CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000600030001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 11, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 4, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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~~Ip~NTIAI
(CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO.
O C I NO. 6660/55
4 August 1955
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NEXT RE'J'EY
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AUT ,'ft-:
1
DATE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA and DOS
review(s)
completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 August 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
AMERICAN-CHINESE TALKS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page I
The Chinese Communists in the past week have given further
evidence that they hope to arrange negotiations with the
United States on major matters. The Communists have not
specified what matters they wish to discuss. Chou En-lai
implied in his foreign affairs speech of 30 July that they
might raise such questions as the "extremely unjust policy
of blockade and embargo," American military maneuvers and
overflights in the China area, and foreign "subversive
activities."
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Soviet Leaders Encourage High-.Level Visits: Recent trips
of Soviet leaders outside the 1no=Soviet bloc and
plans for an unprecedented series of visits by non-
Communist leaders to Moscow in the future are part of
Moscow's program to exploit the present atmosphere of
conciliation and to "humanize" the Soviet regime in
the eyes of the world. The trips of high-ranking
Soviet leaders to Belgrade and Geneva are scheduled
to be followed by visits to India later this year and
to Britain in early 1956. 1 1', . . . . Page 1 25X1
Soviet Internal Propaganda Continues Conciliatory Toward US:
The conciliatory attitude owar t o n e a es w ich
began to be emphasized in Soviet internal propaganda in
early June has continued since the summit conference.
The content of the propaganda suggests that this attitude
will be maintained. . . . . . . . . Page 2 25X1
CONFIDENTIAL
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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SECRET
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 August 1955
Future Status of Soviet Troops in Hungary and Rumania.:
The entry into force o e Aus r:ia.n s a e rea y
and the forthcoming withdrawal of all Soviet troops
from Austria will lead the USSR to re-examine the
justification for keeping its forces in Hungary and
Rumania.. Hungarian and Rumanian Leaders are report-
ed to have been informed by Moscow that Soviet
troops in their countries will be withdrawn by
1 October. There is no evidence yet, however, that
the USSR is preparing to withdraw its 59,000 troops
in Hungary and Rumania. Considerations involving
the Warsaw pact, military factors and the effect on
the Satellites involved ' lita.te against such a.
step. I. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3 25X1
USSR to Develop Gas Industry: The Soviet Union has an-
nounced p a.ns for expanding natural gas production
fivefold by 1960, doubling coal gas production, and
constructing thousands of miles of new distribution
lines. The number of cities supplied by gas is to
be increased by 132, and more than 250 la.rge indus-
trial enterprises and power stations are to be con-
verted to ga.s.
. . . . . . . . . . Page
Stalemate in Laos: The Laos government appears to have
abandoned hope of reaching a, settlement with the
Pathet Lao, but is continuing the negotiations in
order to probe Communist intentions and to please
the Indians on the International Control Commission.
Considerable controversy is foreseen between the
commission and the government as ai, result of the
government's uncompromising stand on the modifica-
tion of election procedures.
Ca.m
b
od is :
In the campaign for the Sep-
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. Page 5
ns, a orces of Prince Sihanouk
are relying on intimidation to undermine the
strength of their opponents. In ca.se this does
not seem sufficient to assure Sihanouk's forces a.
strong majority, the government may directly s
press opposition activities. F77 0
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
4 August 1955
Philippines--Magsaysay-Recto Conflict: The conflict be-
tween res en a.gsaysa.y an ultranationalist Sena-
tor Recto has been referred to the Nacionalista Party
executive committee by party president Rodriguez.
Prospects of a reconciliation appear to be remote as
Magsaysay has openly committed himself to blocking
Recto's renomination to the Senate at the party's
convention some two weeks hence. He also is reported
to be working toward Recto's expulsion from the part
even at the risk of a party split. Page 6 25X1
Indonesian Political Crisis: Vice President Hatta., still
hopeful o orm ng a. cabinet before President Sukarno
returns from Mecca on 5 August, ha.s accepted as forma-
teur Hara.hap, the Ma.sjumi's parliamentary leader. The
new formateur faces continued delaying tactics from
the National ich headed the All cabinet.
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e . . . . . . .
