korea and North Vietnam have
participated in the Communist
trade offensive.
6rapan' s main interest,
however, is in Communist China,
which possesses the iron ore,
coal, soybeans and oilseeds
Japan hopes to import in return
for Japanese finished goods. The
Hatoyama government has already
announced its intention to seek
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a reduction of the embargo to
accomplish this objective.
Cultural Contacts
In addition to trade,
"good-will" missions shuttling
back and forth between Japan
and the Communist bloc have es-
tablished ties between politi-
cians, journalists, farm and
labor leaders, and prominent
figures in the arts, sciences,
and professions. Sport teams,
musicians and ballet troupes
have added their weight to the
Communist propaganda campaign.
Japanese visitors to the
Sino-Soviet bloc are often flat-
tered by being given interviews
with top Communists. Last
month, Bulganin and Khrushchev
met for two hours with Japanese
Diet members and used the oc-
casion to belabor the Japanese
government for "artificially
drawing out the London talks,"
in contrast with the five days
of negotiations with Chancellor
Adenauer. The Japanese were
told to follow an "independent"
policy and establish closer
ties with the Orbit, or be
drawn into an armaments race.
Khrushchev's exposition of the
Russian position drew an en-
thusiastic response from several
Diet members who indicated they
would press for Japan's accept-
ance of the Soviet position on
their return.
The USSR and Japan have
had an especially spirited ex-
chaange on matters involving
nuc:Lear subjects. Moscow has
often exploited Japanese anti-
Western sentiments in this
regard, and has regularly sent
delegations to Japanese scien-
tific congresses and to cere-
monies commemorating the bomb-
ing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
As ~t result, Moscow has been
successful in getting wide Jap-
anese support for its demand
for a ban on nuclear weapons.
Numerous Communist fronts
in Japan support the "peace
offensive" in its various forms
and promote visits to and from
the bloc. They are normally
headed by respected Japanese,
such as Fusanosuke Kuhara, pre-
war conservative party president
and one of the lesse-r Za.iba.tsu--
prewar industrial--leaders, who
is presently visiting Peiping.
Most fronts are organized by
covert Communists in close co-
ordination with the unofficial
Soviet mission in Tokyo. Overt
relationships with the Japanese
Communist Party are avoided.
Effects on Japan
Unofficial contacts between
Japan and the Communist bloc
have on the whole been a propa-
ganda success for the Communists,
despite an undercurrent of cau-
tious criticism voiced by recent
Japanese visitors. Most Jap-
anese tours of the bloc have
produced a rich harvest of com-
plimentary articles, interviews,
books and speeches. Some Jap-
anese try to justify their
highly biased public views by
claiming that any other stand
would be "unpopular," therefore
commercially unsalable. Cer-
ta.inlly, there has been much
wishful thinking in Japan,
based on a universal desire for
trade and diplomatic relations
with the mainland.
These contacts have given
a strong impetus to neutralism
in Japan. They have weakened
public support for a\favorable
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
settlement of Japanese claims
advanced at the London talks.
They have increased pressure
for recognition of Communist
China and the reduction of trade
controls, and by convincing
many Japanese of the sincerity
of the Communist "peace offen-
sive," they have weakened sup-
port for rearmament and Japanese
participation in an Asian de-
fense system.
Moscow probably considers
that the success of its unof-
ficial contacts with Japan will
eventually force the Japanese
negotiators in London to nor-
malize relations with the USSR
substantially on Soviet terms.
NEW SOVIET POLICY ON TOURISM
To add luster to its cam-
paign for "peaceful coexistence,"
the Soviet Union in the last
few months has been promoting
an exchange of tourists with
other countries. For the first
time in Soviet history, a small
number of tourists without of-
ficial status are going abroad,
and for the first time since
the 1930's, unofficial foreign
tourists are being admitted to
the Soviet Union in considerable
numbers.
