CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79-00927A000100240001-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 21
• Document Creation Date: December 19, 2016
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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OCI NO. 0889
13 November 1953
CURRENT
INTELLIGENCE
WEEKLY
DOCUMENT^;O.
NO CHANGE I," CLASS.
! DEGLAS&IIGD
CLASS. CHA^ ;GSD TO: TS S J
NEXT HEVILW DATE: AUTH:
DATE. _ REVIEWER:. 25X1
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIA and DOS review(s)
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Nw VOW
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECT-
ING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WITHIN THE MEANING OF T:HE ESPIONAGE LAWS,
TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMIS-
SION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO
AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
The Current Intelligence Weekly has been prepared pri-
marily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence
Agency. It does not represent ,s complete coverage of
all current situations. Comments and conclusions rep-
resent the immediate appraisal of the Office of Current
Intelligence.
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THE SOVIET WORLD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 4
PROSPECTS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE . . . , . . . . . Page 5
Developments in the Palestine area point to a con-
tinuation of the present tension. Israel apparently is
willing to risk war in order to force the Arabs to nego-
tiate a peace which would end their political and eco-
nomic boycott.
FACTORS THREATENING FRANCE'S INDOCHINA POLICY . , . . . Page 8
France's present Indochina policy was reconfirmed
by the National Assembly largely for lack of an accept-
able alternative, but domestic pressures continue to
build up for some other solution relieving France of its
responsibility.
THE PROSPECTS FOR A JAPANESE DEFENSE BUILD-UP . . . . . Page 10
Japan has clearly indicated its unwillingness for
economic reasons to assume immediately the burden of
increased rearmament, but domestic; factors may even-
tually bring about a change in the government's attitude.
ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST BANKS IN SOUTHERN ASIA
VALUABLE. O PEIPING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 12
Branches of Peiping's Bank of China in southern
Asia have been extremely useful in extending Chinese
Communist influence in that area.
WEST BERLIN'S SECURITY PROBLEM . . . . . . . . . . . . Page 14
There have been few changes directly affecting the
security of West Berlin since January 1953. Nevertheless
the Communists' greater ability to isolate the city with-
out disadvantages to themselves and the death of Mayor
Reuter have contributed to a growing uneasiness there.
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F77 I 'Wimp'
SPECIAL ARTICLE. COMMUNISM IN THE LATIN AMERICAN
REPUBLICS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a . . . Page 17
Expanding diplomatic and commercial relations with
the Orbit, together with the greater attention given
Latin America by international Communist front organi-
zations, are symptomatic of a situation in Latin America
favorable to the growth of Communist parties,
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THE SOVIET WORLD
Ambassador Bohlen, commenting on Voroshilov's speech on
the anniversary of the October Revolution, noted that its
tone was sharper than utterances during the spring and early
summer by Soviet leaders, and that it omitted the previous
statement that there were no international questions in dis-
pute which could not be settled by agreement. However, in
Bohlen 's opinion the speech contained no specific threat of
Soviet action.
Voroshilov presented the standard picture of a peace-
loving Soviet Union versus an imperialist camp headed by the
United States, and left a generally discouraging impression
as to the possibilities for settling outstanding issues in
the immediate future. The speech continued the strong propa-
ganda build-up of Communist China 'which has been characteristic
of the post-Stalin era. This description of Communist China
as a world power is unquestionably part of Moscow's attempts
to flatter Peiping at no great expense.
Regarding the Korean political conference, Voroshilov
furnished additional evidence of Communist unwillingness to
accept UN recommendations on the composition question. He
also gave the customary harangue on the West's policy of re-
arming Germany.
In line with Voroshilov's appeal to French fear of German
rearmament, Soviet ambassador Vinogradov in a recent conver-
sation in Paris with the French ambassador to the USSR
repeated his earlier views that the Soviet Union and France
have a common interest in preventing German remilitarization
and should consequently exchange views on the German problem.
