CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000600070001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 30
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 20
OCR NO. 7426/55
1 September 1955
DMV%Wgr' NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. Q
13 DEC1.ASSf IEE)
CLASS, CHANGE T4: 1S S
, -
NEXTREVIEW DATE:
AUTH: 7t3.2
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
111 OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA and DOS review(s)
completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1955
T H E W E E K I N B R I E F
PART I
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI SITUATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The Israeli attack late on 31 August against an Egyptian
military host at Khan Yunis in the Gaza strip underlines the
danger that the situation may get out of control.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet Approach to UN Disarmament Talks: In the first meetings
o the five-nation sarmamen,E-'subcommittee talks, Soviet
delegate Sobolev has?adopted.the patient and tolerant manner
that Moscow refers to as "the Geneva spirit." Sobolev has
reiterated Moscow's willingness to consider the disarmament
plans of Western nations--especially the President's plan
for blueprint exchange and aerial inspection--as well as
its own. I I . .. . . . . . . . . .
Guided Missile Sites in the Moscow Area: Moscow's air defense
has been strengthened over the past two years by instal-
lations which r b bl 1
a
:e pro a aunchin sites for round-toy
air guided missiles.
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1
Withdrawal of Soviet Forces from Austria Nearly Completed: The
withdrawal of-Soviet group orces an tactical air units
from Austria was nearly completed by 29 August. Rail ship-
ments indicated that the bulk of the tactical forces were
being withdrawn to the USSR. Page 3
Air-raid Shelter Program in Satellites: Numerous reports indi-
cate that several of the uropeari Satellites, following
the leadership of the USSR, have made it compulsory to
include air-raid shelters in new public buildings,
factories, stores, and masonry apartments.
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Page 4
Murmansk-Pechenga Railroad: A new railway line running from
urmans to ec enga is now in operation. It provides the
first rail transportation to the port of Pechenga, to the
nickel mining and smelting facilities in the area, and to
one of the six potential medium or heavy bomber staging
bases in the Kola Peninsula. It will permit greater dis-
persal of air units in the area. Page 4
CONLWWRAL
ENT1AL
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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1 September 1955
USSR Shows Interest in Aircraft Carriers: Although there is
no evidence that a ov e n on possesses or is con-r
structing an aircraft carrier or that any Soviet air,
craft are specifically designed for operating from a
carrier, Soviet military attaches are reportedly show-
ing increasing interest in British carriers.
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Sino-Egyptian Trade Agreement May Lead to Recognition: The
signing on 22 August of a three-year Sino-Boyptian'
trade agreement, the first Chinese Communist trade
agreement with a country in the Year East, seems to
move Peiping closer toward gaining recognition from a
country in that area. Fulfillment of the agreement,
by which China undertakes to exchange annually 60,000
tons of steel products for cotton, will further Peip-
ing's claim that.its rapid industrialization is permit-
ting exports of industrial goods to meet the import
needs of underdeveloped countries. Page 7 25X1
American-Chinese Talk$,:. The Chinese Communists at Geneva
continue to reuse .to commit themselves to an early
deadline for the release of all Americans still de-
tained in China. It still seems a toss-up whether
Peiping will agree to"such a deadline if the alterna-
tive is termination of the talks and public awareness
of the positions taken.. PagP Q 25X1
French North Africa: The French cabinet's acpeptance of the
"package ea " whereby both Resident General Gra.ndval
and Sultan Mohamed ben Arafa are to be removed is not
likely to relieve the serious tension in Morocco. Ia
Algeria, rebel activities continue despite strong
French countermeasures. Instruments of ratification
of the French-Tunisian conventions have been exchanged
in Paris and the conventions are expected to become
effective in mid-September: . . . Page d 25X1
Afghan-Pakistani Dispute: A new Turkish offer to mediate thq
Afghan-Pakistani dispute is endorsed by Pakistan
and may be accepted by Afghanistan, . . Page 0 25X1
Yugoslav Attitude Toward Foreign Aid: The Yugoslavs last
week made an effort to explain away Vice President
Vukmanovic-Tempo's 20 August denunciation of Battle
Act restrictions and adopted a more co-operative at-
titude regarding-the "technical questions" connected
with US inspection of the military aid program in
Yugoslavia.
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THE WEEK IN 13R IEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1955
Widespread Strikes Anticipated in France: The most exten-
sive ren.c stri essince t He nationwide outbreak
of August 1953-,are.-.expected this fall unless large
wage concessions are forthcoming soon. The Communist-
controlled General Labor Confederation is making a
strenuous effort to force the Socialist-oriented
Force Ouvriere and the Christian Workers Confedera-
tion to co-operate with it in a drive for wage nego-
tiations`at the .national level. Page 11
Communist-led Strike. May be Imminent in Costa Rica: A Com- 25X1
mun s,.--le strike Ine United Fruit Company's Laurel
District in Costa Rica is threatened for 14 September.
A strike in this area could spread to the company's
other banana-workers in Costa Rica and Panama, and
might result:. in :increased.Communil.st-led labor strength
in. both countries.Page 12
Labor Unrest.Mounts;;:in Chile: The current strike of some
50,000 can civil servants for a 60-percent wage
increase-reflects labor's.growing unrest as a result
of the steady. depreciation of real wages over the
past several years:., Inflation in Chile continues un-
controlled. :.Labor leaders of the non-Communist left
apparently are trying to force the creation of a left-
wing cabinet'or-to force President Ibanez out of of-
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Tice. . . . Page 12
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Argentine Political Situation: The dramatic staging of
President erons resignation offer and its firm
rejection,`by Peronista organizations on 31 August
has ; probably achieved the. obvious objective of
strengthening,.the_president's position by demonstrat-
ing his strong popular support. Peron's declared in-
tent to impose "pacification" will mean that arrests
and tension will continue at least until there is a
decline in. antigovernment attacks and plotting..
. ... . . . . . . . . . Page 13
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1955
PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE SOVIET DISARMAMENT POSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
In the crowded schedule of international negotiations
set for the next few months, the USSR seems likely to give
high priority to the disarmament problem. Soviet agreement
to concrete steps in this field could persuade the NATO na-
tions of the political and financial advantages of "peaceful
coexistence"--without materially reducing Soviet military
strength in the process. The USSR probably hopes that if it
appears reasonable and offers dramatic "deeds" like the recent
demobilization of part of its armed personnel, Western resolve
to maintain the strength of the Atlantic coalition will gradu-
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TRENDS IN BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
In response to the accelerated pace of political
development in many of its overseas dependencies, Britain
is considering momentous adjustments in its colonial policies.
