CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000300060001-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 6, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 4, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

4 June 1954
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
LDOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. Cf IANG U lO TS S
NEXT REVIEW DATE.
REVIEWER: I
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE~Ija
S
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co noP411Al OCI NO. 6553
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared prima-
rily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency.
It does not represent a complete coverage of all current
situations. Comments and conclusions represent the im-
mediate appraisal of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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4 June 54
THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
CAPABILITIES OF THAI ARMED FORCES LIMITED TO MAINTENANCE
OF INTERNAL SECURITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 9
The Thai armed forces are capable of little more
than maintaining internal security. Involvement of the
high command in politics, lack of experience in modern
warfare, and a serious shortage of trained personnel
are the primary obstacles to their improvement.
ARGENTINA GROWS RESTIVE ABOUT ITS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH
THE UNITED STATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 11
Argentina's hopes that substantial economic assist-
ance will result from its year-old rapprochement with
the United States are waning. While Buenos Aires has
as yet given no sign of returning to its earlier sharp
antagonism toward Washington, it has thus far reserved
its position on the Guatemalan crisis.
DEVELOPING INDEPENDENCE IN GOLD COAST POSES NEW AFRICAN
PROBLEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . Page l:,
The anti-Communist government of Britain's African
Gold Coast colony faces in mid-June its first general
election under virtual self-government. Overwhelming
endorsement of Prime Minister Nkrumah is anticipated.
SYRIAN FACTIONALISM INVITES A LEFTIST-MILITARY COUP . . Page 15
The fumbling efforts of Syrian politicians to organ-
ize a strong conservative parliamentary regime enhance
the possibility of a leftist-military coup.
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THE RISING STATUS OF THE UKRAINE . . . . . . . . . . . Page 16
Recent months have witnessed a significant rise in
the prestige of the Ukraine. The fact that this shift
has accompanied the rising fortunes of Khrushchev sug-
gests that it may be partially attributed to his per-
sonal influence.
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The proposals advanced by the Communists at Geneva during
the second week of restricted sessions on Indochina were elabora-
tions of their first week's positions. Their tactics continued
to indicate a belief that time is on their side and that a combi-
nation of internal pressure in France and military pressure in
Indochina would force the French government toward the Communist
position. While maintaining the stand that the military and
political aspects of an Indochina settlement are inseparable and
that Laos and Cambodia must also be included in a settlement, the
Communists were seeking to keep alive Western hopes for an accept-
able solution by making small concessions.
Moscow and Peiping expressed their satisfaction with an
agreement reached on 29 May that, in order to facilitate an "early
and simultaneous cessation of hostilities," representatives of
the two commands meet at Geneva and in the field to "study the
disposition of forces" to be made following a cease-fire, "begin-
ning with the question of regrouping areas in Vietnam." The
Soviet radio observed subsequently that the conference had "passed
its first milestone on the road to restoring peace in Indochina."
Communist terms for a cease-fire at these meetings of mili-
tary representatives are expected to be stiff. The Communists
will almost certainly cite two phrases in the 29 May agreement--
"early and simultaneous cessation of hostilities" and "beginning
with the question of...Vietnam"--as a basis for insisting that
the cease-fire include arrangements for Laos and Cambodia. While
continuing to leave open the possibility of an armistice without
a simultaneous political settlement, the Communists have not sug-
gested that they are prepared to accept a simple cease-fire and
partition at this time. On the contrary, TASS on 28 May repeated
Molotov's earlier statement that "at least some" political prob-
lems must be connected with a cease-fire.
A curious sidelight on the relations among top Soviet lead-
ers was provided last week. The Soviet censor passed a New York
Times dispatch which, while stressing the important role o co -
le ctive leadership on the highest level in the USSR, stated that
there can be no doubt that party secretary Khrushchev holds the
biggest single job in the USSR and implied that Khrushchev's role
overshadows Malenkov's within the collective.
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Moscow radio announced on 27 May a change in the administra-
tion of the Soviet Petroleum Industry from all-Union to Union-
Republic status and the establishment of a Petroleum Ministry in
the Azerbaijan Republic. Union-Republic Ministries for Coal and
Ferrous Metallurgy have been established in the Ukraine and one
for Nonferrous.: Metallurgy in Kazakh.
