CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000500070001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 33
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 29, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 19, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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DONf1DENT Ak.
COPY NO. 14
OCI NO. 4415/55
19.May 1955
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
DATE
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DCCUMENT NO. LASS- 0
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CONFIDENTIAL
-c-rr-nrx _
*MO &.i TIN S a
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State, JCS reviews completed
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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19 May 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
HINTS OF SOVIET POSITION
AT FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
The positions the USSR is likely to take on the
principal issues at the four-power conference "at the
summit" are emerging from Moscow's recent propaganda
and diplomatic moves. Moscow's proposals on Germany
probably will be presented as part.of a general sys-
tem of European security and arms limitation designed
to permit an East-West detente.
SOUTH VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... Page 2
The Vietnamese government is making progress in
its efforts to eliminate threats to its stability while
curbing the extremism of the Revolutionary Council and
skillfully handling its relations with the French.
Plans for the integration of sect forces, on the other
hand, are still largely in the paper stage.
SOVIET AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Recent observations of Soviet aircraft over Moscow
indicate that the USSR is making rapid progress in build-
ing up its strategic bomber force. Two new jet fighter
types also have been seen in numbers indicating series
production.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Peiping Repeats Offer to Negotiate: Peiping repeated on
May Its willingness o negotiate with the United
States on "relieving tension" and described the
American attitude toward negotiations as "evasive
and equivocal." Chou En-lai said that Peiping still
supports the Soviet proposal for a 10-power confer-
ence, but is "willing to consider other forms."
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
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Formosa Straits: Chinese Communist military construc-
tion in -We Formosa Straits area continues
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
The Coming Diplomatic Conversations in Belgrade: The
forthcoming visits to Belgrade of high-level Soviet
leaders and visits at later dates of representatives
of other countries--the United States, Britain,
France, Burma and India--are unlikely to alter Yugo-
slavia's long-standing policy of remaining detached
from great-power blocs. I I . . . .
. Page 3
Marshal Konev's Role as Party Spokesman: Ivan S. Konev's
appointment as chief of the recently established
combined Soviet bloc military command, together with
his earlier designation as deputy defense minister
and his recent speeches and articles emphasizing the
party's role, suggest that he is the chief public
spokesman for the party within the military group.
As such he may be the party's counterweight in the
officer corps to the popular and independent-minded
Marshal Zhukov. I. . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
Finns Fear Soviet Pressure as Result of German Rearmament:
The progress toward West German rearmament is viewed
with some apprehension in Helsinki, mainly because
the USSR may react by invoking the Finnish-Soviet
pact of 1948, . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
Annual Soviet Troop Movements in Germany and Austria:
The annual spring movement of Soviet ground forces
. . . . . . . . . . . . 0 . . . . . . Page 5
Good Weather in Soviet "New Lands"Area: The Soviet press
reports that weather con ons n the "new lands"
area of western Siberia and Kazakhstan have been "ex-
ceedingly favorable" thus far. However, it is the
weather in June and July which will be the determin-
ing factor. F_ I . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
Burma Continues to Seek New Arms Sources: Burma is con-
tinting to seek new sources for m itary equipment.
Until recently, Burma's only source of such equipment
had been Great Britain. The Burmese have achieved a
measure of success, but the capabilities of their
armed forces-'may suffer as a result of the hetero-
geneous nature of the weapons they are accumulating.
0 . . . 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
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in Germany to summer training areas apparently is
taking place at a somewhat slower pace than last
year. Movement of Soviet units in Austria up to
now has been similar to that of past years,
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19 May 1955
Simla Economic Conference: Rejection by the Asian nations
represented at the Simla economic conference of a
regional organization to plan the use of a proposed
$200,000,000 in American aid appears to have resulted
from the fears of the smaller nations that India
might dominate such an organization. The smaller
nations also seem to feel that they will fare better
with direct aid from the United States.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 7
Afghan-Pakistani Situation: There have been numerous.
rumors during the past week that Afghanistan or Pak-
istan or both have accepted mediation offers from
Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. All of
these countries apparently have either volunteered
their good offices or have been asked by Kabul or
Karachi to intervene diplomatically in the dispute
between the two capitals.
. Page 8
Syria: Outwardly the situation in Syria has calmed down
in the last two weeks. There has been no letup,,
however, in covert plotting by pro- and anti-
government forces, and any attempt to use force will
almost certainly result in counter action. F- I
. . . . . . . . . . . ?. . . . . . . . . . .Page 9 -
French North Africa: Opposition is mounting among French
settlers n Tunisia to the agreement reached by the
French and Tunisian premiers on 22 April. In Algeria,
the security situation has worsened in spite of the
declaration of a state of emergency last month. In
Morocco, terrorist attacks are again on the increase
after a lull of several weeks. . . . Page 10
Czechoslovakia Adopts Militant Minority Policy: The mili-
tant party line, stressing the political supremacy
of Prague, developed at the Slovak Communist Party
Congress last month is almost certain to increase re-
sentment against the regime and bitterness between
ethnic groups. . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Italian Political Situation: Gronchi's refusal on 12 May
to accept the resignation of the Scelba cabinet re-
flected a decision by the present coalition parties
not to rock the political boat in Italy at least
until after the Sicilian elections on 5 June. Basic
dissensions in the coalition parties, however, remain.
. . . . . . .. . . . Page 12
British Election: The outcome of the voting in some 50
cons uencies whose members won in 1951 by majorities
of 1,000 or less will be decisive in the British gen-
eral election. The Conservative Party is still con-
sidered likely to win. . . . . . . . Page 13
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
Unrest In Colombia: Recent developments in Colombia,
particularly a rise in guerrilla activity, indi-
cate a steady trend back toward the widespread
violence which prevailed prior to 13 June 1953,
when the civilian regime of La,ureano Gomez was
overthrown by General Rojas Pinilla. The govern-
ment, moving to maintain its position, appears
to be headed toward outright authoritarianism.
00#0000 . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
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THE SATELLITE AGRICULTURE PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
The announced intention of the Eastern European
Satellites to increase emphasis on heavy industry and
military preparedness, following the example set by
the USSR, has not to date substantially modified their
previous stress on increased agricultural investment
and economic concessions to the peasantry.
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THE WEEK IN BRIEF
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_qW NEW
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
HINTS OF SOVIET POSITION
AT FOUR-POWER CONFERENCE
The positions the USSR
is likely to take on the prin-
cipal issues at the four-power
conference "at the summit"
are gradually emerging from
Moscow's recent propaganda
Moscow's proposals on Ger-
many probably will be presented
as components of a general sys-
tem of European security and
arms limitations.
and diplomatic moves.
As bait for the West Ger-
mans, the USSR will probably
The broad scope of
the
hold out the prospect of the
subjects the USSR would
like
withdrawal of all occupation
to discuss was indicated
in
forces from Germany, the estab-
the omnibus proposals on
dis-
lishment of diplomatic rela-
armament and the reduction of
tension submitted by Ambassador
Malik in the London disarma-
ment talks on 10 May.