In full awareness of its diminishing means of direct control,
London is now seeking a way to advance the colonies toward
autonomy while trying to assure that the remain stable in
the process.
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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1 September 1955
The Israeli attack late
on 31 August against an Egyp-
tian military post at Khan
Yunis.in the Gaza strip under-
lines the danger that the sit-
uation may get out
of control.
This "large-
scale" attack, accord-
ing to an Israeli
army spokesman, was
in retaliation for
the destruction of a
village 25 miles from
Tel Aviv by Egyptian
raiders during the
night of 30-31 Aug-
ust, or only a few
hours after Egypt
had accepted UN Truce
Supervisor Burns'
proposals for a cease-
fire agreement.
Israel had made no
further reply to
'Burns' proposals for
a cease-fire since
its letter of 30 Aug-
ust stating that it
cannot accept them
until Egypt admits
responsibility for
starting the recent
series of raids.
fr., _JERUSALEM
NIR GALIM
MIGDAL
KHAN
YUNIS
GAZA
STRIP
r~ar are `
S R A E L
I }E=OTR L EN AUJA
ZONE
ARMISTICE LINE (1949).
0 25
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PART I OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST Page 1 of 1
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1955
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet Approach to
Disarmament a s
In the first meetings of
the five-nation UN disarmament
subcommittee talks, Soviet dele-
gate Sobolev has adopted the
patient and tolerant manner
that Moscow refers to as "the
Geneva spirit."
While Sobolev has not yet
entered into substantive dis-
cussions on any point, he has
reiterated Moscow's willingness
to consider the disarmament
plans of Western nations--es-
pecially the President's plan
for a blueprint exchange and
aerial inspection--as well as
its own. Sobolev has made it
clear, however, that the USSR
considers that its 10 May pro-
posals "remain the most effec-
tive and realistic" of all the
plans. The Soviet proposals
and the President's plan prob-
ably will occupy the major por-
tion of the subcommittee's work
during the coming weeks.
Guided Missile Sites
n the Moscow Area
Moscow's air defense has
been strengthened over the past
two years by the construction of
installations which are probably
launching sites for ground-to-
air guided missiles.
Approximately 60 of these
installations
in a belt
25 miles deep which extends
three fourths of the way around
Moscow. When duplications are
eliminated and the sites in the
remaining fourth of the belt
are located, it is estimated
that there will be approximately
40 such installations ringing
Moscow at an average distance of
While most Communist com-
mentaries have reported the
subcommittee talks with an air
of optimism, the Czech radio
on 30 August expressed some
doubt that the work of the sub-
committee would be easy. The
broadcast insisted that "ruling
circles in the West" would try
to "disturb" the atmosphere of
international relaxation achieved
at Geneva, and for this purpose
would undoubtedly make full use
of the President's 24 August
Philadelphia speech. This
speech, it said, "considerably
departed from the spirit of
Geneva." Moscow has refrained
from linking the President's
speech with the subcommittee
talks and has thus far avoided
any comment on it. TASS re-
porting of the speech covered
only the points most in harmony
with "the Geneva spirit."
30 miles from the center of the
city. At present, four of the
sites, under construction since
June 1953, appear to have been
completed, and another eight
are probably capable'of limited
use.
Ninety percent of all ob-
served installations are of the
same general configuration, which
consists of three characteristic
and interconnected facilities:
a herringbone layout of road-
ways, a large bunker which may
serve as a control and communi-
cations center, and a domestic
area of permanent buildings
which could house more than 400
men.,
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POSSIBLE GUIDED MISSILE SITES IN THE MOSCOW AREA
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
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?Medyn
? Kondrova
14837
?Salnechnogorskiy
p MILES 50
L-
~ushkino\
Mytishchi? L Shchelkovo Gorodishchi
? ' Noginsk
Babushkin ? Pavlovskiy
i
Ozery
Kashira
The herringbone road com-
plex, which is approximately
one mile long and a half mile
wide, consists of three longi-
tudinal and 10 to 12 transverse
roadways, with the spine of the
system aligned with the center
of the city. The missiles
apparently are launched from
saw-tooth recesses or bays
PART II
along each end of the transverse
roads. Each installation has
approximately 60 of these bays.
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Mon
no Posad 0 ?
MOSCOW Elektrostal DZuyevoo
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1 September 19'55
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area o
Assuming that each saw-
tooth bay contains one launcher
with two reloads, 180 weapons
would be required for each
installation--7,200 for the 40
estimated sites in the Moscow
(Concurred in
by 031)
Withdrawal of Soviet Forces
From Austria Nearly Completed
The withdrawal of Soviet
ground forces and tactical air
units from Austria was nearly
completed by 29 August. Rail
shipments indicated that the
tactical forces were being with-
drawn to the USSR.
Preparations for the air
movement observed during the
first half of the month in-
cluded the removal of radar,
antiaircraft artillery, and oil
storage tanks from airfields.
The first movement of air force
personnel was noted on 11
August, when headquarters and
support personnel departed by
rail.
The evacuation of Soviet
aircraft from Austria apparently
began on 19 August, with the
departure of a reconnaissance
regiment from Vienna-Aspern air-
field, and continued through 24
August. The movement involved
six Soviet regiments equipped
with a total of approximately
190 ;FAGOTS (MIG-15's).
The withdrawal of Soviet
ground forces, beginning 4
August, was also nearly completed
by 29 August. A maximum of
30,000 Soviet personnel of an
estimated 35,000 total have now
been withdrawn from Austria via
Higyesholom, Hungary. The rail
route of these departing forces
indicates that the bulk are
moving back to the USSR, al-
though small ground force ele-
ments were reported moving to
Germany early in August.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1955
Air-raid Shelter Program
in satellites
Numerous reports indicate
that several of the European
Satellites, following the
leadership of the USSR, have
made it compulsory to include
air-raid shelters in new build-
ings. A program incorporating
air-raid shelters in public
buildings, factories, stores,
and masonry apartments was in
operation in many areas of the
.USSR by 1952, and a similar pro-
gram began in the Satellites
in 1953.
A recent report from Bul-
garia states that the building
regulations introduced on 1 Jan-
uary 1955 specify construction
of underground shelters in new
apartment houses, with multistory
dwellings to have shelters two
stories below ground. Czech-
oslovakia has a general policy
requiring the inclusion of shel-
ters in plans drawn for all
government buildings, apartments,
and factories. While there is
not enough information available
on Czechoslovakia to document
complete implementation, there
Murmansk-Pechenga Railroad
A new railway line running
from Murmansk to Pechenga is
now in operation. It provides
the first rail transportation
to the port of Pechenga, to the
important nickel deposits near
Nikel, and to one of the six
potential medium or heavy bomber
staging bases on the Kola Penin-
sula. It will permit greater
dispersal of air units in the
area.
is evidence of shelters in at
least some new construction.