The motivation for these changes appears to have been ex-
pressed in a speech by Khrushchev on 23 February when he spoke of
the need to bring administration close to production in other
fields. Thus, it appears that the present Soviet administration
has, at least in part, modified a heretofore basic tenet of organ-
iza:tibnc ;.which called for direct subordination to Moscow of im-
portant heavy industrial enterprises,
There was additional evidence in statements by Satellite
leaders that their countries are experiencing greater difficul-
ties in implementing their new economic courses than were con-
sidered-likely when the programs were adopted. These difficulties
have made it unlikely that the Satellites will be able to over-
come their shortages of agricultural and consumer goods by the
end of 1955 and could force the extension of the new course into
the 1956-60 five-year plan period. Such a stretch-out would re-
quire the continued diversion of human and material resources to
agriculture and consumer goods sectors and would prolong the slow
rate of growth of heavy industry.
International Communist propaganda, indicating Soviet support
for the Arbenz regime in Guatemala, has reiterated its line of
late 1953 that the United States is "calling openly for interven-
tion in Guatemala" and has conspired with that country's neighbors
for this purpose. Izvestia specifically noted that the US is "air-
lifting weapons to Honduras and Nicaragua," A critical book
review in the May 1954 issue of Kommunist and a 10 May Pravda
article on Latin America by Otto Kuusinen underline the imp ro tance
which the USSR attributes to Latin America. Kommunist, the theo-
retical journal of the party central committee, noted that the
book under review had underestimated the ability of the Latin
American countries to resist United States control and the neces-
sity of enlisting the support of the national bourgeoisie in
opposing imperialism. The book had also failed to emphasize suf-
ficiently the role of the political strike in promoting united
front solidarity, The Pravda article,which was propagandistic
in character, was a rehash of the usual charges of the United
States policy of economic and political control of Latin American
countries which, it was claimed, was a failure.
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4 June 54
CAPABILITIES OF THAI ARMED FORCES LIMITED
TO MAINTENANCE OF INTERNAL SECURITY
Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia unreservedly
willing to join in collective defense of the area, but its
armed forces are capable of little more than maintaining in-
ternal security. Obstacles to their improvement include the
involvement of the high command in politics, lack of experience
in modern warfare, and a serious shortage of trained personnel.
The army, which numbers 57,000, has been undergoing moderni-
zation and reorganization since 1950 with the help of an Ameri-
can military advisory group. Under an expanded American aid
program, now in the planning stages, it would be increased to
90,000. American equipment and supplies are being provided
for the equivalent of nine regimental combat teams and supporting
elements.
The potential of the Thai soldier was demonstrated in Korea,
but the army suffers from important defects.
Most of the army's leaders retain outmoded
concepts of organization and tactics, and their deep involvement
in politics leaves them little time to devote to strictly
military matters.
Another weakness is the serious lack of qualified junior
officers and enlisted cadres, a defect which is aggravated by
emphasis on political connections rather than merit as the
criterion for advancement. Other problems include overcentralized
control, lack of adequate training facilities, and the reluctance
of senior officers to entrust individual soldiers with the
equipment essential to their training.
The Thai air force is probably the best of the indigenous
air forces in Southeast Asia. Three F8F fighter squadrons,
trained and equipped by the United States, give it an estimated
ground support capability of from 35 to 40 sorties per day,
but it lacks any strategic capability. The absence of a co-
ordinated air defense plan, a lack of radar, and the concentra-
tion of most of the planes at Bangkok render the country highly
vulnerable to enemy air attacks.
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The air force also suffers from involvement in politics.
Its chief serves concurrently as minister of communications,
and, despite his responsibilities, he reportedly insists on
making even routine administrative decisions personally, to
the detriment of the development of his subordinates.
The navy'has been in political eclipse since it spear-
headed an abortive coup attempt in June 1951 and is of little
significance. A large part of the fleet is obsolete, and
its ability in case of attack even to carry out its limited
mission of securing the Gulf of Siam is considerably in doubt.
The 40,000-man police force, under the leadership of
the politically powerful General Phao, is a paramilitary
organization and has primary responsibility for patrolling
Thailand's borders. Equipped with small arms and light armored
vehicles, the police are well trained, and their morale is
probably better than that of the regular armed forces. Their
numbers are inadequate, however, to carry out the mission
assigned.
Because of their significance in internal politics,
Thailand's armed forces are concentrated in the Bangkok area.