In addition to listing
,seven specific measures for
ending the cold war, these
proposals included significant
concessions to Western posi-
tions on force levels and the
timing of the prohibition of
nuclear weapons.
The proposals also intro-
duced a completely new approach
to the problem of international
control which will probably
command wide popular interest
and require protracted negotia-
tion.
Premier Bulganin took par-
ticular pains at the Warsaw
conference to place the new
eight-power Soviet bloc secu-
rity treaty in the context of
a possible all-European col-
lective security system like
the all-European security
treaty introduced by Molotov
at the Berlin conference. The
Soviet bloc treaty is left open
to other states, regardless
of their social systems, and
the treaty is to lapse when-
ever an all-European collective
security treaty is concluded.
tions with West Germany, an
ostensible acceptance of the
Eden plan for German elections,
and participation of both parts
of Germany in an all-European
security system pending German
unification.
Moscow's.new disarmament
plan, the proposal to establish
"strictly limited contingents
of local police forces" in both
parts of Germany under four-
poWer'ontrols, and the pros-
pect of a general East-West
detente based on the continued
division of Germany will be
designed to appeal to other.
Western European countries,
especially France.
A special position was
accorded East Germany in the
new bloc security system at
the Warsaw conference.
The final communique
announced that the question
of East German participation
in "measures regarding the
armed forces of the unified
command" is to be examined
later. The meaning of this
provision was clearly stated
by East German premier Grote-
wohi at Warsaw when he de-
clared that "a reunified
Germany will be free of the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
obligations contracted by a
part of Germany in military-
political treaties and agree-
ments which were concluded pri-
or to reunification."
Grotewohl contended that
the Paris agreements deprive
West Germany of the right "to
come to an understanding on
the reunification of Germany,"
but that the Warsaw treaty
leaves East Germany complete
freedom "to negotiate on peace-
ful reunification,"
The ground has thus been
cleared for renewed pressure
by East Germany for bilateral
unity talks with Bonn and for
Soviet unification proposals
within the framework of a
European security system and
a balanced limitation on East
and West German forces and pos-
sibly within the context of a
general global arms limitation
system.
This elaborate structure
of European security, German
unity and arms limitations
would, of course, mean the
dissolution of NATO and the
withdrawal of American mili-
tary power from Europe.
Another key element in
the USSR's developing diplo-
matic offensive came to light
on 13 May, when Moscow an-
nounced that a top-level Soviet
delegation headed by Khrushchev,
Bulganin, and Mikoyan would
go to Belgrade for talks late
this month.
The Soviet leaders prob-
ably anticipate that in addi-
tion to furthering specific
objectives in Yugoslavia, this
dramatic and unprecedented
gesture will generate increas-
ing belief in the possibility
of neutrality within a general
European consolidation and
East-West detente.
The Vietnamese government
is making progress in its ef-
forts to eliminate threats to
its stability while curbing
the extremism of the Revolu-
tionary Committee and skill-
fully handling its relations
with the French. Plans for
the integration of sect forces,
on the other hand, are still
largely in the paper stage.
The Viet Minh has achieved
little visible success in ex-
ploiting the revolutionary
ferments in South Vietnam, but
continuing delays in the reas-
sertion of government authority
in rural areas and the cessa-
tion on 18 May of the southward
movement of anti-Viet Minh
refugees constitute develop-
ments adverse to Diem's govern-
ment.
Binh Xuyen remnants esti-
mated at 1,500 are now located
in the large swampy area south
of Saigon. Army movements are
continuing, but contacts with
the enemy have been infrequent.
As of 13 May, the Binh Xuyen
was estimated to have suffered
750 casualties, not counting
700 troops who rallied to the
government..
The assertion of national
army control over the Imperial
Guard last week removed the
last potential focus of organ-
ized support for Bao Dai.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
General Vy, who figured in the
short-lived pro-Bao Dai coup
in Saigon last month and later
sought control of the Imperial
Guard at Dalat, was stripped
of his rank and "placed at the
disposal of the French army,"
in which he holds the reserve
rank of captain.
Hoa Hao forces under
Generals Tran Van Soai, Lam
Thanh Nguyen, and Ba Cut still
enjoy virtual autonomy in the
rice granary area of western
Cochinchina.
The government hopes that
a show of force by the army,
coupled with cash settlements,
will make possible the integra-
tion of the dissidents without
recourse to fight-
ing. The bulk of
the Cao Dai forces
are already inte-
grated in theory,
but the death of
General The and the
antigovernment ma-
neuvers of the Cao
Dai pope--abetted
by the French, ac-
cording to Diem--may
complicate this
picture.
The demonstra-
tion staged by the
Revolutionary Com-
mittee in Saigon on
15 May stressed the
anti-Bao Dai theme.
However, the earlier
demand that Diem
govern in the name
of the committee
was replaced by the
slogan of "full sup-
port for Diem." The
absence from the
demonstration of
anti-French slogans
also reflected the
committee's willing-
ness to follow Diem's lead.
Diem has argued privately
that the presence of a large
part of the French Expeditionary
Corps in the Saigon area has a
provocative effect on Vietnamese
opinion and stands in the way
of French-Vietnamese co-operation.
His proposal, not yet presented
officially to the French, is
that their forces be stationed
along the 17th parallel truce
line.
The current of anti-French
feeling and the rapid emergence
of new political parties and
alignments in the south have,
in the short term at least,
increased Viet Minh opportu-
nities there. There is no
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
appreciable evidence, however,
that these opportunities have
been effectively exploited.
The pronouncements of the Revo-
lutionary Committee remain
uncompromisingly anti-Communist.
Diem is attempting to
secure closer co-ordination
of his own policies with those
of the Western powers and to
enhance the international
status of his government by
calling for a French-British-
American-Vietnamese conference
in Saigon. The government has
publicly expressed its objec-
tion to the tendency of the
Western countries to discuss
Vietnamese affairs in the
absence of Vietnamese partici-
pants.
The ending of the regroup-
ing period for French and Viet
Minh forces on 18 May also put
a halt to the movement of anti-
Viet Minh refugees to South
Vietnam. The Viet Minh's
systematic obstruction of this
movement has been cited by the
South Vietnam authorities as
grounds for demanding that
the original deadline be indef-
initely extended, and this view
has been presented indirectly
to the truce commission.
The Viet Minh has publicly
denounced the "forced evacua-
tion" to the south, but
an informal Vietnam-
Viet Minh agreement to extend
the deadline had been reached
at Geneva.
Flights in the Moscow area
during the past six weeks have
included types and numbers of
aircraft that provide important
clues on Soviet aircraft devel-
opments.
These sightings indicate
that the Soviet Union is making
rapid progress in building up
its strategic bomber force.
They also indicate that the USSR
is strengthening its defensive
capabilities with the develop-
ment of new fighter aircraft
types.
A Soviet aircraft which
apparently was a prototype jet
heavy bomber comparable.to_the
American B-52 was first ob-
served a little over a year
ago. Today the USSR probably
has in operational units up to
20 of these high-performance
planes (designated BISONS, or
Type 37's in Western intelli-
gence terminology). The com-
bat radius of this aircraft is
2,750 nautical miles, which
means that it could reach the
northwestern part of the United
States on unrefueled, two-way
missions from Siberian forward
bases.