Reports from Hungary indi-
cate that in 1954 .air-raid
shelters in factories were con-
structed in accordance with "gen-
eral regulations," and that each
industrial enterprise was ordered
to recondition old shelters or
build new ones. Building plans
furnished Poland by the USSR
are reported to include heavy
foundations and air-raid shel-
ters for all new housing blocks
in Warsaw. The American air
attache in Warsaw has also re-
ceived a report from a fairly
reliable source that bomb shel-
ters have been included In all
new buildings in Warsaw.
The short time this pro-
gram has been in operation has
enabled it to provide for only
a small proportion of Satellite
requirements. It does, however,
indicate the existence of a co-
ordinated Soviet bloc civil
defense system odeled on the
Soviet pattern.
(Prepared by OR
line passes near or through
Luostori (Pechenga airfield)
and possibly terminates eight
miles north of Pechenga at the
port of Pechenga (Linakhamari),
which is open all year to ships
of all sizes.
Besides the further de-
velopment of the port of Pechenga,
one of the principal economic
reasons for the construction of
this railroad was to improve
access to the Pechenga nickel
deposit--one of the most
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1 September 1955
important in the USSR. At-
present Nikel has a smelting
plant producing 10,000 tons of
nickel annually which is trans-
ported to a refinery at Mon-
chegorsk, south of Murmansk,
where approximately 25 percent
of the USSR's refined nickel
is produced.
That a sizable expansion
of nickel production is con-
templated is seen in the con-
struction of three power plants
in the Pechenga area by a
Finnish company. The second
plant was put into operation
on 10 August 1955, and the
Finnish press has reported
that construction of the third
may begin soon. These three
plants will provide a three-
fold increase in the electric
supply of the area.
Extension of the railroad
system to Pechenga, location
of a potential medium or heavy
bomber staging base, has in-
creased the importance of the
Kola Peninsula as a staging
area. The logistical support
provided by the new railroad
would permit air units to be
MURMANSK-PECHENGA RAILROAD
N O ` F~; W A
Klrkenes
S E A
(Severomorsk
MURMANSK
0 VAYENGA
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S
POLUDSTROV
RYEACHIY
? Potential Medium Bomber Staging Base
A Nickel Mining and Smelter
Murmansk-Pechenga Railroad
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1955
dispersed along the northern
rim of the Kola Peninsula in-
stead of concentrated in the
Murmansk area. This in turn
would facilitate effective em-
ployment of naval jet light
bombers and provide greater
USSR Shows Interest
In rcra t Carriers
The USSR has reached a
stage in its postwar naval ex-
pansion program at which it
would be logical for it to
build an aircraft carrier.
Soviet naval regulations pro-
mulgated in 1948 assigned a
predominantly offensive role
to the Soviet navy in marked
contrast.to the defensive role
played by Soviet naval forces
in World War II. Since 1948,
the USSR has created a powerful
naval striking force, consist-
ing of large numbers of long-
range cruisers, destroyers and
submarines, which may indicate
an intention to operate beyond
the range of land-based.air-
craft.
Although there is no evi-
dence that the Soviet Union
possesses or is constructing an
aircraft carrier, or that any
Soviet aircraft are specifically
designed for-operating from a
carrier,.Soviet military at-
tachds are showing increasing
interest in British carriers.
In May 1955 the Soviet
naval attachd in London visited
the British carrier Albion.
Subsequently, the Soviet
naval attache in London wrote
protection for the six airfields
in this area which would be
logical choices for staging
medium or heavy bomber opera-
tions against North America.
Prepared
jointly with ORR
to the British Admiralty sug-
gesting an exchange of visits
aboard a modern British carrier
and a modern Soviet naval ves-
sel. It is probably this pro-
posal which led to the recently
announced British plans to send
two carriers and four destroyers
to visit the USSR this October.
The American naval attachd
in London reported on 8 July
that the Soviet naval attachd
and two assistants had again
visited'a British carrier, this
time the Centaur, at Portsmouth.
The visitors went directly to
the normal location of the mir-
ror landing sight, a new type
of landing aid developed by the
British and being installed on
some; American carriers, and ex-
pressed disappointment when in-
formed that this was not fitted
on the Centaur.
The Russians asked numerous
questions on carrier design,
covering the speed of the bomb
hoist, the speed of the plane
elevator, and the thickness of
the hangar deck armor.
these developments might reflect
nothing more than Soviet interest
in collecting intelligence on
the British navy. On the other
hand, there are fragments of
information which suggest the
possibility that a carrier is
being constructed in the USSR.
Barriers were recently erected
around a large hull which has
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1 September 19:55
been under construction on the
battleship slip of the Baltic
Shipyard in Leningrad since
1953, obviously in an attempt
to prevent further scrutiny of
this hull by Western attaches.
The Russians have the cap-
ability to build aircraft
Sino-Egyptian Trade Agreement
May Lead to Recognition
The signing on 22 August
of a three-year Sino-Egyptian
trade agreement, the first
which Peiping has concluded
with a country in the Near East,
seems to move Peiping closer
toward gaining recognition from
a country in that area. Ful-
fillment of the agreement, by
which China undertakes to ex-
change annually 60,000 tons of
steel products for cotton, will
also further Peiping's claim
that its rapid industrialization
is permitting exports of indus-
trial goods to meet the import
needs of underdeveloped countries.
Preliminary negotiations
which led to these formal trade
relations were probably insti-
tuted shortly after the Bandung
conference of April 1955 where
Chou En-lai and Egyptian premier
Nasr indicated an interest in
the development of official
contacts. Cairo undoubtedly is
attempting to maintain its an-
nounced neutralist position as
well as to find a market for
cotton surpluses.
That political goals are
primary in Peiping's mind is
borne out by the conclusion of
the first annual protocol to
the three-year agreement, where-
by Communist China will export
carriers. Following World War
II, the USSR obtained original
German plans for an aircraft
carrier and probably acquired
a complete propulsion plant
suitable for installation in
such a vessel.
60,000 tons of domestically
scarce steel products for 15,000
tons of Egyptian cotton. This
protocol accounts for only about
one half of the $56,000,000
trade goal for the first year
under the trade agreement. Sup-
plementary cotton-steel con-
tracts during the effective
period of the first protocol
will probably fulfill the an-
nounced trade goal.