In view of the country's inadequate road net, it is questionable
whether the high command could put the majority of its forces
in the field before a Communist invasion force had achieved
a deep penetration of Thai territory.
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4 June 54
ARGENTINA GROWS RESTIVE ABOUT ITS RAPPROCHEMENT WITH THE
UNITED STATES
Argentina's hopes that substantial economic assistance
will result from its year-old rapprochement with the United
States are waning. Argentine officials are seriously alarmed
by the prospect of "dumped" American agricultural surpluses
displacing Argentine exports vital to the country's economy.
Though Buenos Aires has given no sign of returning to its
earlier sharp antagonism toward Washington, it has also given
no indication of the attitude it would adopt if the present
Guatemalan crisis were brought before the Organization of
American States.
When President Peron expressed to Ambassador Nufer in
February 1953 a strong desire for better relations with the
United States, and later sent fulsome promises of support
through Dr. Milton Eisenhower, a primary motive was the hope
of encouraging substantial American private investment and the
extension of long-term credit for capital goods. Argentina
considers both of these essential for providing the agricultural
and industrial equipment needed to increase production enough
to support the country's rapidly expanding population and
arrest the basic economic decline of the past several years.
Argentina also hoped that American import restrictions would
be sufficiently relaxed to let it earn more dollars.
The hope for considerable American capital have not
materialized, and the possibility of new American import re-
strictions have made Argentina fear that its limited ability to
purchase American equipment may be reduced even further. Buenos
Aires trade circles are still complaining about the limitation
on the import of Argentine oats suddenly imposed last December
when contracts in excess of this ceiling had already been
signed. They are now worried about rumors of new import re-
strictions on tung oil and the danger of a renewed effort in
the United States to raise the tariff on wool, Argentina's
chief dollar earner.
Argentina feels even greater apprehension regarding the
disposal of large American agricultural surpluses in countries
it regards as among its own normal markets. The gift of
700,000 tons of wheat to Pakistan last summer forestalled an
impending Argentine deal to barter wheat for much-needed jute.
Another deal was blocked by a later sale of American linseed
oil to Britain below cost. Trade journals have also criticized
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the use of American wheat surpluses to pay military defense
costs in Spain and Japan, seeing this as a long-term threat
to Argentine exports and to world price levels.
Argentina's growing disappointment over the prospects
for closer American co-operation in solving its pressing finan-
cial difficulties is, according to the American embassy, being
reflectdd in a shift of more trade to Western Europe and the
USSR. Argentina is now more actively considering highly com-
petitive bids from Western European firms, usually aided by
their governments, to supply essential capital goods on long-
term credit terms. Buenos Aires is also considering offers
of capital goods from the Orbit, which has sharply increased
its purchases of Argentine agricultural surpluses.
Meanwhile, Argentina's international payments difficulties
have been reflected in domestic inflation, and a series of
large slowdown strikes for higher wages that started in late
April and is still continuing. With the government thus under
intensifying economic pressures, there have been persistent
rumors in Buenos Aires of impending deterioration in relations
with the United States. Peron assured Nufer in early May
that there was no basis for these rumors; but various other
officials, including Foreign Minister Remorino, a main pro-
ponent of the American-Argentine rapprochement, are known to
be questioning the value of this policy.
Argentina's fears over the threat to its vitally important
agricultural export markets will probably be well aired at
the inter-American economic conference in November. Interim
developments will probably determine whether Argentine speeches
there will be confined to the usual strong demand for "parity"
prices for raw materials or expanded to charge the United
States with neglecting economic co-operation with Latin America.
More immediately, Argentina's economic anxieties may
influence its position on the Guatemala crisis. Thus far, even
the press has been unusually sparing of comment. Argentina,
however, is traditionally sensitive about "intervention" ana,
until last year's rapprochement with Washington, frequently
expressed support for Guatemala.'s resistance to "foreign
imperialism." Any resumption of its pre-1953 pose of defending
Latin American economic interests against the United States
could easily be accompanied by a reversion to Argentina's
earlier position on Guatemala, particularly since considerable
sympathy for Guatemala already exists in much of South America.
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DEVELOPING INDEPENDENCE IN GOLD COAST POSES NEW AFRICAN PROBLEMS
The anti-Communist government of Britain's African Gold
Coast colony faces in mid-June its first general election under
virtual self-government. Overwhelming endorsement of Prime Min-
ister Nkrumah is anticipated. The Gold Coast experiment, which
is being closely watched by most of Africa, may in time produce
the first native African dominion in the British Commonwealth.