At least 13 and possibly
as many as 19 BISONS partici-
pated in the various flyby's
around Moscow. According to
preliminary estimates, a total
of 40 will have been produced
by the end of next month and
about 300 by mid-1957, 200 of
which would be in operational
units.
A new turboprop bomber,
the BEAR (no numeral designation)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY.
19 May 1955
SOVIET AIRCRAFT RECENTLY OBSERVED
(Not to exact scale)
TURBO-PROP HEAVY BOMBER
BEAR"
FARMER"
which appeared in some of the
formations, is probably capable
of making round-trip missions
from peripheral Soviet bases
to most parts of the conti-
nental United States (all ex-
cept the southeastern area.)
without refueling. According
to preliminary evaluation,
it has a combat radius--3,700
nautical miles-which places
it in the heavy bomber category,
a speed of 450 knots,, and a
combat ceiling of 40,000 feet.
At least nine and possibly 12
BEARS have been seen recently
in the Moscow area.
Recent Moscow flights also
included two new jet fighters,
the FLASHLIGHT And the FARMER
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TWIN-JET ALL-WEATHER
FIGHTER "FLASHLIGHT"
SINGLE PLACE FIGHTER
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19 May 1955
The FLASHLIGHT is a twin-
engine jet fighter similar in
some respects to the US F-94.
It probably is an all-weather
fighter carrying air-borne in-
tercept radar equipment. The
availability of the FLASHLIGHT
indicates that the Soviet Union
is overcoming the major
deficiency of its air defense
system to date, namely, poor
interception capabilities un-
der conditions of limited
visibility.
The FARMER is believed
to be a day fighter. Prelimi-
nary evaluations of performance
indicate that it has supersonic
speed capabilities in level
flight, a combat ceiling of
57,000 feet, a combat'radius
of 200 nautical miles, and an
ability to reach 40,000 feet
in five minutes after take-
off. (Con-
curred in by ORR)
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Peiping Repeats
Oyfer to Negotiate
Peiping repeated on 13 May
its willingness to negotiate
with the United States on "re-
lieving tension," and described
the American attitude to date
as "evasive and equivocal."
Chou En-lai said that
Peiping still supports the
Soviet proposal for a 10-power
conference, but is "willing to
consider other forms." He re-
peated that Peiping will not
agree to Chinese Nationalist
participation in any conference.
In a report to the Stand-
ing Committee of the National
People's Congress, Chou re-
capitulated developments at
Bandung and plausibly defended
his use of conciliatory tactics
there.
Chou said, in effect, that
he had succeeded in reducing
the suspicions of many Afro-
Asian leaders, had taken steps
toward strengthening and en-
larging the "neutralist" area,
and had gained general support
for Peiping's current approach
to the Formosa question.
The premier's report also
reaffirmed the hard Chinese
Communist line on substantive
issues which might be discussed
in any negotiations. Chou said
again that there is no need for
a "so-called cease-fire," that
the "liberation" of Formosa is
a Chinese domestic affair, and
that the only matter to be
negotiated between Peiping and
Washington is the American
military "occupation" of
Formosa.
The report made more
apparent the Chinese Communist
hope, previously surmised, of
inducing a withdrawal of
American forces from the China
area and then annexing Formosa
by "peaceful means." That is,
Peiping would welcome direct
negotiations with the undefended
Chinese Nationalists, who would
have the alternatives of assist-'
ing in a peaceful turnover or
being overwhelmed by a military
assault. The Chinese Communists
employed this sort of offer
effectively in the mainland
fighting in 1948 and 1949.
Chou also confirmed that
four Asian leaders--the premiers
of Indonesia, Pakistan and
Ceylon, and. Egypt's minister
for religious affairs--have
accepted his invitation to
visit Communist China. The
Egyptian is en route, and the
Indonesian is to leave next
week. Chou may be expected to
use the visits to gain further
sympathy for Peiping's "peace-
ful" approach.
It is not known whether
the British charge in Peiping
and India's Krishna Menon
have had any success in their
efforts to obtain an elaboration
of the Chinese Communist attitude.
Chou is reported to have
reiterated the main points of
Peiping's propaganda in a talk
with Charge Trevelyan on 9 May,,
and to have promised a more
detailed statement later.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
Formosa Straits
Chinese Communist military
construction in the Formosa
Straits area continues. Several
air clashes. occurred during the
pasts week between Communist and
Nationalist jet fighters north
of the Matsu group on 15 and
16 May.
Construction work at the
five airfield sites opposite
EAST CHINA (incl. FORMOSA)
?Available Airfield (jet)
Airfield Site
--- Proposed Railroad
I00AI
0?.-
The main link to the
province is expected
to be built from
Kueichi, on the
Chekiang-Kiangsi rail-
road, to Foochow.
The branch line to
Amoy will apparently
run from Nanping, mid-
way between Kueichi
and Foochow. Neither
line is likely to be
completed before 1956.
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ngtie
UNDER CONSTr,)CTION
C hingyan
achiang
aochi
Formosa continues. It is now
estimated that the field at
Nantai, near Foochow, will be
finished during June. Three
other fields--Lungtien, Ching-
yang and Swatow Northeast--will
probably be completed in Sep-
tember, and the base at Lung-
chi, west of Amoy, is expected
to be ready in October.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
The Coming Diplomatic
Conversations In e grade
The visit of Soviet party
first secretary Khrushchev, Pre-
mier Bulganin, and presidium
member Mikoyan to Belgrade late
in May will lead off a series
of conferences between Yugoslav
and foreign officials scheduled
during the next six weeks.
The Belgrade press has
hailed the visit of Sovietlead-
ers as a vindication of Yugo-
slavia's long-standing policy
of independence and its refusal
to accept dictation even from
a power as strong as the USSR.
The Burmese and Indian pre-
miers will visit Belgrade during
June in the course of tours in-
cluding a number of countries.
The Yugoslavs have asked
the United States, Britain and
France to send. special repre-
sentatives, other than the
accredited ambassadors, to the
general conference planned for
middle or late June in Belgrade.
to appraise the international
situation.
Yugoslav leaders and the
press have for several months
spoken glowingly of what they
describe as the unique oppor-
tunities open to Yugoslavia
Marshal Konev's Role
As Party Spokesman
Ivan S. Konev's appoint-
ment as chief of the recently
established combined Soviet
bloc military command, together
with his earlier designation
as deputy defense minister and
his recent speeches and articles
emphasizing the party's role,
to foster peace by standing
apart from both the great power
blocs and co-operating with
other more or less neutral na-
tions which champion coexistence.
For the past six months
these leaders have been in-
creasingly harsh in their de-
nunciation of power bloc poli-
tics, criticizing both sides,
but especially the West. They
believe there is now a stra-
tegic equilibrium in Europe,
which they attribute to Western
armament efforts, and they op-
pose further military steps
which they think might upset
that balance and lessen the-e
chances for peace. They be-
lieve that Soviet leaders are
trying to reduce international
tensions and should be encour-
aged in these efforts.
