CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000500050001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 29
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2005
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: May 5, 1955
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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CONFIDENTIAL
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
SUMMARY
COPY NO. 14
OCR NO. 3984/55
5 May 1955
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I I I OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.
CONFIDENTIAL
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& IVES RECORDS CE U1
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly Summary has been prepared
primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all
current situations. Comments and conclusions represent
the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
T H E W E E K. I N B R I E F
PART .1
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
VIETNAM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Having driven most of the Binh Xuyen forces out of
Saigon, Premier Diem is faced with the delicate politi-
cal task of retaining the co-operation of his extremist
followers onthe one hand, and the French and perhaps Bao
Dai on the other. Diem is reluctant to break definitive-
ly with the ancien regime in view of the importance to his
government of he military support which the French can
offer and because the ouster of Bao Dai might call into
question the legality of his government.
AUSTRIAN TREATY CONFERENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 2
The concessions made by Soviet ambassador Ilichev
at the third session of the ambassadors' conference in
Vienna demonstrate that Moscow intends to get an Aus-
trian treaty signed quickly, with no quibbling over de-
tailed terms.
USSR PLANS NEW MOVES
IN EUROPE . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page
The USSR is planning to take steps to give East
Germany more of the attributes of,sovereignty and pre-
pare the way for Soviet diplomatic relations with Bonn.
The Soviet bloc security conference meeting in Warsaw on
11 May will. probably sign a mutual aid treaty and an-
nounce establishment of a unified command as a counter-
AFGHAN-PAKISTANI
TENSION MOUNTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
The Kabul radio broadcast of 4 May proclaiming a
state of emergency and ordering the mobilization of the
armed forces is probably primarily a political move to
indicate firm resistance to Pakistani diplomatic measures
designed to force Af han surrender on the Pushtoonistan
issue.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
FORMOSA STRAITS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
There was no significant military activity in the
Formosa Straits area this week. The Chinese Communists
continue to improve their capabilities in the area.
SYRIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 6
The Syrian political situation, which has been rela-
tively quiet while the controversial proposal for a
Syrian-Saudi Arabian-Egyptian pact has been under consid-
eration, is again threatening to erupt.
Harassment of West Berlin Continues: The East German
government appears to have a opted a policy of in-
termittent pinpricks- against West Berlin designed
to make it difficult for the West to take effective
countermeasures and to force the West Germans into
negotiations with the East German regime at as high
a political level as possible. The restrictive de-
vices employed to date are few and relatively minor
in comparison with measures the East German govern-
ment could take to make life in West Berlin diffi-
cult. I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 1
Japan's Relations With the Sino-Soviet Bloc: Japan's
opening position in the talks es a USSR, sched-
uled to begin in London on 1 June, is taking shape.
Prime Minister Hatoyama, in a reversal of his pre-
vious statements, declared before the Diet last
week that the settlement of such questions as fron-
tier revisions, fishing areas, and the Japanese still
held in Siberia was a condition for restoration of
diplomatic relations with Moscow. . . Page 2
Status of Top Soviet Leaders: The arrangement of por-
traits o the Soviet leaders on May Day demonstrated
graphically that Party Secretary Khrushchev enjoys
precedence but not unqualified pre-eminence.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 3
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5 May 1955
May Day Military Parade in Moscow: The Soviet army
showed new or modified ar lery, including a
200mm gun-howitzer, at Moscow's May Day parade.
Bad weather forced cancellation of the air show,
but several new planes appeared in pre-May Day
practice flights and 11 new jet heavy bombers
were seen in the air at one time.
Page 3
Cambodia: Under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk,
Cambodia is attempting to put a more neutralist
face on its foreign policy. The former king's
desire to forestall accusations of close identi-
fication with Western interests makes him sus-
ceptible to efforts by India to bring Cambodia
into its sphere of influence. . . . Page 5
USSR Encourages Neutrality in the Near East: The
USSR s energe ca y continuing s campaign,
launched in March, to dissuade Near Eastern
countries from adhering to the Turkish-Iraqi
pact. The campaign combines threats, suggestions
that neutrality would have many advantages, and
frank efforts to associate the USSR with the Arab
cause.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 5
Tito Stalls on Closer Military Ties With West: Yugo-
slav leaders are resisting Western requests for
closer military ties. Although Tito has said that
he would give up Western aid rather than start mil-
itary planning talks now, he still wants American
military assistance. . . . . . Page 6
Italian Presidential Election: Giovanni Gronchi's elec-
tion as president of Italy was a severe blow to the
prestige of Premier Scelba and his center coalition
government. The election emphasized the splits with-
in and between the present coalition parties, and may
presage the formation of a government somewhat to the
left of Scelba's. F_ I . . . . . . . . . Page 7
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5 May 1955
Iceland Strike Settled: The settlement on 28 April of
the 42-day s r e of over 7,000 Icelandic workers
is a political victory for the Communist and left
Socialist elements which dominated the strike. The
wage increases granted will probably start a new in-
flationary spiral and could lead to a devaluation of
Iceland's currency. I. . . Page 8
Guatemalan Regime Faces Serious Economic and Political
Pro ems: Guatemala's continuing economic cu es
and internal political rivalries are undermining
the popularity and strength of President Castillo
Armas. Unless the government's financial and polit-
ical difficulties are eased in the near future,
Castillo's position will deteriorate, and coups may
be attempted. . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES.
THE EFFECTS OF THE AUSTRIAN DEVELOPMENTS ON GERMANY Page 1
Chancellor Adenauer's pro-Western policies will
face a severe test during coming months as a result of
the Soviet initiative on an Austrian settlement. There
has been no significant growth of neutrality sentiment
in West Germany. However, plans for a German settlement
modifying Germany's position within the Western defense
alliance are being advanced in West Germany and else-
where in Western Europe.
CHINESE COMMUNIST TACTICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA . . . . .
Chou En-lai's public commitment at Bandung to
peaceful aims and methods strengthens the probability
that Peiping will continue to emphasize the concilia-
tory aspects of its policies toward Southeast Asia.
Page 3
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
OF IMMEDIATE INTEREST
Having driven most of the
Binh Xuyen forces out of Sai-
gon, Premier Diem is faced with
the delicate political task of
retaining the co-operation of
his extremist followers on the
one hand, and the French and
perhaps Bao Dai on the other.