7
Pa
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ge
Malaya.: Expected post-election demands for accelerated
progress toward self-government in Malaya and Singa-
pore have materialized. Both British and local of-
ficials, particularly in Malaya., a
have adopted tolerant attitudes, I ipage 8 25X1
Portuguese-Indian Relations Over Goa: Portugal is in-
creas ng y s ur a over n an claims to Goa as
India is taking steps restricting diplomatic rela.-
tions with Portugal. Political agitation is mount-
ing in India for more energetic action against the
Portuguese enclaves. However, mass demonstrations
against Goa. scheduled for 15 August, the anniversary
of Indian independence, are vio-
lent turn. F 1. ly to take a vio-
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Afghan-Pakistani Dispute: No significant change has oc-
curred In th
d
e
eadlocked Afh
gan-Pakistani dispute,
but the atmosphere in Kabul may have improved to a.
point where further mediation will produce results.
Israeli National Elections: The Mapa.i party of Ben-Gurion
ma n a.ine its leaffe--rship in the Israeli elections,
but the substantial support received by two extreme
right and left parties indicates a. protest against
the relatively moderate policies of the Mapai. A re-
appraisal of foreign and economic policies by the new
government--probably headed by Ben-Gurion--seems like-
ly. Ben-Gurion may see the election trends as a call
for more "vigorous" action. Nevertheless, moderate
influences will continue to act pressures for war, on popular
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4 August 1955
Egyptian Activities in the Southern Sudan: Cairo is
attempting to undermine 'Sudanesepme minister
Azhari's pro-independence government. Egyptian
efforts to stir up dissension among the primitive
tribesmen of the southern Sudan axr^e meetin with
some success. . . . . Page 13 25X1
French North Africa: Tension continues high in French
Morocco, were disorders broke out during the re-
Tigious celebrations over the past weekend. In
Algeria, the lull in terrorist activity was broken
by an ambush of Foreign Legionnaires. The Arab-
Asian bloc has requested the inclusion of both the
Algerian and Moroccan issues on the agenda of the
UN General Assembly, and has also informed the
Security Council that Moroccan rioting is likely
to endanger international peace and security. The
French-Tunisian agreement is being debated in the
French Council of the Republic. . Page 14 25X1
Tito's Position: Tito's speech of 27 July and the recent
Improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations imply that
the Yugoslav leaders are now sufficiently convinced
of Soviet good intentions to permit them to accept
closer relations with the Soviet bloc. They appear
agreed, however, on having such relations on their
own terms and without sacrificing their friendships
with the'West. I I . Page 15
Tito's Charges Against Satellite Leaders: Tito's charges
In his 27 July speech at a.r ova.c that Satellite
leaders are "intriguing" against Yugoslavia may have
serious repercussions in the Sa.te]Llite Communist
parties. The effect will probably be greatest in
Hungary and Albania, the two Satellites where party
discipline has deteriorated the most as a result of
the encouragement given nationalistic tendencies b
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recent changes in Moscow's line. Page 16 25X1
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4 August 1955
Atomic Energy and European Integration:: Proponents of a
new effort toward European integration are encouraged
over the prospects of establishing, an atomic energy
pool of the six Coal-Steel Community countries for
industrial uses. They have indicated that the Ameri-
can attitude toward this plan may be of decisive im-
portance both for the atomic energy pool and for inte-
gration as a whole. . . Page 18
Argentine Political Stalemate: The political stalemate in
Argentina continues. I I. . . . . . . . Page 19
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WESTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIC PROGRESS AND CURRENCY CONVERTI-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .? . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Western Europe, though in most respects economically
stronger than ever before, has in recent months adopted a
slower approach to convertibility of currencies than in
the first half of 1954, when general economic improvement
was less advanced. Procedures for inaugurating converti-
bility were agreed on at the OEEC Council meeting of 28-30
July but their implementation was indefinitely deferred.
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MOSCOW REHABILITATES A DEPORTED MINORITY GROUP . . . . . . Page 6
The restoration of minority rights to the Chechens,
one of more than a half dozen Soviet ethnic minority groups
deported en masse to Central Asia, during World War II, is
another attempt on the part of the Soviet government to
undo one of the grosser discriminatory actions of
Stalin's lifetime.
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4 August 1955
The Chinese Communists in
the past week have supplied
evidence that they hope to
arrange negotiations with the
United States on major matters.
Chou En-tai stated in his
foreign affairs speech on 30
July that Peiping will try to
make the Geneva talks "pave the
way" for further negotiations
with Washington. Two days later
the Chinese Communist Party's
People's Daily called for
iighe-level-"' meetings to fol-
low the Geneva talks.
Chinese negoti