Vinogradov, in contrast to his position last summer, appeared
to expect the ratification of the EDC treaty by the French'
parliament.
Tito's congratulatory telegram to Voroshilov and the
attendance of high Yugoslav officials at a Soviet reception
in Belgrade to celebrate the revolution anniversary have no
precedent during recent years, but indicate no basic change
in Belgrade's policy toward the USSR. The Yugoslav actions
rather reflect the recent normalization of diplomatic rela-
tions with the Soviet government and may also be linked to
the Trieste dispute as a timely warning to the West that*
Belgrade intends to retain its independence and initiative in
international affairs. Recent Yugoslav radio broadcasts have
asserted that this year's October Revolution slogans were
"formulated by Kremlin bureaucrats," and have been particularly
derisive of the Soviet foreign policy, themes.
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'"'W SECRET' INOW
PROSPECTS IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI DISPUTE
Developments in the Palestine area point to a continuation
of the present tension (see map, p. 7). Israel apparently is
willing to risk war in order to force the Arabs to negotiate a
peace which would end their political and economic boycott.
The Arabs are unlikely to resort to war, but further border
troubles, particularly if these follow Security Council deci-
sions unpalatable to the Arab world, will strengthen their
bitterness toward the West.
The sudden increase in the last two months of border inci-
dents provoked by Israel seems partially due to the Ben-Gurion
government's irritation over the increasing effectiveness of
the Arabs' political and economic boycott. Iraq's refusal to
open the Kirkuk-Haifa pipeline, Egypt's continued restrictions
on Suez Canal shipping bound for Israel, and the Arab screening
of goods from Cyprus and other transit points, coupled with
increased Arab threats against Western firms dealing with Israel,
have all helped intensify Israel's economic difficulties.
The most serious development this year from the Israeli
viewpoint is the American effort to reduce Middle East tensions
by putting aid to the Arab countries more or less on a par with
that given Israel. Rumors that the United States and Britain
might provide arms to the Arabs, specifically Syria and Iraq,
have increased Israel's fears of being put at a disadvantage.
On 4 November, about three weeks after the Qibya raid, an
American army attache in Amman, pointing to the call-up of addi-
tional reserves and the build-up of gasoline stocks, reported
that an Israeli attack on Jordan was possible because of the
army's desire for open hostilities with, the Arab Legion. A
similar interpretation had been made in earlier reports by
American officials.
The American charge in Tel Aviv believes that the basic
motivation behind Israel's sudden commencement of the upper
Jordan diversion project was to forestall the American-
proposed "TVA" plan by arousing the Arabs' opposition to the
point where they would oppose any scheme involving Israel. He
also believes that the purpose of the raid against Qibya was to
create such turmoil that the UN Security Council would become
involved and urge, among other things, a negotiated Arab-Israeli
peace,
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The impending retirement of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion
offers no immediate prospect for a more moderate Israeli policy
toward the Arab states. Eshkol and Lavon, the two leading can-
didates for the premiership, are known as loyal supporters of
the strong-willed Ben-Gurion, while the more moderate Foreign
Minister Sharett, who has at times differed with Ben-Gurion, is
not believed by the embassy in Tel Aviv to have much chance of
succeeding him;
Arab countermoves to Israeli maneuvers seem to be primarily
defensive. Nevertheless, the deployment of a considerable por-
tion both of the Syrian army and Jordan's Arab Legion near the
frontier area increases the risk of conflict with the Israelis.
Popular resentment in Jordan over the Legion's failure to prevent
the Qibya attack makes it more difficult for Jordanian commanders
to avoid armed action in the event of future incidents along the
frontier or in the Mt. Scopus area near Jerusalem.
Arab reaction to recent developments points to increasing
bitterness toward the United States. There has been biting press
criticism of Washington's decision to renew aid to the Ben-Gurion
government. The Arabs also continue to insist that Israel agree
to the repatriation of the refugees from Palestine. The recent
statement by General Nagib of Egypt that the United States is
morally responsible for the refugees suggests that this problem
likewise will invite further criticism even from friendly Arab
leaders. Conferences between Arab leaders and Eric Johnston
regarding the US-sponsored "TVA" project reveal generally a
strong, if polite, opposition to a scheme involving cooperation
with Israel.