The army, through its
radio, reserved its position
on both Bao Dai and Diem by
deferring to the will of the
people as expressed through a
national assembly or referen-
dum.
Diem is reluctant to
break definitively with the
ancien regime in view of the
importance of the military sup-
port which the French can offer
and because the ouster of Bao
Dai might call into question
the legality of his government.
He is attempting to meet
this problem by convoking an
"Estates General" of some
1,000 representatives from all
parts of the country` He
apparently feels that the de-
cisions of this body will es-
tablish the legality of his
subsequent actions.
The results of the first
meeting of the congress on 4
May indicated that a majority
of the delegates favored the
immediate deposition of Bao
Dai, while a minority pressed
for the organization of a pro-
visional assembly and cabinet
as the first order of business.
The government indicated
its moderate approach by pro-
posing a three-point resolution
calling for Bao Dai's dele-
gation of powers to a national
assembly, the organizati.(h
elections within four months,
and a pledge by Bao Dai to
refrain from appointing a new
premier during this period.
French officials in Saigon
and Paris contend that Diem is
becoming a captive of the
"People's Revolutionary Com-
mittee" which sprang up during
the past week, and that he may
become a "Kerensky," with the
committee playing the role of
Bolsheviks. Allegations that
the committee is subject to
Viet Minh influence, however,
remain unsubstantiated.
The best known figures
of the committee are the Cao
Dai loyalist general Nguyen
Thanh Phuong and Hoa Hao
general Nguyen Glac Ngo. These
generals, and General Trinh
Minh The--since killed in
action--have been actively
anti-Communist over a period
of many years.
The American embassy in
Saigon believes these men
lack the intelligence to con-
duct the sort of political cam-
paign which the revolutionary
committee has been putting on
and suspects that someone else
is providing the brains.
The committee's brain-
trust appears to consist of
pons who have been closely
associated with loyal elements
of the Cao Dai and Hoa Hao
sects. Of the nine members of
the committee, two are reported
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
to have served with the Viet
Minh sometime prior to 1952.
Evidence is lacking that any
of them has had connections
with the Viet Minh since that
time.
The committee is hammering
away at popular anti-Bao Dai
and anti-French themes. Ex-
tremism is its stock in trade,
and it is thus clearly a threat
to the evolution of a stable,
nationalist government. Whether
Diem will be able to control
the committee is not yet clear.
He should be able to control
it so long as he controls the
national army.
The American embassy in
Saigon deems it possible that
the Viet Minh may be active at
the third or fourth echelon of
the committee. The obscurity
of the committee's origins and
the haste with which it was
organized make it relatively
vulnerable to Viet Minh in-
filtration.
However, a Viet Minh
broadcast of 1 May described
the committee as a "farce."
AUSTRIAN TREATY CONFERENCE
The concessions made by
Soviet ambassador Ilichev at
the third session of the am-
bassadors' conference in Vienna
demonstrate that Moscow intends
to get an Austrian treaty signed
quickly, with no quibbling over
detailed terms.
Although some provisions,
notably the four-power guarantee
for Austria, will probably have
to be worked out by the foreign
ministers, it now appears that
the ambassadors can settle most
of the details.
A major shift in Soviet
tactics was reflected in
Ilichev's agreement on 4 May
to delete Article 17, which
sets the maximum size of
Austrian armed forces, as well
as two other articles restrict-
ing military training and
stocks of war materiel.
On the previous day,
Ilichev had said he was not
authorized even to discuss
Article 17, and on 1 May
Pravda had sharply attacked
etstern proposals for in-
creasing the maximum limits on
the army as an attempt to draw
Austria into the Western mili-
tary bloc.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
Although Austria is not
likely to create a large
enough army to cause Moscow
any serious concern, the USSR
certainly has no interest in
increasing Austrian forces,
and this sudden reversal can
only have been intended to dram-
atize. Moscow's willingness to
make concessions.
Ilichev also agreed at the
third session to delete Article
16, which provides for the re-
patriation of refugees and dis-
placed persons and bans refu-
gee organizations hostile to
any of the powers. The USSR,
which had previously insisted
on including this article,
agreed to drop it altogether,
despite the fact that Western
representatives had offered a
compromise version,.
The Soviet ambassador con-
tinued at this session to
oppose incorporating the Soviet
economic concessions granted
to Austria during the Moscow
talks in Article 35, which,
covers this subject.
USSR PLANS NEW MOVES
IN EUROPE
The USSR is planning sev-
eral modifications in its
European policy in response to
the final ratification of the
Paris accords and the ending
of the occupation of West
Germany.
A Soviet bloc security
conference, with China attend-
ing as an observer, will meet
in Warsaw on 11 May. The eight
countries participating are ex-
pected to sign the treaty of
friendship and mutual aid and
establish the unified command
first threatened at the Moscow
conference last December and
negotiated during February and
March.
Moscow apparently now in-
tends to take formal action
establishing a counterpart to
NATO and facilitating the re-
tention of troops in the
Satellites following an Austrian
treaty.
In order to match the
abolition of the West German
occupation, the USSR may an-
nounce new measures of "sov-
ereignty" for East Germany,
the most likely step being
the abolition of the Soviet
High Commission. The demise
of this already moribund in-
stitution would not necessarily
affect Soviet control of East
Germany or relations with
Allied officials in Germany.
A formal announcement of
the creation of an East German
army appears likely either as
a prelude to or in conjunction
with the Warsaw conference.
A possible date for the
announcement of any such
measures in East Germany would
be 8 May, the tenth anniversary
of V-E day. It is reliably
reported that the Communists
are planning a major propaganda
barrage then, with a large'
rally and parade in East Berlin
and speeches by East German
leaders emphasizing the need
for greater production and
defense efforts in East Germany
to meet the challenge of the
Paris accords.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
With the successful Aus-
trian mission to Moscow in the
background, the USSR may soon
repeat'its 15 January offer to
the West. German government to
establish diplomatic relations.
Preliminary pressures on West
Berlin (see Part II,ip. 1) are
part of the'general Soviet
drive'to force West Germany to
come to terms with Moscow and
the East German regime.