Soviet Tourists Abroad
In August, a group of
about 250 Soviet tourists vis-
ited Warsaw and other Polish
cities. A short'time later,
the Soviet press announced that
a group of tourists had left
Moscow for a. 12-day trip to
Stockholm, Goteborg and other
Swedish cities. The press also
reported that Finnish tourist
agencies had agreed to arrange
a similar trip to Finland. Tours
of Soviet citizens "in the near-
est future" are being arranged
to Communist China and the other
"People's Democracies." In
fact, TASS reported on 25 Sep-
tember that a group of Soviet
ma.na.gers, engineers, workers
and journalists had arrived in
Budapest for a, 7- to 10-da.y
tripe through Hungary.
B. S. Rzhanov, one of the
Soviet officials directing the
program, has expressed hope
that Soviet tourists will be
invited to the United States.
He estimated that a, total of
2,000 Soviet tourists will travel
abroad this year.
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6 October 1955
Who Travels and How
With the average Soviet
industrial worker receiving a
wage of only about 700 rubles
per month, which in most cases
barely provides the basic
necessities of daily living,
the travel program is clearly
out of reach of many of those
for whom trips abroad are de-
signed, and many of the trips
may be government-financed.
The foreign section of the
all-Union Central Council of
Trade Unions is reported to be
in charge of the program. Any
citizen may apply to his local
trade union; the application is
then forwarded to the regional
trade union council, which makes
up the groups of tourists.
Some sort of rationing system
is reported under consideration
in anticipation of a heavy
demand in the future.
The American embassy in
Moscow has commented that al-
though reservations for the
tours may be allocated on a
'first come, first served"
basis to factories and other
institutions, it seems probable
that individual applications
are thoroughly screened by trade
union, party, and police of-
ficials. The embassy has also
noted that the announcement
of these tours has had consider-
able symbolic impact on the
Soviet citizenry, giving the
impression that another signifi-
cant break with the Stalin era
has been effected.
Tourists to the USSR
Soviet policy toward tour-
ists coming to the USSR has also
drastically changed. Prior to
Stalin's death, vacationing
tourists were not admitted to
the Soviet Union. Incoming
travelers were restricted largely
to officially invited delegations,
although the number of these
had steadily increased since 1950,
when only about 2,000 persons
entered the USSR.
After Stalin's death,
the policy gradually changed.
During the first seven months
of 1955 some 30,000 foreigners
(tourists and members of delega-
tions) used the facilities of
Intourist, the Soviet agency
in charge of foreign travelers
in the USSR. Entry of ordinary
tourists in significant numbers
did not begin until August, how-
ever , and before the end of the
year tourists from most of the
Western countries are expected.
If the present rate continues,
the number of visitors to the
Soviet Union this year will be
almost triple the prewar peak
reached in 1936, when over
18,000 tourists, mostly Ameri-
cans, traveled in the Soviet
Union.
In pursuit of this objec-
tive, Intourist has been
distributing brochures and
advertising in foreign news-
papers. Most of the tours are
limited in scope; the broadest
thus far noted is one advertised
in the Swedish press which would
take in Moscow, Kiev, Odessa,
Sochi, Tbilisi and Leningrad
over a 24-day period and cost
3,595 kroner (about $693).
Deviations from the Intourist
itinerary would, of course,
be virtually impossible.
Although efforts are being
made to expand and improve
accommodations and services
(including English lessons for
waitresses), the shortage of
hotel space makes it unlikely
that tourism in the USSR will
reach proportions common in the
West. In addition, the Soviet
Union's reputation as a police
state with rigid controls tends
to scare off many prospective
travelers. In any case,
however, the current Soviet
policy toward foreign tourists
permits the USSR to claim
that it is doing its part in
encouraging international
cultural exchange in keeping with
the spirit of the Geneva confer
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUWUW
6 October 19,105
JAPAN SOCIALIST,,' MERGER APPEARS ASSURED
Japan's Right and Left
Socialist Parties have sub-
merged their divergent policy
viewpoints and their merger,
scheduled for mid-October,
seems assured. Although the
merger will improve the Social-
ists' tactical position, it
will not immediately increase
their strength in the Diet.
Basic antagonisms will be
carried over and differences
between the left and right
factions are likely to make
Socialist unity relatively
short-lived.
JAPANESE DIET
C0114.1.