Reaction within Israel to the UN Security Council discussions
and to the border situation suggests that Ben-Gurion or any likely
successor will continue pressure on the Arab states for a peace
settlement to end the political and economic boycott. Having had
some success in achieving local objectives on the Jordan River
diversion project and in the El Auja neutral zone on the Egyptian
frontier, Israel may be expected to continue its program of
strengthening its defenses and its economy even at the risk of
outright war.
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Neutral
fff
Ain f
Ghadya
Some boundaries shown on this map
are de facto boundaries (1953), not
necessarily recognized as del nitive
by the United States Gor-ernn, t.
Gulf
of
Aqaba
(SAUDI ARABIA1'?,,
35
ISRAEL *
RECENT
ISRAELI BORDER
ACTIVITY
1 Sept. - 4 Nov.
1953
International boundary
---- Armistice line
National capital
0 10 20 30 40
Statute Miles
0 10 20 30 40
Kilometers
* THE FRONTIERS OF ISRAEL SHOWN HERE ARE
THOSE TEMPORARILY ESTABLISHED BY THE
GENERAL ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
ISRAEL AND THE SEVERAL ARAB STATES. THE.
FINAL INTERNATIONAL STATUS OF JERUSA-
LEM HAS NOT YET BEEN DECIDED BY THE
U.N.
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SECRET
FACTORS THREATENING FRANCE'S INDOCHINA POLICY
The Vietnamese reservations on French Union ties and the
Soviet hints of a five-power settlement on Southeast Asia, let
fall in Moscow's 3 November note, are additional latent
threats to the continuation of France's present Indochina
policy,
The National Assembly recently reconfirmed this policy
largely because no acceptable alternative was in sight, and its
preoccupation with hopes for a negotiated peace explains the
Laniel government's presentation of the Navarre plan as a means
of inducing the Viet-Minh to ask for negotiations.
Following the Indochina debate of 28 October, the National
Assembly rejected motions by both Communists and Socialists
for immediate negotiations. It accepted by 315 to 251 a
government-supported resolution calling for the development of
native armies to relieve the French forces, efforts to reach
a general peace in Asia by negotiation, a sharing of France's
burden among the free nations, and continued adherence of the
Associated States to the French Un:Lon, While this represents
no change in official policy, the premier's repeated emphasis
on France's willingness to negotiate whenever the Viet-Minh
seeks talks is stronger than any similar statement since the.
Indochina war began.
It is evident that hopes for early negotiations with the
Viet-Minh are unrealistic, since there is no prospect of a
decisive French military victory in the near future. The
Navarre plan does, however, offer aL feasible program for the
gradual replacement of French troops by Associated States forces,
possibly by 1954-55. Unless political bickering disturbs the
development of this potential, General Navarre may then be able
to repatriate a large number of French troops.
An inherent weakness of the government's present policy,
however, lies in the announced intention to seek negotiations
through military success. Such a policy runs the risk both of
encouraging the Viet-Minh to hold on militarily until French
patience is exhausted, and, if an extended armistice were
concluded, of giving the Viet-Minh an opening to take over by
political means. The growing emphasis on negotiations also
tends to hamper a cooperative military effort by arousing
Vietnamese distrust of French intentions. On the other hand,
gains in military strength by the Vietnamese -- which have
thus far been slow -- tend to give them the ability to take a
strong stand against any negotiations with Ho Chi Minh.
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SECRET
The responsible French press is already discussing
alternative courses for the government if the Navarre plan
does not better the French position sufficiently to permit
a phased military withdrawal. These alternatives are to seek
direct American participation and to request formal intervention
by the United Nations. Withdrawal of French forces is not now
considered militarily feasible, but might be threatened in an
attempt to internationalize the conflict. Paris would probably
think twice, however, about losing control of the dollar
balances accruing from United States aid for the Indochina
war, and about the possible repercussions on French-American
relations and the French position in Africa.