The USSR probably will
encourage visits to Moscow
by nongovernmental Bundestag
groups and hold out the pros-
pect of returning German
prisoners of war. The USSR
admits holding only a few
thousand POW's. West German
estimates run as high as
17,000 in addition to civilian
internees.
AFGHAN-PAKISTANI TENSION MOUNTS
The Kabul radio broadcast
of 4 May proclaiming a state of
emergency is presumably the
Afghan reaction to Pakistan's
closing on 1 May of its consu-
lates-in Afghanistan and its
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a
request for the clos-
ing of Afghan consu-
lates and trade mis-
sions in Pakistan.
The broadcast an-
nounced the mobiliza-
tion of the armed
forces and the calling
up of certain reserve
classes. Kabul also
has recalled its
charge in Karachi.
These Afghan
moves are probably
designed partly to
indicate firmness in
the face of Pakistani
diplomatic measures
aimed at forcing Afghan
surrender on the Push-
toonistan issue.
The moves were
probably also in-
tended to discourage
any attempt by Afghan
tribal groups to march
on Kabul and loot the
city as is customary
in time of unrest. A
few tribesmen had to
be turned back north
of Kabul following
the looting of the
Pakistani embassy
there on 30 March.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
There is no indication
that. mobilization of the 62,000
ineffective Afghan forces was
ordered in preparation for an
armed attack on Pakistan or
because of fear of invasion
from Pakistan.
Pakistani government of-
ficials have informed. the Ameri-
can embassy that they are pre-
pared to break off diplomatic
relations and to close the
Afghan border if Kabul does not
respond by 15 May to their de-
mands for restitution for the
recent looting of the Pakistani
embassy there.
Closing of the border
would cut Afghanistan off from
its normal routes to the sea
and virtually end its trade
with the West.
There was no significant
military activity in the For-
mosa Straits area this week.
The Chinese Communists con-
tinued to improve their capa-
bilities in the area.
Peiping may intend to re-
frain from major assaults while
exploring the possibility of
negotiations with the United
States. However, the Com-
munists may at any time assault
minor offshore islands in order
to keep up some degree of pres-
sure for negotiations.
The primitive Afghan
economy can probably carry on
indefinitely even if most
normal trade channels are
blocked, as it did during
World War II. Strong action
by Pakistan in the near fu-
ture would, h'wever, probably
cause the Afghan government
at least to review its trade
with the USSR in an effort to
determine whether a closer
relationship were necessary,
or advisable.
The Afghan government
has to date given no indication
that it intends to comply with
Pakistani demands, despite the
fact that it is under pres-
sure from several other Asian
nations.
India's V. K. Krishna
Menon is going to Peiping
soon to try-to clarify the
Chinese Communist position on
negotiations. The British
charge in Peiping, instructed
to make similar inquiries, has
not been received by Chou En-
lai.
There are contradictory
reports as to whether the
Chinese Communists, in the
interest of improving the
atmosphere for negotiations,
intend to release any of the
detained Americans in the
near future.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
Chinese Com-
munist public state-
ments continue to
take a hard line on
substantive issues
which any negotia-
tions might discuss.
Peiping maintains
that there is no need
for a cease-fire, as
the United States
and Communist China
are not at war.
Similarly, Pei-
ping asserts that For-
mosa is an "internal"
question, thus imply-
ing that its status
is not negotiable.
The Chinese Commu-
nists allege that
the only "interna-
tional" question is
that of American
"intervention," thus
suggesting that the
only matter to ne-
gotiate is that of
a withdrawal of
American forces from
the China area.
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Proposed Railroad
Naut.0 S0 10? "Miles
0 50 100 130
The Syrian political sit-
uation, which has been relative-
ly quiet while the controversial
proposal for a Syrian-Saudi
Arabian-Egyptian pact has been
under consideration, is again
threatening to erupt.
The assassination of As-
sistant Chief of Staff Malki
on 22 April continues to pro-
duce severe repercussions. His
military partisans--the army
clique led by Chief of Staff
Shuqayr and backed by the left-
ist Arab Socialist-Resurrection-
ist Party (ASRP)--are endeavor-
ing to force civilian authori-
ties to provide legal cover for
taking revenge on the Syrian
Social National Party (SSNP),
which they hold responsible
for the murder.
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5 May 1955
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In the face of these tac-
tics, the opposition--consisting
chiefly of the ailing presi-
dent, a Nationalist Party min-
ority in the cabinet, and con-
servative senior army officers--
is fighting only a rear-guard
action.
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5 May 1955
NOTES AND COMMENTS
Harassment of West Berlin
Continues
The East German govern-
ment appears to have adopted a
policy of intermittent pin-
pricks against West Berlin
designed to make it difficult
for the West to take effective
countermeasures and to force
the West Germans into negotia-
tions with the East Germans at
as high a political level as
possible. The restrictive
devices employed to date are
few and relatively minor in
comparison with measures the
East German government could
take to make life in West Ber-
lin difficult.
Two additional truckloads
of scrap metals have been con-
fiscated by the East Germans;
four truckloads of cable drums
have been impounded, two of
which have been released; and
a load of ball bearings has
been removed from a railway car
at Marienborn and confiscated.
On 26 April the East Ger-
man police started weighing all
trucks at the Marienborn check
point on the Helmstedt Autobahn
and imposing fines of 50 marks
per 100 kilograms of overload.
Road traffic to Berlin, how-
ever, is still moving at
generally normal levels, be-
cause of continued subsidies
by the West German government.
American officials in Ber-
lin predict that within the
next few days 20 to 25 addi-
tional East German "scrap
specialists" will probably be
deployed to various water and
rail check points. This may
lead to additional minor
harassments.-
The East German govern-
ment has clarified its po-
sition somewhat regarding ne-
gotiations on the truck toll.
An editorial in Neues Deutsch-
land on 30 April suggests that
if the Federal Republic will
agree to talks between repre-
sentatives of the Transport
Ministries, the East Germans
will agree that the rank of
the negotiators could be be-
low the deputy minister level.
The West Germans are
anxious to keep the problem
within the framework of inter-
zonal trade talks, but are
willing to add transport
experts to these meetings.