LABOR
FARMERS
LABOR
FARMERS
In the campaign for the
February election for the low-
er house of the Diet, both
Socialist parties publicly
pledged to unite, and the
negotiations on terms began
after the April elections for
local officials had established
the relative strengths of the
two parties. The results of
both elections stimulated the
merger effort, since the
Socialist gains were inter-
preted as having improved the
prospects for a unified Social-
ist; party coming to power.
The elections also established
the predominance of the Left
Socialists, thereby largely
resolving the question of
leadership of the new party.
Prospects of New Party
The new Socialist party,
with 156 seats, will constitute
just over one third of the
lower house of the Diet. It
thus could bloc any attempt by
the conservatives to revise
the constitution in order to
provide a legal basis for
Japanese rearmament.
The Socialists alone will
be incapable of carrying a no-
confidence motion against the
government, but they hope con-
tinued conservative disunity
will gain them the co-
opera-tion of the conservative Liber-
al Party in forcing Prime
Minister Hatoyama's Japan Demo-
cratic Party minority govern-
ment to call an election. They
foresee gains in a series of
future elections that will
eventually lead to a Socialist
cabinet. The conservatives,
however, are aware of the left-
ist threat and Socialist unifi-
cation probably will stimulate.
greater efforts to achieve a
conservative merger.
Left Socialist Party chair-
man, Mosaburo Suzuki, a former
Communist, probably will head
the! unified party, and Right
Socialist secretary general
Inejiro Asanuma and chairman
Jotaro Kawakami will become
secretary general and supreme
adviser of the new organization
respectively. The selection of
national officials appears to
have been settled in?a rela-
tively amicable fashion; how-
ever, the question of consoli-
dating the competing local
organizations probably will be
more difficult.
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The platform for the
unified party has incorporated
ambiguously phrased policy
statements which gloss over
sharply differing views. The
compromises appear to have
been made largely at the ex-
pense of the more moderate
Right Socialist policies, al-
though a Left Socialist Party
convention has criticized the
platform for failing to state
the "peace principles" of the
party. The platform asserts
that Japan is oppressed by the
United States for military
reasons, and that Japan should
scrap the security treaty and
the administrative agreement
with the United States and
seek a neutral position with-
out dependence on either the
Communist or the free world.
The Socialists' prospects
for attaining power in the near
future are limited, but could
be improved by the continued
political instability of the
conservatives and their failure
to resolve Japan's vital eco-
nomic problems. The policies
of a Socialist government,
because of the anti-American
attitudes of the more extreme
Left Socialist leaders, would
emphasize neutralism and closer
relations with the Communist
bloc.
AUSTRIA SINCE THE STATE TREATY
In the two months since
the Austrian state treaty came
into effect on 27 July, Austria
has cautiously adjusted to new
conditions within the general
pattern of neutrality formed
by ten years of occupation, and
on the whole has fared a-little
better than anticipated.
The two governing coali-
tion parties--the People's
Party and the Socialists--
ha.ve reached compromises on
the procedure for forming the
new Austrian army and on the
disposition of the formerly
Soviet-held industries. The
latter have generally proved to
be in better economic shape
than had been expected. The
government has made minor prog-
ress in eliminating local
Communists from influential
positions in these industries
and has removed the remaining
Communist police chiefs in
Vienna.
The Austrian government
is staking every effort to
appear neutral, not only in
foreign policy, but also in
domestic affairs having possi-
ble international implications.
This caution is well illustrated
by the recent removal of its
appointee as personnel director
of the newly acquired oil
administration after a Communist
press campaign had unearthed
his former connection with the
American embassy in Vienna.
Creation of the Army
Current plans for the
armed forces are relatively
modest. The army will be
brought to a strength of about
30,000 in the next 18 months.
Plans for the development of an
air force have been shelved as
too expensive to be considered
at present. A large share of
the army's equipment is expected
to come from the United States
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6 October 1955
and France. Under pressure of
a rebuke from the Soviet ambas-
sador on this score, however,
Vienna announced a "request"
for Soviet military equipment
on 15 September and has since
described to an American offi-
cial the small arms, artillery,
tanks, and other equipment
that the USSR has arranged to
transfer to Austria.