Nevertheless, the impatience at home continues to grow.
The demand on 8 November by Defense Minister Pleven's small
but influential left-wing party, over his opposition, for an
immediate ceasefire in Indochina is symptomatic of the increas-
ing ferment within all French parties over continuation of the
war. The issue of five-power talks, touched on again in the
Soviet note of 3 November, has already split the cabinet, with
Vice-Premier Reynaud demanding that five-power talks on Far
East problems take precedence over any four-power talks on
Germany. Reynaud's supporters seek a cut in Communist Chinese
aid to the Viet-Minh although the vice-premier himself admits
there is little chance of such a meeting accomplishing any-
thing.
Meanwhile, a new danger threatens from the coming talks
between France and Vietnam on French Union membership, the
issue which precipitated the crisis of 28 October in the
Assembly. Vietnamese are likely to consider any arrangement
reached to be only a temporary adjustment. In addition,
stronger pressure by the Associated States for direct American
aid free of French control will be an added argument for those
who question whether France still has a valid stake in the
war,
SECRET
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SECRET
THE PROSPECTS FOR A JAPANESE DEFENSE BUILD-UP
Japan has clearly indicated its unwillingness for economic
reasons to assume immediately the burden of increased rearma-
ment, but domestic factors may eventually bring about a change
in the government's attitude.
A series of talks in Washington between American officials
and a Japanese mission headed by F[ayato Ikeda, personal rep-
resentative of Prime Minister Yoshida, ended inconclusively
on 30 October, with the Japanese refusing to agree to an
early build-up of defense forces. Asserting that recent floods
and a serious rice crop failure necessitated maximum relief
appropriations, Ikeda flatly ruled, out any further expansion
before next spring as politically, if not economically,
impossible.
The Japanese indicated furthermore that without extensive
American economic assistance the best program they could offer
was a 24.,000-man increase in ground forces by April 1955, with
an additional 45,000 troops for a total of 180,000 by the
spring of 1957. Ikeda has since suggested the possibility of
completing the final phase by the summer of 1956. In any
even the Japanese proposals fall far short of the American
goal f a 325,000-man ground force within five years, plus
modest naval and air forces`.
Despite Japan's economic argument against rapid rearma-
ment, an increase to 325,000 would not severely affect the
national economy. Maintenance of the additional forces would
create a further expenditure of but two percent of the projected
national income. It would also add less than 2.5 percent to
Japan's international balance of payments burden, assuming
that the United States supplies the initial basic equipment.
As an inducement to a greater rearmament effort, the
United States has offered FOA dollar credits for the purchase
of arms and equipment. The importance of this offer has been
greatly diminished, however, by concurrent United States plans
to increase the volume of expenditures in Japan through
stepped-up procurement programs for other Far Eastern nations.
Thus, even if Japan fails to expand its armed forces, its
over-all dollar income will not suffer appreciably.
As a result, any change in the Japanese position now
presumably depends on increased pressures from the people
themselves, and it is likely that rearmament sentiment will
grow as the Japanese become more aware of their role in the
containment of Communism.
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SECRET
Continued South Korean seizures of Japanese fishing
vessels have provided the greatest stimulus to Japanese re-
armament sentiment. Additional favorable factors include a
revival of nationalism, the ineffectiveness since the Korean.
truce of leftist propaganda that Japanese soldiers are to be
used as mercenaries, the increased prestige and financial
attractiveness of service in Japan's defense forces, and the
prospect of a withdrawal of American troops from Japan.
Both Moscow and Peiping have been quick to react to the
Ikeda talks. A TASS article charged that the United States
"compelled the Japanese representative to accept all its
demands" and that final agreement on a new Japanese army will
be reached in Tokyo. Peiping hinted darkly at a "plot to
revive Japanese militarism" and warned that so long as Japan
continued to act as a "tool of American aggression" in the
Far East, a peace treaty and the establishment of diplomatic
relations with "New China" would be impossible.