They are flatly opposed to
holding high-level talks that
might be construed as recog-
nition of East German sover-
eignty.
Soviet high commissioner
Pushkin agreed on 30 April to
discuss the Berlin truck toll
problem with the Western high
commissioners. He insisted,
however, that because the toll
was not levied against the
motor transport of the
occupation powers, it was not
within their competence to
settle and was a matter for
negotiation between East-and
West Germany.
Republic's trade.
Pressure from West German
businessmen may force Bonn to
taper off its selective em-
bargo on shipments to East
Germany. Trade circles feel
that Western stoppage of East
German shipments through
Hamburg would be as effective
a form of pressure and would
not injure the Federal
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5 May 1955
Japan's Relations
With the Sino-Soviet Bloc
Japan's opening position
in the talks with the USSR,
scheduled to begin in London
on 1 June, is taking shape.
Prime Minister Hatoyama, in a
reversal of his previous state-
merits,"declared before the
Diet last week that the settle-
ment of such questions as fron-
tier revisions, fishing areas,
and the Japanese still held in
Siberia was a condition for
restoration of diplomatic rela-
tions with Moscow.
Hatoyama had insisted
previously that Japan should
first restore relations with
Moscow and then talk about any
outstanding issues. His pres-
ent attitude more nearly coin-
cides with the views of his
foreign minister, Mamoru
Shigemitsu.
The Japanese are fully
prepared for Soviet stalling
on outstanding questions, how-
ever, and will give ground
about a month after the talks
start and call for an exchange
of ambassadors, according to
one report. The Japanese would
then pursue their bargaining
in hopes of obtaining some
commitments from the USSR.
In a move to strengthen
the Japanese delegation at
the talks, Haruhiko Nishi,
ambassador to Australia, will
be appointed to fill the now
vacant ambassadorial post in
Great Britain. A senior offi-
cial of the Tokyo Foreign Min-
istry states that Nishi has
had considerable experience
with Soviet affairs and, with
Shunichi Matsumoto, will form
a "strong team."
The Chinese Communists
are continuing their efforts
to maneuver the Japanese gov-
ernment into de facto relations.
Chou En-lai told Japan's dele-
gate to the Afro-Asian con-
ference that his government
was prepared to repatriate
Japanese still in China but
that there would have to be
something more than informal
talks.
A similar Chinese strategem
was frustrated when the Jap-
anese government refused to
guarantee the execution of an
$84,000,000 trade plan signed
on 4 May by a private Japanese
organization. Tokyo also re-
fused to grant diplomatic rec-
ognition to a proposed Chinese
trade mission, despite pressure
from Diet groups,, Japanese
traders, and the Communists
themselves.
Nevertheless, the trade
plan--concluded only after
Hatoyama agreeu to extend his
co-operation--pushed Japan one
step further toward recogni-
tion of the Peiping government.
The two parties agreed in the
plan to hold sample fairs and
exchange permanent trade mis-
sions. The inclusion of em-
bargoed items in the trade
plan will increase pressure on
the Japanese government to work
for an early relaxation of
CHINCOM controls.
Prime Minister Hatoyama
reportedly is sending a per-
sonal message to Mao Tse-tung
stating that Japan wishes to
accord diplomatic recognition
to Communist China and that
ne favors a policy of copros-
perity and coexistence with
China. Such a message would
be hardly more than a friendly
gesture since Hatoyama, who
favors a "two Chinas" concept,
fully recognizes that diplo-
matic recognition at this time
would be premature.
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This action contrasts
with Hatoyama's recent Diet
speeches in which he went out
of his way to emphasize that
Japan's basic policy is to
maintain close ties with the
United States. It illustrates
Status of Top Soviet Leaders
The Soviet leaders' por-
traits were apparently ar-
ranged on May Day to convey
the impression that Party
Secretary Khrushchev enjoys
precedence but not unqualified
pre-eminence. Premier Bul-
ganin's picture displaced that
of Khrushchev in first place
in some of the displays, but
the party secretary appeared
in the number-one spot more
often than the premier.
Malenkov' s portrait was
placed at or near the end of
the gallery. He was third in
line, however, when the pre-
sidium members mounted the
Lenin-Stalin tomb, and was
shown standing between Khru -
shchev and Kaganovich in the t,ic-
turos published in the Soviet
press the following day.
These minor inconsisten-
cies may have been designed to
show that Malenkov's demotion
denoted a realignment of po-
May Day Military Parade
In Moscow
Unfavorable weather forced
cancellation of the air portion
of the military demonstration
in Moscow on May Day, but the
Soviet army displayed new or
modified artillery.
The main new item of equip-
ment was a 200mm gun-howitzer
his working assumption that
Japan can maintain friendly
relations with the Sino-Soviet
bloc without endangering the
benefits derived from Japan's
alliance with the United States.
litical power but has not un-
dermined the stability of the
collective leadership.
Neither N. N. Shatalin,
who is still formally a party
secretary, nor N. M. Shvernik,
a candidate member of the party
presidium and chief of the
Soviet trade unions, appeared
at the ceremonies.
Shvernik was last seen in
public on 9 February and Shata-
lin on 21 February, and their
absence on May Day strengthens
the supposition that neither is
presently active in his post.
There have been unsubstan-
tiated reports that Shvernik,
an Old Bolshevik who is now
nearly 68, is ill. Nothing
has been heard of Shatalin, re-
garded as a protege of Malen-
kov, and it is likely that he
has been removed from the key
post he held in the area of
personnel appointments.
with a modified recoil system,
mounted on a single-wheeled
carriage and towed by a heavy-
tracked prime mover. The army
attache reports that this is
the same piece originally seen
in a rehearsal and thought' to
be of 240mm, caliber .
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This suggests that the
weapon is not an entirely new
departure, since the estimated
caliber is more nearly con-
sistent with previously employed
Soviet artillery. The mounting,
however, represents an improve-
ment in mobility over the heavy
artillery pieces now in use by
Soviet field forces.
Improvements in carriage
were probably also incorporated
in the new or modified 122mm
antitank guns and 152mm gun-
howitzers displayed in the
parade. In addition, sixteen
122mm AA guns were displayed.