Communist China's export
of steel products--of prime
necessity to its planned indus-
trial expansion--indicates the
importance which Peiping places
on the establishment of relations
with Egypt.
Until the conclusion of
the present trade agreement,
imports of cotton from Egypt,
which are required by China's
textile industry, have been
paid for in cash. In 1954 China
imported about 10,000 tons of
Egyptian cotton and imports dur-
ing 1955 reached about 20,000
tons,, because of China's poor
domestic crop in 1954.
The trade agreement pro-
vides, in addition to barter
terms of trade, that commer-
cial representatives are to be
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1955
exchanged. This is probably
the key provision in an effort
to secure Egyptian recognition,
which Peiping undoubtedly hopes
will set a precedent for other
states of the Arab bloc.
American-Chinese Talks
The Chinese Communists at
Geneva continue to refuse to
commit themselves to an early
deadline for the release of
all Americans still detained
in China. It still seems a
toss-up whether Peiping will
agree to such a deadline if
the alternative is termination
of the talks and public aware-
ness of the positions taken.
Chinese Communist repre-
sentative Wang Ping-nan this
week confirmed that Peiping
has dropped its request for
the names of all Chinese
nationals in the United States.
Moreover, Ambassador Johnson
believes that Wang has accepted
an American formula under which
the Indian embassy would be
restricted to investigating
the cases only of those Chi=
nese who feel they are being
prevented from returning.
French North Africa
The French cabinet's ac-
ceptance of the "package deal"
whereby both Resident General
Grandval and Sultan Mohamed ben
Arafa are to be removed is not
likely to relieve the tension
in Morocco. In Algeria, rebel
activities continue despite
strong French countermeasures.
Instruments of ratification of
the French-Tunisian conventions
have been exchanged in Paris,
Chou En-lai reportedly
plans to visit Egypt before
the end of the year, at which
time Egypt may agree to
recognize Peiping and exchange
diplomatic representatives.
There has been no further
progress, however, on the
issue of the 40 or more Ameri-
cans still detained.
Wang has been careful not
to encourage any belief that
he will eventually agree to a
definite deadline, such as
three months. On the contrary,
he has insisted that Peiping
can "never" so agree.
Wang's arguments continue
to suggest that Peiping has
several reasons for wishing to
hold back some of the Americans
indefinitely. Among them are
a desire to save face, to en-
sure satisfactory action on
Chinese in the United States,
and to secure additional con-
cessions as the Geneva talks
develop.
and the conventions are expected
to become effective in mid-
September.
French Morocco: The French
cabinet has re uctantly approved
the removal of Moroccan sultan
Mohamed ben Arafa and accepted
Resident General Grandval's
resignation. Popular feeling
among Moroccans in support of
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1 September 1955
Grandval is so high that the
delay in Ben Arafa's departure
envisaged by the French cabinet
may have to be abandoned in
order to avert fresh violence.
French settlers who were
primarily responsible for forc-
ing Grandval's resignation con-
tinue to support Ben Arafa and
may attempt to prevent his de-
parture. The settlers are
unlikely to welcome General
Pierre Boyer de Latour, who is
slated to succeed Grandval.
Boyer de Latour's recent firm-
ness in dealing with the re-
actionaries among French set-
tlers in Tunisia makes him
unwelcome to the settlers in
Morocco.
Isolated terrorism and
sabotage, particularly of tele-
phone and telegraph lines,
continue.
Algeria: The state of
emergency, which was demanded
by the French settlers, has
now been extended to all Alge-
rian departments. Guerrillas
continue their activities in
eastern Algeria.
Meanwhile, the settlers
are seeking to block the re-
forms proposed by Governor
General Soustelle, which are
Afghan-Pakistani Dispute
Turkey has again offered
to mediate the Afghan-Pakistani
dispute.
Turkey's original offer to
mediate the quarrel only if Af-
ghanistan would renounce Push-
toonistan propaganda completely
was rejected by Kabul early in
August. After consultation
with Pakistan, the Turks have
now indicated their willingness
to mediate if propaganda is
limited to "cultural and
scheduled for discussion by the
Algerian Assembly in late Sep-
tembeer. Extremist settler
groups are also seeking to dis-
credit Soustelle, probably hop-
ing to force his recall or
resignation.
Tunisia: The formal ex-
change of instruments of rati-
fication in Paris on 31 August
was the final step prior to
implementation of the French-
Tunisian conventions. The
agreements apparently are
scheduled to be operative begin-
ning in mid-September, but the
entire process of putting them
into effect is expected to take
at least 20 years.
Habib Bourghiba, Nationalist
Neo-I)estour leader, is reported
to be planning for Tunisian
elections at the end of Septem-
ber. Since both the Tunisian
bey and the French community ob-
ject to the principle of direct
popular election ofa parlia-
mentary body, any early elections
are most likely to be limited
and local in nature.
Widespread unemployment
and the serious economic dislo-
cation which resulted from the
recent drought are becoming the
most pressing problems in the
area,
scientific" discussion of Push-
toonistan. The Pakistani gov-
ernment has urged the United
States to give strong support
to the Turkish effort. Although
generally considered to be "pro-
Pakistani," the Turks command
respect in Afghanistan, which
may, therefore, accept the new
offer. Turkey has been reluc-
tant to re-enter the confused
situation and is likely to
withdraw if either side shows
signs; of further intransigence.
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1 September 1955
Yugoslav Attitude
Towarcff-'or`e[gn Aid
The Yugoslavs last week
made an effort to explain away
Vice President Vukmanovic-
Tempo's 20 August denunciation
of Battle Act restrictions and
adopted a more co-operative
attitude' regarding the "techni-
cal questions" connected with
US inspection of the military
aid program in Yugoslavia.
Yugoslav ambassador Vidic
told Ambassador Bohlen in Moscow
on 28 August that Vukmanovic, in
his attack on the Battle Act,
did not mean to imply that the
Yugoslavs could no longer accept
the terms of the act. Instead,
he merely had been putting forth
his government's view that the
improved international situation
made trade restrictions no longer
necessary. In a conciliatory
tone, Vidic said that his gov-
ernment fully understood the
Battle Act and that he realized
the executive branch of the
American government must abide
by the laws connected with for-
eign aid. He reiterated strongly
his government's desire for con-
tinued economic aid from the
United States.
On 27 August Yugoslav for-
eign secretary Popovic, taking
the initiative in a conversa-
tion with Ambassador Riddleber-
ger, emphasized how necessary
he felt it was to settle the
questions concerned with the US
military aid program which were
threatening US-Yugoslav rela-
tions. He agreed that there
was much logic in the American
position and said that he him-
self would discuss the points
involved with Yugoslav military
officials. It was agreed that
Yugoslav and American military
officials would take up the
problems in September, follow-
ing which Popovic and Ambassador
Riddleberger would examine un-
resolved difficulties.