In a speech on 15 May Tito
referred to Yugoslavia as a sig-
nificant moral leader with "a
place in the world that even the
.big powers may envy." He said
that Yugoslavia has always been
"on the side which was desirous
of solving international dis-
putes in a peaceful manner" and
summed up Belgrade's policy as
an effort "to create a third
force of world moral strength
for all those who love peace
suggest that he is the chief
public spokesman for the party
within the military group. As
such he may be the party's
counterweight in the officer
corps to'the popular and in-
dependent-minded Marshal
Zhukov.
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Both in his article com-
memorating Soviet Armed Forces
Day and in his V-E Day speech,
Marshal Konev, in contrast to
other military leaders, de-
parted from the current alpha-
betical listing policy by plac-
ing First Secretary Khrushchev
at the head of the list of
party workers sent to4.the
fronts during World War II.
In the V-E Day speech,
Konov went so far as to single
out Khrushchev by stating that
"Comrade Khrushchev, Comrades
Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kagano-
vich, Zhdanov, and Scherbakov"
Finns Fear Soviet Pressure
As esu o erman Rearmament
The progress toward West
German rearmament is viewed
with some apprehension in Hel-
sinki, mainly because of the
effect it may have on Soviet
policy toward Finland.
Prime Minister Kekkonen
hinted recently to a West Ger-
man journalist that while he
had previously advocated a neu-
tral bloc in.Europe limited to
the northern states, he now
"dared" to think of a broader
arrangement.
Judging from remarks of
other Finnish officials, it
appears that Kekkonen is ap-
prehensive about the conse-
quences for Finland of West
German rearmament. He would
probably greet "neutralization"
of Germany with relief.
Finnish officials fear
that West Germany's entry into
NATO may give the USSR a pre-
text to invoke the 1948 Finnish-
Soviet Friendship and Mutual
Assistance Agreement. Article
Two of this pact obligates the
two countries to confer if it
were sent by the party to lead
the troops in their fight
against the invader.
In addition, Konev's
speech devoted more attention
to the party's role and em-
phasized party militancy to a
far greater degree than any of
the public pronouncements of
other military leaders.
Konev's new prominence and
political orientation also sug-
gest that he is the leading mil-
itary figure in whom the party
leaders, especially Khrushchev,
place special trust.
is "established" that there is
a threat of an armed attack
against Finland, or against
the Soviet Union through Finn-
ish'territory, by Germany or
one of its allies.
The Finns fear that once
West Germany is rearmed, the
Soviet Union may insist that a
"threat" of armed attack does
exist, and that this will be
followed by further Soviet
pressure on Finland. During
the past few years there have
been recurrent rumors that the
USSR would like to establish
radar bases on Finnish territory.
For the time being, how-
ever, it seems likely that
Soviet pressure on Finland will
be devoted largely to efforts
to obtain more positive mani-
festations of Finnish fried
for the USSR and for closer
identification of Finland with
Communist-sponsored foreign
policy moves.
Thus far neither the Finn=
ish defense minister nor a mil-
itary delegation has visited
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19 May 1955
the Soviet Union despite both
official and personal invita-
tions extended by Soviet offi-
cials in late 1954. Many po-
litical leaders, Social Dem-
ocrats in particular, doubt
the political propriety of such
a visit. They hope, that action
in Moscow.
Annual Soviet Troop Movements
in Germany an Austria
The annual spring movement
of the Group of Soviet Forces
in Germany has been under way
since at least 23 April. The
vie=9ERL ZI)I
1
l7`^~
PRAGUE p
0
on the Soviet invitations can
be postponed indefinitely.
The last major develop-
ment in Finnish-Soviet rela-
tions' was in November 1954,
when the Finns declined to
attend the Soviet-sponsored
European Security Conference
beginning of the current move
corresponded closely to the
timing in recent years, but
the move itself is apparently
C
H o
SOVIET FIELD TRAINING AREAS
(GERMANY AUSTRIA HUNGARY)
STATUTE MILES
I
L
mow k
('?r-+S A
% It
YUGOSLA
.proceeding at a
somewhat slower
pace. This may be
to avoid the dis-
ruptive effect to
the East German
rail system of the
concentrated de-
mands in previous
years.
Units may have
been split for sum-
mer training this
year, with some
elements remaining
in their home sta-
tions--presumably
to maintain at
least some Soviet
forces at all key
locations through-
out the Soviet zone
for security pur-
poses.
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19 May 1955
With one exception, the
same training areas used in
1954 are again to be occupied
although there has been some
relocation of divisions, pos-
sibly in connection with the
abandonment of the Wittstock
training area.
Good Weather
In SovTe_T__1T9ew Lands" Area
The Soviet agricultural
press reports that weather
conditions throughout the "new
lands" area of western Siberia
and Kazakhstan have been
"exceedingly favorable" thus
far. However, it is the
weather in June and July which
will be a determining factor.
The present regime,
particularly Party First Secre-
tary N. S. Khrushchev, has
gambled very heavily on the
"new lands" program as a quick
Burma Continues
To ee ew rms Sources
Under a defense agreement
signed at the time of Burma's
independence, Britain under-
took to train Burmese armed
forces. It exercises a virtual
monopoly over the provision of
military supplies. For four
years Rangoon chafed under what
it considered British niggard-
liness-in meeting its require-
ments and in late 1952 abrogated
the defense agreement. Since
then the Burmese government has
greatly accelerated its efforts
to develop new sources of supply.
Britain is still Burma's
major supplier, but Rangoon has
obtained military goods from
several other countries too.
Small arms have been purchased
from France and Italy. Italian
In Austria, movements of
Soviet units to the Doeller-
sheim field training area
were continuing as of 8 May.
Unconfirmed reports, however,
indicate preparations for
imminent'Soviet withdrawal.
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means of boosting the nation's
low food output.
By 1956 the USSR hopes to
have 70,000,000-74,000,000 acres
of "new land" under cultivation
(primarily grain crops.), an in- '
crease of almost 20 percent over
the total 1953 sown area. In
1954, about 9,000,000 acres of
"new lands" were seeded. Soviet
plans call for the seeding: of
an additional 40,000,000 acres
in 1955. (Pre-
pared jointly with ORR)
technicians have installed
Burma's only arms factory
which produces automatic weap-
ons..
Burma's largest arms deals,
however, have been made with
Israel and Yugoslavia. From
Israel, the Burmese have ob-
tained 30 reconditioned Spit-
fires. Marshal Tito has prom-
ised to equip one British-
style infantry brigade as a
gift. A Burmese mission is
now in Belgrade, presumably
arranging for the shipment of
this equipment and to develop
more permanent supply channels.
Although the Burmese for
some time looked to the United
States as an alternate source
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
of military equipment, they
have shown no inclination to
discuss recent offers to con-
sider the matter. The princi-
pal reason for this reversal
in outlook is Burma's deter-
mination-- at almost any cost--
to avoid antagonizing Communist
China.