This is the largest number of
these new Soviet heavy anti-
aircraft weapons seen at one
time by American observers,
although the sighting of small
numbers of them in convoys in
Moscow since late 1954 had sug-
gested that they were to be
added to the air defenses of
the Soviet capital.
There was no air show, but
several new. planes had pre-
viogsly appeared in practice
flights.
Eleven new jet heavy bomb-
ers (BISON) were seen in a
single rehearsal flight. Anal-
ysis of aircraft numerals in-
dicates, however, that as many
as 13 different planes may have
been involved in preparations
for May Day. Formation flights
of this type aircraft were noted
in eight of the 11 practice
flights observed by Western
officials.
Three of the new four-
engine turboprop swept-wing
aircraft, designated BEAR by
Western intelligence, partici-
pated in one of the last re-
hearsals.
Preliminary analysis tends
to support evaluations of this
plane as a bomber rather than
as a cargo or tanker aircraft.
The USSR may have intended
to demonstrate advances in air
defense as well as offensive air
capabilities, inasmuch as a new
twin-jet swept-wing all-weather
fighter and a new single-jet
fighter were also seen in
pre-parade rehearsals.
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5 May 1955
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Cambodia
Under the leadership of
Prince Sihanouk, Cambodia is
attempting to put a more neu-
tralist face on its foreign
policy. The former king--whose
political activities since his
abdication have increased rath-
er than diminished--is quoted
as saying at the Bandung con-
ference that his country had
definitely aligned itself with
"the community of neutralist
nations, including India and
Burma."
Through this and similar
actions, Sihanouk apparently
is attempting to counteract,
both in the minds of his neigh-
bors and of his own people, any
thought that Cambodia's ties
USSR Encourages
Neutrality n the Near East
The USSR is continuing
energetically its campaign,
launched in March, to dissuade
Near Eastern countries from
adhering to the Turkish-Iraqi
pact.
with the West will become too
restrictive. Although the
prince during his recent visit
to New Delhi subscribed to the
"five principles of peaceful
coexistence," his firm anti-
Communist policy in internal
affairs has never been ques-
tioned.
Sihanouk's desire to pre-
serve his country's new-found
independence and forestall ac-
cusations of close identifica-
tion with Western interests
makes him susceptible, however,
to efforts by India.to bring
Cambodia into its sphere of
influence, and thus may ulti-
mately damage Cambodia's rela,
tions with the West.
The campaign combines threats,
suggestions that neutrality
would have many advantages,
and frank efforts to associate
the USSR with the Arab cause.
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5 May 1955
The USSR has made several
gestures to strengthen its
position in the Near East since
the Soviet communique of 16
April which promised a "posi-
tive attitude" toward any
steps by Near Eastern countries
to adhere to the "five princi-
ples of coexistence" in their
relations with the USSR.
Radio Moscow, commemorat-
ing on 26 April the 35th anni-
versary of Kemal Ataturk's
proposal for establishing
relations with the USSR, quoted
Ataturk as having said that the
1921 Soviet-Turkish "Agreement
of Friendship and Brother-
liness" had brought only "good-
ness and benefits" to the
Turks. The broadcast, which
Tito Stalls on Closer
Military es West
In recent talks with the
British and American ambassa-
dors, Tito strongly emphasized
that Yugoslavia is not in-
terested in expanding its
military ties with the West at
this time. He said he wished
to continue co-operation with
the United States, but he told
British ambassador Roberts on
21 April. that he would give
up Western aid rather than
start military planning talks
now.
Yugoslav leaders admit
that Western requests for
greater Yugoslav military
was mild in comparison with
recent Soviet propaganda on
Turkey, noted that this belief
assumes special importance now,
"when relations between the
Soviet Union and Turkey are in
a state which makes their
adjustment desirable."
Following indications at
Bandung of the Communist bloc's
willingness to take an anti-
Israeli position in the Pales-
tine dispute, Soviet official-
dom thoroughly shunned the
national day reception given
by the Israeli ambassador in
Moscow on 27 April. This dis-
play of official Soviet antip-
athy to Israel cannot have been
lost on the Arab diplomatic
colony.
co-operation are justified,
but claim that these requests
pose a real political dilemma
for the regime. They fear
that further military ties
with the West would be incon-
sistent with Belgrade's long-
sought role of serving as a
bridge between East and West,
and providing leadership to
other countries detached from
iie power blocs.
Tito acknowledged that
his lessening interest in addi-
tional military planning with
the West results from an
obvious difference between
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Yugoslavia and the West in
appraising the world situa-
tion. He suggested that some
time this summer it would be
useful to hold a conference
between Yugoslavia and the
Western powers to discuss their
respective appraisals of the
situation.
The Yugoslavs believe
that world tensions have re-
laxed to such a degree that
efforts should now be con-
centrated on trying to solve
East-West problems by ne-
gotiations rather than by
buildi-ag up a "line of
bunkers."
Tito spoke of a "tech-
nical conference" with the
United States, by which he
probably meant a discussion
of Yugoslavia's previously
presented "shopping list" for
additional aid. He pressed
for such a. meeting soon despite
the American ambassador's in-
sistence that it would have
little point.
Tito promised to iron out
difficulties the United States
has encountered in supervising
distribution of goods under
its aid program in Yugoslavia.
His attitude suggested that he
wanted the present relationship
to continue, although without
enlargement in scope.
With his proposals for a
"situation appraisal." confer-
ence later, and a "technical
conference" now, Tito ap-
parently hopes to avoid for
the present Western pressure
for strengthening military
ties. He probably believes
that delay may allow world
tensions to abate sufficiently
to make the whole question
academic.
Should world tensions
again increase, the Yugoslavs
are probably confident that
their importance to the West'
would be great enough to en-
sure Western support whether
or not Yugoslavia makes further
commitments at this time.
For the present the Yugo-
slavs are probably content
with the security commitments
explicit in the Balkan al-
liance and implicit in their
military aid relationships
with the big Western powers.
Within the Balkan pact, they
have continued to improve
field-level co-operation with
the Greeks in their common
area of concern, but have
rejected further links to
NATO through the pact.