Riddleberger found Popovic's
conciliatory attitude in marked
contrast to his previous approach
to this issue. The ambassador
also noted that the Yugoslav
government has recently made a
slight concession by permitting
a small increase in the size of
the US military assistance staff.
Belgrade apparently wants
to avert a crisis in its re-
lations with the United States,
wishing to avoid termination of
American economic aid at least
until it knows what the USSR
will offer in the economic ne-
gotiations now going on in Mos-
cow. In any event, the Yugo-
slav government is not likely
to choose voluntarily a course
that would make it dependent on
the 1JSSR alone for economic
assistance.
supplying equipment.
According to Ambassador
Vidic, his government is seeking
through the Vukmanovic visit to
Moscow to expand the basis for
Yugoslav-Soviet trade; it is par-
ticularly desirous of getting
wheat, cotton, and oil. One
Yugoslav official has said he
hopes to get the latter two
items on five-year credit terms
at 1--percent interest. Vidic has
confirmed that the USSR has of-
fered a gold loan at 2 percent,
and he considers it probable that
the USSR would agree to financing
in their entirety individual
Yugoslav enterprises as well as
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1 September 1955
Widespread Strikes
Anticipated in France
The most extensive French
strikes since the nationwide
outbreak of August 1953 are ex-
pected this fall unless large
wage concessions are forthcom-
ing soon. The Communist-con-
trolled General Labor Confedera-
tion (CGT) is making a strenuous
effort to force the Socialist-
oriented Force Ouvriere and the
Christian Workers Confederation
(CFTC) to co-operate with it in
a drive for wage negotiations
at the national level.
The seriousness with which
the government views the labor
situation was apparent on 25
August when Premier Faure found
time during his brief return to
Paris from the negotiations at
Aix-les-Bains on Morocco to
call a meeting of his labor,
finance, and interior ministers
to discuss the problem. The
government plans to facilitate
labor-employer negotiations,
and hopes that increased pro-
ductivity will allow wage hikes
without price rises.
The labor agitation which
flared up in June and July was
probably checked only because
many plants close or sharply
reduce operations during the
paid vacation period from mid-
July through August. Near in-
surrectional strikes broke out
in the St. Nazaire and Nantes
shipyards during this period.
During these strikes the CGT
undertook to train militants
in leadership and unity-of-
action tactics. Non-Communist
unions have traditionally co-
operated with the CGT in the
shipyards, and the CGT has play-
ed up the results there as an
example of what unity of action
could lead to on a national scale.
The secretary general of
the CGT, Benoit Frachon, pub-
licly asked the president of
the employers' association on
22 August to,begin wage negotia-
tions at the national level
"with the labor confederations."
This was evidently aimed at
forestalling any move by the
government and management to
negotiate with the non-Communist
unions only.
Frachon implied that there
would be agitation in the fall
by the Paris region metalworkers,
the -traditional shock troops of
large-scale labor action. On
23 August the CGT metalworkers
union denounced as "nonexistent"
the agreements concluded in
July with the CFTC and Force
Ouvriere, and called for "tight-
ly controlled unity-of-action
demands."
On 25 August the CGT civil
servants union renewed demands
which had supposedly been set-
tled, and this move has been
interpreted as evidence that
the CGT will unleash a general
strike movement in the fall.
In their efforts to counter
the Communists' bids for labor
power, the non-Communist unions
are handicapped by inadequate
leadership and organization and
by management's attitude. Man-
agement is absolutely opposed
to a general rise in wages and
recently expressed alarm at the
"unexpected trend"' toward sup-
port by conservative governments
of labor's demands.
Moreover, prospects for
collaboration between the non-
Communist labor organizations
have been reduced since July
when the government settled the
civil servants' strike threat
through an agreement with Force
Ouvriere. This enhanced chances
for the CGT to win support from
the CFTC, which has always been
more inclined than the Force
Ouvrere to unity of action
with the Communists.
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1 September 1955
Communist-led Strike
ay Be Imminent n costa Rica
A Communist-led strike in
the United Fruit Company's small
Laurel District in Costa Rica
is threatened for 14 September.
A strike in this area might
spread to the company's 18,000
other banana workers in Costa
Rica, and possibly to its 12,-
000 workers iu Panama. The end
result may be an increase in
Communist-led labor strength
in both countries.
The leader of the current
strike agitation,is Isaias
Marchena, Communist labor boss
in the banana zone on Costa
Rica's Pacific coast.
Marchena, who returned
in September 1954 from three
months of training at the
Communist World Federation of
Trade Unions school in Buda-
pest, has thus far carefully
observed Costa Rica's complex
labor laws. After a second
balloting of the Laurel workers
showed over 60 percent in
favor of a strike, the govern-
ment's labor court-was obliged
on 25 August to declare that a
strike, after a 20-day period
for further negotiations, would
be legal.
In concentrating on the
1,500 workers at Laurel, the
Communists have struck at the
company's weakest point in
Costa Rica. Unlike the major
company divisions in Costa
Rica, the Laurel District,
located on the Panamanian bor-
der, is administered by the
Labor Unrest Mounts in Chile
The current strike of
some 50,000 Chilean civil ser-
vants for 'a 60-percent wage
increase reflects labor's grow-
ing unrest as a result of the
steady depreciation of real
company's subsidiary in Panama,
and the Laurel workers have
not been treated as well as
the company's other Costa Rican
workers.
A strike by the Laurel
workers might well lead to a
sympathy walkout by the easily
aroused labor force of the
company's larger divisions in
Costa Rica. It could also
spread to the company's planta-
tions in Panama, which have
heretofore been relatively
free of Communist agitation.
Such a general walkout by
workers of the largest private
employer in both countries
might lead to increased Commu-
nist strength within Costa
Rican and Panamanian labor.
In an attempt to prevent
a strike, company and govern-
ment officials plan to try to
conclude two- or three-year
contracts with representatives
of a majority of the workers,
but not with the Communist
leaders, in'each of the com-
pany's divisions in Costa Rica.
These contracts would presumably
offer the workers some-
con-cessions.
The American embassy in
San close believes a frank policy
by the company of promoting
democratic unions among its
employees would do much to end
the present situation in which
the Communists in Costa Rica
have "virtuall.y'.a free hand"
among the banana workers.
I
wages over the past several
.years. Since President Ibanez
was inaugurated in November
1952, the cost of living in
Santiago has increased about
270 percent, and wage increases
have failed to keep pace.