Constitutional reforms approved by Britain this spring give
the Gold Coast an all-African elective assembly, an African cabi-
net with complete responsibility, and a privy council to advise
the governor, whose authority will be confined to defense, foreign
affairs, the British UN trusteeship of Togoland, and certain po-
lice matters.
Prime Minister Nkrumah, leader of the Convention People's
Party,has been in power since 1951, and the Gold Coast masses
look upon him as almost a messiah. Only the traditional chiefs
and a few intellectuals offer weak opposition. Under universal
suffrage the incumbents 'are expected to win an overwhelming
majority in the 104-seat legislature.
Once under suspicion because of his leftist past, Nkrumah
now seems firmly committed to a pro-Western orientation. However,
his denunciation in February of Communists in the government and
of subversive literature was in part motivated by the threat to
his own control of the labor movement posed by the influence of
the Communist WFTU.
Fabulously high cocoa prices have brought unprecedented
prosperity to the area, which has a one-crop economy, and ensured
the farmer's loyalty. Nkrumah's close party control has prevented
the growth of any other opposition. From 1951' the party has capi-
talized on the popular demand for independence, but after this
goal is attained the lack of any other program may cause the party
to split into factions. The level of political experience is
generally low and a development of a sense of Gold Coast nation-
hood and attainment of civil service integrity will be necessary
to assure the state's political stability.
Although Britain, on its own initiative, has brought the Gold
Coast close to independence, ultimate accession to dominion status
presumably will to some extent depend on the acquiescence of the
independent members of the Commonwealth. The admission of India,
Pakistan and Ceylon has already destroyed the formerly exclusively
white character of the dominions. South Africans have violently
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criticized the idea of dominion status for the Gold Coast. They
view the approaching independence of,the area as a challenge to
their claim to leadership of the African continent and as a prece-
dent threatening their own existence.
France and Belgium also feel that their interests are endan-
gered by Britain's policy. They fear that Gold Coast independence
would be a challenge to their own colonial policies and their hold
over rich African territories. Pan-Africanism is a developing
force, and Nkrumah is its symbol. Even in some of the most re-
mote areas, Africans are interested in the Gold Coast and many of
the rising native politicians see Nkrumah as a great leader. A
regional conference for West African nationalists held under
Nkrumah's leadership in Kumasi in December caused the French con-
siderable concern because they fear the presence of an independent
state on the borders of French West Africa.
Gold Coast independence would also be a problem for the United
Nations because of the necessary revision of the trusteeship agree-
ment affecting British Togoland and the eventual disposition of
this area. Togoland is to vote in this election. A major party
victory there would encourage the party to demand the complete in-
tegration of Togoland with the Gold Coast. If this were followed
by agitation from the Gold Coast for the association of French
Togoland also, a strong French reaction in the Trusteeship Coun-
cil could be expected.
Development of Gold Coast independence. is a calculated risk
for Britain. It could encourage a pan-African movement to expel
the white man from Africa, The British hope, however, that it
will lead, instead, to a decrease in racial strife and a restora-
tion of the African's faith in the white man's intentions,
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SYRIAN FACTIONALISM INVITES A LEFTIST-MILITARY COUP
The fumbling efforts of Syrian politicians to organize a
strong conservative parliamentary regime enhance the possibil-
ity of a leftist-military coup. Even if this danger frightens
the politicians into unity, the result will at best be a fragile
coalition.
The politicians are united only in their opposition to hav-
ing any more regimes like that of former dictator Shishakli.
They show little evidence, however, of unity on specific civilian
alternatives. Neither major party--Nationalist or Populist--
appears capable of winning a decisive victory in elections origi-
nally promised for June, and which have variously been reported
as postponed until July, August, or even October.
The two parties are vaguely committed to joint action. They
have failed, however, to agree to bring former president Quwatli
back from Cairo as a presidential candidate, and have made little
progress in drawing up a common slate of electoral candidates.
There are increasing rumors that the present transitional. govern-
ment of Nationalists, Populists, and independents will be replaced
by a neutral cabinet for the remainder of the pre-election period.
The politicians fear that radical socialists, supported by
military partisans, will attempt to seize power. This threat comes
from the leader of the Arab Socialist-Resurrectionist Party, -
Akran Hawrani--a skilled politician and an experienced conspirator.