Italian Presidential Elections
The election on 29 April
of Giovanni Gronchi, 67-year-
old left-wing Christian Demo-
cratic president of the Chamber
of Deputies, as president of
Italy was a victory for the
parties of the left. The elec-
tion outcome was largely the
result of internal quarrels
within the Christian Democratic
Party, and is a severe blow to
the prestige of Premier Scelba,
and his center coalition gov-
ernment.
Gronchi's political career
goes back to 1919, when he was
one of the original leaders of
Don Sturzo's Popular Party,
the forerunner of the present
Christian Democratic Party.
He served in Mussolini's fix'st
government, but soon joined
the opposition and was expelled
from parliament in 1926. He
joined the Anti-Fascist Resist-
ance in 1942, and since World
War II has been a member of
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the National Council of the
Christian Democratic Party. He
was minister of industry and
commerce from 1944 to 1946, and
became president of the Chamber
of Deputies in 1948.
Gronchi represents those
who favor a government "opening
to the left." He has been a
consistent advocate of Christian
Democratic collaboration with
all "democratic" factions, in
which he would include the
Nenni Socialists. He has long
argued that the.way to reduce
Communist strength in Italy is
to undertake a vigorous and far-
reaching reform program.
The presidential election,
which Gronchi won on the fourth
ballot with 658 out of a possible
843 votes, revealed a deep split
within the Christian Democratic
Party.
The right and left fac-
tions of the party refused to
support the official party can-
didate, Senate president Mertl-
zagora, in the early ballots.
The Christian Democratic lead-
ership and some rightist ele-
ments finally threw their votes
to Gronchi in order to hide the
fact that otherwise he would
have been elected primarily by
Nenni Socialist and Communist
votes, Some 90 Christian Dem-
ocrats;apparently refused to
the very end to follow party
directives.
The Scelba cabinet will
submit its resignation on 12
May, when Gronchi is inaugu-
rated. Parliament is apparently
determined to get the govern-
ment off its present "dead
center" and to break the stale-
mate blocking implementation
of any effective program, and
it.may therefore decide on a
change of premier, looking
toward a shift either to the
left or the right.
Gronchi's personal choice
for premier would probably be
a Christian Democrat, perhaps
Budget Minister Ezio Vanoni,
whose economic plan the Nenni
Socialists have already of-
fered to support,
Other possible premiers
include Chiristian Democratic
Party president Zoli, a non-
controversial figure whose
selection would be considered
a temporary arrangement, and
former premier Pella, a right-
wing Christian Democrat, who
is generally regarded as a
temporizer.
In any case, the parlia-
ment's decision will almost
certainly be made strictly in
terms of domestic policies.
While the next government may
be somewhat to the left of
Scelba's, no change is antici~
pated in Italy's pro-Western
foreign policy.
Iceland Strike Settled
The settlement on 28 April The strike settlement,
of the 42-day-long strike of which was evidently brought
over 7,,000 Icelandic workers is on by the threat of a walkout
a political victory for the in refrigeration plants, pro-
Communists and left Socialist vides for a total wage increase
elements which dominated the of 16 percent.
strike. The wage increases
granted will probably start a The employers will pay
new inflationary spiral and 13 percent, including a 10
could lead to a devaluation of percent rise in the basic
Iceland's currency. hourly wage, while the national
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and local governments will con-
tribute 3 percent to the new
unemployment insurance fund
which the strike settlement
provides for. The new agree-
ments are valid until June
1956.
The settlement is a vic-
tory for the workers. The
unions initially demanded wage
increases of 30 to 40 percent,
but were reported prepared from
the start to accept about 15
percent. The employers insisted
until late April that they would
not go beyond 8 percent.
The Communists and the
left-wing Socialist leaders
of the Icelandic Federation
of Labor (IFL), who started
and controlled the strike ac-
tion, will be able to extract
much propaganda value from the
settlement. The general strike
of 1952, when the IFL was con-
trolled by the right-wing
Socialists, was settled by the
enactment of measures by the
government which reduced the
Guatemalan Regime Faces Serious
Economic and Political Proble-ms
Guatemala's continuing
economic difficulties and in-
ternal political rivalries are
undermining the popularity and
strength of President Castillo
Armas. Unless the government's
financial and political prob-
lems are eased in the near
future, Castillo's position
will deteriorate, and coups
may.be attempted.
A start toward economic
recovery evident early this year
was suddenly reversed in mid-
February with the drop in
world prices for coffee, which
has accounted for up to 80
percent by value of the coun-
try's exports in recent years.
cost of living by about 3 per-
cent, but without any actual
increase in wages.
The Communists will be
encouraged to capitalize on
their newly won prestige to
pursue their objective of
attempting to create a new
political bloc of all labor
elements under the aegis of
the IFL. Their ultimate ob-
jective is to gain control of
the government.
The new wage scales will
shortly become effective for
all workers in Iceland. With-
out additional government sub-
sidies, which do not now ap-
pear likely, these increases
will raise
the already high
production
costs.
Increased pressure
for
devaluation of the currency
in order to maintain
petitive position of
the com-
Icelandic
fish and fish products in world
markets is almost cer
tain to
follow.
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Unemployment remains high and
there are growing signs of
labor discontent.
The government, which has
pledged itself to do more in
two years than the previous
Communist-influenced govern-
ments did in ten, is in finan-
cial straits. Whereas the
Arbenz regime spent $90,000,000
during its last year in of-
fice, the Castillo government
is expected to be able to
budget only about $59,000,000
for the coming year. Ameri-
can grant aid thus far approved
in principle.-would raise the
total to about $72,000,000.
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Factionalism in the army
and government also hinder the
development of stable govern-
ment. Resentment is believed
to be still strong among regu-
lar army officers displaced
by veterans of Castillo's
"Army of Liberation," who now
hold most top military posi-
tions.
The "liberation" faction
also controls many high civil-
ian posts, and apparently as-
pires to even greater control.
Critical of Castillo's middle-
of-the-road policies, this
group has exerted strong pres-
sure on him to "clean up once
and for all" what it considers
potential centers of opposition
in the army and government.
During April there was
a marked increase in rumors
of serious divisions within
the government, and some evi-
dence that these rumors origi-
nated with the "liberation"
faction. This evidence of
growing suspicions and jeal-
ousies may presage a new gov-
ernment shake-up.