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1 September 1955
Political considerations
also are involved. Left-wing
non-Communist groups in CUTCH,
the labor confederation which
claims to represent all-organ-
ized labor in Chile, apparently
are trying to force the creation
of a left-wing government. The
Communists, however, have re-
mained relatively quiet thus
far; their party is outlawed
and they evidently fear that in
the event of demonstrations the
government would single them
out for reprisals.
. The government has an-
nounced that it will not nego-
tiate with the strikers until
they return to work, and several
hundred leaders of the striking
workers have been arrested.
The government's vigorous action
is reported to have cowed the
unions, and CUTCN has voted
against calling a general
strike.
Argentine Political Situation
The dramatic staging of
President Peron's resignation
offer and its firm rejection
by Peronista organizations on
31 August has probably achieved
the obvious objective of
strengthening the president's
position by demonstrating his
strong popular support.
A near-record crowd re-
portedly responded to the
Peronista Party's call for mem-
bers to assemble and remain in
front of Peron's office until
he withdrew his offer. The
general strike called by the
General Confederation of Labor
in support of Peron was reported
effective- throughout the country.
On 29 August President
Ibanez asked congress for
extensive special powers for a
six-month period to deal with
the strikes. The initial re-
action of congressional leaders
to this request was not favora-
ble, however, and previous such
requests by Ibanez have been
turned down. The American
embassy in Santiago estimated
on 30 August that congress
would refuse to grant the spe-
cial powers on the ground that
the emergency was not suffi-
ciently grave.
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coalition controls anything
near a majority.
Even granting all of the
strikers'. demands probably
would not have any lasting
settling effect so long as
inflation continues uncontrolled.
To date no one has been able to
produce an economic stabili-
zation plan acceptable to the
badly split Chilean congress,
in which no single party or
Peron's address to the
crowd made clear that the
government's peaceful "pacifi-
cation" tactics will be changed
and that "pacification" will
be imposed if necessary, This
probably means that arrests
and tension will continue, at
least until there is a decline
in antigovernment attacks,
which have been continuing on
a small scale.
The army, which has held
the dominant power position in
the government since the 16
June revolt and which also
reportedly believes firm
measures are necessary for the
regime's security, may try to
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1 September 1955
dissuade Peron from extreme
repressive measures. The army's
position was strengthened re-
cently by the consolidation of
virtually all of the country's
internal security forces under
an army general.
The violent tone of Peron's
speech, which was probably
stronger than the army expected,
may make it difficult for the
army to continue its moderate
"pacification" efforts while
at the same time supporting
Peron. Nevertheless, the top
military leadership will prob-
ably continue to support Peron
as long as he co-operates in
suppressing controversial
figures and policies, especially
those responsible for the former
attacks on the church.
Anti-Peron sentiment re-
mains strong, however, in the
lover military echelons, par-
ticularly in the provinces.
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In the crowded schedule
of international negotiations
set for the next few months,
the USSR seems likely to give
high priority to disarmament.
Concrete achievements in this
field could demonstrate to the
NATO nations the political and
financial advantages of "peace-
ful coexistence"--without
materially reducing Soviet mili-
tary strength in the process.
The USSR's disarmament
position undoubtedly will be
based on its 10 May omnibus
proposal for relaxing inter-
national tension. The disarma-
ment section of the 10 May
pronouncement seems to be a
serious counterproposal to the
plans previously advanced by
the Test. The USSR probably
hopes that if it appears
reasonable and offers dramatic
"deeds" like the recent demobi-
lization of part of its armed
personnel, Western resolve to
maintain the strength of the
Atlantic coalition will gradu-
ally diminish.
Moscow may seek to avoid
the complex questions at issue
by pressing for specific
numerical limitations of armed
personnel, which it probably
regards as reasonable, mutually
advantageous, and possible to
effect. Moscow may be willing
to make substantial reductions
in its conventional military
strength in order to achieve
political objectives, but
probably intends to maintain its
nuclear strength. The diver-
gence of views on the crucial
matter of inspection and con-
trol. makes an early agreement
on this issue unlikely.
Basically, the Soviet pro-
posa.l of 10 May would establish
limitations on the troop strength
of the five major powers, reduce
overt military expenditures, and
prohibit the use of nuclear
weapons. The principal loop-
holes appear to be the lack
of provisions for an adequate
system of inspection and con-
trol and the lack of a specific
limitation on conventional
armaments.
Conventional Arms and Expendi-
ures
The two-year disarmament
plan would first freeze the
PROPOSED REDUCTION OF MILITARY MANPOWER
Present
Strength
United States
3,304,001
(Unofficial)
USSR
3,991,000
China
2,624,000
France
810,000
United Kingdom
834,000
Interim Level
2,152,000-2,402,000 4000P000-1,500,000
2,496,000-2,716,000 1,000,000-1,500,000
1,812,000 -2,062,000 1,000,000 -1,500,000
730,000
742,000
SECRET
650,000
050,000
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1 September 1955
military manpower of each of
the major powers at its 1954
level and then reduce this fig-
ure during the first year by
half the amount required to
reach the proposed ultimate
level. Military expenditures
would be reduced accordingly.
Reduction of manpower and ex-
penditures would be completed
during the second year of the
plan.
The apparent balance of
armed personnel strength which
would result from the proposal
may be misleading. The develop-
ment of nuclear weapons, togeth-
er with the ability to deliver
such weapons, probably will
continue to be the most
decisive factor
determining relative
military strengths.
The Soviet switch
to a willingness to
abandon some of the
USSR's conventional
strength as a first
step in the disarma-
ment schedule may
represent no more
than a recognition
of the realities of
nuclear warfare.
Furthermore, aside
from the gap that
may exist between
overt and covert
military expenditures
there remains the
important question
of conventional
equipment and materi-
el. The Soviet pro-
posal calls for a re-
duction of armaments
paralleling personnel
and expenditure cuts,
but nothing is said
with regard to the
number of such items
as jet bombers, sub-
marines or tanks.
Achieve half of
planned reduction
during first year
Completed reduction
of forces and expenditures
by end of second year
Moscow has stipu-
lated that a world
disarmament confer-
ence should beheld to
fix arms and manpower
limitations for the other
nations of the" orld--at levels
to be determined by economic
and political factors, but not
to exceed 200,000 men for each
nation. This figure was enun-
ciated by Bulganin at Geneva.
The recent Soviet and
Satellite announcements on re-
duction`'?bf military manpower
probably are intended, in
part, to give additional prop-
aganda. impetus to the man-
power aspect of the Soviet
proposal.