Simla Economic Conference
Rejection by the Asian
nations represented at the
Simla economic conference of a
regional organization to plan
the use of a proposed $200,000-
000 in American aid appears to
have resulted from the fears of
the smaller nations that India
might dominate such an organi-
zation. The smaller nations
also seem to feel that they
will fare better with direct
aid from the United States.
The Simla meetings from 9
to 13 May, just two weeks after
the close of the Afro-Asian
conference which had formally
recognized the urgency of pro-
moting economic development
and co-operation within the
area, failed to live up to the
aspirations expressed at Ban-
dung. Most of the nations re-
sponding to India's invitation
accepted with misgivings re-
garding India's intentions. It
is not surprising, therefore,
that no co-ordinated plan de-
veloped.
As a result, Prime Minis-
ter Nehru, whose prestige was
reported badly damaged at Ban-
dung, may feel he has been dealt
another blow at Simla.
The full report of the
conference has not been made
public, but a summary report
A continuation of the
trend in Burmese arms procure-
ment may free Burma to some
extent from dependence on
Britain, but the diversity of
the material it is accumulat-
ing threatens to create seri-
ous problems of maintenance,
organization and training.
indicates the general view was
that in the present state of
economic development of Asia,
there is no advantage in having
an intermediate regional organi-
zation or even a secretariat.
It was felt that the country
programs should continue to be
bilateral as at present.
The conferees also declared
that $800,000,000 rather than
the proposed $200,000,000 would
be necessary to set up a re-
gional balance of payments or-
ganization to help the Asians
over short-term dollar short-
ages. The majority apparently
felt that the best use to make
of the fund would be to apportion
it among the countries represented
The representatives expressed
concern that the United States
might have an adverse reaction
to their lack of enthusiasm for
a regional plan.
The countries sending fully
participating delegations to
Simla were Cambodia, India,
Japan, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan,
Thailand and South Vietnam. A
British expert represented Ma-
laya, North Borneo, Sarawak and
Singapore. The Philippines and
Indonesia sent observers. Burma
and Ceylon refused to attend.
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19 May 1955
Afghan-Pakistani Situation
There have been numerous
rumors during the past week
that Afghanistan or Pakistan
or both have accepted "media-
tion" offers from Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.
All of these countries appar-
ently have either volunteered
their good offices or have been
asked by Kabul or Karachi to
intervene diplomatically in
the dispute between the two
capitals.
It is not clear, however,
that Afghanistan and Pakistan
have officially agreed on the
precise nature of the body to
be formally charged with in-
vestigating their dispute.
Saudi Arabia, the only country
to have taken positive action
to date, has sent a delegation
headed by an uncle of King
Saud to both Kabul and Karachi.
There is some talk of form-
ing a joint fact-finding com-
mission composed of several
Moslem countries. It has also
been reported that several
countries will act independently
in investigating the situation.
The terms of reference of
any "mediating" or fact-finding
body, likely to be accepted by
both Afghanistan and Pakistan
are also unclear.
Pakistan has refused to
negotiate the Pushtoonistan
question and is supported in
this stand by Turkey.
Iraq is apparently prima-
rily interested in the events
of 30 March and 1 April. Saudi
Arabia, which seems to be trying
to mediate on the basis of the
Koranic principle of "forgive
and forget," has failed to gain
Pakistani acceptance of any
such principle. Egyptian and
Iranian views are still not
clear, though Egypt seems to
desire investigation of the
30 March incident before any
other subject is discussed.
Pakistan obviously has in
mind solely a determination of
guilt for the wrecking of the
Pakistani embassy in Kabul on
30 March and subsequent demon-
strations at its consulates in
Kandahar and Jalalabad and at
the Afghan consulate in Pesha-
war. It presumably feels that
no impartial body could find
it equally guilty with Afghan-
istan and that the latter coun-
try will therefore publicly have
to accept an adverse finding.
There is at present some
question, however, as to whether
the trend of events is pro-
gressing in favor of Pakistan.
At the suggestion of in-
terested countries, Pakistan
has postponed closing the Afghan
frontier and withdrawing its
diplomats in Kabul beyond the
15 May deadline originally set.
In doing so, Pakistan probably
feels it retains the capability
of reasserting pressure on
Afghanistan at will and that
its action will prejudice any
investigators in its favor.
the Afghan government has been
encouraged by the delay to
-
continue its resistance.
he Saudi dele-
gation in Kabul has been much
impressed by Afghan arguments
and that it has already reached
one-sided conclusions. It is
possible to interpret the latest
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19 May 1955
Afghan propaganda broadcasts
as indicating an emboldened
Afghan line.
The situation still seems
to be weighted in favor of
Pakistan, however. Pakistan's
refusal on 19 May to accept
Saudi proposals will probably
again discourage the Afghan
government. Turkish, Iraqi,
and Egyptian opinion appears
to be veering in favor of
Pakistan. In case of split
decisions or an inability on
the part of "mediators" to
reach any specific conclusion,
Pakistan can still close the
Afghan border and break diplo-
matic relations.
despite the brave
front ei.ng put up by Afghan
leaders, Prime Minister Daud
is deeply discouraged at the
failure of his mobilization
scheme to arouse enthusiastic
support from the tribesmen.
Syria
Outwardly the situation
in Syria has calmed down in
the last two weeks. There
has been no letup, however,
in covert plotting by pro-
and antigovernment forces,
and any attempt to use force
will almost certainly result
in counteraction.
Rightist officers are
apparently being encouraged
by a high official in the
Ministry of Defense to act
against the government.
Most units of the First
and Sixth Infantry brigades
and armored and reconnaissance
units outside Damascus are
reported ready. This indi-
cates a hitherto unprecedented
amount of preparation.
There is considerable doubt as
to whether he is in complete
control of the army, and there
are indications that army con-
scriptees taken away from
spring planting chores may soon
become disgruntled.
Since it is highly un-
likely that Daud wishes to start
a war with Pakistan, or that he
would be permitted by the royal
.family to do so even if he so
desired, it may be that Daud
will have to retract the mobili-
zation order shortly for lack
of food and equipment with which
to supply the troops.
The troops may have been
alerted to deal with the sit-
uation that prevailed early
in May, when the army chief
of staff and his leftist sup-
porters threatened to ride
roughshod over the opposition.
The situation has calmed some
since then, and the army units
mentioned may not act under
present circumstances.
Meanwhile, Iraq has
stepped up its political ac-
tivity against the Syrian
government. Two former Iraqi
prime ministers have been sent
to Syria to persuade the
Populist and Nationalist
leaders to organize a coali-
tion against the government.
Iraq has also sent a strong
note warning Syria against
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19 May 1955
adhering to Egypt's proposed
defense pact.
French North Africa
Opposition is mounting
among French settlers in Tu-
nisia to the agreement reached
by the French and Tunisian
premiers on 22 April. The
opposition now centers on a
demand for the removal of
Resident General Boyer de la
Tour rather than an attack
on Tunisian nationalism as
such.
Moroccan and Tunisian
extremist settler groups met
in Tunis on 14 and 15 May to
perfect plans to dissuade the
French National Assembly from
approving the agreement.