Hawrani's efforts to achieve strong representation in the cabinet
have been supported by Assistant Chief of Staff Malki, who is the
popular leader of one of the army's factions.
Hawrani also has the support of Captain Mustafa Hamdun, who
played a major role in the overthrow of Shishakli on 25 February
and who has a well-knit group of 30 junior officers behind him.
Fear of a leftist-military coup may galvanize the politicians
into collaborating effectively enough to dominate the elections
and ensure the continuance of the present .setup... At best, this
will give Syria a civilian government without a policy.In the light
of Syria's chaotic parliamentary experience--and without full army
subordination to civilian rule--such political weakness seems to be
an invitation for a military coup.
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THE RISING STATUS OF THE UKRAINE
Recent months have witnessed a significant rise in the
prestige of the Ukraine to a position close to that of the
Great Russian Republic (RSFSR) It-is probably largely
intended to mend the Kremlin's relations with the Ukraine--
next to the RSFSR, the largest and most highly industrialized
of the Soviet republics--which has always been an area of
potential disaffection.
While this readjustment may be partially explained by the
general re-examination of Soviet policy following Stalin's death,
it has not been accompanied by an over-all relaxation of Soviet
nationalities policy. It seems, indeed, somewhat inconsistent
with the relatively harsh attitude toward the ,national minori-
ties which the regime resumed after Beria's purge.
The rise in the prestige of the Ukraine has centered on
the celebration of the 300th anniversary of its reunification
with Russia. This occasion was extensively celebrated by all
the Soviet Republics and in general received more attention
over a longer period of time than the observance of any other
anniversary in recent years. Announcement of the celebration
was made in December 1953, and an official statement on the
history of Ukrainian-Great Russian relations was issued last
January by the all-Union Central Committee. The anniversary
was climaxed by a jubilee session of the Ukrainian Supreme
Soviet on 23 May, followed by a similar meeting in the RSFSR
on the 29th.
Propaganda surrounding the event stressed the great and
long friendship of the Ukraine and Russia as.ani outstanding
example of the invincibility and superiority of the Soviet
family of nations. This constant association of the Ukraine and
Great Russia as "the two great Slavic nations" tended to give
the Ukraine a privileged status among the republics,
An outstanding concrete gesture to honor the Ukraine, made
in connection with the anniversary, was the dramatic cession of
the entire Crimean area by the RSFSR to the Ukraine. In
addition to having a certain economic rationale, the move
raises the standing of the Ukraine, for never before has any
territorial readjustment between republics involved the ceding
of any substantial portion of land by the Great Russian
Republic.
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A further significant event was the renaming of the
Ukrainian party buro in October 1953. In a move limited as yet
to the Ukraine, the buro was changed to a "presidium," par-
alleling the current nomenclature on the all-Union level.
The fact that the shift in the Ukraine's status has accom-
panied and supported the rising fortunes of N. S. Khrushchev
suggests that it::may be partially attributed to his personal
influence. Khrushchev served as first secretary of the
Ukrainian party from 1938 to 1949--with the exception of a nine-
month period in 1947--and he could be expected to havea keen
awareness of the problems and importance of that region.
Furthermore, he probably continues to exercise considerable
personal influence in the Ukraine, and an increase in the ,
prestige of the area redounds to his own personal advantage.
Thus the recent Ukrainian Supreme Soviet meeting also brought
Khrushchev't1 greatest degree of personal publicity accorded to
any living Soviet leader since the inauguration of the collective
leadership theme.
The appointment, in the past eight months, of several men
with Ukrainian experience to leading posts in the USSR has also
served both to enhance the status of the Ukraine and to Place
Khrushchev's associates in key positions. Appointees of this
type include V. P. Mzhavanadze, who was made first secretary of
the Georgian Republic in September 1953, and L. R. Korniets, who
became minister of agricultural procurement. in November 1953.
The probable elevation of Kirichenko, the present first
secretary in the Ukraine, to alternate membership in the all-
Union party presidium, if verified, would be a striking example
of these mutually beneficial personnel shifts. Besides raising
a long-time Khrushchev associate to this important body, it
puts a man there who has been connected with the Ukraine
throughout his career.
These appointments and the current propaganda gestures
toward the Ukraine suggest that it may play a role reminiscent
of that played by Georgia under the Stalin regime.
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