Nuclear Weapons
With respect to nuclear
weapons, during the first year
SOVIET DISARMAMENT PROPOSAL
444444444
SECRET
Freeze manpower
at 1954 level
Manpower to be
equalized in 2 years
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1 September 1955
FRANCE
UK-
the Soviet proposal calls for
a moratorium on test explosions
and agreement by the five major
powers not to be the first to
employ nuclear weapons. At
the beginning of the second
year,the production of nuclear
weapons would be stopped and
there would be a complete pro-
hibition of their use after
the armed forces were reduced
by 75 percent of the total
reduction. By this proposal,
Moscow reiterates its earlier
insistence that the disarmament
program must be completed in
such a way that conventional
and nuclear disarmament are
completed simultaneously.
Control and Inspection
The Soviet disarmament
plan substantially follows
Western proposals, but the
Soviet provision for control
and inspection moves away
from the framework within
which control usually has
been discussed. The Soviet
statement asserted that under
current conditions of inter-
national distrust the types of
disarmament control hitherto pro-
posed would be unreliable and un-
realistice The proposal urged
that conditions of trust must
first be created among nations
by means of a broad political
settlement and a system of
warnings and guarantees against
sudden aggression.
The Soviet plan contained
a provision for setting up a
permanent control organiza-
tion, which would be allowed
during the first phase of the
plan to establish control posts
at "big ports, railway junctions,
motor roads, and airdromes."
i
USE OF NUC LEAAA' APONS
SECRET
(BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
An approximation. Value data do
not necessarily reflect the volume
of armaments production.
WE . S AND
IEtITIO SE
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It would be entitled to "de-
mand and receive" information
from states regarding implemen-
tation of the cuts in armed
forces and armaments, although
there is no provision for
verifying this information.
The control organization
would, when the second phase of
the plan came into effect, have
a staff of inspectors who "with-
in the bounds of the control
functions they exercise would
have unhindered access at any
time to all objects of control.,,
This phrasing suggests that
the 'USSR still adheres to its
position of strictly limiting
inspection to specifically
designated establishments.
The Soviet proposal dis-
misses the crucial matter of
nuclear inspection, saying it
is an insoluble problem because
of the difficulty in detecting
whether atomic energy installa-
tions permitted for peaceful
purposes were in fact being
used for the production of
stocks of fissionable material
for weapons. It asserts that
there are "possibilities beyond
the reach of international con-
trol" for "organizing the secret
manufacturing of atomic and hy-
drogen weapons."
Physical inspection of
plants producing fissionable
materials, however, and a close
audit of the records of these
plants, if this were allowed,
would of course make more diffi-
cult the clandestine accumula-
tion of a large stockpile of
fissionable material for nuclear
weapons.
While there could not be
complete confidence that the
inventory of Soviet nuclear
weapons or the clandestine pro-
duction of fissionable material
could be determined, there could
be fairly effective inspection
of weapons delivery systems.
The preparation necessary for
launching a co-ordinated air
attack on the United States
would, at the present time,
be difficult to conceal from
inspection agents, given
facilities for unhindered
travel. Similarly, the devel-
opment and production of long-
range ? guided missiles-would prob-
ably be impossible to hide from
inspectors because of the scale
and extreme complexity of the
undertaking required for such
projects.
Under the broad terms of
the current Soviet disarmament
proposals, however, the possi-
bilities for evasion of inspec-
tion of disarmament measures
are almost unlimited. The
USSR's reluctance to commit
itself to an effective inspec-
tion system is suggested by
the fact that the USSR has so
far temporized with the recip-
rocal aerial inspection plan
advanced by President Eisenhower
at Geneva.
Related Aspects of the Omnibus
Proposal
The disarmament plan was
a major part of the Soviet
proposal of 10 May. Also in-
cluded were proposals for the
discontinuation of war propa-
ganda, the withdrawal of forces
from Germany, the dismantling of
extraterritorial bases, the
settlement of Far Eastern prob-
lems, and economic and cultural
exchanges. It was not clear
from the language of the pro-
posal whether Western acceptance
of some or all of these other
provisions was expected to pre-
cede agreement on the disarma-
ment plan.
While the Soviet Union will
probably continue to publicize
these issues for propaganda pur-
poses during forthcoming dis-
armament discussions, the issues
themselves are not likely to
become major bones of contention
in the discussions.
Soviet propaganda on dis-
armament has continued to em-
phasize the 10 May proposals
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3 September 1955
suggesting that they would pro-
vide a realistic basis for UN
discussions. A recent Pravda
article stressed that thepos-
sibilities for an agreement
TRENDS IN BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY
In response to the accel-
erated pace of political de-
velopment in many of its over-
seas dependencies, London is
considering momentous adjust-
ments in its colonial policies.
British official thinking has,
recently shown a growing aware-
ness both of the constitutional
problems and of the -immediate
risks in Britain's policy of
encouraging political ambi-
tions in its colonies. In full
awareness of its diminishing
means of direct control, London
is now seeking a way to make
the colonies autonomous while
trying to assure that they re-
main stable in the process.
Practically all of Brit-
ain's 35 colonies scattered
around the globe have made im-
portant constitutional progress
in the ten years since the war.
Eleven of the 35 now have full
adult suffrage. In the legis-
latures of 17, at least a ma-
jority of the members are
elected by popular vote. In
the past two years, constitu-
tional development has been
especially rapid in 11 of the
12 colonies with populations
exceeding 1,000,000.
Nigeria, for example, with
a population of 31.5 million,
is approaching almost complete
local autonomy, and with British
advice will undertake a further
examination of constitutional
arrangements and the question
of self-government next year.
Singapore in effect has had two
are infinitely better since the
Geneva conference and main-
tained that a new "vital force"
is apparent in the current move
for disarmament.
new constitutions since 1953.
Despite the continuance of
emergency conditions, important
changes have been instituted
in both Kenya and the Federation
of Malaya.
The Trend Toward Autonomy
As a result of increasingly
insistent demands for local
autonomy and a concurrent re-
duction in Bri-Cain's capabili-
ties for direct control, ad-
ministrative ties between London
and the colonies have steadily
loosened. American observers
note that the Colonial Office
refers even minor decisions to
the colonial administrations,
even if it means months, of delay.
According to the parliamentary
under secretary for colonial
affairs, the Colonial Office no
longer considers it desirable
or possible for colonial gov-
ernors to-"thrust advice" on
ministers in constitutionally
advanced territories such as
Nigeria and the Gold Coast, vhere
autonomy is virtually complete.
In practice, this also applies
even in less advanced colonies.