Ambassador Allison in Tokyo believes that the next two
months will be crucial for the minority Yoshida government
as it maneuvers to establish a majority through the formation
of a conservative coalition. Leaders of the conservative
opposition have indicated that a major price for future cooper-
ation in the Diet will be the'adoption of a stronger rearma-
ment policy, probably somewhere between the present American,
and Japanese positions. This, in :itself; is an element of
pressure on Yoshida.
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1*010 SECRET
ACTIVITIES OF CHINESE COMMUNIST BANKS IN SOUTHERN ASIA
VALUABLE TO P]'IPING
Branches of the Bank of China under Peiping's control
have been extremely useful for extending Chinese Communist
influence in southern Asia.
Communist-controlled branches are located in Singapore,
Kuala Lumpur, Penang, Djakarta, Surabaya, Calcutta, Bombay,
Karachi, Chittagong, and Rangoon. The branches in Indochina,
Thailand and the Philippines remain under Taipei's control.
These branch banks have been Communist-controlled since
1950,when they accepted Peiping's control after a brief period
of uncertainty. Peiping ensures that its policies are followed
abroad by bringing top officials to Peiping for indoctrination
and by periodically sending out employees from the home office
as replacements.
The principal activity of those banks in southern Asian
cities with important Chinese communities has been to strengthen
the ties of Overseas Chinese to Pei ing and to support indigenous
Communist subversive movements.
The financial services offered by these banks may have
been effective in inducing many politically indifferent or
anti-Communist Overseas Chinese to collaborate with the Peiping
regime. Throughout southern Asia branches require low interest
rates and less collateral than other banks in the community.
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SECRET
Another function of the branch banks is to finance part
of the Soviet Orbit trade in southern Asia, where there are
no other official Communist financial institutions.
The Bank of China branches are also valuable as reliable
trade agents for Peiping, which has not yet attempted to send
official trade representatives to these countries.
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*aw SECRET:' *fto
WEST BERLIN'S SECURITY PROBLEM
In recent months a number of factors have contributed
to a growing uneasiness in West Berlin, While there have been
few changes directly affecting its security since January 1953,
the Communists are increasingly able to isolate the city with-
out concurrent disadvantage to thOamselves. In the death of
Mayor Reuter the West Berliners lost the one man proved
capable of providing effective unifying leadership, and the
provisional nature of the new city government emphasizes
this fact,
Highway, rail, canal, and air access to West Berlin is
now basically the same as it was in May 1952, when the last
major restrictions were imposed (see map, p, 16). Four major
highways, deteriorating badly in some places, and six rail lines
are still open to the Federal Republic. No real effort has
been made to block use of the three 20-mile-wide air corridors,
although Soviet representatives, during the course of last
summer's fruitless negotiations on air regulations, made clear
that they do not recognize the rights claimed by the Allies.
The continued expansion of rail and canal by-passes
around West Berlin now largely precludes any repetition of the
retaliatory steps taken by the West during the 1948-49
blockade. An outer ring of rail by-passes has been completed
for some time and is now being double-tracked; an inner-ring
by-pass is within a few miles of completion. The capacity of
the canal by-pass completed last year is being increased; most
barges of over 500 tons now have to pass through the Western
sectors of the city.
The number of crossing points between East and West Berlin
has remained at 87 since February, but miles of barbed-wire
and other types of fencing have been constructed by the
Communists on all sides of West Berlin since early spring.
The city's streetcar and bus system was split last January.
The subway system, still operating as a unit, could be divided
without serious consequences for West Berlin, A split in the
elevated system, however, would leave it operative only in
East Berlin, where most of the yards and shops are located,
Such a division has become possible during the past year with
the construction of East-Berlin by-passes,
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C1T.1/"1T T1rr,
Other utilities, except for the sewage system, have
long since operated separately in the Soviet and Western
sectors. So far as is known, the Communists have taken no
steps to solve the health and technical problems which they
would face in any attempt to split the citywide sewage system.