Assembly action is expected
in July.
While the majority of
Tunisians are hopeful that
autonomy will be achieved,
extremist nationalists, who
are demanding independence,
have already clashed with
moderates. Fear that ex-
tremists might attempt to
disrupt the homecoming cele-
bration for nationalist hero
Habib Bourghiba, originally
slated for 18 May, as well as
the possibility that local
French police groups opposing
autonomy might incite
storing order.
Baghdad seems prepared
to give Syrian political
leaders whatever political
assistance it can, but armed
intervention would be consid-
ered only if Syrian authori-
ties requested it for re-
trouble, has resulted in post-
ponement of Bourghiba's return.
The security situation
in Algeria has worsened in
spite of state of emergency
measures put into effect last
month. Some 2,000 specially
trained and equipped gendarmes
were flown into eastern Al-
geria late last week to aid
the more than 40,000 French
troops there in rounding up
guerrilla and terrorist bands.
Terrorist attacks in Mo-
rocco are again on the increase
after a lull of several weeks.
Recent reports state that Paris
is considering early action
to replace the present sultan,
but officials in the Protec-
torates Ministry emphatically
deny that any action is con-
templated with regard to Mo-
rocco until after the Tunisian
conventions have been approved
in the National Assembly.
Continued procrastination
by the authorities increases
the likelihood that guerrilla
bands, like those in Algeria,
may develo in Morocco.
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19 May 1955
12 14 16 18 20 22
?
/S 'NI'
G E R M A N Y
Q 50 100 MILES
%
0~ 50 !0 KILOMETERS
LL
P 0 L l 5 14
r.
,./~
,
f A D M I N I S T R A i 1 D'N?)
?
r
?
BOHEMIA
P o L A N D %
so
PRAGUE
~? r \
50
OPIZ N
MORAVIA 1~ ~? ~. 'y
r ~..
G E R M
~
_V _ - rr
N Y
.'~ :
48
Th. W;t-d S-7 Goy.,.- d.., .o ..oymr.
J
? ?h r.? , "? M. Ode.- S ,. .i Ib drl6. . 0. boGerm..
b.u.dny S o om. o of ! Ih. olhe. ~.e.r.eren.l bou.d.rros
1
r
G A R Y
H U N ~~ u'?J j
rhown n. nee .....rlly ...egN..d by rh. U.a.d Sr.r.,
?~ Gowr. -
? r ,~,b
?SUDAPEST
]4 16 A 20 22
CZECHOSLOVAKIA - estimated total population for 1955 -_1211955.000
Area of heaviest Slovak concentration
Area of heaviest Hungarian concentration
Total population of Slovak regions, 1947 census - 3,400.000
Total estimated number of Hungarians In Sovakia, 1947 - 600,000
Total population of Czechoslovakia, 1947 census - 12,200,000
50511-6;
Czechoslovakia Adopts
Militant Minority o icy
The difficult minorities
problems facing the European
Satellites showed up with un-
usual clarity last month in
Czechoslovakia, where major
speeches at the Slovak Commu-
nist Party Congress reflected
the regime's continuing con-
cern with the country's two
major minority groups, the
Slovaks and the ethnic Hungar-
ians.
The militant party line
developed at the congress --
stressing the political suprem-
acy of'Prague and placing
primary blame for difficulties
on the minority groups them
selves -- is almost certain
to increase resentment against
the regime and bitterness be-
tween ethnic groups.
There are difficulties of
long standing with the more
than 500,000 ethnic Hungarians
in Slovakia. Encouragement of
national sentiment in Hungary
by the regime when Nagy was
premier probably aggravated
the situation and caused con-
cern in Prague.
Because of the current
Hungarian campaign' .to
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19 May 1955
eradicate the "right-wing" em-
phasis on.nationalism, the
Czech regime may now feel
freer to make new attacks on
Hungarian nationalism.
Slovak party first secre-
tary Bacilek claimed at the
party congress that bourgeois
nationalism in Slovakia can
most frequently be encountered
among ethnic Hungarians, includ-
ing party members. He warned
these members that, just as
the Hungarian Workers' Party
establishes policy for its
members, "the Communist Party
of Czechoslovakia determines
the attitude of its Hungarian
comrades."
The problem of Slovak
separatism, which is widespread
at all levels of the popula-
tion, also was a major topic of
speeches at the congress. The
former party line, which empha-
sized Czech-Slovak equality,
Italian Political Situation
President Giovanni Gronchi's
refusal on 12 May to accept the
resignation of the Scelba cabi-
net reflected a decision by
the present coalition parties
not to rock the political boat
in Italy at least until after
the Sicilian elections on 5
June. Basic dissensions in
the coalition parties remain,
however, and the Scelba govern-
ment has become little more
than a caretaker regime.
Gronchi's inaugural ad-
dress called for greater par-
ticipation in the direction of
the Italian state by the work-
ing classes. It was generally
interpreted as an ambitious
program of social and economic
reform.
has been revised and,the Slovaks
are now told that they must
learn to "love and trust
Prague."
The tone of recent offi-
cial statements indicates that
the Slovak Communist Party is
to be openly de-emphasized and
clearly subordinated to the
Czech party. The removal of
Czechoslovakia's second ranking
party leader, Premier Siroky,
from the Slovak politburo at
the congress probably reflects
this trend.
Primary motivation for the
present policy may be the party's
fear of the effects of minority
sentiments within its own ranks.
The regime may feel that achiev-
ing increased party discipline
through militancy would more
than compensate for the inevi-
table aggravation of popular
hostility.
In the opinion of the
American embassy in Rome, the
speech indicated a lack of
awareness of the nature of the
Communist threat and seemed to
remove any prospects of a vig-
orous anti-Communist campaign
by the government.
Gronchi's address was
well received by the great ma-
jority of Italians, however,
who felt it contained in part
the ideas of the church's so-
cial encyclicals and the doc-
trinal statements, of the Chris-
tian Democratic Party.
The coalition parties de-
cided against making any change
for the time being. The
cabinet announced on 12 May
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19 May 1955
that since there had been no
change in the parliamentary
majority on which the govern-
ment depended, there was no
constitutional,reason for
creating a cabinet crisis.
Immediately after the
Scelba cabinet's resignation
was refused, a "rebellion"
flared up among a hundred or
so right-wing Christian Demo-
crats. This group, known as
the "Concentration" faction,
had challenged the party lead-
ership in the presidential
election in April, and now
announced that it reserved
"full freedom of action" to
vote against Scelba's center
coalition.
On the real point at issue
--the demand for a voice in
determining Christian Democra-
tic policy--the "Concentra-
tion's" tactics appear to have
won them a major concession.
Party leaders have agreed that
major decisions will be made
by the Christian Democratic
parliamentary group, rather
than by the Fanfani-controlled
British Election
The outcome of the voting
in some 50 constituencies whose
members won in 1951 by majori-
ties of 1,000 or less will be
decisive in the British general
election. The Conservative
Party is still considered
likely to win.