London's?most serious prob-
lem in arranging for the changed
status of Britain's colonies
concerns those territories which
are undergoing rapid political
development but which lack the
resources for achieving full
Commonwealth membership. Britain
evidently still regards the
attainment of equal and inde-
pendent status within the
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1 September 1955
Commonwealth as dependent on a
territory's ability to be eco-
nomically viable and to make
some contribution to Common-
wealth defense. The wealth
and size of Nigeria and the
Gold Coast-provide for their
becoming Commonwealth members
relatively soon. Barbados or
Jamaica, on the other hand,
can scarcely ever hope to meet
these criteria.
In an effort to deal with
the constitutional problems of
COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS*
:UNITED KINGDOM
JAMAICA .,BAHAMAS
IiR. HOND./ -LEEWARD IS
WINDWARD 15~.;-BARBADOS ^AMBIA
TRINIDAD and TORAI:O't na SIERRA LEONE A
Commonwealth
Approaching Commonwealth status
^ Federation
^ Colony
Some members of the Commonwealth
are not shown on this map
I SEPTEMBER 1955
N. RHODESIA
ST HELENA
inclines to the view that all
colonies should henceforth be
regarded as potentially inde-
pendent members of the Common-
wealth. In what appear to be
officially inspired trial bal-
loons, commentators close to
the Colonial Office have re-
cently suggested that its
functions and personnel be
transferred to the Commonwealth
Relations Office.
In similar vein, a Colo-
nial. Office official on 27 June
ADEN JNL.IA
BRUNEI
FE D. OF N. BORNEO
':. MALAYA`
E IYA SEYCHELLES f SARAWAK
NYASALAND
MAURITIUS
r FALKLAND IS.
the far more numerous weaker
dependencies, Britain seems to
be considering two main ap-
proaches. One is the adoption
of a changed terminology which
would blur even further the
distinction between the depend-
ent empire and independent
members of the Commonwealth and
in effect establish an inter-
mediate Commonwealth status.
The other approach is the for-
mation of stronger constitu-
tional units through regional
associations of the smaller
colonies.
Intermediate Commonwealth
Status
There are several indica-
tions that London's thinking
discussed with American offi-
cials the "new status" of
British colonies. He noted
that "commonwealth" already
had a fixed usage and that the
Colonial Office has long sought
a substitute for "colony," a
term with "so many unpleasant
connotations." He said that
Britain is considering the
adoption of the term "state."
The establishment of an
intermediate Commonwealth mem-
bership would antagonize some
influential British elements.
On the other hand, London may
calculate that any such action
would be well received by
colonial peoples as an earnest
of Britain's sincerity, and
that the resulting good will
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY S
1 September 19115
would be conducive to orderly
political development. In
addition to these benefits,
conferring a new status would
presumably broaden the juridi-
cal and political framework
within which many colonial
problems could be handled.
Regional Federations
Britain is making an effort
to enhance the political and
economic viability of some of
its colonies by promoting the
development of regional fed-
erations with common judicial,
financial, and legislative in-
stitutions. London's policy
is to encourage such associa-
tions among members not strong
enough to stand alone, or those
which would draw essential sup-
port from a more powerful neigh-
bor. The Central African Fed-
eration was formally established
in 1953, and federations are
now being actively considered
for the West Indies and South-
east Asia. Britain apparently.
intends to work toward an East
African Federation also.
Regional association is
most advanced among the seven
small West Indian colonies,
which are expected to reach
final agreement on a federal
constitution at a conference
next January. The federation
is expected to be in operation
by 1957.
Some British officials re-
portedly hope that establish-
ment of a West Indies federa-
tion will promote political
development in British Guiana,
where no progress has been made
toward restoration of responsi-
ble government since the Com-
munist-induced crisis of Octo-
ber 1953. These officials
reason that in the wider federal
political arena, responsible
political leaders.in other ter-
ritories may organize moderate
political parties in British
Guiana in the hope of gaining
support from them in the fed-
eral legislature.
The establishment of such
a federation evidently will
not result in,its immediate
admission to Commonwealth mem-
bership. Colonial leaders
themselves have expressed the
view that this will not be
feasible until both British
Guiana and British Honduras
have achieved a stage of polit-
ical development more like
that of Jamaica and Trinidad.
In Southeast Asia, Britain
is reported as now definitely
planning to complete federation
of the colony of Singapore and
the Federation of Malaya within
five years. Britain would for
a time retain authority in mat-
ters of finance, defense, and
foreign affairs, but the fed-
eration would ultimately be
offered independence with the
option of joining the Common-
wealth. According to a 19
August statement by Colonial
Secretary Lennox-Boyd, this
federation would eventually be
expanded to include the British
territories of Sarawak, Brunei,
and North Borneo.
The principal obstacles to
orderly political development
in Malaya and Singapore con-
tinue to be the Communist
threat to internal security and
the rivalry between the Malayan
and Chinese communities. Al-
though it is generally agreed
that Britain will not relinquish
final control in the area until
the Communist problem is greatly
reduced, London apparently in-
tends to continue pushing the
development of federal parlia-
mentary institutions, and ap-
parently considers their es-
tablishment the prerequisite to
independence for either terri-
tory?
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
1 September 1955
In East Africa, Britain
apparently sees in federation
a means of breaking through
the ethnic rivalries and
economic obstacles which have
greatly complicated political
development there. Publicly,
however, Britain has allowed
the idea of an East African
federation to recede into the
background. This has been
partially because of the opposi-
tion of_ Uganda--which teas strong
indigenous institutions and
few white settler groups--to
possible association with
Kenya and Tanganyika, where
the European minorities exer-
cise considerable power. The
recent report of the East
Africa Royal Commission, how-
ever, which will form the basis
for new policy developments
affecting the region, strongly
implies the necessity of a
federal political solution.
Although many of the
commission's recommendations
are provoking controversy both
in London and among European
settlers in Kenya, the Colo-
nial Office can be expected
to move ahead with arrange-
ments already projected for
closer association of Kenya
and Tanganyika. An approach
to Uganda, however, would pre-
sumably remain a more distant
prospect.
Prospects
The prospects are for the
continuation of a relatively
rapid devolution of political
power to local authorities.
Despite,, warnings by many
British observers that "fail-
ure" may wreak permanent
damage on a colony, its in-
habitants, and perhaps Brit-
ish and Western interests,
London evidently has no in-
tention of changing its ob-
jective. Unsatisfactory con-
ditions in such territories
as Cyprus and British Guiana
have led to a heightened aware-
ness of the risks involved,
but have not deterred Britain
from its general ,approach.
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