In August the USSR transferred to the East German govern"
ment authority to approve all interzonal passes and bills of
lading for shipments through East German territory. Although
this has had no ill effects as yet, the USSR could disclaim
responsibility for future problems and attempt to force the
Allies to deal directly with--and thus grant de facto
recognition to--the East German regime.
West Berlin's economy has improved to some extent since
the blockade, but the production index is still only two
thirds of the 1936 level. Orders received by its industries
reached a postwar peak in June and September of this years
Employment is at a four-year high, but 20 percent of the work-
ing population is still without jobs. About 40,000 West
Berliners, or some 17,000 fewer than a year ago, are still
employed in East Berlin.
The West Berlin government not being formed is unlikely
to change the Socialist-oriented policies of Mayor Reuter.
Even before Reuter's death, however, there were signs of un-
rest among conservative groups within the three-party
coalition, with the Free Democrats spearheading the demand that
Berlin policies should reflect Adenauer's election triumph.
The deepening split between the Socialists and.Free Democrats
and Christian Democrats has occasioned rumors that next fall's
election may have to be moved up to January or February. In
any event it is clear that until elections are held the govern-
ment will have a provisional character, and any postelection
government will lack the ability of Reuter's government to
take resolute action in an emergency.
SECRET
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*Sipe SECRET V=_ W
SPECIAL ARTICLE
COMMUNISM IN THE LATIN AMERICAN REPUBLICS
Two principal developments during the past year are
symptomatic of a situation in Latin America favorable to the
growth of Communist parties. One is the expansion over the
past six months of diplomatic and commercial relations between
Latin America and the Orbit. The other is an increasing
attention to the area by international Communist organizations
as seen in the approximate doubling of Latin American repre-
sentatives they have attracted to several "world" conferences
in the past two years.
Within the past six months commercial and diplomatic
relations between Latin America and the Orbit have improved
markedly, although the Orbit's share of the area's total
trade remains very small. There are now Soviet or Satellite
diplomatic missions located only in, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay,
Mexico and Ecuador. Orbit trading firms and traveling repre-
sentatives have been expanding their efforts to promote trade
relations, however, playing on the widespread desire of Latin
American countries to obtain higher prices for their raw ma-
terials and to reduce their economic dependence on the United
States,
As a result of such efforts, Soviet and Hungarian trade
agreements with Argentina were concluded in August. Uruguayan-
Soviet meat negotiations, if completed on the terms now under
discussion, will double Uruguay's trade with the Orbit. Brazil
is negotiating the renewal of trade pacts with Czechoslovakia
and Poland.
Bolivia established diplomatic relations with Hungary
in August through the Hungarian minister resident in Buenos
Aires, having in the previous year made a similar arrangement
with Czechoslovakia. Mexico recently appointed an ambassador
to the Soviet Union, where its mission for the past five years
has been headed only by a charge d'affaires,
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Attendance at other recent international Communist front
meetings has also been unusually high. While not more than
300 Latin Americans representing 17 countries went to Berlin
for the 1951 Youth Congress, about 1500 representing all 20
countries attended the Youth Conference at Bucharest last
August. Even the geographically remote Peiping "Peace" Con-
ference in October 1952 drew 94 delegates from 12 Latin Ameri-
can countries.
The potentialities of the national Communist parties vary
widely. Some of their most effective activity seems to be
conducted through "peace" societies, youth and women's groups,
and the CTAL, i;he Latin American affiliate of the WFTU. The
propaganda of the different front organizations, like that of
Radio Moscow, presents Latin America as a semicolonial area
obliged to make excessive economic and political sacrifices
to support United States "imperialism," There is no reliable
evidence, however, that the Orbit missions in Latin America
direct party activities.