If rumors of unrest
continue to grow in intensity
and the economy remains de-
pressed, ambitious individ-
uals, within and outside the
administration, will probably
feel encouraged to plot Cas-
tillo's overthrow.
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PATTERNS AND PERSPECTIVES
THE EFFECT OF THE AUSTRIAN DEVELOPMENTS ON GERMANY
Chancellor Adenauer's pro-
Western policies will face a
severe test during coming months
as a result of the Soviet in-
itiative on an Austrian settle-
ment.
There has been no signifi-
cant growth of neutrality senti-
ment in West Germany. However,
plans for a German settlement
modifying Germany's position
within the Western defense al-
liance are being advanced in
West Germany and elsewhere in
Western Europe.
Bundestag leaders generally
feel the public recognizes the
vast differences between the
Austrian and German situations,
although there may be a small
rise in neutralist sentiment
if and when an Austrian treaty
is actually concluded.
Public attention in West
Germany is now fixed on the
terms for German unification
which Moscow may propose at the
hoped-for East-West conference
this summer. In previous con-
ferences the Soviet Union has
always been handicapped in its
efforts to sway German opinion
by the basic West German dis-
trust of the Kremlin's inten-
tions and declarations. An
Austrian settlement would modify
this distrust somewhat, since
it would be regarded as evi-
dence of Soviet willingness to
conclude agreements on major
European issues, perhaps even
such as would call for with-
drawals of Soviet troops.
In the Soviet-Allied strug-
gle over German unity and
neutrality, the fundamental
issues remain:(1) how an all-
German government should be
formed and (2) whether that
government should be free to
join alliances.
While all West German
political parties are at pres-
ent agreed that free elections
are indispensable as a first
step toward unification, there
is considerable disagreement
on the question of alliances.
Adenauer's Christian Democratic
Union is the only strong ad-
vocate of the principle that
freedom to join alliances must
be a condition for unity.
The opposition Social
Democrats have openly stated
that the Paris accords should
be bartered away at the next
four-power meeting, and that
neutrality should be accepted
in return for the holding of
free all-German elections.
There are indications that
some factions of the minor
coalition parties are sus-
ceptible to this argument.
Adenauer, speaking through
his personal envoy in London,
stated last wee', that in the
light of Austrian developments
and expected Soviet maneuvers,
the West cannot at the next
big-power meeting simply repeat
its 1954 demands for free
elections and freedom to form
alliances and hope to retain
the firm support of German
public opinion.
Adenauer fears that at
the four-power conference the
Soviet Union would ostensibly
accept the principle of free
elections as the first step
toward unification, hoping to
have it rejected because it
would be premised on Germany's
neutralization. A summary re-
jection of such a proposal
would put the onus on the West
for any failure of the confer-
ence and would gravely weaken
the chancellor's position.
The chancellor has sug-
gested that the West offer to
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include the Soviet Union and
its Satellites in a new security
system encompassing all of
Europe, Canada, and the United
States. The proposal calls for
arms limitation, inspection of
defense establishments, and a
system of nonaggression and
mutual assistance agreements.
West Germany's present NATO
commitments would not be af-
fected by the plan.
By offering guarantees
against future German aggres-
sion, Adenauer hopes to demon-
strate that the Soviet Union
has no valid excuse for in-
sisting on German neutrality,
and is only using the alliance
issue as a pretext for prevent-
ing German unification. To
his critics who claim the USSR
will never release East Germany
because East Germany would then
only be added to the Western
military potential, the chan-
cellor has already hinted that
the East zone should be demili-
tarized following unification.
Privately Adenauer and his
advisers state that unity is
probably unattainable at this
time. The chancellor believes
his government will be in a
better position to deal with
the problem of unification sev-
eral years hence when an East-
West detente may be possible.
Adenauer considers that
his most important task at
present is to get his country
firmly established within its
present alliances. He believes
that if he can win the 1957
federal elections, future ad-
ministrations will not attempt
to break these Western ties.
During the next several
months, Adenauer's policies
will undergo severe tests.
Not only will an Austrian
settlement create some public
confidence in Soviet proposals
at the projected conference,
but the ratification of the
Paris accords and the advent
of rearmament have already
occasioned something of a
now-or-never attitude on
unity in West Germany. In
addition, public opinion has
always been susceptible to
the idea of a neutrality
commitment in order to obtain
free elections.
The Bonn government, how-
ever, will probably not de-
viate from its present course
unless Moscow is willing to
accept virtually intact the
Western terms for unification.
The locus of power in the
Federal Republic remains fixed
in the hands of a government
leader who is determined to
avoid neutrality and whose
great popularity completely
eclipses that of any other
public figure. Public opinion
polls in 1954 showed that the
West German people were willing
to accept neutrality in ex-
change for free all-German
elections--but only on the
condition that the West guaran-
tee such an arrangement.
The West Germans continue
to assert that unity is Bonn's
foremost goal, but it is
apparent that they do not want
to risk their present security
to attain it. In a large meas-
ure the chief issue in the
Federal Republic is not unity,
but prosperity.
As long as the Adenauer
government makes reasonable
moves to counteract Moscow's
unity propaganda and there is
no drop in living standards,
the government will probably
be able to keep the nation
within its Western alliances.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
CHINESE COMMUNIST TACTICS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Chou En-lai's public com-
mitment at Bandung to peaceful
aims and methods strengthens
the probability that Peiping
will continue to emphasize the
conciliatory aspects of its
policies toward Southeast Asia.
In dealing with Southeast
Asia, Communist China has gen-
erally followed two parallel
lines: one has been concilia-
tory, featuring repeated dec-
larations of peaceful intentions
and a desire for normal rela-
tions with all the countries of
Asia; the other has'.been threat-
ening.
While it has increased its
military capabilities in South
China, Peiping has pointed out
the "dangers" of military
alliances among Asian nations,
particularly those including
Western powers. Communist
propaganda has singled out the
Thai government for criticism
as a puppet of American imperial-
ism, and last summer former
Thai premier Pridi Phanamyong,
now in exile in Peiping, was
permitted to broadcast this
theme over Peiping radio.
In recent weeks, Chinese
Communist propaganda has sup-
pressed the more threatening
aspects of the approach to
.Southeast Asia in favor of an
intensified attack on American
motives and intentions toward
the area.