A political struggle be-
tween the coalition parties
for control of the army had
been anticipated, but a work-
able compromise was reached in
a law passed in September.
Under this, the army is admin-
istered under the chancellery,
where the People's Party is
represented by Chancellor Raab
and the Socialists by Vice
Chancellor Schaerf. The army
organization itself is headed
by a member of the People's
Party with a Socialist deputy,
and a similarly dual distri-
bution of the top positions is
to prevail throughout the
military hierarchy.
Former Soviet Enterprises
The two parties have been
even more at odds over the
ultimate disposition of the
oil fields and varied indus-
trial plants formerly operated
by the USSR. The Socialists
want to absorb these assets
into their nationalization
program under the Ministry of
Nationalized Industries, which
they control. The conserva-
tive People's Party wants to
return the individual plants
to their original owners or
sell them to private capital.
Both parties, however, are
in full agreement on the
urgency of continuing the opera-
tion of former Soviet enter-
prises, which are of great
importance to Vienna and lower
Austria, and a resolution of
the more immediate problems
has already been achieved.
The government will operate as
nationalized enterprises about
15 large firms which were
originally included under the
nationalization laws passed in
1946 and 1947. All other firms
will be held by the Finance
Ministry, which is controlled
by the People's Party, for
ultimate disposition. Both
parties will be represented in
the administration of these.
properties.
It now appears probable
that this compromise will go
even further. Under the pro-
jected arrangement, the Finance
Ministry would have to obtain
Socialist approval of the sale
or return to private owners of
any plants it administers,
while People's Party represent-
ative s would continue to be
included in the management of
the state-owned plants.
So far at least, the
purely economic problems of
administering the former Soviet
enterprises have proved less
difficult than expected. Aus-
trian technicians have expressed
surprise at how well a num-
ber of the factories have been
maintained, and it now appears
that the oil reserves are over
30,000,000 tons greater than
the amount Austria had counted
on to make the deliveries to
the USSR which are specified in
the treaty. Production is
handicapped, however, by a
severe shortage of technical
personnel.
Eliminating Communist Influence
More serious difficulties
are posed by the problem of
removing Austrian Communists
from their entrenched positions
in the formerly Soviet-held
enterprises. The Austrian-
Soviet agreement of 15 April
specified that no worker can
be dismissed solely for Com-
munist affiliation. It is not
always possible to shift work-
ers to less responsible posi-
tiorns or dismiss them because
their jobs have been abolished.
Communist control of the labor
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organizations in formerly
Soviet-controlled plants will
be even harder to overcome.
In Vienna, where the
police in the Soviet sectors
were heavily Communist infil-
trated, the government has
removed all the remaining
Communist police chiefs. The
Austrian Communist Party,
which has never polled more
than five percent of the popu-
lar vote except in a few areas
under Soviet occupation, will
be further weakened by such
moves, but it must be assumed
that there are still numerous
penetrations by Communist
agents of the police and other
government agencies both in
Vienna and the provinces.
International Communist
organizations, such as the
World Federation of Trade
Unions and the World Peace
Council, which maintain their
headquarters in Vienna, will
not be seriously harassed by
the Austrians. The government
has stated it intends to deport
any of their officials living
in Vienna without proper
documentation, but it has been
scrupulously legal in its
treatment of the organizations
and has allowed them to remain
there despite the objections
of some Western powers.
Foreign Policy
The government has thus
far made no indicative moves
in international affairs, but
some! hint of the kind of neu-
trality it will pursue in the
future is found in its current
position on the Danube question.
There is already consid-
erable pressure from business-
men and numerous government
officials for immediate Aus-
trian adherence to the Soviet-
dominated 1948 Danube Conven-
tion,, and such a move is gen-
erally expected within the
next year. The Foreign Minis-
try, however, thus far has
avoided any move in this direc-
tion and is presumably waiting
for the opportunity to balance
such action with a correspond-
ing move toward association
with some Western international
organization such as the Coal-
Steenl Community.
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