The Conservatives are con-
fident that if they gain even a.
few of the marginal seats,
they will be returned to office
with a working majority.
party directorate in which the
right wing has no voice.
Participation of this
"Concentration" faction in
Christian Democratic policy
making will strengthen party
discipline, but may make it
more difficult to achieve
agreement on any specific pro-
gram. Furthermore, the minor
parties in the coalition are
dissatisfied with the
achievements of the Scelba
government,
The instability of the
situation suggests that there
may be some changes in the
government's line-up and pro-
gram during the summer, after
all the parties have had an
opportunity to estimate the
significance of the results
of the Sicilian elections.
The decision whether or not
to form a new government will
almost-certainly be made in
terms of domestic issues, and
will have little effect on
Italy's forei n policy.
if the electorate turns out in
the same proportion as in 1951
(82.6 percent), they might even
win.
American officials in
Britain report that the voters
are apathetic. They attribute
this to the lack of an exciting
issue and to the general pros-
perity and full employment.
They believe the Conservatives
will profit from electioneering
on Prime Minister Eden's record
as a peacemaker.
Laborites, on the other
hand, hope they can at least
hold the Conservative Party to
its present over-all majority
of 19 seats. They hope that
Both parties are concen-
trating primarily on the
marginal seats and on those
constituencies which have been
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19 May 1955
substantially changed by-the
recent redistribution of_seats.
The Conservatives captured
15 of the marginal seats in
1951. Several:of them are,in
Lancashire, where the Laborites
hope to capitalize on dissatis-
faction with depressed condi-
tions in the local textile in-
dustry. The Conservatives made
gains in local elections in '
that area last month, however,
and the government has canceled
the purchase tax on nonwoolen
textiles.
The redistribution of
seats, which created 11 new
constituencies, abolished six
and raised the House of Commons
Unrest in Colombia
Recent developments in
Colombia, particularly a rise
in guerrilla activity, indicate
a steady trend back toward the
widespread violence which pre-
vailed prior to 13 June 1953,
when the civilian regime of
Laureano Gomez was overthrown
by General Rojas Pinilla.
The political and ad-
ministrative ineptness shown
by the Rojas regime has cost
it, much of its original pop-
ularity and support. The
government, moving to main-
tain its position, appears to
be headed toward outright
authoritarianism.
Serious outbreaks of
violence have occurred in six
of the country's 16 departments
in recent months. Eastern
Tolima, where the most serious
incidents have taken place,
has been declared a "zone of
military operations." Some
2,500 persons have been evacu-
ated and government troops,
membership to 630, is believed
to favor the Conservatives.
The effect of major boundary
changes in 177 other con-
stituencies, 14 of which are
among the 50 marginal seats,
is not clear. Many of these
changes are due to the post-
war movement of workers from
cities to. suburbs and to the
growth of new industries in
rural areas.
Neither party knows
whether these "mixed" con-
stituencies will be predom-
inantly Labor or Conservative
and neither accordingly is
willing to estimate the effect
of the redistributing on the
election.
believed to number 3,000, are
stepping up efforts to.dis-
lodge some 3,000 guerrillas
entrenched there.
The regime continues to
claim that these disturbances
are caused by bandits and
Communists, do not represent
a revival of guerrilla activ-
ity, and are not political in
character. These claims are
apparently intended to fore-
stall charges that the govern-
ment is using the military
for political persecution.
The US Military Assist-
ance Advisory Group in Co-
lombia ^eports that American
equipment supplied under the
bilateral military agreement
only for hemispheric defense
is being used against the
guerrillas. The Colombian
military have attempted to
justify this, arguing that the
equipment is intended for use
in combating international
Communism and that the situation
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19 May 1955
in Colombia is similar to that
which prevailed in Guatemala
prior to the Castillo revolu
tion.
Colombia's 2,500-
member Communist Party is
actively interested
in the disturbances;
some Communist ef-
forts at provocation
and propaganda ex-
ploitation have been
indicated. There is
no concrete evidence,:
however, that Com-
munists are direct-
ing or are responsi-
ble for the cont hued
and widespread out-
breaks.
The available
evidence seems to
support the belief
that a good part of
the violence, at
least in Tolima, is
due to vendettas be-
tween Liberal guer-
rillas and bands
supporting the Gomez.
faction of the Con-
servative Party.
The renewed
violence is a mani-
festation not only
of the growing un-
rest, but also of
the larger, continu-
ing struggle between
the two traditional
political parties.
The Conserva-
tives have rejected recent
Liberal overtures for biparti-
san co-operation to re-estab-
lish constitutional rule, which
had prevailed for nearly half
a century prior to 1948.
Nominally the ruling party,
the Conservaties remain seri-
ously split between the fol-
lowers of Rojas and those of
Gomez. The latter group's
opposition to the regime is
growing and efforts at party
unity have so far proved futile.
The Liberals, probably
the majority party in popular
support, are also divided on
the question of co-operating
with Rojas.
The regime, meanwhile, is
attempting to build up a mass
political following.
The government's efforts
include daily propaganda hews
broadcasts and.pr.eparations to
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19 May 1955
publish an official newspaper
to compete with the party
dailies.
These moves have served
to alienate still further the tra-
ditionally influential politi-
cal and social groups, already
made uneasy by repeated signs
that the regime has abandoned
its announced intention to re-
turn the country to constitu-
tional government.
President Rojas, who was
elected for a four-year term
by the Constituent Assembly
in August 1954, announced on
1 January that he would not
lift the five-year-old state
of siege and that general
elections would not be held.
He claimed that the unsettled
situation did not permit the
resumption of the country's
control by partisan politics.
The trend toward a per-
manent military dictatorship
indicated in this announce-
ment can also be seen in Rojas'
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failure to form a truly Con-
servative-Liberal coalition
government, and the administra-
tion's hostility toward exist-
ing labor confederations.
Furthermore, strict censorship
is maintained over the press
and radio, and the military
code was recently amended to
provide severe penalties for
criticism of the military.
These developments, to-
gether with the increasing
government corruption--which
reportedly involves virtually
all military and civilian
officials, including the
president--are undermining the
support and prestige of the
regime. There is even some
evidence of discontent among
military eletaents.
Thus far, however, Rojas
apparently has maintained the
confidence and support of the
majority of the armed forces,
largely through treating them
as a privileged caste.
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THE SATELLITE AGRICULTURE PROBLEM
The announced intention
of the Eastern European Satel-
lites to increase emphasis on
heavy industry and military
preparedness, following the
example set by the USSR, has
not to date substantially
modified their previous stress
on increased agricultural in-
vestment and economic conces-
sions to the peasantry.
The "new course" agricul-
tural policy inaugurated in
the summer of 1953 reversed
an earlier--Stalin era--policy
of neglect and coercion in
agriculture. This reversal,
which followed the Soviet line
as developed after Stalin's
death, was caused in large
part by the failure of agricul-
tural production in the Satel-
lites to achieve the prewar
level (see Table I).