The Afro-Asian conference
provided Premier Chou En-lai
with an excellent opportunity
to stress the conciliatory
aspects of Communist China's
policy.
In speeches to the con-
ference and in private state-
ments to Southeast Asian dele-
gates, Chou denied charges that
Communist China has designs on
Southeast Asia. He said in his
first speech that "China has
no intention whatever of
subverting the government of
its neighboring countries."
Chou made vigorous attempts
at Bandung to reassure the
Southeast Asian countries.
Even Thailand and the Philip-
pines, the most Western-
oriented of those countries,
were objects of these efforts.
Thailand and the Philippines
In his speech to the con-
ference on 23 April, Chou
said that fear of China on the
part of Thailand and the Philip-
pines was quite natural "since
we lack mutual understanding."
He added that "we have given
assurances to Prince Wan of
Thailand and General Romulo of
the Philippines that we will
not engage in any aggression
or make direct threats against
Thailand or the Philippines."
Viet Minh foreign minister
Pham Van Dong backed up Chou's
moves by agreeing on the re-
settlement of Vietnamese refu-
gees in northeast Thailand.
Chou invited representa-
tives of Thailand to visit
Yunnan Province to assure them-
selves that Peiping was not
permitting the training of a
guerrilla- force for the eventual
"liberation" of Thailand.
Prince Wan has indicated that
he cannot make the trip but
has not denied the possibility
that a delegation may be sent.
In spite of the fact that
the two countries "have no
common border," Chou also in-
vited a delegation from the
Philippines to visit Communist
China, especially Fukien and
Kwangtung Provinces, to see
that Communist China has no
aggressive intentions toward
the Philippines.
Indochina
Chou reiterated assurances
given at Geneva that Communist
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
China would not intervene in
the internal affairs of the
Indochinese states, mentioning
Laos and Cambodia specifically.
He was silent on Vietnam. He
said China's policy toward
these states was typical of its
policy toward all countries.
Both Nehru and Chou were
present when the delegations
BURMA
Pop. 18,300,000
Chinese 350,000
India indicated its inter-
est in Laos and Cambodia by
recognizing Cambodia last
December and sending a consul
general to Laos in January.
Nehru appears resigned to the
eventual absorption of South
Vietnam by North Vietnam as a
result of the elections sched-
uled to take place in July 1956.
DISTRIBUTION OF CHINESE IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA
The bar gran is divided nisi-l1, Into units proponionatp la he tol.i
popmetlon of the '"'Was and areas named. Dlmsione w,thin these units
shpt the percenUge .,,he population that is Chinese.
The Chinese population throughout the area is conceneated mostly in the
serge cities. the most important of which ere acceniM on In. map by larg.
colored dote.
All fIWres are epproaimete.
to RUNEI Popd
0600 Chinon 10,000
N.BORNEO
Pop. 330,000
Chinon MODD
of North Vietnam and Laos
reached their understanding
that the question of the Com-
munist-led Pathet Lao forces
would be considered an inter-
nal affair of Laos. Pham and
Laotian premier Katay expressed
the hope that the problem
could be settled in accordance
with the "five principles."
The presence of Nehru and Chou
suggests a tacit Indian-Chinese
Communist agreement on the
countries' interests in South-
east Asia,
INDONESIA
Pop. 79,000,000
Chinon 2,500,000
Indonesia
0 Chinese Nationalist Embassy
0 Chinese Communist Embassy
. Chinese Communist Consulate
S Bank of China Branch
Chou pointed out to other
Southeast Asian countries what
he said were the advantages of
the treaty on dual nationality
which was concluded between
China and Indonesia during the
Afro-Asian conference. It was
hinted that other countries
with substantial Chinese minor-
ities might obtain similar
agreements if they recognized
Communist China.
After'Bandung, Chou remain-
ed in Indonesia on a two-day
MALAYA!
\ K.mlour
THAILAND
Pop. 18,500,000 MALAYA
Chine> 3,000,000 ,300,
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY SUMMARY
5 May 1955
state visit during which he was
accorded unusual honors. Chou
and President Sukarno signed
a joint statement affirming
the "five principles" of co-
existence, thus associating
Indonesia with India and Burma,
which arrived at similar under-
standings with Peiping last
summer.
The Chou-Sukarno statement
included a declaration of the
"inalienable right" of any
people "to safeguard their
sovereignty and territorial
integrity."
Burma
Peiping apparently also
improved its relationship with
Burma during the conference.
Chou stayed in Rangoon both
going to and coming from Bandung,
and talked at length with
Premier U Nu.
Chou's conciliatory atti-
tude appears to have lulled the
suspicions of some of the Ban-
dung delegates whose governments
have been most hostile to .
Peiping. Both Prince Wan and
General Romulo have testified
to their belief in Chou's
"sincerity." They were also
made to feel that Chou's
apparent relaxation of his
position on the Formosa issue
was due in part to efforts by
themselves and other Asian
states to seek a peaceful
solution to the problem. The
premiers of Laos, Pakistan, and
Ceylon-expressed similar sen-
timents.
Chou's public commitment
at Bandung to peaceful aims and
methods increases the likelihood
that Peiping will continue to
be cautious in its policies
toward Southeast Asia in order
to avoid alienating any sub-
stantial portion of Asian
opinion. Communist China is
likely to rely primarily on
normal diplomatic procedures in
dealing with those countries
with which it has formal rela-'
tions and to continue efforts
to establish such relations
with other countries.
Peiping's assistance to
North Vietnam provides an
opportunity for indirect Chinese
influence ' is the adjacent areas
of South Vietnam, Laos,. and
Cambodia. For example, direct
aid to North Vietnam facilitates
Viet Minh support of Pathet Lao
activities in northern Laos.
Chinese Communist encouragement
of subversion in other parts of
Indochina will probably also
come through the agency of the
Viet Minh. Thailand is also
susceptible to subversion
through Communist-supported
forces in Laos.
Even in areas of Southeast
Asia which are hostile to
Communist China, it is likely
that Peiping will limit itself
to promoting Communist objectives
covertly through indigenous
movements in order to deflect
charges of interference in the
internal affairs ox otner
countries.
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