Nowhere, except in Guatemala, are the Communists strong
enough to dominate government policy, but their influence is
now reaching dangerous proportions in Brazil. In southern
South America, and also in Cuba, the parties. are moderately
successful. In the other Latin American republics, the parties,
although for the most part ineffective generally retain in-
fluence in some areas of activity. Only in Haiti and the
Dominican Republic can Communist influence ire unaracterized
as negligible.
In the much publicized case of Guatemala, Communists and
Communist sympathizers continue to hold a large majority in
congress, to occupy responsible executive posts, to wield
dominant influence in labor circles and to maintain a regular
and widely circulated press.
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Communist influence in Brazil has increased rapidly during
the past four months, while the government's anti-Communist
measures have gradually weakened until they are now virtually
nonexistent. In addition to furthering the popular agitation
for increased diplomatic and commercial relations with the USSR
and its Satellites--which is prevalent in many Latin American
countries--the Brazilian Communists are achieving unusual suc-
cesses in purely party activities. For example, they have
secured virtual control of a new weekly financed principally
by Labor Minister Joao Goulart, and they are apparently pro-
ceeding on schedule in the collection of $375,000 for the party
press.
The Communists are now predicting legalization of their
party in time to run under their own, name in the 1954 Brazilian
congressional elections, but have reportedly taken the pre-
caution of purchasing the use of a minor party's label. Com-
munist influence in Brazilian labor circles in the past has
been proportionately much less-than in the country generally.
The appointment of the opportunistic Goulart to the Labor
Ministry last June, however, gave the Communists an opportunity
to gain influence.
In Argentina, Chile, and Bolivia, the Communists have
profited from the circumstance that much of the thinking popu-
lation considers the. Soviet Union no threat to their countries,
and that the respective governments in recent years have en-
gaged only sporadically in anti-Communist activity. Although
Communists in these three countries have elected no representa-
tives to the national legislatures under their owr label, there
are in each case men sympathetic to Marxism active in govern-
ment. In Argentina, Communist infiltration of the civil ser-
vice, labor organizations and press continues, and President
Peron has still not recognized the sheer opportunism of his
"dissident" Communist support, despite his recent arrests of
"official" party members in increasing numbers.
The estimated annual income of the Communist parties in
these three countries ranges from the equivalent of $500,000
in Argentina to $10,000 in Bolivia; and in each nation there
is a regular party press in addition to some infiltration of
the non-Communist press. All three countries, like Guatemala
and Brazil, are the target of Soviet radio broadcasts speci-
fically slanted to local conditions.
In Cuba, the party has capable leadership and has tradi-
tionally played an active role in international Communist af-
fairs. Despite the government's current strong anti-Communist
policy, the party still retains some labor strength and has
reportedly infiltrated President Batista's political organi-
zation.
19
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In most of the remaining Latin American republics, Com-
munist influence is smaller thanks to less favorable conditions
and to deficiencies in leadership, but in each case there has
been some success. In Venezuela, for instance, the largest
daily newspaper is owned by a pro-Communist and its news selec-
tion is slanted although government censorship prohibits straight.
Communist-line articles. In Ecuador, the secretary general
of the Communist Party holds a seat under the Communist Party
label in the Senate, and the party has considerable influence
in the labor movement. In Panama, despite serious organiza-
tional deficiencies, the party has influence in the educational
system.
Mexico and Uruguay are special cases. In both countries
the prestige and influence of the regular Communist parties is
slight. In both countries, however, other Soviet-linked activity
is more effective than the regular Communist party. The Latin
American Confederation of Labor (CTRL) has its headquarters in
Mexico and Mexico's Lombardo Toledano, a vice-president of the
WFTU, is the key figure in Communist: labor activities in the
hemisphere.
In Uruguay the Slav Union, ostensibly a cultural organi-
zation for Uruguayans of Slavic extraction, is closely linked
to the Soviet embassy in Montevideo and may be more useful as
a channel of Communist propaganda than is the party.
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