Measures were taken, in
varying degrees depending on
individual Satellite conditions,
to increase agricultural in-
vestments, the size of the
agricultural labor force, the
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
19 May 1955
(1950 = 100)*
Pre-War 1952 1953
(1935-39
average)
ALBANIA
95
97
99
BULGARIA
100
95
99
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
109
100
95
81
95
86
95
95
* Included are bread grains, coarse
grains, rice, potatoes, cattle,
hogs, horses and sheep. Constant
price weights for 1950 were used
to determine index.
total area under cultivation
and the extent of mechanization.
In addition, the socialization
of agriculture was slowed or
stopped, taxes and delivery
quotas were reduced, prices
paid for agricultural commod-
ities were increased,and a
generally more liberal attitude
toward the peasantry was adopted.
These new measures raised
new problems, ideological as
well as economic. The party
was called on to tread a middle
way. The sins of left and right
deviation were newly defined--
and the amount of attention
the party press devoted to the
problem indicated that both
heresies were widespread.
Confusion resulted, and this,
coupled with long-standing
government and party weaknesses
in the countryside and with
traditional bureaucratic in-
eptness, hamstrung progress
from the very beginning.
The peasants, justifiably
wary of Communist promises, were
unwilling to;co-operate on the
basis of announced good
intentions, but were quick to
take advantage of the new
liberalization.
In Hungary, for example,
farmers withheld deliveries in
the hope of further concessions,
and great numbers of peasants
left the collective farms. Al-
most 40 percent of the collec-
tive farmers in Hungary withdrew,
affecting about one quarter of
all socialized land.
Role of the Independent Peasant
Despite the past policy
of giving virtually all avail-
able aid to the collective
farms, the independent peasant,
who continues to cultivate more
than half the land in all the
Satellites except Bulgaria, is
a more efficientfarmer than
the collectivized peasant, and
normally produces higher yields.
The regimes, still com-
mitted to a policy of land
socialization, have been pre-
vented by Communist ideology
from facing the issue squarely.
In effect, the private peasant
has been asked to increase
production, with less help than
has been given to collectives,
in order to support a regime
which admittedly aims at his
own ultimate extinction.
The regimes have failed
to produce manufactured con-
sumers' goods in quantities
sufficient to provide the kind
of incentive the peasants would
find most attractive. Shortages
of agricultural equipment,
seeds, fertilizers and insec-
ticides continue.
Manpower Problems
Plans for diverting both
skilled and unskilled manpower
to the farms were almost com-
pletely unsuccessful.
Czechoslovakia's ambi-
tious program to gain 320,000
new agricultural workers be-
tween mid-1954 and 1958
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INDEX OF FOOD AND LIVESTOCK
PRODUCTION IN THE EUROPEAN
SATELLITES, PRE-WAR AND 1952-53
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19 May 1955
apparently has foundered, for
example. Only 17,000 were
recruited during 1954, and the
January 1955 target for re-
cruitment of farm laborers
from industrial enterprises
and villages was fulfilled by
less than 2 percent.
Programs for the develop-
ment of fallow land, such as
Czechoslovakia's plan calling
for the cultivation of an ad-
ditional 120,000 hectares this
year, have also made little
progress,according to official
admissions.
In many cases the regimes
found themselves in dilemmas
of their own creation. The
agricultural manpower shortage,
for example, could have been
solved, in a sense, by forced
wholesale transfers of popula-
tions and/or labor groups.
But such measures have been
frowned on during the new
course and, in addition, such
transfers would adversely
affect already lagging indus-
trial growth.
The planners are confronted
by other difficulties, in-
cluding their own incompetence.
The necessity of importing
large quantities of foodstuffs
limits other imports, many of
which would help boost food
production at home. Thus,
Czechoslovakia officially re-
ported that last year it im-
ported one half of its cereal
grain and meat. The programs
for raising agricultural pro-
duction through mechanization
and through consumers' goods
incentives were in partial con-
flict, the two making contra-
dictory demands on industry.
Increases in Investment
Efforts to increase pro-
duction through a program of
greater investments in agri-
culture have continued this
year. Scheduled increases over
1954 announced to date range
CURRENT FOOD SITUATION IN THE EUROPEAN SATELLITES
General
Situation
ALBANIA chronically unsatis-
factory; normally a
food deficit country
dependent on imports
BULGARIA indications of occa-
sional and local
shortages
HUNGARY generally
unsatisfactory
POLAND best off among
Satellites
RUMANIA generally
unsatisfactory
Items in
Shortest Supply
no known serious
shortages
meat, animal fats,
bread grains
meat, butter,
sugar, flour
(in some areas)
meat, animal fats,
possibly bread
fresh meats,
animal fats
General
Outlook Through
July 1955
insufficient
data
continued deterio-
ration unless im-
ports from Soviet
bloc are increased
continued
deterioration
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19 May 1955
from 12.1 percent in Poland to
45.8 percent in Bulgaria. As
yet, however, there has been
little'or no return on this
policy.
In Poland and Czech-
oslovakia, for example, where
total planned agricultural
investments for 1954 were
about 30 percent above 1953,
plans for major crops were not
fulfilled. Total 1954 grain
production in East Germany and
Czechoslovakia was actually
lower than in 1953.
Poland increased produc-
tion but did not meet its plan.
The animal husbandry situation
did not improve and also failed
to meet planned goals. In turn,
food availabilities did not
attain planned levels (see
Table II).
Bad weather, which has
continued this year, and the
hostile attitude of the peasants
have severely limited produc-
tion in recent years. Satellite
leaders seem to be operating
on hope as much as on actual
expectations.
In Czechoslovakia, for
example, the peasants have
been informed that, despite a
notable lack of response, the
government is continuing to
extend concessions. These have
included recent retail price
reductions and an increase in
payments for agricultural goods.
The incentive program has
been continued this year in all
the Satellites. Bulgaria raised
state agricultural purchase
prices for collective farms in
January. Minor concessions
have been announced in Poland,
Rumania and Albania.
Earlier indications of a
return to a coercive policy in
Hungary apparently prompted a
strong peasant reaction, and
the regime has subsequently at-
tempted to assure private peas-
ants that it will continue to
support them. In the latter
part of March, it gave concrete
form to these assurances by
canceling a decree of last De-
cember which would have obliged
private farmers to make good
shortages in the winter wheat
sowing plan. Certain produce
delivery dates were liberalized
at the same time.
Although concessions have
continued and basic new course
agricultural policy remains'the
same, some modifications in the
program are inevitable. The
tone of propaganda in most of
the Satellites, coupled with
actual measures in some areas,
indicates that collectivization
programs will receive new
emphasis.
The gaining of new members
for collectives will apparently
be a gradual process, however,
at least for this year. The
general line toward kulaks has
hardened, and, as party organ-
izations in rural areas are
strengthened, discipline as a
whole may be tightened.
Such modifications do not
necessarily reflect as yet the
beginnings of a return to more
coercive practices. The essen-
tial elements of the agricul-
tural new course should survive
at least until the production
results of the 1955 crop year
are known. Another poor harvest,
however, probably would mean a
severe tightening of new course
procedures in agriculture.
F Concurred in by ORR)
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